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Doherty Fesniak:
Analyst, Formatting the Final Paper, “Introduction,” “Summary,” “Purpose”
Oliviah Gearhart:
Analyst, Submitting the Final Paper, “Finances,”“Historical Case Review”
Bryn McLaughlin:
Analyst, Compiling the Final Paper, “Leadership”
Ian Merendino:
Analyst, Editor, “Origins of Hamas, Ideology, and Goals”
Michael Delong:
Analyst, Editor, “Targets, Areas of Influence, and Tactics”
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Table of Content
Purpose 3
Introduction 3
Leadership 5
Finances 7
Summary 14
Works Cited 15
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Purpose
The purpose of this research paper is to explore the impacts of Foreign Terrorist
Organization, Hamas, on society and global security. This study seeks to elaborate on Hamas’s
call for the destruction of Israel and their aim to liberate Palestine from Israeli occupation. The
most influential organization rising from the crucible of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has
become deadly towards their enemies, and will continue to do so. While Hamas upholds armed
resistance as the only successful method to liberate Palestine, the war between the Palentinians
and the Israelis has emerged as a genuine threat not just to Israel, but also to Palestinian political
movements.
I. Introduction
Hamas is a creation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine during the first uprising
against Israel. The intifada erupted spontaneously without being politically organized by any
organization. The Muslim Brotherhood saw this as an opportunity to stir up religious and
nationalist sentiments. The group strives to create an Islamic State based on the principles of the
Islamic law. They believe that no Muslim has the right to give up ownership of any part of their
land. Therefore, Hamas does not recognize Israeli’s right to exist and has dedicated itself to
violently seek the obliteration of Israel, with no effort of achieving peace negotiations.
Hamas primarily consisted of three circles of leadership, founded by Ahmed Yassin.
However, governance did not diminish their nature of violence. They are responsible for
thousands of brutal deaths in Israeli towns since 1988, and its leaders have committed to the
group’s targets and tactics. These are all possible with the millions of dollars they are receiving
from charitable organizations and several other sources to fund their administrative and terrorist
activities. While there are countless threats worthy of our attention that exist, it is important to
focus on and understand this organization, as it impedes on efforts to maintain global security.
The blockade and violence in the Gaza strip continue to this day, trapping the people of Gaza by
limiting travel. Humanitarian aid and trade are scarce, which leads to unemployment and
hardships. Additionally, if the Hamas-led government stays in power, there is a greater chance
that it will deepen its hold on Palestinian institutions, welcome the contribution of radical
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Islamist opportunists, and prepare for the eventual resumption if the armed struggle against Israel
affecting global security.
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forces. Because we are close allies with Israel, the United States is one of the few that has
declared Hamas a terrorist organization and continues to be declared an enemy against american
ideals.
III. Leadership
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chief and remains Hamas’ head leader (Hamas. 7). Hamas’ military wing, the Izz ad-Din
al-Qassam Brigades, is commanded by Marwan Issa and Mohammed Deif (Hamas par. 7). All of
these leaders, working as one, have continued to execute the Hamas’ agenda.
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IV. Finances
Finances are critical to the operation of any terrorist organization. Methods of receiving
funding include extortion, drug trafficking, kidnapping, being sponsored by a state, and
charitable organization donations. Specifically, in the case of Hamas, the most lucrative methods
have been charitable organization donations and being sponsored by Iran. However, this does not
mean the terrorist organization does not participate in any other financial gain activities. It has
been observed that Hamas has operated in the Triborder region of Argentina, Brazil, and
Paraguay, and they are “one part terrorist organization and are becoming one part global drug
trafficking cartel” (Moditsi and Rana 3). Despite this, drug trafficking is an extremely minor part
of funding compared to the millions of dollars that Hamas is receiving from Iran and from
charitable organizations stationed around the world.
Iran has played a critical role in funding Hamas and its terroristic activities. It is one of
only four countries that sponsor terrorism. It funds Hamas for both geo-strategic and ideological
reasons (Levin). Iran believes that if it funds Hamas, it can expand its realm of influence. The
country also shares the same ideological beliefs that Israel is a threat to Muslim land. As of
August 2019, Iran has promised to increase funding to Hamas as long as they are provided with
information about Israeli missile capabilities. The promised increase is $30 million per month, an
unprecedented amount. Before this Iran was only paying Hamas about $6 million per month, so
this revenue increase could correlate to an increase in terrorist recruitment and activity
(Bachner).
While Hamas receives funds from a multitude of different sources, its primary source of
revenue comes from charitable organizations around the world. Hamas is able to prove that they
are doing charitable work, however this work is primarily a recruiting skill. The money raised
through these organizations is spent funding members’ salaries, obtaining military weapons, or
recruiting through charitable acts.
There are 5 key charitable organizations that still provide revenue for the terrorist group,
but it is also important to discuss two key organizations that provided the majority of Hamas’
funding before they were shut down. The Holy Land Foundation was based in the United States
and continued to send money to Hamas between 1989 to 2001. It is estimated that the Holy Land
Foundation funneled more than $12 million across the globe to Hamas (“No Cash for Terror”).
The other primary charity that Hamas was funneling money through was the Al Aqsa
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Foundation. It was established in 1997, being headquartered in Germany with branch offices
across the globe. It was closed in 2002, and it was officially designated as a Specially Designated
Terrorist Entity by the United States in 2003 (“Treasury Designates Al-Aqsa International
Foundation as Financier of Terror Charity Linked to Funding of the Hamas Terrorist
Organization”). Their assets of $137 million have been frozen since then, hinting that they have
contributed hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas, becoming a critical part of their financial
battle (Dotinga). After both of these foundations were shut down in the early 2000s, Hamas
needed to establish new and stronger ways to get money through charitable organizations.
It is important to understand how Hamas obtained finances in the past before needing to
shift to other organizations in order to predict how the terrorist organization will continue to be
financed in the future. Right now, there are 5 major charities that are supporting Hamas
financially (“U.S. Designates Five Charities Funding Hamas and Six Senior Hamas Leaders as
Terrorist Entities”). These 5 are as stands:
While looking only at the names of these charities, they may appear to be helpful,
humanitarian organizations. However, after taking a closer look, that is not the case. The United
States added both CBSP and ASP to the list of Specially Designated Terrorist entities in 2003,
but neither has been shut down or had their assets frozen. A Wall Street Journal article reported
an illegal method of transferring funds that CBSP was supposedly using to transfer money to
Hamas, titled “trade-based money laundering” (“French Islamist Organizations”). From
investigations, it has been proved that CBSP and ASP have raised funds from a number of
mosques and Islamic centers around France and Switzerland. Israeli authorities have provided
hard evidence through raids that CBSP has been making bank transfers to Hamas-run welfare
groups, counting 45,000 euros in the first half of 2004 alone. Combined CBSP and ASP sent
over tens of millions of dollars to Palestinian territories through Hamas (“Islamist
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Organizations”). As of 2007, French authorities have ruled in favor of CBSP and ASP, while
they continue to be terrorist entities according to the United States.
CBSP, ASP, and the remaining three organizations that are all a part of the Union of
Good (Levitt). The Union of Good is an umbrella organization that uses this web of charitable
organizations to facilitate transferring funds to Hamas. These funds are to strengthen Hamas’
military and political power in regions of the West Bank and Gaza by giving charitable donations
to terrorists’ families and giving social welfare and other social services on behalf of Hamas
(“Treasury Designates Union of Good”). This organization is the current primary source of
revenue for Hamas. Hamas raises tens of millions of dollars every year through outside
charitable organizations, such as the ones that fall under the control of the Union of Good (“Bank
Accounts for Hamas-Controlled Organizations”).
Hamas is primarily located in Israel, and that is where they have heavy influence. The
Gaza Strip and the West Bank are the main influential areas for Hamas, as they have tried to gain
control over the areas in the past. The group is seen as a resistance movement by its supporters in
Israel, as its main commitment is the destruction of Israel. This is why its main target is the
citizens of Israel. The main tactic they use is suicide bombings to carry out these attacks against
Israeli citizens and usually come as a direct response to a political action that was carried out by
the government. For example in 2003, after peace talks failed with Israel and Hamas leadership
was targeted, suicide bombings resumed.
The group also claims it played a major part in the escalation of intifada activity, which is
the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which began
in 1987. Hamas sought to gain major control of these areas from Palestinian control by carrying
out attacks against Israeli targets, particularly soldiers. They chose soldiers during this period to
send a message to Israel as well as encourage other members of the organization to do the same
thing. During the course of the intifada, Hamas admitted to forty attacks. Their main attacks
were carried out using explosive charges as well as firebombs and arson in the areas of Gaza and
Israel. One of their major tactics during this period of time was the publication of “leaflets.”
These were meant to incite rioting as well as inform the public of attacks. They often called for
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the use of guns against other civilians and Israeli security personnel and speaking out against the
peace process. Hamas was unsuccessful in gaining major influence in the Gaza Strip and West
Bank because of the retaliation of Gaza and Israel, attacking Hamas using rocket attacks and air
strikes.
Hamas wanted full control of Israel, Gaza and the West Bank so they could liberate
Palestine. Another one of their tactics to try and fulfill this goal was to enter the political scene.
In 2005, they won in multiple elections, beating Fatah and after this, it led to deadly clashes
between Hamas and Fatah. In contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas believes Jihad is the
only means to liberate and solve the problem of Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood believes
that Islam would be established throughout the territories first and Jihad would follow. This is
why peace talks between Hamas and the government have never worked out because they
specifically reject any political arrangement that would have them give up any part of Israel.
Hamas had a large impact on regional security when they won those elections in 2005.
After forty years, the political party Fatah was replaced by a violent organization. This win for
Hamas put them on the radars of surrounding countries as well as the United States. Hamas was
more of a regional security issue more than a global issue, as most of their attacks took place in
the Middle East. After these elections, fighting between Hamas and Fatah escalated, causing
security issues. Rockets and air strikes were exchanged between Hamas in Gaza and Israeli
security forces in Israeli territory.
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as a martyr and encouraging more people to step up in defense of their people (“Suicide
Bombing Attacks On Civilians”).
Because suicide bombers are a popular method of terrorism for Hamas, it is important to
study cases that involve them in order to prevent them from happening in the future. The focus of
this historical review will be on the suicide bombing that occured on August 19, 2003 on a bus in
Jerusalem. This historic case review is excerpted from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
provides insight on how Hamas operates and illustrates how Hamas takes action based on their
ideological views to accomplish their goals. These goals are stated in their charter, which
commits members to destroying Israel because Palestine cannot be free until they are an Islamic
State-- this Islamic state is Hamas’ ultimate ambition (Wyne). The goal is not just to create this
state over the West Bank and Gaza, but the entire region where Israel is now.
Event Description:
On August 19, 2003, a Palestinian suicide bomber detonated a five kilogram device full
of ball-bearings on a crowded bus in Jersalem, killing twenty-three and injuring over 130. The
bus was a No. 2 Egged bus, transporting individuals home from praying at the Western Walls.
According to this report, this attack occurred on the eve of the month of Elul, which is, for the
ultra-orthodox, the month of prayers of penance recited before the week of Rosh Hashanah.
Shortly after the attack the Cabinet of Israel decided to wage an all-out war against Hamas. This
decision was made on September 1, 2003 (“Suicide Bombing of No 2 Egged Bus in Jerusalem”).
The target of this attack was Jews of Israel. Israel authorities responded to the suicide
bombing by declaring a war against Hamas. However, Israel knew that they could win a
conventional war against Hamas. Israel is called the “military powerhouse of the Middle East”
(Wyne). It has technological capabilities such as atomic and nuclear weapons that would destroy
Hamas and all of Palestine in a heartbeat, given a conventional war. The struggle is that Hamas
relies heavily on asymmetric warfare like suicide bombers. They are difficult to detect and there
is never a shortage of them. Because it is not a conventional war, the response of Israel to this
attack was not sound. It is better to gather intel and learn how to predict and prevent suicide
bombers than to wage a war against an enemy who uses asymmetric warfare.
In response to this attack, the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan condemned
suicide attacks and urged Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas to arrest the instigators and prevent
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something like this from happening again. He advised the Government of Israel to act with
restraint in face of this violence, and he called for a revisitation of the political process of conflict
resolution in the “Road Map,” which encourages a permanent two-state solution to the conflict
(“Suicide Bombing of No 2 Egged Bus in Jerusalem”). The European Commission agreed with
Annan and encouraged Palestinian Authority to work to end Hamas and to continue dialogue
with Israel for peace. President Bush commented on the attack claiming that there can be no
compromise for terrorism and that those who exist solely to murder innocent people need to be
eliminated themselves.
In terms of international response to this attack, the response was not firm enough. Words
to inspire Palestine to actively search out and convict terrorists, along with working with Israel
for a peace agreement is unlikely. It is hopeful to believe that the Palestine Authority would do
that on their own on a basis of recommendation. Economic sanctions should have been placed on
Palestine to increase the pressure of convicting the terrorists involved in this attack and others
that are working to kill Israelis. Economic sanctions would force Palestine to put an end to the
terrorist attacks in the region more than the suggestions and advice of a few world leaders.
Effects:
This attack contributed to a string of suicide bombings and terrorist attacks that Hamas
claimed credit for between the years 2000 and 2004. During this time, more than 1,000 Israelis
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were killed, 70% were civilians and 30% were from the security forces (Waxman). This number
is higher than all the casualties in the years preceding this time period. While this attack seems to
be an insignificant attack, when combined with the hundreds of other attacks occurring, the
effects become easily visible. Despite the large number of casualties, the reach of the effects
extend farther than that.
During this time, suicide bombing became the most popular and most effective method of
violence for Hamas to use. While they only counted for 1% of the attacks, they caused 44% of
the casualties (Waxman). Thus, terrorist organizations, specifically Hamas, began to incorporate
suicide bombing as a primary tactic. The integration of suicide bombings as a primary tactic
became normalized after this four-year period.
Another effect that this attack and the ones similar to it in this time period had was
psychological effects on Israelis. 44% of Israelis were exposed in some way to a terrorist attack
in this four-year timeframe. More than a third of Israelis who participated in a psychological
study were reported to have a traumatic stress-related symptom, and the average had about four
symptoms (Waxman). Thus, the traumatizing effects that these attacks had on Israelis is
staggering and will influence how Israeli decision-makers interact with Palestine far into the
future. These effects make a peaceful relationship between the two states extremely unlikely.
Goals:
The goals of this attack were like every other attack that Hamas has and will take credit
for. The goals were to create fear and panic in Israelis in order to gain psychological and real
power over them. This in turn would facilitate the destruction of Israel in order to create an entire
Islamic state of Palestine. The goal involved killing and injuring many Israelis to establish
paranoia of accomplishing everyday tasks. When people die and others become too fearful to
participate in everyday life, Hamas can step in to overtake the country to aid in the development
of their ideal state. Despite their success in killing and injuring many people and establishing fear
in the region, they have yet to accomplish their ultimate goal.
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VII. Summary
While many other threats are worthy of our attention, it is important to understand that
the terrorist group Hamas is known to be an extremely violent organization. Their goal is to
violently seek the obliteration of Israel, as they believe that no Muslim has the right to give up
the land that was bestowed upon them. Hamas asserts dominance through the instigation of fear
within Israel, which they have accomplished through winning the Palestinian Legislative Council
elections in 2006. This has had a large impact on global security, as Hamas was put into radars of
allied countries even though they were only a regional threat since their attacks were mostly in
the Middle East. They gained control over the Gaza strip, which allowed them to blockade the
area, letting in limited amounts of basic humanitarian needs such as food, and trapping the
people of Gaza. This violence and limited relief continue to this day, leading to suffering and
unemployment. It is important to understand how this organization functions in order to put a
stop to the terror that Hamas strikes in the lives of Israelis. Even though surrounding countries
recognize them as a terrorist organization, full comprehension is needed to put a stop to the
obliteration of Israel by the hands of Hamas.
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Works Cited
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Israel.” The Times of Israel, The Times of Israel, 5 Aug. 2019,
www.timesofisrael.com/iran-agrees-to-increase-hamas-funding-to-30-million-per-month-
report/.
sen LLC, 2 Jan. 2020,
“Bank Accounts for Hamas-Controlled Organizations.” Osen LLC, O
https://www.osenlaw.com/content/bank-accounts-hamas-controlled-organizations.
Dotinga, William. “Terror Concerns Support Asset Freeze on Al-Aqsa.” CNS, Courthouse News
Service, 15 Nov. 2012,
www.courthousenews.com/terror-concerns-support-asset-freeze-on-al-aqsa/.
“French Islamist Organizations.” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs, 21 Oct. 2018,
jcpa.org/the-spiders-web/chapter-ii-delegitimization-in-france/islamist-organizations/.
Levin, Daniel. “Iran, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.” The Iran Primer, United States
Institute of Peace, 9 July 2018,
iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2018/jul/09/iran-hamas-and-palestinian-islamic-jihad.
Levitt, Matthew. “U.S. Designated Hamas Front Gets Symbolic Win in France.” The Washington
he Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2007,
Institute for Near East Policy, T
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https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-designated-hamas-front-ge
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Moditsi, Kleopatra and Rana, Reem. “The Linkage Between Illicit Drug Trafficking and
Terrorist Groups.” 2017. PDF File.
“No Cash For Terror.” The FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigations, US Department of Justice, 25
Nov 2008,
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%20the%20trial%2C%20the%20government,of%20Israel%20through%20violent%20jih
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State of Israel, 2003,
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02%20Egged%20bus%20in%20Jerusalem%20-%201.aspx.
Waxman, Dov. “Living with Terror, Not Living in Terror: The Impact of Chronic Terrorism on
Israeli Society.” Perspectives on Terrorism, Terrorism Research Initiative and the Center
for Terrorism and Security Studies, 2011,
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Wyne, Ali. “Suicide Terrorism As Strategy: Case Studies of Hamas and the Kurdistan Workers
Party.” 2005. PDF File.
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“Profile: Hamas Palestinian Movement.” BBC News, BBC, 12 May 2017,
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Tahhan, Zena. “Hamas and Fatah: How Are the Two Groups Different?” Palestine News | Al
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ent/.
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