Meinongian Modal Meinongianism

Daniel Milne-Plückebaum

1 Introduction

Inspired by Meinong’s claim that “there are objects such that it is true to say of them that

there are no such objects” (1960, 83), modern Meinongians, less paradoxically, hold that

some objects lack the first-order property of existence. Yet they hold further that such objects

do have other properties; for otherwise, it would be hard to see how nonexistents could be

what certain of our thoughts are about—which is, arguably, the chief role they’re supposed

to play. Lastly, then, given this job description for nonexistents, as well as the fact that there

seem to be no constraints as to the characterisations we can come up with in thought to

intend specific, and distinct, objects, Meinongians adhere to the Intentionality Thesis (IT):

every characterisation is satisfied by some nonexistent object; and distinct characterisations

are satisfied by distinct nonexistents. But then Meinongians must be able to say, for every

characterisation C, which nonexistent object satisfies C, and why.

Presumably, for each characterisation C, whatever satisfies C is just as C says; and this

might be unpacked in terms of instantiating every property represented by C. But then, given that

existence is just a property, whatever satisfies the characterisation of being golden, moun-

tainous and existent, say, instantiates goldenness, mountainhood and existence. Since nothing

instantiates these properties, however, nothing satisfies this characterisation—against IT.

It is the Meinongian’s pet project to defend IT. In particular, according to Priest’s (2005)

Modal Meinongianism (MM), for each characterisation C, whatever satisfies C indeed instan-

tiates each property represented by C, but only in those worlds that realise the situation about

the object envisaged. So according to MM, whatever satisfies the characterisation of being

1
golden, mountainous and existent does instantiate goldenness, mountainhood and existence

all right, but only in imagination-realising worlds—among which the actual world (@) isn’t

to be found. Yet while this move appears to save IT, Barz (2016, 252, fn. 11) has reservations

about regarding MM as a genuine kind of Meinongianism, as he holds that according to MM,

nonexistents are both fully contained and just as characterised in nonactual worlds, whereas

he understands Meinongianism as being committed to the claim that nonexistents are both

fully contained and just as characterised in @.

In this paper, I show that Barz is mistaken—both in his assessment of MM and in his

characterisation of Meinongianism in general. For first, MM doesn’t relocate nonexistents

themselves, but only their respective so-beings. Second, while MM has it that nonexistents

are just as characterised in worlds distinct from @, this doesn’t amount to their being just as

characterised in nonactual worlds, but to their being just as characterised in nonexistent worlds.

Further, by explaining what Meinongianism, qua account of intentionality, is supposed to

accomplish in the first place, I show that Barz’ understanding of Meinongianism as being

committed to a strong Actuality Thesis, in fact, overshoots the mark. Finally, then, I formulate

an alternative Meinongian Actuality Thesis that’s compatible with Meinongianism’s general

mission statement, and particularly with MM as built around nonexistent worlds.

Let’s begin by defining Meinongianism, understood as a metaphysical thesis.

2 Modal Meinongianism Defined

Despite Ryle’s harsh prediction that Meinong’s object theory “is dead, buried and not going

to be resurrected” (1973, 255), Meinongianism not only has been resurrected, but is slowly

nursed back to health by its contemporary proponents, who ingeniously use modern ideas

to explicate and defend its defining theses, which I list in what follows.

First, here’s the Basic Thesis, as it’s nowadays understood:

(BT) Some objects don’t exist.

Contra Quine (1948, 32), then, Meinongians hold that to be the value of a bound variable

is not to exist/be, but just to be an object; whereas, according to the Existence Thesis,

2
(ET) to exist/be is to instantiate the first-order property of existence.

Moreover, Meinongians adhere to the Distinctness Thesis:

(DT) For some nonexistent object o and some nonexistent object o? , o , o? .

DT, in turn, is accounted for by the So-Being Thesis (see Meinong, 1971, 489):

(ST) Distinct nonexistents are distinct in virtue of differing in terms of what they’re like.

Let’s say that BT, ET, DT and ST together define Core Meinongianism. Standardly, though,

Meinongians take two further theses on board, which, let’s say, turn Core into Pure Meinong-

ianism. One is the Concreteness Thesis (see Sainsbury, 2010, 23):

(CT) Nonexistent objects are concrete.

The other is the Actuality Thesis (see Barz, 2016, 252, fn 11):

(AT) Nonexistent objects are actual.

Now, one reason to believe in Meinongianism, Core or Pure, is that it grounds an account

of intentionality that does full justice to the phenomenology of thought; for Meinongians hold

that in seemingly thinking about something that doesn’t exist, one is never in fact thinking

about nothing, but is always in fact thinking about some nonexistent object; and in seemingly

thinking about distinct objects that don’t exist, one is never in fact thinking about just one

nonexistent object,1 but is always in fact thinking about distinct ones. Yet given this account

of intentionality, Meinongians must explain, first, how thoughts can be about nonexistents at

all; second, for any thought T about some nonexistent object, which object it is that T is about;

and, third, for any particular thought T about a particular nonexistent object o, why it is o that

T is about, and not some other nonexistent object o? .

So here’s the general picture. First, according to Meinongians, one typically thinks about

nonexistents indirectly, as mediated through characterisations, i.e., modes of presentation that

serve as fields of mental vision, as it were, in that they guide and restrict acts of intentional
1
Such an object might be held to play the same role as the null entity in Scott’s (1967) system, being just what
all and only those thoughts are about that aren’t about anything existent.

3
pointing. E.g., thinking about the golden mountain involves entertaining the characterisation

being golden and mountainous (GM, for short), and aiming for the thought to be singular.

Second, Meinongians hold that for any characterisation C, for any C-involving singular

thought TC such that TC is about a nonexistent object, it is whatever optimally satisfies C that

TC is about, where optimal C-satisfaction is a matter of being exactly as C says. E.g., if it’s the

golden mountain that’s just as GM says, and not the metallic mountain, say, or the golden

mountain with Trump’s face carved into it, then it’s the golden mountain, but neither of

the other objects, that optimally satisfies GM—and so that certain GM-involving singular

thoughts are about.

This picture and the assumed universal success rate of thinking about (distinct) nonexis-

tents are moulded into what is not only the main reason for adhering to Meinongianism, but

also its Achilles’ heel—the Intentionality Thesis:

(IT) (i) Every characterisation is optimally satisfied by some nonexistent object; and

(ii) distinct characterisations are optimally satisfied by distinct nonexistents.2

IT quantifies over humanly imaginable and expressible characterisations that don’t them-

selves refer to or quantify over characterisations.3 This leaves open whether some nonexist-

ents don’t satisfy any such characterisation. I focus on those that do, however, and call them

Purely Intentional Objects (PIOs).

It’s IT that keeps Meinongians busy. For on the one hand, they have uncountably many

characterisations such that, given ITi , for any characterisation C, some PIO o optimally satisfies

C—in virtue of being exactly as C says; and given ITii , for any distinct characterisations C

and C? , some PIO o optimally satisfies C—in virtue of being exactly as C says—, but not

C? —in virtue of not being exactly as C? says; whereas some PIO o? optimally satisfies C? —in

virtue of being exactly as C? says—, but not C—in virtue of not being exactly as C says. On

the other hand, they have uncountably many PIOs such that, given ST, for any distinct PIOs

o and o? , o and o? are distinct in virtue of their having different so-beings. Given IT and
2
I offer no criterion of identity for characterisations on this occasion.
3
So (imaginable and expressible) characterisations such as being an object o such that o doesn’t satisfy any imag-
inable or expressible characterisation are ruled out.

4
ST, then, for any characterisation C, if some PIO o optimally satisfies C—in virtue of being

exactly as C says—, while for any other PIO o? , o? doesn’t optimally satisfy C—in virtue of

not being exactly as C says—, then this is so in virtue of o and o? ’s having different so-beings.

So to tell informatively, for any characterisation C, which PIO it is that optimally satisfies

C, Meinongians must tell informatively what anything that optimally satisfies C must be

like such that it, but nothing else, is just as C says. That is, Meinongians must formulate a

Characterisation Principle (CP).

Here’s one attempt—known as the Naïve CP:

(CPN ) For any characterisation C, whatever optimally satisfies C actually instantiates all and

only those ordinary properties represented by C, and vice versa.

Given CPN , whatever satisfies the characterisation of being golden and mountainous, say,

actually instantiates the ordinary properties goldenness and mountainhood. Similarly, however,

given CPN and ET, whatever satisfies the characterisation of being golden, mountainous and

existent actually instantiates the ordinary properties goldenness, mountainhood and existence

(see Russell, 1905, 483). But nothing actually instantiates these properties. Given CPN , then,

nothing satisfies the characterisation in question—against ITi .

So Meinongians must formulate a different CP—but one that departs from CPN as little

as possible, as CPN straightforwardly does justice to both AT and CT. Here, I focus on the

Modal CP, which defines Modal Meinongianism (MM), as formulated by Priest (2016):4

(CPM ) For any characterisation C, whatever optimally satisfies C instantiates all ordinary

C-represented properties in exactly those worlds that realise the situation about the PIO

envisaged, and vice versa.

Given CPM , PIOs needn’t actually instantiate their characterising properties. This squares

our troublesome characterisation with IT; for given CPM , whatever satisfies the characterisa-

tion of being golden, mountainous and existent instantiates goldenness, mountainhood and
4
Alternatively, Zalta (1983) holds that C-satisfaction is grounded in PIOs’ actually encoding, and not instantiat-
ing, ordinary properties; and Parsons (1980) holds that C-satisfaction is grounded in PIOs’ actually instantiating
properties of a special ontological kind.

5
existence only in those worlds that realise the situation about the object envisaged—among

which the actual world (@) isn’t to be found, which makes the PIO in question nonexistent in

@. Additionally, CPM allows for PIOs to instantiate properties in @, but only ones that aren’t

existence-entailing,5 like being-thought-about-by-Trump or being self-identical. Yet given some

characterisation C, if such properties aren’t themselves represented by C, they don’t feature

in C’s CPM -yielded condition of so-being.

Prima facie, however, MM doesn’t qualify as a kind of Pure Meinongianism, which is,

arguably, a drawback of the account. According to Barz (2016, 252, fn. 11), the reason for this

assessment is that MM has it that PIOs are both fully contained and just as characterised in

nonactual worlds, whereas AT has it that PIOs are both fully contained and just as characterised

in @.

Yet I think that Barz is wrong on two counts. First, not only does MM not relocate PIOs

themselves, but just their respective so-beings, but MM also does not relocate these so-beings to

nonactual worlds, but to nonexistent worlds. Second, Meinongianism is not, in fact, committed

to an Actuality Thesis that is as strong as Barz proposes. I argue for both claims in the next

section.

3 Modal Meinongianism Purified

Let’s first look at what appears to be the most straightforward strategy to reconcile MM

with Barz’ understanding of AT: construe the worlds as invoked in MM (the worldsMM , for

short) as actual abstracta, such as sets of sentences (see Berto, 2008)! Then worldsMM are just

unactualised representations of the world as it could (or couldn’t) have been; and so what I

call Abstractualist MM (MMA ) has it that for every characterisation C, whatever optimally

satisfies C is actually just as C says according to each worldMMA that would truthfully represent

the world, had it realised the situation about the PIO envisaged. So given MMA , the golden

mountain is actually such that, according to certain representations, it’s golden and mountainous;

that is, it’s actually such that, were any such representation actualised, it would be golden
5
A property P is existence-entailing if, for every possible world w and every object o, if o instantiates P in w,
then o instantiates existence in w.

6
and mountainous. But this counterfactual condition is fulfilled, not in virtue of the golden

mountain’s partaking in any extensional fact of something’s instantiating ordinary properties,

but in virtue of its fulfilling another counterfactual condition—to the effect that were some

representation actualised, such an extensional fact would obtain; and so the golden mountain

is actually such that it instantiates goldenness and mountainhood in certain worldsMMA only

in this extensionally irreducible say-so sense. Arguably, however, whatever is such that its

being representationally so-and-so is just what makes it the objects it is is itself abstract. But if

worldsMMA pass on abstractness to PIOs themselves, MMA violates CT, and so isn’t Pure.6

Yet we’ve seen that Naïve Meinongianism, which incorporates AT and CT, violates IT.

Thus, since Meinongian accounts of PIOs are tailored to fit IT, friends of nonexistents might

well have to settle for a version of Core Meinongianism. But if PIOs are regarded as just not

concretely existent, then MMA threatens to collapse into Abstractualism about PIOs, which has

it that PIOs are actual and abstract, but existent simpliciter. This collapse is avertible only if

BT, as restricted to PIOs, is explicitly understood as

(BTM ) PIOs don’t exist simpliciter,

while all abstracta that are PIOs are regarded as nonexistent simpliciter. Yet while Meinong-

ianism should indeed be regarded as committed to BTM , the latter claim is difficult to uphold

without regarding all abstracta as nonexistent simpliciter; but this Meinongianism about abstracta

requires not only careful terminological bookkeeping, but also IT-independent argument.7

In any case, are PIOs really to be regarded as abstract across the board? E.g., while both

the golden mountain and the Russell set pass as PIOs, is the former to be regarded as just as

abstract as the latter simply in virtue of this fact? If not, as I think is plausible, then Meinongians,

including those who make room for abstract PIOs like the Russell set, should adhere to:

(CTM ) Some PIOs are concrete.

6
CT has it that PIOs are just as concrete as paradigmatic existent concreta like the Big Maple Leaf or Ben Nevis;
that is, they’re really just as characterised (see Reicher, 2014, §4), which, arguably, amounts to their instantiating
their characterising properties.
7
The simplest way to regard abstract PIOs as nonexistent simpliciter is to hold that to exist simpliciter just is to
be concrete—which covers all abstracta, of course.

7
 So we’ve come full circle. For in light of CTM , Modal Meinongians need concrete worldsMM ;

and fittingly, of course, for Lewis, “worlds are something like remote planets; except that

most of them are much bigger than mere planets, and they are not remote” (1986, 2). That is,

qua mereological sums of spatiotemporally related objects, Lewisian worlds are, like remote

planets, home to extensional facts. Yet unlike remote planets, Lewisian worlds aren’t part

of @, which is the maximal mereological sum of objects spatiotemporally related to us, but

alternative such sums of other spatiotemporally related objects, and thus nonactual. So if

Lewisian worlds are held to play the role of worldsMM , then what I call Nonactualist MM

(MMN ) has it that for every characterisation C, whatever optimally satisfies C is just as C

says in each nonactual worldMMN that really does realise the situation about the PIO envis-

aged.8 But then, of course, the golden mountain instantiates goldenness and mountainhood

nonactually—against AT.

But again, violating AT isn’t so bad per se. Yet just as in MMA ’s case, MMN might not even

qualify as Core. To see this, consider Lewis’ argument from ways:

I believe, and so do you, that things could have been different in countless ways. [. . .] Ordinary
language permits the paraphrase: there are many ways things could have been beside the way
they actually are. On the face of it, this sentence is an existential quantification. [. . .] [T]aking the
paraphrase at its face value, I therefore believe in the existence of entities that might be called ‘ways
things could have been’. I prefer to call them ‘possible worlds’ (1973, 84).

So for Lewis, worlds can ground our truthful modal talk and thought; and this, he holds,

together with their use in other philosophical domains, justifies our postulating them (1986,

5-68). So if, in effectively running an argument from intentional ways, Modal Meinongians give

Lewisian worlds the further role of grounding our purely intentional talk and thought, the

utility argument is strengthened.

8
Given IT, (different) impossible characterisations are satisfied by (different) PIOs. So MMN proponents need
impossible worlds as well. Yet according to Lewis, postulating these gives rise to contradictions tout court (1986, 7,
fn. 3). Moreover, it’s difficult to square impossibilia with Lewis’ aim of metaphysically reducing the modalities to
the goings-on in nonactual worlds. So despite being theoretically useful (Yagisawa, 1987, 176-182), if impossibilia
can’t be coherently integrated into Lewis’ reductionism (contra Kiourti, 2010), MMN doesn’t get off the ground at
all. Yet as I propose below, Lewis’ project has no import on the—bear with me!—genuinely Meinongian Modal
Meinongian project.

8
 Yet as the argument from ways has it, in postulating Lewisian worlds, one postulates their

existence—their extra-worldly existence, that is, given that they exist neither actually nor just

relative to themselves; and this isn’t a failure, on Lewis’ part, to realise that what he regards

as existential quantification had better be construed as quantification simpliciter, or his failure

to distinguish between these quantification types.9 For arguably, Lewisian worlds are fit to

play many of their roles, particularly that of grounding our truthful modal talk and thought,

only if they exist. Yet given that to be thus-and-so in a Lewisian world w is to be thus-and-so

simpliciter and a mereological part of w, where mereological parts of existent objects also exist

(Lewis, 1986, 3), worldsMMN pass on existence to PIOs themselves. But if PIOs are regarded as

just not actually existent, MMN threatens to collapse into Nonactualism about PIOs, which has it

that PIOs are concrete and nonactual, but existent simpliciter (see Lewis, 1978).10 Again, given

BTM , this collapse is avertible only if all nonactualia that are PIOs are regarded as nonexistent

simpliciter. Yet it’s difficult to uphold this without regarding all nonactualia as nonexistent

simpliciter; and this Meinongianism about nonactualia requires not only careful terminological

bookkeeping, but also IT-independent argument.11

Prima facie, then, construing worldsMM as actual or concrete forces those rejecting a more

encompassing Meinongianism to regard PIOs as existent simpliciter—against BTM . But then

haven’t Modal Meinongians reached an impasse?

Not if they change a third parameter. That is, given BTM , Modal Meinongians can regard

PIOs’ so-beings as grounded by worldsMM that are actual (against MMN ), concrete (against

MMA ) and nonexistent simpliciter (against MMA and MMN ). Effectively, then, they can adopt

an ontologically neutralised version of Lewis’ argument from ways—a decidedly Meinongian

argument from purely intentional ways, as it were—, containing not existential quantifications

over Lewisian worlds, but just quantifications over worldsMM , where worldsMM are regarded as

having all the properties ascribed to Lewisian worlds sans those implying existence.12 Then
9
Lewis explicitly denies any such conflation/identification (1990; 1986, 6).
10
Incidentally, Sainsbury (2010, 90) classifies MM as a kind of Nonactualism.
11
The simplest way to regard nonactual PIOs as nonexistent simpliciter is to hold that to exist simpliciter just is
to be actual (see Linsky and Zalta, 1991)—which covers all nonactualia, of course.
12
Moreover, Modal Meinongians can conclude that some objects are impossible worldsMM by adopting an onto-
logically neutralised version of Naylor’s (1986, 29) argument from ways things couldn’t have been.

9
Modal Meinongians can hold that for every characterisation C, whatever optimally satisfies

C is just as C says in each imagination-realising Meinongian worldMM .13

Note that, in construing worldsMM as nonexistent simpliciter, I’m not giving in to Meinong-

ianism about nonactualia. Instead, I’m merely saying that the worlds as invoked by MM are to

be construed as nonexistent. And this, I propose, is compatible with the existence of nonactual

worlds. For although Meinongianism and Nonactualism are structurally very similar (Linsky

and Zalta, 1991), even if it turned out that Meinongianism and Nonactualism are really just two

labels for a single metaphysical theory, it would still need to be settled whether it is, ultimately,

a Meinongian or Nonactualist one, as each theory is tailored to fit a different metaphysical job

description. Thus, if one theory collapses into the other, one job can’t get done by the retained

theory. So even on the assumption that Meinongianism and Nonactualism are isomorphic,

if their associated job descriptions differ, then these theories are to be identified only if one

job is licenced to remain unfulfilled by the retained theory. But then it’s neither incoherent

nor patently unreasonable to regard Meinongianism and Nonactualism not as rivalling, but

as complementary theories, and thus to adhere to both theories at once.

Incidentally, Linsky and Zalta hold that “a Meinongian need simply defend the intelligi-

bility of the existence predicate (if only by supposing that it signifies a primitive property)”

(1991, 439), and, more elaborately:

[H]owever they express themselves, Meinongians recognize divisions within their ontologies. They
recognize some kind of gap between objects like you, us and this computer terminal and such objects
as Sherlock Holmes, the golden mountain, the round square, the Russell set, and so forth. [. . .] The
question is not what predicates to use, but rather, whether one quantifies over some such distinctive
objects in one’s metaphysics. To do so is the touchstone of Meinongianism. Both the Meinongians
and David Lewis assume that they need ‘extra’ objects for an adequate foundation for metaphysics
(1991, 440; my emphasis).

They go on to ask whether Lewis’ distinction between actualia and possibilia gives him

a Meinongian ontology, thereby ignoring the theoretical possibility of combining the two the-

ories. That is, in addition to having nonactualia instantiate the primitive existence property,

Meinongian Nonactualists recognise a gap between what Lewis regards as objects and all the
13
I’m tempted to call this account Meinongian MM, but I shall resist and stick with MM.

10
rest.14 So qua Nonactualists, Meinongian Nonactualists assume nonactualia to ground certain

truths, like the truth that, possibly, a golden mountain has Trump’s face carved into it; but qua

Meinongians, they assume yet more extra objects for an adequate metaphysical foundation,

namely those targeted by our purely intentional talk and thought, like acts of imagination to the

effect that a golden mountain has Trump’s face carved into it. For Meinongian Nonactualists,

then, nonexistents, and not nonactualia, serve as purely intentional objects.15

So theorising about nonactualia and theorising about nonexistents are independent meta-

physical projects. The former project is pursued to shed light on the all-encompassing (part

of) reality to which we belong, bursting all spatiotemporal boundaries. Call this (part of)

reality R. Orthogonally, the latter project is pursued to shed light on the (part of) reality that

serves as the target range of our non-R-related thoughts. Call this purely intentional (part of)

reality I. Ultimately, then, the Pure Meinongian theses serve the purpose of keeping I and

R neatly apart, whatever R turns out to be. But then it’s hardly surprising that the worlds held

to ground aspects of R aren’t to be held to ground aspects of I as well; instead, if aspects of

I are also held to be grounded by objects that play a world-like role, then these objects had

better be construed as belonging exclusively to I.16

14
This seems to square even with how Lewis conceives of the relation between Meinongianism and Nonactu-
alism, for he says:
At this point you might surmise that the distinction Routley has in mind [between being and existence (Routley, 1980)]
is genuine, and what more that we accept it no less than he does. It is just that he calls it the distinction between what
‘exists’ and what does not; whereas we call it the distinction between present actual, particular, spatiotemporal things
and all the rest. [. . .] For does he not say that it is exactly the present, actual, . . . things that ‘exist’?—he does. But
plainly he takes that to be a highly controversial substantive thesis, not a trivial matter of definition. [. . .] But if ‘existence’ is
understood so that it can be a substantive thesis that only some of the things there are exist—or, for that matter, so that
it can be substantive thesis that everything exists—we will have none of it (1990, 30-1; my emphasis).

Lewis effectively reinforces his adherence to Nonactualism sans Meinongianism; for Meinongianism falls out
of Nonactualism only if the distinction between being and existence mirrors that between existence and actuality;
and this mirroring happens only if Meinongianism wouldn’t remain a substantive theory if Nonactualism turned
out to be true; but Meinongianism would remain a substantive theory even if Nonactualism turned out to be true.
So Lewis’ disagreement with Meinongians concerns neither how to label what’s really just one theory, nor which
one of two theories to adopt, but simply whether to adhere to BTM .
15
It follows that Nonactualist Meinongians must have distinct golden mountains play distinct roles. For while
certain modal truths can only be grounded by nonactual golden mountains, certain purely intentional endeavours
can only target nonexistent golden mountains.
16
While I focused on Lewis’ Nonactualism in this paper, my point generalises. Another account that initially
seems well-suited to explicate the nature of worldsMM is Yagisawa’s (2010), which has it that worlds are points in
modal space—akin to spatial or temporal points—, and real, but not existent simpliciter (or nonexistent simpliciter,
for that matter, as existence, for Yagisawa, is domain-relative). Yet given that Yagisawa’s worlds are supposed to
be serviceable in much the same way as Lewis’, grounding many parts of R, they, too, should be kept conceptually
apart from worldsMM .

11
 To conclude, I offer a new Meinongian Actuality Thesis. To see how it is to be formulated,

compare the preceding picture to Priest’s own. Priest holds that all worlds are nonexistent,

and so that nothing is a nonactual world (2005, 139). But this is right only in so far as MM must

be compatible with Actualism; for as we’ve seen, (Modal) Meinongianism per se presupposes

neither Nonactualism nor Actualism. Thus, in light of my claim that Meinongianism is mainly

concerned with separating intentional from non-intentional reality, its Actuality Thesis need

only capture this compatibility. So the following suffices:

(ATM ) No PIO o is such that, for some nonactual world w, o is fully or partly contained or just

as characterised in w.

In sum, since (Meinongian) MM has it that the (purely intentional) golden mountain in-

stantiates goldenness and mountainhood only in worldsMM that are themselves nonexistent,

and so neither in @ nor in nonactual worlds, MM satisfies both CTM and ATM —which is all

that Meinongian Purity requires.

4 Conclusion

In this paper, I argued for a conception of Meinongian Purity that’s satisfied even by MM.

Incidentally, however, as Berto and Priest (2014) point out in reply to Kroon (2012), MM isn’t

Literalist, where Literalism has it that PIOs actually instantiate their characterising properties

(see Fine, 1982). Perhaps, then, in doubting whether MM qualifies as a kind of Meinongian-

ism, Barz has the Literalist conception in mind. Yet to function as an account of PIOs, a

Meinongianism needn’t be Literalist, but only Pure.17

I conclude by pointing out two important consequences of the preceding picture. First,

given that nonexistent worldsMM feature in CPM , Modal Meinongians must give up the thesis,

implicitly endorsed by most Meinongians, that only existent objects are to feature in PIOs’

CP-yielded conditions of so-being. Yet in any case, given my construal of Meinongian Purity,

I see no plausible reason for endorsing this thesis; after all, existent objects aren’t individuated
17
NB: A Literalist Meinongianism can be Pure (and so non-Naïve). Arguably, Parsons’ (1980) account is of this
kind.

12
on the basis of nonexistent ones, so why should nonexistent objects be individuated wholly

on the basis of existent ones? On the contrary, I feel ill at ease with the thought that some

of the objects featuring in PIOs’ CPM -yielded conditions of so-being—properties—are still

existent. Moreover, I think that other kinds of Meinongianism are, ultimately, forced to give

up the thesis in question as well.18 Second, my picture helps Modal Meinongians in their

quest to defend IT. Consider characterisations such as being actually golden, mountainous and

existent (Beall, 2006), or being necessarily round and square. Once Modal Meinongians rely on

nonexistent worldsMM to individuate objects satisfying non-modal characterisations, I see no

problem in their relying on whole pluralities of nonexistent worldsMM to individuate objects

that satisfy such irreducibly modal characterisations; for given (Modal) Meinongianism, they

come ontologically free.

Bibliography

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