PATERNITY AND FILIATION
Fernandez
De asis v. Court of appeals
SUBJECT MATTER: paternity and filiation
Facts:
On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres (the herein private
respondent) in her capacity as the legal guardian of the
minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for
maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis alleging
that the latter is the father of the subject minor Glen Camil
Andres de Asis, and despite repeated demands, Manuel de
Asis refused and failed to provide for the maintenance and
support of the minor. Because the petitioner (Manuel de
Asis) denied as paternity of the said minor and so he cannot
therefore be required to provide for such. And so the case
was dismissed by virtue of the said manifestation.
On September 7, 1995, another Complaint for maintenance
and support was brought against Manuel A. de Asis, this
time in the name of Glen Camil Andres, represented by her
legal guardian/mother Vircel D. Andres.
On October 8, 1993, petitioner moved to dismiss the
Complaint on the ground that it is barred by the prior
judgment, which was dismissed with prejudice.
Issue:
Whether or not the second action may still proper after the
dismissal of the prior petition.
Held:
It is indisputable that the present action for support can be
brought; notwithstanding the fact the previous case filed
against the same defendant was dismissed. And it also
appearing that the dismissal of the prior case was not
adjudication upon the merits, as heretofore shown, the right
of herein plaintiff-appellant to reiterate her suit for support
and acknowledgment is available, as her needs arise. Once
the needs of plaintiffs arise, she has the right to bring an
action for support, for it is only then her cause of action
accrues.
Fernandez v.
sUBJECT MATTER: Kinds of Filiation, Kinds/ Status of
Children
Facts:
The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa A.
de Venecia were the registered owners of a parcel of land
located at Dagupan City consisting of 194 sq. m. and a two-
storey building. Generosa gave birth to a baby boy named
Rogelio who died when he was only 12 years old as
paralytic. It was revealed that the late Spouses being
childless by the death of their son, purchased a one (1) baby
boy who was later identified as Rodolfo Fernandez.
On July 20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died thereby leaving
his wife Generosa and Rodolfo Fernandez an estate
consisting a parcel of land consisting an area of 194-sq. m.
wit a two-storey residential building. On August 31, 1989,
Rodolfo Fernandez (appellant) and Generosa de Venecia
executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition dividing and
allocating to themselves the following:
(a) 119.5 sq. m. of the said parcel of land plus
the residential house will belong to
Generosa de Venecia.
(b) 74.5 sq. m. of the said parcel of land will
belong to Rodolfo V. Fernandez.
On the same day, Generosa executed a Deed of Sale to
Eddie Fernandez, appellant’s son, over her share.
After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano, Julita,
William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo and Gregorio,
all surnamed Fernandez, being nephews and nieces of the
deceased Jose K. Fernandez, their father Genaro being a
brother of Jose, filed September 21, 1994, an action to
declare the Extra-judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of
Sale void ab initio.
The complaint alleges that defendants (herein appellants),
motivated by unmitigated greed, deliberate and malicious
acts of depriving the plaintiff and other heirs (herein
appellees) of the deceased spouses, without basis of
heirship or any iota of rights to succession or inheritance,
taking advantage of the total physical and mental incapacity
of the deceased Generosa de Venecia aggravated by
unlawful scheme confederated, colluded and conspired
with each other on causing the fake, simulated grossly
inauthentic contracts purporting to be executed on August
31, 1989.
Issue:
Whether or not the filiation of Rodolfo Fernandez by
adoption entitles him successions and inheritance.
Held:
Rodolfo Fernandez was not a legitimate nor a legally
adopted child of spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa
de Venecia-Fernandez, hence could not inherit from the
spouses. Because it was negated by the fact of failing to
present any birth certificate or any public document that
would give a proof of being a legitimate child. Rodolfo
even presented his baptismal as evidence but was spurious
and falsified.
Concepcion v. CA
SUBJECT MATTER: Action to impugn legitimacy
Facts
On 29 December 1989, Ma. Theresa and Gerardo got
married. On 8 December 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to
Jose Gerardo. Their relationship turned sour which caused
Gerardo to file a petition for annulment on the ground of
bigamy. He contended that prior to their marriage, Ma.
Theresa had an annulled marriage with Mario Gopiao
(married December 10, 1980) and petitioner also found that
Mario was still alive. Maria did not deny this prior
marriage but claimed that she never lived with Mario at all.
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario
was valid and subsisting marriage with Gerardo is a
bigamous one. The custody of the child was awarded to the
wife while Gerardo was granted with visitation rights.
Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the decision
INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the decision which
granted to the petitioner ‘visitation rights’ in favor of the
putative father of an illegitimate child. She further
maintained that Hose Gerardo’s surname should be
changed form Conception to Almonte following the rule
that an illegitimate child shall use the mother’s surname.
However, the law applied the “best interest of the child”
principle hence dismissing her motion.
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of appeals
assigning as error the ruling of the trial court granting
visitation rights to Gerardo and Jose Gerardo’s surname
must be Almonte but it was also denied. The Court of
Appeals further held that an illegitimate child cannot use
the mother’s surname motu propio and that she should file
a separate proceeding for a change of name under the Rules
of Court to effect corrections.
However, after further investigation, the Court of Appeals
found out that appellant was married to Mario Gopiao and
that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with the
appellee Gerardo since their marriage was void ab initio for
being bigamous. Therefore, the child, under the law, is the
legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage
between Ma. Theresa and Mario, he cannot be deemed to
be the illegitimate child of the void marriage. Moreover,
Gerardo can claim neither custody nor visitation rights over
the child and he cannot impose his surname upon the child.
Hence this appeal.
Issue
Whether or not Gerardo was entitled of the
visitation rights over Jose Gerardo and whether or not his
name shall be carried by the child.
Held
The status and filiation of the child cannot be
compromised. Under Article 64 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, a child who was conceived or born during the
marriage of his parents is legitimate. Under Article 167 of
same Code, the child shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulterous.
Hence, Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child of the marriage
between Ma. Theresa and Mario. Since the marriage
between Ma. Theresa and Gerardo was void form the very
beginning, he never became her husband and thus never
acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
Thus, there is no legal reason for Gerardo to
claim visitation rights over the child because it was ruled
that the child is a legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and her
legal husband Mario.
Wherefore, petition denied and the Court of
Appeals decision and resolution was affirmed.
Angeles v. Maglaya
SUBJECT MATTER: Action to impugn legitimacy
Facts
On March 25, 1998, in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) at Caloocan City, respondent filed a petition for
letters of administration and her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M.
Angeles.
Francisco died intestate on January 21, 1998 Manila,
leaving behind four (4) parcels of land and a building,
among other valuable properties ad that there is a need to
appoint an administrator of Francisco’s estate. She alleged
that she (respondent) is the sole legitimate child of the
deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and, together with
petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, decedent’s wife by his second
marriage, are the surviving heirs of the decedent; and that
she has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications required of an administrator.
Petitioner opposed the petition and claimed to be made as
the administratrix of Francisco’s estate. Petitioner alleged
having married Francisco on August 7, 1948 and Francisco
represented in their marriage contract that he was single at
that time. Petitioner also averred that respondent could not
be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded
as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth
certificate was not signed by him. Pressing on, petitioner
further alleged that respondent, despite her claim of being
the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado,
has not presented the marriage contract between her
supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to
prove such union. And evidently to debunk respondent’s
claim of being the only child of Francisco, petitioner
likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their
marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al.
Petitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving spouse of
Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to
the administration of his estate.
On 12 July 1999, the trial court found that respondent
failed to prove her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco
hence dismissing the petition. The Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the trial court’s order of dismissal
and directed it to appoint respondent as administratrix of
the estate of Francisco.
Issue
Whether or not respondent is the legitimate child of
decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercad.
Held
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a
valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful
union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between
parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be
more emphatic on the matter: “Children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.”
Ironical as it may seem, respondent herself undermined her
very own case. As it were, she made certain judicial
admission negating her own assertion – as well as the
appellate court’s conclusion - that Francisco was legally
married to Genoveva. As may be recalled, respondent had
declared that her mother Genoveva died in 1988, implying,
quite clearly, that when Francisco contracted marriage with
petitioner Belen S. Angeles in 1948, Genoveva and
Francisco were already “spouses”. Now, then, if, as
respondent maintained despite utter lack of evidence, that
Genoveva Mercado and Francisco were married in 1938, it
follows that the marriage of Francisco to petitioner Belen
Angeles in 1948, or prior to Genoveva’s death, would
necessarily have to be bigamous, hence void, in which case
petitioner could not be, as respondent alleged in her petition
for letters of administration, a “surviving spouse” of the
decedent.
WHEREFORE, the herein assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and the order of the trial court dismissing Special
Proceedings No. C-2140 REINSTATED.
ARTURO R. ABALOS vs. GALICANO S.
MACATANGAY, JR.
SUBJECT MATTER: Action to impugn legitimacy
Facts
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the
registered owners of a parcel of land with improvements
located at Azucena St., Makati City consisting of about
three hundred twenty-seven (327) square meters, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 145316 of the
Registry of Deeds of Makati.
Armed with a Special Power of Attorney dated
June 2, 1988, purportedly issued by his wife, Arturo
executed a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement
(RMOA) dated October 17, 1989, in favor of respondent,
binding himself to sell to respondent the subject property
and not to offer the same to any other party within thirty
(30) days from date. Arturo acknowledged receipt of a
check from respondent in the amount of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00), representing earnest money for the
subject property, the amount of which would be deducted
from the purchase price of One Million Three Hundred
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,300,000.00). Further,
the RMOA stated that full payment would be effected as
soon as possession of the property shall have been turned
over to respondent.

Subsequently, Arturo’s wife, Esther, executed a
Special Power of Attorney dated October 25, 1989,
appointing her sister, Bernadette Ramos, to act for and in
her behalf relative to the transfer of the property to
respondent. Ostensibly, a marital squabble was brewing
between Arturo and Esther at the time and to protect his
interest, respondent caused the annotation of his adverse
claim on the title of the spouses to the property on
November 14, 1989.
Esther, through her attorney-in-fact, executed a
contract to Sell the property to the extent of her conjugal
interest therein for the sum of six hundred fifty thousand
pesos (P650,000.00) and agreed to surrender possession of
the property to respondent within twenty (20) days from
November 16, 1989, while the latter promised to pay the
balance of the purchase price in the amount of one million
two hundred ninety thousand pesos (P1,290,000.00) after
being placed in possession of the property. Esther also
obligated herself to execute and deliver to respondent a
deed of absolute sale upon full payment.
In a letter dated December 7, 1989, respondent
informed the spouses that he had set aside the amount of
One Million Two Hundred Ninety Thousand Pesos
(P1,290,000.00) as evidenced by Citibank Check No.
278107 as full payment of the purchase price. He reiterated
his demand upon them to comply with their obligation to
turn over possession of the property. Arturo and Esther
failed to deliver the property which prompted respondent to
cause the annotation of another adverse claim on TCT No.
145316. On January 12, 1990, respondent filed a complaint
for specific performance with damages against petitioners.
Arturo filed his answer to the complaint while his wife was
declared in default.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the
complaint for specific performance. It ruled that the Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) ostensibly issued by Esther in
favor of Arturo was void as it was falsified. Hence, the
court concluded that the SPA could not have authorized
Arturo to sell the property to respondent. The trial court
also noted that the check issued by respondent to cover the
earnest money was dishonored due to insufficiency of
funds and while it was replaced with another check by
respondent, there is no showing that the second check was
issued as payment for the earnest money on the property.
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court. It ruled that the SPA in favor of Arturo, assuming
that it was void, cannot affect the transaction between
Esther and respondent. The appellate court ratiocinated that
it was by virtue of the SPA executed by Esther, in favor of
her sister, that the sale of the property to respondent was
effected. On the other hand, the appellate court considered
the RMOA executed by Arturo in favor of respondent valid
to effect the sale of Arturo’s conjugal share in the property.
Hence this petition.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner may be compelled to
convey the property to respondent under the terms of the
RMOA and the Contract to Sell
Held
Contracts, in general, require the presence of
three essential elements: (1) consent of the contracting
parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the
contract; and (3) cause of the obligation which is
established.
Significantly, the Family Code has introduced
some changes particularly on the aspect of the
administration of the conjugal partnership. The new law
provides that the administration of the conjugal partnership
is now a joint undertaking of the husband and the wife. In
the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
partnership, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. However, the power of administration does
not include the power to dispose or encumber property
belonging to the conjugal partnership. In all instances, the
present law specifically requires the written consent of the
other spouse, or authority of the court for the disposition or
encumbrance of conjugal partnership property without
which, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
Inescapably, herein petitioner’s action for
specific performance must fail. Even on the supposition
that the parties only disposed of their respective shares in
the property, the sale, assuming that it exists, is still void
for as previously stated, the right of the husband or the wife
to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Nemo dat qui non
habet. No one can give what he has not.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case
No. 90-106 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati is
ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Jao vs. Court of Appeals
SUBJECT MATTER: Action to impugn legitimacy
Facts
On October 18, 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao,
then a minor, represented by her mother and guardian-ad-
litem Arlene Salgado, filed a case for recognition and
support against private respondent Perico V. Jao. The latter
denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping
test which was in due course conducted by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) upon order of the trial court.
The result of the blood grouping test, held January 21,
1969, indicated that Janice could not have been the possible
offspring of Perico V. Jao and Arlene S. Salgado.
Issue
Whether or not blood grouping test are
conclusive as to non-paternity.
Held
A universal scientific agreement that blood
grouping are conclusive as to non-paternity, although
inconclusive as to paternity—that is, the fact that the blood
type of the child is a possible product of the mother and
alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is
born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is
not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother
and that of the alleged father are cross matched, then the
child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.
Andal and Dueňas vs. Macaraig
SUBJECT MATTER: Action to impugn legitimacy
Facts
Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis in
January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went
to live in his house to help him work his farm. His sickness
became worse that on or about September 10, 1942, Maria
Duenas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live
in the house of Maria’s father, until the middle of 1943.
Since May 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse
and treated each other as husband and wife. On January 1,
1943, Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who
did not even attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria
Duenas gave birth to a boy, who was given the name
Mariano Andal. Brought by the death of Emiliano Andal,
Eduvigis Macaraig took possession of the land whom the
deceased owned because there is none in the family has the
right to inherit.
Mariano Andal assisted by his mother Maria
Duenas, as guardian, filed an action for the recovery and
possession of a parcel of land situated in Calabanga,
Camarines Sur. They alleges that Mariano Andal is the
surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas and
that Emiliano Andal was the owner of the parcel of land in
question whom he acquired by virtue of a “donation propter
nuptias” from his mother, Edivigis Macaraig.
Issue
Whether or not Emiliano Andal is the father of
Mariano Andal despite his illness and despite the
intercourse of the wife with another man.
Held
Yes, the child is still the legitimate child. The fact
that the husband was seriously sick is not sufficient to
overcome the presumption of legitimacy. There cases
where persons suffering from TB can do the carnal act even
in the most crucial stage of health because then they seem
to be more inclined to sexual intercourse. This presumption
can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife
during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth
of the child. “Impossibility of access by husband to wife
would include absence during the initial period of
conception, impotence which is patent, continuing and
incurable; and imprisonment, unless it can be shown that
cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison
regulations.” The fact that the wife had illicit intercourse
with a man other than her husband during the initial period
does not preclude cohabitation between said husband and
wife.
Babiera vs. Catotal
SUBJECT MATTER: Action to impugn legitimacy
Facts:
Presentacion B. Catotal (private respondent) filed
a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of
Teofista Babiera. From that petition, private respondent
asserted that she is the only surviving child of the late
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Carinosa, who
died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively; that
on September 20, 1996 a bay girl was delivered by ‘hilot’
in the house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera
and without the knowledge of said spouse, Flora Guinto,
the mother of the child and a housemaid of the said
spouses, caused the registration/ recording of the facts of
birth of her child, by simulating that she was the child of
the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena,
then 54 years old, and made the latter to appear as the
mother by forging her signature; that petitioner, then 15
years old saw with her own eyes and personally witnessed
Flora Guinto gave birth to Teofista Guinto.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 170 of the Family Code is
applicable.
Held:
Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
present case. A close readings of this provision shows that
it applies to instances in which the father impugns the
legitimacy of his wife’s child. The provision, however,
presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of
the another. The present case alleges and shows that
Hermogena did not gave birth to petitioner. In other words,
the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an
illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the
former is not the latter’s child at all. Verily, the present
action does not impugn petitioner’s filiation to Spouses
Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera because there is no blood
relation to impugn in the first place.
Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals
SUBJECT MATTER: Action To Impugn Legitimacy
Facts
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian
owned various properties especially in Laguna. Isabel died
on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the grave on
November 13, 1989. He died intestate.
The fight for administration of Vicente’s estate
ensued. On September 24, 1990, private respondents
Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar
(Vicente’s sister and nephew, respectively) prayed for the
issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate in
favor of private respondent Aguilar.
On November 2, 1990, Marissa Benitez (herein
petitioner) opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the
sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of
administering her estate. The parties further exchanged
reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal postures.
Issue
Whether or not the petitioner is a legitimate child
of the deceased spouses.
Held
If appellee Marissa Benitez is truly the real,
biological daughter of the late Vicente O. Benitez and his
wife Isabel Chipongian, why did he and Isabel’s only
brother and sibling, Dr. Nilo Chipongian, after Isabel’s
death on April 25, 1982, state in the extra-judicial
settlement that they executed her estate, “that we are the
sole heirs of the deceased ISABEL CHIPONGIAN because
she died without descendants or ascendants.”
Dr. Chipongian, placed on the witness stand by
appellants, testified that it was his brother-in-law, Atty.
Vicente O. Benitez who prepared said document and that
he signed the same only because the latter told him to do
so. But why would Atty. Benitez make such a statement in
said document unless appellee Marissa Benitez is really not
his deceased wife’s legal heir.
As for as Dr. Chipongian, he lamely explained
that he signed said document without understanding
completely the meaning of the words “descendant and
ascendant.” The court cannot believe Dr. Chipongian being
a practicing pediatrician who has even gone to US.
Obviously, Dr. Chipongian was just trying to protect the
interest of appellee, the foster daughter of his deceased
sister and brother-in-law, and against those of the latter’s
collateral blood relatives.
WIILIAM LIYAO, JR. REPRESENTED BY HIS
MOTHER CORAZON GARCIA vs JUANITA
TANHOTI-LIYAO
SUBJECT MATTER: Who may file, within what period
Facts
Corazon is legally married to but living
separately from Ramon Yulo for more than ten (10) years
at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon
cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the
time on William’s untimely demise on 2 December 1975.
They lived together in the company of Corazon’s
two children from her subsisting marriage.
Sometime in 1944, Corazon bought a lot but
failed to secure the signature of his her husband. With
regard to the alleged son of Corazon and William, trial
court ruled in favor of the petitioner but the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision.
Issue
Whether or not the Court of Appeals’ decision
was correct.
Held
It is correct. The fact that Corazon Garcia had
been living separeately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at
the time petitioner was conceived and born, is of no
moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds
for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears that such
can be invoked by the husband or in proper cases his heirs
under conditions set forth by the Civil Code.
Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon vs. Court of Appeals
SUBJECT MATTER: Who may file, within what period
Facts
Petitioners were born as a result of the marriage
between Carolina de Jesus and Danilo de Jesus. The latter
acknowledged petitioners as his illegitimate children in a
notarized document. They filed for partition with Inventory
and Accounting after Juan Dizon died intestate.
Issue
Whether petitioners are the acknowledged
illegitimate offspring of the decedent
Held
The issue at hand cannot be aptly adjudicated
without an action having been first instituted to impugn
their legitimacy as being the children of Carolina and
Danilo de Jesus in a lawful wedlock. Declaration of
legitimacy cannot be collaterally attacked. Moreover, there
is a presumption that children born on wedlock are
legitimate. However, this becomes conclusive when
evidence shows proof that there is physical impossibility of
access between the spouses during the 1st 120 days of the
300 days, which immediately precedes the birth of the
child.
Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing vs. Court
of Appeals
SUBJECT MATTER: Action To Claim Legitimacy
Facts
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six
children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was
born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and
registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila.
Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of
private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of
Tondo, Manila.
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to
her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since
Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she
asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her
four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of
Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child
while Bienvenida was doing laundry.When Bienvenida
returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were
gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house
in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there. Husband and
wife, after having been reconciled, looked for their missing
son in other places. However, they saw no traces of his
whereabouts.
Four years later, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the
death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband
of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in
Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida went to Hagonoy, Bulacan,
where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first
time after four years. She claims that the boy, who was
pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late
Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez. She
avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite
her demand to do so.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas
corpus with the trial court in order to recover their son. On
March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since
Angelita and her common-law husband could not have
children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an
impossibility.5 The trial court also held that the minor and
Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it
ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are
one and the same person who is the natural child of
petitioners. However, said decision was reversed by the
Court of Appeals.
Issue
Whether or not the respondent court of appeals
erred in reversing the decision of the regional trial court
dismissing the petition for "habeas corpus" and in directing
that the custody of the minor John Thomas Lopez who was
proven to the same minor as Edgardo r. Tijing, Tr., be
returned to the private respondent.
Held
A close scrutiny of the records of this case
reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is
sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually
her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr. there is evidence that
Angelita could no longer bear children. She admitted that
after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at
the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas
Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming
she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she
offered no evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978
and 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who
allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No
clinical records, log book or discharge order from the clinic
were ever submitted. All these considered, we are
constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of
petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain
custody of said child
Go Kim Huy vs. Go Kim Huy
SUBJECT MATTER: Action To Claim Legitimacy
Facts
Bonifacio Go Kim died on February 26, 1974.
William Go Kim Huy, petitioner herein, claims hereditary
rights over the mass of property, rights, and assets
belonging to the estate of the deceased.
On June 18,1980, petitioner filed a complaint
against Santiago Go Kim Huy, the latter’s children,
Bonifacio Go Kim & Sons, and Santiago Go Kim Huy &
Sons, Company, to declare the properties and business held
by them as part of the estate the Bonifacio Go Kim, and
compel them to render an accounting.
Petitioner testified that he is known by his name
Go Kim Huy or William Go. He added that his schooling,
sustenance and everyday needs were shouldered by the
decedent. He asserts that he was forced to file the case in
court because respondent Santiago refused to give him his
share on the estate of his father.
On the other hand, respondent Santiago avers that
he is the only son of Bonifacio Go Kim. He maintains that
petitioner has lived and worked with them and was treated
as a family member because petitioner’s father was a close
friend of the decedent. Petitioner’s real parents were Gaw
Gee and Ng Kee as appearing in his landing certificate.
Respondent denied any relation with petitioner and declares
that the grant of petitioner for change of name from Gaw
Piak to William Go Kim Huy did not make him a member
of the family of Bonifacio Go Kim.
While the case in the trial court was pending,
respondent’s counsel filed a letter-complaint dated May 23,
1983 with the Ministry of Justice attacking the certification
dated May 27, 1974 stating that the records filed in the
Bureau of Immigration (BID) showed that the decedent
registered petitioner as one of his sons. The BID then
cancelled its certification and declared that petitioner is not
a son of the decedent.
Petitioner went to the Supreme Court via a
special civil action for certiorari assailing the opinion of the
Ministry of Justice. Petition was denied on August 22,
1988.
On February 16, 1996, the trial court dismissed
the complaint for insufficiency of evidence and ordered
petitioner to pay respondent in sum of P200, 000.00 as
moral damages.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner can claim legitimacy so
as to be entitled to acquire his share over the estate of the
decedent?
Held
By provision of will or operation of law, heirs are
called to succeed. Nevertheless, the burden of proof is on
the petitioner to establish his affirmative allegation that
Bonifacio Go Kim is his father. Petitioner insists that the
Supreme Court disregard the action taken by the BID and
consider the documents previously cancelled by the said
office to support his claim for legitimacy. The documents
petitioner wanted the Supreme Court to reconsider were
already cancelled by the BID, which has been affirmed by
the Supreme Court thirteen years ago. In fact, petitioner’s
alleged filiation was merely dependent upon the
certification issued by the BID in 1974 and he has failed to
show by convincing evidence, other than the cancelled
certification, that indeed he was related to the decedent. In
the voluminous records presented, it all boils down to a
reconsideration of the BID finding, which cannot no be
disturbed.
Tecson vs. COMELEC
SUBJECT MATTER: Rights of legitimate children
Facts
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan
Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. commonly
known as FPJ, filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines
under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP)
Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to
be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth
to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Petitioner herein contested the candidacy and presented
twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more
significant ones being a certification issued by Estrella M.
Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives
that there appeared to be no available information regarding
the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San
Carlos, Pangasinan, a certification issued by the Officer-In-
Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives
that no available information about the marriage of Allan F.
Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, a certificate of
birth of Ronald Allan Poe, Original Certificate of Title No.
P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, copies of Tax
Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No.
23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, a copy of the certificate
of death of Lorenzo Pou, a copy of the purported marriage
contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and a
certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San
Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in
the said office during the period of from 1900 until May
1946 were totally destroyed during World War II. But the
petition was denied en banc by the COMELEC, Hence this
petition.
Issue
Whether or not FPJ is a natural born Filipino
Citizen.
Held
The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and
prematurity, the petitions in this case both having been
directly elevated to this Court in the latter’s capacity as the
only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential
election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the
primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked
only after, not before, the elections are held. But while the
totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly
failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties
to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether
or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as
so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC must not
only be material, but also deliberate and willful. Therefore
the petition is dismiss
IN RE: JULIAN LIN WANG
SUBJECT MATTER: Rights of Legitimate Children
Facts:
On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa
Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change
of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil
Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to
drop his middle name and have his registered name
changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin
Wang.
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on
February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-
Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other.
When his parents subsequently got married on September
22, 1998, ...they executed a deed of legitimation of their
son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang….
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in
Singapore for a long time because they will let him study
there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine
who was born in Singapore…. Since in Singapore middle
names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried
in a person’s name, they anticipate that Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of
his current registered name which carries a middle name.
Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are
brother and sister since they have different surnames.
Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin language
since they do not have the letter "R" but if there is, they
pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons that the name of
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to
Julian Lin Wang.
On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision
denying the petition. The trial court found that the reason
given for the change of name sought in the petition—that
is, that petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when
studies in Singapore because of his middle name—did not
fall within the grounds recognized by law. The trial court
ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience
of the child. Since the State has an interest in the name of a
person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of
the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code,
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of
the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this
right should now be taken from petitioner Julian,
considering that he is still a minor. The trial court added
that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he
could then decide whether he will change his name by
dropping his middle name.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
but this was denied in a resolution dated 20 May 2004.
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari
(Under Rule 45.
Issue:
Whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child
is contrary to Article 174 of the Family Code.
Held:
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to comment on the petition. The OSG filed
its Comment positing that the trial court correctly denied
the petition for change of name. The OSG argues that under
Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have
the right to bear the surnames of their father and mother,
and such right cannot be denied by the mere expedient of
dropping the same. According to the OSG, there is also no
showing that the dropping of the middle name "Carulasan"
is in the best interest of petitioner, since mere convenience
is not sufficient to support a petition for change of name
and/or cancellation of entry.
The OSG also adds that the petitioner has not shown any
compelling reason to justify the change of name or the
dropping of the middle name, for that matter. Petitioner’s
allegation that the continued use of the middle name may
result in confusion and difficulty is allegedly more
imaginary than real. The OSG reiterates its argument raised
before the trial court that the dropping of the child’s middle
name could only trigger much deeper inquiries regarding
the true parentage of petitioner. Hence, while petitioner
Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no
confusion since both use the surname of their father, Wang.
Even assuming that it is customary in Singapore to drop the
middle name, it has also not been shown that the use of
such middle name is actually proscribed by Singaporean
law
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It
is absolute, intended to protect the individual from being
confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects,
for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed,
unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may
be changed only for good cause and by judicial
proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and,
therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos
or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.
This citation does not make any reference to middle names,
but this does not mean that middle names have no practical
or legal significance. Middle names serve to identify the
maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given
name and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and
legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right
to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while
illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother,
unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case
they may bear the father’s surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is
not recognized by the father bears only a given name and
his mother’s surname, and does not have a middle name.
The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore
identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child
is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or
acknowledged by the father in a public document or private
handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother’s
surname as his middle name and his father’s surname as his
surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged illegitimate child.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner
for the dropping his middle name is convenience. However,
how such change of name would make his integration into
Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly
established. That the continued use of his middle name
would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute
proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered
complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the
nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of
name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his
name be left to his judgment and discretion when he
reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may
not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change
of his name and granting of the same at this point may just
prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
CABATANIA v. REGODOS
SUBJECT MATTER: Voluntary Recognition of
Illegitimate Children, How Made
Facts:
This controversy stemmed from a petition for
recognition and support filed by Florencia Regodos in
behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo
Regodos
During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother
of private respondent who was born on September 9, 1982
and that she was the one supporting the child. She
recounted that after her husband left her in the early part of
1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for
work and was eventually hired as petitioners household
help. It was while working there as a maid that, on January
2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they
checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual
intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got
pregnant. On the other hand, Camelo Babatania denied all
allegations and provided for a different version. Petitioner
was therefore surprised when summons was served on him
by Florencias counsel. She was demanding support for
private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused,
denying the alleged paternity.
After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to
the testimony of Florencia despite its discovery that she
misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her
husband was alive. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in its application
of article 283 of the civil code on the compulsory
recognition and award of support in favor of respondent-
appellee Camelo Regodos.
Held:
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles
172 and 175 of the Civil Code:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment;
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
In the case at bar, private respondent presented a
copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation
of which was without the knowledge or consent of
petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying
the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity
when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil
registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child on the information of a third person.
In the same vein while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence
of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified
but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s
paternity. Also, private respondent failed to present
sufficient proof of voluntary recognition.
Wherefore the petition is hereby granted. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of
the Regional Trial is reversed and set aside. Private
respondent’s petition for recognition and support is
dismissed.
ECET v. ECETA
SUBJECT MATTER: Voluntary Recognition of
Illegitimate Children, How Made
Facts:
In 1977, Vicente died. During his lifetime,
however, he sired Maria Theresa, an illegitimate
daughter.Thus at the time of his death, his compulsory heirs
were his mother, Rosalina, and illegitimate child, Maria
Theresa.
In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218, for Partition and
Accounting with Damages[2] against Rosalina alleging that
by virtue of her father’s death, she became Rosalinas co-
heir and co-owner of the Cubao property. In her answer,
Rosalina alleged that the property is paraphernal in nature
and thus belonged to her exclusively.
After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered judgment
in favor of the herein respondent. The Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification the trial court’s ruling. Hence
this petition.
Issue:
Whether the certified xerox copy of the
certificate of live birth is competent evidence to prove the
alleged filiation of the respondent as an illegitimate
daughter of her alleged father Vicente Eceta.
Held:
Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with
Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate.
Vicente himself signed Maria Theresa’s birth certificate
thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act
alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his
paternity over Maria Theresa.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate
children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission
of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate
child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no
further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does
not require a separate action for judicial approval.
Wherefore the petition for review on certiorari is denied.
The decision of the court of appeals which affirmed with
modification the decision of the regional trial is affirmed in
toto.
Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
SUBJECT MATTER: Voluntary recognition of
illegitimate children
Facts
On September 18, 1953, Maria Teresa R. Alberto
was born to Aurora Reviva and Juan M. Albert, both were
not married. Then sometime on September 18, 1967, the
alleged father of Maria Teresita, Juan M. Alberto was
assassinated and died intestate. His lawful wife, Yolanda R.
Alberto was appointed as administratrix of the his estate.
After the Inventory and Appraisal and the Administratrix’s
Accounting approved, the proceedings were closed and
terminated. On September 15, 1978, Maria Teresa R.
Alberto filed a motion to leave and to intervene as
oppositor and to reopen the proceedings. The motion was
granted by the probate court. Upon presentation of
evidences by both parties, the court was convinced that
Maria Teresa R. Alberto had been in continuous possession
of a natural child, thereby compelling the descendants’
heirs and estate to recognize her as such and allow her to
participate in the estate proceedings. However the Court of
Appeals reversed the probate court’s decision, finding no
satisfaction in the degree of proof to establish Maria Teresa
R. Alberto as a child of the deceased.
Issue
Whether or not the Maria Albert be legally be
recognized by the heirs of the estate of Juan Alberto as a
natural child of the latter.
Held
The supreme court recognized the intent and effort of Juan
M. Alberto to introduce Maria to the family as one of his
flesh and blood, by allowing Maria to use his family name
and by giving her mother money to support her support and
by openly introducing her to members of his family,
relatives, and friends as his daughter. By the effect of the
operation of Art. 285 of the Civil Code, Maria seeking a
judicial declaration shall be recognized as a natural child to
enable her to participate in the estate of her deceased father.
De jesus vs. Estate of decedent juan gamboa dizon
SUBJECT MATTER: Voluntary recognition of
illegitimate children
Facts
Juan G. Dizon a well founded man, acknowledged through
an affidavit; Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his
own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus
sometime in 1991. On March 12, 1992 Juan G. Dizon died
leaving his assets consisting of shares of stock in various
corporations and other properties. Respondents, the
surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent
Juan G. Dizon, including the corporation of which the
deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the
case alleging a call for altering the status of petitioners
from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de
Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate
children of Carolina de Jesus and the deceased Juan Dizon
but it was dismissed.
Issue
Whether or not the Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus
can claim to be illegitimate children of Dizon.
Held
Only the father can impugn the legitimacy of the child
while he is still alive, if not , then his heirs. But the
question in this case is can both Petitioners claim being an
illegitimate child at the same time a legitimate of other
parent. The answer would be in the negative. It is unlikely
that the law recognize such relationship. And taking into
consideration the evidence presented is only an affidavit
which cannot be fully given credence in the absence of any
other evidences. Thus this petition is dismiss
Aparicio vs. Paraguya
SUBJECT MATTER: Voluntary recognition of
illegitimate children
Facts
Trinidad Montilde had a love affair with a priest named
REVEREND FATHER Felipe Lumain to which she
became pregnant, fearful of the societal pressure, she
married Anastacio Mamburao to conceal her pregnancy,
disgraceful as it is REVEREND FATHER Felipe Lumain
even solemnized their marriage and on October 31, 1936,
REVEREND FATHER Lumain died but left a last will and
testament wherein he acknowledged Consolacion as his
daughter and instituted her as the sole and universal heir to
all his property rights and interests. This was duly probated
and approved in the Court of First Instance of Bohol in
June 11, 1938 and was duly affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Upon turning into adulthood Consolacion filed an
action against Hipolito Paraguya for the recovery of certain
parcels of land she claims to have inherited from her father,
REVEREND FATHER Lumain, she got what she want but
not satisfied she appealed to the Supreme Court
Issue
Whether or not Consolacion has the rights of a
natural child of her deceased father REVEREND FATHER
Lumain and to claim the parcels of land as her inheritance
Held
The probated will of REVEREND FATHER
Lumain has the full effect of law, indicating in his will that
she is her daughter and who will be the universal heir of all
his estate. Thus the will must be fully be enforced, thus all
of the estate of the late REVEREND FATHER Lumain
must be transferred to the petitioner. The petition was
granted by the supreme court.
Rivero v. CA
SUBJECT MATTER: Voluntary recognition of
illegitimate children
Facts
On May 3, 1965, Lucia Origen, together with
Cipriano de la Cruz, Leocadia Rivero, Domingo Rivero and
Delfin Jusayan, instituted against Jaime Rivero to declare
null and void a contract of sale of a parcel of land and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55814; that the plaintiffs
are some of the legal heirs of the deceased, Ana
Concepcion, who died intestate that on or about March 15,
1965. during her last illness, the deceased decided to
mortgage the abovementioned property for P5,000.00 so
that she could pay her existing obligation to one Filomena
Jusayan in the amount of P3,000.00 and to spend for her
recovery from illness; that she entrusted the title to her
property to the defendant, Jaime Rivero, trusting that he
would facilitate the mortgage; that the defendant did not
mortgage the property but instead, on or about March 25,
1965, when Ana Concepcion was no longer in full
possession of her reasoning faculties, said defendant,
through fraud and misrepresentation, manifesting that
certain documents were supposed to be deeds of mortgage
of the abovenamed property and also through violence and
undue influence on Ana Concepcion, effected the signing
by the deceased of the documents which are in reality a
deed of absolute sale and an affidavit of alienation; that the
defendant did not give any consideration to Ana
Concepcion and, in fact, the deceased died without paying
her debt to Filomena Jusayan, and said Ana Concepcion
lacked proper medical treatment; that on or about March
26, 1965, the defendant effected the registration of the
property in question in his name and Transfer Certificate of
Title No.
Issue
Whether or not consent is vitiated by any of the
circumstances and whether the contract is in a public or
private writing
Held
The record discloses that Ana Concepcion was the only
daughter of Vicente Concepcion who died in 1934; that
Ana Concepcion inherited from her father a parcel of land
which is the subject of the present controversy; that Ana
Concepcion was afflicted with pulmonary tuberculosis and
as she needed money for her treatment, she requested her
nephew, Jaime Rivero, to work for the transfer of the title
of the land in question to her; that on January 20, 1965,
through the efforts of Jaime Rivero, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-55814 embracing said land was issued in the
name of Ana Concepcion; that Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-55814 was never delivered by Jaime Rivero to Ana
Concepcion until she died; that not long after the death of
Ana Concepcion on April 18, 1968, the relatives of the
deceased discovered that the land of Ana Concepcion had
been registered in the name of Jaime Rivero who secured
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 56789 in his name from
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan; and that a deed entitled
"Kasulatan Sa Ganap Na Bilihan" dated March 24, 1965,
whereby it was made to appear that Ana Concepcion had
sold to Jaime Rivero the land in question, was allegedly
concocted by Jaime Rivero, taking advantage of his being
in possession of the certificate of title of Ana Concepcion.
The undisputed facts of record support the
finding of the trial court that the consent of Ana
Concepcion to the deed of sale was obtained through the
fraudulent misrepresentation of Jaime Rivero that the
contract she was signing was one of mortgage. The land in
question is located in the Municipality of Polo, Bulacan,
very near Manila. It has an area of 2 hectares, 32 ares and
45 centares. The consideration for the sale of said land is
only P5,000.00 which is not only grossly inadequate but
shocking to the conscience. The land in question was sold
for less than P0.25 per square meter. It appears that Ana
Concepcion only wanted to mortgage the property so she
could pay her indebtedness of about P3,000.00.
Considering the nature of the area of the property, the same
can be sold for about P100,000.00. In 1958 Ana
Concepcion had executed an option to sell the land in
question for a price of P4.50 per square meter. It appears
from the description of the land in question that the same is
a corner lot being bounded on the south and west by a road
3 meters wide.
People v. Bayani
SUBJECT MATTER: Compulsory Recognition of
Illegitimate Children, Who may file and when to file action
for compulsory recognition
Facts:
Sgt. Moreno Bayani, a member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP), seeks the reversal of the 28 April 1995
decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City,
Branch 11, in Criminal Case No. 6433, finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with all the accessory penalties provided by law; to
indemnify complainant Maria Elena Nieto in the amount of
Fifty Thousand (P50, 000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
In her sworn complaint dated 22 February 1993 and filed
on 24 February 1993 with the court below, the complainant
charged the accused with the crime of rape allegedly
committed.
Issues:
The accused seasonably appealed from the decision. In his
Appellant's Brief, he assigns the following errors to the trial
court:
Held:
Article 176 of the Family Code confers parental authority
over illegitimate children on the mother, and likewise
provides for their entitlement to support in conformity with
the Family Code. As such, there is no further need for the
prohibition against acknowledgment of the offspring by an
offender who is married, which would vest parental
authority in him. Therefore, under Article 345 of the
Revised Penal Code, the offender in a rape case who is
married can only be sentenced to indemnify the victim and
support the offspring, if there be any. In the instant case
then, the accused should also be ordered to support his
illegitimate offspring, Tracy Jhuen Nieto, 72 with Marie
Elena Nieto, but in light of Article 20173 of the Family
Code, the amount and terms thereof to be determined by
the trial court only after due notice and hearing.
People v. Manahan
SUBJECT MATTER: Compulsory recognition
Facts:
Complainant Teresita Tibigar, 16 years old,
worked at the Espiritu Canteen in Dagupan City. As a stay-
in waitress she slept at the second floor of the canteen.
Manuel Manahan is the brother-in-law of Josefina Espiritu,
owner of the canteen. His wife Primadonna is the sister of
Josefina Espiritu. Manuel and Primadonna temporarily
reside at the canteen together with the family of Josefina as
Primadonna was then pregnant.1âwphi1.nêt
On 5 January 1995, at about two o'clock in the morning,
Teresita who was asleep was suddenly awakened when she
felt someone beside her. Upon opening her eyes she saw
accused Manuel Manahan as he immediately placed
himself on top of her. She tried to shout but the accused
covered her mouth. He then forcibly spread her legs. She
cried; she pushed and kicked him many times in an effort to
free herself but the accused proved too strong for her. Soon
enough she became weary and exhausted.
Meanwhile, on 2 October 1995, she gave birth to a healthy
baby girl and christened her Melanie Tibigar.
Issue:
Whether or not accused should recognize his
child with victim
Held:
On the matter of acknowledgment and support of
the child, a correction of the view of the court a quo is in
order. Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that
persons guilty of rape shall also be sentenced to
"acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent
him from doing so," and "in every case to support the
offspring." In the case before us, compulsory
acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper
there being a legal impediment in doing so as it appears
that the accused is a married man. As pronounced by this
Court in People v. Guerrero, the rule is that if the rapist is a
married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the
offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate." Consequently, that
portion of the judgment under review is accordingly
deleted. In any case, we sustain that part ordering the
accused to support the child as it is in accordance with law.
Cruz v. Cristobal
SUBJECT MATTER: Liquidation of absolute community
Facts:
Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs
of the deceased Socorro Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat
claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura
Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On
the other hand, Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose are
also the children of Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from
his second marriage to Donata Enriquez.
On 18 June 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal
purchased a parcel of land with an area of 535 square
meters located at 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan,
Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 10878-2. More than six decades later,
petitioners learned that private respondents had executed an
extrajudicial partition of the subject property and
transferred its title to their names.
Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to
attempt to settle the case between them and private
respondents, but no settlement was reached. Thus, a
Complaint or Annulment of Title and Damages was filed
before the RTC by petitioners against private respondents
to recover their alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject
property.
To prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal certificates of Elisa,
Anselmo, and the late Socorro were presented. In the case
of Mercedes who was born on 31 January 1909, she
produced a certification issued by the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar, attesting to the fact that records of birth for
the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948
were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a
judgment on 11 July 1997, dismissing the case, ruling that
petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal and birth
certificates presented have scant evidentiary value and that
petitioners’ inaction for a long period of time amounts to
laches. Not satisfied, petitioners sought recourse in the
Court of Appeals which ruled that they were able to prove
their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal
thru "other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws," but affirmed the ruling of the trial court
barring their right to recover their share of the subject
property because of laches.
Issue:
Whether or not baptismal certificates are valid to
prove filiation.
Ruling:
The Court granted the petition and recognized
and declared as children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal
from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. The Deed of
Partition executed by private respondents is declared not
binding upon petitioners who were not notified or did not
participate in the execution thereof. The subject property in
the name of private respondents is ordered to be partitioned
and distributed in accordance with the decision and
appropriate certificates of title be issued in favor of each of
the recognized heirs of the late Cristobal Buenaventura.
Article 172 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and Special Laws, may consist of the child's baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the
child's name has been entered, common reputation
respecting the child's pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of
admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
CABATANIA v. CA
SUBJECT MATTER: Voluntary Recognition of
Illegitimate Children, How Made
Facts:
This controversy stemmed from a petition for
recognition and support filed by Florencia Regodos in
behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo
Regodos
During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother
of private respondent who was born on September 9, 1982
and that she was the one supporting the child. She
recounted that after her husband left her in the early part of
1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for
work and was eventually hired as petitioners household
help. It was while working there as a maid that, on January
2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they
checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual
intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got
pregnant. On the other hand, Camelo Babatania denied all
allegations and provided for a different version. Petitioner
was therefore surprised when summons was served on him
by Florencias counsel. She was demanding support for
private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused,
denying the alleged paternity.
After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to
the testimony of Florencia despite its discovery that she
misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her
husband was alive. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in its application
of article 283 of the civil code on the compulsory
recognition and award of support in favor of respondent-
appellee Camelo Regodos.
Held:
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles
172 and 175 of the Civil Code:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment;
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
In the case at bar, private respondent presented a
copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation
of which was without the knowledge or consent of
petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying
the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity
when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil
registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child on the information of a third person.
In the same vein while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence
of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified
but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s
paternity. Also, private respondent failed to present
sufficient proof of voluntary recognition.
Wherefore the petition is hereby granted. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of
the Regional Trial is reversed and set aside. Private
respondent’s petition for recognition and support is
dismissed.
Lagabala vs. Santiago
SUBJECT MATTER: Proof of illegitimacy
Facts
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the
decision dated March 4, 1997, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 32817, which reversed and set aside the
judgment dated October 17, 1990, Of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 54, in Civil Case No.87-41515,
finding herein petitioner to be the owner of 1/3 pro indiviso
share in a parcel of land.
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 64729, located in Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz,
Manila. Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered it in
his name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now
respondents herein) sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of
the property. On April 20, 1981, the trial court in that case
decided in favor of the sisters, recognizing their right of
ownership over portions of the property covered by TCT
No. 64729. The Register of Deeds of Manila was required
to include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in the
certificate of title to said property.
Jose died intestate on February 6, 1984. On August 5, 1987,
respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title,
ownership, and possession against herein petitioner, Ida C.
Labagala, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, to,
recover from her the 1/3 portion of said property pertaining
to Jose but which came into petitioner's sole possession
upon Jose's death.
Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the property
belongs to them by operation of law, because they are the
only legal heirs of their brother, who died intestate and
without issue. They claimed that the purported sale of the
property made by their brother to petitioner sometime in
March 1979 was executed through petitioner's
machinations and with malicious intent, to enable her to
secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT
No. 172334) in petitioner's name alone.
On October 17, 1990, the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioner Ida C. Labagala, thus affecting their credibility.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the decision of the trial court.
Issues
1. Whether or not petitioner has adduced preponderant
evidence to prove that she is the daughter of the late Jose T.
Santiago.
2. Whether or not respondents could still impugn the
filiation of the petitioner as the daughter of the late Jose T.
Santiago.
Held
Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not have
the right to transfer ownership of the entire property to
petitioner since 2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters.
Petitioner could not have given her consent to the contract,
being a minor at the time. Consent of the contracting
parties is among the essential requisites of a contract,
including one of sale, absent which there can be no valid
contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not pay any
centavo for the property, which makes the sale void. Art.
1471 provides that If the price is simulated, the sale is void,
but the act may be shown to have been in reality a
donation, or some other act or contract.
Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of
donation. Again, as explained by the Court of Appeals:
Even assuming that the deed is genuine, it cannot be a valid
donation. It lacks the acceptance of the donee required by
Art. 725 of the Civil Code. Being a minor in 1979, the
acceptance of the donation should have been made by her
father, Leon Labagala or [her] mother Cornelia Cabrigas or
her legal representative pursuant to Art. 741 of the same
Code. No one of those mentioned in the law - in fact no one
at all - accepted the "donation" for Ida.
In sum, we find no reversible error attributable to the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, hence it must be
upheld.
Locsin V Locsin
Subject Matter: Proof of Illegitimacy
Facts:
Records shows that on November 1991, eleven months
after Juan Locsin, Sr. died intestate, respondent Juan
Locsin, Jr filed with the regional trial court a petition for
letters of administration praying that he be appointed
administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased.
He alleges in the petition that is an acknowledged son and
that he is the only surviving legal heir of the deceased, and
the presence of other undermined properties of the
deceased
Petitioner interposed in the proceeding alleging that they
are the legal heirs of the decedent being the heirs of the
decedent’s siblings. They averred that the respondent is not
an acknowledged son of the deceased.
The regional trial court rendered a decision, which was
affirmed by the Courts of Appeals appointing the
respondent administrator.
During the earlier proceeding, respondent evidenced his
filiation by presenting a machine-copied birth certificate, a
picture and the testimony of the Local Civil Registrar,
while the petitioners presented a true copy of respondent’s
birth certificate from the Civil Registrar General.
Issue:
whether or not respondent sufficiently proved his filiation
to be an interested party, as contemplated by law, in the
estate proceeding.
Held:
while a birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence
for the purposes of filiation and recognition, it offers only a
prima facie evidence and may be refuted by contrary
evidence.
Where there are glaring discrepancies between the
certificates of live birth recorded in the local Civil Registry
and the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General, the
latter prevails.
A person’s photograph with his mother near the coffin of
the alleged father cannot and will not constitute proof of
filiation.
The court ordered respondents petition for the issuance of
the letters of administration dismissed.
Artemio G. Ilano vs.The Court of Appeals.
SUBJECT MATTER: Proof of illegitimacy
Facts
Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then managing a business of
her own as Namarco distributor, met petitioner. Later, he
courted her more than four years. Their relationship
became intimate and with his promise of marriage, they
eloped to Guagua, Pampanga. They stayed at La Mesa
Apartment, located behind the Filipinas Telephone
Company branch office, of which he is the president and
general manager. He came home to her three or four times
a week.
In June, 1962, Leoncia, who was conceiving at that time,
was fetched by petitioner and they transferred to San Juan
St., Pasay City. In October, 1962, she delivered a still-born
female child at the Manila Sanitarium. The death certificate
was signed by petitioner. Thereafter, while they were living
at Highway 54, Makati, private respondent Merceditas S.
Ilano was born on December 30, 1963 also at the Manila
Sanitarium. Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los
Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and
Artemio Geluz Ilano. Leoncia submitted receipts issued by
the Manila Sanitarium to show that she was confined there
from December 30, 1963 until January 2, 1964 under the
name of Mrs. Leoncia Ilano.
The support by petitioner for Leoncia and Merceditas was
sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered by him,
thru Melencio, thru Elynia (niece of Leoncia) or thru
Merceditas herself; and sometimes in the form of a check
like Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532, the
signature appearing thereon having been identified by
Leoncia as that of petitioner because he often gives her
checks which he issues at home and saw him sign the
checks. Both petitioner and his daughter admitted that the
check and the signature are those of the former.
Petitioner's defense was a total and complete denial of any
relationship with Leoncia and Merceditas. He disowned the
handwritten answers and signatures in the death certificate
of a female child surnamed Ilano, although opposite father's
name the typewritten name, Artemio G. Ilano, appears.
Issue
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that
an adulterous child cannot file an action for recognition;
Held
Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code,
illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born
out of wedlock were generally classified into two groups:
(1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born
outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of
conception of the child, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other (Article 119, old Civil
Code; Article 269, new Civil Code) and (2) Spurious,
whether incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other
on account of certain legal impediments. Since petitioner
had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas
was conceived, she is a spurious child. In this regard,
Article 287 of the Civil Code provides that illegitimate
children other than natural in accordance with Article 269
and other than natural children by legal fiction are entitled
to support and such successional rights as are granted in the
Civil Code. The Civil Code has given these rights to them
because the transgressions of social conventions committed
by the parents should not be visited upon them. They were
born with a social handicap and the law should help them
to surmount the disadvantages facing them through the
misdeeds of their parents. However, before Article 287 can
be availed of, there must first be a recognition of paternity
either voluntarily or by court action. This arises from the
legal principle that an unrecognized spurious child like a
natural child has no rights from his parents or to their estate
because his rights spring not from the filiation or blood
relationship but from his acknowledgment by the parent. In
other words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose not
because he was the true or real child of his parents but
because under the law, he had been recognized or
acknowledged as such a child
Petitioner is obliged to recognize Merceditas as his
spurious child In reversing the decision of the trial court,
respondent court found, as it is likewise our finding, that
private respondent's evidence to establish her filiation with
and the paternity of petitioner is too overwhelming to be
ignored or brushed aside by the highly improbable and
fatally flawed testimony of Melencio and the inherently
weak denials of petitioner The court a quo did not likewise
consider the evidences as sufficient to establish that
plaintiff was in continuous possession of status of a child in
view of the denial by appellee of his paternity, and there is
no clear and sufficient evidence that the support was really
given to plaintiff's mother. The belated denial of paternity
after the action has been filed against the putative father is
not the denial that would destroy the paternity of the child
which had already been recognized by defendant by various
positive acts clearly evidencing that he is plaintiff's father.
A recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot be
withdrawn
Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals
SUBJECT MATTER: Proof of illegitimacy
Facts
In 1983,Violeta Esguerra, single, met Carlito S.
Fernandez, married, at the Meralco Compound tennis
courts where Violeta’s father worked as a tennis instructor.
The two then started an illicit sexual relationship six
months after their first meeting. The tryst allegedly gave
birth to herein petitioners Carlo Antonio and John Paul
Fernandez.
Petitioners filed a civil case for support against
Carlito in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The
case however, was dismissed on the basis of immateriality,
and insufficiency and incompetence of evidence.
Another action for recognition and support was
filed on February 19, 1987 at the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Br. 87. Eventually, the decision was rendered
in favor of the petitioners.
On appeal, the decision was set aside and the complaint
was dismissed by respondent appellate court on October
20, 1992. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied
in December 22, 1922.
Hence this appeal.
Issue
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to
recognition and support from private respondent?
Held
It is the Court’s findings that that petitioners’
evidence failed to substantiate their cause of action.
Respondent appellate court was correct in applying the
doctrine of res judicata as additional reason for dismissing
the case.
Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals
SUBJECT MATTER: Proof of illegitimacy
Facts
On October 15, 1986, an action for compulsory recognition
and support was brought before the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio-Benguet, Br. 9, by herein respondent Clarito
Agbulos against Bienvenido Rodriguez, petitioner herein.
At the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother, Felecitas
Agbulos Haber, as first witness. In the course of her direct
examination, she was asked by counsel t reveal the identity
of the plaintiff’s father but the defendant’s counsel raised a
timely objection, which the court sustained.
The plaintiff file before the Supreme Court a petition for
review on certiorari questioning the said order in UDK
8516 entitled “Clarito Agbulos vs. Hon. Romeo A.
Brawner and Bienvenido Rodriguez.” On March 18, 1988,
the Supreme Court referred the petition to the Court of
Appeals, which promulgated the questioned decision dated
November 2, 1988.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the action for compulsory
recognition is deserves merit
Held:
In view in Art. 172 of the Family Code, with
respect to Art. 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
filiation may be proven by “any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father.”
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
SUBJECT MATTER: Proof of illegitimacy
Facts
Francisco Jison married Lilia Lopez in 1940. At the end of
1945 or at the beginning of 1946, Francisco impregnated
Esperanza F. Amolar, who was a nanny for Francisco’s
daughter, Lourdes. As a result, Monina Jison was born on
August 6, 1946. Petitioner alleges she enjoyed continuous
implied recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco.
Monina further alleges that Francisco has always given her
support and support for her education.
On March 15, 195, Monina Jison, praying for a judicial
declaration of her illegitimate status and for Francisco to
recognize her as such, filed a complaint against Francisco
L. Jison in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City. A
decision was rendered dismissing the complaint with costs
against Monina Jison.
On appeal by Monina, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court in April 25, 1995.
Hence this appeal.
Issue
Whether or not the action for recognition is of merit?
Held
Monina Jison’s evidence hurdled “the high
standard of proof” required for the success of an action to
establish one’s illegitimate filiation when relying upon the
provisions regarding “open and continuous possession” or
“any other means allowed the by the Rules of Court and
special laws”; moreover, Monina proved her filiation by
more than mere preponderance of evidence.
Pe Lim vs. Court of Appeals
SUBJECT MATTER: Proof of illegitimacy
Facts
In 1978, Maribel Cruz, then 16, was a part-time
student at the same time a receptionist at the Tonight’s
Club and Rest house. It was here where she met Raymond
Pe Lim on her first night on the job. Lim allegedly wooed
Maribel and the latter reciprocated. They soon lived
together with Lim paying the apartment rentals. Maribel
left for Japan, already pregnant, in July 1981 and returned
to Manila in October of the same year.
On January 17, 1982, Maribel gave birth to a girl and was
named Joanna Rose C. Lim. Lim paid the bills for
Maribel’s confinement.
Towards the latter part of 1983, petitioner abandoned the
mother and child. Unfortunately, various jobs and he from
relatives were not enough to meet their needs. Maribel
asked Lim for support but, despite promises, was never
given. Maribel then filed a complaint for support in the
Regional Trial Court on Manila. The trial court rendered its
decision enjoining Lim to provide support for Joanna Rose
and pay litigation expenses.
Lim elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which in
turn affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court.
Hence this petition.
Issue
Whether or not the action for compulsory
recognition is of merit?
Held
Petitioner has never controverted the evidence on
record. His love letters to Maribel vowing to be a good
father to Joanna Rose; pictures of himself on various
occasions cuddling Joanna Rose and Certificate of Live
Birth say it all. The rule in Art. 283 of the Civil Code that
filiation may be proven by “any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father” shall govern.
Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing vs. Court
of Appeals
SUBJECT MATTER: DNA Tests
Facts
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six
children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was
born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and
registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila.
Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of
private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of
Tondo, Manila.
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to
her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since
Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she
asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her
four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of
Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child
while Bienvenida was doing laundry.When Bienvenida
returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were
gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house
in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there. Husband and
wife, after having been reconciled, looked for their missing
son in other places. However, they saw no traces of his
whereabouts.
Four years later, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the
death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband
of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in
Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida went to Hagonoy, Bulacan,
where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first
time after four years. She claims that the boy, who was
pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late
Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez. She
avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite
her demand to do so.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas
corpus with the trial court in order to recover their son. On
March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since
Angelita and her common-law husband could not have
children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an
impossibility.5 The trial court also held that the minor and
Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it
ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are
one and the same person who is the natural child of
petitioners. However, said decision was reversed by the
Court of Appeals.
Issue
Whether or not the respondent court of appeals
erred in reversing the decision of the regional trial court
dismissing the petition for "habeas corpus" and in directing
that the custody of the minor John Thomas Lopez who was
proven to the same minor as Edgardo r. Tijing, Tr., be
returned to the private respondent.
Held
A close scrutiny of the records of this case
reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is
sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually
her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr. there is evidence that
Angelita could no longer bear children. She admitted that
after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at
the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas
Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming
she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she
offered no evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978
and 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who
allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No
clinical records, log book or discharge order from the clinic
were ever submitted. All these considered, we are
constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of
petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain
custody of said child.
Arnel Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
SUBJECT MATTER: DNA Tests
Facts
Respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in
1992, after which they entered into an intimate relationship.
Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on
November 10, 1999. Despite Arnel’s insistence on
abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child
out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol
Medical Hospital in Quezon City. The baby’s birth
certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father.
Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but
later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support
despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested
to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied
having fathered the child. On January 19, 2001, while Fe
was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills
Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his
van, with the open car door hitting Fe’s leg. This incident
was reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was diagnosed
with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing
chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued
Arnel for support. Arnel contended to prove paternity
through DNA test hence this appeal.
Issue
Whether or not DNA paternity testing can be
ordered in a proceeding for support without violating
petitioner’s constitutional right to privacy and right against
self-incrimination.
Held
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts
should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples, whether proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the
tests. And the growing sophistication of DNA testing
technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for
such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long
believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly
expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect
time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a
dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering.
We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate
our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining
paternitY
Rosendo Herrera vs. Rosendo Alba
SUBJECT MATTER: DNA Tests
Facts
On May 14, 1998, Rosendo Alba, then thirteen
years old, represented by his mother filed for compulsing
recognition, against support and damages against petitioner.
Petitioner, however, denied having physical contact with
respondent’s mother and that he denied having the child as
his. As remedy, respondent filed a motion to direct the
taking of DNA paternity test to abbreviate the proceedings
but the petitioner contracted the motion and alleged that is
violate of his right against self incrimination. The trial court
granted the petition but petitioner still contends that such
act is unconstitutional, hence, hence, he filed for motion for
reconsidered and a petition for centiorary.
Issue
May the court compel petitioner to undergo DNA
test; and whether or not such test could be used as proof of
filiations between the child and the alleged father.
Held
The court ruled that DNA samples from an
accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a
paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this
action the
At it is invilation of his rights against self incrimination,
well not violate such right. This privilege only applies to
evidence that is “communicative” in essence taken under
dures. The Supreme Court ruled that the right against self-
incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communication from defendant
not an exclusion taken from his body. The policy of the
Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of
the paternity and filiation of children, especially of
illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the
protative father to claim his own defenses. Wherefore, the
court may order such test to be used in facilitating
judgment.
People v. Vallejo
SUBJECT MATTER: DNA tests
Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, sentencing
Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino to death and ordering him to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages for the rape-slaying of a 9-year old child, Daisy
Diolola, in Rosario, Cavite on July 10, 1999.
The Information charging accused-appellant
Gerrico Vallejo with the crime of Rape with Homicide
alleged:
"That on or about the 10th day of July 1999, in Barangay
Ligtong I, Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Trial Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design,
by means of force and intimidation, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with DAISY DIOLOLA Y DITALO, a nine-
year old child against the latter's will and while raping the
said victim, said accused strangled her to death."
Issue:
 Whether or not accused should be convicted
based on DNA reslts
Held:
The DNA analysis conducted by NBI Forensic Chemist
Aida Viloria-Magsipoc is also questioned by accused-
appellant. He argues that the prosecution failed to show that
all the samples submitted for DNA testing were not
contaminated, considering that these specimens were
already soaked in smirchy waters before they were
submitted to the laboratory.
DNA is an organic substance found in a person's cells
which contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical
twins, each person's DNA profile is distinct and unique.
Thus, it is the inadequacy of the specimens submitted for
examination, and not the possibility that the samples had
been contaminated, which accounted for the negative
results of their examination. But the vaginal swabs taken
from the victim yielded positive for the presence of human
DNA. Upon analysis by the experts, they showed the DNA
profile of accused-appellanT
Pp v. Yatar
SUBJECT MATTER: DNA Tests: Probative Value in
Paternity Cases
Facts:
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn
Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn
Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of their
grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal,
Kalinga. They were talking about the letter sent by their
aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, appellant Joel Yatar,
through Kathylyn’s friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn
handed the letter to appellant earlier that morning. At 9:00
a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together
with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in Nagbitayan some
two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband
departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended to go to
Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to
leave, she would just stay home and wash her clothes or go
to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left
alone in the house. Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and
fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of
Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of the house. They
went inside the house through the back door of the kitchen
to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was
doing there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to
bring to the house of his mother. In the evening of the same
day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights
in her house were off. She called out for her granddaughter,
Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open. She
noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill
up earlier that day was still empty. She went up the ladder
to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was
upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a rope, so
she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark,
she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.
Issue:
Whether the Deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) of the sperm specimen from the vagina of the
victim was identical to the semen of that of appellant’s
gene type.
Held:
Significantly, subsequent testing
showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm
specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the
semen to be that of appellant’s gene type. DNA is a
molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living
organisms.23 A person’s DNA is the same in each cell and
it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA
in a person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his
saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax,
mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.24
Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human
genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA,
with the notable exception of identical twins. DNA print or
identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely
effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate
a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has
been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA
identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a
more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently
facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the
acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper
administration of justice in every case. DNA evidence
collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime
or eliminate one from suspicion in the same principle as
fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving sexual assault
would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue,
semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victim’s
body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing,
carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to
the victim’s body during the assault. Forensic DNA
evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical
contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly
collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA
can be compared with known samples to place the suspect
at the scene of the crime.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon
Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution
as an expert witness on DNA print or identification
techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was
determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant
are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination.
The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he
was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8,
DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with
semen taken from the victim’s vaginal canal. Verily, a
DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim
and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court
during the course of the trial.
RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE
EN BANC
RESOLUTION
Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson and
Members of the Subcommittee on Evidence submitting for
this Court's consideration and approval the proposed Rule
on DNA Evidence, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the
same.
This Resolution shall take effect on October 15, 2007
following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
October 2, 2007
RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE
Section. 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply whenever
DNA evidence, as defined in Section 3 hereof, is offered,
used, or proposed to be offered or used as evidence in all
criminal and civil actions as well as special proceedings.
chan robles virtual law library
Sec. 2. Application of other Rules on Evidence. - In all
matters not specifically covered by this Rule, the Rules of
Court and other pertinent provisions of law on evidence
shall apply.
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Rule, the
following terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) "Biological sample" means any organic material
originating from a person's body, even if found in
inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This
includes blood, saliva and other body fluids, tissues, hairs
and bones;
(b) "DNA" means deoxyribonucleic acid, which is the
chain of molecules found in every nucleated cell of the
body. The totality of an individual's DNA is unique for the
individual, except identical twins;
(c) "DNA evidence" constitutes the totality of the DNA
profiles, results and other genetic information directly
generated from DNA testing of biological samples;
(d) "DNA profile" means genetic information derived from
DNA testing of a biological sample obtained from a person,
which biological sample is clearly identifiable as
originating from that person; chan robles virtual law
library
(e) "DNA testing" means verified and credible scientific
methods which include the extraction of DNA from
biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the
comparison of the information obtained from the DNA
testing of biological samples for the purpose of
determining, with reasonable certainty, whether or not the
DNA obtained from two or more distinct biological
samples originates from the same person (direct
identification) or if the biological samples originate from
related persons (kinship analysis); and
(f) "Probability of Parentage" means the numerical
estimate for the likelihood of parentage of a putative parent
compared with the probability of a random match of two
unrelated individuals in a given population. chan robles
virtual law library
Sec. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. - The
appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or
on application of any person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall
issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a
showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample:
(i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing
now requested; or
(ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results
may require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce
new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of
the case; and chan robles virtual law library
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court
may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or
integrity of the DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need
of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including
law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is
commenced.
Sec. 5. DNA Testing Order. - If the court finds that the
requirements in Section 4 hereof have been complied with,
the court shall -
(a) Order, where appropriate, that biological samples be
taken from any person or crime scene evidence;
(b) Impose reasonable conditions on DNA testing designed
to protect the integrity of the biological sample, the testing
process and the reliability of the test results, including the
condition that the DNA test results shall be simultaneously
disclosed to parties involved in the case; and
(c) If the biological sample taken is of such an amount that
prevents the conduct of confirmatory testing by the other or
the adverse party and where additional biological samples
of the same kind can no longer be obtained, issue an order
requiring all parties to the case or proceedings to witness
the DNA testing to be conducted.
An order granting the DNA testing shall be immediately
executory and shall not be appealable. Any petition for
certiorari initiated therefrom shall not, in any way, stay the
implementation thereof, unless a higher court issues an
injunctive order. The grant of a DNA testing application
shall not be construed as an automatic admission into
evidence of any component of the DNA evidence that may
be obtained as a result thereof. chan robles virtual law
library
Sec. 6. Post-conviction DNA Testing. - Post-conviction
DNA testing may be available, without need of prior court
order, to the prosecution or any person convicted by final
and executory judgment provided that (a) a biological
sample exists, (b) such sample is relevant to the case, and
(c) the testing would probably result in the reversal or
modification of the judgment of conviction. chan robles
virtual law library
Sec. 7. Assessment of probative value of DNA evidence. -
In assessing the probative value of the DNA evidence
presented, the court shall consider the following:
(a) The chain of custody, including how the biological
samples were collected, how they were handled, and the
possibility of contamination of the samples;
(b) The DNA testing methodology, including the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, the
advantages and disadvantages of the procedure, and
compliance with the scientifically valid standards in
conducting the tests;
(c) The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation
by any reputable standards-setting institution and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. If the
laboratory is not accredited, the relevant experience of the
laboratory in forensic casework and credibility shall be
properly established; and
(d) The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter
provided.
The provisions of the Rules of Court concerning the
appreciation of evidence shall apply suppletorily. chan
robles virtual law library
Sec. 8. Reliability of DNA Testing Methodology. - In
evaluating whether the DNA testing methodology is
reliable, the court shall consider the following: chan robles
virtual law library
(a) The falsifiability of the principles or methods used, that
is, whether the theory or technique can be and has been
tested;
(b) The subjection to peer review and publication of the
principles or methods;
(c) The general acceptance of the principles or methods by
the relevant scientific community;
(d) The existence and maintenance of standards and
controls to ensure the correctness of data generated;
(e) The existence of an appropriate reference population
database; and
(f) The general degree of confidence attributed to
mathematical calculations used in comparing DNA profiles
and the significance and limitation of statistical calculations
used in comparing DNA profiles. chan robles virtual law
library
Sec. 9. Evaluation of DNA Testing Results. - In evaluating
the results of DNA testing, the court shall consider the
following: chan robles virtual law library
(a) The evaluation of the weight of matching DNA
evidence or the relevance of mismatching DNA evidence;
(b) The results of the DNA testing in the light of the
totality of the other evidence presented in the case; and that
chan robles virtual law library
(c) DNA results that exclude the putative parent from
paternity shall be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the
value of the Probability of Paternity is less than 99.9%, the
results of the DNA testing shall be considered as
corroborative evidence. If the value of the Probability of
Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable
presumption of paternity.
Sec. 10. Post-conviction DNA Testing. Remedy if the
Results Are Favorable to the Convict. - The convict or the
prosecution may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in the court of origin if the results of the post-conviction
DNA testing are favorable to the convict.
In case the court, after due hearing, finds the petition to be
meritorious, it shall reverse or modify the judgment of
conviction and order the release of the convict, unless
continued detention is justified for a lawful cause.
A similar petition may be filed either in the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court, or with any member of said
courts, which may conduct a hearing thereon or remand the
petition to the court of origin and issue the appropriate
orders.
Sec. 11. Confidentiality. - DNA profiles and all results or
other information obtained from DNA testing shall be
confidential. Except upon order of the court, a DNA profile
and all results or other information obtained from DNA
testing shall only be released to any of the following, under
such terms and conditions as may be set forth by the court:
chan robles virtual law library
(a) Person from whom the sample was taken;
(b) Lawyers representing parties in the case or action
where the DNA evidence is offered and presented or sought
to be offered and presented;
(c) Lawyers of private complainants in a criminal action;
(d) Duly authorized law enforcement agencies; and
(e) Other persons as determined by the court.
Whoever discloses, utilizes or publishes in any form any
information concerning a DNA profile without the proper
court order shall be liable for indirect contempt of the court
wherein such DNA evidence was offered, presented or
sought to be offered and presented.
Where the person from whom the biological sample was
taken files a written verified request to the court that
allowed the DNA testing for the disclosure of the DNA
profile of the person and all results or other information
obtained from the DNA testing, the same may be disclosed
to the persons named in the written verified request.
Sec. 12. Preservation of DNA Evidence. - The trial court
shall preserve the DNA evidence in its totality, including
all biological samples, DNA profiles and results or other
genetic information obtained from DNA testing. For this
purpose, the court may order the appropriate government
agency to preserve the DNA evidence as follows: chan
robles virtual law library
(a) In criminal cases:
i. for not less than the period of time that any person is
under trial for an offense; or
ii. in case the accused is serving sentence, until such time
as the accused has served his sentence; and
(b) In all other cases, until such time as the decision in the
case where the DNA evidence was introduced has become
final and executory. chan robles virtual law library
The court may allow the physical destruction of a
biological sample before the expiration of the periods set
forth above, provided that: chan robles virtual law library
(a) A court order to that effect has been secured; or
(b) The person from whom the DNA sample was obtained
has consented in writing to the disposal of the DNA
evidence. chan robles virtual law library
Sec. 13. Applicability to Pending Cases. - Except as
provided in Sections 6 and 10 hereof, this Rule shall apply
to cases pending at the time of its effectivity. chan robles
virtual law library
Sec. 14. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on
October 15, 2007, following publication in a newspaper of
general circulation. chan robles virtual law library
Estate of Ong v. Diaz
SUBJECT MATTER: Who may file and when to file an
action for compulsory recognition
Facts:
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing
(1) the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 23
November 2005 and (2) the Resolution2 of the same court
dated 1 March 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 70125.
A Complaint3 for compulsory recognition with prayer for
support pending litigation was filed by minor Joanne
Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and
guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong
(Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac
City. In her Complaint, Jinky prayed that judgment be
rendered:
(a) Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne Rodjin
Diaz as his daughter.
(b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support of
P20,000.00 pendente lite and thereafter to fix monthly
support.
(c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorney’s fees in
the sum of P100,000.00.
(d) Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as maybe
just and equitable in the premises.4
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in
Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got acquainted. This
developed into friendship and later blossomed into love. At
this time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese national,
Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19
February 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V.
Valdez.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant should recognize
plaintiff as his natural child
Held:
From among the issues presented for our disposition, this
Court finds it prudent to concentrate its attention on the
third one, the propriety of the appellate court’s decision
remanding the case to the trial court for the conduct of
DNA testing. Considering that a definitive result of the
DNA testing will decisively lay to rest the issue of the
filiation of minor Joanne, we see no reason to resolve the
first two issues raised by the petitioner as they will be
rendered moot by the result of the DNA testing.
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination
of filiation of minor Joanne for purposes of support in favor
of the said minor.
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate
paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with
paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present
case), or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on
the person who alleges that the putative father is the
biological father of the child. There are four significant
procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which
parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative
defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and child.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage
is presumed legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child
and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the
Family Code provides:
Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be
made in favor of legitimacy. We explained the rationale of
this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of
Appeals:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a
declaration in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to
protect the innocent offspring from the odium of
illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not
conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by
evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New
Civil Code provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty
days following the celebration of the marriage, and before
three hundred days following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted
other than that of the physical impossibility of the
husband’s having access to his wife within the first one
hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which
preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately
in such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as
follows:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
GUY VS. COURT OF APPEALS
SUBJECT MATTER: who may file and when to file an
action for compulsory recognition
Facts
On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes
Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother
Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 138. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
4549 and entitled Intestate Estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a.
Rufino Guy Susim).
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died
intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an
estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and
personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving
spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina,
George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private
respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular
administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei’s
estate. They likewise prayed that, in the meantime,
petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be
appointed as Special Administrator of the estate.
Petitioner asserted that his deceased father left no
debts and that his estate can be settled without securing
letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court. He further argued that private
respondents should have established their status as
illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei
pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.
Issue
Whether or not the release and waiver of claim is
void.
Held
The Court held that parents and guardians may
not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards
without judicial approval. This is because repudiation
amounts to an alienation of property which must pass the
court’s scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward.
Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and
Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar
private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of
the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the
intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one
lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which
waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates
waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent
given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
In the present case, private respondents could not have
possibly waived their successional rights because they are
yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate
children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has
consistently denied that private respondents are his co-
heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived
their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do
not have such right. Hence, petitioner’s invocation of
waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.
Rivero v. CA
SUBJECT MATTER: who may file and when to file an
action for compulsory recognition
Facts
On May 3, 1965, Lucia Origen, together with
Cipriano de la Cruz, Leocadia Rivero, Domingo Rivero and
Delfin Jusayan, instituted against Jaime Rivero to declare
null and void a contract of sale of a parcel of land and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55814; that the plaintiffs
are some of the legal heirs of the deceased, Ana
Concepcion, who died intestate that on or about March 15,
1965. during her last illness, the deceased decided to
mortgage the abovementioned property for P5,000.00 so
that she could pay her existing obligation to one Filomena
Jusayan in the amount of P3,000.00 and to spend for her
recovery from illness; that she entrusted the title to her
property to the defendant, Jaime Rivero, trusting that he
would facilitate the mortgage; that the defendant did not
mortgage the property but instead, on or about March 25,
1965, when Ana Concepcion was no longer in full
possession of her reasoning faculties, said defendant,
through fraud and misrepresentation, manifesting that
certain documents were supposed to be deeds of mortgage
of the abovenamed property and also through violence and
undue influence on Ana Concepcion, effected the signing
by the deceased of the documents which are in reality a
deed of absolute sale and an affidavit of alienation; that the
defendant did not give any consideration to Ana
Concepcion and, in fact, the deceased died without paying
her debt to Filomena Jusayan, and said Ana Concepcion
lacked proper medical treatment; that on or about March
26, 1965, the defendant effected the registration of the
property in question in his name and Transfer Certificate of
Title No.
Issue
Whether or not consent is vitiated by any of the
circumstances and whether the contract is in a public or
private writing.
Held
The record discloses that Ana Concepcion was the only
daughter of Vicente Concepcion who died in 1934; that
Ana Concepcion inherited from her father a parcel of land
which is the subject of the present controversy; that Ana
Concepcion was afflicted with pulmonary tuberculosis and
as she needed money for her treatment, she requested her
nephew, Jaime Rivero, to work for the transfer of the title
of the land in question to her; that on January 20, 1965,
through the efforts of Jaime Rivero, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-55814 embracing said land was issued in the
name of Ana Concepcion; that Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-55814 was never delivered by Jaime Rivero to Ana
Concepcion until she died; that not long after the death of
Ana Concepcion on April 18, 1968, the relatives of the
deceased discovered that the land of Ana Concepcion had
been registered in the name of Jaime Rivero who secured
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 56789 in his name from
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan; and that a deed entitled
"Kasulatan Sa Ganap Na Bilihan" dated March 24, 1965,
whereby it was made to appear that Ana Concepcion had
sold to Jaime Rivero the land in question, was allegedly
concocted by Jaime Rivero, taking advantage of his being
in possession of the certificate of title of Ana Concepcion.
The undisputed facts of record support the
finding of the trial court that the consent of Ana
Concepcion to the deed of sale was obtained through the
fraudulent misrepresentation of Jaime Rivero that the
contract she was signing was one of mortgage. The land in
question is located in the Municipality of Polo, Bulacan,
very near Manila. It has an area of 2 hectares, 32 ares and
45 centares. The consideration for the sale of said land is
only P5,000.00 which is not only grossly inadequate but
shocking to the conscience. The land in question was sold
for less than P0.25 per square meter. It appears that Ana
Concepcion only wanted to mortgage the property so she
could pay her indebtedness of about P3,000.00.
Considering the nature of the area of the property, the same
can be sold for about P100,000.00. In 1958 Ana
Concepcion had executed an option to sell the land in
question for a price of P4.50 per square meter. It appears
from the description of the land in question that the same is
a corner lot being bounded on the south and west by a road
3 meters wide.
Joey Briones vs. Maricel Miguel, et. Al
SUBJECT MATTER: Who may file and when to file an
action for compulsory recognition
Facts
On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel Miguel and
Francisca Miguel came to the house of petitioners in
Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the
minor child and requested that they be allowed to bring the
child at the SM department store for recreation. The
respondents, however instead of returning the child to his
father brought the child to his mother’s custody. The
petitioner alleged that he exerted efforts in searching the
child but all his efforts were futile. Hence, he filed for
Habeas Corpus against herein Respondents.
Issue
Who should custody of the child?
Held
Petitioner contends that the mother of the child, Loreta is
not always in the country thus she cannot attend to the
needs of the child. The court however ruled that the child
being an illegitimate should be under the custody of the
mother. As the cited in David V. Court of appeals, the
recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could not
be a ground for ordering the latter for support to, but not
custody of, the child; it follows that only if she, the mother,
defaults can the father assume custody or authority over the
minor. Of course putative father may adopt his own
illegitimate child; in such a case, the child shall be
considered legitimate child of the adoptive parent.
Wherefore, the decision of the court of appeals is hereby
affirmed but modified. The mother can have custody of the
child until he reaches the age of 10.
Rosendo Herrera vs. Rosendo Alba
SUBJECT MATTER: Who may file and when to file an
action for compulsory recognition
Facts
On May 14, 1998, Rosendo Alba, then thirteen
years old, represented by his mother filed for compulsing
recognition, against support and damages against petitioner.
Petitioner, however, denied having physical contact with
respondent’s mother and that he denied having the child as
his. As remedy, respondent filed a motion to direct the
taking of DNA paternity test to abbreviate the proceedings
but the petitioner contracted the motion and alleged that is
violate of his right against self incrimination. The trial court
granted the petition but petitioner still contends that such
act is unconstitutional, hence, hence, he filed for motion for
reconsidered and a petition for centiorary.
Issue
May the court compel petitioner to undergo DNA
test; and whether or not such test could be used as proof of
filiations between the child and the alleged father.
Held
 The court ruled that DNA samples from an
accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a
paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this
action the
At it is invilation of his rights against self incrimination,
well not violate such right. This privilege only applies to
evidence that is “communicative” in essence taken under
dures. The Supreme Court ruled that the right against self-
incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communication from defendant
not an exclusion taken from his body. The policy of the
Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of
the paternity and filiation of children, especially of
illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the
protative father to claim his own defenses. Wherefore, the
court may order such test to be used in facilitating
judgment.
Marquino vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
SUBJECT MATTER: Who may file and when to file an
action for compulsory recognition
Facts
On January 10, 1971,Bibiana Romano-Pagadora brought a
civil action for the Judicial Declaration of Filiation,
Annulment of Partition, Support, and Damages against
Eutiquio Marquino. Also included, as defendants were
Maria Terenal-Marquino, Eutiquio’s wife, and their
children, Luz, Ana, and Eva. Romano-Pagadora was born
on December 2, 1926 by Gegoria Romano and allegedly by
Eutiquio, who was single then. The Marquinos personally
knew Romano-Pagadora for she was hired as a helper in
their household. She claims she has always enjoyed
continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged
natural child by direct acts of the Marquinos. The
Marquinos, on the other hand, denied the allegations.
During the pendency of the trial, Bibiana died on March 17,
1979. Six days later, her heirs were ordered to substitute for
her. On May 17, 1983, the Marquinos filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that an action for recognition is
intransmissible to the heirs, the same being a personal act.
The case was dismissed.
The heirs of the deceased interposed an appeal before the
Intermediate Appellate Court. On August 20, 1983
however, Eutiquio Marquino died. On June 17, 1895, the
appellate court decided in favor of the heirs of Romano-
Pagadora reversing the decision of the trial court.
Hence this petition.
Issues
a) Whether or not the death of the natural child
during the pendency of her action for
recognition is transmissible to the heirs?
b) Whether or not the death of the putative
parent also during the pendency of the case
is transmissible to the heirs?
Held
Art. 173 is the governing provision wherein the
child can bring the action during his or her entire lifetime
and even after the death of the parents. In other words, the
action does not prescribe as long as he lives. The article
cannot be given any retroactivity for it will prejudice vested
rights transmitted to them at the time of the death of their
father.
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
SUBJECT MATTER: Who may file and when to file an
action for compulsory recognition
Facts
On April 9, 1987, Emilei Dayrit Cuyugan, as other and
legal guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed a
complaint for “Claim of Inheritance” against Corito
Ocampo Tayag, the administatrix of the late Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo. Emilei D. Cuyugan, petitioner therein, alleged
that several years before Atty. Ocampo died, they had an
illicit relationship, which later brought about Chad on
October 5, 1980, therefore Chad is entitled to a share of the
estate of Atty. Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs.
Petitioner Tayag, respondent therein, filed a counterclaim
and a Motion to Dismiss. The motion was denied on
October 12, 1987. Likewise her Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied on November 19, 1987.
Tayag proceeded to the Court of Appeals on December 10,
1987 and filed a petition praying for certiorari and
prohibition, which was granted on August 2, 1989 and
enjoined the trial court judge to resolve petitioner’s motion
to dismiss. In compliance with the order, the trial court
acted on and denied motion to dismiss the complaint.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on
January 30, 1990.
As a consequence, petitioner filed another petition for
certiorari and prohibition on March 12, 1990 with the Court
of Appeals, praying to set aside the orders of the Regional
Trial Court. On May 10, 1990, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition and on September 5,1990, denied
motion for reconsideration
Hence this petition
Issue
Whether or not the right of a minor child to file
an action for recognition is a vested right?
Held
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code
finds no proper application to this case since it will
ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent
and, consequently, of the minor child she represents, both
of which has been vested with the filing of the complaint in
court. The trial court, therefore, was correct in applying
Article 285 of the Civil Code and holding that private
respondent’s cause of action has not yet prescribed.
People vs. Bayani
SUBJECT MATTER: Who may file and when to file an
action for compulsory recognition
Facts
Sgt. Moreno Bayani, a member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP), seeks the reversal of the 28 April 1995
decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City,
Branch 11, in Criminal Case No. 6433, finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with all the accessory penalties provided by law; to
indemnify complainant Maria Elena Nieto in the amount of
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
In her sworn complaint dated 22 February 1993 and filed
on 24 February 1993 with the court below, the complainant
charged the accused with the crime of rape allegedly
committed.
Issues
The accused seasonably appealed from the decision. In his
Appellant's Brief, he assigns the following errors to the trial
court:
The trial court erred in rendering a judgment in this case on
a sworn statement of the complainant charging the
appellant the crime of rape, for the reason that the signature
appearing thereon was not identified by complainant and
not presented as evidence in court by the prosecution.
Held
Article 176 of the Family Code confers parental authority
over illegitimate children on the mother, and likewise
provides for their entitlement to support in conformity with
the Family Code. As such, there is no further need for the
prohibition against acknowledgment of the offspring by an
offender who is married which would vest parental
authority in him. Therefore, under Article 345 of the
Revised Penal Code, the offender in a rape case who is
married can only be sentenced to indemnify the victim and
support the offspring, if there be any. In the instant case
then, the accused should also be ordered to support his
illegitimate offspring, Tracy Jhuen Nieto,72 with Marie
Elena Nieto, but in light of Article 20173 of the Family
Code, the amount and terms thereof to be determined by
the trial court only after due notice and hearing.
Republic vs. Abadilla
SUBJECT MATTER: Rights of illegitimate children
Facts
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino lived together
without the benefit of marriage. Their cohabitation
produced two bys, Emerson and Rafael. In their birth
certificates, they were registered under the surname
“Abadilla” and their father’s name entered as “Herson.”
Moreover, the date and place of marriage of their parents
Gerson and Luzviminda were registered as June 19, 1987,
Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
On February 5, 1997, Gerson and Luzviminda, together
with their children, filed an Amended Petition for
Correction/Cancellation of Entries before the Regional
Trial Court of Laoag City, Br. 65, seeking that, (1) the
place and date of marriage of Gerson and Luzviminda is
deleted and; (2) the father’s name be changed from
“Herson” to “Gerson.” Petition was given due course on
February 17, 1998 and ordered the requested corrections.
The Solicitor General interposed on the ground that the trial
court committed a reversible error when it granted the
petition but failed to order the change of the minors’
surnames from “Abadilla” to “Celestino.”
Hence this petition
Issue
Whether or not the minors are entitled to the
surname of the feather despite their illegitimacy.
Held
As illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael
should bear the surname of their mother, Luzviminda
Celestino as provided for in Article 176 Family Code.
Resultantly, with the correction of the entries in their birth
certificates, which deleted the entry in the date and place of
the marriage of the parents, the corresponding correction
with respect to their surnames should have also been made
and changed to Celestino, their mother’s surname.
Verceles v. Posadas
SUBJECT MATTER: Rights of Illegitimate Children
Facts:
Clarissa met Teofisto (mayor of Pandan) and the latter
offered job to the former. On November 10-15, they went
to a seminar together with other companion. Teofisto
fetched Clarissa in My Bro’s Hotel and went to Mayon
Hotel to have lunch. Clarissa was surprised when her
companions were not there. And at that moment, Teofisto
was making amorous advances on her and she run towards
the comfort room and closeted herself there. Clarissa being
afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident.
Clarissa went to Virac to follow-up the funds for barangay
funds. She met with Teofisto on a hotel to update the latter
with the matter. Teofisto led her to the upper floor of the
hotel and there she suddenly embraced her and said some
promises to Clarissa and eventually Clarissa succumbed.
From there, Clarissa became pregnant. Clarissa presented
three letters ( two of which are with the letterhead of Mayor
of Pandan), pictures. On March 1987, she received a letter
and php 2,000 from Teofisto. On June 1987, Teofisto went
to see her and gave her php 2,000 for her delivery. She
gave birth to Verna Aiza Posada on September 23, 1987.
Clarissa’s statement was corroborated by her mother.
Clarissa filed a complaint for damages and coupled with
support pendent lite which was granted by the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada
was proven
Held:
A perusal of the complaint before the RTC shows
that although its caption stats “Damages coupled with
support pendent lite”. Clarissa’s averments therein, her
meeting with the petitioner, his offer of a job, his amorous
advances, her seduction, their trysts, her pregnancy, birth of
her child, his letters, her demand for support for her child,
all clearly establish a case for recognition of paternity. We
have held that the due recognition of an illegitimate in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court record, or
in any authentic writing is in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgement of the child and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a
ground for recognition, it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval.
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia , Honorato B. Catindig, petitioner.
SUBJECT MATTER: Rights of illegitimate children
Facts
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig,
herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He
alleged therein among others, that Stephanie was born on
june 26, 1994, that her mother is Gemma Astorga Gar cia;
that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle
nameand surname, and that vhe is now a widower and
qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that
Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia her
mother’s surname and that her surname Garcia be changed
to Catindig, his Surname.
The trial court rendered the assailed decision granting the
adoption, however, the trial Court did not allow the use of
her mother’s surname as her middle name.
Thus, petitioner filed a motion for clarification
and reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be
allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia)
as her middle name.
Issue
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the
surname of her mother, as her middle name, when she
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Held
As correctly submitted by parties, there is no law
regulating the use of a middle name. Notably, the law is
likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.
The Court ruled that since no law granting an
illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, as in this
case, to use as middle name the mother’s surname, the
Court found no reason why Stephanie should not allowed
to use her mother’s surname Garcia as her middle name.
Wherefore, the petition was granted.
Joey Briones vs. Maricel Miguel, et. Al
SUBJECT MATTER: Rights of illegitimate children
Facts
On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel Miguel and
Francisca Miguel came to the house of petitioners in
Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the
minor child and requested that they be allowed to bring the
child at the SM department store for recreation. The
respondents, however instead of returning the child to his
father brought the child to his mother’s custody. The
petitioner alleged that he exerted efforts in searching the
child but all his efforts were futile. Hence, he filed for
Habeas Corpus against herein Respondents.
Issue
Who should custody of the child?
Held
Petitioner contends that the mother of the child, Loreta is
not always in the country thus she cannot attend to the
needs of the child. The court however ruled that the child
being an illegitimate should be under the custody of the
mother. As the cited in David V. Court of appeals, the
recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could not
be a ground for ordering the latter for support to, but not
custody of, the child; it follows that only if she, the mother,
defaults can the father assume custody or authority over the
minor. Of course putative father may adopt his own
illegitimate child; in such a case, the child shall be
considered legitimate child of the adoptive parent.
Wherefore, the decision of the court of appeals is hereby
affirmed but modified. The mother can have custody of the
child until he reaches the age of 10.
People of the Philippines v. Glabo
SUBJECT MATTER: Rights of illegitimate children
Facts:
Mila (mental retarded) and Judith were summoned by the
appellant to wash clothes of his wife. After which, Judith
was commanded to wash dishes in the nearby creek. When
Judith was already washing dishes and Mila was hanging
clothes, Mila was suddenly pulled by the appellant and
raped her to satisfy his lust.
It rained so hard, so Judith went back to the house. While
underneath the house, she saw Glabo on the top of Mila and
saw how Mila was raped. The two girls went to their house
silently. Mila kept the incident. Until, Mila became
pregnant as a result of the rape. Right there, Mila confessed
that she was raped by Glabo and they filed complaint for
rape against the accused. The Regional Trial Court
rendered a decision convicting Glabo for the crime of rape
and sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua, with accessory
penalties of civil interdiction for life and perpetual absolute
disqualification, to moral damages of php 50,000, to give
support to the child who is a result of the rape and to pay
the costs.
Issue:
Whether or not the penalties imposed against the
accused is proper.
Held:
Concerning the acknowledgement and support of the
offspring of rape, Article 345 of the RPC provides for three
kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the offender:
1. Indemnification, 2. Acknowledgement of the offspring,
unless the law should prevent him so doing and 3. In every
case, to support the offspring. With the passage of the
Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural
children and natural children by legal fiction was
eliminated and now they fall under the specie of
illegitimate children. Since parental authority is vested by
Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and
considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion
perpetua automatically loses the parental authority over his
child.
Tonog v. Court of Appeals
SUBJECT MATTER: Rights of illegitimate children
Facts: on September 23 1989, petitioners give birth to a
child, her illegitimate daughter with the respondent. A year
after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner, left for the United
States where she found work as a nurse. The child was left
in the care of his father and paternal grandparents.
On January 1990, respondent filed a petition for
guardianship, on which a month later, he was appointed as
the legal guardian. Petitioner avers that she only learned of
the decision a month later, and accordingly filed for relief
of judgment, on which she was then granted to file her
opposition to private respondent petitions, as well as a
motion to remand the custody of the child to her.
The Court of Appeals decided over the issue of
guardianship and custody over the child that such custody
shall then be awarded to the respondent temporarily
pending the resolution of the main case.
Issue: Who shall meantime hold custody over the child
pending the resolution of the guardianship proceeding, on
who shall have the final custody over the child.
Held: In custody disputes, it is the axiomatic that the
criteria are the welfare and well being of the child.
Incurring at its decisions, the court must take into the
account the respective resources and the social and moral
situations of the contending party.
Bearing in mind the welfare of the minor is the controlling
factor; the court finds that the Court of Appeals did not err
in the allowing the father to retain in the meantime parental
custody over the child.
Republic vs. Abadilla
SUBJECT MATTER: Rights of illegitimate children
Facts
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino lived together
without the benefit of marriage. Their cohabitation
produced two bys, Emerson and Rafael. In their birth
certificates, they were registered under the surname
“Abadilla” and their father’s name entered as “Herson.”
Moreover, the date and place of marriage of their parents
Gerson and Luzviminda were registered as June 19, 1987,
Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
On February 5, 1997, Gerson and Luzviminda, together
with their children, filed an Amended Petition for
Correction/Cancellation of Entries before the Regional
Trial Court of Laoag City, Br. 65, seeking that, (1) the
place and date of marriage of Gerson and Luzviminda is
deleted and; (2) the father’s name be changed from
“Herson” to “Gerson.” Petition was given due course on
February 17, 1998 and ordered the requested corrections.
The Solicitor General interposed on the ground that the trial
court committed a reversible error when it granted the
petition but failed to order the change of the minors’
surnames from “Abadilla” to “Celestino.”
Hence this petition
Issue
Whether or not the minors are entitled to the
surname of the feather despite their illegitimacy.
Held
As illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael
should bear the surname of their mother, Luzviminda
Celestino as provided for in Article 176 Family Code.
Resultantly, with the correction of the entries in their birth
certificates, which deleted the entry in the date and place of
the marriage of the parents, the corresponding correction
with respect to their surnames should have also been made
and changed to Celestino, their mother’s surname.
Mossesgeld v. Court of appeals
SUBJECT MATTER: Rights of illegitimate children
Facts:
Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld gave birth to a baby boy. The
presumed father is Eleazar Siriban Calasan and signed the
certificate of the child as the informant, indicating therein
the child’s first name as Jonathan, middle name as
Mossesgeld and last name as Calasan. Calasan executed an
affidavit admitting the paternity of the child.
Due to the refusal of the person in
charge at the hospital in placing the presumed father’s
surname as the child’s surname in the certificate of live
birth, petitioner himself submitted the certificate to the
office of the local civil registrar of mandaluyong for
registration. And the same was rejected pursuant to Article
176 of the Family Code that illegitimate shall use the
surname of their mother.
Issue:
Whether or not the child can use the presumed
father’s surname.
Held:
Artcle 176 of the Family Code provides that
illegitimate children must use the surname and shall be
under the custody of the mother and shall be entitled to
support in conformity to this code. This is the rule
regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity.
Consequently, the LCR correctly refused to register the
certificate of live birth of the petitioner’s illegitimate child
using the surname of the alleged father, even with the
latter’s consent.
Silva vs. Court of Appeal
SUBJECT MATTER: Rights of illegitimate children
Facts
Carlito E. Silva, a married businessman, and
Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local actress, cohabited
without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of
two children: Ramon carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very
long after, a rift ion their relationship surfaced. It began,
according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her
acting career over his viogorous objections. The assertion
was quickly refuted by Gonzaleswho claimed that she, in
fact, had never stopped working throughout their
relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in
February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to allow Silva, in
apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have
the children in his company on weekends. Silva filed a
petition for custodial rights over the children before the
Regional Trial Court (“RTC”), Branch 78, of Quezon City.
The petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that
Silva often engaged in “gambling and womanizing” which
she feared could affect the moral and social values of the
children.
Take out the children without the written consent
of the mother or respondent herein. No pronouncement as
to costs.
Silva appeared somehow satisfied with the
judgment for only Gonzales interposed an appeal from the
RTC’s order to the Court of Appeals.
For the meantime, Gonzales got married to a
Dutch national. The newlyweds emigrated to Holland with
Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.
The allegations of respondent against the
character of petitioner, even assuming as true, cannot be
taken as sufficient basis to render petitioner an unfit father.
The fears expressed by repondent to the effect that
petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their children
once allowed to even temporarily associate with petitioner
is but the product of respondent’s unfounded imagination,
for no man, bereft of all moral persuasions and goodness,
would ever take the trouble and expense in instituting a
legal action for the purpose of seeing his illegitimate
children. It can just be imagined the deep sorrows of a
father who is deprived of his children of tender ages.
Issue
The issue before us is not really a question of
child custody; instead, the case “merely concerns the
visitation right of a parent over his hildren which the trial
court has adjudged in favor of petitioner by holding that he
shall have “visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays
and/or Sundays, but in no case (could) he take out the
children without the written consent of the mother”. The
visitation right referred to is the right of access of a
noncustodial parent to his or her child or children.

Held
The court appreciates the apprehensions of
private respondent and their well-meant concern for the
children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner
would have ulterior motives or undue designs more than a
parent’s natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were
only on brief visits, his own children. The trial court,in any
case, has seen it fit to understandably provide this
precautionary measure, i.e., “in no case (can petitioner)
take out the children without the written consent of the
mother.
David vs. Court of Appeals
SUBJECT MATTER: Rights of illegitimate children
Facts
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of
private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in
Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the
father of four children, all grown-up. After a while, the
relationship between petitioner and private respondent
developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son,
Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both
girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy
Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private
respondent’s wife when Daisie took Christopher J. to
Villar’s house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in
1986 and introduced him to Villar’s legal wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely
brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually
accepted by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to
allow Christopher J. then six years of age, to go with his
family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar
refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled
Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next
school year.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child
since at the time of his conception, his father, private
respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another
woman other than the child’s mother. As such, pursuant to
Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the
parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who,
as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have
custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been
deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private
respondent; she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Issue
Whether or not the private respondent has the
right of the custody of the child knowing that the child is
below seven years of age and an illegitimate.
Held
Habeas Corpus; Parent and child; custody; while
it is true that the determination of the right to the custody of
whom children is relevant in cases the parents, who are
married to each other are for some reason separated from
each other, it does not follow that it cannot arise in any
other situation
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed
out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at
least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot
be taken from the mother’s custody. Even now that the
child is over seven years of age, the mother’s custody over
him will have to be upheld because the child categorically
expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art.
213 of the family code, courts must respect the “choice of
the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen
is unfit” and here it has not been shown that the mother is
in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if
private respondent loves his child, he should not condition
the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to
him (private respondent)
WHEREFORE, private respondent is ORDERED
to deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody
of his mother, the herein petitioner, and to give him
temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00 pending the
fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate action.
LEGITIMATED CHILDREN
De Santos vs. Angeles
SUBJECT MATTER: Rights of illegitimate children
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia
Bona with which they were blessed with a daughter, herein
petitioner, Maria Rosario de Santos. Thereafter, the
relationship of the spouses became stained to the breaking
point. Dr. de Santos fell in love with a fellow doctor,
Conchita Talag. Antonio sought the dissolution of his
previous marriage by obtaining a decree of divorce in
Nevada. Antonio and Conchita then proceeded to Tokyo in
1951 to wed. This union produced eleven children.
On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a
month later, on April 23, Antonio and Conchita contracted
a marriage in Tagaytay celebrated under Philippine laws.
On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate.
On May 15, 1981, Conchita, herein private respondent,
went to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Br.121,
asking for the issuance of letters of administration in her
favor over the settlement of her late husband’s estate.
Petition was granted.
After six years of intestate proceedings, herein petitioner
decided to intervene. Thus, in her motion of November
1987, she argued that private respondent’s children were
illegitimate on November 14, 1991, after approval of
private respondent’s accent of her administration, the court
denied petitioner’s motion. A motion for reconsideration
was also denied on January 9, 1992.
Hence this petition
ISSUE
Whether or not the children of private
respondents are natural children by legal fiction?
HELD
While a legitimated child may enjoy the same
successional rights granted to legitimate children, a natural
child by legal fiction cannot rise beyond that to which an
acknowledged natural child is entitled, insofar as hereditary
rights are concerned. It is thus incongruous to conclude, as
private respondent maintains, that petitioner’s half siblings
can rise to her level by the fact of being legitimized for two
reasons: First, they failed to meet the requisite of
legitimation that they be natural children within the
meaning of Article 269; second, natural children by legal
fiction cannot be demand that they be legitimized simply
because it is one of those rights enjoyed by acknowledged
natural children.
Abadilla vs. Tabiliran
SUBJECT MATTER: Rights of illegitimate children
Facts
The herein administrative case arose from a
complaint, dated September 8, 1992, filed by Ma. Blyth B.
Abadilla, a Clerk of Court assigned at the sala of
respondent, Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. Respondent stands
charged with "gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and
corruption unbecoming of a judge.
In her verified complaint, complainant Abadilla,
in respect to the charge of gross immorality on the part of
the respondent, contends that respondent had scandalously
and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan
during the existence of his legitimate marriage with
Teresita Banzuela. Adding ignominy to an ignominious
situation, respondent allegedly shamefacedly contracted
marriage with the said Priscilla Baybayan on May 23,
1986. Complainant claims that this was a bigamous union
because of the fact that the respondent was then still very
much married to Teresita Banzuela. Furthermore,
respondent falsely represented himself as single" in the
marriage contract and dispensed with the requirements of a
marriage contract by invoking cohabitation with Baybayan
for five years. In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct,
complainant claims that respondent caused to be registered
as "legitimate," his three illegitimate children with Priscilla
Baybayan , respondent knew that these children cannot be
legally registered as legitimate. Complainant manifests that
the commission by the respondent of the foregoing acts
renders him unfit to occupy the exalted position of a
dispenser of justice.
Issue
Whether or not the children are legitimated?
Held
The Civil Code on ratification on contracts in
general is allowed to be applied, it being ratification of
marital cohabitation. Article 76 of Civil Code, now Art 34
of the Family Code was intended to facilitate and
encourage the marriage of persons who have been living in
a state of concubinage for more than five years. However,
it also requires that parties in the cohabitation do not suffer
from any impediment. In the case at bar, Judge Tabiliran
was still validly married when he cohabited. For purposes
of remarriage, he has to wait for seven years from 1966, at
the time of claimed abandonment but in 1970, he already
had a child with Priscilla. Thereby, the ratification of their
cohabitation was not valid.
It is important to note that these children were
born prior to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla. As a
lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite
his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three children
cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered
legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an
existing valid marriage between respondent and his first
wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran.
Only natural children can be legitimated.
Children born outside of wedlock of parents, who, at the
time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified
by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
Legitimation is limited to natural children and
cannot include those born of adulterous relations. The
Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which took effect
on August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-mentioned
provision thus the Civil Code provides under Art. 17 7,
“[o]nly children conceived and born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former,
were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other may be legitimated.”
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia , Honorato B. Catindig, petitioner.
SUBJECT MATTER: Adopten children
Facts
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig,
herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He
alleged therein among others, that Stephanie was born on
june 26, 1994, that her mother is Gemma Astorga Gar cia;
that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle
nameand surname, and that vhe is now a widower and
qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that
Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia her
mother’s surname and that her surname Garcia be changed
to Catindig, his Surname.
The trial court rendered the assailed decision granting the
adoption, however, the trial Court did not allow the use of
her mother’s surname as her middle name.
Thus, petitioner filed a motion for clarification
and reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be
allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia)
as her middle name.
Issue
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the
surname of her mother, as her middle name, when she
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Held
As correctly submitted by parties, there is no law
regulating the use of a middle name. Notably, the law is
likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.
The Court ruled that since no law granting an
illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, as in this
case, to use as middle name the mother’s surname, the
Court found no reason why Stephanie should not allowed
to use her mother’s surname Garcia as her middle name.
Wherefore, the petition was granted.
DSWD v. Belen
SUBJECT MATTER: Adopten children
FACTS
Respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare
Officer II, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan is charged with
disregarding the provisions of the same Circular No. 12 of
this Court in connection with the aforementioned special
proceeding.
As appears from the records, the spouses Desiderio Soriano
and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are
naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for
adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. In
due time, respondent Judge Belen granted the petition in a
decision dated June 25, 1992, after finding that petitioner
spouses were highly qualified to adopt the child as their
own.
Among other evidence adduced before him, respondent
judge based his decree primarily on the “findings and
recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on
the one hand and the adoptee on the other hand have
already developed love and emotional attachment and
parenting rules have been demonstrated to the minor.
However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to
obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD in
order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the
department uncovered what it considered as an anomalous
adoption decree regarding said minor. It turned out that the
DSWD did not have any record in its files regarding the
adoption and that there was never any order from
respondent judge for the DSWD to conduct a “Home and
Child Study Report” in the case. Furthermore, there was no
directive from respondent judge for the social welfare
officer of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on
the matter of the required reports for said minor’s adoption.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondents committed an error
concerning the adoption in question.
HELD
The error on the part of both respondent judge
and social worker is thus all too evident. Pursuant to
Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent judge
should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset
about the commencement of Special Proceeding No. 5830
so that the corresponding case study could have been
accordingly conducted by said department which
undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that
possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the
proper recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge
should never have merely presumed that it was routinary
for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD
regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to
exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination was
observed in the adoption proceedings, together with all the
other requirements of the law.
Teotico vs. Del Val
SUBJECT MATTER: Adopten children
FACTS
On July 14, 1955, Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. De
Aguirre died leaving properties worth P600, 000.00. She
left a will written in Spanish whish had her signature signed
in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar G. Sanchez, and
Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures.
Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton acknowledged the said
will.
Among the many legacies and devices made in the will was
one made of P20, 000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the
testatrix’s niece Josefina Mortera. The testatrix also
instituted Josefina as her sole and universal heir to all the
remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the
will.
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the
probate of the will before the Court of First Instance of
Manila, which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955. A
day before the said hearing however, Ana Del Val Chan,
herein oppositor-appellant, claiming to be an adopted child
of Francisca Mortera, sister of the testatrix, as well as an
acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, deceased
brother of the testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate of
the will.
Vicente B. Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the opposition
saying that oppositor has no legal personality. Oppositor
was not allowed to intervene. Oppositor however added an
allegation saying that the will is inoperative with respect to
the share of Rene A. Teotico.
On November 10, 1960, the probate court
admitted the will to probate but declaring the portion made
in favor of Rene A. Teotico void and should be passed to
the testatrix’s heirs be way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico fled a motion for
reconsideration. Also, oppositor filed her motion for
reconsideration on the portion of the judgment that decreed
the probate of the will. Both motions were denied.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not oppositor has the right to
intervene in the proceedings?
HELD
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person
may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding, he
must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the
property to be affected by it either as an executor or as a
claimant in the estate. Under the terms of the will,
oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no
interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or
administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property
affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any
provision designating her heir, legatee or devisee of any
portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will
either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any
claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a
co-owner thereof.
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN, petitioner, versus,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
SUBJECT MATTER: Adopten children
Facts
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin,
a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino
parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for
the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born
on August 31, 1986; Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on
September 7, 1987; and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was
born on August 5, 1989. The minors are the natural
children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother, and
Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when
Manuel died on May 19, 1990, the children were left to
their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their
biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there
and now has two children by her second marriage and no
longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos
nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the
institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially
supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives
abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000,
petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have
given their written consent to the adoption; she is qualified
to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old
widow, has children of her own who are already married,
gainfully employed and have their respective families; she
lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she
acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She
came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors;
her children gave their written consent to the adoption of
the minors. Petitioner’s brother, Mariano Ramos, who
earns substantial income, signified his willingness and
commitment to support the minors while in petitioner’s
custody.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner
Held
The general requirement of consent and notice to
the natural parents is intended to protect the natural
parental relationship from unwarranted interference by
interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the
best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed
adoption.
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is
indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption.
Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires
that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights
and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Herbert Cang vs.Court of Appeals
SUBJECT MATTER: Adopten children
Facts
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who
were married on January 27, 1973, begot three children,
namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on
January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3,
1981.Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of
her husband's alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco,
a family friend of the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna
Marie filed a petition for legal separation with alimony
pendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Cebu which rendered a decision approving the
joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they
agreed to "live separately and apart or from bed and board."
That the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into any contract
or agreement with any person or persons, natural or
juridical without the written consent of the husband; or any
undertaking or acts that ordinarily requires husband's
consent as the parties are by this agreement legally
separated;
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a
divorce from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial
District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the
divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three
minor children to Anna Marie, reserving "rights of
visitation at all reasonable times and places" to petitioner.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents
Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano,
respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie,
filed Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the adoption
of the three minor Cang children before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14-
year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna
Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that
her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to support"
his children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald
V. Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the
children; that because she would be going to the United
States to attend to a family business, "leaving the children
would be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-
seeking venture abroad;" and that her husband had "long
forfeited his parental rights" over the children for the
following reasons:The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707
allowed her to enter into any contract without the written
consent of her husband;
Issue
Whether or not minor children be legally adopted without
the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that
the latter has abandoned them.
Held
Petitioner may not be deemed as having been completely
deprived of parental authority, notwithstanding the award
of custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation case. To
reiterate, that award was arrived at by the lower court on
the basis of the agreement of the spouses.
While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may
be subject to a compromise, there was no factual finding in
the legal separation case that petitioner was such an
irresponsible person that he should be deprived of custody
of his children or that there are grounds under the law that
could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal
separation case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer of
custody over the children from Anna Marie back to
petitioner. The order was not implemented because of Anna
Marie's motion for reconsideration thereon. The Clavano
family also vehemently objected to the transfer of custody
to the petitioner, such that the latter was forced to file a
contempt charge against them.

The law is clear that either parent may lose parental
authority over the child only for a valid reason. No such
reason was established in the legal separation case. In the
instant case for adoption, the issue is whether or not
petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant
dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation
of parental authority is one of the effects of a decree of
adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in
this case precisely because, as this Court has demonstrated
earlier, the finding of the courts below on the issue of
petitioner's abandonment of his family was based on a
misappreciation that was tantamount to non-appreciation,
of facts on record.
Republic vs. Hughes
FACTS
James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of
United States married Lenita Mabunay, a Filipino citizen,
who was later naturalized as a citizen of that country. On
June 29, 1990 the spouses jointly filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Angeles City to adopt Ma. Cecilia.
Neil and Mario, all surnamed Mabunay, minor niece and
nephews who had been living with the couple even prior to
the filing of the petition. The minors, as well as their
parents, gave consent to the adoption.
The petition was granted in the Regional Trial
Court and was affirmed in the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether or not spouses Hughes could legally
adopt under Philippine Law.
HELD
Art 184 of the Family Code provides that aliens
are not qualified to adopt except (a) a former Filipino
citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity, (b)
one who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her
Filipino spouse, and (c) one who is married to a Filipino
citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity of the latter.
It is clear that James is not qualified to adopt
while Lenita seems to appear to be qualified, unfortunately,
Art 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife,
a condition which must be read along with Art 184.
The court is not unmindful of the possible
benefits that an adoption can bring for the adopting parents
and adopted children. It also realize that in proceedings of
this nature, paramount consideration is given to the
physical, moral, social and intellectual welfare of the
adopted for whom the law on adoption has in the first place
been designed. When, however, the law is clear and .no
other choice is given, the court must obey its full mandate.
The decision is reversed and set aside.
TOLEDANO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch
69, Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE
and EVELYN A. CLOUSE, respondents.
FACTS
On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, private
respondents spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor,
Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private
respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. In an Order issued on March
12, 1990, the petition was set for hearing on April 18, 1990.
The said Order was published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province of Zambales and City of
Olongapo for three (3) consecutive weeks.
The principal evidence discloses that private
respondent Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the
United States of America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino on
June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988,
Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States of
America in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally,
and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12)
year old minor.
Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989
up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been
under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon
gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala,
a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty
and inability to support and educate her son.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker
assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study, favorably
recommended the granting of the petition for adoption.
The trial court granted the petition for adoption filed by
Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse and
decreed that the said minor be considered as their child by
adoption.
The Solicitor General, however, interposed
contending that Spouses Clouse are not qualified to adopt
minor Solomon under the law.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Spouses Clouse are qualified
to adopt under the law.
HELD
No. There can be no question that private
respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt
Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases.
In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a
natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the
second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative
by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In
the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse
jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on
February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse
was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino
citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the
United States in 1988. Under Articles 184 and 185 of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The
Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents
spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon
Joseph Alcala.
Thus, the petition was granted.
G.R. No. 117209 February 9, 1996
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 158,
Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y
NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE,
respondents.
FACTS
Private respondents, spouses Munson on March
10, 1994, filed a petition to adopt the minor Earl
Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional
facts required by rule of the Rules of Court for adoption of
the minor. In the very same petition, private respondents
prayed for the change of the first name of said minor to
Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he has
been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends
since May 1993 when he arrived at the private respondents
residence.

On April 18, 1994 hearing, petitioner,
represented by the Solicitor General, opposed the inclusion
of the relief for change of name in the same petition for
adoption, citing it would be a violation of the Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court . In its formal opposition, dated May 3,
1995, petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of the
petition for adoption, and the petitions for change of name
in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be
conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings. After
considering the evidence and arguments of the contending
parties, the trial court ruled in favor of the respondent.
ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court erred in granting
the change in name of minor as embodied in the petition for
adoption of the said minor.
HELD
Yes. Changing the given or proper name of a
person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial
change in one’s official or legal name and cannot be
authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the
statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply
to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in
keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which the
application is made should normally make its decree
recording such change.
The official name of a person whose birth is
registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein,
If a change in one’s name is desired, this can only be done
by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and
procedural requirements for a special proceeding for
change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor
can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name
shall be filed in the regional trial court of the province
where the person desiring to change his name resides. A
petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem,
strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is
indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for
its adjudication. The Solicitor General correctly points out
the glaring defects of the subject petition insofar as it seeks
the change of name of the adoptee, all of which taken
together cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no
petition sufficient in form and substance for change of
name as would rightfully deserve an order therefor. It
would be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for
adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the
corresponding petition for the latter relief at law.
Thus, the Court granted the petition of the
Republic and modified the order of the trial court; the name
of the adopted child shall remain as Kevin Earl Munson y
Andrade until a proper proceeding for the change of name
shall have been effected.
G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JAIME B. CARANTO,
and ZENAIDA P. CARANTO, respondents.
FACTS
The petition at bar was filed on September 21
1988 by private respondents spouses Jaime B. Caranto and
Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon,
then fifteen years old, who had been living with private
respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition
insofar as it sought the correction of the name of the child
from "Midael" to "Michael." Thereafter the case was heard
during which private respondent Zenaida Caranto,
Florentina Mazon (natural mother of the child), and the
minor testified. The RTC dismissed the opposition of the
Solicitor General on the ground that Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) applies only to the correction of entries
concerning the civil status of persons.
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of
Appeals reiterating his contention that the correction of
names cannot be effected in the same proceeding for
adoption. On January 23, 1992, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Private
respondents were required to comment.
ISSUE
Whether or not a change of name of an adoptee
could be effected simultaneously with the adoption
proceeding.
HELD
Petitioner's contention is that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption
because the notice by publication did not state the true
name of the minor child. Petitioner invokes the ruling in
Cruz v. Republic. There the petition for adoption and the
notice published in the newspaper gave the baptismal name
of the child ("Rosanna E. Cruz") instead of her name in the
record of birth ("Rosanna E. Bucoy"). The present case is
different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name
of the child sought to be adopted. That purpose has been
served by publication of notice in this case.
The Court held, however, that both the Court of
Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private
respondents' prayer for the correction of the name of the
child in the civil registry.
Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108
of the Rules of Court applies to this case and because its
provision was not complied with, the decision of the trial
court, insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the
minor, is void and without force or effect.
The trial court was clearly in error in holding
Rule 108 to be applicable only to the correction of errors
concerning the civil status of persons.
This case falls under letter "(o)," referring to
"changes of name.", Article 412 of the Civil Code to
implement which Rule 108 was inserted in the Rules of
Court in 1964 covers "those harmless and innocuous
changes, such as correction of a name that is clearly
misspelled." In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, it was held that
"the change of petitioner's name from Beatriz
Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo is a mere
innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding is
appropriate."
While there was notice given by publication in
this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption made in
compliance with Rule 99, 4. In that, notice only the prayer
for adoption of the minor was stated. The necessary
consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as
an indispensable party and to give notice by publication of
the petition for correction of entry was to render the
proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction of
entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction
both as to party and as to the subject matter.
Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals was
modified that the decision of the Regional Trial Court to
order to the local civil registrar to change the name
"MIDAEL" to "MICHAEL" in the birth certificate of the
child, was deleted. In other respects relating to the adoption
of Midael C. Mazon, the decision appealed from was
affirmed.
March 20, 1997
REPUBLIC vs. VERGARA
FACTS
Respondent spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and
Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin
R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively, younger
siblings of Rosalina on June 25, 1990. Samuel R. Dye, Jr. a
member of the United States Air Force is an American
citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His
wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a
naturalized American. They have two children. Maricel and
Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their
consent to the adopion.
On September 10, 1990, after trial, the lower court rendered
its decision on granting the petition and declaring Alvin
and Maricel to be the children of the spouses Dye by
adoption. Respondent Regional Trial Court disregarded the
(16) year age gap requirement of the law, the spouses being
only (15) years and three months and fifteen years and nine
months older than Maricel Due, on the ground that a literal
implementation of the law would defeat the very
philosophy behind adoption statutes, namely, to promote
the welfare of a child. The court also found that the
petitioning spouses are mentally and physically fit to adopt,
possess good moral character, sufficient financial
capability, love, and affection for the intended adoptees.
ISSUE
Whether or not spouses Dye are qualified to
adopt under the law.
HELD
No. Samuel Dye is an American and therefore, an
alien, is disqualified from adopting the minor Maricel and
Alvin Due. Because he does not fall under any of the three
aforeqouted exception laid down by the law. Also, the law
does not provide for an alien who is married to a former
Filipino citizen to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a
relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the general
rule that aliens may not adopt.
The Supreme Court is not in the position to
affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption in the
case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified
without violating the proscription against judicial
legislation. It cannot sustain the respondent spouses’
petition for adoption.
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN
SIBULO (previously referred to as “DR. MELVIN S.
LAHOM”), respondent.
FACTS
In 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for
adoption of herein respondent. In keeping with the court
order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name
“Jose Melvin Sibulo” to “Jose Melvin Lahom.”
Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga
City. In her petition, she averred that the herein
respondent had continued to used his surname, Sibulo, to
the utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and
his records with the Professional Regulation Commission
showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally
issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and
activities in connection with his practice of his profession,
he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
Petitioner alleged further that respondent had
been jealous of her nephews and nieces whenever they
would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they
were only motivated by their desire for some material
benefits from petitioner.
Furthermore, in view of respondent’s insensible
attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable
relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has
suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after all
respondent’s only motive to his adoption is his expectancy
of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner
and her late husband.
However RA 8552, a new statute, deleted from
the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of
adoption. Nonetheless, the trial court respected petitioner’s
right to rescind the decree of adoption under the Family
Code but likewise denied her petition citing grounds of
prescription.
ISSUE
Whether or not the subject adoption, decreed on
05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter
after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552.
HELD
No. The Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 on
adoption later modified by the Child and Youth Welfare
Code and then by the Family Code of the Philippines, gave
immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the
adopted. In 1989, the United Nations initiated the
Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a
State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that
adoption was impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to
favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights
and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it
affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only
in his new family but also in the society as well. The new
law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption
decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever
the legal ties created by adoption.
The concept of “vested right” is a consequence of the
constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a
present fixed interest which in right reason and natural
justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes
not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a
demand but also exemptions from new obligations created
after the right has become vested. Rights are considered
vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,
absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and
irrefutable.
R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from
an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption
decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn
out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden
duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would
be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have
to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an
adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture
of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving
child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law,
an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and,
by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from
having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
Thus, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court that herein respondent is still the legal child of
petitione