Natashia Johnson

Intro to Legal Analysis and Writing

Case Brief

CITATION:

Marron v. Marron, 19 Cal. App. 326. (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1912)

FACTS:

On April 22, 1907, in consideration of the sum of $10, the deceased made a deed and
assignment to his mother of property estimated to be of the value of about $15,000, and
being nearly all of his real and personal property. He was then about thirty-three years of
age. "He was fragile and a man of very nervous temperament"; was married and had a
child, a girl, about four months old. At the time of his marriage in February 1901, he was
accustomed to drink occasionally intoxicating liquor, and in the spring of the following
year commenced to drink such liquor to excess, and continued to do so until the time of
his death. In February 1907, at the request of his wife, he took a solemn pledge to abstain
from the use of all such liquor for one year. Between this date and the date of making the
deed and assignment he had been *330 in several medical institutions for treatment for
alcoholism. His craving for liquor was so strong that he broke his pledge the day he took
it. On the way home from one of the hospitals where he had been treated for his
unfortunate habit he obtained and drank liquor. It was his custom for several months prior
to making the transfers in question to take whisky or beer to bed with him to drink during
the night. In brief, according to testimony introduced by plaintiff, he had become a
habitual drunkard. On the day he made the deed and assignment he was drunk, stupid and
appeared irrational. "He was not in his right mind and he didn't know what he was
doing." His mother and other members other family were probably present when he
executed the instruments, but his wife, whom he held in high regard, was absent and
knew nothing about the transaction until several days afterward. The notary before whom
the acknowledgment was made, believing that the deceased was conveying his property
to his wife, explained to him that "under the instrument his wife could sell the property if
she wanted to," and he made a note of such explanation in his official record. The
deceased made no answer to this explanation. The family of the deceased was very
unfriendly to the plaintiff, and had accused her of many delinquencies, among others of
being a drunkard and of caring nothing for her husband. She had never had any trouble
with her husband, and was kind and devoted to him. He always expressed himself as fond
of her and of his little girl. On the morning of April 25th, three days after the documents
were executed; a sister and two brothers of the deceased forced an entrance into the
plaintiff's home by smashing the back door, for handing to plaintiff's husband, as they
told her, a telegram, and collecting twenty-five cents for its transmission. On that
occasion they took deceased away with them, and the plaintiff never afterward had an
opportunity to confer with her husband alone, for he was always accompanied by some
member of his mother's family or a caretaker, presumably employed by them. From the
date of the instruments plaintiff never saw her husband sober during the remainder of his
life. He died July 1, 1907, at a medical institution where he was being treated for
alcoholism. He left no will. The defendant, Mary Marron, was unable, when her
deposition was taken, and at the trial, *331 several months later, to produce the deed,
claiming on both occasions that it had been mislaid in her home and that she was unable
to find it.
RULE:

The circumstances, under which a conveyance was made, the condition of the grantor at
the time, and the injustice to him and his heirs if it is upheld, may cast on the grantee the
burden of showing the absence of undue influence or imposition.

ISSUE:

Whether a person habitual drunkenness would affect his competency to enter into an
agreement to convey property?

ANALYSIS:

The court considered only the evidence in the case due to the motion for nonsuit. In a
motion for nonsuit it does not matter if the trial is heard by jury or judge. In looking at the
evidence, it showed that the deceased was a habitual drinker for a number of years. He
also was so at the time the property was conveyed. They viewed his act to be of an “an
unusual one and one inconsistent with his duties and obligations to his wife and child as
well as to himself”. They took notice that the defendant did not produce the signature-
bearing document for comparison, the impression the deceased left on the notary, and he
was unable to speak with his wife alone. These circumstances left the burden upon the
defendant. The court held that equity would not allow a person who is intoxicated out of
a deal once he is sober and changes his mind. However, “equity will not countenance
fraudulent imposition, and gross inadequacy of consideration is always received as
evidence of imposition, justifying the interference of equity to set aside the contract”.

CONCLUSION:

The courts ruled correctly in reversing the trial court decision of granting a motion for
nonsuit. From the evidence that the court looked at it is clear that the deceased was more
than a social drinker. With each year passing he became more and more intoxicated and
continued to do so until his death. That shows he lacks mental capacity to enter in to any
business transaction. Furthermore, for the defendants to accept and finalize a deal that
was without adequate consideration constitutes fraud and undue influence.

JUDGMENT REVERSED.
CITATION:

Swan v. Talbot, 152 Cal. 142 (Cal. 1907.)

FACTS:

Swan, plaintiff-respondent, sold Talbot, defendant-appellant, a piece of personal

property. The Swan was intoxicated when deal was made. Talbot paid to Swan a total of
$10,604.32, which included $200 in coin paid to Swan at the time of the execution of the
bill of sale. The property has an actual value of $21,949.86. Swan sued Talbot in court
either to receive his personal property back or to receive compensation for the difference.
The trial court ordered Talbot to pay $11,345.54. Talbot appealed the judgment and for
the denial of his request motion for a new trial. The appeals court affirmed the trial court
judgment and order.

Anderson had a note that was executed to Swan in the sum of $2,591.96, including
interest. Talbot used this amount as collateral security for his debt to the bank. This
payment is a debt Talbot had assumed. A petition for a rehearing was filed and granted.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the trial court judge was biased against the defendant and prejudiced in
his order against the plaintiff, thus requiring a new judge to sit for trial?
2. Whether the defendant owed the plaintiff any further compensation, thus entitling
the plaintiff to the correct amount of compensation that should be paid for the
personal property?

RULE:

1. It is the duty of the trial judge to hear and determine motion to have another judge
sit for the trial is there is present of bias. It is his determination whether another
judge should sit to try a case.
2. When the court finds for a rescission of the bill of sale and also that it was
impracticable to decree a return of the property, it was within its jurisdiction
thereupon to state and settle the account between the parties, and to award a
personal monetary judgment against the defendant for the difference, although
such relief was not specifically prayed for in the complaint

ANALYSIS:

Should bias or disqualification is shown; it is the duty of a judge to remove himself from
the case. However, if there is no bias or evidence to show of the former, then it is within
the judge’s right to deny the motion. The stated that though the act is embarrassing and
painful to do they would not say that the trial judge erred by not removing himself. “But
the law has seen fit to impose this painful duty upon him, and he may not shirk its
performance.” (Higgins v. City of San Diego, 126 Cal. 304, [58 Pac. 700, 59 Pac. 209];
People v. Findly, 132 Cal. 305, [64 Pac. 472]; Lamberson v. Superior Court, 150 Cal.458,
[91 Pac. 100])

The court felt that it was better for compensation to settle the difference between the
parties and that cancelling the bill of sale and returning the personal property was
inadequate. The court looked at Judge Story, (Eq. Jur., sec. 2313), “Equity therefore will
not assist a man to avoid a contract which he has entered into when drunk, merely
because when in his sober senses he may wish he had not entered into it.” Since there is a
speedy recovery, the court looked to equitable jurisdiction. The courts took precedent of
two cases Phelan v. Gardner, 43 Cal. 306 and Moore v. Moore, 56 Cal. 92. In Phelan, s
person may use intoxication if they are able to show the extent of the intoxication lasted
for several hours after they entered into agreement. In Moore, if a person is shown of
weak mind and has received improper consideration for property, equity will set aside the
contract. Indifference and undue influence will be inferred, thud removing the trial by
jury.

CONCLUSION:

If there is evidence to show that bias is present, a judge must remove himself and allow
another judge to try the case. This will ensure that a fair trial is given and that a judge, as
the trier of law, as done his job in accordance of the law. A person’s state of mind and
level on drunkenness will be looked at to see if (1) a cancellation of the bill of sale and
returning of property or (2) equitable jurisdiction to reign and settle the difference in the
value of the property between what s paid and received. The action to change the amount
minus the collateral security that was paid is correct due to there was no evidence to show
that the note Anderson paid to Swan was indeed a loan. It would not be fair to have the
debt of Swan transferred to Talbot because it did not originate with him, thus requiring
the amount to be removed from what is owed to the plaintiff.

JUDGMENT MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.

CITATION:

Guidici v. Guidici, 2 Cal.2d 497 (Cal., 1935)

FACTS:

The plaintiff was sixty years of age when deed was transferred. The property is located in
Loyalton, Sierra County. He purchased the farm in 1913 for $16,000. Besides the farm,
the only other property he owned is small amount of stock maintained on the property.
This was his main source of income. He pays alimony, in support of three children, each
month for $37.50 from his previous marriage. The defendant, the plaintiff and two close
friends of the defendant drove to Reno, Nevada. The trip to Reno was for the marriage of

up at a law office to have the deed conveyed to the defendant. The lawyer told them to
marry and then have the deed conveyed. The defendant refused. There was no description
of the property. They returned to the property to get a description and then back to the
law office around 8:30 pm. The deed was transferred. They married with justice of the
peace at about 9:30 pm and returned to the farm. The plaintiff found out she had a deed to
the farm and demanded it back. The defendant refused. They lived as man and wife for
ten days. They had separate bedrooms after that. The plaintiff became ill and spent
several weeks in the hospital. The defendant drank for approximately ten to 14 days
before the signing of the deed. The deed was dated November 12, 1930. The plaintiff
action in court against the defendant began February 14, 1931, upon his release from the
hospital.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the deed to the property was conveyed without fraudulent intentions due
to the state of mind, the plaintiff had at the time of conveyance to the defendant?

RULE:

For a person to enter into a valid contract there must be (1) an offer; (2) An Acceptance
in strict compliance with the terms of the offer; (3) Legal Purpose/Objective; (4)
Mutuality of Obligation – also known as the “meeting of the minds”; (5) Consideration;
and (6) Competent Parties.

APPLICATION:

A person entering a contract must be of sound mind. The state of intoxication or

drunkenness is held to the same standard as a person without the mental capacity. With
out a mental capacity a person is unable enter in to a contract. In conveying the property,
the court heard testimony from the notary, the medical doctor, and the neighbors, to
which they testified that his actions and comprehension was during the ten to two weeks
prior to the transfer of the deed was supporting in that the plaintiff was not of sound
mind.

CONCLUSION:

A contract consists of voluntary promises between competent parties to do, or not to do,
something, which the law will enforce. Not anyone can enter into a contract. Their must
be a mutual meeting of the minds. Mental capacity is one determination of making an
enforceable contract. Since the plaintiff had sufficient evidence that he was not of sound
mind, this left him at a disadvantage and understanding of what he was doing when the
deed was conveyed to the defendant. His property was his only source of income and it
was what he used to support his children. As the court had stated there was no
compensation given and it would seem unlikely that a reasonable person would have
entered into an agreement as this.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
CITATION:

Donnelly v. Rees, 141 Cal. 56 (Cal. 1903)

FACTS:

The land conveyed was an undivided half of certain mines owned by Patrick Kean. Kean
was the owner of the half interest in the mining claims. The parties to this suit are
Winifred Kean Donnelly, the plaintiff-respondent, daughter, and sole heir of Patrick
Kean, and the defendants-appellants, D. W. Rees, and Thomas O’Brien. Kean was
looking to convey the deed in order to prevent a lien on the property. Kean wanted
Monaghan to accept the deed. Kean was indebted to Monaghan for $100. They declined.
The defendant was present and asked Kean to make the deed to him. Kean agreed. The
parties to the deed left. O’Brien asked the witness, Carroll, to ask Rees, if he could be put
on the deed as well. The witness stated to O’Brien he spoke to Rees and then drew up the
deed to include O’Brien. Kean’s heir, Donnelly, took action to litigate against the
defendants stating that the conveyance of the deed was done with the intent of fraud and
undue influence, and that Kean was a habitual drunk and not able to enter into such
agreement.

RULE:

For a person to enter into a valid contract there must be an offer; an approval in strict
compliance with the terms of the offer; reciprocity of consideration; and competent
parties.

RULE: Section 2224 of the California Civil Code states that: “One who gains a thing by
fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act,
is, unless he or she has some other and better right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the
thing gained, for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it.” (1) The
defendants gained the land by “fraud” and also (2) by “undue influence” and also (3) they
gained the thing by “violation of trust.”

ISSUE:

1. Whether the defendant gained the title to the property by fraud, undue influence,
and done so by a violation of the trust, thus allowing the plaintiff to recover
compensation?

ANALYSIS:

Kean’s affidavit was admissible as evidence in trial court. The affidavit included that not
sham, or without consideration, or in fraud of creditors. The court reviewed the testimony
of the statements made at the time the deed was executed. The general rule in the court of
equity is that no consideration will be given to the owner of a deed if it is done with the
intent to defraud creditors. The court sated in looking at the rules that: “It may be added
that the principle applies a fortiori in this case, where, by express statutory provisions
containing no qualifying or excepting words, "one who gains a thing by fraud ... [or]
undue influence” takes as trustee for the grantor. (Civ. Code, sec. 2224.)” The court
summed of the case in the following manner:

1. For five years before the execution of the deed Kean had been a habitual drunkard
to an extent seriously to impair his mind, and such as "to make him an easy prey
to the arts and schemes" of defendants or other designing people;
2. He was in such a condition of drunkenness when he made the deed "as to render
him unfit to transact business, and entirely incapable of realizing and
understanding or attending to the said transaction";
3. The deed was without consideration; and
4. It was procured by the fraudulent practices of the defendants, or, in the terms used
in the findings, it was fraudulently procured by "the arts and importunities" or
"arts and schemes" of the defendants, and by undue influence exercised over the
grantor by them.

CONCLUSION:

Whether a transaction constitutes a fraudulent conveyance depends upon the existence of

the intent to defraud at the time that the challenged transfer was made. The affidavit in
Kean’s words showed that he had no interest to defraud his creditors. He received monies
from the deal. The court ruled correctly. A person cannot defraud its creditors by
transferring property. This would make the act of conveyance done by fraud, thus
eliminating the intention of the grantor to the grantee. In looking at the elements into
entering a contract, if any element is not met the contract is void. The heir is able to bring
an action; however, the dispute was the state of mind of the owner, the consideration that
was not paid, and the legal purpose of the conveyance of the property. These findings
resulted in the trial court to enter a judgment on behalf of the plaintiff.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
CITATION:

Phelan v. Gardner, 43 Cal. 306. (Cal. 1872)

FACTS:

The parties to this action are Thomas Phelan, plaintiff-respondent and Gardner, the
defendant –appellant. The defendant employed the plaintiff as his broker, to sell for him
certain land at an agreed commission of five per cent on the amount of the sale. The
defendant paid the plaintiff $300.The plaintiff procured and brought to the defendant one
Cusheon, who agreed with the defendant, verbally, to purchase the land for the sum of
$30,000. The defendant gave Cusheon a memorandum in writing, by which he promised
to sell to him for the price named, and to give him fifteen days to complete the search and
purchase of the land. Before the expiration of the fifteen days, Cusheon tendered to the
defendant a performance in accordance with the agreement, and was informed that the
land had been sold to another party. The plaintiff sues to recover the amount of his
commissions. In August 1869, the plaintiff in this action brought an action of forcible
entry and detainer against the defendant in this action, to recover possession of a lot in
San
Francisco. The defendant appealed the judgment.

RULE:

A party may show, in order to reverse a settlement made by him, that, at the time, he was
incapable of contracting intelligently, by reason of intoxication, and evidence of the
party's condition, as to being intoxicated several hours after the settlement, may be given,
as tending to throw light on his condition when the settlement was made.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court err in their ruling of not allowing judgment roll in the forcible
entry and detainer, thus removing the defendant from owing any monies for the
commission of the plaintiff?

ANALYSIS:

The court held that, “A judgment is only conclusive upon questions involved in the suit,
and upon which it depends, or upon matters which might have been litigated and decided
in the suit.” The court found the theory of a non-binding contract between the defendant
and Cusheon to be weak. The court held that, “In the absence of an agreement to that
effect, the principal cannot refuse to pay the broker's commissions upon the ground that
he did not choose to make the sale. The intoxication of the plaintiff was not an issue that
was of concern because of the plaintiff actions that later followed on the commencement
in the agreement between him and the defendant. The court sated that the issue was not
the plaintiff drinking but with his mental capacity.
CONCLUSION:

The court made a correct decision in upholding the trial court ruling. The plaintiff was
due compensation for his duties and the defendant was not justified in his refusal of
payment. The defendant employed the plaintiff as his broker. He secured a person that
was interested in the property. It was the choice of the defendant not to enter an
agreement by his own and not due to the plaintiff. This shows that the plaintiff was doing
the job he was hired to do. The defendant tried to use the intoxication of the plaintiff;
however, this issue is not a concern because of the plaintiff actions to continue with the
agreement when sober and he received consideration for the contract he entered with the
defendant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

The general issue that all of these cases discuss is mental capacity and intoxication in
accordance to contract law. similarities between the cases
Phelan v Gardner; Swan v. Talbot; and Marron v Marron all were similar in the
way they all dealt with mental incompetencies of grantor- fraud and undue intoxication
and error in granting non suit– burden of proof.
Guidici v. Guidici and Donnelly v. Rees had no similarities to...