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Law Enforcement Access to Smart Devices

More and more devices are becoming part of the ‘internet of things.’ Here’s an overview of what they are, what they collect, and what
police might get.
This resource details the potential privacy issues for numerous internet-connected devices. They include connected
cameras (doorbells, indoor, and outdoor cameras), smart speakers and digital assistants, physical activity trackers,
thermostats, in-car systems, and automated license plate readers.
The summaries include how the devices work and who makes them, what kinds of data are collected and how long it’s
retained, possible uses of device data by law enforcement, transparency reports, and relevant legal cases and further
reading.
The resource is a companion to our related expert brief, which covers privacy and civil rights concerns, the legal
frameworks for data access, how law enforcement access works in practice, and conclusions about how to improve
privacy protections.

I. Connected Cameras (Doorbells and Indoor and Outdoor

Cameras)
How they work and who makes them

• How they work: Connected cameras record preset areas in and around a home. 1 These
recordings are stored online and can be retained, clipped, and shared based on the user’s settings
and subscription model.2 Recordings can be accessed via a mobile app, home console, or other
personal device. 3
Connected cameras can be set to trigger alerts that are delivered to the device owner and other
users.4 These can be based on facial recognition, motion triggers, or other settings selected by the
person or persons who control the device.5

• Who makes them: Companies selling this technology include Google (Nest), Amazon (Ring),
SimpliSafe, eufy, and Arlo.

What kinds of data are collected and how long data is retained
• Data about the owner: Name, home address, locations where the cameras are placed, and credit
card information may be stored by these connected cameras.6 In some situations, users can also
share their social media handles, demographic information, interests, hobbies, gender, and age.7

• Data about others: Video and audio recordings of residents, guests, employees, service workers,
and others who may enter the camera’s capture radius can be captured and stored. Depending on
where a camera is placed, it may also record events that occur on the streets and even in homes
surrounding the device — for example, when the camera can see a neighbor’s window.
o Companies such as Google and eufy offer facial recognition data that captures “face images
and underlying face prints,” allowing device owners to track anyone that comes into contact
with the camera.8
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o Companies such as SimpliSafe also maintain lists of the number of adults and children living
in a home, as well as the name and telephone number of a friend or family member to be
alerted in case of an alarm.9
o Companies also capture a running list of motions and alerts, including which camera
captured the information; the date and time; environmental data such as the temperature of
the device and ambient light sensors; and technical information such as the model and serial
number, software version, and Wi-Fi signal strength. 10

• Retention: The retention period for footage may depend on the plan obtained by a user. For
example, Nest Aware Plus stores 60 days’ worth of “event video” (recordings triggered by
activity that a camera detects) history in the cloud, and stores 24/7 recordings for a period of 10
days.11 By comparison, some companies offer local retention using traditional memory cards,
which can store months’ worth of recordings but would not be directly available to anyone other
than those with access to the physical card. 12

Law enforcement access

• Access via user: The person purchasing the cameras can choose to share recordings directly with
law enforcement.
o Companies like Ring partner with law enforcement to simplify requests for camera
recordings, including offering advice on best practices to successfully request footage.13 Ring
facilitates police requests through the app’s Control Center, though users can disable this
feature so they do not receive law enforcement requests. 14
o Law enforcement may also be able to access videos that users share to public channels. For
example, Ring has a feature that allows users to share clips to public social media, which are
then available to any viewer, including law enforcement. 15

• Access via device manufacturer: Law enforcement can request access to data directly from the
company.
o Compelled Disclosure: Depending on factors such as the sensitivity of the data or if a
request relates to the content of communications, a warrant or subpoena may be legally
required. Company privacy policies typically note that they will disclose user data where
required by law.16 However, in situations where legal obligations are unclear, it may be up to
the company to make individual decisions about whether to push back against an overbroad
request.
o Voluntary Disclosure: Company privacy policies note that in situations such as
emergencies or when the company believes it is necessary to protect against harm to the
rights, property, or safety of the company, its users, or the public, they may voluntarily hand
over data to law enforcement.17 However, depending on the nature of the company and the
specific functionality of their product, there may be no legal restrictions that limit a
company’s voluntary disclosure of data to law enforcement.

Possible uses of device data by law enforcement

• Review video and audio recording of an incident.

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• Review footage of a person or their car or other mode of transportation.

• Establish a relationship between people and between a person and a given residence.

• Evaluate a person’s alibi or version of events.

• Run still images through police facial recognition systems.

Transparency reports

• Google and Amazon publish summaries incorporating all disclosures of user data into an overall
report that gives numbers across each company’s entire suite of products. These documents do
not break down the number of law enforcement requests for data from connected cameras or
specify the type of data provided. 18
o Transparency reports do not account for situations where users voluntarily turn over data to
law enforcement.

• SimpliSafe, Arlo, and eufy do not publish transparency reports.

Relevant legal cases and further reading

• Police in Jackson, Mississippi, Want Access to Live Home Security Video, Alarming Privacy
Advocates (NBC News)

• Judge: Audio Rrom Ring Doorbell Can Be Used as Evidence In Rochester Shooting Case, (New
Hampshire Union Leader)

• Cop Accused of Peeping on Breastfeeding Mom Via iPhone App (Engadget)

• How An Amateur Rap Crew Stole Surveillance Tech That Tracks Almost Every American
(Forbes)

• State v. Rogers, No. 20180842-CA, 467 P.3d 880 (Utah 2020). After a home was burglarized, a
neighbor provided the homeowners and a police officer with video footage and a still image
from the video of a person who had been recorded on the neighbor's doorbell camera. At trial,
the neighbor identified the defendant as the person recorded by the doorbell camera.

II. Digital Assistants

How they work and who makes them

• How they work: Digital assistants are voice-enabled devices that perform a variety of tasks based
on preset commands.19 They can be used to perform internet queries, display connected camera
streams, control speakers and television sets, and more. 20 Amazon allows users to set up their
devices to detect sounds such as smoke alarms or glass breaking, and they can be programmed to
“deter” unwanted visitors by turning on lights or playing the sound of a dog barking. 21
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• Who makes them: Some of the companies selling this technology include Google (Google
Assistant), Amazon (Alexa), and Apple (Siri). They integrate this technology into a variety of
different hardware devices, such as the Google Nest Hub, Amazon Echo, and Apple HomePod.

What kinds of data are collected and how long data is retained

• Data about the owner: Voice recordings, name, address, email address, nickname, telephone
number, credit card information, and more. 22 Digital assistants may also access location history,
search history, device contacts, website activity, calendar data, and more. 23

• Data about others: Voice recordings of individuals who interact with the digital assistant or
whose voices are audible in a recording.

• Retention: Amazon retains voice recordings and transcripts indefinitely, until a user deletes
them.24 Google says that it does not retain audio recordings by default; users can elect to store
recordings and can set up automatic deletion. 25 Apple stores recordings using a random identifier
for six months (making it difficult to connect the recordings to a person’s account) and then
stores them without any identifier for up to two years. 26

Law enforcement access

• Access via user: Law enforcement can ask the owner of the device to turn over data voluntarily.

• Access via device manufacturer: Law enforcement can also request access to data directly from
the company.
o Compelled Disclosure: Depending on factors such as the sensitivity of the data or if a
request relates to the content of communications, a warrant or subpoena may be legally
required. Company privacy policies typically note that they will disclose user data where
required by law.27 However, in situations where legal obligations are unclear, it may be up to
the company to make individual decisions about whether to push back against an overbroad
request.
o Voluntary Disclosure: Company privacy policies note that in situations such as
emergencies or when the company believes it is necessary to protect the rights, property, or
safety of the company, its users, or the public, the company may also voluntarily hand over
data to law enforcement.28 However, depending on the nature of the company and the
specific functionality of their product, there may be no legal restrictions that limit a
company’s voluntary disclosure of data to law enforcement.

Possible uses of device data by law enforcement

• Identify a suspect, victim, or witness through voice recordings.

• Evaluate a person’s alibi or version of events.

• Establish a relationship between people and between a person and a given residence.
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Transparency reports

• Amazon, Google, and Apple publish summaries incorporating all disclosures of user data into an
overall report that gives numbers across each company’s entire suite of products. These
documents do not break down the number of law enforcement requests for data from digital
assistants or specify the type of data provided. 29
o Transparency reports do not account for situations where users voluntarily turn over data to
law enforcement.

Relevant legal cases and further reading

• Can Amazon’s Alexa Provide Murder Clues? Digital Assistants Could Aid Prosecutions (ABA
Journal)

• Amazon’s Alexa May Have Witnessed Alleged Florida Murder, Authorities Say (NBC News)

• Arkansas Prosecutors Drop Murder Case That Hinged On Evidence From Amazon Echo
(NPR)

• Judge Orders Amazon to Turn Over Echo Recordings in Double Murder Case (TechCrunch)

• Audio From Amazon Echo Dot Could Sway Investigation Into Woman Killed By Spear (ABC
News)

III. Activity Trackers

How they work and who makes them

• How they work: Activity trackers are personal devices that are used to track an individual’s
movements and health data. This data can be accessed via a mobile application or other personal
device.30

• Who makes them: Companies selling this technology include Fitbit, Garmin, Amazon, and
Apple.

What kinds of data are collected and how long data is retained

• Data about the owner:

o Name, email address, mailing address, phone number, and payment information. 31
o Location data derived from GPS signals, device sensors, Wi-Fi access points, cell tower IDs,
and IP addresses.32
o Steps traveled, calories burned, weight, heart rate, sleep stages, and time spent in
movement.33
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• Retention: Varies by device, but many companies retain data as long as they consider a user to
have an active account.34

Law enforcement access

• Access via user: Law enforcement can ask the owner of the device to turn over data voluntarily.

• Access via device manufacturer: Law enforcement can also request access for data directly from
the company.
o Compelled Disclosure: Depending on factors such as the sensitivity of the data or if a
request relates to the content of communications, a warrant or subpoena may be legally
required. Company privacy policies typically note that they will disclose user data where
required by law.35 However, in situations where legal obligations are unclear, it may be up to
the company to make individual decisions about whether to push back against an overbroad
request.
o Voluntary Disclosure: Company privacy policies note that in situations such as
emergencies or where the company believes it is necessary to respond to threats to the
security of the services or the physical safety of any person, companies such as Fitbit may
also voluntarily hand over data to law enforcement. 36 However, depending on the nature of
the company and the specific functionality of their product, there may be no legal
restrictions that limit a company’s voluntary disclosure of data to law enforcement.

Possible uses of device data by law enforcement

• Approximate a person’s location or movements during a given time frame.

• Evaluate a person’s alibi or version of events.

• Approximate a person’s time of death.

Transparency reports

• No transparency reports identified.

Relevant legal cases and further reading

• Amazon’s New Health Band Is the Most Invasive Tech We’ve Ever Tested (Washington Post)

• Liars Beware: Fitbit and Other Technology May Expose You (ABA Journal)

• Google Tracked His Bike Ride Past a Burglarized Home. That Made Him a Suspect. (NBC
News)

• Female Jogger in Seattle Uses Self-Defense Tactics to Fend Off Brutal Assault (ABC News)
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• In Connecticut Murder Case, a Fitbit Is a Silent Witness (New York Times)

• 91-Year Old Accused in Killing Where Fitbit Gave Clue Dies (Associated Press)

• "48 Hours": The High-Tech Alibi (CBS News)

• Bicycle-Riding Hitman Convicted With Garmin GPS Watch Location Data (Naked Security)

• Commonwealth v. Glenn, No. 2438 EDA 2018, 2020 WL 602331 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2020). In a
murder investigation, police obtained data from the victim’s Fitbit indicating the date and time
that the victim stopped moving.

IV. Connected Thermostats

How they work and who makes them

• How they work: Thermostats regulate the temperature of a home through a mobile app, a
connected speaker, or a home console.37 Some models also have artificial intelligence capabilities
that learn preferences over time.38

• Who makes them: Companies that sell this technology include Google (Nest), Honeywell, Lux
Kono, Bosch, and Amazon (Ecobee).

What kinds of data are collected and how long data is retained

• Data about the owner:

o These devices may collect the owner’s name, email, telephone number, home address or zip
code, credit card information, nationality, and country of residence. 39
o With user permission, devices also collect geolocation information from users’ phones. 40

• Data about a residence and its inhabitants:

o These devices can collect indoor and outdoor temperature, smoke and carbon monoxide
levels, humidity, ambient light, movement, and more. 41
o They may also gather usage data, including the status and runtime of heating and air
conditioning in the home and the overall home electrical usage.42
o Some devices store information based on interactions with third party devices, such as home
computers.43

• Retention: The retention period for data varies. For example, Google says it may retain some
data indefinitely, whereas other data is deleted after a “predetermined period.” However, there is
no specific retention period by each data type. 44

Law enforcement access

• Access via user: Law enforcement can ask the owner of the device to turn over data voluntarily.
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• Access via device manufacturer: Law enforcement can also request access for data directly from
the company.
o Compelled Disclosure: Depending on factors such as the sensitivity of the data or if a
request relates to the content of communications, a warrant or subpoena may be legally
required. Company privacy policies typically note that they will disclose user data where
required by law.45 However, in situations where legal obligations are unclear, it may be up to
the company to make individual decisions about whether to push back against an overbroad
request.
o Voluntary Disclosure: Company privacy policies note that in situations such as
emergencies or when the company believes it is necessary to protect against harm to the
rights, property, or safety of the company, its users, or the public, the company may also
voluntarily hand over data to law enforcement. 46 However, depending on the nature of the
company and the specific functionality of their product, there may be no legal restrictions
that limit a company’s voluntary disclosure of data to law enforcement.

Possible uses of device by law enforcement

• Verify a person’s alibi or version of events.

• Evaluate movements that may contradict a person’s statements.

• Verify whether someone was inside a home.

Transparency reports

• Google and Amazon publish reports incorporating all disclosures of user data into an overall
summary that gives numbers across each company’s entire suite of products. These documents
do not break down the number of law enforcement requests for data from connected
thermostats or specify the type of data provided.47
o Transparency reports do not account for situations where users voluntarily turn over data to
law enforcement.

• Honeywell, Lux Kono, and Bosch do not publish transparency reports.

Relevant legal cases and further reading

• Thermostats, Locks and Lights: Digital Tools of Domestic Abuse (New York Times)

V. Connected Cars
(a) Embedded Technology
How they work and who makes them
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• How they work: Embedded technologies are built-in features that enable cars to perform a
variety of tasks. These can include:
o talking to other vehicles that surround them, such as when a car uses driving assist mode to
determine when other cars are braking or encroaching on its lane.48 The car may then alert
the driver, depending on the settings available;
o talking to cloud networks to perform services including navigation, to receive alerts, to run
diagnostics, and to communicate with emergency responders;49 and
o talking to their environment, such as a car’s communication with a “smart city” to receive
information about things such as traffic congestion or fuel station locations. 50

• Who makes them: Companies offering embedded technologies in their vehicles include BMW,
Ford, Tesla, Toyota, Subaru, and others.

What kinds of data are collected and how long is data retained

• Data about the owner: Embedded technologies can collect the owner’s name, address, telephone
number, date of birth, email address, login information, demographic data, gender, emergency
contact information, information about the acquisition and financing of a vehicle, and credit card
information. 51

• Data about the car and people inside the car: These technologies can also record the location
data of a car’s movements; audio recordings (such as voice recordings of individuals that interact
with a digital assistant); car diagnostics (such as tire pressure, fuel levels, and odometer readings);
incident data (such as information about collisions, the direction from which a car was hit, which
airbags were deployed, and safety belt usage); communications with third parties and with
employees providing support services; and vehicle data such as a car’s location within a lane or
its average speed.52

• Retention: Retention periods are unclear; some privacy policies disclose that they retain
information as long as necessary to provide services and comply with legal obligations. 53 OnStar
warns users that it is their responsibility to delete their information from OnStar systems before
they sell or otherwise transfer their car to another owner. 54

Law enforcement access

• Access via user: Law enforcement can ask the car owner to provide information they can access
in the car or through a mobile application connected to the car. The owner may be different
from the person who regularly operates the car — for example, where an employer, partner,
parent, or other person is the car owner.

• Access via car manufacturer: Law enforcement can also request data directly from the company.
o Compelled Disclosure: Depending on factors such as the sensitivity of the data or if a
request relates to the content of communications, a warrant or subpoena may be legally
required. Company privacy policies typically note that they will disclose user data where
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required by law.55 For example, police have been able to request location data and real-time
wiretapping of conversations with a warrant. 56 However, in situations where legal obligations
are unclear, it may be up to the company to make individual decisions about whether to
push back against an overbroad request.
o Voluntary Disclosure: Company privacy policies note that in situations such as
emergencies or where the company believes it is necessary to protect against harm to the
rights, property, or safety of the company, its users, or the public, the company may also
voluntarily hand over data to law enforcement. 57 However, depending on the nature of the
company and the specific functionality of their product, there may be no legal restrictions
that limit a company’s voluntary disclosure of data to law enforcement.

Possible uses of device data by law enforcement

• Evaluate a person’s alibi or version of events.

• Evaluate a person’s location or movements during a given time frame.

• Evaluate whether someone was inside a car.

• Analyze voice recordings that identify a suspect, victim, and more.

• Intercept communications and track location on an ongoing basis.

Transparency reports

• No transparency reports were located.

Relevant legal cases and further reading

• Cartapping: How Feds Have Spied on Connected Cars For 15 Years (Forbes)

• Burglary Suspect Arrested in Camden After OnStar Tracks Stolen Vehicle (Philly Voice)

• 12-Year-Old Faces Felony Charges After High Speed Chase Through Conroe (The Courier)

• BMW Remotely Locks Alleged Thief In Car He’s Trying to Swipe (CNET)

• In the Matter of the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Roving
Interception of Oral Communications, 2003 in case # 02-15635, the Ninth Circuit allowed the
FBI to obtain a court order compelling a car manufacturer to use technology embedded in a car
to allow agents to eavesdrop on conversations in the car.

• People v. Oelerich, 78 N.E.3d 992 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). Defendant's car had OnStar. One piece of
evidence was a 47-second-long recording of the conversation between the OnStar operator and
the defendant, where the operator asked the defendant what had just happened and the
defendant said, referring to a hallucinogenic drug, “I was driving because I wanted to have the
great DMT trip of my life. And I cannot die….” The prosecutor used the OnStar recording to
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argue that the defendant was deliberate in driving into the other vehicle, while the defense used
the recording to show that the defendant had not been rational and was in a psychotic state.

• State v. Wilson, 2008-Ohio-2863 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). Defendant purchased a used vehicle
equipped with OnStar, but he declined OnStar services. However, the service had not yet been
disabled when OnStar received an emergency button key press from the vehicle. After the
OnStar operator received no response, they requested local police to provide emergency
assistance at the vehicle's location. While monitoring the vehicle, the operator overheard the
vehicle occupants discussing a possible illegal drug transaction and permitted the police
dispatcher to listen in. The dispatcher notified the officers. The officer who arrived on scene
“observed furtive movement” from the driver of the vehicle (the defendant), removed him from
the vehicle, and conducted a search, ultimately finding marijuana. The trial court denied the
defendant’s motion to suppress, finding there was no Fourth Amendment violation because
governmental action did not cause the OnStar employee to monitor the conversation. The court
of appeals affirmed.

• People v. Jacques, 2016 WL 4482930 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). Following a burglary where the victim
reported the license plate number of the defendant, police obtained a warrant to access the
location of the defendant’s vehicle through OnStar. After locating the defendant’s vehicle, the
police planted their own tracking device on the car to track its location.

(b) Supplemental Technology

How they work and who makes them

• How they work: Supplemental technologies are external tools that enable cars and drivers to
perform a variety of tasks. These technologies include:
o GPS navigators that provide driving directions;58
o dashboard cameras that record what’s happening inside of a car and can be set up to
automatically record when they detect impacts or possible accidents;59
o security devices that track a car’s location and send messages to the user if a car is bumped
or moved;60
o other devices that can plug into a car and issue diagnostic reports and driving reports;61 and
o digital assistants that can perform a variety of services based on voice commands. 62

• Who makes them: Companies selling these devices include Google, Apple, Pioneer, Kenwood,
OnStar, Amazon, Garmin, Raven, and Vivint.

What kinds of data are collected and how long data is retained

• Data about the device owner: These devices may collect the user’s name, mailing address, email
address, telephone number, and payment information. 63

• Data about the car and people inside the car: They may also gather location data, video and audio
footage of what occurs in and around a car, and diagnostic reports about the condition of a car. 64
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• Retention: Retention periods are unclear, with some privacy policies disclosing that they retain
information as long as necessary to provide services.65

Law enforcement access

• Access via user: Law enforcement can ask the owner of the device to turn over the data. The
device owner may be different from the car owner — for example, where an employer, partner,
parent, or other person controls a device attached to a car.

• Access via device manufacturer: Law enforcement can also request access for data directly from
the company.
o Compelled Disclosure: Depending on factors such as the sensitivity of the data or if a
request relates to the content of communications, a warrant or subpoena may be legally
required. Company privacy policies typically note that they will disclose user data where
required by law.66 However, in situations where legal obligations are unclear, it may be up to
the company to make individual decisions about whether to push back against an overbroad
request.
o Voluntary Disclosure: Company privacy policies note that in situations such as
emergencies or when the company believes it is necessary to protect their rights and
property, they may also voluntarily hand over data to law enforcement. 67 However,
depending on the nature of the company and the specific functionality of their product,
there may be no legal restrictions that limit a company’s voluntary disclosure of data to law
enforcement.

Possible uses of device data by law enforcement

• Evaluate a person’s alibi or version of events.

• Evaluate a person’s location or movements during a given time frame.

• Verify whether someone was inside a car.

• Evaluate voice recordings to help identify a suspect, victim, and more.

Transparency reports

• Apple, Amazon, and Google publish summaries incorporating all disclosures of user data into an
overall report that gives numbers across each company’s entire suite of products. These
documents do not break down the number of law enforcement requests for data from each
product or specify the type of data provided.68
o Transparency reports do not account for situations where users voluntarily turn over data to
law enforcement.

• Pioneer, Kenwood, OnStar, Garmin, Raven, and Vivint do not publish transparency reports.
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Relevant legal cases and further reading

• Dash Cams Can Be Silent Witnesses During Police Traffic Stops and Other Incidents
(Consumer Reports)

VI. License Plate Readers

How they work and who makes them

• How they work: License plate readers use a combination of cameras and computer software to
scan and store the license plates as well as photos of every car passing by the device.
o Through a user interface, users can set up “hot lists” to alert them whenever a particular car
passes by or leaves a neighborhood.
o Companies also retain license plate information for future uses. These uses may include data
sharing with law enforcement and with other customers who have “a legitimate commercial
interest,”69 such as repossession services on behalf of creditors.70

• Who makes them: Companies selling these devices include Flock Safety, Vigilant Solutions, and
Obsidian Integration.

What kinds of data are collected and how long is data retained

• Data about the owner: These devices may record the name, phone number, email, zip code, 71
usernames, affiliated organizations, and IP addresses of anyone who accesses the license plate
reader data.72
o Vigilant Solutions logs how its customers use their products, and occasionally audits these
logs.73

• Data about cars: Some devices may record video and still images of cars and license plate scans,
as well as the date, time, and location associated with this data.74

• Environmental data and data about the license plate reader: Some devices collect temperature
and ambient light information.75 Additionally, companies maintain records on the serial number,
software version, cellular signal strength, and geolocation of their license plate readers. 76

• Retention: Flock Safety retains video and audio information for 30 days, although users can save
and retain data indefinitely. 77 Vigilant Solutions retains data as long as it has “commercial
value.”78

Law enforcement access

• Access via user: Law enforcement can ask the owner or any user with access to the data to
voluntarily disclose it. Companies like Flock Safety create user interfaces that allow users to
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either share information with police on a case-by-case basis or to allow the police to have direct
access to the system. 79

• Access via device manufacturer: Law enforcement can also request access for data directly from
the company.
o Compelled Disclosure: Depending on factors such as the sensitivity of the data, a warrant
or subpoena may be legally required. Company privacy policies typically note that they will
disclose user data where required by law.80 However, in situations where legal obligations are
unclear, it may be up to the company to make individual decisions about whether to push
back against an overbroad request. Flock Safety also reserves the right to use and disclose
aggregated data the company collects for unspecified “crime prevention efforts.” 81
o Voluntary Disclosure: Company privacy policies note that in situations such as
emergencies or when the company believes it is necessary to protect against harm to the
rights, property, or safety of the company, they may also voluntarily hand over data to law
enforcement. 82 However, depending on the nature of the company and the specific
functionality of their product, there may be no legal restrictions that limit a company’s
voluntary disclosure of data to law enforcement.

Possible uses of device data by law enforcement

• Verify cars and people present at the scene of a crime.

• Establish relationships between people.

• Track a particular driver’s location and movement over time.

• Locate cars associated with AMBER alerts for abducted children.

• Cross-reference state and federal databases with information on gang membership and unpaid
fines.

Transparency reports

• No transparency reports identified.

Relevant legal cases and further reading

• Neighborhood Watch Has a New Tool: License-Plate Readers (OneZero)

• Looking to Combat Crime, H.B. Gated Community Turns to License Plate Reading Cameras
(Los Angeles Times)

• License Plate Tracking For Police Set to Go Nationwide (CNET)

• It’s Not Just the Police: Your HOA May Be Tracking Your License Plate (The San Diego Union-
Tribune)
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• Twin Cities Neighborhood Association Turns to New Camera Technology to Deter Car, Home
Break-Ins (CBS Minnesota)

1 See, e.g., “How to Set Up and Use Activity Zones,” Google Nest Store, accessed December 16, 2020,
https://support.google.com/googlenest/answer/9207697?hl=en&co=GENIE.Platform%3DiOS.
2 See, e.g., “Don’t Miss a Thing with the New Nest Aware,” Google Store, accessed December 16, 2020,

https://store.google.com/us/product/nest_aware.
3 See, e.g., “Ring Protect,” Ring, accessed December 16, 2020, https://shop.ring.com/pages/protect-plans.
4 See, e.g., Megan Wollerton, “How to Set Up Motion Zones on Your Ring Security Camera or Doorbell,” CNET,

October 9, 2019, https://www.cnet.com/how-to/how-to-set-up-motion-zones-on-your-ring-security-camera-or-

doorbell/.
5 See “Learn About Familiar Face Detection and How to Manage Your Library,” Google Nest, accessed December 16,

2020, https://support.google.com/googlenest/answer/9268625?co=GENIE.Platform%3DAndroid&hl=en (facial

recognition); See “Understanding Notifications for Ring and Motion Events,” Ring, DATE ACCESSED/MODIFIED
TK, https://support.ring.com/hc/en-us/articles/210052646-Understanding-Notifications-for-Ring-and-Motion-Events
(motion triggers); See, e.g., “Understanding Notifications for Ring and Motion Events,” Ring, accessed December 16,
2020, https://support.ring.com/hc/en-us/articles/210052646-Understanding-Notifications-for-Ring-and-Motion-
Events (examples of settings that can be adjusted by users).
6 See, e.g., “Ring Privacy Notice,” last updated October 9, 2020, https://shop.ring.com/pages/privacy-notice; and

“Privacy Statement for Nest Products and Services,” accessed December 16, 2020, https://nest.com/legal/privacy-
statement-for-nest-products-and-services/.
7 See, e.g., “eufy Privacy Policy,” accessed December 16, 2020, https://www.eufylife.com/privacy-policy#1 (“We may

ask you to submit the following types of Personal Information: first and last name, country, email address, product serial
number, date of purchase, telephone number, mailing address, and proof of purchase. We may also collect additional
personal information such as your interests or hobbies, your gender or age.”); and “SimpliSafe Privacy Policy,” last
updated February 2020, https://simplisafe.com/privacy-policy (“Types of personal information we collect when you
become a customer and provide it to us include . . . demographic information about you.”).
8 “Learn about familiar face detection,” Google Nest, accessed December 16, 2020,

https://support.google.com/googlenest/answer/9268625?co=GENIE.Platform%3DAndroid&hl=en (facial
recognition). Google directs owners to notify “guests” that their faces may be captured. See Privacy Statement for Nest
Products and Services (“Depending on where you live and how you configure the Products and Services, you may need
to get explicit consent to scan the faces of people visiting your home.”).
9 See SimpliSafe Privacy Policy, last updated February 2020, https://simplisafe.com/privacy-policy (“Types of personal

information we collect when you become a subscriber to monitoring services and you provide it to us include . . . the
number of adults and children living at the location where the alarm will be installed . . . name and telephone number for
friends or family you would like to be contracted in the event of an alarm”).
10 See, e.g., Leo Kelion, “Amazon’s Ring Logs Every Doorbell Press and App Action,” BBC, March 4, 2020,

https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-51709247.
11 “Don’t Miss a Thing with the New Nest Aware,” Google Store, accessed December 16, 2020,

https://store.google.com/us/product/nest_aware; see also Ring Protect.

12 See, e.g., “eufyCam,” accessed December 16, 2020, https://www.eufylife.com/products/variant/eufycam/T88011D1.

“eufyCam doesn’t require any monthly fees to use, and comes with a 16GB microSD card that stores up to one-years’
worth of recordings. Cloud storage service optional.”
13 Caroline Haskins, “Amazon is Coaching Cops on How to Obtain Surveillance Footage Without a Warrant,” Vice,

August 5, 2019, https://www.vice.com/en/article/43kga3/amazon-is-coaching-cops-on-how-to-obtain-surveillance-

footage-without-a-warrant.
14 Todd Haselton, “How to Stop Police from Asking for Videos from Your Amazon Ring Doorbell,” CNBC, February

3, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/03/how-to-stop-police-from-asking-for-videos-from-ring-doorbells.html.
15 See “Shared Video Management,” Ring, accessed December 16, 2020, https://support.ring.com/hc/en-

us/articles/360045097612-Shared-Video-Management. “Shared Event video links are created when you choose to share
a private video on the Ring app or ring.com, via email, social media (Neighbors app, Facebook, Nextdoor, etc.), or by
text.”
 16

16 See, e.g., “Ring Privacy Notice.” (“We also may disclose personal information about you (1) if we are required to do so
by law or legal process (such as a court order or subpoena.”); and “Privacy Statement for Nest Products and Services.”
(“We will share personal information with third parties if we have a good faith belief that access, use, preservation or
disclosure of the information is reasonably necessary to (i) meet any applicable law, regulation, legal process or
enforceable government request.”)
17 See, e.g., Privacy Statement for Nest Products and Services; Ring Privacy Notice; SimpliSafe Privacy Policy; and “Arlo

Terms and Conditions,” last updated August 26, 2020, https://www.arlo.com/en-us/about/terms-and-conditions/.

18 “Google Transparency Report,” accessed December 16, 2020, https://transparencyreport.google.com/user-
data/overview?hl=en; “Amazon Transparency Report,” accessed December 16, 2020,
https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=GYSDRGWQ2C2CRYEF.
19 See Richard Baguley and Colin McDonald, “Appliance Science: Alexa, How Does Alexa work? The Science of

Amazon Echo,” CNET, August 4, 2016, https://www.cnet.com/news/appliance-science-alexa-how-does-alexa-work-

the-science-of-amazons-echo/.
20 Stacey Gray, Always On: Privacy Implications of Microphone-Enabled Devices, Future of Privacy Forum, April 2016,

https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/FPF_Always_On_WP.pdf.
21 See “Introducing Alexa Guard Plus,” Amazon, accessed December 16, 2020,

https://www.amazon.com/b?ie=UTF8&node=18021383011.
22 See, e.g., “Amazon Privacy Notice,” Amazon, last updated January 1, 2020,

https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=GX7NJQ4ZB8MHFRNJ.
23 Anyone within the range of a digital assistant may be able to activate the device and learn information about the

person whose account is associated with the device (e.g., calendar, contacts, email, and more). By aggregating one policy
for various services, companies like Google make it difficult to fully understand the universe of data collected, stored,
and shared by its digital assistant product. See, e.g., “Google Privacy Policy,” last updated September 30, 2020,
https://policies.google.com/privacy.
24 Brian Huseman (Amazon) to Senator Coons, June 28, 2019,

https://www.coons.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Amazon%20Senator%20Coons__Response%20Letter__6.28.19[3].pdf
. (“We retain customers’ voice recordings and transcripts until the customer chooses to delete them.”)
25 “Data Security and Privacy on Devices that Work with Assistant,” Google Nest Help, accessed December 16, 2020,

https://support.google.com/googlenest/answer/7072285?hl=en.
26 See “Ask Siri, Dictation & Privacy,” Apple, accessed December 16, 2020, https://support.apple.com/en-

us/HT210657. (“Your request history is associated with the random identifier for up to six months. Your request history
may include transcripts, audio for users who have opted in to Improve Siri and Dictation, and related request data such
as device specifications, device configuration, performance statistics, and the approximate location of your device at the
time the request was made. After six months, your request history is dissociated from the random identifier and may be
retained for up to two years to help Apple develop and improve Siri, Dictation, and other language processing features
like Voice Control. The small subset of requests that have been reviewed may be kept beyond two years, without the
random identifier, for ongoing improvement of Siri.”)
27 See, e.g., “Amazon Privacy Notice.” (“We release account and other personal information when we believe release is

appropriate to comply with the law; enforce or apply our Conditions of Use and other agreements; or protect the rights,
property, or safety of Amazon, our users, or others”); “Google Privacy Policy.” (“We will share personal information
outside of Google if we have a good-faith belief that access, use, preservation, or disclosure of the information is
reasonably necessary to . . . meet any applicable law, regulation, legal process, or enforceable governmental request”);
and “Apple Privacy Policy,” last updated December 31, 2019, https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/. (“It may
be necessary − by law, legal process, litigation, and/or requests from public and governmental authorities within or
outside your country of residence − for Apple to disclose your personal information. We may also disclose information
about you if we determine that for purposes of national security, law enforcement, or other issues of public importance,
disclosure is necessary or appropriate.”)
28 See, e.g., “Amazon Privacy Notice”; “Google Privacy Policy”; and “Apple Privacy Policy.”
29 See “Amazon Transparency Report”; “Google Transparency Report”; and “Apple Transparency Report,” accessed

December 16, 2020, https://www.apple.com/legal/transparency/us.html.

30 See, e.g., Robbie Gonzalez, “Science Says Fitness Trackers Don’t Work Anyway,” Wired, December 25, 2017,

https://www.wired.com/story/science-says-fitness-trackers-dont-work-wear-one-anyway/.
31 See, e.g., “Garmin Privacy Policy,” last updated June 5, 2020, https://www.garmin.com/en-

US/privacy/global/policy/.
 17

32 See, e.g., “Fitbit Privacy Policy,” last updated October 8, 2020, https://www.fitbit.com/global/us/legal/privacy-
policy.
33 See, e.g., “Fitbit Privacy Policy.”
34 See, e.g., “Garmin Privacy Policy”; “Fitbit Privacy Policy.”
35 See, e.g., “Garmin Privacy Policy”; “Fitbit Privacy Policy.”
36 See “Fitbit Privacy Policy.”
37 See Erika Rawes, “What Is a Smart Thermostat?” Digital Trends, December 2, 2019,

https://www.digitaltrends.com/home/what-is-a-smart-thermostat/.
38 See, e.g., Frank O’Connell, “Inside the Nest Learning Thermostat,” New York Times, October 3, 2012,

https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/10/04/business/inside-the-nest-learning-
thermostat.html.
39 See, e.g., “Privacy Statement for Nest Products and Services”; “Amazon Privacy Notice”; “LUX Privacy Policy,” Lux,

last updated October 16, 2017, https://pro.luxproducts.com/privacya/.

40 See also “Data Protection Notice,” Bosch Thermotechnology, accessed December 16, 2020, https://www.bosch-

thermotechnology.com/gb/en/commercial-industrial/data_protection.html.
41 See “Data Protection Notice,” Bosch Thermotechnology.
42 See LUX Privacy Policy,; “Resideo Connected Home End-User License Agreement and Privacy Statement,” Resideo,

last updated June 1, 2020, https://www.resideo.com/us/en/corporate/legal/eula/english-

gb/#_PRIVACY_RESIDEO.
43 See “Resideo Connected Home End-User License Agreement and Privacy Statement;” “LUX Privacy Policy.”
44 See “Nest Retention Statement,” Nest, accessed December 16, 2020, https://nest.com/data-retention/.
45 See, e.g., “Privacy Statement for Nest Products and Services”; “Amazon Privacy Notice”; and “LUX Privacy Policy.”
46 See, e.g., “Privacy Statement for Nest Products and Services”; “Amazon Privacy Notice”; and “LUX Privacy Policy.”
47 See “Amazon Transparency Report”; “Google Transparency Report.”
48 See, e.g., Liz Kim, “What is Hyundai SmartSense?” JD Power, September 8, 2020,

https://www.jdpower.com/cars/shopping-guides/what-is-hyundai-smartsense.
49 See, e.g., “Subaru StarLink,” Subaru, accessed December 16, 2020,

https://www.subaru.com/engineering/starlink/safety-security.html.
50 See, e.g., “Connected Car. Its History, Stages and Terms,” BMW, June 8, 2020,

https://www.bmw.com/en/innovation/connected-car.html.
51 See, e.g. “OnStar Privacy Statement,” last updated January 2020, https://www.onstar.com/us/en/privacy_statement/.
52 See, e.g., “OnStar Privacy Statement”; “BMW Assist Terms and Conditions,” BMW, last updated June 14, 2017,

https://www.bmwusa.com/content/dam/bmwusa/connected-
drive/pdf/BMWAssist_TERMS_and_CONDITIONS_2014_later.pdf; and “Subaru Starlink Privacy Policy,” last
updated May 1, 2018, https://www.subaru.com/company/starlink-privacy.html.
53 See, e.g., “Subaru Starlink Privacy Policy”; “OnStar Privacy Statement”; and “BMW Assist Terms and Conditions.”
54 “OnStar Privacy Statement.” (“If you sell or otherwise transfer your vehicle, it is your responsibility to delete all

information (such as contacts, address look-ups, saved map addresses) from the vehicle’s system and contact us to
transfer or cancel your account. If you do not delete this information, it may remain on the vehicle’s system and may be
accessible to future users of the vehicle. For instructions on how to delete information from your vehicle’s system,
please refer to your vehicle owner’s manual.”).
55 See, e.g., “Subaru Starlink Privacy Policy.” (“We cooperate with government and law enforcement officials and private

parties to enforce and comply with the law and may be compelled to disclose your information to government or law
enforcement officials or private parties in response to a validly-issued subpoena or court order to . . . satisfy any
applicable law, regulation, subpoenas, governmental requests, or legal process . . .”); “OnStar Privacy Statement.” ("As
required or permitted by law, such as in conjunction with a subpoena, government inquiry, litigation, dispute resolution,
or similar legal process, when we believe in good faith that disclosure is necessary to protect our rights, your safety, or
the safety of others, to detect, investigate and prevent fraud, or to conduct screening to ensure you are not on any
government list of restricted parties.”); and “BMW Assist Terms and Conditions.” (“We reserve the right to disclose
your personal information to respond to authorized information requests from government authorities, subpoenas or
other litigation process or to protect the interests or safety of the Sites’ visitors, customers, employees, or others, to
address national security situations, or when otherwise required by law.”).
56 See, e.g., “Subaru Starlink Privacy Policy”; “OnStar Privacy Statement”; and “BMW Assist Terms and Conditions.”
57 See, e.g., “Subaru Starlink Privacy Policy”; “OnStar Privacy Statement”; and “BMW Assist Terms and Conditions.”
58 See, e.g., Gretchen Newcomb, “Pioneer AVIC-W8500NEX Review,” PC Magazine, September 19, 2019,

https://www.pcmag.com/reviews/pioneer-avic-w8500nex.
 18

59 See, e.g., Dan Seifart, “Ring Announces New Line of Security Cameras for Cars,” The Verge, September 24, 2020,
https://www.theverge.com/2020/9/24/21453632/ring-car-alarm-security-camera-connect-tesla-price-specs-features-
amazon.
60 See, e.g., Molly McLaughlin, “Cobra CDR 855 BT Review,” PC Magazine, March 3, 2017,

https://www.pcmag.com/reviews/cobra-cdr-855-bt.
61 See, e.g., BlueDriver Pro Scar Tool, https://www.bluedriver.com/products/bluedriver-scan-tool.
62 See “The Rise of the In-car Digital Assistant,” Automotive World, October 21, 2019,

https://www.automotiveworld.com/special-reports/special-report-the-rise-of-the-in-car-digital-assistant/.
63 See ““The Rise of the In-car Digital Assistant.”
64 See, e.g., “Garmin Privacy Policy”; “Raven Privacy Policy,” accessed December 16, 2020,

https://ravenconnected.com/privacy-policy/; “Vivint Privacy Policy,” last updated December 15, 2019,

https://www.vivint.com/company/policies/privacy; “Google Privacy Policy”; and “Amazon Privacy Notice.”
65 See, e.g. “JVCKENWOOD USA Corporation Privacy Policy,” last updated July 1, 2020,

https://policy.us.jvckenwood.com/privacy.html. (“JVCKENWOOD USA Corporation will retain your Personal

Information for the period necessary to fulfill the purposes outlined in this Privacy Policy unless a longer retention
period is required or permitted by for legal, auditing, or compliance purposes.”); “Raven Privacy Policy.” (“We retain
your personal information only as long as necessary to facilitate the use of our products and services. When your cancel
your subscription to our services, we will take steps to have your personal information deleted and erased.”)
66 See, e.g., “JVCKENWOOD USA Corporation Privacy Policy.” (“JVCKENWOOD USA Corporation may share

information about you for business purposes as follows or as otherwise described in this Privacy Policy . . . in response
to a subpoena, legal order or official request, including lawful requests by public authorities to meet national security or
law enforcement requirements.”); “Raven Privacy Policy.” (“Raven Connected may be requested or required by law to
disclose personal information to proper law enforcement authorities, even though you might have requested that we do
not share such personal information. This information may be necessary to identify, contact or bring legal action against
anyone who may attempt to cause injury to another’s rights or property. We may also release your personal information
when we believe the release is appropriate to comply with the law, enforce our policies, or protect ours or others’ rights,
property, or safety.”)
67 See, e.g., “JVCKENWOOD USA Corporation Privacy Policy”; “Raven Privacy Policy.”
68 See “Apple Transparency Report”; “Amazon Transparency Report”; and “Google Transparency Report.”
69 See, e.g., “Vigilant Solutions Usage and Privacy Policy,” accessed December 16, 2020,

https://www.vigilantsolutions.com/lpr-usage-and-privacy-policy. (“The company authorizes collection of LPR data for

the use of the company and its customers consistent with this policy. The authorized uses of the ALPR system are . . .
(1) By customers to identify or ascertain the location of a specific vehicle under circumstances when there is a legitimate
commercial interest . . . (2) By law enforcement agencies for law enforcement purposes . . . (3) By the company to make
LPR data available to customers and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) for the purposes above, and to provide market
research information to customers based on aggregated LPR data.”)
70 See, e.g., Susan Crandall,“Vigilant Solutions Bolsters Commercial LPR Database through Agreement with Plate

Locate,” Digital Recognition Network, April 19, 2018, https://drndata.com/vigilant-solutions-bolsters-commercial-lpr-

database-agreement-plate-locate/.
71 “Privacy Policy for Flock Safety,” last updated July 10, 2020, https://www.flocksafety.com/legal/privacy-policy.
72 “Vigilant Solutions Usage and Privacy Policy.”
73 “Vigilant Solutions Usage and Privacy Policy.”
74 See, e.g., “Privacy Policy for Flock Safety”; “Vigilant Solutions Usage and Privacy Policy.”
75 See “Privacy Policy for Flock Safety.”
76 See, e.g., “Privacy Policy for Flock Safety.”
77 “Flock Safety ALPR Policy,” accessed December 16, 2020, https://www.flocksafety.com/alpr-policy.
78 See “Vigilant Solutions Usage and Privacy Policy.”
79 See, e.g. “Neighborhoods Stop Crime in Their Community with License Plate Readers,” KCTB5 Kansas City,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXqFj4H6XKg (Uploaded by Flock Safety).

80 See, e.g., “Vigilant Solutions Usage and Privacy Policy”; “Terms of Service for Flock Safety.”
81 “Terms of Service for Flock Safety.” (“Customer acknowledges that Flock will be compiling anonymized and/or

aggregated data based on Customer Data input into the Services (the ‘Aggregated Data’). Customer hereby grants Flock
a non-exclusive, worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free right and license (during and after the term hereof) to use and
distribute such Aggregated Data to improve and enhance the Services and for other marketing, development, diagnostic
and corrective purposes, other Flock offerings and crime prevention efforts.”)
 19

82See, e.g., “Terms of Service for Flock Safety.” (“For clarity, Flock may access, use, preserve and/or disclose the
Footage to law enforcement authorities, government officials, and/or third parties, if legally required to do so or if Flock
has a good faith belief that such access, use, preservation or disclosure is reasonably necessary to: (a) comply with a legal
process or request; (b) enforce this Agreement, including investigation of any potential violation thereof; (c) detect,
prevent or otherwise address security, fraud or technical issues; or (d) protect the rights, property or safety of Flock, its
users, a third party, or the public as required or permitted by law, including respond to an emergency situation.”)