1. REPUBLIC ACT NO.

10883 or ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT

G.R. No. 132788 October 23, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ISAIAS FERNANDEZ y VERAS a.k.a. "ISAIAH FERNANDEZ," ROBERT "BOBBY" KIWAS y BINAWE, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE
and CHARLIE DOE, accused,
ISAIAS FERNANDEZ y VERAS a.k.a. "ISAIAH FERNANDEZ," appellant.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For automatic review is the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, dated January 14, 1998, in Criminal
Case No. 14390-R, finding appellant Isaias Fernandez y Veras, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Republic Act No.
6539,2 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and sentencing him to death.

In an Information dated June 18, 1996, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged herein appellant, Robert
"Bobby" Kiwas, and three Does with violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of April 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, conspiring, confederating
and mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and drive away a motor
vehicle described as follows:

MAKE---------------------------TOYOTA

SERIES--------------------------TAMARAW FX

TYPE OF BODY---------------WAGON

PLATE NO.---------------------AVF-723

MOTOR NO.--------------------2C 3020507

SERIAL/CHASSIS NO. ------CF50 0016027

belonging to SPOUSES JEFFRED ACOP & JOSEPHINE ACOP and driven by CLIFFORD GUINGUINO y GORIO and on the occasion
and by reason of said carnapping, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, the accused attacked,
assaulted and shot the said Clifford Guinguino y Gorio, thereby inflicting upon the latter: Cardio Respiratory failure,
Hypovolemic shock, Cardiac tamponade, Hemothorax Intra Abdominal Hemorrhage Secondary to Gunshot Wound, Multiple,
which caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

On May 21, 1997, appellant Fernandez, who was then at large, was arrested by elements of the Philippine National Police
Criminal Investigation Group (PNP-CIG) in Baguio City, by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the trial court.4

The following day, appellant was arraigned and with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the indictment.5 He waived
pre-trial. Thereafter, the case was set for continuous trial to terminate within sixty (60) days, pursuant to Supreme Court Adm.
Order No. 104-96.6 Appellant was tried separately as his co-accused, Robert "Bobby" Kiwas, had been earlier tried and
convicted of the offense charged.

The facts of this case, as drawn from the records, are as follows:
Engineer Jeffred Acop, a resident of Baguio City was the owner and operator of two Tamaraw FX taxis, registered as "RAMA."7
One of said taxis was maroon in color and bore registry plate no. AVF 723. Its regular driver was Clifford Guinguino.8

On the morning of April 21, 1996, Guinguino took out the maroon Tamaraw FX taxi to ply his daily rounds in Baguio City.9
Later that day, sometime between 6:00 to 7:00 p.m., prosecution witness Arcadio Awal, Guinguino’s brother-in-law10 and a
taxi driver by occupation, encountered the latter driving the "RAMA" taxi of Engr. Acop at Governor Pack Road, Baguio City11
while Guinguino was driving the maroon Tamaraw FX "RAMA" taxi towards Marcos Highway. Awal used to drive the "RAMA"
taxi that Guinguino was driving.12 Guinguino had four or five male passengers on board.13 Awal, however, failed to recognize
the faces of Guinguino’s passengers as it was already dark and the two vehicles were moving at a fast clip.14 Awal and
Guinguino’s vehicles passed each other quickly and they blew the horns of the vehicles they were driving as an exchange of
greetings. It was to be the last time that Guinguino was seen alive. Eng. Acop waited that whole night for Guinguino to return
the taxi he was driving but in vain.15

At around 8:00 a.m. of April 22, 1996, Police Precinct No. 5 in Baguio City received a call informing them that a dead body was
to be found at Interior Balacbac, Baguio City.16 Immediately, SPO4 Lucio Alvarado, who took the call and his fellow law
enforcer, SPO1 Wilfredo Cabayanan, proceeded to the area. On seeing that there was indeed a male corpse in the area,
apparently the victim of foul play, SPO4 Alvarado immediately left to call a medico-legal officer, leaving SPO1 Cabayanan to
secure the crime scene. The latter initially examined the cadaver and saw that it had sustained several gunshot wounds.17

After some minutes, Dr. Arsenio B. Avenido, a medico-legal officer of the Baguio City Health Department arrived. After his own
preliminary examination of the victim’s remains, Dr. Avenido surmised that the victim had been killed either late in the
evening of the previous day or very early in the morning of April 22, 1996.18 The corpse was then removed from the scene to
enable Dr. Avenido to conduct a proper autopsy.

The post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Avenido showed that the victim had sustained the following injuries:

HEAD – No evidence of external physical injury

NECK – Gunshot wound 3 cm. x. 0.3 cm., 2.4 cm. in depth latero medial neck right point of exit once

THORAX – Wound gunshot 1.4 x 0.7 cm., 3 cm. in depth hypochondrium left

ABDOMEN – Gunshot wound 1.4 cm. x 1 cm., 4 cm. in depth anterior lumbar right.19

In the course of his examination, Dr. Avenido recovered a slug from the body, which a ballistic examination showed had been
fired from a .22 caliber firearm.20 He turned over the slug to the police for a ballistic examination.21 Dr. Avenido found the
cause of death to be:

Cardio respiratory failure, hypovolemic shock, cardiac tamponade, hemothorax intra abdominal hemorrhage due to gunshot
wound, multiple.22

Meanwhile, on April 23, 1996, Engr. Acop accompanied by Awal and Magdalena Guinguino, the victim’s mother, went to
Baguio City Police Precinct No. 5 to report that Acop’s Tamaraw FX taxi and its driver were missing. When shown the corpse
found by the police at Interior Balacbac, Acop identified it to be the remains of his missing driver, Clifford Guinguino. The
Baguio City police force then conducted a series of search and recovery operations to find and get back the missing motor
vehicle, but to no avail. Having come up empty through their efforts, the Baguio City police then spread the word about the
missing vehicle to the police units in the nearby provinces and requested their assistance in locating it.23

While the Baguio City police were still busy with what proved to be fruitless efforts to locate the "RAMA" Tamaraw FX taxi,
which seemed to have vanished from the face of the earth, late one evening in the last week of April 1996, prosecution witness
Laurencio Ducusin, the barangay captain of Casanfernandoan, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, was informed by some of the barangay
tanods, that a Tamaraw FX had stopped at one of their checkpoints. Ducusin and the tanods were at that time doing the nightly
ronda in the barangay.24
Ducusin proceeded to the checkpoint and saw a maroon Tamaraw FX driven by his brother-in-law, the appellant herein.25 He
had four male companions with him aboard the vehicle, one of whom was referred to as "Kiwas."26 Ducusin then got aboard
the vehicle and they proceeded to his house, with the appellant driving.

On reaching his house, Ducusin exerted all efforts to be hospitable to his visitors.27 The appellant then informed Ducusin that
the vehicle he was driving was owned by the appellant’s kumpare. Ducusin noticed, however, that they were armed with
firearms of various calibers,28 but gave no further thought to it since he knew for a fact that the appellant was working as a
security officer for a Baguio-based security agency.29

The appellant and his group stayed for two (2) days at the house of Ducusin. They left the vehicle with him, saying that they
would be back for it.30

Several days later, three of appellant’s companions, one of whom Ducusin recognized as Kiwas, returned to Ducusin’s place
and took the vehicle with them.31 After leaving for places unknown, they returned and stayed with Ducusin for another two
days. When they departed, they left the vehicle with Ducusin, on the pretext that it had a defect.32

After several more days, Kiwas together with four companions returned and like the last time, Kiwas drove away the vehicle
only to return after several hours.33 When Ducusin asked why they were using the vehicle although it supposedly had a
defect, Kiwas replied that they would have it repaired.34 The group then left, leaving Ducusin again in possession of the
vehicle. They promised to return for the vehicle with the appellant whom they referred to as "sir."35

After the lapse of several days, a mechanic arrived at Ducusin’s house saying that the appellant’s group had sent him to effect
repairs on the vehicle.36 Meanwhile, Ducusin had parked the vehicle inside the camalig of his mother, Catalina Ducusin, which
was some two hundred (200) meters away from his house.37

The mechanic worked for several days. He changed its chassis38 and then repainted the vehicle, changing its color from
maroon to gold.39

Ducusin was made suspicious by this turn of events and fearful that the vehicle was not really owned by his brother-in-law’s
kumpare, he confided his suspicions to SPO2 Maximiano Balelo of the Pozorrubio Police Station on June 5, 1996.40 SPO2
Balelo recalled that on April 23, 1996, the Baguio City Police Command advised them to be on the lookout for a carnapped
maroon Tamaraw FX taxi with the marking "RAMA," which had been taken by unidentified men in Marcos Highway in the
evening of April 21, 1996.41 The Pozorrubio police conducted surveillance operations to determine if the vehicle was in their
area of jurisdiction.

SPO2 Balelo then advised his superior officer, Chief Inspector Lorenzo Pedro, Pozorrubio Chief of Police, about the information
he received from Ducusin. Elements of the Pozorrubio police immediately conducted surveillance operations in barangay
Casanfernandoan to verify Ducusin’s report.42

On June 5, 1996, the police confirmed the information given by Ducusin that a Tamaraw FX was indeed to be found in
Casanfernandoan. The next day, the police recovered said vehicle at the camalig of Ducusin’s mother. They called up Engr.
Acop in Baguio City and asked him to go to Pangasinan to see if the vehicle recovered was his missing Tamaraw FX taxi.

Despite the change in its color, Engr. Acop was able to identify the vehicle recovered by the Pozorrubio police as his missing
RAMA taxi. His identification was made through the stickers that he placed on the vehicle, the floormats, the steering wheel
cover, and the several dents on its body.43 He also tried his spare key in the vehicle’s ignition to determine if this would fit. It
turned out to be a perfect fit.44 Engr. Acop could not identify the vehicle through its engine number or chassis number, leading
him to believe that both the engine and the chassis had been changed, but nonetheless, the vehicle recovered bore the same
production number (JY 999-02) as his missing Tamaraw FX. The recovered vehicle was then brought back to Baguio City.

In Baguio City, a macro-etching examination was conducted by Alma Margarita D. Villaseñ or, the PNP Forensic Chemist at
Camp Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad.45 The examination showed that the engine number of the recovered vehicle had not been
tampered with, but the chassis number (EVER 96-49729-C) was different from that in its certificate of registration (CF-50-
0016027).46 This led Villaseñ or to conclude that the chassis had been replaced.47 Nonetheless, Villaseñ or observed that the
vehicle could still be identified through its production number (JY 999-02), a secret manufacturer’s number used to
distinguish a particular vehicle from others of the same make or model.48
One of the witnesses presented by the prosecution, Robert Reyes, a marketing executive of Toyota Cubao, Inc., testified that
there are three (3) ways by which a Toyota vehicle may be identified: (1) by the engine number; (2) by the chassis number;
and (3) its production number. Reyes categorically declared that no two (2) Toyota vehicles would have identical engine,
chassis, and production numbers.49 Reyes also identified the production number of the Toyota (JY 999-02) as that indicated in
the sales invoice prepared by Toyota Cubao, Inc. when the said vehicle was sold by them to NORCAR Allied Motors in Baguio
City.50

Honorio Danganan, owner of NORCAR Allied Motors, an authorized Toyota dealer in Baguio City declared on the witness stand
that he sold a Toyota Tamaraw FX to the spouses Acop with the following vehicle identification markings: (1) Engine number:
2C-302507; (2) Chassis number CF-50-0016027; and (3) Production number JY 999-02.51 Danganan stated that although the
recovered vehicle now had a different chassis number, it still bore the original production number JY 999-02, thus leading him
to conclude that there is a very big possibility that it was the same vehicle he sold to the spouses Acop.52

To prove that appellant’s group is a syndicate organized for carnapping activities, the prosecution adduced in evidence the
information filed against appellant, Kiwas, and four other men, before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet for carnapping with
violence of another Toyota Tamaraw FX belonging to a certain James Advincula. 53

At the trial, herein appellant raised the defense of denial and alibi in his bid to escape culpability. He claimed that on April 21,
1996, the date when Clifford Guinguino was killed, he was working at the office of BISAI until 11:00 p.m.54 Among the things
he did was to prepare his belongings as he was scheduled to go to Balatoc, Antamok, Sangilo to deliver the pay of the guards
stationed there. After he was through with his preparations, he went straight home to Brookside, Baguio City.55

Appellant further claimed that on April 28, 1996, he went home to Bued, Binalonan, Pangasinan, after office hours. He said his
family was throwing a thanksgiving party for his daughter Carla Joy Fernandez, who just graduated from St. Louis University
with a nursing degree.56 Carla Joy, however, was not present at said affair as she was already attending board review classes
in Manila.57 He added that it was in the midst of the family party that at about 11 p.m. Kiwas arrived. He said Kiwas was one of
the security personnel of BISAI. Together with five (5) male companions, Kiwas came on board a Toyota Tamaraw FX with
"RAMA" markings on the sides.58

According to appellant, Kiwas introduced to him one of his companions, "Benny," as a kumpare. "Benny" was supposedly in
need of money and willing to mortgage the vehicle to the appellant.59 As the latter had no money with him, Kiwas asked if
they could go to the appellant’s sister in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, to mortgage the vehicle.60

Appellant stated that he accompanied Kiwas and his group to his sister’s residence in Pozorrubio. They arrived in town at
around 11:00 p.m. There they ran into a checkpoint manned by the barangay police. Appellant informed them that he was
looking for the barangay captain, Laurencio Ducusin, who happened to be his brother-in-law.61

When Ducusin arrived, the appellant claimed that he informed him about the offer of "Benny" to mortgage the vehicle. As
Ducusin was agreeable, appellant then asked Kiwas to take him back to Binalonan as it was already late and he had to report
for work the following day in Baguio City.62 He denied staying at the Ducusin residence for two days. He said Ducusin and two
of the companions of Kiwas brought him back to Binalonan right away, arriving there at around two o’clock in the morning.63

To buttress his alibi that he was at work in BISAI the night of April 21, 1996, when Clifford Guinguino was killed and the
Toyota Tamaraw FX vehicle he was driving disappeared, the appellant presented Rolanda Paraan, former Administrative
Manager of BISAI and two accounting clerks of said security agency, namely: Emma Ruth Alcantara and Evelyn
Madarang.1awphi1.nét

Alcantara and Madarang corroborated appellant’s alibi that he worked from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. on April 21, 1996.64
Appellant’s defense presented the payroll of BISAI and his daily time record. But on cross-examination, none of the defense
witnesses could state with certainty where appellant was from the time he reported to work in the morning to the time he left
in the evening.65 As appellant’s own testimony showed, his work as security operations officer was mainly in the field,
supervising and inspecting the security guards deployed in various places in Baguio City.66 Neither Alcantara nor Madarang
could categorically state whether appellant had in fact returned to the office from his rounds of the security postings to log out
at 7:00 p.m. since both ladies left the BISAI offices at 5:00 p.m.
On January 14, 1998, the trial court promulgated its judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ISAIAH FERNANDEZ Y VERAS, also known as Isaias Fernandez, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 14 of Republic Act 6539, as amended by Section 20 of Republic Act 7659 (Qualified
Carnapping where the driver of the carnapped vehicle, Clifford Guinguino, was killed in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof) as charged in the Information in conspiracy with Robert Kiwas (who was already
convicted after a separate trial earlier) and others whose identities and whereabouts are yet unknown, and hereby sentences
him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH to be implemented in accordance with law; to indemnify jointly and severally
with his confederates, the heirs of Clifford Guinguino the sum of P50,000.00 for his death, P74,945.00 as actual damages,
P200,000.00 as moral damages, and P1,590,000.00 as unearned income; and to likewise indemnify jointly and severally with
his confederates, the spouses Jeffred Acop and Josephine Acop, the owners of the carnapped subject taxi, the amount of
P373,500.00 as value of the carnapped vehicle, all indemnifications are without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and to pay the proportionate costs.

SO ORDERED.67

In view of the imposition of the death penalty, the records of Criminal Case No. 14390-R were elevated to this Court for
automatic review.

Before us, the appellant assigns the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT FERNANDEZ IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF QUALIFIED
CARNAPPING.

A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO PROVE
THAT FERNANDEZ COMMITTED QUALIFIED CARNAPPING.

B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN LENDING UNDUE CREDENCE TO WITNESS LAURENCIO DUCUSIN’S PATENTLY UNRELIABLE
TESTIMONY.

C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO PROVE
THAT FERNANDEZ CONSPIRED WITH ROBERT KIWAS AND THREE (3) JOHN DOES TO COMMIT QUALIFIED CARNAPPING.

D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON PATENTLY INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS FINDING OF GUILT
AGAINST FERNANDEZ.

E. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO LEND CREDENCE TO FERNANDEZ’ VERSION OF THE EVENTS.1a\^/phi1.net

F. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED FERNANDEZ’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN
GUILTY.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING ON FERNANDEZ THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH.

A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT FERNANDEZ IS A MEMBER OF AN ORGANIZED GROUP OR SYNDICATE
ENGAGED IN AN ILLEGAL CARNAPPING SCHEME.68

Briefly stated, the issues for our resolution are: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain appellant’s conviction; and (2) the
propriety of the penalty imposed.

On the first issue, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the essential elements of carnapping as defined in
Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended. He contends that, assuming arguendo there is on record
circumstantial evidence against appellant, nonetheless such evidence could not be relied upon by the trial court to constitute
proof beyond reasonable doubt that he participated in the unlawful taking of the vehicle and fatal shooting of its driver.
Instead, according to appellant, the most that could be attributed to him is that he accompanied the group of Kiwas in bringing
the stolen vehicle to Laurencio Ducusin in Pangasinan.

For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the undisputed factual circumstances established by
the prosecution constitute an unbroken chain of events which lead fairly and reasonably to but one conclusion, namely: that
the appellant is guilty of the offense charged.

For circumstantial evidence to be a sufficient basis for a conviction, the following requisites must be satisfied: (1) there must
be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.69

Considering the evidence on record, with the submission of the parties, we find the prosecution evidence sufficient to sustain
appellant’s conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, we find no reason to deviate from the trial court’s assessment as to
appellant’s culpability for carnapping with homicide.

The trial court found appellant and his companions were in control and possession of the subject vehicle soon after the
shooting of the driver, Clifford Guinguino. Witness Laurencio Ducusin testified that when the group of appellant arrived in
Pozzorubio, Pangasinan, appellant who was addressed as "Sir" by his companions, was the one driving the vehicle. Appellant
himself admitted that the taxi he rode in going to the Ducusin’s had the marking "RAMA" on it.70

In the absence of an explanation of how one has come into the possession of stolen effects belonging to a person shot,
wounded and treacherously killed, he must necessarily be considered the author of the aggression, the death of the person, as
well as the robbery committed.71 This presumption is consonant with Rule 131 (3) (j) of the Rules of Court72 and validly
applies to a case of carnapping for, indeed, the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping is the same and,
had it not been for the enactment of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle would certainly fall
within the purview of either theft or robbery. This presumption extends to cases where such possession is either unexplained
or that the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto.73 Appellant
having failed to give a plausible explanation for his possession of the stolen Tamaraw FX, perforce, he is presumed to have
taken the vehicle away from the rightful owner or possessor thereof.

We have no reason to doubt Ducusin’s credibility as a witness. Ducusin is appellant’s own brother-in-law, but he is also a
Barangay Captain. Despite his relationship with appellant, his sense of justice proved unerring. He bared his suspicion to the
police that the vehicle left in his care was a hot item. Appellant tried to ascribe ill-motive on Ducusin for testifying against him,
but appellant failed in this regard. Absent a showing that the witness was actuated by an improper motive, the presumption is
that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.74 This rule has a more compelling application
when the witness testifies against a relative, for no person would implicate in a crime his own kin, disregarding the
unspeakable social stigma it may cause against his entire family, unless that person seeks only the truth, for justice to prevail.

We find that sufficient circumstantial evidence exists, consistent with appellant’s guilt, and inconsistent with his innocence. 75
Against appellant are the following circumstances: (1) He and his group were in possession of the stolen Tamaraw FX after its
driver was shot to death. (2) The victim, Clifford Guinguino, was last seen between 6 to 7 p.m. that night, with five men aboard
the FX dovetailing with the testimony of Ducusin that appellant’s party of five men were on board the vehicle when they
arrived in Pangasinan before midnight sometime in the latter part of April. (3) Appellant who was addressed as "Sir" by the
group, was the one driving the vehicle when he, Kiwas, and three John Does arrived in Pangasinan hours after the Guinguino’s
fatal shooting. (4) On arrival in Pangasinan, appellant and Kiwas were armed with .22 caliber guns while the others were
carrying .38 caliber guns, which match the wounds of the victim, some of which were characteristic of .22 caliber bullets while
the others were bigger, typical of a .38 caliber. (5) Appellant and his group left the vehicle at the Ducusins at the pretext that it
needed repairs, although it was brand new and was able to run all the way from Baguio. (6) Instead of just repairing it, a man
sent by appellant’s group changed the engine and chassis of the vehicle and repainted its body from maroon to gold. (7)
Appellant did a vanishing act from his work a day after the stolen car was identified by its owner and placed in custodia legis.
(8) He went into hiding and was unheard of until his arrest.

The foregoing factual circumstances constitute evidence of weight and probative force which may even surpass direct
evidence in its effect upon the Court.76 The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence under Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
77 is that the guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one particular piece of evidence. Circumstantial
evidence is like a rope composed of many strands and cords. One strand might be insufficient, but five together may suffice to
give it strength.78 Here, strands of evidentiary facts weaved together compels to conclude that the crime of carnapping with
homicide has been committed, and that the appellant cannot hide behind the veil of presumed innocence.

Lastly, we find appellant’s defense of alibi inadequate to support his exculpation.

According to appellant, on April 21, 1996, he was at work from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. and the next day, April 22, from 7:00
a.m. to 7:00 p.m. He presented in this regard his payroll receipts as supporting evidence. However, as found by the trial court,
his claim that he worked on April 21, 1996 in BISAI from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m. is contradicted by his own daily time record, which
stated that he was at work from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. only that day. Also, the Accounting Clerk from BISAI who prepared the said
payroll, said there was no way of ascertaining whether appellant was in fact present at his post of duty because, as roving
supervisor, he checked security guards in their posts located at various client-establishments.1ªvvphi1.nét

Appellant claims that he went down to Binalonan to attend his daughter’s graduation thanksgiving party on April 28, 1996.
There at about 11 p.m., Kiwas and five companions whom he had not met before arrived on board the subject "RAMA" taxi and
spoke to him about their dire need of cash and their willingness to mortgage the subject taxi, according to appellant. Since he
was cash-strapped himself, appellant said, he accompanied them to the house of his sister and brother-in-law, Laurencio
Ducusin, in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. They arrived in Pozorrubio at about midnight. But, according to appellant, it was not he
but only Kiwas and his group who transacted business with his sister. Thereafter, at 2 a.m. the next day, the group brought him
back to Binalonan while Kiwas and others spent the rest of the night in Pozorrubio with the Ducusins.

As the trial court observed, appellant’s version of events runs contrary to ordinary human experience. His story taxes one’s
credulity too much.

Why would appellant’s family set the celebration of his daughter’s graduation on a date when supposedly the celebrant was in
Manila already reviewing for the board exams? What’s the logic behind Kiwas’ driving all the way from Baguio to Pangasinan
in the middle of the night just to borrow money from appellant? Why was Kiwas accompanied by five men just to get the
alleged loan? What prompted appellant to rush with a group of strangers to his sister’s house in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, in the
middle of the night? Why borrow only ₱10,000, but leave a new FX taxi worth ₱400,000 as collateral? All these questions beg
to be answered, but in vain, as we try to make sense of appellant’s tale.

As a supervisor of the security agency, appellant was not a novice in the nuances of the law. Seeing the taxi’s "RAMA" markings
boldly written on it, appellant should have been more circumspect as to vehicle’s ownership. Why didn’t he inquire for the
registration papers of the FX? For someone of his stature and experience, it was rather odd that he did not inquire into the
basics of a rush transaction.

Even more puzzling, appellant did not present his sister to corroborate the essentials of his story. The defense had no
corroborating witnesses at all to back appellant’s version. His denial and alibi have no leg to stand on.

In sum, we find no reason nor justification to reverse the findings and conclusions of the trial court. In affirming convictions,
the evidence required remains, as always, one beyond reasonable doubt, though we do not ask for proof that excludes all
possibility of error.79 Only moral, not absolute, certainty is what the fundamental law requires. In this case, considering the
circumstances of the case, we entertain no doubt on appellant’s guilt.

As to the penalty, the trial court imposed the death sentence on appellant. Pursuant to the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-
Carnapping Act, amended by Section 20 of Republic Act 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is imposable when
the owner or the driver of the vehicle is killed in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. 80
Considering as aggravating the commission of the offense by a person belonging to an organized or syndicated crime group
under Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659,81 the trial court imposed the extreme penalty on
appellant. But appellant’s defense now questions the propriety of imposing on him the death sentence.

Under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, both aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be
alleged in the information. Being favorable, to the appellant, this new rule can be given retroactive effect as they are applicable
to pending cases.82
In this case, the allegation of being part of a syndicate or that appellant and companions had formed part of a group organized
for the general purpose of committing crimes for gain, which is the essence of a syndicated or organized crime group,83 was
neither alleged nor proved by the prosecution. Hence, we agree that it was error for the trial court to sentence appellant under
Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659.

No aggravating circumstance having been alleged or proved properly in this case, the provisions of Article 63 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code should be applied. Without mitigating nor aggravating circumstance found in the commission of the
offense, the lesser penalty for the offense, which is reclusion perpetua, should be imposed on appellant.

As to damages, the amount of the trial court’s award for lost earnings needs to be recomputed and modified accordingly.

The Court notes that the victim was 27 years old at the time of his death and his wife testified that as a driver of the Tamaraw
FX taxi, he was earning at least ₱250.84 Hence, the damages payable for the loss of the victim’s earning capacity following the
formula85 used by the Court in People v. Visperas, G.R. No. 147315, January 13, 2003, is computed thus:

Gross Annual Earnings = ₱250 x 261 working days in a year

= ₱ 65,250
Net Earning Capacity = 2/3 x (80-27) x [₱ 65,250- ₱ 32,625]
= 35.33 x ₱ 32,625
Lost Earnings = ₱ 1,152,641
With respect to the award by the trial court of ₱200,000 in moral damages, in line with prevailing jurisprudence, it should be
deleted for lack of needed proof. The award of ₱74,945 as burial and other expenses is also deleted for lack of adequate proof,
but the victim’s heirs are entitled to temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000 pursuant to case law. The award of
₱373,500 to the Spouses Jeffred and Josephine Acop, as restitution of the value of their FX taxi, should also be upheld because
it is supported by evidence on record. 86

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, dated January 14, 1998, in Criminal Case No.
14390-R, finding appellant ISAIAS FERNANDEZ y VERAS a.k.a. "ISAIAH FERNANDEZ" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Republic Act No. 6539 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim CLIFFORD GUINGUINO the sum of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity, ₱1,152,641
representing lost earnings, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages. Appellant is also ORDERED TO PAY the owners of the FX
taxi, Spouses Jeffred and Josephine Acop, the amount of ₱373,500, as restitution for the stolen vehicle. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172604               August 17, 2010
(Formerly G.R. Nos. 155345-47)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
VENANCIO ROXAS y ARGUELLES, Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

On appeal by way of automatic review is the Decision 1 dated January 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00666, affirming the Judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicting appellant Venancio Roxas y Arguelles
(appellant) for the crimes of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with Frustrated Murder, Violation of Republic Act (R.A.)
6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, and Theft. The Informations alleged –

In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54285 for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with Frustrated Murder –

That on or about January 12, 1994 in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring together, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there by means of force,
violence against and intimidation of person and at gunpoint, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously kidnap, carry away and
detain AGNES GUIRINDOLA, a female, thereby depriving her of her liberty, and thereafter bring her to an uninhabited place in
Barangay Bagong Pook, San Jose, Batangas and then and there, with intent to kill and with treachery, evident premeditation,
and abuse of superior strength, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot her in the face with a hand gun, thus performing all
the acts of execution which would produce the crime of MURDER as consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not produce it
by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, the able and timely medical assistance given to said Agnes
Guirindola which prevented her death, resulting to her utmost grief, sorrow, sufferings and sleepless night, compensable in
actual, moral and exemplary damages in such amounts as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3

In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54286 for Carnapping –

That on or about January 12, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring together, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of
force, violence against and intimidation of person and at gunpoint, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
take and carry away one Nissan Sentra Model 1993 with Plate No. TKR-837, then driven by Agnes Guirindola but owned by her
mother Elvira G. Guirindola, to the damage and prejudice of said Agnes Guirindola and Elvira G. Guirindola in such amount as
may be awarded to them under the Civil Code of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

and -

In Criminal Case No. 94-54287 (amended) for Robbery –

That on or about January 12, 1994 in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring together, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of
force, violence against and intimidation of person and at gunpoint, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, while on board the motor vehicle of AGNES GUIRINDOLA, a 1993 Nissan Sentra with Plate No. TKR-837, and in the
course of its trip, divested and robbed said Agnes Guirindola of the following cash, check and personal belongings, to wit:

Cash ₱1,000.00

Check 3,000.00

Pieces of jewelry valued at 34,000.00

and in the course of execution thereof, shoot and fatally wounded Agnes Guirindola with a handgun, which is clearly
unnecessary in the commission of the crime, to the damage and prejudice of said Agnes Guirindola, in such amount as may be
awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

The antecedent facts as culled from the records are as follows:

On January 12, 1994, around 3:00 p.m., Agnes Guirindola (Agnes), while cruising along Panay Avenue, Quezon City, on board a
red 1993 model Nissan Sentra sedan with plate number TKR-837, was suddenly flagged down by a man wearing a PNP
reflectorized vest. The man signaled her to make a U-turn. Agnes complied and made the U-turn. The man walked in front of
her car and proceeded to the right side of the car. 6 Agnes, later on, identified the man in open court as appellant, Venancio
Roxas (Roxas).

Agnes opened the right front window of the car and asked Roxas, who had positioned himself at the front passenger side, " Ano
ang problema?" Roxas replied, "Miss, one way street po ito." Agnes explained to the man that she usually passed by the same
street and it was only that day that she had been caught. Roxas told her that the street had been made a one-way street
because a girl figured in an accident in the same street two days ago. 7

Roxas then asked for Agnes' driver’s license. After taking the driver’s license, Roxas handed her a piece of paper which she was
asked to sign. Agnes noticed that it was not the usual traffic citation ticket but, nevertheless, she pretended to sign the same by
making a check thereon.8

When Agnes handed back the paper to Roxas, the latter asked her to open the door of the car so that he could show her the
one-way sign and the other traffic aide at the corner of the street. Agnes let Roxas enter the car. Roxas then instructed Agnes to
drive to the corner of the street, and upon reaching the corner, Roxas pointed to her the one-way sign and looked for the traffic
aide he had told Agnes about. The traffic aide was not there. Agnes asked Roxas where she could drop him. Roxas told Agnes to
make a left turn from the corner of the street and that he will alight somewhere in Mother Ignacia. Agnes obliged and made a
left turn and stopped the car. Thinking that Roxas was waiting for a bribe, Agnes took out her wallet, pulled a ₱50.00 bill and
gave it to Roxas. After receiving the money, Roxas returned to Agnes her driver’s license. 9

Upon returning the driver’s license to Agnes, Roxas immediately switched off the engine of the car and poked a gun at her
saying "Miss, kailangan ko ang kotse mo." Agnes, terrified and shocked by Roxas’ actions, cried and pleaded with him to let her
go and just take the car. Roxas continued to poke a gun at her, unmindful of what Agnes was telling him. 10

After a while, Agnes heard a knock from outside the car. Roxas opened the rear door and then someone boarded the car,
occupying the back seat. The second passenger immediately reclined the driver’s seat and pulled Agnes towards the back seat.
Agnes identified this man as Roberto Gungon (Gungon). Subsequently, Roxas took the driver’s seat and drove the car while
Gungon held Agnes on the shoulder with one hand, and her leg with the other. 11

Agnes then heard Gungon say: "Boss, dalhin natin sya sa Philcoa." After crossing Mother Ignacia Street, Gungon got his beeper
and told Roxas: "Boss, dalhin na natin siya sa dati, doon na natin siya i-s." Agnes became more frightened as she understood "s"
to mean "salvage," a lingo for summary execution.12

Along the way, Roxas stopped the car and went to a sari-sari store. Gungon was left behind, holding Agnes, and would tighten
his grip every time she made a slight move and sometimes would poke a gun at her. Upon returning to the car, Roxas offered
Agnes a bottle of soft drink and Skyflakes biscuit. Agnes refused so Roxas handed the softdrink to Gungon and told him:
"Mamaya painom mo sa kanya at pakainin mo siya." Gungon took the bottle of softdrink and tried to force Agnes to drink the
contents thereof. Agnes refused because she saw tablets floating inside the bottle. Roxas resumed driving, while Gungon held
Agnes.13

Agnes testified that she planned to escape, but could not make a single move because every time she made a slight move,
Gungon would poke the gun at her. The windows of the car were tinted and remained closed. 14

Around 5:00 p.m., Agnes noticed that they were already at the South Superhighway. 15

Along the superhighway, Roxas stopped the car in order to urinate. Gungon guarded Agnes by holding her. When Roxas
returned, Gungon alighted to relieve himself too. While Gungon was out of the car, Roxas sat at the driver’s seat facing Agnes
and poked his gun at her. Shortly thereafter, Gungon came back to the car and Roxas resumed driving. When Agnes took the
prayer leaflet from her wallet, Gungon looked at her wallet and saw the picture of her sister. When asked if she was the one in
the picture, Agnes told Gungon that it was her sister. Out of the blue, Gungon also took his wallet and showed Agnes three (3)
pictures which, according to him, were the pictures of his niece, her girlfriend and that of Roxas and a lady with a little child.
After showing the same to Agnes, Gungon returned the said pictures to his wallet. 16 Agnes planned to escape at that time but
the car was running at a speed of 80 to 100 kilometers per hour. Agnes just continued to pray. 17

At this point, Gungon again offered the softdrink to Agnes. When she refused, Gungon became mad and tightened his hold on
Agnes, forcing her to drink it. Sensing that Gungon was already furious, Agnes took the softdrink. After Agnes drank it, Roxas
told Gungon, "Ipainom mo pa itong dalawang tablets dahil malaki sya, mahina iyong dalawa para sa kanya ." Gungon took the
tablets from Roxas and forced Agnes to swallow the same. Out of fear, Agnes took the tablets, but did not swallow them. She
placed the tablets under her tongue. When Roxas and Gungon were not looking, she took her handkerchief and spat out the
tablets into the handkerchief.18

Afterwards, Agnes told Roxas and Gungon that she was hungry and wanted to eat a McDonald’s sandwich. Gungon replied that
they were in the province and that there was no McDonald’s there. Roxas told Agnes that they will just drop by a restaurant to
buy something to eat. Roxas then stopped by a bakery and alighted from the car, while Gungon held Agnes. It was at this point
that Agnes noticed the signboard of the bakery which read something like Sto. Tomas or San Jose, Batangas. After a while,
Roxas came back with a "taisan" cake and offered it to Agnes which she refused. At that instance, Agnes felt dizzy and fell
asleep.19

When Agnes woke up, she found herself lying at the back seat with her legs on the lap of Gungon. The car was at a standstill.
She noticed from the car’s clock on the dashboard that it was about 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. She also found out that her jewelries
consisting of bracelets, pair of earrings, necklace and a watch worth around ₱30,000.00 to ₱40,000.00, as well as her pair of
shoes, were already gone. When she asked Gungon about them, the latter told her that they were just keeping the same for her.
Agnes also lost her wallet containing a check in the amount of ₱3,000.00 and cash in the amount of ₱1,000.00. 20

Agnes also noticed that there was already a third man sitting in front of the car beside Roxas who was still driving. She then
asked them if she could relieve herself. Gungon asked Roxas if Agnes would be allowed to relieve herself to which Roxas
answered in the affirmative. Agnes fixed her hair and then asked Gungon for her shoes. Gungon put the shoes on her feet.
Roxas alighted from the car and opened the rear door. Gungon alighted first from the car followed by Agnes. Gungon then led
Agnes to a nearby grassy area and told her, "O, dyan ka na lang umihi." After Agnes relieved herself, and as she was about to get
up and return to the car, she saw white sparks at her right side and then she fell down. When she opened her eyes, she saw
Roxas walking back towards the car with a gun in his hand. She did not see Gungon at that particular time. Then she lost
consciousness.21

When Agnes regained consciousness, she was all alone. Roxas, Gungon and the third man, as well as the car, were no longer
there. It was very dark. She followed a "sparkling light" that led her to a small house. Upon reaching the house, she opened the
door and saw two (2) children and a teenager singing. She asked for their help but upon seeing her, they ran away. She then
saw a lady standing at the stairs of the house carrying a baby. Agnes asked for her help but the lady went upstairs and locked
herself inside the room. Agnes followed her and knocked at the door of the room asking for help, but still the lady did not come
out of the room. She then went downstairs and lied down on the sofa. Only then did she notice that blood was profusely oozing
from her face and there were "holes" in the left side of her neck and her right cheek. 22

After a while, Agnes heard a vehicle arrive and also heard voices saying: "May taong duguan sa loob ng bahay, tulungan natin
siya!" Agnes was then carried to a Fiera motor vehicle and brought to the Batangas Regional Hospital, where she was treated
for her wounds and given first aid.23 Agnes sustained the following injuries:

Gunshot wound, POE, Zygomatic area (R), POX Sudmandibular area (L); Fx, zygomatic arch & condylar area, (R) Sec to GSW;
Submandibular Gland involvement with sinus tract. (Exhibit "A," Medical Certificate dated February 1, 1994 signed by
attending physician Dr. Lauro R. San Jose, Captain MC, Neurosurgery 4-A, p. 177, Volume III, Record)

The following day, about 3:00 a.m. of January 13, 1994, the parents of Agnes and the rest of the family arrived at the hospital.
Her parents immediately arranged for her transfer to the V. Luna General Hospital (now AFP Medical Center) in Quezon City,
where she was treated further, operated on and confined for forty-three (43) days. 24 Agnes incurred actual damages
amounting to ₱36,161.83 for her hospitalization, surgical operation and medical treatment, and suffered moral damages the
amount of which she cannot readily quantify, as a result of the ordeal she underwent on that fateful day of January 12, 1994. 25
Upon transfer of Agnes to the V. Luna General Hospital, her parents immediately reported the incident to the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, which promptly conducted an investigation. On January 17, 1994, some NBI agents visited her
for the taking of the cartographic sketches of Roxas and Gungon. On January 19, 1994, another group of NBI agents went to the
hospital and showed her 3 to 4 pictures of Gungon who was subsequently arrested in Davao City. On February 1, 1994, Agnes
positively identified Gungon at the NBI in a police lineup consisting of 5 to 6 men. Likewise, Agnes was able to identify certain
personal effects recovered from Gungon such as her rosary beads, 26 jewelry purse,27 key chain with a key to the lock of her
Nissan Sentra car,28 and the check taken from her, which were all presented in evidence in the trial of Gungon as well as in the
trial of the instant case against Roxas.29

In the meantime, the NBI conducted a manhunt for Roxas. On September 11, 1995, Roxas was arrested by elements of the NBI
inside the municipal hall of Taysan, Batangas, where he was working under the Office of the Mayor using the aliases "Joe
Villamor" and "Marianito Villamor."

Agnes further testified that the name of appellant Venancio Roxas was supplied by the NBI, but she was very sure that he was
the person who fatally shot her. She positively identified Roxas on January 12, 1994 during a police line-up at the NBI as the
perpetrator other than Gungon, of the crimes charged. She told the NBI agents that the person in the picture was the one who
had flagged her down and shot her on January 12, 1994.

For the defense, appellant denied committing the crimes charged against him. He claimed that it was impossible for him to be
at the place of incident on January 12, 1994. He narrated that on that same day, at around 6:00 to 7:00 p.m., he and a certain
Tranquilino Mangiliman and two others were installing an antenna on the roof of his house. He added that he never left his
house that evening. Both Mangiliman and his wife, Hermogena Roxas, testified that on January 12, 1004, Roxas was in his
house at Feria Compound, Commonwealth Town Homes, Quezon City.

Subsequently, in a Decision30 dated September 5, 2002, the court a quo, found Roxas guilty of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention with frustrated murder, carnapping and theft, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in these cases finding accused Venancio Roxas y Arguelles guilty beyond
reasonable doubt:

In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54285 for Kidnapping and serious illegal detention with frustrated murder, and sentences him to
suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH.

In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54286, for Carnapping, and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
from 18 years, as minimum, to 25 years, as maximum;

In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54287, for the crime of Theft, and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision
mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for the additional ₱10,000.00 in excess of ₱20,000.00 value of the property taken or a total of
9 years, 8 months and 1 day, as maximum.

The accused shall be credited in full of his preventive imprisonment.

Accused Roxas is also liable to pay the offended party Agnes Guirindola, moral and exemplary damages in the amount of
₱1,000,000.00 and ₱500,000.00, respectively, actual damages in the amount of ₱36,161.83, representing her hospitalization
and related expenses, and ₱38,000.00 representing the value of the articles taken from her. Accused Roxas is likewise ordered
to pay Mrs. Elvira Guirindola the amount of ₱250,257.90.00, representing the cost of repair of the subject vehicle.

SO ORDERED.

August 29, 2002, Quezon City.31

Roxas moved for a reconsideration of the September 5, 2002 decision of the court a quo. Likewise, noting the well-attended
promulgation of the court a quo’s decision, Roxas also moved for the inhibition of the Honorable Judge Demetrio Macapagal,
Sr. He argued that the presence of then Justice Secretary Hernando Perez showed the court's predisposition to convict him of
the offenses charged. Roxas contended that he was robbed of his right to due process because the Judge Demetrio Macapagal,
Sr. had lost the cold neutrality of an impartial judge required of him in trying and resolving cases.
In an Order32 dated October 8, 2002, the RTC denied appellant’s motions for inhibition and reconsideration.

Meanwhile, appellant's co-accused Roberto Gungon y Santiago was found guilty of the same charges in a Decision 33 dated
March 19, 1998. Roxas was at-large during the trial and was arrested only after the RTC rendered the judgment of conviction
against Gungon. Thus, the cases, as far as they concerned Roxas, was archived until he was eventually arrested on September
11, 1995.

The records of this case were originally elevated to this Court for automatic review. Conformably with our ruling in  People v.
Mateo,34 however, the case was referred to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review.

In its Decision35 dated January 13, 2006, the appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the court a quo.

Thus, this appeal, raising the following arguments:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RENDERING IN THE ABOVE-TITLED CASE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT A QUO HAS LOST THE COLD NEUTRALITY OF AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE, THEREBY VIOLATING
THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO DUE PROCESS.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE OFFENSES OF (1)
KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION WITH FRUSTRATED MURDER, (2) CARNAPPING, AND (3) THEFT.

Roxas challenged the RTC judge’s neutrality as he invoked that he was deprived of his right to due process because of the
"unexplained presence" of the former Secretary of the Department of Justice, Hernando Perez, in court. He contended that the
RTC was already predisposed to convict him even before trial.

We are unconvinced.

The Court finds no basis for appellant's allegation that he was deprived of due process of law and that the trial conducted was
far from impartial and fair. The imputation of bias and partiality is not supported by the record. The fact that the trial judge
opted to believe the prosecution's evidence rather than that of the defense is not a sign of bias. 36

Even if the RTC had allowed the presence of then Secretary Hernando Perez and the media, there is no sufficient basis to show
that their presence or pervasive publicity unduly influenced the court's judgment. Before we could conclude that appellant
was prejudiced by the presence of the media and Secretary Perez, he must first show substantial proof, not merely cast
suspicions. There must be a showing that adverse publicity indeed influenced the court's decision. 37 We found none, in this
case.

Appellant further argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty of the crimes charged against him.

Time and again, we have ruled that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are
entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would have affected the
result of the case. The trial court is in a better position to decide the question of credibility, having seen and heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying. 38

We have painstakingly examined the records of the case, particularly the testimonies for the prosecution and the defense.
However, after much examination, we find no persuasive much less compelling reason to depart from the findings of the trial
court.

Agnes not only positively identified her abductors, she also graphically narrated what happened on January 12, 1994. Actual
restraint of the victim's liberty was evident in the instant case from the moment Agnes was taken from Panay Avenue to a
remote place in Batangas. Agnes testified, thus:

Q - After Roberto Gungon pulled you towards the back seat, what happened?
A - Venancio Roxas took the driver seat and started the car, sir. I mean, he took the driver seat and started the car.

Q – What was Roberto Gungon doing after Venancio Roxas started the car?

A – He was holding me sir.

Q – How was he holding you?

A – One hand on my shoulder and the other one is (sic) on my leg, sir.

xxxx

Q – What did Gungon do with the bottle?

A – He still forced me but when I refused he just placed it down in the car, sir.

Q – After that what happened?

A – Roxas still drove and Gungon was still holding me, then after that we went to this gasoline station to gas up, sir.

xxxx

Q – Why were you not able to escape while you were seated and crying?

A – Because Gungon was holding me and everytime I just made a slight move, he poked the gun at me, sir. 39

xxxx

Q – While you were praying, do you know what Gungon and Roxas were doing at that time?

xxxx

A – Yes, Roxas was driving and Gungon was still holding me and he asked Roxas if he could relieve himself, sir.

xxxx

Q – After your car stopped, what happened?

A – He told Gungon that he'll take a leak (sic) first before Gungon so Roxas alighted from the car and took a leak (sic),
sir.

Q – How about Gungon, where was he?

A - He was seated beside me, he was still holding me, sir.

Q - After Roxas finished leaking (sic), do you know what did he do (sic), if any?

A- Yes, he went back to the car, he sat at the driver's seat, he faced in front of me (sic), took the gun and poked it at me
and then Gungon alighted from the car and he was the next one who took a leak (sic), sir.

xxxx

Q - After Roxas alighted from the car, where were you at that time?

A - I was still sitting at the car, with Gungon, sir.

 Q- What was Gungon doing at that time?

A- Yes, we were waiting for Roxas and he was holding my leg, sir. 40

xxxx

Q – Previously, you testified that Gungon was holding you and everytime you made a slight movement he would grips
(sic) you firmly and poke a gun at you. My question is – for how long had Gungon been doing this?

A - Ever since he pulled me from the driver seat to the back seat up to the time when we were cruising along South
Superhighway, sir.

Q - Up to that while you were driving?

A – Yes, sir.

Q – When you reached Batangas, in the bakery, what was Gungon's (sic) doing to you, if any?

A- He kept on holding me although from time to time and only when I made a slight move, sir. 41

Thus, based on the foregoing testimony of Agnes, the trial court did not err in convicting appellant of the crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime, thus:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other
manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority;

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill
him shall have been made;

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a
public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts,
the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (As amended by Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 7659). 42

The evidence likewise reveal, undoubtedly, the commission of frustrated murder as qualified by the circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation. The medical findings show that had it not been due to the timely and proper medical
attention given to the victim, the gunshot wound sustained by the victim would have been fatal.

Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself, arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. As narrated by Agnes, she could not have been aware that she would be attacked by
appellant. In the darkness of the night while she just finished relieving herself and still trying to get up, she was shot by
appellant in the head with a gun. There was no opportunity for her to defend herself, since appellant, suddenly and without
provocation, shot her as she was about to get up. The essence of treachery is the unexpected and sudden attack on the victim
which renders the latter unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. This
criterion applies whether the attack is frontal or from behind. 43

Moreover, the requisites of evident premeditation was likewise duly established in this case, to wit: (a) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and
(c) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
act.44

The prosecution's evidence particularly the testimony of Agnes demonstrated that Gungon and Roxas had indeed planned to
kill her from the time they took the car. As testified to by Agnes:

Q- You said that Roxas returned with a biscuit and a bottle of softdrink, what was done with the biscuit and bottle of
softdrink, if you know?

A – I refused to accept it, he insisted but still I refused so he just handed it to Gungon. He just told Gungon "mamaya
painom mo sa kanya at pakainin mo siya," sir.

Q – Why did you refuse the softdrink?

A- Simply because when he handed it to me I saw tablets floating inside the bottle, sir. 45

xxxx

Q – At about 5:00 and 6:00 in the evening of January 12, 1994 where were you at that time?

xxxx

A- Actually we were not really there, its (sic) we were headed towards South Superhighway. I mean I don’t know the
exact place but I am familiar that we were heading towards South super highway, sir.

xxxx

Q – When you reached the South Superhighway at that time what happened?

A – While we were in the car Gungon got his beeper and then he told Roxas "Boss, negative Philcoa," sir.

xxxx

Q – While you were driving along South super highway at that time, do you know what happened inside the car
between the three of you?

A – Yes, sir. That time Gungon was still holding me and then he told Roxas "boss, dalhin na natin siya sa dati, doon na
natin siya i-s."

Q – After you heard that remark of Gungon, what did you do?

A – Well, of course I was shocked and I asked them if they were going to rape me or kill me or just leave me
somewhere, I do not know, sir.

Q – After you uttered those words, do you know if Gungon answered?

A – Yes, sir, he told me that don’t give us ideas (sic). 46

xxxx

Q – What did you do when the bottle of softdrink was being offered to you?

A - I refused to get it, sir.

Q – When you refused to drink it, do you know what did Gungon do?
 A – Yes, he got mad and furious, he held me so tight and forced me to drink it, sir.

Q - Now, because he was furious and he was angry at you, what did you do?

A - I took the softdrink, sir.

Q- After you drank that softdrink, what happened?

xxxx

A – Yes, sir, after drinking it Roxas offered two (2) more tablets to Gungon, he told to Gungon "ipainom mo pa sa kanya
itong dalawang tabletas dahil malaki siya, mahina iyong dalawa para sa kanya". 47

xxxx

Q – Do you know what time was it when you woke up?

A - I guess it was about 9:30 or 10:00 in the evening, sir.

Q – How were you able to place the time?

A - There is a watch on the dashboard of the car, sir.48

Thus, from the foregoing, it is evident that the commission of the killing, albeit frustrated, was formed from the moment the
accused took the victim in Quezon City until she was ultimately "executed" in Batangas. The lapse of more than eight hours,
that is, approximately from 1:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., satisfies the last requisite for the appreciation of evident premeditation as
there was sufficient time for meditation and reflection before the commission of the crime yet appellant proceeded with the
same.

Likewise, we agree that Roxas is also guilty of violation of the Anti-Carnapping Law. R.A. 6539, otherwise known as An Act
Preventing and Penalizing Carnapping, defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to
another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things."
More specifically, the elements of the crime are as follows:

1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;

2. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle;

3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;

4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.

A careful examination of the evidence presented would show that all the elements of carnapping were proven in this case. It
cannot be denied that the 1993 Nissan Sentra with plate number TKR-837 was unlawfully taken from Agnes without her
consent and by means of force or intimidation, considering that he and his co-accused alternately poked a gun at Agnes. After
shooting her, appellant also flee with the subject vehicle which shows his intent to gain. Agnes also positively identified
appellant and Gungon as the ones who took the subject vehicle from her.

Finally, we likewise agree that Roxas is only guilty of theft and not robbery as initially charged.

From the records, it appears that the jewelries and cash were taken from Agnes without the attendance of violence or
intimidation upon her person. Agnes herself testified that when she regained consciousness, she already found her necklace,
pair of earrings, watch and cash, to be missing. 49 While it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that appellant took Agnes'
personal things, there was no evidence, however, that the taking was employed with the use of force, violation and
intimidation.
PENALTIES

As to the imposable penalty, we sustain the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the appellate court, with modification as to the
penalty for the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with frustrated murder and the awarding of damages.

The crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention has been correctly complexed by the RTC with frustrated murder. A
complex crime is committed when a single act constitutes two or more, grave or less grave, felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other.

In a complex crime, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Since the kidnapping and serious illegal detention is the more serious crime, the proper penalty under Article 267 50 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, should be applied in its maximum period; thus, the penalty should be death.
However, in light of R.A. 9346, or the Anti-Death Penalty Law, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the
imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of death is, thus, proper and ineligible for parole.

Likewise, in accordance with current jurisprudence, we modify the award of damages, and apply People of the Philippines v.
Richard O. Sarcia51 where we said:

The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v. Salome and People v. Quiachon is the
penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heineousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on
the offender.

xxxx

It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a
heinous offense is still death and the offense is still heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is
still Php75,000.00.

People v. Quiachon also rationcinates as follows:

With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing jurisprudence, correctly awarded the following
amounts: ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances warranting the imposition
of the death penalty; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages because the victim is assumed to have suffered moral injuries, hence,
entitling her to an award of moral damages even without proof thereof, x x x.

Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil
indemnity of ₱75,000.00 is still proper because, following the rationcination in People v. Victor, the said award is not
dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the
imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. The Court declared that the award of ₱75,000.00
shows "not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time but
also the expression of the displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."1avvphi1

The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which
would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to
reclusion perpetua.52

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 13, 2006, in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00666, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, insofar as to sentence appellant Venancio Roxas y Arguelles to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with Frustrated Murder, and to declare him
ineligible for parole. Appellant is, likewise, ordered to pay Agnes Guirindola ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as
moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.
2. ANTI-FENCING LAW OF 1979

G.R. No. 225695, March 21, 2018

IRENEO CAHULOGAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Ireneo Cahulogan (petitioner) assailing the
Decision2 dated November 6, 2015 and the Resolution 3 dated June 8, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
01126-MIN, which affirmed the Judgment 4 dated October 4, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan De Oro City, Misamis
Oriental, Branch 41 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 2011-507, convicting petitioner of the crime of Fencing, defined and penalized
under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1612, otherwise known as the "Anti-Fencing Law of 1979." 5

The Facts

On April 18, 2011, an Information 6 was filed before the RTC charging petitioner with the crime of Fencing, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about January 14, 2011 [,] at about 4:00 o'clock [sic] in the afternoon, at Bugo, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the knowledge and consent of the owner
thereof, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of,
or in any manner deal, Two Hundred Ten (210) cases of Coca Cola products worth Php52,476.00 owned by and belonging to
the offended party Johnson Tan which accused know, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of
the crime of Theft, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid sum of Php52,476.00.

Contrary to Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as Anti-Fencing Law of 1979. 7
The prosecution alleged that private complainant Johnson Tan (Tan), a businessman engaged in transporting Coca-Cola
products, instructed his truck driver and helper, Braulio Lopez (Lopez) and Loreto Lariosa (Lariosa), to deliver 210 cases of
Coca-Cola products (subject items) worth P52,476.00 to Demins Store. The next day, Tan discovered that contrary to his
instructions, Lopez and Lariosa delivered the subject items to petitioner's store. Tan then went to petitioner and informed him
that the delivery to his store was a mistake and that he was pulling out the subject items. However, petitioner refused, claiming
that he bought the same from Lariosa for P50,000.00, but could not present any receipt evidencing such transaction. Tan
insisted that he had the right to pull out the subject items as Lariosa had no authority to sell the same to petitioner, but the
latter was adamant in retaining such items. Fearing that his contract with Coca-Cola will be terminated as a result of the
wrongful delivery, and in order to minimize losses, Tan negotiated with petitioner to instead deliver to him P20,000.00 worth
of empty bottles with cases, as evidenced by their Agreement 8 dated January 18, 2011. Nonetheless, Tan felt aggrieved over
the foregoing events, thus, prompting him to secure an authorization to file cases from Coca-Cola and charge petitioner with
the crime of Fencing. He also claimed to have charged Lariosa with the crime of Theft but he had no update as to the status
thereof.9

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty, 10 but chose not to present any evidence in his defense. Rather, he merely
submitted his memorandum,11 maintaining that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 12

The RTC Ruling

In a Judgment13 dated October 4, 2013, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and
accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate period often (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.14

The RTC found that the prosecution had successfully established the presence of all the elements of the crime of Fencing,
considering that Lariosa stole the subject items from his employer, Tan, and that petitioner was found to be in possession of
the same. The RTC noted that under the circumstances of the case, petitioner would have been forewarned that the subject
items came from an illegal source since Lariosa: (a) sold to him the subject items at a discount and without any corresponding
delivery and official receipts; and (b) did not demand that such items be replaced by empty bottles, a common practice in
purchases of soft drink products. 15
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed16 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision17 dated November 6, 2015, the CA affirmed petitioner's conviction. 18 It held that Lariosa's act of selling the
subject items to petitioner without the authority and consent from Tan clearly constituted theft. As such, petitioner's
possession of the stolen items constituted prima facie evidence of Fencing - a presumption which he failed to rebut. 19

Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration 20 which was, however, denied in a Resolution 21 dated June 8, 2016; hence,
this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's conviction for the crime of Fencing.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is without merit.

"Time and again, it has been held that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and it is the duty of the
reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.
The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records,
revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law." 22

Guided by this consideration, the Court finds no reason to overturn petitioner's conviction for the crime of Fencing.

Section 2 of PD 1612 defines Fencing as "the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy,
receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item,
object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft."23 The same Section also states that a Fence "includes any person, firm, association, corporation or
partnership or other organization who/which commits the act of fencing." 24

The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (a) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (b) the
accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses,
keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of
value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (c) the accused knew or should have known
that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
(d) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another. 25 Notably, Fencing is a malum prohibitum, and
PD 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of Fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item,
object or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value
of the property.26

In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the crime of Fencing, as it was shown that: (a) Lariosa sold to petitioner the subject items without authority and
consent from his employer, Tan, for his own personal gain, and abusing the trust and confidence reposed upon him as a truck
helper;27 (b) petitioner bought the subject items from Lariosa and was in possession of the same; (c) under the circumstances,
petitioner should have been forewarned that the subject items came from an illegal source, as his transaction with Lariosa did
not have any accompanying delivery and official receipts, and that the latter did not demand that such items be replaced with
empty bottles, contrary to common practice among dealers of soft drinks; 28 and (d) petitioner's intent to gain was made
evident by the fact that he bought the subject items for just P50,000.00, lower than their value in the amount of P52,476.00.
"[T]he Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as there is no
indication that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. In fact, the
trial court was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties, and
hence, due deference should be accorded to the same." 29

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on petitioner, pertinent portions of Section 3 of PD 1612 read:
Section 3. Penalties. - Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as hereunder indicated:

a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than 12,000 pesos but not exceeding 22,000
pesos; if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty pertaining
thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed.

xxxx
Notably, while the crime of Fencing is defined and penalized by a special penal law, the penalty provided therein is taken from
the nomenclature in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In Peralta v. People,30 the Court discussed the proper treatment of penalties
found in special penal laws vis-a-vis Act No. 4103, 31 otherwise known as the "Indeterminate Sentence Law," viz.:
Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), provides that if the offense is
ostensibly punished under a special law, the minimum and maximum prison term of the indeterminate sentence shall not be
beyond what the special law prescribed. Be that as it may, the Court had clarified in the landmark ruling of  People v. Simon that
the situation is different where although the offense is defined in a special law, the penalty therefor is taken from the technical
nomenclature in the RPC. Under such circumstance, the legal effects under the system of penalties native to the Code would
also necessarily apply to the special law.32
Otherwise stated, if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the penalties under the RPC, the ascertainment of the
indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules applied for those crimes punishable under the RPC. 33

Applying the foregoing and considering that there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances present in this case,
the Court finds it proper to sentence petitioner to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4)
years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.

At this point, the Court notes that as may be gleaned from its whereas clauses, PD 1612 was enacted in order to provide
harsher penalties to those who would acquire properties which are proceeds of the crimes of Robbery or Theft, who prior to
the enactment of said law, were punished merely as accessories after the fact of the said crimes. 34 This rationale was echoed
in Dizon-Pamintuan v. People35 where the Court held that while a Fence may be prosecuted either as an accessory of
Robbery/Theft or a principal for Fencing, there is a preference for the prosecution of the latter as it provides for harsher
penalties:
Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held liable as an accessory, as the term is defined in Article 19 of
the Revised Penal Code. The penalty applicable to an accessory is obviously light under the rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55,
and 57 of the Revised Penal Code, subject to the qualification set forth in Article 60 thereof. Noting, however, the reports from
law enforcement agencies that "there is rampant robbery and thievery of government and private properties" and that "such
robbery and thievery have become profitable on the part of the lawless elements because of the existence of ready buyers,
commonly known as fence, of stolen properties," P.D. No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy penalties on persons who profit
by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft." Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be
prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, he ceases to be a mere
accessory but becomes a principal in the crime of fencing. Elsewise stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand,
and fencing, on the other, are separate and distinct offenses. The state may thus choose to prosecute him either under the
Revised Penal Code or P.D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable considering that fencing is
a malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of
the property.36
While PD 1612 penalizes those who acquire properties which are proceeds of Robbery or Theft, its prescribed penalties are
similar to the latter crime in that they are largely dependent on the value of the said properties. In fact, a reading of Section 3
of PD 1612 and Article 309 of the RPC (which provides for the prescribed penalties for the crime of Theft) reveals that both
provisions use the same graduations of property value to determine the prescribed penalty; in particular, if the value: ( a)
exceeds P22,000.00, with additional penalties for each additional P10,000.00; (b) is more than P12,000.00 but not exceeding
P22,000.00; (c) is more than P6,000.00 but not exceeding P12,000.00; (d) is more than P200.00 but not exceeding P6,000.00;
(e) is more than P50.00 but not exceeding P200.00; and (f) does not exceed P5.00. However, with the recent enactment of
Republic Act No. 10951,37 which adjusted the values of the property and damage on which various penalties are based, taking
into consideration the present value of money, as opposed to its archaic values when the RPC was enacted in 1932, 38 the
graduation of values in Article 309 was substantially amended, without any concomitant adjustment for PD 1612. This
development would then result in instances where a Fence, which is theoretically a mere accessory to the crime of
Robbery/Theft, will be punished more severely than the principal of such latter crimes. This incongruence in penalties
therefore, impels an adjustment of penalties.

However, while it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court
dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation. 39 As the Court remains mindful of the fact that the determination of penalties is
a policy matter that belongs to the legislative branch of the government, it finds it prudent to instead, furnish both Houses of
Congress, as well as the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice, pursuant to Article
540 of the RPC, copies of this ruling in order to alert them on the aforestated incongruence of penalties, all with the hope of
arriving at the proper solution to this predicament.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 6, 2015 and the Resolution dated June 8, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 01126-MIN finding petitioner Ireneo Cahulogan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Fencing defined and penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the "Anti-Fencing Law,"
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate period of
four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum.

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Department of Justice, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 220440, November 08, 2017

KATHERINE ROSE SALVA, Petitioner, v. ILDEFONSO P. MAGPILE, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the December
5, 2014 Decision1 and September 4, 2015 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 99819. The dispositive
portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.
08-184 dated June 17, 2011 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The auction sale of the parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 215195 conducted on May 24, 2006 is hereby declared NULL and VOID. The Certificate of Sale issued by
virtue of the said sale in favor of herein respondent-appellee Katherine Rose Salva is hereby ordered CANCELLED.

SO ORDERED.3
The facts are uncomplicated.

Sometime in 1968, respondent Ildefonso P. Magpile (Magpile) acquired a 262-square-meter parcel of land situated in Makati
City, Metro Manila. His title thereto, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 215195, 4 was registered on February 19, 1968 and
bears "2118 Apolinario, Makati, Rizal" as his postal address. 5 He transferred to and resided in the subject property. On June
30, 1980, he filed with the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Makati a Sworn Statement of the True Current and Fair Market
Value6 of the land covered by TCT No. 215195 as well as the improvements made thereon. In the Sworn Statement, he wrote
"1772 Evangelista, Bangkal, Makati, M.M." as his postal address.

Magpile failed to pay the real property taxes due on the subject property from 1998 up to 2006. As a result, the City Treasurer
of Makati sent him billing statements, 7 notice of realty tax delinquency,8 and warrants of levy9 at the address "2118 Apolinario
St., Bangkal, Makati City." On May 24, 2006, the subject property was sold at a public auction for P200,000.00 to petitioner
Katherine Rose Salva (Salva) as the highest bidder.10

Almost two years after, on March 5, 2008, Magpile, through his daughter, Ma. Socorro Magpile-Del Rosario as attorney-in-
fact,11 filed a petition12 to declare as null and void the auction sale and to cancel the certificate of sale issued in favor of Salva.
The case was raffled to Makati RTC, Branch 150 and docketed as Civil Case No. 08-184.

In his petition; Magpile claimed that he did not receive any of the notices sent by the City Treasurer, who failed to comply with
Section 258, Chapter VI, Title II, Book II of Republic Act. (R.A.) No. 7160, or the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). He
asserted that his former .postal address is no longer existing since 1996. As proof, he attached the Certification dated February
28, 2008 issued by the Barangay Captain of Pio del Pilar, Makati, attesting that " the address or numbers of residences and
establishments located in Apolinario Street this Barangay have been changed since 1996" and that "the former postal address of
Mr. Ildefonso P. Magpile of 2118 Apolinario Street indicated last 1968 [has] been replaced last 1996 by the current numbers or
address 1510 A & B Apolinario Street."13

Despite impleading the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the City Treasurer of Makati as public respondent, only Salva filed an
Answer.14 She alleged, among others, that public respondent enjoys the presumption of regularity, and assuming that Magpile's
allegations are true, he is estopped for his failure to call the attention of public respondent about the continued use of 2118
Apolinario St., Bangkal, Makati City as his postal address. It was noted that years had elapsed from the alleged submission of
the Sworn Statement until the notice of realty tax delinquency was sent.

At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following facts:

1. That on June 30, 1980, petitioner filed with the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Makati a Sworn Statement of the current
and fair market value of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 215195 as well as the improvements thereon, with an area of
262 square meters described as Lot No. 10, Block 7 of Psd 1754 located at No. 1772 Evangelista, Bangkal, Makati under Tax
Declaration No. 001-00780. That a one and one-half residential house is constructed on the lot; x x x [and]
2. That in the Sworn Statement, petitioner stated therein that the postal address is at 1772 Evangelista, Bangkal, Makati, Metro
Manila[.] x x x15
Salva admitted the existence and authenticity of the documents attached to the petition, to wit: TCT No. 215195, billing
statements dated February 3, 2006 and March 14, 2006, notice of realty tax delinquency dated February 24, 2006, warrants of
levy dated April 7, 2006, notice of public auction, and certification of the Barangay Captain of Pio del Pilar. 16

The issues formulated for resolution were:

1. whether or not the Auction Sale conducted on May [24], 2006 is valid;

2. whether or not the City Treasurer complied with the provision of e Local Government Code, specifically Section 258, Chapter
6 of RA No. 7160; and

3. whether or not the Notice of Levy was deemed to have been received by the petitioner. 17
After the termination of pre-trial, the parties agreed to submit the case for decision based ori the pleadings, thereby leaving
the trial court to resolve the issues after submission of memorandum. 18

In his Memorandum,19 Magpile insisted that he did not receive any of the notices sent by the City Treasurer of Makati, who sent
all notices to his former postal address that no longer exists since 1996 per Certification of the Barangay Captain of Pio del
Pilar. According to him, the City Treasurer could not feign ignorance of such fact since it would be reflected in the return of the
notices. Also, the Sworn Statement he submitted to the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Makati in 1980 already declared
that he had occupied and resided at the subject property as early as 1968 and that his postal address is 1772 Evangelista,
Bangkal, Makati, Metro Manila. Moreover, even granting that a notice of delinquency was posted and published, the auction
sale is still null and void because he did not receive the warrant of levy, which is a clear violation of Section 258 of the LGC. No
effort was done nor was there any intention on the part of the City Treasurer to serve such warrant to the occupant of the
property. These effectively disputed the presumption of regularity. Finally, Magpile argued that while he deposited the amount
required under Section 267 of R.A. No. 7160, inclusive of the two percent (2%) interest from the date of the sale up to the time
of the institution of the action, he should not be liable for the 2% interest because he was also a victim of the negligence of fault
of the City Treasurer.

On the other hand, Salva countered in her Memorandum 20 that Magpile should have taken the witness stand to prove his
allegations that he did not receive the notices or warrant and that there was irregularity in the performance of official function
on the part of the City Treasurer. She surmised that he was aware that his testimony could not withstand the crucible test of
cross-examination. The presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced, therefore, applies in
this case. Further, Salva contended that not a single document is on record wherein Magpile himself denied receiving the
notices or warrant. The petition was verified by his daughter, who has no personal knowledge of the alleged non receipt of
notices by her father and had not testified in open court. Documentary evidence, which are, at best, merely corroborative, have
no leg to stand on in the absence of Magpile's oral testimony.

For Salva, Magpile's place of residence has no bearing to the case. She asserted that the notice of delinquency must be posted
and published but need not be mailed. Likewise, although the law requires that a warrant of levy be mailed, if not personally
served, it is silent on where the mail should be addressed. Thus, the warrant of levy need not be mailed to the residence of the
delinquent taxpayer; it may be mailed to any of the postal addresses given. Salva argued that Magpile should be deemed as
having maintained two postal addresses .considering that she never admitted his alleged transfer of residence. 21 He should
have established that 2118 Apolinario Street was no longer his postal address and that he advised the City Treasurer to direct
all communications to his new postal address. A different address indicated in the Sworn Statement does not mean that it
replaces the one previously given by Magpile and it does not instruct that all notices and communications should, henceforth,
be sent to the newly given address. According to Salva, the only legal conclusion that could be drawn therefrom is that he
maintains two postal addresses, which is not prohibited by law, and that the mails intended for him could be directed to either
one of them.

As to the Certification issued by the Barangay Captain of Pio del Pilar, Salva pointed out that it is immaterial to the case and has
no probative value because both parties agreed that 2118 Apolinario Street is in Barangay Bangkal, but Magpile presented a
Certification issued by Barangay Pio del Pilar.

On June 17, 2011, the trial court denied Magpile's petition, opining that the notices sent to him through registered mail by the
City Treasurer adequately protected his rights as the registered owner of the subject property. It held that: (1) under Section
254 of the LGC, it is sufficient that the notice of delinquency was sent via registered mail by the City Treasurer; and (2) Section
258 of the LGC gives the City Treasurer the option to send the warrant of levy and does not require that it must be actually
received by the delinquent taxpayer. It further ruled:
The court would readily declare non-compliance with the law had the notices and the Warrant of Levy been sent to an address
other than the one indicated in the TCT and in the Makati tax records and if such address is not the residence known to the
treasurer or if sent to a person not the registered owner of the property. The fact that petitioner was not able to read the
Notices and the Warrant of Levy is of no consequence. Fault may be attributed to him for his failure to amend his address and
provide the City Treasurer of a more complete and reliable one. The allegation of petitioner that he did not receive the notice
of delinquency and Warrant of Levy is merely an allegation. Without the petitioner presenting competent evidence to
provnon-receipt of the notices, such allegation would remain an allegation. Records further show that petitioner did not testify
in court. He merely relied on the documents to prove his allegations. Moreover, petitioner failed to present competent
evidence that he has already established his new residence at 1772 Evangelista St., Bangkal, Makati. The address indicated by
petitioner in the Sworn Statement filed with the Assessor's Office does not automatically prove that he is no longer a resident
of 2118 Apolinario St., Bangkal, Makati City. Petitioner should have presented competent evidence which imports not only his
intention to reside at 1772 Evangelista St., Bangkal, Makati but also that he is personally present in that place coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.

In contrast, the Treasurer's Office cannot be faulted for sending the notices and Warrant of Levy to the address indicated in
petitioner's Transfer Certificate of Title and on his tax records. As discussed earlier, Section 258 instructs the Treasurer where
to send the Warrant of Levy.

The Certification issued by the Barangay Captain of Barangay Pio del Pilar to the effect that the address and number of
petitioner's former postal address at 2118 Apolinario St., Bangkal, Makati have been replaced in 1996 as 1510 A & B
Apolinario St. has no probative value since the property is located in Barangay Bangkal and not Barangay Pio del Pilar. It
would have been more believable had the Barangay Captain of Barangay Bangkal issued the said Certification. 22
Magpile filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; 23 hence, he elevated the case to the CA. He argued that there was
non-compliance with Section 258 of the LGC on the grounds that: (1) the notices and warrants of levy were sent to an address
that is wrong, non-existent, and neither provided by the taxpayer nor indicated in his tax records; and (2) the levying officer
failed to submit a report on the levy to the sanggunian concerned within ten (10) days from receipt of the warrant by the
owner of the property or person having legal interest therein. On the other hand, Salva maintained her previous assertions
and, in addition, averred that the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the appeal pursuant to
Section 7 (a) (3) of R.A. 9282.

In dismissing the challenge on its jurisdiction, the CA said:

Civil Case No. 08-184 cannot be considered as a local tax case considering that it does not involve the collection of taxes but
one which involves merely the annulment of an auction sale conducted for nonpayment of the same. It must be remembered
that nowhere in the said case did Magpile ever questioned the validity of the real property tax assessed on his property.
Neither does he also deny his liability for the payment of the said taxes nor the proper amount thereof which was assessed
against him. What was merely assailed by Magpile is the alleged denial of due process on his part in the levying of his property
since the notices and warrant of levy were sent to an address which he claims he does not reside in. 24
The appellate court agreed with the RTC that the Certification of the Barangay Captain of Pio del Pilar has no probative value
as it has been conclusively proven by Magpile's repeated admission in his pleadings that his former postal address, "2118
Apolinario Street," is in Barangay Bangkal, Makati, and that it is beyond the authority of the Barangay Captain to make any
declaration regarding the location of the said address as the same is not within his territorial jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it was
ruled that the City Treasurer erred in sending the notices to Magpile's old address despite being informed of the change of
postal address to "1772 Evangelista, Bangkal, Makati" when he filed the Sworn Statement. For the CA, Magpile's act of
providing a different address had the effect of notifying the City Treasurer of changing his postal address in the tax records of
Makati. An express mention that he had abandoned the address stated in TCT No. 215195 and that all notices and
communications should be directed to another address given is not needed. The Sworn Statement was considered as part of
the tax record of the taxpayer and any change in the taxpayer's circumstances relative to the taxation of the property is
reflected in the said document. It was opined:
x x x At the risk of being repetitive, We reiterate that it is just illogical to require the taxpayer to amend the address appearing
in his certificates of title covering his real properties every time there will be a change in his postal address just to ensure that
all notices that will be sent by the local government in relation to the taxation of the said real properties will be received by
him. Since the documents being filed by taxpayer in relation to the taxation of his real properties form part of his tax records
with the City/Municipality, the more logical approach should be that all notices to the taxpayer by the City/Municipality can in
turn be sent at the address provided by the taxpayer in the said documents since the same form part of his tax records with the
City/Municipality.25
Citing Talusan v. Tayag,26 the CA held that cases involving an auction sale of land for the .collection of delinquent taxes are  in
personam; thus, there must be actual notice sent to the delinquent taxpayer in order for the auction sale to be valid. Since there
was no proper service to Magpile of the notice of delinquency and the warrant of levy, the City of Makati did not comply with
Sections 254 and 258 of the LGC.
The petition lacks merit.

First, on procedural matters. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. 27 R.A. No. 9282,28 which was passed into law on March 30, 2004
and took effect on April 23, 2004, 29 amended Section 7 of R.A. No. 1125. It provides:

SEC. 7. Section 7 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:

"(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

x x x x

"(3) Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in
the exercise of their original or applellate jurisdiction[.]
The local tax cases referred to in Section 7(a) (3) above-quoted include those involving real property taxes. 30 Real property
taxation is governed by Book II of the Local Government Code on "Local Taxation and Fiscal Matters" and real property taxes
are collected by the Local Treasurer, not by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in charge of collecting national internal revenue
taxes, fees, and charges.31 In National Power Corp. v. Municipal Government of Navotas, et al.,32 the Court held:
Indeed, the CTA, sitting as Division, has jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions, rulings and resolutions of the RTC over
local tax cases, which includes real property taxes. This is evident from a perusal of the Local Government Code ( LGC) which
includes the matter of Real Property Taxation under one of its main chapters. Indubitably, the power to impose real property
tax is in line with the power vested in the local governments to create their own revenue sources, within the limitations set
forth by law. As such, the collection of real property taxes is conferred with the local treasurer rather than the Bureau of
Internal Revenue.

We, therefore, disagree with the conclusion of the CTA En Banc that real property taxes have always been treated by our laws
separately from local taxes. The fact that a separate chapter is devoted to the treatment of real property taxes, and a distinct
appeal procedure is provided therefor does not justify an inference that Section 7(a)(3) of R.A. 9282 pertains only to local
taxes other than real property taxes. Rather, the term "local taxes" in the aforementioned provision should be considered in its
general and comprehensive sense, which embraces real property tax assessments, in line with the precept Generalia verba
sunt generaliter inteligencia - what is generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between the restricted sense and the
general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used. In
the words of the Court in Marcos v. Chief of Staff:

Where words are used which have both, a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail over the restricted unless
the nature of the subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended.

Here, the context in which the word "local taxes" is employed does not clearly indicate that the limited or restricted view was
intended by the legislature. In addition, the specification of real property tax assessment under Paragraph (a)(5) of Section 7
of R.A. 9282, in relation to the decisions of the CBAA, is only proper given that the CBAA has no jurisdiction, either original or
appellate, over cases involving local taxes other than real property taxes.

Based on the foregoing, the general meaning of "local taxes" should be adopted in relation to Paragraph (a) (3) of Section 7 of
R.A. 9282, which necessarily includes real property taxes.33
The above notwithstanding, the CA correctly asserted its jurisdiction in this case. Here, the dispute arose from the alleged non-
compliance of the respondents with the pertinent provisions of the LGC on tax delinquency sale. A plain reading of Magpile's
petition before the RTC would show that he did not assail the legality or validity and reasonableness or correctness of the real
property tax assessment and collection. In fact, he categorically and repeatedly admits in his pleadings that he failed to pay the
real property tax from 1998 up to 2006. As the CA ruled, what he is questioning is the alleged denial of due process in the
levying of his property. Basic is the rule that the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought determine
the nature of an action.34 In order for the trial court to resolve Magpile's petition, the issues regarding the legality/validity or
reasonableness/correctness of the real property tax assessment and collection need not be dealt with. At bar, the issue of the
validity and legality of the tax sale is not essentially related to the issue of the demandability of the real property tax.
Therefore, the non-dismissal of Magpile's appeal by the CA was in order.

Now, on the substantive matters.

As an exception to the rule that administrative proceedings are presumed to be regular, there can be no presumption of the
regularity of any administrative action which results in depriving a taxpayer of his property through a tax sale. 35 The fairly
recent case of Corporate Strategies Development Corp., et al. v. Agojo 36 discussed this at length, thus:
In Spouses Sarmiento v. CA, this Court reiterated the rule that there could be no presumption of the regularity of any
administrative action which resulted in depriving a taxpayer of his property through a tax sale. This is an exception to the rule
that administrative proceedings are presumed to be regular. This has been the rule since the 1908 case of Valencia v. Jimenez
and Fuster where this Court held:

The American law does not create a presumption of the regularity of any administrative action which results in depriving a
citizen or taxpayer of his property, but, on the contrary, the due process of law to be followed in tax proceedings must be
established by proof and the general rule is that the purchaser of a tax title is bound to take upon himself the burden of
showing the regularity of all proceedings leading up to the sale. The difficulty of supplying such proof has frequently lead to
efforts on the part of legislatures to avoid it by providing by statute that a tax deed shall be deemed either conclusive or
presumptive proof of such regularity.

Those statutes attributing to it a conclusive effect have been held invalid as operating to deprive the owner of his property
without due process of law. But those creating a presumption only have been sustained as affecting a rule of evidence,
changing nothing but the burden of proof. (Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U.S., 51.)

The tax law applicable to Manila does not attempt to give any special probative effect to the deed of the assessor and
collector, and therefore leaves the purchaser to establish the regularity of all vital steps in the assessment and
sale. (Emphasis supplied)

In 1915, the Court reiterated this doctrine in Camo v. Boyco. It was written therein that no presumption of the regularity
existed in any administrative action which resulted in depriving a citizen or taxpayer of his property. It further stated that on
the contrary, the due process of law to be followed in tax proceedings must be established by proof and the general rule was
that the purchaser of a tax title was bound to take upon himself the burden of showing the regularity of all
proceedings leading up to the sale.

And in the 2003 case of Requiron v. Sinaban, this Court likewise pronounced that it was incumbent upon the buyer at an
auction sale to prove the regularity of all proceedings leading to the sale for the buyer could not rely on the presumption of
regularity accorded to ordinary administrative proceedings.

The above jurisprudential tenor clearly demonstrates that the burden to prove compliance with the validity of the proceedings
leading up to the tax delinquency sale is incumbent upon the buyer or the winning bidder, which, in this case, is the
respondent. This is premised on the rule that a sale of land for tax delinquency is in derogation of property and due process
rights of the registered owner. In order to be valid, the steps required by law must be strictly followed. The burden to show
that such steps were taken lies on the person claiming its validity, for the Court cannot allow mere presumption of regularity
to take precedence over the right of a property owner to due process accorded no less than by the Constitution. 37
In determining whether Salva has fulfilled her burden of proving compliance with the requirements for a valid tax delinquency
sale reference should be made on Sections 254,258 and 260 of the LGC.

Section 254 mandates that the notice of delinquency in the payment of the real property be: (1) posted at the main entrance of
the provincial capitol, or city or municipal hall and in a publicly accessible and conspicuous place in each  barangay of the local
government unit concerned, and (2) published once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province, city, or municipality. In Talusan v. Tayag,38 the Court added that the notice of delinquency should be
sent to the registered owner of the property subject of a possible tax sale. We ratiocinated:
In this regard, we note that unlike land registration proceedings which are in rem, cases involving an auction sale of land for
the collection of delinquent taxes are in personam. Thus, notice by publication, though sufficient in proceedings in rem, does
not as a rule satisfy the requirement of proceedings in personam. As such, mere publication of the notice of delinquency would
not suffice, considering that the procedure in tax sales is in personam. It was, therefore, still incumbent upon the city treasurer
to send the notice of tax delinquency directly to the taxpayer in order to protect the interests of the latter. 39
Under Section 258, the warrant of levy must be mailed to or served upon the delinquent owner of the real property or person
having legal interest therein, or in case he is out of the country or cannot be located, to the administrator or occupant of the
property. At the same time, written notice of the levy with the attached warrant shall be mailed to or served upon the assessor
and the Register of Deeds of the province, city or a municipality where the property is located, who shall annotate the levy on
the tax declaration and certificate of title of the property, respectively. The levying officer shall submit a report on the levy to
the sanggunian concerned within ten (10) days after receipt of the warrant by the owner of the property or person having
legal interest therein.

Lastly, Section 260 requires that within thirty (30) days after service of the warrant of levy, the local treasurer shall proceed to
publicly advertise for sale or auction the property or a usable portion thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the tax
delinquency and expenses of sale. The advertisement shall be effected by: (1) posting a notice at the main entrance of the
provincial, city or municipal building, and in a publicly accessible and conspicuous place in the barangay where the real
property is located, and (2) publication once a week for two (2) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province,
city or municipality where the property is located.

In this case, the notice of tax delinquency was not proven to have been posted and published in accordance with the
requirements of the LGC. Specifically, Salva failed to support her claim that the City Treasurer, her deputy or any authorized
officer actually caused the posting of a notice of delinquency in the Makati City Hall and in a publicly accessible and
conspicuous place in Barangay Bangkal where the property is purported to be located. Likewise, she failed to substantiate the
fact that the notice was published. The Affidavit of Publication of the newspaper's publisher as well as the issues of the
newspaper where the notice was published were not presented as proof.

The notice of delinquency, which was allegedly sent via registered mail, was improperly addressed. We agree with Magpile's
contention that the billing statements, notice of realty tax delinquency, and warrants of levy were all sent by the City Treasurer
to "2118 Apolinario St., Bangkal, Makati City," which is an address other than the one indicated in his tax records. Notably,
TCT No. 215195 showed Magpile's address as "2118 Apolinario, Makati, Rizal," while the Sworn Statement stated his address
as "1772 Evangelista, Bangkal, Makati, M.M." In the absence of a registry return card or an affidavit of service, it cannot be
definitely ascertained that the documents were in fact received by Magpile or any of his authorized representative. Adding to
the doubt is the undisputed allegation of Magpile that, per Certification issued by the Barangay Captain of Pio del Pilar, Makati,
"2118 Apolinario Street" has been replaced by "1510 A & B Apolinario Street" since 1996. If indeed true, there is really no way
that the mail matters would reach the addressee.

Further, Salva did not adduce evidence to show that Magpile received the warrant of levy. That the delinquent taxpayer must
be actually notified of such warrant is implied from Section 258, which explicitly directs the levying officer to "submit a report
on the levy to the sanggunian concerned within ten (10) days after receipt of the warrant by the owner of the property or
person having legal interest therein." Contrary to the opinion of the RTC, "[it] is essential that there be an actual notice to the
delinquent taxpayer, otherwise, the sale. is null and void although preceded by proper advertisement or publication. This
proceeds from the principle of administrative proceedings for the sale of private lands for non-payment of taxes being  in
personam."40

Moreover, Salva did not care to prove that notice of the levy with the attached warrant was mailed to or served upon the
Assessor and the Register of Deeds of Makati and that the auction sale was advertised through posting and publication, all of
which she could have easily verified had she inquired to and coordinated with the Office of the City Treasurer of Makati.

Salva should have provided documentary proof to establish that she derived her right from a proceeding that did not violate
Magpile's substantial right to due process. However, she chose to rely on the presumption of regularity, which is not
applicable. Undeniably, there is insufficiency of evidence to prove faithful compliance with all the essential and indispensable
requirements of the LGC for a valid tax delinquency sale.

The public auction of land to satisfy delinquency in the payment of real estate tax derogates or impinges on property rights
and due process.41 Thus, the steps preScribed by law are mandatory and must be strictly followed; if not, the sale of the real
property is invalid and does not make its purchaser the new owner. 42 Strict adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is
imperative not only for the protection of the taxpayers, but also to allay any possible suspicion of collusion between the buyer
and the public officials called upon to enforce the laws. 43

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The December 5, 2014 Decision and September 4, 2015
Resolution of the Court of Appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 99819, which reversed and set aside the June 17, 2011 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 150, Makati City, are AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Section 267 of R.A. 7160, considering the invalidity
of the sale at public auction of the real property covered by TCT No. 215195, the entire amount deposited by respondent
Ildefonso P. Magpile shall be paid to petitioner Katherine Rose Salva.

SO ORDERED.
3. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE LAW ON FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS THEREOF

G.R. No. 223505, October 03, 2017

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF DETECTIVE AND PROTECTIVE AGENCY OPERATORS (PADPAO), REGION 7 CHAPTER,
INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) AND/OR ITS COMMITTEE ON THE BAN ON FIREARMS AND
SECURITY PERSONNEL (CBFSP), Respondents.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the validity of Section 2(e), Rule III of
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 10015 2 (Resolution No. 10015) filed by petitioner Philippine Association
of Detective and Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO), Region 7 Chapter, Inc., which is an association of licensed security
agencies and company security forces in Region 7 under Republic Act No. 5487 3 (RA 5487) or the Private Security Agency Law.

The Assailed COMELEC Resolution

Under Resolution No. 9981,4 the COMELEC set the election period for the May 2016 National and Local Elections beginning on
January 10, 2016 up to June 8, 2016 (120 days before and 30 days after the election day). 5

On November 13, 2015, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 10015 which provided for the rules and regulations on the
ban on bearing, carrying or transporting of firearms and other deadly weapons and the employment, availment or engagement
of the services of security personnel or bodyguards during the election period, more commonly referred to as the "Gun Ban."
Despite the nomenclature used, it must be noted that the regulation covers not only the subject of firearms, but also the
engagement of security services.

Section 1, Rule II of Resolution No. 10015 provides for the prohibited acts during election period:

RULE II

GENERAL PROVISIONS

SECTION 1. Prohibited Acts. - During the Election Period:

a. No person shall bear, carry or transport Firearms or Deadly Weapons outside his residence or place of
business, and in all public places, including any building, street, park, and in private vehicles or public
conveyances, even if he is licensed or authorized to possess or to carry the same, unless authorized by the
Commission, through the CBFSP,6 in accordance with the provisions of this Resolution;

b. No person shall employ, avail himself or engage the services of security personnel or bodyguards, whether or
not such security personnel or bodyguards are regular members or officers of the Philippine National Police
(PNP), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), other law enforcement agency of the government or from a
private security service provider, unless authorized by the Commission, through the CBFSP, in accordance
with the provisions of this Resolution;

c. No person or entity shall transport and deliver Firearms and/or its parts, Ammunition and/or its
components, and Explosives and/or its components, unless authorized by the Commission, through the
CBFSP, in accordance with the provisions of this Resolution.

In turn, Section 1, Rule III of Resolution No. 10015 lists those who may apply for authority to bear, carry, or transport firearms
or deadly weapons. Private security services providers (PSSPs), 7 which include private security agencies (PSAs), are
specifically included. The provision states:
RULE III

AUTHORITY TO BEAR, CARRY OR TRANSPORT FIREARMS OR OTHER DEADLY WEAPONS

SECTION 1. Who may bear, carry or transport firearms or deadly weapons. - Only the following persons may be authorized
to bear, carry or transport Firearms or other Deadly Weapons during the Election Period:

x x x x

L. Members of Private Security Service Providers (PSSPs); Provided, That, when in the possession o(Firearms, they are:

i. in the agency-prescribed uniform with the agency-issued identification card prominently displayed and visible at
all times, showing clearly the name and position;

ii. in possession of a valid License to Exercise Security Profession (LESP) with Duty Detail Order (DDO), and valid
firearms license of the agency/company where they are employed

iii. deployed by PSA/PDS/CGF duly licensed by the PNP;

iv. in the actual performance of official duty at his specified place or area of duty; and

v. carrying one (1) small firearm, unless specifically allowed otherwise under existing laws. rules and regulations ;
(Emphasis supplied)

Section 2(e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015 provides for the documentary requirements for the application:
SECTION 2. Application for authority to bear, carry or transport Firearms or Deadly Weapons - All applications shall
include:

x x x x

(e) For Private Security Services Providers (Agencies) mentioned in Section 1, paragraph L of Rule III:

1. Duly accomplished CBFSP Form No. 2016-02 (downloadable at www.comelec.gov.ph) in three (3) copies with CD;

2. Form 16A-02 indicating therein:

i. the full names of the security personnel with their corresponding rank/position;

ii. firearms description and registration data;

iii. the security personnel's respective LESPs and DDOs;

3. Form 16B with the colored 4" x 5" picture and description of the authorized uniform of the Agency;

4. Copy of the Agency's License to Operate (LTO);

5. A certified true copy of the agency's updated and valid Monthly Disposition Report (MDR);

6. Certification under oath that x x x the firearms described are duly registered firearms and the persons named therein
are:
i. regular employees of the Agency;

ii. performing actual security functions;

iii. receiving regular compensation for the services rendered in the said agency;

iv. duly authorized and sanctioned by their agency to bear, carry and transport firearms in the exercise of their
security functions and duties;

v. covered by duly issued and valid LESPs and DDOs;

 7. Copy of Official Receipt to prove payment of the filing fee in the amount of Fifty Pesos (PhP50.00) for each security
personnel included in the list.

Thus, under the said provisions, PSAs may obtain authority to bear, carry, and transport firearms outside their place of work
or business and in public places during the election period after compliance with the foregoing documentary requirements
and under the conditions set forth therein.

The Petition

Petitioner assails the validity of Section 2(e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015 insofar as its application to PSAs is concerned.
Petitioner asserts that the COMELEC does not have any authority to promulgate rules regarding the bearing, carrying, or
transporting of firearms by PSAs. Petitioner alleges that PSAs should not be required to secure authority from the COMELEC as
RA 5487 already grants to PSAs and their security guards, watchmen, detectives, and security personnel the authority to
possess, bear, carry, and transport firearms, being necessary equipment for the conduct of its business and practice of its
personnel's profession. Section 13 of RA 5487 states:
SEC. 13. Issuance of Firearms. - A watchman or security agency shall be entitled to possess firearms after having satisfactorily
passed the requirements prescribed by the Chief, Philippine Constabulary pertinent to the possession of firearm of any caliber
not higher than 45 caliber in a number not exceeding one firearm for every two watchmen or security guards in its
employ: Provided, however, That a watchman or security agent shall be entitled to possess not more than one riot gun or
shotgun in order to provide adequate security when circumstances so demand: Provided, further, That all the firearms
mentioned herein shall be carried by the watchman or security guard only during his tour of duty in proper unifonn within the
compound of the establishment except when he escorts big amounts of cash or valuables in and out of said compound.
Petitioner maintains that the power to promulgate rules and regulations with regard to said law is granted to the Philippine
National Police (PNP), in consultation with the PADPAO, under Section 17 of the said law:
SEC. 17. Rules and Regulations by Chief, Philippine Constabulary. - The Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, in consultation with
the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Incorporated and subject to the provisions of existing
laws, is hereby authorized to issue the rules and regulations necessary to carry out the purpose of this Act.
Petitioner also asserts that the COMELEC's powers are defined and limited to election related matters under the 1987
Philippine Constitution. According to petitioner, nothing in the Constitution gives to the COMELEC, even during election
period, the power and authority to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the bearing, carrying, and transporting of
firearms by PSAs. According to petitioner, in issuing Resolution No. 10015, the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Petitioner further avers that Resolution No. 10015 violates the constitutional tenets of equal protection of laws and non-
impairment of obligations of contracts as it impairs the contracts of its member PSAs with their respective clients. As well,
petitioner asserts that the COMELEC contradicts itself. While Section 1, Rule III of Resolution No. 10015 provides that PSSPs or
PSAs may bear, carry or transport firearms or deadly weapons, immediately thereafter, Section 2 mandates that they must
apply for said authority. Petitioner also claims that the filing fee of 50.00 for each security personnel requesting for authority
is exorbitant.

Lastly, petitioner cites Rimando v. COMELEC,8 (Rimando) as supposedly strengthening its position that respondent COMELEC
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with abuse of jurisdiction when it approved and implemented Resolution No.
10015.

The petition includes a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order which was noted by the
Court.

The OSG Comment

The COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Comment 9 on June 27, 2016.

On the procedural issue, the OSG contends that the petition is moot and academic as Resolution No. 10015 is no longer in
effect, since the election period already expired on June 8, 2016. Also, a petition for  certiorari under Rule 65 is the wrong
remedy because Resolution No. 10015 was issued in the exercise of COMELEC's administrative function and not its quasi-
judicial power. The petition is actually one for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Assuming arguendo that the petition for certiorari is proper, it was filed out of time. Under Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court, a certiorari petition must be filed within 30 days from notice of a resolution. Resolution No. 10015 was promulgated on
November 13, 2015 and was published on COMELEC's website 10 on November 14, 2015. However, the petition was filed only
on April 8, 2016. Even assuming that the petition may be filed under Rule 65 under the Court's extraordinary jurisdiction, the
petition is still filed beyond the 60-day period under the said Rule.

With regard to the substantive aspect, the OSG argues that the COMELEC's powers are not limited to those enumerated in the
1987 Constitution. Both Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 11 (BP 881) and RA 716612 confer upon the COMELEC the power to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the provisions of said laws.

The OSG points out that the prohibition on carrying of firearms during the election period and the requirement of written
authority from the COMELEC are found in both laws. 13 Thus, when the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 10015, it was merely
implementing the mandates of BP 881 and RA 7166.

The OSG further argues that neither does Resolution No. 10015 violate the equal protection clause as PSAs are not singled out
in the imposition of the requirement. The requirement of written authority to carry, possess, and transport firearms applies
even to public officials, members of the PNP and AFP, security personnel of foreign diplomatic corps, cashiers, disbursing
officers, or persons who habitually carry large sums of money, among others. The non-impairment of contracts clause is not
violated as well. Resolution No. 10015 does not prevent PSAs from performing their contractual obligations. It merely requires
written authority to bear, carry, and transport firearms during the election period.

Lastly, the OSG refutes the applicability of Rimando in this case. In said case, Rimando was the president of a security agency. It
was alleged that he permitted his security guards to carry firearms outside their place of business without written authority
from the COMELEC. The issue therein was Rimando's liability for failing to obtain a permit from the COMELEC. The Court,
interpreting Section 261(s) of BP 881, absolved Rimando of the election offense as it was held that "bearing of arms by such
person within the immediate vicinity of his place of work is not prohibited and does not require prior written approval from
the Commission."14 The guards of Rimando were guarding a private residential subdivision, which was considered their place
of work, although they had a separate main office. Thus, the guards were actually within their place of work and there was no
need to secure written authority from the COMELEC.

Petitioner filed a Reply15 on November 15, 2016 reiterating the arguments in the petition.

Issues

1. Whether the petition is moot;

2. Whether the remedy is proper and timely filed; and

3. Whether Section 2(e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015 is valid.

The Court's Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Procedural aspects

At the outset, although the subject of the petition is a Resolution of the COMELEC promulgated relative to the May 2016
National and Local Elections, the issue raised herein has not been rendered moot and academic by the conclusion of the 2016
elections.

As a rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. In International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines),16 the Court held:
An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become
academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial
intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the
determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events. 17
There are recognized exceptions to the rule; thus, the Court has seen fit to decide cases, otherwise moot, if:  first, there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest are
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,
and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 18

The present case falls within the fourth exception. For this exception to apply, the following factors must be present: (1) the
challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and. (2) there is a
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action. 19

The election period in 2016 was from January 10 until June 8, 2016, or a total of only 150 days. The petition was filed only on
April 8, 2016. There was thus not enough time for the resolution of the controversy. Moreover, the COMELEC has consistently
issued rules and regulations on the Gun Ban for previous elections in accordance with RA 7166: Resolution No. 8714 20 for the
2010 elections, Resolution No. 9561-A21 for the 2013 elections, and the assailed Resolution No. 10015 for the 2016 elections.
Thus, the COMELEC is expected to promulgate similar rules in the next elections. Prudence accordingly dictates that the Court
exercise its power of judicial review to finally settle this controversy.

On the timeliness of the filing of the petition, the Court holds that the 30-day reglementary period under Rule 64 22 in relation
to Rule 65 does not apply. The Court's power to review decisions of the COMELEC stems from the Constitution itself. Section 7,
Article IX-A thereof prescribes:
Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty
days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution
upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself.
Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
The Court has interpreted this constitutional provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC  en
banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. 23 The petition herein assails the validity of a
COMELEC Resolution which was issued under its rule-making power, to implement the provisions of BP 881 and RA 7166.
Thus, the period under Rule 64 does not apply.

On the propriety of the remedy, the OSG argues that the appropriate case should have been a petition for declaratory relief
before the Regional Trial Court under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. On this procedural issue, respondent's position has merit.
However, considering the very important and substantive issues raised that, as explained, are expected to recur, the Court
resolves to set aside this technicality and rule on the substantive issue to put an end to this controversy.

Substantive Aspects

The COMELEC did not exceed its rule making authority in issuing the assailed provision of Resolution No. 10015.

Petitioner contends that the COMELEC does not have the authority, during an election period, to impose upon PSAs the
requirement of written authority from the COMELEC to bear, carry, and transport firearms and other deadly weapons, as the
power to do so belongs exclusively to the PNP under RA 5487. Petitioner is mistaken.

The power of the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations to enforce and implement elections laws is enshrined in the
Constitution, which provides:
Section 6, Article IX-A:

Section 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of
its offices. Such rules, however, shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

Section 2, Article IX-C:

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
and recall.
The COMELEC's power to issue rules and regulations was reiterated in BP 881:
Article VII. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

SEC. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. - In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall:

x x x x

(c) Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is
required to enforce and administer x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In Aquino v. COMELEC,24 the Court recognized the wide latitude given to the COMELEC by the Constitution and by law to
enforce and implement election laws to fulfil its mandate of ensuring free, orderly, peaceful, and honest elections. The Court
held:
A common and clear conclusion that we can gather from these provisions is the obvious and unequivocal intent of the framers
of the Constitution and of the law to grant the COMELEC with powers, necessary and incidental to achieve the objective of
ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

Thus, expressly, the Constitution and the laws grant the COMELEC with the power, first and foremost, to "[e]nforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election," and second, to "promulgate rules and regulations."
Together, these powers ensure that the COMELEC is well armed to properly enforce and implement the election laws and
enable it to fill in the situational gaps which the law does not provide for or which the legislature had not foreseen. 25
In Lakin, Jr. v. COMELEC,26 the Court also ruled:
The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum, and a recall. In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the COMELEC is also charged to promulgate IRRs implementing the provisions of the  Omnibus Election Code or
other laws that the COMELEC enforces and administers. 27
COMELEC's Resolution No. 10015 finds statutory basis in BP 881 and RA 7166:
B.P. 881

SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

x x x x

(q) Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business. - Any person who, although possessing a permit to carry
firearms, carries any firearms outside his residence or place of business during the election period, unless authorized
in writing by the Commission: Provided, That a motor vehicle, water or air craft shall not be considered a residence or place
of business or extension hereof.

This prohibition shall not apply to cashiers and disbursing officers while in the performance of their duties or to persons who
by nature of their official duties, profession, business or occupation habitually carry large sums of money or valuables.
(Emphasis supplied)

R.A. 7166

SEC. 32. Who May Bear Firearms. - During the election period, no person shall bear, carry or transport firearms or other
deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street, park, private vehicle or public conveyance, even if
licensed to possess or carry the same, unless authorized in writing by the Commission. The issuance of firearm licenses
shall be suspended during the election period.

Only regular members or officers of the Philippine National Police, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other law
enforcement agencies of the Government who are duly deputized in writing by the Commission for election duty may be
authorized to carry and possess firearms during the election period: Provided, That, when in the possession of firearms, the
deputized law enforcement officer must be: (a) in full uniform showing clearly and legibly his name, rank and serial number
which shall remain visible at all times; and (b) in the actual performance of his election duty in the specific area designated by
the Commission.

x x x x

SEC. 35. Rules and Regulations. - The Commission shall issue rules and regulations to implement this Act. Said rules shall
be published in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. (Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to PADPAO's position, the Constitution and the cited laws specifically empower the COMELEC to issue rules and
regulations implementing the so-called Gun Ban during election period.

Under BP 881 and RA 7166, it is unlawful for any person to bear, carry, or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in
public places during the election period, even if otherwise licensed to do so, unless authorized in writing by the COMELEC.
Section 35 of RA 7166 also uses the mandatory word "shall" to impose upon the COMELEC its duty to issue rules and
regulations to implement the law.

To be sure, the COMELEC's authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement Section 32 of RA 7166 has
jurisprudential imprimatur. In Orceo v. COMELEC,28 the Court upheld the inclusion of airguns and airsoft guns in the definition
of firearm under COMELEC Resolution 8714, viz.:
Evidently, the COMELEC had the authority to promulgate Resolution No. 8714 pursuant to Section 35 of R.A. No. 7166. It was
granted the power to issue the implementing rules and regulations of Sections 32 and 33 of R.A. No. 7166.  Under this broad
power, the COMELEC was mandated to provide the details of who may bear, carry or transport firearms or other
deadly weapons, as well as the definition of "firearms," among others. These details are left to the discretion of the
COMELEC, which is a constitutional body that possesses special knowledge and expertise on election matters, with the
objective of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

x x x x

A license to possess an airsoft gun, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, does not confer an absolute right, but
only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed.

x x x x

The Court holds that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in including airsoft guns and airguns in the term
firearm in Resolution No. 8714 for purposes of the gun ban during the election period, with the apparent objective of ensuring
free, honest, peaceful and credible elections this year. x x x 29 (Emphasis supplied)
PADPAO's insistence that the power to issue rules and regulations in relation to the operation of PSAs belongs exclusively to
the PNP is specious. In RA 5487, it is the PNP that exercises general supervision over the operation of all private detective and
watchman security guard agencies. It has the exclusive authority to regulate and to issue the required licenses to operate
security and protective agencies.30 The COMELEC does not encroach upon this authority of the PNP to regulate PSAs - as it
merely regulates the bearing, carrying, and transporting of firearms and other deadly weapons by PSAs and all other
persons, during election period.

Notably, the language of RA 5487 and its implementing rules is not so restrictive as to prohibit other government agencies
from imposing additional restrictions relating to the conduct of business by PSAs and PSSPs under special circumstances. In
this case, the special circumstance is the election period. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that historically, Philippine
elections have been marred by violence and unnecessary bloodshed and additional guidelines must be put in place to
eliminate, or at least, lessen the threat. Whether or not the Gun Ban has been an effective deterrent is a different matter, which
is beyond the Court's domain.

The wording of Section 261 of BP 881 and Section 32 of RA 7166 also provides that the said provisions apply to any and all
persons. Thus, PADPAO cannot claim any exception as a PSA under the cloak of RA 5487.

Moreover, the license to operate as a PSA and the right to possess and carry firearms do not confer an absolute right on the
private licensee, as this is still subject to regulation. In Chavez v. Romulo,31 the Court upheld the validity of the Guidelines in the
Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence 32 issued by the PNP, which revoked all permits to
carry firearms outside of residence and imposed additional requirements and restrictions thereto.

As to the nature of the right to bear arms, the Court ruled:

The right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to regulation. The maintenance of peace and order and the
protection of the people against violence are constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear arms is to be construed in
connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties. 32a
Lastly, RA 5487 is not a blanket authority on PSAs to carry firearms. Even if they are licensed as a security agency, they must
still apply for license to own and possess a firearm as required under RA 10591 33 or the Comprehensive Firearms and
Ammunition Regulation Act.

Resolution No. 10015 does not violate the equal protection clause and the non-impairment of contracts clause.

Petitioner's argument that the application of Resolution No. 10015 to PSAs violates the constitutional tenets of equal
protection and non impairment of contracts deserves scant consideration.

Under the Bill of Rights in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, these are protected rights:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws.

x x x x
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
The equal protection clause means that "no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which
is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances." 34 The guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification. The equal protection clause,
therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary. 35

Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. 36

Resolution No. 10015 applies to any and all persons, whether private individuals or public officers. Rule III thereof contains a
comprehensive list of persons required to obtain written authority from the COMELEC to bear, carry, and transport firearms
outside his place or residence or business. Aside from PSAs and PSSPs, the regulation applies even to the President of the
Republic of the Philippines, Vice President, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, and Court of Tax Appeals and
Judges of lower courts, members of the Philippine National Police, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and to cashiers and
disbursing officers or persons who by the nature of their official duties, profession, business or occupation habitually carry
large sums of money or valuables, among others. 37

Under Section 2 of Rule III, PSAs/PSSPs and cashiers and disbursing officers or persons who by the nature of their official
duties, profession, business, or occupation habitually carry large sums of money or valuables are required to pay a filing fee.
The former are required to pay P50.00 for each security personnel while the latter are required to pay P5,000.00. No filing fee
is imposed on the government officials and employees.

As correctly put by the COMELEC, through the OSG, there is substantial distinction between and among the persons listed
therein.

Majority of the persons listed are public officers who include highranking officials, law enforcement officers, members of the
armed forces, and other government officials providing security services to officials of the Philippine government or foreign
diplomatic corps.

Cashiers, disbursement officers, similar persons with the same nature of work, and PSAs do not fall under the same category.
They are not public officers, law enforcement officers, and neither are they providing security services in relation to public
office. The inclusion of cashiers and disbursement officers is due to the necessity for them to safeguard the significant sums of
money or valuables in their possession. PSSPs/PSAs are included due to the nature of their private business, which is to
provide security services to their clients.

On this imposition on private individuals, the Court ruled in the old case of Government of the Philippine Islands v.
Amechazurra38:
[N]o private person is bound to keep arms. Whether he does or not is entirely optional with himself, but if, for his own
convenience or pleasure, he desires to possess arms, he must do so upon such terms as the Government sees fit to impose, for
the right to keep and bear arms is not secured to him by law. The Government can impose upon him such terms as it pleases. If
he is not satisfied with the terms imposed, he should decline to accept them, but, if for the purpose of securing possession of
the arms he does agree to such conditions, he must fulfill them. x x x 39
Furthermore, the imposition of the license fee is germane to the purpose of the law, which is to regulate the bearing, carrying,
and transporting of firearms during the election period. It is not limited to existing conditions only as it applies similarly to
cashiers, disbursing officers, PSSPs, and PSAs during election period.

As to the violation of the non-impairment clause, petitioner's claim cannot be countenanced. The non-impairment clause
under Section 10, Article III of the Constitution is limited in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by
enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes
the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws
remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. 40

In this case, PSAs' contracts with their clients are not affected in any manner by the requirement of having to obtain from the
COMELEC written authority to bear, carry, and transport firearms outside of their residence or place of work and in public
places, during election period. All that PSAs must do is to secure such authority.

Lastly, the filing fee of fifty pesos (P50.00) per security guard can hardly be said to be exorbitant. It is a reasonable charge for
the issuance of the permit to private individuals. Besides, petitioner did not present any evidence to prove its allegation that
the amounts collected are exorbitant or unreasonable.

Rimando v. COMELEC is not applicable in this case.

Petitioner's reliance on Rimando is hollow, if not totally pointless.

In said case, Rimando was the president and general manager of a security agency. The COMELEC had issued a resolution
recommending the filing of an Information against Rimando for violation of Section 261(s) of BP 881. It was alleged that
Rimando was guilty of an election offense as he unlawfully allowed his security guards to guard private residences in Santa
Rosa Homes Subdivision in Laguna, using firearms, knowing fully well that they had no prior written authority from the
COMELEC as required under then COMELEC Resolution No. 3328, in relation to the Gun Ban during election period from
January 2, 2001 until June 13, 2001.

The Court ruled in favor of Rimando stating that under Section 261(s) of BP 881, the punishable act is the bearing of arms
outside the immediate vicinity of one's place of work during the election period and not the failure of the head or responsible
officer of the security agency to obtain prior written COMELEC approval. There is likewise nothing in RA 7166 that expressly
penalizes the mere failure to secure written authority from the COMELEC as required in Section 32 thereof. Such failure to
secure an authorization must still be accompanied by other operative acts, such as the bearing, carrying or transporting of
firearms in public places during the election period.

The Court also clarified the correct interpretation of Section 261(s) 41:
A perusal of Section 261 (s) in its entirety would show that, as a rule, the bearing of arms by a member of security or police
organization of a government office or of a privately owned security agency outside the immediate vicinity of one's place of
work is prohibited. Implicitly, the bearing of arms by such person within the immediate vicinity of his place of work is not
prohibited and does not require prior written approval from the Commission. However, Section 261 (s) also lays down
exceptions to this rule and states that the general prohibition shall not apply in three instances: (a) when any of the persons
enumerated therein is in pursuit of another person who has committed or is committing a crime in the premises the former is
guarding; (b) when such person is escorting or providing security for the transport of payrolls, deposits, or other valuables;
and (c) when he is guarding private residences, buildings or offices. It is only in the case of the third exception that it is
provided that prior written approval from the COMELEC shall be obtained. 42
Thus, there is nothing in Rimando that would support petitioner's tenuous contentions. Precisely, Resolution No. 10015
provides for the requirements to obtain written authority from the COMELEC to bear, carry, and transport firearms or
dangerous weapons outside one's residence or place of work, or in any public place only during the election period.

All told, the Court holds that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion or exceed its jurisdiction in including PSSPs and
PSAs within the ambit of those persons required to secure written authority from the COMELEC to bear, carry, and transport
firearms and other dangerous weapons outside their place of residence, work, or within public places during the election
period.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari with prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction/temporary restraining order are DENIED for lack of merit. The Court upholds Section 2(e), Rule III of COMELEC
Resolution No. 10015 as valid and constitutional.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184355, March 23, 2015

ARNULFO A.K.A. ARNOLD JACABAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision1 dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City,
which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, Cebu City, finding petitioner guilty of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (RA) 8294.

An Information was filed with the RTC, Branch 13, Cebu City 2 charging petitioner with violation of PD 1866 as amended by RA
8294, to wit:
That on or about the 16th day of July 1999, at about 12:45 A.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there have in his possession and control the
following articles, to wit:
1. One (1) cal. 45 pistol “Llama Gabilondo” with SN515090

2. One (1) stainless magazine for caliber 45 pistol loaded with seven (7) rounds of Live ammunitions for caliber .45

3. Three (3) short magazines for caliber 5.56 mm containing fifty-nine rounds of live ammos

4. Two (2) long magazines for caliber 5.56 mm containing fifty-five (55) rounds of live ammos

5. One (1) Bandoler for caliber 5.56 mm

6. One (1) bullet [links] for caliber 7.62 mm with twenty-eight (28) rounds of live ammos for caliber 7.62 mm

7. One (1) bullet clips for caliber 30 M1 Garrand Rifle containing eight (8) rounds of live ammos

8. One (1) plastic sachet containing five (5) rounds of live ammos for caliber 5.56 mm

9. Six (6) rounds live ammos for caliber 7.62 mm

10. One (1) pair Upper Handguard for caliber 5.56 mm M16 rifle

11. One (1) damage carrying handle for caliber 5.56 rifle.
without first securing the necessary license/permit issued therefor from any competent authority.

Contrary to law.3
On July 19, 1999, petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge. 4

Trial on the merits ensued.

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

Evidence for the prosecution established that on July 15, 1999, Police Senior Inspector Ipil H. Dueñ as (P/SInsp. Dueñ as) of the
now defunct Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) filed an Application for Search Warrant before Branch
22 of the RTC, Cebu City, to search the premises of [appellant's] residence at J. Labra St., Guadalupe, Cebu City and seize the
following items.
One (1) 7.62 cal M-14 Rifle;
Two (2) 5.56 mm M16 Armalite Rifle;
One (1) 12 gauge Shotgun;
One (1) .45 cal. Pistol;
One (1) .9 mm cal. Pistol
A Search Warrant was then immediately issued to the applicant by Judge Pampio A. Abarintos.

At about 12:45 in the morning of July 16, 1999, the search warrant was implemented by P/S Insp. Dueñ as as the team leader,
SPO2 Eric Mendoza, SPO2 Eric Abellana. PO1 Allan Jalagpas, PO3 Epifania Manila Sarte and other members of the PAOCTF.
Before reaching appellant's house, the policemen invited three (3) barangay tanods from Guadalupe's Barangay outpost to
accompany them to the house of the appellant.

Upon arrival to appellant's house, SPO2 Abellana served the search warrant to appellant who was just inside the house
together with his wife and other ladies. Upon informing appellant of the search warrant, he became angry and denied having
committed any illegal activity. P/SInsp. Dueñ as assured appellant that he had nothing to worry about if the PAOCTF would not
find anything.

The team proceeded to search the living room in the presence of three tanods and the appellant himself. The team continued
to search the room where SPO2 Abellana found a calibre .45 placed in the ceiling. Appellant, who was at the living room that
time, rushed to the room and grappled with SPO2 Abellana but failed to get hold of the gun.

After an exhaustive search was done, other firearms and ammunitions were recovered from the searched premises. An
inventory was made at the living room of appellant in the presence of appellant himself, the barangay tanods and other
persons present during the search. After appellant and the witnesses signed the inventory receipt, the team proceeded back to
their office with appellant and the confiscated items.

Police Officer IV Dionisio V. Sultan, Chief Clerk of the Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police-
Visayas (FED PNP-Visayas), testified that he prepared a certification dated April 29, 2002. Based on their office's master,
appellant is not licensed to possess any kind of firearm or ammunition.

For the defense, they presented witness Felipenerie Jacaban, older sister of the appellant, who testified as to her presence
during the conduct of the search. According to Felipenerie, at about 12:45 in the morning of July 16, 1999, policemen
conducted a raid in the house of Gabriel Arda (uncle of appellant). The policemen who implemented the warrant were looking
for his brother, herein appellant, so she went to appellant's house and informed him that a raid was conducted at their uncle's
house and policemen were looking for him. When appellant arrived at his uncle's house, policemen searched around the house
and a pistol was subsequently recovered. Felipenerie claims that the recovered pistol was allegedly pledged by a policeman to
her father. She also testified that appellant never made any protest and merely observed the proceeding. 5
On July 12, 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision6 convicting petitioner of the crime charged, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding ACCUSED ARNULFO a.k.a. ARNOLD JACABAN GUILTY of the crime of
violation of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294 and sentences him to a penalty of imprisonment of from SIX (6) YEARS AND
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS, as maximum, plus fine in the amount of
P30,000.

With cost against the accused.

SO ORDERED.7
In so ruling, the RTC found that the prosecution had established all the elements of the crime charged. Petitioner was in
possession of the firearm, ammunitions and other items with intent to possess the same as they were found inside his house;
and he had no license or permit to possess the same from any competent authority. The RTC did not give credence to
petitioner’s claim that he is not the owner of the house but his uncle, Gabriel Arda, as the latter did not testify at all and was
not in the house at the time of the raid. It was petitioner and his wife who were at the house at 12:45 a.m. of July 16, 1999; and
that petitioner did not protest his arrest.

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the CA. After the respective briefs had been filed, the case was submitted for decision.

On July 30, 2008, the CA issued its assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the RTC decision.

The CA agreed with the RTC’s conclusion that the elements of the crime charged were duly proved by the prosecution. Anent
petitioner’s claim of the alleged discrepancy in the testimony of PO3 Sarte on the time the raid was conducted, the CA found
the same to be minor and did not damage the essential integrity of the prosecution’s evidence in its material whole; and that
such discrepancy was explained by PO3 Sarte in her testimony.

Hence, this petition for review filed by petitioner.

Petitioner argues that the RTC decision finding him guilty of the crime charged is premised on its erroneous conclusion that he
is the owner the house where the unlicensed firearms and ammunitions were found. He reiterated his claim that there was
discrepancy in the testimony of PO3 Sarte as to the time the raid was conducted.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 8 As such, we are not
duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. The findings of
facts by a trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court. 9 This rule, however, is not
without exceptions.10 However, petitioner failed to show that his case falls under any of the exceptions.
Section 1 of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, provides:

Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. -

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the
firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9
millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and
caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or
three: Provided, however,

That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.

The essential elements in the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions are: (1) the
existence of subject firearm; and, (2) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned the same does not have the
corresponding license for it. 11 The unvarying rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition.12 What the law requires is merely possession, which includes not only actual physical possession, but also
constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one’s control and management. 13

Once the prosecution evidence indubitably points to possession without the requisite authority or license, coupled
with animus possidendi or intent to possess on the part of the accused, conviction for violation of the said law must
follow. Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or determination of which is largely dependent on attendant events
in each case. It may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding
circumstances.14

Here, the prosecution had proved the essential elements of the crime charged under PD 1866 as amended by RA 8294. The
existence of the seized firearm and the ammunitions was established through the testimony of PO3 Sarte. There was an
inventory of the items seized which was made in the presence of the petitioner and the three barangay tanods who all
voluntarily signed the inventory receipt. PO3 Sarte identified all the seized items in open court.

It was convincingly proved that petitioner had constructive possession of the gun and the ammunitions, coupled with the
intent to possess the same. Petitioner's act of immediately rushing from the living room to the room where SPO2 Abellana
found a calibre .45 and grappled with the latter for the possession of the gun proved that the gun was under his control and
management. He also had the animus possidendi or intent to possess the gun when he tried to wrest it from SPO2 Abellana.

Petitioner's lack of authority to possess the firearm was established by the testimony of Police Officer IV Dionisio V. Sultan,
Chief Clerk of the Firearms and Explosive Division of the Philippine National Police-Visayas (FED-PNP- Visayas) that petitioner
is not licensed to possess any kind of firearm or ammunition based on the FED-PNP master list.

Anent petitioner's argument that the house where the firearm was found was not owned by him is not persuasive. We quote
with approval what the RTC said in debunking such issue which was affirmed by the CA, thus:
If the accused is not really the owner of the house where the firearm, ammunitions and other items were found, he should
have

protested his arrest. But in the instant case Felipenieri (sic) Jacaban said that there was no protest at all.

If the accused is not really the owner of the house raided by the police officers, what was he and his wife doing there at 12:45
in the morning?

The defense asserted that the house of the accused was already demolished when the road fronting it was widened. But the
defense failed to present the tax declaration covering the said house before it was demolished.

x x x   x x x   x x x

Gabriel Arda, the alleged owner of the house did not testify. He was allegedly suffering from hypertension. The defense,
however, did not file a motion to take his deposition.
Felipenieri likewise testified that at the time of the raid, the owner of the house was not present. Her testimony bolsters the
fact that Gabriel Arda is not really the owner of the house where the raid was conducted. 15
Even assuming that petitioner is not the owner of the house where the items were recovered, the ownership of the house is
not an essential element of the crime under PD 1866 as amended. While petitioner may not be the owner, he indeed had
control of the house as shown by the following circumstances: (1) When the PAOCTF went to the house to serve the search
warrant, petitioner was very angry and restless and even denied having committed any illegal act, but he was assured by
P/SInsp. Dueñ as that he has nothing to answer if they would not find anything, thus, he consented to the search being
conducted; (2) while the search was ongoing, petitioner merely observed the conduct of the search and did not make any
protest at all; and (3) petitioner did not call for the alleged owner of the house.

As to the alleged discrepancy in PO3 Sarte's testimony as to the time the search was conducted, we agree with the CA when it
found:
Appellant likewise questions the discrepancies in the testimony of prosecution witness PO3 Epifania Sarte. Appellant contends
that PO3 Sarte could not even testify correctly as to the time the raid was conducted. According to appellant, the established
fact on records shows that it was conducted past midnight of July 16, 1999 while witness PO3 Sarte asserted that it was
conducted at 12:45 high noon of said date.

It bears stressing that minor discrepancies might be found in her testimony, but this does not damage the essential integrity of
the evidence in its material whole, nor should it reflect adversely on the witness' credibility as it erases suspicion that the
same was perjured. Here, prior testimony of PO3 Sarte as to the time of the raid is considered only a trivial matter which is not
even enough to destroy or discredit her credibility. Besides, she was able to explain her mistake when she previously stated
that the search was conducted at 12:45 noon of July 16, 1999 instead of 12:45 in the morning as she was hungry when she first
testified. The record likewise does not reveal that PO3 Sarte was actuated by ill-motive in so testifying against appellant. Thus,
when there is nothing to indicate that a witness was actuated by improper motives, her positive declarations on the witness
stand, made under solemn oath, deserve full faith and credence. 16
The RTC sentenced petitioner to an imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to six (6)
years and eight (8) months, as maximum, plus fine in the amount of P30,000.00. The CA upheld the RTC. Under PD 1866, as
amended by RA 8294, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms classified as high powered, like cal. 45, is prision
mayor minimum and a fine of P30,000.00. Applying Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum period of the
imposable penalty cannot exceed prision mayor minimum in its medium period, there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, i.e., six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seven (7) years and four (4) months. The minimum period,
as provided in the Indeterminate Sentence Law, shall be within the range of prision correccional in its maximum period, i.e.,
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, the penalty next lower in degree to  prision
mayor minimum.17 Thus, the minimum penalty imposable must be modified. Albeit, PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, is
a malum prohibitum and that the Revised Penal Code is generally not applicable, it has been held that when a special law,
which is a malum prohibitum, adopts the nomenclature of the penalties in the Revised Penal Code, the latter law shall apply. 18

While in 2013, RA 10951 entitled “An Act Providing for a Comprehensive Law on Firearms and Ammunitions and Providing
Penalties for Violation Thereof” took effect, the same finds no application in this case as the law provides for stiffer penalties
which is not at all favorable to the accused.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated July 30, 2008, is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX (6) YEARS
of prision correccional in its maximum period, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of  prision
mayor minimum in its medium period, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.