MID-TERM EXAM:

PHILOSOPHY

SUBMITTED BY:

MUHAMMAD SHOAIB TARIQ

REG: 2193343
SEC: (M2)
BBA(Hons)

SUBMITTED TO:

MISS IRAM SABA

QUESTION NO 1:

According to “Hume” that Empiricism is not an adequate

account of human knowledge because it leads us into
skepticism about many fundamental ideas such as the Self,
Causation and God. Give two rational arguments in
support of your Answer.
ANSWER:
Hume was an Empiricist, which means he accepted "circumstances and end results
are discoverable not by reason, but rather by experience". Hume's detachment
between Matters of Fact and Relations of Ideas is regularly alluded to as "Hume's
fork." Critics frequently contend that observation can't represent clear instances of
information thus suggests doubt. Customarily, information has been taken to infer
that we can't be mixed up as in our proof must be more grounded than even the
most elevated likelihood, so that 'plausible information' is conflicting.
Hume said information on what's to come is surmised from propensity and custom
from an earlier time. We depend on past experience to deduce things that go past
our present sense insight. Since Hume proclaims endless ideas void, apparently
Empiricism isn't a satisfactory record of human information since it drives us into
incredulity about numerous
key thoughts, for example, the Self, Causation and God. Anyway this isn't really
an issue for Hume since he said that real information must be followed back to
detect information and on the off chance that can't get an immediate follow back to
an impression, at that point this idea is a classification blunder.
Hume holds an empiricist form of the hypothesis, since he feels that all that we
accept is eventually recognizable to encounter. He starts with a record of
observations, since he accepts that any comprehensible philosophical inquiry must
be posed and replied in those terms.

QUESTION NO 2:
Can philosophy develop by itself, without the support of
science? Can science "work" without philosophy? Has
science reached such a level of theoretical thought that it no
longer needs philosophy? Or is the connection between
philosophy and science so mutual that it is characterized by
their ever-deepening interaction. What is your opinion in
context of philosophy and science?
ANSWER:
A few people imagine that the sciences can stand separated from reasoning, that
the researcher ought to really abstain from philosophizing, the last regularly being
perceived as baseless and for the most part ambiguous hypothesizing.
On the off chance that the term reasoning is given such a helpless translation,
at that point obviously anybody would concur with the notice "Material
science, be careful with power!" But no such admonition applies to theory in
the
higher feeling of the term. The particular sciences can't and ought not break their
associations with genuine way of thinking.

Science and theory have consistently gained from one another. Theory resolutely
draws from logical disclosures new quality, material for expansive speculations,
while to the sciences it bestows the world-see and methodological driving forces
of its general standards. The most recent speculations of the solidarity of issue,
movement, existence, the solidarity of the spasmodic and ceaseless, the standards
of the preservation of issue and movement, the thoughts of the limitlessness and
boundlessness of issue were expressed in an overall structure in reasoning. Other
than affecting the advancement of the specific fields of information, reasoning
itself has been significantly improved by progress in the solid sciences. Each
major logical disclosure is simultaneously a stage forward in the improvement of
the philosophical world- view and approach. Philosophical proclamations depend
on sets of realities concentrated by technical studies and furthermore on the
arrangement of suggestions, standards, ideas and laws found through the
speculation of these realities. The accomplishments of the particular sciences are
summarized in philosophical proclamations.
A few people feel that science has arrived at such a degree of hypothetical idea that
it at this point don't needs reasoning. In any case, any researcher, especially the
theoretician, knows in his heart that his imaginative action is firmly connected
with theory and that without genuine information on philosophical culture the
aftereffects of that movement can't turn out to be hypothetically compelling. All
the remarkable theoreticians have themselves been guided by philosophical idea
and attempted to motivate their students with its valuable impact to make them
authorities able to do exhaustively and basically examining all the standards and
frameworks known to science, finding their interior logical inconsistencies and
defeating them by methods for new ideas. Genuine researchers, and by this we
typically mean researchers with an amazing hypothetical handle, have never
betrayed way of thinking. Really logical idea is deeply philosophical, similarly as
genuinely philosophical idea is significantly logical, established in the whole of
logical accomplishments Philosophical preparing gives the researcher a broadness
and infiltration, a more extensive degree in presenting and settling issues. In some
cases these characteristics are splendidly communicated, as in crafted by Marx,
especially in his Capital, or in Einstein's wide-going normal logical originations.

The shared belief of a generous piece of the substance of science, its realities
and laws has consistently related it to
reasoning, especially in the field of the hypothesis of knowledge, and today this
shared view joins it with the issues of the good and social parts of logical
disclosures and specialized developments. This is justifiable enough. Today too
many talented personalities are arranged on damaging objectives.
In antiquated occasions, as we have seen, essentially every prominent researcher
was simultaneously a logician and each scholar were somewhat a researcher. The
association among science and reasoning has suffered for a huge number of years
Theory might be known as the "study of sciences" presumably as in it is, basically,
the mindfulness of technical disciplines and the source from which all the sciences
draw their reality see and methodological standards, which throughout hundreds of
years have been sharpened down into compact structures. All in all, reasoning and
the sciences are equivalent accomplices helping imaginative idea in its
investigations to accomplish summing up truth. Theory doesn't supplant the
particular sciences and doesn't order them; however it arms them with general
standards of hypothetical deduction, with a strategy for insight and world-see. In
this sense logical way of thinking truly holds one of the critical situations in the
arrangement of technical disciplines.
There are questions that would science be able to work without theory or not?
Science can't manage without theory on the grounds that there are philosophical
positions understood in the presuppositions and objectives of any logical
worldview and in how hypotheses are associated with the real world: and it is the
assignment of reasoning of science to basically draw in with those presuppositions.

Presently we turn towards the association of theory and science.

The association among science and reasoning has suffered for a huge number of
years. In present-day conditions it has not exclusively been protected but at the
same time is developing generously further. The size of the logical work and the
social importance of exploration have obtained colossal extents.

At one time it was usually held that way of thinking was the study of sciences,
their incomparable ruler. Today material science is viewed as the sovereign of
sciences. The two perspectives contain a specific proportion of truth. Material
science with its custom, the particular objects of study and huge scope of
accurate strategies for perception and examination applies an incredibly
productive impact on all or practically all circles of information. Theory might be
known
as the "study of sciences" presumably as in it is, essentially, the mindfulness of
technical disciplines and the source from which all the sciences draw their
reality see and methodological standards, which throughout hundreds of years
have been sharpened down into succinct structures.
Overall, theory and the sciences are equivalent accomplices helping innovative idea
in its investigations to accomplish summing up truth. Theory doesn't supplant the
particular sciences and doesn't order them; however, it arms them with general
standards of hypothetical intuition, with a strategy for comprehension and world-
see. In this sense logical way of thinking honestly holds one of the critical situations
in the arrangement of technical studies.

QUSTION NO 3:
Philosophy, Science and Religion mark three of the most
fundamental modes of thinking about the world and our
place in it. Are these modes incompatible? Or are they
complementary or mutually supportive each other?
ANSWER:
Religion, science and reasoning investigate and cover various parts of human life,
the presence of our universe and person. Religion is an uncommon type of
consciousness of the world; the faith in divine beings or an allowance of faith-based
expectations concerning the cause and reason for the universe.
The strict arrangement of portrayal of the world (perspective) depends on trust or
mysterious experience and connected with the disposition to the mysterious and
immaterial substances. The specific significance of religion is introduced by ideas,
for example, great and insidiousness, profound quality, morals, strict laws, reason
and importance of life, and so on

Science is a unique sort of intellectual movement pointed toward acquiring,

refining and creation of target, precise, coordinated and all-around grounded
information about nature, society and thinking. The premise of this action is the
assortment of logical proof of their consistent refreshing and systematization, basic
investigation, and on this premise, the union of new logical information or
speculations, which not just portray the discernible characteristic or social marvels,
yet additionally permit us to develop cause-impact associations (causation) and to
anticipate. Those logical speculations and theories, which are upheld by realities or
experience, are detailed as laws of nature or society. With regards to the way of
thinking, so it is an order that reviews the most well-known basic attributes and
basic standards of the truth (being) and comprehension, human presence, relations
among man and the world. Reasoning is normally depicted as a hypothesis or a
science, a type of belief system, a type of human action, an extraordinary method
of comprehension.
The connection between religion, reasoning and science in moving toward
questions with respect to the characteristic world and human instinct is a subject
of different conversations. It is accepted that the assertions about the world made
by science and religion may depend on various strategies. Religion frequently
depends on disclosure and confidence. Simultaneously, the strategies for science
are intricate. Then again,

Science and religion are not fundamentally unrelated but instead corresponding. I
accept that science and religion manage various domains of life and address
different human feelings and necessities. Both are religious modalities (science
regularly requires confidence in the yet concealed) and investigate and test
measurements past current human cognizance. Maybe it relies upon which religion
you're alluding to. The additionally intriguing and nuanced question is whether
having any conviction framework which can be neither affirmed nor discredited by
science is characteristically in struggle with the logical strategy and the
assemblage of information we've amassed. The response to this inquiry, as you
will see, is that having such a conviction framework is certifiably not a vital and
adequate condition for being in struggle with science. Let me first point out that
religion and science have numerous similitudes. Except if God flies down
from Heaven to mercifully demonstrate his reality for us, strict convictions can't
be demonstrated to be valid; they are accepted without any doubt. A few
researchers may locate this funny, however science has the indistinguishable
trademark, which is additionally its most prominent quality.
All things considered; logical speculations can never be demonstrated to be right.
Proof can be accumulated on its side, yet we can never know with 100%
conviction if gravity really works the manner in which we think. Without a doubt,
general relativity depicts it well, however as endless teachers underscore here, our
logical speculations are models. We persistently refine those models as new data
becomes visible. Less usually known is that religions do something very similar.
The convictions of a religion are reconsidered and refined over the long haul and
new information is achieved. Actually, a few religions, for example, Catholicism,
accumulate gatherings of its individuals occasionally for that express reason.

While the two orders accumulate proof, it very well may be contended by some
that the proof in science is much stronger than that in religion. All things
considered, science can quantify things quantitatively, yet religion can't gauge the
amount of the "God Field" is show in a congregation. All things being equal,
religions have additionally accumulated proof; it's simply an alternate kind,
appearing as writings, cases of supernatural occurrences, and other individual
proof.
Some find that proof convincing enough to shape a conviction, others don't.

In the event that we are discussing the contradiction of science theory and
religion so I would state that the way of thinking and science chips away at a
similar viewpoint and with regards to religion everything accompanies the strict
talks and the things our religion demonstrates around 1400 years in reverse from
this age, science demonstrates such things today. The exceptionally obvious
clash between transformative science and creationism has invigorated a lot of
discourse in the logical press about the connection among science and religion.
The Scientist Science, Nature, and numerous different diaries have given a lot of
room to the issue.

A reasonable agreement rises out of this overflowing of writing. Researchers

vivaciously guarantee that no contention exists among science and "sensible"
religion (obviously barring fundamentalism, regardless of whether Islamic or
Christian). The ramifications of present-day science, in any case, are unmistakably
conflicting with most strict customs. So, I think the connection among theory and
science is viable, while the connection among science and religion are
inconsistent.