Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 175602               February 13, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs.
P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ, Accused-Appellants.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The two accused were tried for three counts of murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon
City. On January 20, 2005, after trial, the RTC convicted them as charged, prescribed on each of them the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count, and ordered them to pay to the heirs of each victim ₱93,000.00 _as actual
damages, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the modification that each of the accused
pay to the heirs of each victim ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus costs of suit.

The two accused then came to the Court on final appeal, but on May 9, 2007, Edwin Valdez filed a motion to
withdraw appeal, which the Court granted on October 10, 2007, thereby deeming Edwin’s appeal closed and
terminated.1

On January 18, 2012, the Court promulgated its judgment on the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez, finding him guilty
of three counts of homicide, instead of three counts of murder, and meting on him for each count of homicide the
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum,2 to
wit:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18, 2006 is MODIFIED by finding PO2
Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE, and sentencing him to suffer for
each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum; and to pay to the respective heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and
Joselito Sayson the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Subsequently, Edwin sent to the Court Administrator a selfexplanatory letter 3 dated March 12, 2012, where he
pleaded for the application to him of the judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 on the ground that the
judgment would be beneficial to him as an accused. The letter reads as follows:

HON. MIDAS MARQUEZ

Court Administrator
Office of the Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Manila

SUBJECT: Re. Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of Rules of Court, Request for.
Your honor,

The undersigned most respectfully requesting through your Honorable office, assistance on the subject mentioned
above.

I, Edwin and Eduardo, both surnamed Valdez were both charged before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 86,
Quezon City for the entitled Crime of Murder in Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-90718 to Q-0090720, which convicted us
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for each of the three (3) offense.

Then after the decision of the RTC Branch 86, the same was appealed to the Court of Appeals with CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00876 and again on July 18, 2006 the Honorable Court of appeals Ninth Division issued a Decision AFFIRMED
the questioned Decision with MODIFICATION.

Only my Co-principal Accused EDUARDO V. VALDEZ enterposed appealed (sic) the Affirmatory Decision of the
Honorable Court of Appeals to the Highest Tribunal with G.R. Nos. 175602. On my part, I decided to withdraw my
appeal, because I believe that there is no more hope for me, but I was wrong when I read the Decision of the First
Division of the Supreme Court, dated January 18, 2012 signed by the Chief Justice Honorable Renato C. Corona
and finally I found hope.

And now I come to your Honorable Office through this letter to seek help and assistance that the Decision of the
Supreme Court to my Brother Eduardo V. Valdez may also benefitted (sic) the undersigned through Section 11 (a) ,
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

"(a) An Appeal taken by the one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar
as the judgment of the Appellate Court is favorable and applicable to the latter: x x x"

Favorable Humanitarian consideration on this matter.

Thank you very much and more power, God Bless.

Respectfully yours

EDWIN V. VALDEZ

Through a comment filed on September 25, 2012,4 the Solicitor General interposed no opposition to the plea for the
reduction of Edwin’s sentences for being in full accord with the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence.

We grant the plea for reduction of Edwin’s sentences.

The final judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 downgraded the crimes committed by Eduardo from three
counts of murder to three counts of homicide, and consequently prescribed lighter penalties in the form of
indeterminate sentences. As a result, Eduardo would serve only an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision
mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, under which he can qualify for parole in due
course by virtue of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, instead of suffering the indivisible penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count.

The Court rationalized the result as follows:

x x x The records show that the version of PO2 Valdez was contrary to the established facts and
circumstances showing that he and Edwin, then armed with short firearms, had gone to the jai alai betting
station of Moises to confront Jonathan Rubio, the teller of the betting booth then busily attending to bettors
inside the booth; that because the accused were calling to Rubio to come out of the booth, Moises
approached to pacify them, but one of them threatened Moises; Gusto mo unahin na kita?; that immediately
after Moises replied: Huwag!, PO2 Valdez fired several shots at Moises, causing him to fall to the ground;
that PO2 Valdez continued firing at the fallen Moises; that Ferdinand (another victim) rushed to aid Moises,
his brother, but Edwin shot Ferdinand in the head, spilling his brains; that somebody shouted to Joselito
(the third victim) to run; that Edwin also shot Joselito twice in the back; and that Joselito fell on a burger
machine. The shots fired at the three victims were apparently fired from short distances.

The testimonial accounts of the State’s witnesses entirely jibed with the physical evidence. Specifically, the medico-
legal evidence showed that Ferdinand had a gunshot wound in the head; that two gunshot wounds entered
Joselito’s back and the right side of his neck; and that Moises suffered a gunshot wound in the head and four
gunshot wounds in the chest. Also, Dr. Wilfredo Tierra of the NBI Medico-Legal Office opined that the presence of
marginal abrasions at the points of entry indicated that the gunshot wounds were inflicted at close range. Given that
physical evidence was of the highest order and spoke the truth more eloquently than all witnesses put together, the
congruence between the testimonial recollections and the physical evidence rendered the findings adverse to PO2
Valdez and Edwin conclusive.

Thirdly, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit the felony. Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be direct because
conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their acts. Herein, both lower courts deduced the conspiracy between
the accused from the mode and manner in which they perpetrated the killings. We are satisfied that their deduction
was warranted.

Based on the foregoing, PO2 Valdez cannot now avoid criminal responsibility for the fatal shooting by
Edwin of Ferdinand and Joselito. Both accused were convincingly shown to have acted in concert to
achieve a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns. Their acting in concert was
manifest not only from their going together to the betting station on board a single motorcycle, but also
from their joint attack that PO2 Valdez commenced by firing successive shots at Moises and immediately
followed by Edwin’s shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito one after the other. It was also significant that they
fled together on board the same motorcycle as soon as they had achieved their common purpose.

To be a conspirator, one did not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither did he have to
know the exact part performed by his co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal acts. Accordingly, the
existence of the conspiracy between PO2 Valdez and Edwin was properly inferred and proved through their
acts that were indicative of their common purpose and community of interest.

And, fourthly, it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three homicides, instead of
three murders, on account of the informations not sufficiently alleging the attendance of treachery.

Treachery is the employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of any of the crimes against persons
which tend to directly and specially insure its execution, without risk to the offending party arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. It encompasses a wide variety of actions and attendant circumstances, the
appreciation of which is particular to a crime committed. Corollarily, the defense against the appreciation of a
circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is also varied and dependent on each particular instance. Such variety
generates the actual need for the state to specifically aver the factual circumstances or particular acts that constitute
the criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate the liability for the crime in the interest of affording the accused
sufficient notice to defend himself.

It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption
or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information. In People v. Dimaano, the Court elaborated:

For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or
part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of
the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in
such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does
not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated
in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined
by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the
elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him
so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. [emphasis supplied]

The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused "with intent to kill, qualified with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did x x x assault, attack and employ
personal violence upon" the victims "by then and there shooting them with a gun, hitting [them]" on various
parts of their bodies "which were the direct and immediate cause of their deaths" did not sufficiently set
forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the killings. It should not be
difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not
show how the execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from
the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per
se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of
the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a
conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting
treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the informations.

x x x. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and
cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. This requirement accords
with the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in the
body of the information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he must be tried
thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice, x x x.

xxxx

x x x. There being no circumstances modifying criminal liability, the penalty is applied in its medium period (ie., 14
years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence is taken from prision mayor, and the maximum from the medium period of reclusion
temporal. Hence, the Court imposes the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to
17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum for each count of homicide.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18, 2006 is MODIFIED by finding PO2
Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE, and sentencing him to suffer
for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay to the respective heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson, Moises
Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied)

On his part, Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of the downgrading of the crimes committed
(and the resultant lighter penalties) despite the finality of his convictions for three counts of murder due to his
withdrawal of his appeal. The downgrading of the crimes committed would definitely be favorable to him. Worth
pointing out is that to deny to him the benefit of the lessened criminal responsibilities would be highly unfair,
considering that this Court had found the two accused to have acted in concert in their deadly assault against the
victims, warranting their equal liabiliy under the principle of conspiracy.

We grant Edwin’s plea based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which relevantly provides:

Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. – (a) An appeal taken by one or more of several
accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is
favorable and applicable to the latter.
 xxxx

In this connection, the Court has pronounced in Lim v. Court of Appeals6 that the benefits of this provision extended
to all the accused, regardless of whether they appealed or not, to wit:

As earlier stated, both petitioner and the OSG laterally argue that in the event of Guingguing’s acquittal, petitioner
should likewise be acquitted, based on Rule 122, Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, which states:

SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.-

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as
the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

Private respondent however, contends that said provision is not applicable to petitioner inasmuch as he appealed
from his conviction, and the provision states that a favorable judgment shall be applicable only to those who did not
appeal.

A literal interpretation of the phrase "did not appeal," as espoused by private respondent, will not give justice to the
purpose of the provision.

It should be read in its entirety and should not be myopically construed so as to defeat its reason, i.e., to benefit an
accused who did not join in the appeal of his co-accused in case where the appellate judgment is favorable. In fact,
several cases rendered by the Court applied the foregoing provision without regard as to the filing or non-filing of an
appeal by a coaccused, so long as the judgment was favorable to him.

In People v. Artellero, the Court extended the acquittal of Rodriguez’s co-accused to him despite the withdrawal of
his appeal, applying the Rule 122, Section 11(a), and considering that the evidence against both are inextricably
linked, to wit:

Although it is only appellant who persisted with the present appeal, the well-established rule is that an appeal in a
criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the
parties. The records show that Rodriguez had withdrawn his appeal due to financial reasons. However, Section 11
(a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not
affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellant court is favorable and applicable to
the latter." As we have elucidated, the evidence against and the conviction of both appellant and Rodriguez are
inextricably linked. Hence, appellant’s acquittal, which is favorable and applicable to Rodriguez, should benefit the
latter.

In People v. Arondain, the Court found accused Arondain guilty only of homicide.  Such verdict was applied to his
1âwphi1

co-accused, Jose Precioso, who was previously found guilty by the trial court of robbery with homicide, despite the
fact that Precioso appealed but failed to file an appellant’s brief. The Court also modified Precioso’s civil liability
although the additional monetary award imposed on Arondain was not extended to Precioso since it was not
favorable to him and he did not pursue the appeal before the Court.

In People v. De Lara, Eduardo Villas, together with several coaccused, were found by the trial court guilty of forcible
abduction. During pendency of the review before the Court, Villas withdrew his appeal, hence his conviction became
final and executory. Thereafter, the Court found Villas’ co-accused guilty only of grave coercion. Applying Rule 122,
Section 11(a), the Court also found Villas guilty of the lesser offense of grave coercion since it is beneficial to him.

In People v. Escaño, the Court granted a motion filed by accused Julian Deen Escaño, praying that the Court’s
Decision dated January 28, 2000, acquitting his co-accused Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez in Criminal Case
No. 95-936 for violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, be applied to him. Escaño
originally filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court but later withdrew the same.

In the foregoing cases, all the accused appealed from their judgments of conviction but for one reason or another,
the conviction became final and executory. Nevertheless, the Court still applied to them the favorable judgment in
favor of their co-accused. The Court notes that the Decision dated September 30, 2005 in G.R. No. 128959 stated,
"'the verdict of guilt with respect to Lim [herein petitioner] had already become final and executory." In any event, the
Court cannot see why a different treatment should be given to petitioner, given that the judgment is favorable to him
and considering further that the Court's finding in its Decision dated September 30, 2005 specifically stated that "the
publication of the subject advertisement by petitioner and Lim cannot be deemed by this Court to have been done
with actual malice."7

ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the plea of EDWIN VALDEZ for the application to him of the judgment
promulgated on January 18, 2012 finding P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ guilty of three counts of homicide, and
sentencing him to suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17
years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay to the respective heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson, the late
Moises Sayson, Jr., and the late Joselito Sayson the amounts of₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages for each count.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 172035               July 4, 2012

FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, Petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by Fernando Q. Miguel (petitioner), assailing the
1 

January 25, 2006 and March 27, 2006 resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. These resolutions (i) ordered the
2 

petitioner’s suspension from public office and (ii) denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the suspension
order.

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

On May 29, 1996, then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other local officials of Koronadal City, South Cotabato
3 

filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman) charging the petitioner, among
4 

others, with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, in connection with the consultancy services for the
5 

architectural aspect, the engineering design, and the construction supervision and management of the proposed
Koronadal City public market (project). 6 

In a June 27, 1996 order, the Ombudsman directed the petitioner, among others, to submit his counter-affidavit. On
October 23, 1996, after moving for an extension, the petitioner filed his counter-affidavit. In its July 29, 1999
7 

resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause against the petitioner and some private individuals for violation of
R.A. No. 3019 and against the petitioner alone for Falsification of Public Document under Article 171, par. 4 of the
Revised Penal Code. 8 

On March 1, 2000, the Ombudsman filed the corresponding informations with the Sandiganbayan. The information
9 

for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads:

That on 10 January 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Koronadal, South
Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the [petitioner], a high ranking public officer
in his capacity as former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato, and as such while in the performance of
his official functions, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position,
conspiring and confederating with the private [individuals] xxx acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits and advantages to said [accused], by
inviting them to participate in the prequalification of consultants to provide the Detailed Architectural & Engineering
Design and Construction Supervision and Management of the proposed Koronadal Public Market, without causing
the publication of said invitation in a newspaper of general circulation, thereby excluding other consultants from
participating in said prequalification. (Emphases and underscoring added)
10 

On motions separately filed by two of the petitioner’s co-accused, the Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the
11 

Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a reinvestigation. On August 21, 2000, the petitioner, through counsel,
followed suit and orally moved for a reinvestigation, which the Sandiganbayan likewise granted. The Sandiganbayan
gave the petitioner ten (10) days within which to file his counter-affidavit with the OSP. 12 

Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, the petitioner asked the Sandiganbayan for a thirty-day extension to
13 

submit his counter-affidavit. Shortly before the expiry of the extension requested, the petitioner asked the OSP for
14 

an additional thirty-day period to file his counter-affidavit. Despite the two extensions asked and granted, the
petitioner asked the OSP anew for a twenty-day extension period. 15 

Despite the extension period asked and given, the petitioner failed to file his counter-affidavit, prompting Prosecutor
Norberto B. Ruiz to declare that the petitioner had waived his right to submit countervailing evidence (April 25, 2001
resolution). On July 31, 2001, then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the resolution. 16 

On August 7, 2001, Prosecutor Ruiz asked the Sandiganbayan for the arraignment and trial of the petitioner and of
the other accused private individuals. 17 

On August 6, 2002, after several extensions sought and granted, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash and/or
Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against him. On February 18, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied the
petitioner’s motion because of the pending OSP reinvestigation – this, despite the OSP’s earlier termination of the
reinvestigation for the petitioner’s continuous failure to submit his counter-affidavit. The petitioner did not question
18 

the denial of his motion.

On November 3, 2004, the petitioner was arraigned; he pleaded not guilty in both criminal cases. 19 

On April 28, 2005, the OSP filed a Motion to Suspend [the petitioner] Pendente Lite. On June 27, 2005, the
petitioner filed his "Vigorous Opposition" based on the "obvious and fatal defect of the [i]nformation" in failing to
allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages was done through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. 20 

On January 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed resolution suspending the petitioner pendente
21 

lite –

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Prosecution’s Motion is GRANTED. As prayed for, the Court hereby
orders the suspension of [the petitioner] from his position as City Mayor, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, and from
any other public position he now holds. His suspension shall be for a period of ninety (90) days only. 22 

On February 2, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of his suspension order and demanded for a pre-
suspension hearing. The Sandiganbayan denied his motion, prompting him to file this certiorari petition to
23  24 

challenge the validity of his suspension order.

THE PETITION 

The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering his suspension despite the
failure of the information to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages by the petitioner was
made through "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence." He alleges that the phrases
"evident bad faith" and "manifest partiality" actually refers not to him, but to his co-accused, rendering the
25 

information fatally defective.

The petitioner bewails the lack of hearing before the issuance of his suspension order. Citing Luciano, et al. v. Hon.
Mariano, etc., et al., he claims that "[n]owhere in the records of the [case] can [one] see any order or resolution
26 

requiring the [p]etitioner to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended." For 27 

the petitioner, the requirement of a pre-suspension hearing can only be satisfied if the Sandiganbayan ordered an
actual hearing to settle the "defect" in the information.

THE OSP’S COMMENT 

The OSP argues for the sufficiency of the information since all the elements of the offense under Section 3(b) of
R.A. No. 3019 are specifically pleaded by way of ultimate facts. These elements are:

1. The petitioner was the Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato at the time material to the acts
complained of;

2. The petitioner acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith when he invited only his co-accused
private individuals to participate in the prequalification of consultants for the project instead of publishing it in
a newspaper of general circulation; and

3. The petitioner’s actions, performed in relation to his office, gave unwarranted benefits and advantages to
his co-accused. 28 

The OSP faults the petitioner for his attempt to mislead the Court on the sufficiency of the allegations in the
information, by conveniently failing to cite the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality" when the
petitioner quoted the "relevant" portions of the information in his petition.

Citing Juan v. People, the OSP argues that while no actual pre-suspension hearing was conducted, the events
29 

preceding the issuance of the suspension order already satisfied the purpose of conducting a pre-suspension
hearing – i.e., basically, to determine the validity of the information. Here, the petitioner was afforded his right to
preliminary investigation both by the Ombudsman and by the OSP (when the petitioner moved for a reinvestigation
with the Sandiganbayan); the acts for which the petitioner was charged constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 and
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code; and the petitioner already moved to quash the information, although
unsuccessfully, after he had been declared to have waived his right to submit countervailing evidence in the
reinvestigation by the OSP. 30 

ISSUES

There are only two issues presented for our resolution:

1. Whether the information, charging the petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, is valid;
and

2. If it is valid, whether the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing renders invalid the suspension
order against the petitioner.

THE COURT’S RULING

We dismiss the petition for failure to establish any grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the assailed
resolutions.

The information for violation of R.A. No. 3019 is valid

In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation
against him, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules) requires, inter alia, that the
31  32 
information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which
constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these acts or omissions and its attendant
circumstances "must be stated in ordinary and concise language" and "in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged x x x and for the court to pronounce judgment." 33 

The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such
particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged. In particular,
whether an information validly charges an offense depends on whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or
information shall establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. The raison d’etre of
the requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. 34 

In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond the standard of a "person of
common understanding" in appreciating the import of the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality." A reading of the information clearly reveals that the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality" was merely a continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused
private individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic reading of the information would yield.

Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have us believe that this elemental phrase was actually omitted in the
information when, in his reaction to the OSP’s comment, what the petitioner actually disputes is simply the clarity of
35 

the phrase’s position, in relation with the other averments in the information. Given the supposed ambiguity of the
subject being qualified by the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality," the remedy of the
petitioner, if at all, is merely to move for a bill of particulars and not for the quashal of an information which
sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense charged. 36 

The pre-suspension order is valid

Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:

Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he
failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

While the suspension of a public officer under this provision is mandatory, the suspension requires a prior hearing
37 

to determine "the validity of the information" filed against him, "taking into account the serious and far reaching
38 

consequences of a suspension of an elective public official even before his conviction." The accused public official’s
39 

right to challenge the validity of the information before a suspension order may be issued includes the right to
challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the filing of an information against him, and (ii)
propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts charged do not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of
the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code. 40 

In Luciano v. Mariano that the petitioner relied upon, the Court required, "by way of broad guidelines for the lower
41 

courts in the exercise of the power of suspension," that –

(c) …upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order with proper notice requiring the
accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended from office
pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion for an
order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to quash the information or challenges the validity thereof,
such show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court
duly hear the parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and thereafter hand down its
ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension should it uphold the validity of the information or withholding
such suspension in the contrary case.

(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should
be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him, e.g. that
he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not
constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal
Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a
motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis
supplied)

The petitioner questions the absence of any show cause order issued by the Sandiganbayan before his suspension
in office was ordered. As clear as the day, however, Luciano considered it unnecessary for the trial court to issue a
show cause order when the motion, seeking the suspension of the accused pendente lite, has been submitted by
the prosecution, as in the present case.

The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of the information so that
the trial court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case,
withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its validity.  That
1âwphi1

hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash. 42 

While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the
validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings against him, Luciano likewise emphasizes that no
43 

hard and fast rule exists in regulating its conduct. With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in mind, the
44 

absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a suspension order.

In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court considered the opposition of the accused (to the prosecution’s motion to
45 

suspend pendente lite) as sufficient to dispense with the need to actually set the prosecution’s motion for hearing.
The same conclusion was reached in Juan v. People, where the Court ruled:
46 

In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the validity of the Informations that
had been filed against petitioners, we believe that the numerous pleadings filed for and against them have achieved
the goal of this procedure. The right to due process is satisfied nor just by an oral hearing but by the filing and the
consideration by the court of the parties' pleadings, memoranda and other position papers.

Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public official is given an
adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019,
then an accused would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted. It is well settled that "to
47 

be heard" does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural
due process exists. 48 

In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his Vigorous Opposition (to the OSP’s Motion to Suspend Accused
Pendente Lite), and after receiving an adverse ruling from the Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved for reconsideration of the
suspension order issued against him, and (iii) filed a Reply to the OSP’s Opposition to his plea for
reconsideration. Given this opportunity, we find that the petitioner’s continued demand for the conduct of an actual
49 

pre-suspension hearing – based on the same alleged "defect in the information," which we have found wanting –
50 

has legally nothing to anchor itself on.

Another reason that militates against the petitioner’s position relates to the nature of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019; it
is not a penal provision that would call for a liberal interpretation in favor of the accused public official and a strict
construction against the State. The suspension required under this provision is not a penalty, as it is not imposed as
51 

a result of judicial proceedings; in fact, if acquitted, the accused official shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during his suspension. 52 

Rather, the suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is a mere preventive measure that arises from the legal
53 

presumption that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of
malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the
arrest of the accused. 54 
Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere preventive measure whose duration shall in no case exceed ninety
(90) days, the adequacy of the opportunity to contest the validity of the information and of the proceedings that
55 

preceded its filing vis-à-vis the merits of the defenses of the accused cannot be measured alone by the absence or
presence of an actual hearing. An opportunity to be heard on one’s defenses, however unmeritorious it may be,
against the suspension mandated by law equally and sufficiently serves both the due process right of the accused
and the mandatory nature of the suspension required by law.

Lest it be forgotten, Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reinforces the principle enshrined in the Constitution that a public
office is a public trust. In light of the constitutional principle underlying the imposition of preventive suspension of a
56 

public officer charged under a valid information and the nature of this suspension, the petitioner’s demand for a trial-
type hearing in the present case would only overwhelmingly frustrate, rather than promote, the orderly and speedy
dispensation of justice.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 179031               November 14, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs.
BENJAMIN SORIA y GOMEZ, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This case involves a father’s detestable act of abusing his daughter through rape by sexual assault.

Factual Antecedents

Accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez (appellant) seeks a review of the December 29, 2006 Decision of the 1 

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01442 which affirmed with modification the June 30, 2005
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, in Criminal Case No. Q-01-98692. Said
2 

RTC Judgment found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his daughter
"AAA", as described in an Information, the relevant portion of which reads:
3  4 

That on or about the 26th day of February, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, who is the father of
private complainant "AAA", did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously with force and intimidation commit
an act of sexual assault upon the person of one "AAA", a minor, 7 years of age[,] by then and there inserting his
penis into [the] genital of said complainant, all against her will and consent, which act debases, degrades, or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of said "AAA", as a human being, in violation of said law.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5 

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Pre-trial and trial thereafter ensued.
Version of the Prosecution

On February 26, 2000, "AAA" and her siblings enjoyed the spaghetti their father (appellant) brought home for
merienda. After eating, "AAA" went to the bedroom to rest. Thereafter, appellant also entered the room and
positioned himself on top of "AAA", took off her clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina. "AAA" felt intense
pain from her breast down to her vagina and thus told her father that it was painful. At that point, appellant
apologized to his daughter, stood up, and left the room. This whole incident was witnessed by "AAA’s" brother,
"BBB".

The pain persisted until "AAA’s" vagina started to bleed. She thus told her aunt about it and they proceeded to a
hospital for treatment. Her mother was also immediately informed of her ordeal. Subsequently, "AAA" was taken into
the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

On March 15, 2000, Medico-Legal Officer Francisco A. Supe, Jr., M.D. (Dr. Supe) examined "AAA", which
examination yielded the following results:

GENERAL AND EXTRA-GENITAL: Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female child. Breasts are
undeveloped. Abdomen is flat and soft.

GENITAL: There is absent growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex, and coaptated with light brown labia
minora presenting in between. On separating the same, disclosed an elastic, fleshy type, hyperemic and intact
hymen. Posterior fourchette is sharp.

CONCLUSION: The subject is in virgin state physically. There are no external signs of application of any form of
physical trauma. 6 

Version of the Defense

Appellant admitted that he was at home on the day and time of "AAA’s" alleged rape but denied committing the
same. Instead, he claimed that the filing of the rape case against him was instigated by his wife, whom he
confronted about her illicit affair with a man residing in their community. According to appellant, he could not have
molested "AAA" because he treated her well. In fact, he was the only one sending his children to school since his
wife already neglected them and seldom comes home.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On June 30, 2005, the trial court rendered its Judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
7 

crime of rape against "AAA", his daughter of minor age, as charged in the Information. It ruled that the lack of
tenacious resistance on the part of "AAA" is immaterial considering that appellant’s moral ascendancy and influence
over her substitute for violence and intimidation. It also held that his wife could not have instigated the filing of the
8 

rape case since as the mother of "AAA", it would not be natural for her to use her child as a tool to exact revenge
especially if it will result in her embarrassment and stigma. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of "AAA"
9 

and her positive identification of appellant as her rapist, and rejected the latter’s defense of denial. The dispositive
portion of the Judgment reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the herein accused, BENJAMIN SORIA
Y GOMEZ − GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged and sentences him to suffer the supreme
penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the offended party the amount of P75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00, and the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse
proclivities for aberrant sexual behavior for sexually abusing their own daughters.

SO ORDERED. 10 

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision dated December 29, 2006, the CA found partial merit in the appeal. While the appellate court was
11 

convinced that appellant raped "AAA", it nevertheless noted the prosecution’s failure to present her birth certificate
as competent proof of her minority. Thus, the CA concluded that the crime committed by appellant against his
daughter was only simple rape and accordingly modified the penalty imposed by the trial court from death to
reclusion perpetua and reduced the civil indemnity awarded from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00. The dispositive portion
of the appellate court’s Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the June 30, 2005 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, in Criminal Case No. Q-01-98692, is hereby MODIFIED, in that, the
penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua instead of death and the civil indemnity to be paid by the offender
to the victim is hereby reduced to the amount of P50,000.00 instead of P75,000.00 pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence as explained in this decision.

Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC
dated September 28, 2004, which became effective on October 15, 2004, this judgment of the Court of Appeals may
be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED. 12 

Still insisting on his innocence, appellant comes to this Court through this appeal.

Assignment of Errors

Appellant adopts the same assignment of errors he raised before the appellate court, viz:

I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF RAPE
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE X X X.

II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED, THE TRIAL
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON HIM. 13 

Appellant asserts that he should be acquitted of the crime of rape since there is no evidence that would establish
the fact of sexual intercourse. Aside from the prosecution’s failure to prove penile contact, "AAA’s" testimony was
also wanting in details as to how he took off her underwear or whether she saw his penis during the incident despite
leading questions propounded on the matter by the prosecution. The medical report even revealed that "AAA’s"
hymen remained intact and that there were no notable lacerations or external physical injuries thereon. Appellant
therefore surmises that his wife merely instigated "AAA" to file this baseless rape case against him in retaliation for
his act of confronting her about her illicit relationship with a neighbor.

Our Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

The crime of rape under Article 266-A of

the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, classified the crime of rape as a crime
against persons. It also amended Article 335 of the RPC and incorporated therein Article 266-A which reads:

Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,

 c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present;

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an
act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Thus, rape can now be committed either through sexual intercourse or by sexual assault. Rape under paragraph 1
of the above-cited article is referred to as rape through sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge is the central element
and it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is commonly denominated as "organ rape" or "penile rape" and
14  15 

must be attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.

On the other hand, rape under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A is commonly known as rape by sexual assault. The
perpetrator, under any of the attendant circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1, commits this kind of rape by
inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal
orifice of another person. It is also called "instrument or object rape", also "gender-free rape". 16 

The Information did not specify whether

the crime of rape was committed through
sexual intercourse or by sexual assault.

The Information in this case did not specify with certainty whether appellant committed the rape through sexual
intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, or rape by sexual assault as described in paragraph 2 thereof. The
Information stated that appellant inserted his penis into the genital of "AAA," which constituted rape by sexual
intercourse under the first paragraph of Article 266-A. At the same time, the Information alleged that appellant used
force and intimidation to commit an act of sexual assault. While these allegations cause ambiguity, they only pertain
to the mode or manner of how the rape was committed and the same do not invalidate the Information or result in
the automatic dismissal of the case. "[W]here an offense may be committed in any of the different modes and the
offense is alleged to have been committed in two or more modes specified, the indictment is sufficient,
notwithstanding the fact that the different means of committing the same offense are prohibited by separate sections
of the statute. The allegation in the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be regarded as
a description of only one offense and the information is not thereby rendered defective on the ground of
multifariousness." Any objection from the appellant with respect to the Information is held to have been waived
17 

failing any effort to oppose the same before trial. He therefore can be convicted of rape through sexual intercourse
18 

or rape by sexual assault, depending on the evidence adduced during trial.

The findings of the RTC and the CA on

the credibility of "AAA" deserve respect

and great weight.

Both the trial court and the CA held that "AAA" was a credible witness. They ruled that her testimony deserved
credence and is sufficient evidence that she was raped by appellant. We find no cogent reason to overturn these
findings.

It would be highly inconceivable for "AAA" to impute to her own father the crime of raping her unless the imputation
is true. In fact, it takes "a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which
19 

would put her own father in jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself to a
lifetime of shame" unless the imputation is true.
20 

When a rape victim’s testimony on the manner she was defiled is "straightforward and candid, and is corroborated
by the medical findings of the examining physician as in this case, the same is sufficient to support a conviction for
rape."21 
Appellant is guilty of rape by sexual

assault and not through sexual

intercourse.

The trial court’s conviction of the appellant was for rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1(a) of Article
266-A. The CA sustained the trial court’s finding that appellant had sexual intercourse with "AAA" against her will.

In determining whether appellant is indeed guilty of rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article
266-A, it is essential to establish beyond reasonable doubt that he had carnal knowledge of "AAA". There must be
proof that his penis touched the labia of "AAA" or slid into her female organ, and not merely stroked the external
surface thereof, to ensure his conviction of rape by sexual intercourse. 22 
1ªvvph!1

We reviewed the testimony of "AAA" and found nothing therein that would show that she was raped through sexual
intercourse. While "AAA" categorically stated that she felt something inserted into her vagina, her testimony was
sorely lacking in important details that would convince us with certainty that it was indeed the penis of appellant that
was placed into her vagina.

When "AAA" was placed on the witness stand, she narrated that:

Q - The earlier statement which you made when you said that you wanted to explain something about your father, is
that true?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - So, you said that you wanted to explain something about your father, what was that?

A - What he did, sir.

Q - What was that?

A - I was raped, sir.

Q - What did he do when you said he raped you?

A - He laid on top of me, sir. 23 

xxxx

Q - So when you said he laid on top of you, did you feel anything? Did you feel any pain in any part of your body?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - In what part of your body did you feel pain?

A - I felt pain in my breast and my stomach.

Q - What about your private part?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - Did you know why your stomach as well as your body and your private part hurt or become painful?

A - I don’t know, sir.

Q - Did you feel something inserted into your private part?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - What is that, if you know?

A - The bird of my papa.

Q - Why did you know that?

A - Because my brother, "BBB", told me.

Q - Why? Was "BBB", your brother, present when your father was on top of you?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - Why do you know that he was there?

A - He told me so, sir.

Q - Who?

A - "BBB".

Q - Okay, when you felt pain as something was inserted [into] your private part, what did you say to your father?

A - He left the room.

Q - Before he went away and left?

A - It was painful, sir.

Q - And what was the answer of your father?

A - He said sorry, sir.

Q - How long was he or how long were you in that position, you were lying down and your father was on top of you?

A - I do not know, sir. 24 

xxxx

Q - Earlier, you were making reference to your father whom you said abused you. I am asking you now to tell us if
your father is around?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - Will you please point x x x to him?

A - Yes, sir. (Witness pointing to a man who is wearing yellow t-shirt and maong pants who when asked identified
himself as Benjamin Soria.)

Q - Is he the same person who according to you laid on top of you and inserted something into your vagina or
private part?
A - Yes, sir. 25 

It is evident from the testimony of "AAA" that she was unsure whether it was indeed appellant’s penis which touched
her labia and entered her organ since she was pinned down by the latter’s weight, her father having positioned
himself on top of her while she was lying on her back. "AAA" stated that she only knew that it was the "bird" of her
father which was inserted into her vagina after being told by her brother "BBB". Clearly, "AAA" has no personal
knowledge that it was appellant’s penis which touched her labia and inserted into her vagina. Hence, it would be
erroneous to conclude that there was penile contact based solely on the declaration of "AAA’s" brother, "BBB",
which declaration was hearsay due to "BBB’s" failure to testify. Based on the foregoing, it was an error on the part of
the RTC and the CA to conclude that appellant raped "AAA" through sexual intercourse.

Instead, we find appellant guilty of rape by sexual assault. It cannot be denied that appellant inserted an object into
"AAA’s" female organ. "AAA" categorically testified that appellant inserted something into her vagina. She claimed to
have suffered tremendous pain during the insertion. The insertion even caused her vagina to bleed necessitating
her examination at the hospital. Both the trial court and the CA found "AAA’s" testimony to be credible. We find no
compelling reason not to lend credence to the same.

This defilement constitutes rape under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC, which provides that rape by sexual
assault is committed "by any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting x x x any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person."

Moreover, Dr. Supe corroborated her testimony as follows:

Q - Doctor, with respect to Exhibit A, the Medico-Legal Report pertaining to the entry into the genital, which reads:
On separating the hymen, disclosed was an elastic, fleshy type, hyperemic and intact hymen. Will you please tell us,
Doctor, what is this hyperemic hymen?

A - Hyperemic hymen, sir, means that at the time of examination, I found out that it was reddish in color.

Q - Considering the age of the child or the patient, the victim whom you examined at that time who was about 6
years old, will you be able to tell us, Doctor, what could have caused this kind of injury, because this is an injury to
the hymen?

A - Hyperemic, sir, is observed whenever there is friction applied to an area, such as in the form of scratching.

Q - What about insertion of object, would this result into hyperemic hymen?

A - If the object is being rubbed, sir, there is a possibility.

Q - A finger will produce this kind of injury?

A - Possible, sir. 26 

According to Dr. Supe, it is possible that "AAA’s" hyperemic hymen may be the result of the insertion of a finger or
object. While Dr. Supe said that the injury could also be attributed to scratching, "AAA’s" testimony is bereft of any
showing that she scratched her genital organ thus causing the reddening. Appellant would also want to make it
appear that the injury of "AAA" was the result of friction from playing or riding a bicycle since the doctor testified that
this was also possible. However, there is likewise no evidence that friction was applied on "AAA’s" female organ
when she played hide and seek with her playmates or that she actually rode a bicycle. On the other hand, "AAA"
was categorical in stating that in the afternoon of February 26, 2000, appellant removed her clothes, laid on top of
her, and that she felt something being inserted into her vagina and that thereafter she experienced pain in her
genitals. The foregoing thus proved that appellant inserted an object into "AAA’s" vagina against her will and without
consent. Simply put, appellant committed the crime of rape by sexual assault.

The following are the elements of rape by sexual assault:

 (1) That the offender commits an act of sexual assault;

(2) That the act of sexual assault is committed by any of the following means:

(a) By inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice; or

(b) By inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person;

(3) That the act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:

(a) By using force and intimidation;

(b) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or

(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or

(d) When the woman is under 12 years of age or demented. 27 

In the instant case, it was clearly established that appellant committed an act of sexual assault on "AAA" by inserting
an instrument or object into her genital. We find it inconsequential that "AAA" could not specifically identify the
particular instrument or object that was inserted into her genital. What is important and relevant is that indeed
something was inserted into her vagina. To require "AAA" to identify the instrument or object that was inserted into
her vagina would be contrary to the fundamental tenets of due process. It would be akin to requiring "AAA" to
establish something that is not even required by law. Moreover, it might create problems later on in the application
of the law if the victim is blind or otherwise unconscious. Moreover, the prosecution satisfactorily established that
appellant accomplished the act of sexual assault through his moral ascendancy and influence over "AAA" which
substituted for violence and intimidation. Thus, there is no doubt that appellant raped "AAA" by sexual assault.

Appellant’s contentions are untenable.

The failure of "AAA" to mention that her panty was removed prior to the rape does not preclude sexual assault. We
cannot likewise give credence to the assertion of appellant that the crime of rape was negated by the medical
findings of an intact hymen or absence of lacerations in the vagina of "AAA". Hymenal rupture, vaginal laceration or
genital injury is not indispensable because the same is not an element of the crime of rape. "An intact hymen does
28 

not negate a finding that the victim was raped." Here, the finding of reddish discoloration of the hymen of "AAA"
29 

during her medical examination and the intense pain she felt in her vagina during and after the sexual assault
sufficiently corroborated her testimony that she was raped.

Likewise undeserving of credence is appellant’s contention that his wife merely instigated "AAA" to file the charge of
rape against him in retaliation for his having confronted her about her illicit affair with another man. This imputation
of ill motive is flimsy considering that it is unnatural for appellant’s wife to stoop so low as to subject her own
daughter to the hardships and shame concomitant with a prosecution for rape, just to assuage her hurt feelings. It is30 

also improbable for appellant’s wife to have dared encourage their daughter "AAA" to publicly expose the dishonor
of the family unless the rape was indeed committed. 31 

Penalty

Under Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty for rape by sexual assault is prision mayor. However, the penalty is
increased to reclusion temporal "if the rape is committed by any of the 10 aggravating/qualifying circumstances
mentioned in this article". The Information alleged the qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority. It was
alleged that appellant is the father of "AAA". During the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated that "AAA" is the
daughter of appellant. During trial, appellant admitted his filial bond with "AAA". "Admission in open court of
32  33 

relationship has been held to be sufficient and, hence, conclusive to prove relationship with the victim." 34 

With respect to minority, however, the Information described "AAA" as a 7-year old daughter of appellant. While this
also became the subject of stipulation during the pre-trial conference, same is insufficient evidence of "AAA’s" age.
Her minority must be "proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself". "There must be independent
35 
evidence proving the age of the victim, other than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of
denial by the accused." Documents such as her original or duly certified birth certificate, baptismal certificate or
36 

school records would suffice as competent evidence of her age. Here, there was nothing on record to prove the
37 

minority of "AAA" other than her testimony, appellant’s absence of denial, and their pre-trial stipulation. The
38 

prosecution also failed to establish that the documents referred to above were lost, destroyed, unavailable or
otherwise totally absent. 39 

It is settled that "when either one of the qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority is omitted or lacking,
that which is pleaded in the information and proved by the evidence may be considered as an aggravating
circumstance." As such, appellant’s relationship with "AAA" may be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
40 

In view of these, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal which ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor
which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Hence, a penalty of twelve (12) years of prison
mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is imposed upon appellant.

Damages

In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the awards of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages are each modified to P30,000.00. "AAA" is also entitled to an interest on all
41 

the amounts of damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until
fully paid.
42 

WHEREFORE, the December 29, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01442 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape by sexual assault and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prison
mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is also ordered to pay "AAA" the
amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
"AAA" is entitled to an interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of
this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.