Why Aceh-Indonesia Conflict Resolution can’t be Copy-paste in

Bangsamoro-Philippines Issue?

Corespondent Author : Sidik Jatmika, (Dr.sidikjatmika@gmail.com),

Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia
Co-author: Chalilla Raihan Nabilazka
(Chalillaraihannabilazka.2016@fisipol.umy.ac.id),
Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Abstract
This article focuses on conflict resolution in Aceh, Indonesia, and Bangsamoro, Phillipines, as a
comparative study. The two different regions have at least two similar characteristics: both are
recognised by central government as widely autonomous provinces compared to other provinces, and
both have same problems with revolutionary groups that attempt to withdraw from central government.
This qualitative research aims to examine conflict resolution process and result in both local
governments. The main objective is to identify similarities rational choice (survival, security,
economy/welfare, prestige, and influence) especially how political elites would still feel enjoy to conduct
those agreements in both regions. The findings confirm that both GAM (Aceh) and MILF (Bangsamoro)
have similar political preference sequence. It is argued that Aceh-Indonesia conflict resolution could not
automatically be applied in the Bangsamoro-Philippines issue.

Keywords: Aceh, Bangsamoro, Conflict Resolution

INTRODUCTION

After the Cold War period ended, peace agreements have became the main tool
to deal with conflicts by which government and their armed opponents involved in
direct negotiations and treated as equals (Bell, 2006). Arnson in Harish (2005) defines
peace agreement as dialogue over time between representatives of contesting forces,
with or without an intermediary, aimed at securing an end to the hostilities in the context
of agreements over issues that transcend a strictly military nature (Harish, 2005). The
Helsinki agreement between the Governmet of Indonesia (GoI) and Free Aceh
Movement (GAM) in 2005 was a concrete example on how peace accords could end
armed separatism and had an impact on lasting peace in Aceh –where the insurgency
was once took place for years. Now in 2020, the same measure is being taken by the
Government of Philippines (GoP) and Bangsamoro to terminate armed secessionism
in southern – muslim majority area of the Philippines asking for independence from
the country. While Helsinki’s peace accord was successfully implemented and has
been lasting for nearly 2 decades, the moves to carry out the peace agreement are
just commencing in the case of the Philippines - Bangsamoro.
 Aceh Peace Agreement has succeeded in solving Aceh separatism issue in
Indonesia, resulting in the absence of military clashes since Helsinski Agreement 2006
to date (14 years). It has contributed towards global acceptance of Indonesian succes
in handling Aceh Insurgency. Now in 2020, Bangsamoro begins a new step of Peace
Agreement by which 5 Muslim-majorities provinces in South Philippines are given
broad rights to self-govern, but in fact still there are such of bloody-accidents
(Tribunnews, 2020). For example, The 2020 Jolo bombings occurred on August 24,
2020, when insurgents believed to be Abu Sayyaf jihadists detonated two bombs in
Jolo, Sulu, Philippines, killing 14 peoples and wounding 75 others (Tribunnews, 2020).

However, in spite of the fact that the case in both countries have similarities such
as the background and quest for independence, there exist several differences which
emanates a question: Why Aceh – Indonesia conflict resolution can’t be copypaste in
the Phillipines? This paper will compare the implementation of peace agreement in the
two cases utilizing rational choice theory to answer the above question.

GAM and Bangsamoro conflict as international political issues

The insurgency in Aceh regency lasted for 30 years before finally resolved in
2005 with the mediation from Crisis Management Initiative (CMI). Yet, the root of
conflict could be traced back as early as the pre-colonial era by which Aceh was an
independent sultanate having huge control in the Malacca Straits. As Indonesia gained
independence, the region was incorporated into the state and thus Aceh sultanate
never recovered. The tenacity of Aceh to implement the sharia and establish
independent Islamic state made its relation with the country problematic. However, the
Soekarno had also promised the region that special autonomy, particularly to apply
Islamic law, will be granted to Aceh which unfortunately did not happen until 2005.
Massive oil, gas, and marine usurpation by central authorities and the widespread of
human rights violations were also at the heart of conflict. Aceh Free Movement (GAM)
was then formed in 1976 under the leadership of Hasan Tiro, seeking independence
for the veranda of Mecca.

Jakarta’s response towards Aceh had been largely characterized by militaristic

approach. Indonesian National Armed Force (TNI) was in direct armed confrontation
with GAM since the region declared independence in 1976. The situation was worsen
in 1990’s when Soeharto regime implemented counterinsurgency operation “Jaring
Merah” in the region (Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a
Separatist Organization, 2004). Legal attempts also taken by Hasan Tiro, who fled to
Sweden since 1979. The leader of GAM sent letters to United Nations bodies regarding
Java colonialization over Aceh (Damanik, 2010). Until the resignation of Soeharto in
1998, there were an estimated 10.000 deaths of human rights violations that drew
attention of international human rights organizations which afterwards urging
international communities to give pressure to Indonesian authorities.

The effort for peace negotiation was first initiated by Abdurrahman Wahid
administration by inviting Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) as a mediator. The work
generated humanitarian pause but soon collapsed due to lack of trust between the
parties. Subsequently, the work was continued by Megawati and brought forth
Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement (COHA). The whole attempts gained
international support as the process was endorsed by international organizations. UN
Secretary General, Kofi Annan, United States, as well as various European Union
countries praised the agreement. Moreover, international governmental and
nongovernmental bodies channel substantial funds to support the agreement.
Ambassador of the US and European countries made well-publicized visit to Aceh
(Aspinall & Crouch, 2003). Nevertheless, the accord broke down and the region was
again under military operation “Terpadu” with the issue of Presidential decree 28/2003
regarding Martial Law over Aceh, sending 42.000 armed forces to the area. It sigified
the attempt of Indonesia to maintain its territory by even sacrifising civilian (Kadir,
2012). The establishment of military operation again drew international attentions as
the case of human rights abuse escalated. International organizations such as
Amnesty International and Human Rights Wacth warned the government regarding the
failure to address and seemingly zero attention from central government towards the
abuse happening in Aceh (reliefweb, 2000).

The use of military approach ended with the coming Tsunami in December 2004
leaving hundreds of thousands of deaths, deteriorating the already severe situation of
conflict. The condition in Aceh compelled the central government to open the region to
international aids and NGOs which, on the other hand, internationalize every
movement made by conflicting actors. The pacifying effect of the Tsunami eventually
gave room for GoI and GAM to step into negotiation as both parties realized that to
continue military campaign was impossible, and only in peace it was possible to rebuild
Aceh. Negotiations between the GoI and GAM lasted in five rounds from January to
July 2005, birthing the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by two
parties in August of that year.

Quite similar to the case of Aceh, Moro conflict in the southern part of the
Philippines has been lasted for decades. Moro people residing in the Mindanao were
previously under several muslim sultanates, and known for their resistance against
foreign rule particularly during the Spanish and US colonization. Consequently, after
integrated into the Philippines, the Moros continued their efforts for self-determination.
Nevertheless, the pivotal point ignited the perennial insurgency was the Jabidah
massacre during Marcos administration in which around 60 Tausug muslim youths
incorporated in the state-sponsored military operation “Merdeka” to recover the status
of Sabah were massacred. The murder subsequently drew greater international
attention to muslim Moro. Officials in Kuwait and Malaysia openly expressed their
criticism to the Philippine government, while Moroccan newspaper wrote details of the
muslim massacre. In mid 1971, Libyan delegates sent a personal letter to President
Marcos expressing concern of Colonel Qaddafi towards the situation, and in November
of that year three Muslim religious leaders from the Soviet Union visited Muslim
communities in Mindanao and Muslim leaders in Manila. The pressure given to the
authorities of the Philippines did not stop there, as in January 1972 Marcos eventually
invited Muslim ambassadors from Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore,
Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia to tour the Muslim provinces. Organisation of the Islamic
Conference in one of its resolution requested the government of the Philippines to
guarantee the lives and properties of Philippine Muslims (Majul, 1988).

As great as the grievances expressed by international communities, internal

unrest also took place in the country. Moreover, the incident followed by another
seventy muslim massacre in Manila which signified the narrative that muslims were
disregarded in the country. Mass of scholars demonstration took place before the
palace, and multiple armed muslim groups emerged questing for independence. Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) and its splinter group, Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) became leading organization among Moro separatists. The government and
MNLF eventually stepped into dialogue means since Marcos era. Yet, the failed
ceasefire, lack of trust and different approaches applied towards the rebel groups in
every regime prolong the conflict.

Several negotiations were took place both abroad within the Philippines. Tripoli
Agreement in 1976 laid out the concept of autonomus Muslim region in Mindanao
consisting of thirteen provinces, which realized during Corazon Aquino administration.
Afterwars, Jeddah Accord and Jakarta Accord come to pass and eventually forming
Autonomus Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) under Organic Act 6734. However,
the experiment failed and replaced with the new autonomous political entity called
Bangsamoro. In 2012 under Aquino III administrations the conflicting parties agreed
on the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) that creates Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), superseding the ARMM, and
plans to address structural reform. FAB particularly praised by multiple countries
including the Australia, the United States, the European Union, United Kingdom,
Japan, Turkey, Thailand, and Indonesia. Finally the Comprehensive Agreement on the
Bangsamoro (CAB), the final version of FAB, was signed in Manila in 2014. The CAB
consist twelve points giving greater political and economic powers to Bangsamoro.
The government of Bangsamoro will be established in 2016 and the state will gain
greater revenue sharing. MILF itself would remain as a social movement, while political
party as vehicle for its member will be soon formed (Rosauro, 2014).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Rational Choice Theory

Having its root on the classical economy, rational choice gradually applied to
other areas outside of economy, including sociology, psychology, and political science.
It is an umbrella term for a variety of patterns explaining social phenomena as results
of individual action that can in some way be interpreted as rational. It states that
individuals make rational choice, and thus generate outcomes, that are in line with their
personal preferences means the choice someone make will give him the greatest form
of benefit or satisfaction. Elster (1989) stated that the essence of rational choice theory
is “when faced with several courses of actions, people usually do what they believe is
likely to have the best overall outcomes”. The theory departs from an understanding
that human is rational actor who use rational calculation based on available
information, so individual could maximize advantages and minimize losses.

In terms of rationality in politics, the political preference in this aspect could be

understood as the tendency to put things in logical order (rational choice) of political
behaviour carried out by political elites to minimize the cost in achieving certain political
objectives. In general, political rationality of a country has the order of the following:
survival, security, economy/welfare, prestige, and finally influence (Warsito, 2017).

In examining an option in regard to rational choice, three aspects should be the

consideration. They are completeness (all options listed based on priorities),
transitivity (all options could be compared, such as A is better than B and B is better
than C. Thus A is better than C), and independency (if A is to be better than B, the
later emergence of option X, B will never be better than A) (Warsito, 2017).
Furthermore, Warsito (2017) suggests that rational choice does not necessarily involve
one person only in the policymaking process or decision making process (DMP).

RESEARCH FINDINGS

A. The Dynamics of Implementation of the Helsinki Peace Agreement and the

political preference of Acehnese elites.

The peace negotiations between the GoI and GAM in Helsinki was finally
successful to put the longstanding war between the two parties into an end. It brought
forth the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the delegates of conflicting
actors and the former Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari. The MoU consisted of five
points outlining broad aspects from arms decommissioning, former combatant
reintegration, governance of Aceh including economic provisions and formation of
local political parties, security arrangements, human rights, and Aceh Monitoring
Mission.

The following section aims to break down the dynamics in the implementation of
peace agreement and its progress in post-conflict era using the political preference
order, and subsequently discuss the political preference of Acehnese using GAM’s
ideological approach of political preference proposed by Takdir Ali Mukti (Mukti, 2019).
Survival
Paul (1999) emphasizes that state survival is a matter of existence. It is
concerned with the basic fact of the existence of the ‘things’ themselves (Paul, 1999).
Later, Kadercan (2013) added that the concern for survival animates state behaviour
and set the dynamics of interstate relation (Kadercan, 2013).

In this aspect, what GAM aspire in the past was to be exist as a sole nation, and
neither to be a part of nor autonomus region within Indonesian unitary system. It seek
liberty from both Dutch and Javanese domination causing agony for the Acehnese
(Mukti, 2019). In doing so, GAM involved in an enduring war with the GoI.

However this idea cannot be pursued as GAM eventually signed the peace accord in
2005 and incorporated as self-governed region within the Republic of Indonesia.

Security

Previously, in pre-peace era GAM confronted the government with open wars
causing many casualties from national forces, GAM guerrillas, and civil societies.
Nevertheless this was changed after the signing of Helsinki peace accord by which
GAM fighters dissolved and in exchange, Aceh is given the right to form local political
parties to transform yet continue GAM struggle in securing the region.

The formation of local political parties was considered as major breakthrough in

the peace process. Through the MoU, GoI allowed Aceh to form local political parties
that could participate in local elections, gubernatorial elections, as well as legislative
elections. During peace negotiation, GAM representatives particularly believe that the
formation of local parties was crucial since the current national parties are mostly under
the control of Jakarta and thus can not represent the Acehnese (Ansori, 2012).
Opening up political participation was seen as a medium to continue GAM struggle in
a more peaceful and democratic way. “Partai Aceh” was established in 2008 under the
leadership of GAM which then participated in the legislative election in the following
year.

The first elections held in Aceh was local elections in December 2006, to choose
both governor and heads of districts. The gubernatorial elections won by former
prominent GAM member, Irwandi Yusuf dan Nazar Abdullah, assigning them as new
governor and vice governor of the region. In the local elections, GAM won almost in
every district where the movement had candidates running, and by late 2007, almost
one half of Aceh was being administered by individuals with GAM affiliations at the
district level (Wandi & Zunzer, 2008). The elections itself considered a huge success
with high voters turnouts (80%) and largely free from violence, far from what was
feared before (Thorburn, 2012).

In 2009 legislative elections, six local parties namely Partai Aceh (PA), Partai
Daulat Aceh (PDA) –dominated by santri, Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera (PAAS), Partai
Rakyat Aceh (PRA) –dominated by youth and scholars, Partai Bersatu Aceh (PBA),
and Partai Suara Independen Rakyat Aceh (SIRA) –previously vocal in promoting
referendum agenda, participated. Issue raised by each party was different;
implementation of sharia, anti-corruption issue, and the emphasis of universal values
of Islam –to counter the strict application of sharia proposed by opponent (Affan, 2009).
This indicated the growing democracy through the establishment of political parties
whcich represent different Acehnese interests from former combatant to youth. The
subsequent elections was held in 2014, and 2019. However, only several parties
succeed to register to the next elections as some entered parliamentary threshold
(Amirulkamar & Ismail, 2019). On the other hand, new party, Partai Nasional Aceh
(PNA) –later changed the name to Partai Nanggroe Aceh, emerged and participated
both elections. Partai Aceh won in the two elections, indicating the continued primacy
of GAM in post-war Aceh, even it lost several seats in the later.

Welfare

Economy is among the crucial aspects that contribute to the success of peace
agreement. Susan (2002) stated that economic plays an important role in the success
of peace implementation (Woodward, 2002). Thus, Wennmann (2009) suggests that
economic provision should be a defined point in the peace agreement, therefore it
convinces societies that indeed it’s worthwhile to put down arms and benefit economic
opportunities of peace (Wennmann, 2009).

In this aspect, the agreement clearly outlines that Aceh will receive 70% of
profits from the current and future hydrocarbon and other natural resources’ deposit in
its territorial and surrounding sea. The region is also given the rights to administer
seaports and airports, seek foreign direct investment in Aceh, and enjoy free trade with
unhindered access both with other regions in Indonesia and with foreign countries
(Wandi & Zunzer, 2008).
After the signing of the accord, Acehnese government was aggressively
promoting region’s advantages from the side of both natural resources and its strategic
position of Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand growth triangle. Between 2006 and 2008, a
total of forty-two foreign and six domestic investors intended to invest in Aceh, which
would provide jobs for approximately twenty-two foreign and 4.021 domestic workers
if all the investments reach fruition. Local investment and small to medium-scale credit
allocation also increased steadily since the end of conlict (Thorburn, 2012). In addition,
LoGA mandated that Aceh will receive Special Autonomy Fund (Dana Otonomi
Khusus) for 20 years, amounting to 2% share of national General Allocation Fund
(Dana Alokasi Umum) for fifteen years and 1% for the next five years. This windfall
accounted for more than half of total provincial government revenue by 2008,
impacting on the increasing regional GDP (World Bank, 2010).

Nevertheless, recent study shows that Aceh’s income from the transfer funds
(GAF and SAF) is exceeding regional income. It states that Aceh public spending relies
on the transfer funds more than its locally-generated revenue or is called flypaper
effects (Zulfan & Maulana, 2019). Currently, the economy in Aceh is still dominated by
agricultural sector (Biro Humas dan Protokol Sekretariat Daerah Aceh, 2019).
However, a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) was established in Lhokseumawe district
in 2017. SEZ is a specific boundaries area determined to carry out economic functions
and obtain certain facilities. Related to Arun Lhokseumawe SEZ, it is focused on the
sector of energy, petrochemicals, agro-industry supporting food security, logistics, and
kraft paper. In particular, the SEZ projected to absorb up to 40.000 labors until 2027
(Dewan Nasional Kawasan Ekonomi Khusus Indonesia, t.thn.).

In terms of economic convenience for ex-guerrillas, until recently, many of

former combatants are still facing some difficulties to find jobs and earn money, though
some others succeed in business and politics. However, this is understandable given
the low educational background of majority of ex-combatant. Besides that, land
distribution for ex-combatant has not been realized to date although it was mandated
in the MoU. This matter, as Chief of Aceh Transitional Committee argues, is among
the cause of low economic level of former soldiers (Fajar, 2020).

Prestige
Bloom in Wood, S (2014) described national prestige as the influence that can
be exercised or the impression produced by virtue of events and images that devalue
or enhance national identity. Further, Kaufman and Zimmer stated that nations with an
understanding as prestige possessor: that they are politically influential, pervaded with
grandeur, demonstrate artistic, economic, sporting or intellectual achievement, the
land they occupy is attractive (Wood, 2014).

In the MoU signed by Indonesia and GAM, the prestige aspect lies in the
reestablishment of Wali Nanggroe institution and the use of regional symbol such as
flag. Wali Nanggroe in literal means guardian of the state. History of the institution
could be traced back to the early colonial era by which the Dutch came to the
archipelago. It consisted of several costumary group led by Wali Nanggroe. While the
term was used particularly in the sultanate era to refer the person who, for specific
duration, run the country as the legitimate sultan was still too young to take the role.
After the peace accord, the term of Wali Nanggroe is re-used and the institution is
reestablished, but at the moment is within the unitary state of Indonesia. Yet, the
function is different, as current Wali Nanggroe hold a position as the unifier of customs
(Nurmalia, 2016).

The existence of Wali Nanggroe is intended to be an alternate force when the

formal leadership is incapable of enforcing, especially in dealing with negative effects
of inevitable globalization in the region so modern Aceh will always be based on the
noble values growing in the societies (Ghulsyani, 2017). However, matters emerged
regarding the authority of Wali Nanggroe that considered exceeding the power of the
executive (Irmayani & Haikal, 2016). Qanun Number 9 Year 2013 article 29 stated that
Wali Nanggroe has the rights to: a) manage the assets of Aceh located in both inside
and outside Aceh (outside of province and overseas), b) conduct cooperation with
various parties, both domestic and international, for the advancement of Aceh
civilization, and c) mantain Aceh’s peace and participate in the process of settling world
peace. This matter changes the function of Wali Nanggroe from being symboliccultural
to having actual power in the realm of paradiplomacy, which violated the provisions in
LoGA. Previous study conducted by Mukti (2019) stated that even though the
expanding authority on paradiplomacy is opposed by the central government, Jakarta
has not yet taken a step to deal with this concern. While Aceh side also has not yet
been willing to ammend the law. Mukti later come to conclusion that the reason why
Aceh choose to stay on its position is the still-living and rooted GAM’s ideology based
on the undisputed history that Aceh was once a great sultanate and the legal
international norm that Aceh has the right to be an independent nation (Mukti, 2019).

Influence

Cox and Jacobson in Arts and Verschuren (1999) defines influence as

modification of one actor’s behaviour by that of another (symbolically: A -> B). Thus,
actor A, being an individual or collective, modifies the behaviour of decision maker in
political arena, resulting in a modified decision (Arts & Verschuren, 1999).

In this instance, Aceh’s capacity to influence other state’s behaviour and thus
decision is vanished after the sultanate included in the territory of Indonesia. As Aceh’s
idea of being an independent nation unachieved, it could be said that Aceh as an
autonomus region in Indonesia has no influence over other state’s behaviour.

B. The Dynamics of Implementation of Peace Agreement between Bangsamoro

and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines

The final draft of the peace agreement between the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines (GRP) and Bangsamoro was summed in the Comprehensive
Agreement of Bangsamoro (CAB) signed in 2014, with the BARMM officially
inaugurated in March 2019. CAB covers extensive features comprises of four annexes
on the transitional arrangements, revenue generation and wealth sharing, power
sharing, and normalization, and an addendum on Bangsamoro waters. The section
bellow will discuss the agreement using political rationality and identify which part of
the pact is given the most pressure.

Survival
Republic Act No. 11054 or commonly known as Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) clearly
stated that “...Bangsamoro Autonomous Region has jurisdiction which shall always be
an integral, indivisible, and inseparable part of the national territory of the

Republic of the Philippines...”. This indicates that Bangsamoro, de jure and de facto,
is a region within the Philippines and thereby, its the term survival in this instance,
refers to an autonomus region of a country given the rights to self govern.
Previously, Moro people in Mindanao involved in four decades war to seek
independence from the national government. The region later granted autonomy in
1990, called as Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Nevertheless,
several clashes still took place in the area. The current Bangsamoro autonomous
region (BARMM) replaced the previous ARMM established during Aquino
administrations.

Security

In terms of security, the relationship between the central government and the
Bangsamoro government is asymmetric, mainly to recognize the aspiration of
selfdetermination of Moro people. The peace pact also mandated the establishment of
Bangsamoro assembly (elected by voters) which will be consisted of at least fifty
members comprised of representative from Bangsamoro and non-Moro indigenous
communities, women, settler communitites, and other sectors. The assembly later
elects the Chief Minister who will chooses Deputy Chief Minister to form the Cabinet.
In addition, a Philippine Congress – Bangsamoro assembly forum for purposes of
cooperation and coordination of legislative initiatives will be formed (Annex on
PowerSharing to the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB), 2013).

Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) was formally

inaugurated in March 2019 in the presence of President Duterte. Currently, it is the
Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) led by Al-Hajj Murad Ebrahim, previously
Chairperson of MILF, that exercise executive and legislative powers as the interim
government of BARMM (Taniguchi, 2020). The transition from the ARMM to the
BARMM itself set to reach completion in June 2022, after the first group of legislator
consisted of 80 members of parliament is elected. The seats in the Parliament are
classified into representatives of political parties (50%), Parliamentary districts (40%),
and reserved and sectoral representatives (10%) (Vina, 2019). However, challenges
are existence since within the Bangsamoro jurisdiction are non-Moro indigenous
groups. Adequate representatives in the parliament and participation in drafting the
codes of Bangsamoro region is a must (Ranada, 2019).

Besides the points above, separation of powers in Bangsamoro region are ruled.
Reserved powers or powers over which authority are retained by Central Govenrment
including foreign policy, monetary and coinage, citizenship, immigration, custom and
tariff, global trade, and intellectual property rights. Exclusive powers or powers over
which authority pertain to Bangsamoro government, ranging from the education,
history and culture, trade, investments, manufacture and public utilities, labor and
employment, to environmental management. And concurrent powers or shared
powers between the Central Government and Bangsamoro government including
pollution control, disaster risk reduction and management, coastguard, and public
order and safety.

Welfare

The CAB signed by MILF and GRP outlines the revenue and wealth sharing, by
which emphasis is given particularly on the revenues from tax, natural resources. It
stated that Bangsamoro government has the power to levy capital gain tax,
documentary stam tax, donor and estate tax where the taxable elements are within the
Bangsamoro. Other taxes, fees, and charges collected in Bangsamoro, other than tariff
and custom duties, 75% will be shared with the Bangsamoro and the remaining 25%
will pertain to the Central Government. Besides that, Bangsamoro will enjoy authority,
control, and income from the previously government-owned and -contolled
corporations and financial institutions operating exclusively in the Bangsamoro
territory. Lastly, BARMM will receive block grants or annual financial assistance from
the Central Government, alike other region, and shall not be less than the last budged
received by the ARMM before the establishment of BTA (Official Gazette, 2013).

In terms of income from natural resources, Bangsamoro shall retain revenues

from non-metalllic minerals. With respect to metallic minerals, Bangsamoro will receive
by 75% of total revenue, while in terms of fossil fuels and uranium, Bangsamoro and
the Central Government will receive equal share by 50%. The agreement also
mandated the formation of Bangsamoro development plans, that is consistent with
national development goals (Annex on Revenue Generation and Wealth-sharing to the
Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB), 2013).

Among the significant strides taken by the Bangsamoro government are the
approval annual block grant of the Php 65 billion budget for the 2020 fiscal year of
Bangsamoro. BARMM also held Tourism Stakeholders’ Summit to promote and
advance tourism industry by which the BARMM tourist department spearheaded the
promotion of halal and sustainable tourism in the region, as well as Bangsamoro
Energy Forum to develop sustainable enery sources in the region. In addition to that,
the the government sets high investment record. By 2019, five investments were
registered in the BARMM by the Regional Board of Investment (RBOI) (Fernandez,
2019). The RBOI has also registered a total of Php 4.153 billion worth of investment
and recorded 2.724 employments in 2019. The government also set Bangsamoro
online job portal and BARMM Full Disclosure Policy Portal to enable societies to
understand government financial transactions and how the local government budget
is spent and managed (Bureau of Public Information , 2019).

Prestige

Previously, sharia justice system and sharia courts were already applicable in the
ARMM. Since the BARMM replaced the previous system, the power over the sharia
courts and its system are transferred to the current Bangsamoro government. Sharia
law has its root on the Quran and Sunnah, and in this matter, Sharia law applies only
to muslim, although non-muslim can voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of sharia
court. The sharia court resolves disputes relating to marriage, divorce, betrothal or
breach of contract to marry, customary dower, dispotition of property upon divorce,
maintenance and support, and consolatory gift, and restitution of marital rights.
Currently, five sharia courts are exist within the jurisdiction of Bangsamoro.

In addition to being the only region implementing sharia law within the Philippines,
BARMM also enjoy other privileges, including authority over the hajj and umrah
affecting pilgrims from within the Bangsamoro. The BARMM government later will work
closely with the Central Government regarding this matter since the Central
Government is responsible for pilgrims from outside Bangsamoro. Bangsamoro also
has a Wali, who is chosen by Bangsamoro Parliament and will have a term of six years.
Wali’s role is as the ceremonial head of Bangsamoro and administer the oath of office
of all Parliament members, including the Chief Minister, dissolving parliament and
subsequently call for election of new parliament, (Gavilan, 2019). Moreover, the first
law passed by the Bangsamoro parliament was an act adopting BARMM official flag
which embodies its people’s identity, history, heritage, struggles, and aspiration (Paris,
2019).

Influence

Referring to the concept of (A -> B) of influence towards other nation behaviour,

Bangsamoro region is currently has no control of influence. As BARMM officially
replaced the ARMM as an autonomous region within the Republic of the Philippines in
2014, the region has no weight, in a capacity of independent nation, to influence other
state’s decision. As the the consequence still there are such of bloody-accidents at
the Southern Philipine. For example Jolo bombings occurred on August 24, 2020,
when insurgents believed to be Abu Sayyaf jihadists detonated two bombs in Jolo,
Sulu, Philippines, killing 14 people and wounding 75 others (tribunnews, 2020)

DISCUSSION

Based on discoveries related to the implementation of peace agreement in Aceh

and Bangsamoro, some points are taken into considerations, particularly the attention
given to political rationality order. Ideology preference, in this matter, is among the
most dominant factors influencing political preference. This part of study will compare
the political preference of Acehnese based on Tiroism proposed by Mukti (2019), to
the political preference of Bangsamoro based on Islamism, and whether or not the
Aceh-Indonesia conflict resolution can be copy-paste in Bangsamoro Philippines
issue.

Regarding to political rationality order, Acehnese elites possess distinct political

rationality order compared to the commonly used preference. Tiroism as an ideology
play an important role in sequencing the order. Tiroism built on two main foundations;
undisputed history that Aceh was the great and sole sultanate in Sumatra recognized
by western countries, and international law that Aceh is a legal successor state of the
past sultanate, given the fact that Aceh sultanate had never surrendered to the Dutch.
The Dutch, in this case, violated the law by submitting Aceh to the new Indonesia-Java
colonial (Mukti, 2019). Mukti (2019) stated that the current Acehnese political
rationality are: prestige, security, welfare, justice, and survival. The biggest portion is
given to prestige, given the fact that Aceh is the only region implementing islamic law,
portraying their adherence towards Islam. In addition, Aceh has its own flag and Wali
Nanggroe which strongly represent the identity of the Acehnese, even back to the era
when Aceh is an idependent sultanate. The second sequence is security, as Aceh local
parties, particularly Partai Aceh, driven by former GAM leaders, is still dominating the
political sphere in the region. This shows the GAM leadership in post-agreement era.
Welfare ranks third in the political preference of Acehnese elites. Slow economic
growth as given in the findings shows that Aceh is still dependent onto transfer funds,
and thus, indicates that the region has not yet sturdy economically. Influence is
nonexistence in Aceh’s case since the region has no authority, in the capacity of a
state, to influence other nation’s decision. In regard to this, Mukti stated that the fourth
sequence of the political preference is justice. Justice aspect in the MoU lay in the
“Human Rights” point that covers several matters including the establishment of
Human Rights Court and Commission of Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) in Aceh, to
deal with past human right abuse happened in the region. However, the establishment
of the TRC took a while before finally established in 2016 (Wahyuningroem, 2017). It
also faces political and economic support from the government (Komisi Kebenaran
dan Rekonsiliasi, 2019). Survival ranks last since the current Aceh existence is as an
autonomous region within the unitary system of Indonesia.

However, staying in the agreement with the Central Government gives

satisfaction for the Acehnese elites, since it still acomodates the political preference of
GAM. Besides, the region is allowed to apply sharia law, establish Wali Nanggroe
institution, gain substantial funds from Jakarta, and has the privilege to form local
political parties within its territory. Thus, it is the rational choice taken by the Acehnese
elites with low cost and great benefit.

In the case of Bangsamoro, Liow (2006) stated that ideology of MILF, the
leading separatist group signing the agreement with the Government of the
Philippines, is Islamism. Citing The Bangsamoro Mujahid writen by Hashim Salamat,
the late MILF leader and founder, Liow noted that the ultimate objective of the
resistance was to make the supreme word of Allah, which means the establishment of
Muslim community and Islamic system of government, and the application of Islamic
way in all aspects of life. And this ideal will be achieved through jihad and dakwah.
This further strengthened by Salamat statement “The MILF adopts the Islamic ideology
and way of life..(and) believes in the Islamic concept of state and government...and
one has not perfected his worship if whom he owes obidience and allegiance does not
recognize the supremacy of the Law of God” (Liow, 2006).

As officially inaugurated in March 2019, the length of implementation of peace

agreement by Bangsamoro government is quite small compared to the Acehnese.
Nevertheless, on the face of it the emphasis is given particularly on the privilege, by
which BARMM officials passed the first law regulating the adoption of Bangsamoro
flag. In addition, Bangsamoro is the single region applying sharia law and is currently
possessing five sharia courts, as well as its own flag reflecting people’s identity,
history, and struggle. This is in compliance with the Salamat statement that the islamic
system of government is needed to perfect one’s worship. Security ranks second in
the order, as the region is at the moment enjoying self-governance system with private
parliament and cabinet led by a Chief Minister. However, the parliament will also
consist of non-Moro including indigenous and settler communities and thus should
reflects the diversity within Bangsamoro. Moreover, the Bangsamoro government
enjoys exclusive powers ranges from education (which Islamic subjects are inserted)
to environmental management. The subsequent preference is welfare. The law
regulates revenue sharing within BARMM jurisdiction, particularly on the taxes and
fees, as well as natural resources. In addition, the region will receive block grants. In
regard to influence, BARMM is similiar to Aceh as the region does not possess the
capacity of a state to influence other nation’s behaviour and decisions. However, it is
important to note that Bangsamoro also prioritizes human rights enforcement.
Bangsamoro Basic Law, also known as RA 11054 outlines the establishment of
Bangsamoro Human Rights Commission (BHRC) which realized in December 2019
after the parliament unanimously approved The Bangsamoro Human Rights Act of
2019. Until recently, BHRC has hold several discussions and works on human rights
cases (Bangsamoro Human Rights Commission, 2020). Survival ranks last since the
entity of Bangsamoro exist as an autonomous region within the Republic of the
Philippines.

The implementation of peace agreement based on political rationality order can

be seen as below:

ASPECT ACEH - INDONESIA BANGSAMORO – THE

PHILIPPINES
APLICATION OF AGREEMENT (POLITICAL RATIONALITY)
Political Rationality Ideological approach: Ideological approach:
Tiroism Islamism
Implementation of sharia
Application of sharia law,
law, establishment of Wali
1. Survival Wali, Flag of Bangsamoro
Nanggroe institution, Flag
(Prestige)
of Aceh (Prestige)
Establishment of Aceh BARMM Parliament and
2. Security
political parties (Security) Cabinet (Security)
Revenue sharing, transfer
Revenue sharing, block
3. Welfare funds (SAF and GAF)
grants (Welfare)
(Welfare)
Formation of Aceh Truth Formation of Bangsamoro
4. Prestige and Reconciliation Human Rights
Commission (Justice) Commission (Justice)
Autonomous region:
Autonomous region: Bangsamoro Autonomous
5. Influence Nanggroe Aceh Region of Muslim
Darussalam (Survival) Mindanao (BARMM)
(Survival)
Table I. Comparative of Rational Choice of Aceh and Bangsamoro

From the table above, it is clear that even though having different ideological-
approach, both Acehnese and Bangsamoro have similar sequence on the political
rationality that is: prestige, security, welfare, justice, and survival. However, it does not
automatically mean that Aceh-Indonesia way to maintain peace agreement could
automatically be copypaste in the Bangsamoro-Philippines case. There must be a
political will from Bangsamoro and the Central Government of the Philippines to build
a lasting peace. Besides, political elites of Bangsamoro must feel that their interest,
particularly in cultural, political, and economic articulations is fulfilled by peace
agreement.
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