Boolos (1987) Saving Frege From Contradiction

Saving Frege from Contradiction
Author(s): George Boolos

Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 87 (1986 - 1987), pp. 137-151
Published by: Wiley on behalf of Aristotelian Society
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IX*-SAVING FREGE FROM
CONTRADICTION
by George Boolos
In section 68 of Die Grundlagen derArithmetikFrege defines the
number that belongs to the concept F as the extension of the
concept 'equinumerous (gleichzahlig) with the concept F'. In
sections that follow he gives the needed definition of equinumer-
osity in terms of one-one correspondence, and in section 73
attempts to demonstrate that the number belonging to F is
identical with that belonging to G if and only if F is
equinumerouswith G. In view of Hume's well-known 'standard
by which we can judge of the equality and proportion of
numbers',' we may call the statement that the numbers
belonging to F and G are equal if and only if F is equinumerous
with G (or the formalization of this statement) Hume'sprinciple.
As we shall see, Frege's attempt to demonstrate Hume's
principle, which is vital to the development of arithmetic
sketched in the next ten sections of the Grundlagen, cannot be
considered successful. We begin with a look at Frege's
attempted proof before turning to our main concern, which is
with two ways of repairingthe damage to his workcaused by the
discovery of Russell's paradox.
Frege writes,
On our definition, what has to be shown is that the
extension of the concept 'equinumerous with the concept
F' is the same as the extensionof the concept 'equinumerous
the concept G', if the concept F is equinumerouswith the
concept G. In other words: it is to be proved that, for F
equinumerous with G, the following two propositionshold
good universally: if the concept H is equinumerous with
the concept F, then it is also equal to the concept G; and
* . . [conversely]. ...
*
Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at 5/7 Tavistock Place, London WC1, on
Monday, 16 February 1987 at 6.00 p.m.
1"When two numbers are so combin'd, as that the one has always an unite answering
to every unite of the other, we pronounce them equal," Treatise,1,IIIJ,.
138 GEORGE BOOLOS
The sophisticated definition of numbers as extensions of certain

concepts of concepts and extensive use of binary relationsfound
in the Grundlagen are evidence that Frege was there committed to
the existence of objects of all finite types: 'objects', the items of
the lowest type 0, and, for any types ti,... tn, relations of type
(ti,. .. ,tn) among items of types ti,. . . tn. An item of type (t), for
some type t, is called a concept. Concepts of type (0) are called
'first-levelconcepts'; those of type ((O)),'second-levelconcepts'.
The relation borne by an object x to a concept F when x falls
under F is of type (0,(0)); the relation rl defined below is of type
((O),O).It seems clear that Frege accepted a comprehension
principle governing the existence of relations, according to
which for any sequence of variables xl,. . . ,x, of types t1,. . . ,tnand
any predicate A(xl, . .. ,xn) (possibly containing parameters)
there is a relation of type (tl,. . . tn) holding among those items of
types ti,... . tn satisfying the predicate and only those. This
principle can be proved from the rule of substitutionFrege used
in the Begriffschrift.Thus, in view of the predicate 'F is
equinumerous with G' (F a first-level concept parameter, G a
first-level concept variable), Frege concludes that there is a
second-level concept under which fall all and only those first-
level concepts that are equinumerous with (the value of the
parameter) F.
It also seems clear that at the time he wrote the Grundlagen,
Frege held that for each concept C of whatevertype, there is a
special object 'C, the extension of C. Thus extensions are objects;
and the number belonging to the first-levelconcept F is defined
by Frege to be the extension of a certain second-level concept,
the one under which fall all and only those first-level concepts
equinumerous with F. We shall often abbreviate '(is) equi-
numerous with': eq.
The announced task of section 73 is to show that the number
belonging to the concept F, NF for short, = NG if F eq G. Since
Frege has defined NF as 'eq F, what must be shown is that 'eq
F= ' eq G under the assumption that F eq G. But almost all of
73 is devoted to showing that if H eq F, then H eq G and
observing that a similar proof shows that if H eq G, then H eq
F. Frege takes it that showing these two propositionsis sufficient;
he writes 'in other words'. In a footnote he adds that a similar
proof can be given of the converse, that F eq G if NF =NG.
SAVING FREGE FROM CONTRADICTION 139
And of course we know exactly how the proofwould go: 'On our
definition what must be shown is that if 'eqF= 'eq G, in other
words, if the following two propositionshold good universally:if
H eq F then H eq G and if H eq G then H eq F, then F eq G. But
since F eq F, by the first of these alone, F eq G.'
Why did Frege suppose that one could pass so freely between
"eq F = 'eq G' and 'for all H, H eq F iff H eq G'? It seems most
implausible that any answer could be correct other than:
because he thought it evident that for anyconcepts C and D of
the same type (t), 'C = 'D if and only if for all items X of type t,
CX iff DX.
Notoriously, this assumption generates Russell's paradox (in
the presence of the comprehension principle, whose validity I
assume). It is noteworthy that the proof Frege gave of the
inconsistency of the system of his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik
resemblesCantor'sproofthat there is no one-one mapping of the
power set of a set into that set rather than the version of the
paradox that Russell had originally communicated to him. Of
course in his second letter to Frege, well before Frege came to
write the appendix to the Grundgesetze, where Frege's proof
appears, Russell had explained to him the originsof the paradox
in Cantor's work.
In the present notation, Frege's version of Russell's paradox
runs: By comprehension, let R be the first-level concept
[x: 3 F(x - 'FA-iFx)]. Consider the object 'R, which is the
extension of R. If iR'R, then since for all F, 'R =F-FR,
R'R. So R'R. But then for some F, 'R ='F and -T'R. Thus by
the principle about extensions mentioned two paragraphsback,
Vx(Rx Fx). Thus iR'R, contradiction.
Since Frege defines numbers as the extensions of second-level
concepts, it might be hoped that the Russell paradox does not
threaten Frege's derivationof arithmetic in the Grundlagen, for to
prove the main proposition of 73, '[H: H eq F] = '[H: H eq G] iff
F eq G, he needs only the principle: for any second-level
concepts C,D, 'C ='D iff for all first-levelH, CH iffDH. Notice
the difference between this principle-call it (VI)-and the
instance of (V) in which t =0 that leads to Russell'sparadox:for
any first-levelconcepts F,G, 'F = 'G ifffor all objectsx, Fx iff Gx.
Part of the cause of the Russell paradox is that certain extensions
are in the range of the quantifiedvariableon the rightside of (V).
140 GEORGEBOOLOS
Since this is not the case with (VI), might (VI) then be
consistent?
No. Define il by: Fix iff for some second-level concept D,
x='D and DF. By comprehension one level up, let C =[F:
3x(Fix AXFx)]. By comprehension at the lowest level, let
X = [x:x ='C]. Suppose Xi'C. By the definition of , for some
D, 'C ='D and DX, whence by (VI) CX. By the definitionof C,
for some x, lXix and Xx. By the definition of X, x = 'C, and
therefore lXil'C. Thus -iXi'C, whence for every D, if 'C ='D
then iDX. Therefore iCX. But by the definition of C, for every
x such that Xx, Xqx, and since X'C, Xi'C, contradiction. As
with the Russell paradox, it is the assumption that ' is one-one
that causes the trouble.
Thus not only is (V) in full generality inconsistent, so is the
apparently weaker (VI). But Frege does not need the full
strength of (VI) to prove that NF = NG iff F eq G. On the basis
of the following proposition, 'Numbers':
VF3!xVH(Hijx H eq F),
he can define NF as the unique object x such that for all concepts
H, Hix if H eq F and then easily prove from this definition that
NF =NG iff F eq G.
Numbers expresses a proposition to whose truth Frege was
committed. It is a proposition about concepts, objects couched
in the language of second-orderlogic to which one new relation,
il, has been added. ('Eq' is of course definable in second-order
logic in the standard way.) Thus it is involved with higher-order
notions or with notions not expressiblein the language of Frege's
Begriffsschriftif at all, only in that r is a relation of concepts to
objects. Notice that for any concept F the x (unique, according
to Numbers) such that for all concepts H, Hilx iff H eq F will be
an extension, for since F eq F, Fox, and thus for some C, x ='C
(and CF). The chief virtue of Numbers, though, is that it is
formally consistent (as John Burgess2,Harold Hodes3, and the
author4 have noted).
We may see this as follows. Let the object variables in
2 The Philosophical
Review93 (4), p. 638-640.
3 TheJournalof Philosophy81 (3), 1984, p. 138.
'In "The Consistency of Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic,"to appear in OnBeingand
Saying:EssaysforRichardCartwright,edited byJudithJarvis Thomson, MIT Press, 1987.
Numbers range over all natural numbers, the concept variables

range over all sets of natural numbers and for all n, the
n-ary relation variables range over all n-aryrelations of natural
numbers. (We are thus defining a 'standard' model for
Numbers.) Let ri be true of a set S of natural numbers and a
natural number n if and only if either for some natural number
m, S has m members and n m+ 1 or S is infinite and n-O. So
interpreted, Numbers is true.
For let S be an arbitraryset of natural numbers.Let n = m + 1
if S is finite and has mmembers;let n =0 otherwise. Then for any
set U of natural numbers, Uin holds iff either for some m,U has
mmembers and n = m + 1 or U is infinite and n =0, if and only if
U and S have the same number of members, if and only if U eq S
holds. The uniqueness of n follows from the definition of r1and
the fact that S eq S holds.
Much of the interestof the proofjust given lies in the fact that
it can be formalized in second-orderarithmetic. Let Eq(H,F) be
the standard formula of second-orderlogic defining the relation
'there is a one-one correspondence between U and S'. The
relation 'S is infinite and n =0 or for some m, S has mmembers
and n = m+ 1' can defined by a formula Eta(F,x) of second-
order arithmetic in such a way that the sentence
VF3!xVH(Eta(H,x) Eq(H,F))
is provablein second-order arithmetic. Thus we have a relative
consistency proof: a proof of a contradiction in the result of
adjoining the formalization
VF3!xVH(Hilx -Eq(H,F))
of Numbers (with Hrlx now taken as an atomic formula) to any
standard axiomatic system of second-orderlogic could immedi-
ately ('primitive recursively') be transformed into a proof of a
contradiction in second-orderformal arithmetic. It is pointless
to try to describehow unexpectedthe discoveryof a contradiction
in second-orderarithmetic would be. Since Hume's principle is
a theorem of a definitional extension of the second-ordertheory
whose sole axiom is Numbers, it too is consistent (relative to the
consistency of second-order arithmetic).
The distance between Numbers and Hume's principle is
certainly not all that great: Numbers provides the justification
142 GEORGEBOOLOS
for the introduction of the functorN, 'the number belonging to';

Numbers also follows from Hume's principle when Fnx is
defined as x = NF. One of Numbers' minor virtues is that it
encapsulates the only assumption concerning the existence of
extensionsthat Frege actually needs.For once Frege has Hume's
principle in hand, he needs nothing else.
In sections 74-83 of the Grundlagen,Frege outlines the proofsof
a number of propositions concerning (what we now call) the
natural numbers, including the difficult theorem that every
finite number has a successor.(Formalizationsof) all of these can
be proved in axiomatic second-order logic from Hume's
principle in more or less the manner outlined in these ten
sections of the Grundlagen. I am uncertain whether Frege was
aware that Hume's principle was all he needed; his puzzling
remark at the end of the Grundlagen about attaching no decisive
importance to the introduction of extensions of concepts may be
taken as some evidence that he knew this.
It's a pity that Russell's paradox has obscured Frege's
accomplishment in the Grundlagen. It's utterly remarkable that
the whole of arithmetic can be deduced in second-order logic
from this one simple principle, which might appear to be
nothing more than a definition. Of course, Hume's principle
isn't a definition, since 'NF' and 'NG' are intended to denote
objects in the range of the first order variables. (Cf. Wright's
book Frege'sConception of Numbersas Objects.5)And as Frege's
work shows, Hume's principle is much more powerful than we
might have supposed it to be, implying, with the aid of second-
order logic, the whole of second-orderarithmetic (while failing
to imply I).
In fact, that Hume's principle is consistent can easily come to
seem like a matter of purest luck. Suppose we do for
isomorphismof (binary) relationswhat we havejust done for the
notion of equinumerosity of concepts: adjoin to second-order
logic an axiom
OrdType -R = -S R iso S,
with - a function sign that takes a binary relation variable and
makes a term of the type of object variables, and R iso S some
5Aberdeen University Press, 1983.
formula expressing the order-isomorphismof the relations that

are values of the variables R and S. In other words, suppose we
introduce in the obvious way what Cantor called 'order types'
and Russell, 'relation numbers'. It would, I imagine, be the
obvious guess that if Hume's principle is consistent, then so is
OrdType, which states that the order-typesof two relations are
the same iff the relations are order-isomorphic.
In sections 85 and 86 of the Grundlagen Frege takes Cantor to
task for having appealed to 'inner intuition' instead of providing
definitions of Numberand followingin a series.Frege adds that he
thinks he can imagine how these two concepts could be made
precise. One would have liked to see Frege'saccount of Cantor's
notions; one cannot but suspect that in order to reproduce
Cantor's theory of ordinal numbers, Frege would have derived
OrdType from a (possible tacit) appeal to (V).
Doing so would have landed him in trouble deeper than any
he was in in the Grundlagen, however, and not just because of
the appeal to (V). For the guess that OrdType is consistent if
Hume's principle is consistent is wrong. As Hodes has also
observed, OrdType leads to a contradiction via the reasoningof
the Burali-Fortiparadox. Thus although Numbers is consistent,
a principle no less definitional in appearance and rather similar
in content turns out to be inconsistent. In view of the
inconsistency of (VI) and OrdType, the consistency of Hume's
principle is sheer luck.
To show that arithmetic follows from Hume's principle, or its
near relationNumben, is to give a profoundanalysisof arithmetic,
but it is not to base arithmeticon a principlestrikinglylike Frege's
rule (V). We know from Russell's and Cantor's paradoxes that
there can be no function from (first-level)concepts to objectsthat
assigns different objects to concepts under which different
objects fall. Identifying concepts under which the same objects
fall, we may say that there is no one-one function from concepts
into objects. But the function denoted by N is a particularlynon-
one-one function. With the exception of [x:x ? x], every concept
shares its number with infinitely many other concepts. One
might wonder whether one could base arithmetic on a function
assigning objects to concepts which, though necessarilynot one-
one, fails to be one-one at only one of its values. We'll see how to
do this below.
144 GEORGEBOOLOS
In the appendix to the second volume of his Grundgesetze,

Frege asks
Is it always permissible to speak of the extension of a
concept, of a class? And if not, how do we recognize the
exceptional cases?Can we always infer from the extension
of one concept's coinciding with that of a second that every
object which falls under the first concept also falls under
the second?These are the questionsraisedby Mr. Russell's
communication.
Before showing how Russell's paradox could be deduced in the
system of the Grundgesetze,
he declares
Thus there is no alternative but to recognize the extensions
of concepts, or classes,as objects in the full and propersense
of the word, while conceding that our interpretation
hitherto of the words 'extension of a concept' is in need of
correction.
After showing that his rule (Vb) leads of Russell's paradox,
Frege proves that every function fromconcepts to objectsassigns
the same value to some pair of concepts under which different
objects fall. He observesthat the proof is 'carriedout without the
use of propositionsor notations whosejustification is in any way
doubtful' and adds that
this simply does away with extensions in the generally
received sense of the term. We may not say that in general
the expression 'the extension of one concept coincideswith
that of another' means the same as the expression 'every
object falling under the first also fallsunder the second and
conversely'.
Frege then proposes a repair. In place of the defective rule
(V), assume (V'), which we may put: the extensions of F and G
are identical iff the same objects otherthanthoseextensionsfall
under F and G. He remarksthat 'Obviously this cannot be taken
as definingthe extension of a concept but merely as stating the
distinctive property of this second level function'.
It is well known that Frege's proposed repair fails. A
particularly useful discussion of the failure is found in Resnik's
book FregeandthePhilosophy of Mathematics.6 I want to consider

an alternative repair to the Grundgesetze suggested by the second
question asked in its appendix: How do we recognize the
exceptional cases?
Frege does not in fact offer an answer to his question.
Although he does discuss certain exceptional cases in the
appendix, they are not the ones referredto in his question, which
are, presumably, the concepts that lack an extension in the
customary sense of the term. The exceptions Frege discussesare
not concepts but certain objects, namely, extensionsof concepts.
But there is a simple answer that Frege might have given, one
that uses only such notions as were available in 1908.
Identification of the exceptional concepts will suggest a
replacement for rule (V) which Frege might well have found
perfectly acceptable, and which seems no more ad hoc than
Frege's own rule (V'). The defect Russell revealed could have
been repaired rather early, and by a patch that is really quite
simple and closely related to ideas found in Cantor'swork, some
of which, at least, was familiar to Frege.
I shall not discuss the question whether the repair vindicates
logicism. I doubt that anything can do that. I merely wish to
claim that the repair I shall give should have been no less
acceptable to Frege than the one he actually offered.
We'll begin the description of the repair with a bit of
stipulation. Let's detach the existence of extensions from the
term 'coextensive' and say that a concept F is coextensive with a
concept G if and only if all objects that fall under F fall under G
and vice versa. Five more definitions follow, of 'subconcept',
'goes into', 'V', 'small' and 'similar'.
Let us call a concept F a subconcept of a concept G if every
object that falls under F falls under G. Let us say that a concept
F goesintoG if F is equinumerouswith a subconcept of G. If F is a
subconcept of G, than F goes into G; if F goes into G and G goes
into H, then F goes into H. It can be shown that if F and G go
into each other, then they are equinumerous.
Let V be the concept, [x:x = x], identicalwithitself And let us
say that a concept F is smallif V does not go into F. V is not small.
If F goes into G and G is small, then F is small; thus any
6Cornell University Press, 1980.
146 GEORGE BOOLOS
subconcept of a small concept is small and any concept

equinumerous or coextensive with a small concept is small. Let
us say that F is similarto G iff (F is small v G is small - F is
coextensive with G).
We want now to see that is similartois an equivalence relation.
Reflexivity and symmetry are obvious. As for transitivity,
suppose that F is similar to G and G to H. If F is small, then F is
coextensive with G (for F is similar to G), thus G is small, and
then G is coextensive with H; thus F is coextensive with H. And
in like manner, but going the other way, if H is small, F is
coextensive with H. Thus F is similar to H.
We now suppose that associated with each concept F, there is
an object *F, which I will call the subtension of F, and that as
extensions were supposed to be in one-one correspondencewith
equivalence classesof the equivalence relation coextensive with,so
subtensions are in one-one correspondence with equivalence
classes of the equivalence relation similarto; thus the principle
(New V) holds: *F = *G iff F is similar to G.
In view of the 'Julius Caesar problem' it may be uncertain
whether (New V) can be taken as definingsubtensions, but like
(V) and unlike (V') it does not merely state the distinctive
property of a certain second level function. (V) and our
replacement (New V) explain in a non-circularway, as (V') did
not, when objects given as extensions or subtensionsof concepts
are identical; the statements of the identity conditions do not
contain expressionsexplicitly referringto those very extensions
or subtensions.
Moreover, (New V) enables us to definc the 'exceptional'
concepts quite easily, as those that are not small. For it follows
from (New V) that for every concept F, if F is small, then for
every concept G, *F = *G iffF is coextensivewith G. Furthermore
if F is not small then there is a concept G not coextensive with F
but such that *F = *G; of course any such G will itself fail to be
small. (Since F is not small, F is equinumerouswith V; but as we
shall see, V is equinumerouswith V -0 (definedbelow).Thus F is
equinumerous with one of its proper subconcepts G; since G is
not small, *F = *G.)
We must now make it plausible that arithmetic can be
developed in second-orderlogic from (New V) alone. There are
many ways to do this; perhaps the easiest is to develop 'finite set
theory' from (New V), taking the development of arithmetic

from finite set theory for granted.
Following Frege, let us say that x E (is a member of) y, if for
some F,y = *F and Fx. And let us call an objecty a setify = *G for
some smallconcept G. Thus ify is a set and for some concept H,
y=*H, then xEy iff Hx.
Again a la Frege, let 0= *[x:x # x]. Since 0 is an object,
[x:x # x] is small and 0 is thereforea set. For all x, not: xeO. *V,
however, is not a set. Therefore there are at least two objects.
Thus for any object y, the concept [x: x y] is small; let {y}
= *[x: x -y]. For any object y, {y}is a set. (So {*V} is a set even
though *V is not.)
For any concept F and object y, let F +y be the concept
[x: Fx v x y] and F -y the concept [x: Fx AX Oy]. We now want
to see that if F is small, so is F +y, for any object y.
We first observe since 0 t{z}, V goes into V -0 via the map
that sends each object x to {x}. Suppose that F +y is not small.
Then V goes into F +y via a map (pwhich, switching one or two
values of (pif necessary,we may assume sends 0 toy. Then V -0
goes into F via (a restriction of) (p,Since V goes into V -0, V
goes into F and F is not small. It follows that if F is small, so is
F+y.
For any objects z,w, let z + w =[x: xEzV x = w]. Then if z is a
set, so is z+w;xez+wiffxezvx-w.
As in Grundlagen83, we may define HF = [x: VF(FO'A
VzVw(FZ AFw - Fz + w) -Fx)]. An induction principle for HF
follows directly: to show that all HF objects fall under a certain
concept F, it suffices to show that 0 does, and that z + w does
whenever z and w do. Thus all HF objects together with all of
their members are HF sets.
The axioms of (second-order)General Set Theory are:
Extensionality: VxVy(Vz(zex '- zey) - x y),
Adjunction: VwVz3yVx(xey xez vx = w), and all
Separation: VFVzByVx(xeyxez A Fx).
These axioms all hold when relativizedto HF. For extensionality,
note that two HF setscoincide if the same HF setsbelong to both;
separation is easily proved by induction on z. Second-order
arithmetic can now be deduced in the usual way from General
Set Theory. It is of some interest to note that the relativizations
148 GEORGEBOOLOS
of the remaining axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory plus

Choice minus Infinity can also be deduced from (New V).
Note also that the derivation of General Set Theory from
(New V) is quite elementary, not much more difficult than it
would have been from (V). We have had to check that certain
subtensions were sets, but these checks were easily made. And
although equinumerosity figures in the definition of the key
notion of smallness, the Schroder-Bernstein theorem, or the
technique of its proof, is nowhere used.
The hereditarilyfinite setsare the membersof the smallestset A
containing all finite subsets of A. Of course the null set 0 is
hereditarily finite, as are {0}, {{0}}, {0,{0}}, etc. An alterna-
tive characterization of the hereditarily finite sets is that
they are the members of the smallest set containing 0 and
containing zU{w}whenever it containsz and w. Our construction
shows that the hereditarilyfinite sets can be seen as 'constructed
from' the relation is similartoas the finite cardinalsarisefromthe
relation is equinumerous with, and as extensions were supposed to
arise from is coextensivewith. Truth-values arise in a similar
manner from is materially equivalentto, via the axiom:
Vp=Vq- (p -q).
When the natural numbers or the hereditarily finite sets are
thus 'constructed' from equinumerosity or similarity, other
objects are constructed too. We have already met the non-set
*V. On the construction of the Grundlagen, along with the usual
natural numbers some funny numbers arise, among them the
number NV of things there are, the number N[x: 3Fx = NF] of
numbers there are, and the number of finite numbers there are.
Frege acknowledged the last of these, dubbing it 00l, but he must
admit all of them if he wants to define 0 as the number belonging
to the concept not identicalwith itself (It is consistent with
Numbers that all three are distinct; it is also consistentthat they
are all identical.)
It is often said that Zermelo-Fraenkelset theory is motivated
by a doctrine of 'limitation of size': a collection is a set if it is
'small' or 'not too big', a collection being 'too big' if it is
equinumerous with the collection of all sets. The notion of
smallness is sometimes taken as to motivate the axioms of set
theory: it is thought that if certain sets are small, then certain
other sets formed from them by various operations will also be
small. (Michael Hallett has effectively criticized the thought

that the power set operation produces small sets from small
sets.7) In most treatments of set theory, the idea of smallness is
left at the motivational level. Our construction explicitly
incorporates it into our axiom (New V) governing subtensions.
Another respect in which our constructiondiffersfromthat of ZF
or its class-theoretic relatives is the combination of a 'universal'
object with the absence of a complement operation: for every x,
xc*V; but if for every x #0, xEy, then Oey also.
It follows from (New V) that if F is small, then *F = *G if and
only if F and F are coextensive; if neither F nor G is small, then
F- *G (for F and G then satisfythe definition of 'similar').Our
construction, as we have noted, concentrates the non-one-one-
ness of the function * in a single value, the object V*. A theorem
of set theory throws some light on the question how non-one-one
any function like * from concepts to objects must be. It follows
from the Zermelo-Konig inequality (which can be proved in ZF
plus the axiom of choice) that for any infinite set x and functionf
from the power set of x into x, there is a member a of x such that
there are at least as many subsetsy of x such thatfy = a as there
are subsetsof x altogether. Thus (higher-orderset theory implies
that) any attempt to assign concepts (classes) to objects must
assign to some one object as many concepts as there are concepts
altogether. There is then a clear sense in which the failureof * to
be a one-one function is no worse than necessary and the
replacement of extensions 'F by subtensions *F is a minimal
departure from the project of the Grundgesetze. The theorem also
shows that project not to have been a near miss.
Although I have given an informal sketch of the derivation of
General Set theory from (New V), it is to be emphasized that this
derivation can be carriedout formallyin axiomatic second-order
logic in which the sole axiom (other than the standardaxioms of
second-orderlogic) is (New V). (Of course the rules of formation
will guarantee that for each concept variable F, *F is a term of
the type of object variables.)
There remains a matter not yet attended to: the consistencyof
(New V). It should now be no surprisethat (New V) is consistent
'In his CantorianSet Theoryand Limitationof Size, Oxford University Press, 1984.
150 GEORGEBOOLOS
(if second-order arithmetic is). Indeed, it is quite simple to

provide a standard second order model for (New V).
As in the proof of the consistency of Numbers, let the object
variables range over all natural numbers. Since the model is
standard and its domain is countably infinite, a subset X of the
domain satisfies'is small' if and only if X is finite. We must now
supply a suitable function T from sets of natural numbers to
natural numbers with which to interpret *.
Let D be some one-one map of all finite sets of natural
numbers into the natural numbers. The best known such D is
given by: D(X) = the number whose binary numeral, for every
number x, contains a 1 at the 2X'splace iffxeX.) Then if X and Y
are finite sets of natural numbers, 1 + D(X) = 1 + D(Y) iff
X =Y.
For any set X of natural numbers, let T(X) = 0 if X is infinite
and = 1 + D(X) if X is finite. Then T(X) T(Y) iff either X and
Y are both infinite or X Y, iff (if X or Y is finite - X Y).
Thus (New V) does indeed have a standardmodel: it is true over
the natural numbers when * is interpreted by T. Utilizing the
particular function D defined above, we can convert the
foregoing argument into a proof of the consistency of (New V)
(relative to that of second-order arithmetic) in the usual way.
How then does (New V) prevent Russell's paradox?Let's try
to re-derive it: By comprehension,let R be the first-levelconcept
[x: ] F(x*=FA1Fx)]. If 1R*R, then since for all F, *R=
*F-F*R, R*R. So R*R. So for some F, *R *F andiF*R. But
we cannot show that Vx(Rx Fx) unlesswe can show that F or R
is small, and this there is no way of doing if second-order
arithmetic is consistent. The unsurprisingconclusion is that R is
not small. It is more interestingto note that since every number
fails to fall under at least one concept of which its is the number,
the Russellian number N[x:3F(x=NF A-Fx)] is (provably)
identical with N[x: 3F x = NF], the number of numbers.
A piece of mathematics carried out in an inconsistenttheory
need not be vitiated by the inconsistencyof the theory: it may be
possible to develop the mathematics in a suitable proper
subtheory. The development of arithmetic outlined in the
Grundlagencan be carried out in the consistent theory obtained
by adding Numbers to the system of Begriffsschriftas well as in
the inconsistent system of the Grundgesetze.Consistent systems
similar to, but stronger than, (New V) plus second-order logic

can readily be given, e.g., by replacing 'small' by 'countable'. It
would be of some interest to find out how much of the
mathematics done in the Grundgesetze can be reproduced in such
systems.8
'Research for this paper was carried out under a grant from the National Science
Foundation.

Boolos (1987) Saving Frege From Contradiction

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Boolos (1987) Saving Frege From Contradiction

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Saving Frege from Contradiction

Author(s): George Boolos

The sophisticated definition of numbers as extensions of certain

Numbers range over all natural numbers, the concept variables

for the introduction of the functorN, 'the number belonging to';

5Aberdeen University Press, 1983.

formula expressing the order-isomorphismof the relations that

In the appendix to the second volume of his Grundgesetze,

book FregeandthePhilosophy of Mathematics.6 I want to consider

6Cornell University Press, 1980.

subconcept of a small concept is small and any concept

theory' from (New V), taking the development of arithmetic

of the remaining axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory plus

small. (Michael Hallett has effectively criticized the thought

(if second-order arithmetic is). Indeed, it is quite simple to

similar to, but stronger than, (New V) plus second-order logic

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