1. Republic Act No.

10883 - An Act Providing for a New Anti-Carnapping Law

of the Philippines or New Anti-Carnapping Act of 2016

PEOPLE v. MACARANAS; G.R. No. 226846; June 21, 2017

FACTS:

Frank Karim Langaman and his girlfriend Kathlyn Irish Mae Cervantes were at
Meyland Village, Meycauayan, Bulacan in the evening of February 18, 2007, aboard
Frank’s motorcycle. When they were about to leave, three men suddenly approached
them. One of the three held Frank by the neck and shot him causing him to fall down.
The same man pointed his gun at Kathlyn and demanded that she give him her
cellphone. After she gave her cellphone, the same man hit her back. Kathlyn pretended
to be unconscious. The three men left together riding Frank’s motorcycle. It was then
that Kathlyn was able to seek help and Frank was taken at the hospital. Eventually,
Frank died on March 30, 2007.

An information was filed against Richard Lalata and a certain John Doe charging
them of violation of R.A. No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972).

The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Carnapping. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court and the CA committed an error in giving full
credence to the testimony of the lone witness.

HELD:

No, the trial court and the CA did not commit an error in giving full credence to
the testimony of the lone witness.

Carnapping is the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle and it becomes

qualified or aggravated when, in the course of the commission or on the occasion of the
carnapping, the owner, driver or occupant is killed or raped. It is similar to the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide.

The elements of carnapping as defined under R.A. No. 6539 are:

1.) That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;

2.) That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
 3.) That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or taking was
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using
force upon things; and

4.) That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle.

To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be
proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original
criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the
commission of the carnapping on the occasion thereof.

In this case, all elements are present. The trial court has the unique position in
directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. The testimony of Kathlyn
satisfies the test of credibility. More importantly, during her time at the witness stand,
Kathlyn positively and categorically identified accused as one of the three men who
committed the crime.

2. Presidential Decree 1612 - Anti Fencing Law of 1979

CAHULOGAN v. PEOPLE; G.R. No. 225695; March 21, 2018

FACTS:

Johnson Tan, a businessman engaged in transporting Coca-Cola products

instructed his truck driver and helper, Braulio Lopez and Loreto Lariosa to deliver 210
cases of Coca-Cola products worth Php52,476.00 to Denims Store. The next day, Tan
discovered that his helpers delivered the items to Ireneo Cahulogan’s store. Tan then
went to Cahulogan and informed him that the delivery was a mistake and that he was
pulling out the items. Cahulogan refused, claiming that he bought the same from
Lariosa for Php50,000.00, but could not present any receipt as evidence. Tan secured
an authorization to file cases from Coca-Cola and charge Cahulogan with the crime of
fencing.

The RTC found Cahulogan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
The CA affirmed Cahulogan’s conviction as his possession of the stolen items
constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing – a presumption he failed to rebut.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Cahulogan’s conviction for the crime of
fencing.

HELD:
 Yes, the CA correctly upheld Cahulogan’s conviction.

Fencing as “the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for
another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall
buy and sell or in any other manner deal in any article item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of
the crime of robbery or theft.”

The essential elements of the crim of fencing are as follows:

1.) A crime of robbery or theft has been committed

2.) The accused, who is not the principal or an accomplice in the commission of
the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells, or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any
article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft;

3.) The accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft;

4.) There is, on the part of one of the accused, imtent to gain for oneself or for
another.

In this case, the courts found that the prosecution was able to establish beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime of fencing.

a.) Lariosa sold to Cahulogan the items without consent from Tan for his own
personal gain;

b.) Cahulogan bought the items from Lariosa and was in possession of the same;

c.) Cahulogan should have been forewarned that the items came from an illegal
source, as his transaction with Lariosa did not have any accompanying official
receipts;

d.) Cahulogan’s intent to gain was evident when he bought the items for only
Php50,000.00 lower than their original value.

The court finds no reason to deviate the factual findings of the trial courts as
there is no indication that it overlooked the surrounding facts and circumstances of the
case.
3. Republic Act No. 10591 - An Act Providing For A Comprehensive Law On
Firearms And Ammunition And Providing Penalties For Violations Thereof

DE GUZMAN v. PEOPLE; G.R. No. 240475; July 24, 2019

FACTS:

On October 22, 2014, SPO1 Ador Estera and 9 other police officers were on
patrol along Taft Avenue. As they approached the White House Market, they noticed
people were running away from it. They saw a revolver-wielding man, whom they later
identified as De Guzman, shouting as though quarreling with someone. SPO1 Estera
told De Guzman to put down the gun, to which he complied. SPO1 Estera asked him if
he had a license to possess it, but he kept mum. SPO1 Estera then handcuffed De
Guzman, discovering in his possession a sachet of suspected shabu.

However, the defense alleged an entirely different version of events. It

emphasized, first, that De Guzman was arrested on October 21, 2014 not on the 22 nd.
On October 21, De Guzman and his sister, Jessica, were dressing chicken to sell at the
public market. While they were taking a break, 10 men in civilian clothes arrived, as
though looking for something. Among the, SPO1 Estera, as De Guzman later identified,
approached De Guzman and asked him why he had knives. He replied that he used
them for dressing chickens. SPO1 Estera asked him if they had a mayor’s permit, to
which De Guzman replied that since they merely operated a small business, they did
not obtain such a permit.

Calling De Guzman’s reply “bastos,” SPO1 Estera pulled out his gun and pointed
it at him. De Guzman begged SPO1 Estera for forgiveness. SPO1 Estera took his knives
and ordered him to lie on his stomach then frisked him but found nothing. As SPO1
Estera’s companions arrived, Estera told them that he was arresting De Guzman for
having the knives in his possession. SPO1 Estera allegedly demanded Php300,000.00
from De Guzman otherwise he will be charged with illegal possession of firearm and
dangerous drugs. Unable to produce the amount, De Guzman was charged with the
threatened offenses.

De Guzman noted that he did not know SPO1 Estera. He recalled, however, that
about a month prior to his arrest, he won a Php50,000.00 cockfight bet against Estera.
De Guzman also admitted to owning a firearm, a .45 caliber Amscor, covered by a
Firearm License and a Permit to carry along with a Certification that he was indeed a
firearm holder. He emphasized that there was no point in him carrying an unlicensed
firearm when he had a licensed gun.

The RTC convicted De Guzman. According to it, the presentation of .38 caliber
revolver couple with SPO1 Estera’s identification of them as the same items obtained
from De Guzman established the elements for conviction of the charge of illegal
possession of firearm. The CA affirmed De Guzman’s conviction as well.

ISSUE:

Whether or not De Guzman is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating R.A.

10591.

HELD:

No, it was a serious error for the CA to affirm De Guzman’s conviction.

Proof of reasonable doubt demands moral certainty. The prosecution’s reliance

on nothing more than the lone testimony of a witness, who is faulted with a vendetta
and illegal activities allegedly committed against the accused, hardly establishes moral
certainty.

To sustain convictions for illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution must

show two essential elements:

1.) That the firearm subject of the offense exists; and

2.) That the accused who possessed or owned the firearm had no corresponding
license for it.

The RTC was quick to conclude that the 1 st element was shown merely when the
prosecution presented a .38 caliber revolver and had them identified by SPO1 Estera.

On the 2nd element, the RTC noted not only a Certification issued by the Firearms
and Explosive Division of PNP belying petitioner’s license or registration to possess, but
also petitioner’s own declaration that he had no such license to possess a .38 caliber
revolver. It was an error for RTC to say petitioner’s own declaration that he had no
license to own, possess or carry a .38 caliber revolver was enough to establish the 2 nd
element for conviction. Petitioner’s point was that he had no reason to brandish an
unlicensed firearm when he already had a perfectly legitimate, licensed gun. He was
making his own positive assertion, not an admission.

In what amounted to a contest between 2 vastly different accounts, the standard

proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been met by the prosecution by
wagering its case on no one but SPO1 Estera.