Qualitative Research Journal: Article Information

Qualitative Research Journal
A philosophical discussion of qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods

research in social science
Saša Baškarada, Andy Koronios,
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Saša Baškarada, Andy Koronios, (2018) "A philosophical discussion of qualitative, quantitative, and
mixed methods research in social science", Qualitative Research Journal, https://doi.org/10.1108/
QRJ-D-17-00042
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Philosophy of
A philosophical discussion of social science
qualitative, quantitative, and
mixed methods research in
social science
Saša Baškarada and Andy Koronios Received 9 March 2017
Revised 20 October 2017
University of South Australia, Adelaide, Australia Accepted 22 October 2017
Abstract
Purpose – Much of the contemporary methodological literature tends to be self-referential and frequently
ignorant of the breadth and depth of philosophical assumptions underpinning various methodological
positions. Without a clear understanding of the philosophical underpinnings, logically deriving applicable
validity criteria becomes very difficult (if not impossible). As a result, the purpose of this paper is to present a
critical review of historical and more recent philosophical arguments for qualitative, quantitative, and mixed
methods research in social science.
Design/methodology/approach – A targeted review of seminal philosophy of science papers dealing with
ontological and epistemological assumptions of, and relation between, natural and social science.
Findings – The paper highlights the link between ontological/epistemological assumptions and
methodological choices in social science. Key differences between the natural and social science are
discussed and situated within the main paradigms.
Originality/value – The paper draws attention to a range of difficulties associated with the adoption of the
natural sciences and the related positivist approaches as a role model for work in the social sciences. Unique
contributions of interpretive and critical approaches are highlighted. The paper may be of value to scholars
who are interested in the historical context of the still-ongoing qualitative-quantitative debate.
Keywords Quantitative, Qualitative, Positivism, Paradigm, Mixed methods research, Interpretivism
Paper type General review
1. Introduction
Natural sciences are generally viewed as being descriptive because physical behaviors are
explained through mathematical formulae, empirical because relevant variables denote
observables, functional because each input is related to exactly one output, and deterministic
because the future is in principle predictable (Brodbeck, 1954). The epistemological status of
social sciences may be viewed either as a factual question that could in principle be answered
scientifically, or as a normative question that cannot be answered empirically (Gewirth, 1954).
Nevertheless, positivism, which views physics as science par excellence (Kincaid, 1990b),
maintains that social sciences are in essence no different from natural sciences
(Føllesdal, 1979), and that, as such, they should also principally aim for nomological
prediction and explanation (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948). Scholars argue that “There are
numerous valid reasons for positivists to follow the natural sciences as a role model for work
in the social sciences” (Hasan, 2014, p. 4). It may be assumed that few practicing social
scientists disagree since quantitative research methods, which originate in the positivistic
natural sciences, have also been dominating the social and the behavioral sciences (Alise and
Teddlie, 2010; Lopez-Fernandez and Molina-Azorin, 2011; Yang, 2013; Rod, 2009; Black, 2006;
Kapoulas and Mitic, 2012). Moreover, “Qualitative scholars struggle to obtain tenure, their
research is often underfunded, the journals they publish in are given low impact scores”
(Denzin, 2017, p. 15).
However, critics have argued that due to their distinct problem domains the social and Qualitative Research Journal
the natural sciences cannot be regarded as alternatives and, thus, should not be directly © Emerald Publishing Limited
1443-9883
compared (Machlup, 1961). In contrast to natural sciences, which largely deal with DOI 10.1108/QRJ-D-17-00042
QRJ quantitative aspects, it may be maintained that social sciences are primarily interested in
qualitative characteristics (Weber, 1949). Viewed as such, social sciences should principally
aim for hermeneutical understanding (Verstehen) (Taylor, 1974). Others have reasoned that
natural sciences are analytic, whereas the social sciences are synthetic in nature
(Hayek, 1952). In addition to being much more heterogeneous than natural sciences
(Gewirth, 1954), social sciences are also largely context dependent (Faber and Scheper,
2003). For instance, it has been argued that results of quantitative marketing research have
a “limited lifetime and applicability because background contexts and consumer behaviours
are in perpetual flux” (Robertshaw, 2007, p. 11).
Reflecting on the ongoing quantitative-qualitative debate conducted in the marketing
“crisis literature,” Rod (2009) concludes that the relevant philosophical issues have not been
resolved and argues for a pragmatic approach in which “academics should be free to
subscribe to whatever guiding epistemological and ontological philosophy they choose”
(p. 128). This is the same position as adopted by proponents of mixed methods research
(MMR), a rapidly emerging social science research paradigm that aims to bridge the
quantitative-qualitative (positivist-interpretivist) divide.
Given that many mixed methods researchers are indifferent to the underlying
epistemological and ontological assumptions (Bryman, 2007; Alise and Teddlie, 2010), it is
unsurprising that many MMR studies do not state any rationale for choosing a mixed
approach (Bryman, 2006). Some proponents of MMR claim that philosophical assumptions
do not dictate methodological choices ( Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004), while others
argue that, given their metaphysical nature, epistemology and ontology are not relevant to
the research process (Giddings, 2006). While admitting that qualitative and quantitative
approaches may be appropriate in different situations, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) do
not specify the nature of such situations. Critics have noted that this lack of concern
for epistemological and ontological issues may have to do with a tacit adoption of the
traditional positivist consensus (Denzin, 2012; Giddings, 2006).
Without a clear understanding of the philosophical underpinnings, logically deriving
applicable validity criteria becomes difficult (if not impossible), which potentially makes
MMR study design and evaluation a highly subjective affair. Following Charles Sanders
Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) argue that MMR
should be judged based on its empirical and practical consequences. While pragmatism
allows mixed method researchers to adopt a multitude of research methods and sidestep the
contentious issues of truth and reality (Feilzer, 2010), given that empirical and practical
consequences are not always immediately obvious, judging the value of any conclusions
reached would have to be deferred until real-world outcomes can be observed (Rod, 2009).
As a consequence, basic research may receive less attention than applied research
( Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004).
Synthesizing various reviews of MMR, Denscombe (2008) shows that some researchers
primarily use mixed methods in order to improve data accuracy, produce a more complete
picture, and mitigate against single-method biases, while others may simply use questionnaires
as a tool for interviewee selection, or interviews to help explain quantitative findings. He argues
that justifying the use of MMR because it provides “fusion of approaches,” “a third alternative,”
or because it desirable or pragmatic is insufficient (Denscombe, 2008). Others have argued
that MMR may have more to do with pleasing research funding authorities, than with a
genuine integration of research approaches (Giddings, 2006). Without a clear understanding of
the underlying paradigm, MMR is arguably nothing more than triangulation (Denzin, 2012;
Flick, 2017).
Based on the concerns highlighted above, a number of scholars have called for more
theoretical research on the philosophical underpinnings of qualitative, quantitative, and MMR
(Denzin, 2012; Creswell and Tashakkori, 2007; Giddings, 2006; Johnson et al., 2007; Greene, 2008).
This paper answers such calls by identifying the main ontological and epistemological Philosophy of
assumptions from the philosophy of social science literature and discussing how they drive social science
methodological choices. Key differences between the natural and social science are
discussed and situated within the main paradigms. The paper draws attention to a range
of difficulties associated with the adoption of the natural sciences and the related positivist
approaches as a role model for work in the social sciences, and highlights the value of
interpretive and critical approaches.
2. MMR
It has been argued that MMR is a third research paradigm that aims to transcend the
traditional dichotomy between quantitative (positivist) and qualitative (interpretivist)
research ( Johnson et al., 2007; Denscombe, 2008; Morgan, 2007). A general definition
synthesized from leading methodologists defines it as “the type of research in which a
researcher or team of researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative
research approaches […] for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and
corroboration” ( Johnson et al., 2007, p. 123). Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) define MMR
as “the class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and
qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single
study” (p. 17). Although it is argued that MMR is a synthesis that includes ideas from
qualitative and quantitative approaches, what exactly is synthesized or how precisely that
is done remains ambiguous.
Some scholars advocate using qualitative and quantitative methods in parallel, while
others argue that MMR research should aim for integration. However, exactly how
qualitative and quantitative methods may best be integrated is not always clear.
For instance, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) present six mixed-model designs, for which
they do not provide detailed explanations. One of the designs starts with quantitative
research objectives, collects quantitative data, but performs qualitative analysis. Exactly
how one is supposed to qualitatively analyze quantitative data, and relate a presumably
qualitative finding to a quantitative research objective is not made clear. Another popular
three-dimensional typology of MMR identifies eight designs that differ on the level of
mixing (partial vs full), time orientation (concurrent vs sequential), and emphasis of
approaches (equal vs unequal) (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2009). Others have proposed
guidelines for MMR at the synthesis level; that is, synthesizing research evidence from
published qualitative and quantitative studies (Heyvaert, Maes, and Onghena, 2013).
If MMR is to effectively integrate qualitative and quantitative methods, it needs to be
able to blend compatible axiomatic elements of interpretivism and positivism into another
“so that one is engaging in research that represents the best of both worldviews” (Guba and
Lincoln, 2005, p. 201). Although, this is well understood and accepted by MMR scholars,
relevant discussions have so far been undertaken at a relatively high level of abstraction,
and MMR largely ignores “epistemology, and ontology, in favor of a brute methodology”
(Pierre, 2014, p. 9). As such, specific axiomatic elements and the degree of potential
compatibility have received limited attention. As a result of the ontological and
epistemological ambiguity “we are still in the infant stages of understanding how to judge
the quality of mixed methods practice” (Greene, 2008, p. 18). Based on a comprehensive
review of critical appraisal frameworks for evaluating the methodological quality of MMR
studies, Heyvaert, Hannes, Maes and Onghena (2013) agree that “consensus on the critical
appraisal of MM studies is lacking” (p. 303).
Arguments that mixed methods researchers should design their studies “based on
consideration of the types of ‘validity’ presented in the qualitative research literature […] the
quantitative research literature […] and the mixed methods research literature” ( Johnson
et al., 2007, p. 128) assume inter-paradigm commensurability, which this paper argues is
QRJ largely unjustified. Pierre (2014) observes that “Confusion and contradiction are not
uncommon in mixed methods when a researcher claims to enact positivist and interpretive
social science at the same time in the same “mixed” methods study” (p. 9). Some of the
arguments put forward by the proponents of inter-paradigm commensurability are not
particularly convincing. For instance, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) support their view
by noting that “both quantitative and qualitative researchers use empirical observations to
address research questions” (p. 15). While Onwuegbuzie et al. (2011) argue that mixed
methods researchers need to be able to effectively integrate the philosophical assumptions
that underlie both positivist and interpretivist paradigms, relevant discussions have so far
been undertaken at a relatively high level of abstraction. For instance, they note that
“the mixed researcher has to make ‘Gestalt switches’ (Kuhn, 1996) from a quantitative lens
to a qualitative lens and vice versa, going back and forth, multiple times” (p. 1261).
This process is supposed to lead to “a new or consolidated viewpoint emerging” (p. 1261) that
“is informed by, is separate from, and goes beyond what is provided by either a pure
qualitative viewpoint or a pure quantitative viewpoint” (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2006, p. 59).
The assumption that multi-paradigm research teams may organically integrate potentially
incommensurable paradigms in a MMR approach (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2011) is unsupported
by empirical evidence. MMR scholars who accept the paradigm incommensurability thesis
instead argue for the parallel use of qualitative and quantitative methods.
While qualitative and quantitative social science research methods have found their
justifications in metaphysical arguments, MMR has been advocated on pragmatic grounds
(Morgan, 2007; Johnson et al., 2007). However, as a philosophy of science, pragmatism
(or instrumentalism) is essentially relativistic in the sense that it does not offer normative
advice, but instead reserves its judgment until resulting utilities may be compared
(Denzin, 2012; Russell, 1967). This, of course, may create difficulties with evaluating
research designs and outputs proactively, and in isolation from comparable studies
(Kuhn, 2012; Feyerabend, 1993). Given that pragmatist philosophies may range from realism
and weak pluralism to anti-realism and strong pluralism (neo-pragmatism), arguing for
“pragmatism of the middle” ( Johnson et al., 2007, p. 125) as the philosophical foundation of
MMR may be too much of a compromise. In any case, Denzin (2012) observes that most
MMR proponents adopt traditional as opposed to neo-pragmatism.
Given that the pragmatist approach to MMR rejects “the top-down privileging of
ontological assumptions” (Morgan, 2007, p. 68), MMR may be dominated by the qualitative
component and the corresponding interpretivist paradigm, the quantitative component and
the corresponding positivist paradigm, or it may be balanced by admitting equal status to
both components ( Johnson et al., 2007). Nevertheless, it is claimed that successful mixed
methods studies need to be able to integrate the qualitative and quantitative components, thus
producing novel insights that are not apparent when the individual components are
considered in isolation (Creswell and Tashakkori, 2007). It has been suggested that this may
be ensured by having at least one mixed research question (e.g. “what and how?,” “what and
why?”) (Tashakkori and Creswell, 2007). However, given that quantitative methods and the
underlying positivism still dominate top social/behavioral science journals (Lopez-Fernandez
and Molina-Azorin, 2011), and considering that a high proportion of MMR is quasi-mixed in
nature (Alise and Teddlie, 2010), it is perhaps unsurprising that some qualitative researchers
have referred to MMR as “positivism dressed in drag” (Giddings, 2006, p. 195). Such a view
gains a particular strength if qualitative approaches are largely used to inform subsequent
quantitative investigations (Lee, 1991).
3. Nomological prediction and explanation

According to positivism, social sciences should principally aim for nomological prediction
and explanation. Nomological predictions and explanations, which are considered logically
equivalent, logically link initial conditions (causes) with their effects via empirical Philosophy of
(potentially probabilistic) general laws (Hempel, 1942; Kincaid, 1990b). Thus, given an effect, social science
an explanation aims to identify its causes, whereas given a set of causes (initial conditions) a
prediction aims to determine their effects. In that context, scientific laws may be viewed as
regularities in nature that govern the course of events by logically linking causes with their
effects (Dowe, 2004; Schaffer, 2004). Laws identify causal factors (Kincaid, 2004), constrain
the scope of what is possible, support counterfactual conditionals (Mitchell, 1997), and
cannot be known a priori (Roberts, 2004). A causal factor (or partial cause) may be viewed
as an insufficient but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition
(Mackie, 1980). The most restrictive view of scientific laws, which only admits of
non-contingent regularities, excludes biology (which is contingent on evolutionary
dynamics) and by implication social science. However, while it may be obvious that
biology largely deals with contingent regularities (Brandon, 1997), it has been argued that
physics and chemistry also apply under boundary conditions, and depend on some basic
properties of the world that are not logically necessary (Mitchell, 1997; Mitchell, 2000).
Predictive power may be considered along at least three independent dimensions:
probability, quantity, and timing. Probabilistic theories (e.g. quantum physics) may not be
able to make definite predictions in individual cases, while at the same time being able to
make very accurate aggregate predictions (Hitchcock, 2004). With respect to quantitative
accuracy, a prediction may state that a magnitude will change, change by at least a certain
amount, change within definite limits, or change by a definite amount (Martin, 1994). Similar
considerations apply to the predicted timing of the change.
Explanations may be viewed as answers to context dependent “why” questions
(Van Fraassen, 1980). The power of an explanation may be evaluated with respect to at least
two dimensions, including: the extent to which the explanation can adequately answer any
given, fully specified question; and the number (or the breadth) of relevant questions the
explanation can answer (Kincaid, 1986; Popper, 1979). From a positivist point of view,
scientific explanations have two major constituents: the explanandum and the explanants
(Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948). The explanandum, which describes the phenomenon to be
explained, must logically follow from the explanans. The explanans, which account for the
phenomenon, specify a set of antecedent conditions and a set of general laws.
However, this reasoning does not necessarily translate to social science. For instance, such
laws are dependent on the antecedent conditions, which are much more numerous and
complex in the social sciences (Faber and Scheper, 2003). Furthermore, historians sharply
differentiate between historical explanations and future predictions; they consider
explanations and predictions logically different (Mink, 1966). This is partly based on the
assumption that the past consists of knowable facts, whereas future is indeterminate. If one
takes the possibility of conceptual innovation into account, the relationship between social
science explanations and predictions becomes asymmetrical (Taylor, 1974). In other words,
social sciences are then viewed as being largely retrospective/historical. The assumption that
explanations must be articulated in terms of laws has also been challenged (Salmon, 1994;
Kitcher, 1981; Van Fraassen, 1980). Armed with that challenge, others have argued that social
sciences can be deemed scientific, even though they may not produce any universal laws
(Roberts, 2004). Instead, merely being able to extrapolate claims from a particular
phenomenon to some other context may be considered sufficient (Mitchell, 2000).
According to Friedman (1953), the “ultimate goal of positive science is the development
of a ‘theory’ or ‘hypothesis’ that yields valid and meaningful (i.e. not truistic) predictions
about phenomena not yet observed” (p. 7). Yet, even though economics is arguably the most
developed social science (Kincaid, 1990b), many of its “laws” (e.g. a decline in the supply of a
commodity will lead to an increase in its price) that have been well confirmed under certain
assumptions and ceteris paribus clauses are arguably nothing more than tautologies, or
QRJ hedged laws (Roberts, 2004). In other words, since many of the basic principles are a priori
(Hitchcock, 2004), given enough assumptions and ceteris paribus clauses, such “laws” follow
deductively. Viewed as such, economics may be more favorably compared to mathematics
than to an empirical science of human behavior (Rosenberg, 1983). Nevertheless, although
tautologies (e.g. logic and mathematics) may not be useful for the purpose of prediction, they
may serve as specialized language used to systematize empirical phenomena (Friedman, 1953).
However, although the number of empirical facts is finite, the potential number of theories that
are consistent with empirical facts is infinite (Føllesdal, 1979). Thus, we can only show that a
theory works better than any competing theories, and/or that, although tested under a number
of conditions, a theory has not been falsified. No theory can ever be proved, or disproved
independently from auxiliary hypotheses. Given a choice of several theories with equal
predictive powers, Ockham has taught us to prefer simplicity. Of course, much of human
behavior is structured and predictable (at least probabilistically), and all natural science laws
apply under certain ceteris paribus conditions (Kincaid, 2004). But, given the complex and
dynamic nature of social phenomena, relevant ceteris paribus clauses are much more difficult to
identify, enumerate and specify (Salmon, 1990; Roberts, 2004).
4. Agency and structure

Nomological social science explanations and predictions may confer causal power on either
individuals or macro-level social structures (Durkheim, 1994). In other words, they may
adopt either methodological individualism or methodological holism. However, both
approaches, which by definition discount human agency, present a number of significant
challenges. Rational choice theory in neo-classical economics provides an example of
methodological individualism, whereas classical Marxism may be viewed as an example of
methodological holism. Although, the discussion about methodological individualism and
holism is in some respects similar to the discussion relating to the reduction of mental
phenomena to physical phenomena, this analogy should not be taken too far (Nelson, 1990;
Brodbeck, 1954). The strongest form of methodological individualism claims that any
explanation of social phenomena must solely rely on individuals, whereas the weakest form
only claims that some reference to individuals is a necessary condition for any full
explanation of social phenomena (Kincaid, 1986). To differentiate social science from
psychology, relevant explanations and predictions may deal with undesired or unexpected
macro-level consequences (Hayek, 1952). Hegel (2012) and his followers may on the other
hand be considered as advocates of one of the most extreme forms of metaphysical holism.
Methodological individualism may seem appealing since it is intuitive to attribute causal
power to individuals and to imagine testing causal relationships experimentally on
individuals. In other words, it may be argued that “all causal connections at the social level
operate through individualistic mechanisms” (Nelson, 1990, p. 195). Hayek (1952) adopts this
position and takes it further by arguing that social science is unavoidably subjective
because the underlying psychology, which largely relies on introspection, is also subjective.
In other words, one can differentiate between ideas that cause social phenomena and ideas
(theories) which people form about those phenomena. While the former may be treated
as “facts,” the latter “pseudo-entities” may not. Needless to say, others have disputed this
argument (Rudner, 1954). Arguments against methodological individualism include claims
that macro-level phenomena may be relatively independent of the underlying causal chain
(Miller, 1978). In other words, social phenomena may be realized via a variety of different
patterns of interactions between individuals (Kincaid, 1986). This is analogous to emergent
phenomena in complex systems (Goldstein, 1999), or attractors in chaotic systems
(Thietart and Forgues, 1995).
Critics have convincingly argued that understanding of social phenomena revolves
around human agency – reasons for intentional action – rather than cause-effect relationships
(Dray, 1979; Winch, 2002; Machlup, 1961; Davidson, 1994). Causal explanations, which Philosophy of
discount human agency, instead deal with bodily movements and non-intentional actions. social science
Positivists have argued that social science explanations that are explicated in terms of reasons
implicitly rely on causality and rest on underlying general laws (Fay, 1994). According to
that view, beliefs, reasons, and intentions should simply be considered as antecedent
conditions of causal explanations (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948). Positivists further claim
that such explanations often fail to differentiate between non-causal and causal reasons; e.g.
given the same reasons, two people may act differently (even the same person may act
differently at different times). Identifying “the” as opposed to “a” reason presupposes
certain underlying regularity (i.e. general laws). In other words, “a” reason merely provides an
interpretation. However, this point may be countered by arguing that only the primary reason
(comprising belief and desire) for an action, which need not entail any law-like properties, may
be viewed as its cause (Davidson, 1963). In other words, such primary reasons may function as
singular causes. This is because intentionality is only intelligible in the context of the complete
set of beliefs and desires, as well as in the context of social and physical conditions
(Nelson, 1990). The influence of the context of social and physical conditions on intentional
outcomes has been demonstrated in a number of well-known studies (Milgram, 1963;
Schachter and Singer, 1962). Some feminist critiques of normative gender differences follow
the same argument (Weisstein, 1971). As such, while one may be able to identify necessary
intentional conditions, identifying sufficient conditions may not be possible. The feasibility of
nomological social science laws is further undermined by the fact that preferences/desires
may be incomplete (i.e. multiple optima) as well as that there may be multiple
possible comparable means of satisfying each desire (i.e. multiple solutions) (Elster, 1994b).
With reference to optimal choice, it seems likely that there may be conditions when it
is not clear that the worst consequences of a preference are always better than the best
consequences of any other option.
Intentional explanations, which assume human agency, also presuppose rationality in
order to infer people’s beliefs and values from their actions, while at the same time
interpreting people’s actions in terms of their beliefs and values (Føllesdal, 1982; Elster,
1994b). Rationality may be defined in terms of efficient goal-directed behavior (Lukes, 1967).
Its basic assumptions include things like belief coherence and consistency (at a time and
over time), and utility maximization. When evaluating rationality, universal (truth and logic)
as well as context-dependent criteria may need to be taken into consideration. Some
rationality criteria seem to necessitate universality since all human (and some animal)
behavior is predicated on successful predictions about the world. Yet, additional contextual
criteria may decide whether certain beliefs are appropriate under given circumstances; in
other words, criteria for evaluating the strength of justification for holding a belief
(Elster, 1994b). Such contextual criteria may also contain an ethical component dealing with
the desirability of goals as such.
It may be assumed that humans have rationality as a norm. In other words, that once
irrationality has been pointed out to people, they will tend to adjust their beliefs and actions
as to make them more rational (Føllesdal, 1982). However, non-rational theories (Kahneman,
2011; Kahneman, 2003) that are grounded in regularities (Dore, 1961) pose significant
challenges to rational approaches to explanation. For instance, some have argued that
behavior of social actors may also be explained with reference to objective interests;
i.e. desires, goals, or needs, of agents which are not their reasons for action (Miller, 1978).
Thus, social sciences need to differentiate between theories presupposing perfect rationality,
bounded rationality, and non-rationality. Presuppositions of non-rationality give rise to
critical approaches (Fay and Moon, 1977; Fay, 1994). In contrast to social science, natural
science predictions, which have no systemic side-effects (Buck, 1963; Merton, 1968), do not
need to deal with value judgments or rationality.
QRJ We have already noted that intentionality is only intelligible in the context of the
encompassing conceptual system (Fay, 1994). However, due to the human capacity for
self-reflection and self-transformation, concepts that give rise to mental, and in turn social
phenomena, are in the state of continuous and unpredictable evolution (Collingwood, 1994).
Thus, whether theoretical constructs in the social sciences can be comprehensively defined
and operationalized is questionable (Faber and Scheper, 2003; Middendorp, 1991).
Furthermore, depending on its formulation and dissemination style, a social science
prediction may under certain conditions affect the system, thus, either becoming
self-fulfilling or self-defeating (Romanos, 1973; Buck, 1963). In addition to reflexive
predictions, the Rosenthal Effect has undoubtedly demonstrated that experimenter’s
expectations may influence study outcomes (Martin, 1977). Although not strictly in the same
category as reflexive predictions, the Rosenthal Effect has a similar reflexive nature.
Presupposing no infinite regress, prior knowledge and consideration of any such
effects may in principle (although not necessarily in practice) make some social science
predictions more accurate (Simon, 1954). While the relatively slow pace of conceptual
evolution implies that identifying temporary (and culturally dependent) generalizations may
be possible, hoping for anything more than that would presuppose the end of history
(Fukuyama, 2006), and could be oppressive in character (Deutsch, 2011; Rabinow and
Sullivan, 1987; Hirschman, 1970). Critical theory embraces human capacity for reflexivity by
aiming to investigate regularities in the social phenomena, not with a view of identifying
universal laws, but with the objective of human enlightenment and emancipation, so that
such regularities can be circumvented if so desired (Wylie, 1992). To paraphrase Marx
(1994), the point is not simply to interpret the world, but to change it.
A variation of the classical argument against skepticism maintains that this limitation is
self-contradictory (Nagel, 1994). The critique turns the limitation against itself from the
sociology of science point of view by maintaining that it is making a universal argument, the
possibility of which it is denying. However, one may argue in response that the limitation,
which is philosophical in nature, applies to empirical social science, but not to rational
philosophical arguments (i.e. to itself). Arguments which claim that conceptual evolution may
not necessarily undermine predictive power as long as conceptual extension is maintained
seem to confound physical and social concepts (Martin, 1994). Although physical concepts
may change meaning while preserving extension (e.g. the meaning of the Sun through history),
it is not clear how this analogy could apply to social concepts, which do not have extension
per se. Arguments that conceptual change itself could be predicted also seem unconvincing.
However, others have argued that this point may not be unique to social sciences, since all
sciences interpret the data using previously defined categories (Kincaid, 2004).
Adopting methodological holism, positivist social science explanations and predictions
may take the form of structural functionalism. Functionalism may be viewed as teleological
since it aims to explain phenomena in terms of their contribution toward the preservation of a
biological or social system. In other words, it maintains that phenomena exist because of their
effects (Kincaid, 1990a). If exclusively adopted, functionalism may also presuppose “the best
of all possible worlds” and thus also be theological in nature (Elster, 1994a); in such case no
phenomena are accidental (i.e. all phenomena are seen as being meaningful and beneficial).
As such, functionalism has been criticized on the ground that relevant explanation frequently
implicitly assume some optimal system state, that they frequently ignore possible functional
alternatives (i.e. presuppose necessity), that they frequently omit relevant auxiliary conditions
(i.e. presuppose sufficiency), that they fail to generate testable predictions, and that they are
frequently trivial or tautological (Hempel, 1994). It is not difficult to see why functional
explanations may be tautological. If the explained phenomenon is part of a system to which
survival it provides a unique contribution, it follows that the survival of the phenomenon itself
is dependent on its continuing contribution to the survival of the system.
While it may be argued that functional explanations rest on causal laws (Hempel, 1994), Philosophy of
this relationship is potentially complicated (Dore, 1961; Cohen, 1994). For instance, social science
explaining a micro phenomenon (a cause) in terms of its effects on the macro system does
not necessarily say anything about how the phenomenon came to be in the first place
(Elster, 1994a). Furthermore, although functional explanations are usually advanced in the
context of complex social systems, they frequently assume simple two-variable interactions
(Kincaid, 1990a). Based on the nature of complex systems, such assumptions are
questionable at best. Nevertheless, functional explanations should not necessarily be
entirely discounted as they may be useful and appropriate in some contexts; e.g., explaining
an archeological artefact in terms of its function (Salmon, 1990). Arguably, functional
explanations are most suitable when used within a framework of random mutation and
natural selection (Cohen, 1994). Basic functional explanations that do not explain the
underlying mechanism are not entirely insignificant, but may instead be viewed as potential
opening for future research. However, absent the underlying mechanism, and given the
non-experimental nature of most such studies, it is questionable whether such correlates are
explanatory; i.e., they may be spurious (Elster, 1994a).
If the purpose of social science is to identify correlational and/or causal relationships
between macro-level social phenomena then arguments for methodological individualism
are beside the point (Kincaid, 1986). Furthermore, individual actions only make sense in a
social context (Kincaid, 1986). For instance, any explanation pertaining to the social realm,
even if underpinned by individuals, nevertheless requires the use of socially constructed
constructs, such as roles and institutions (Lukes, 1968). Consequently, it is unclear what an
explanation purely based on methodological individualism would look like. On the other
hand, given the difficulty/impossibility of experimentally manipulating macro-level social
phenomena, demonstrating causation at that level may be very difficult, if not impossible.
This difficulty does not necessarily apply to demonstrating correlation.
The dichotomy between methodological individualism and holism is difficult to justify,
since social phenomena are not merely epiphenomenal, but may instead affect psychological
phenomena (through socialization), which in turn give rise to social phenomena
(Watkins, 1957). In other words, “to ask which is cause and which effect is as futile as
the problem of the hen and the egg” (Russell, 1967, p. 597). Thus, the question at hand is
different from similar questions in physical sciences; e.g., whether chemistry is reducible to
physics. Structuration theory (Giddens, 2013) provides a bridge between individual agency
and structural forces. It may be argued that social phenomena are difficult to predict
precisely because of this two-way relationship. This aspect is also demonstrated by an
apparent contradiction in Marxism; although the descriptive aspect is structural/functional
in nature (Cohen, 1994), the normative aspect embraces human agency (i.e. is revolutionary).
This contradiction may be dismissed by claiming that even the descriptive aspect of
Marxism relies on micro-level (individualist) phenomena (Little, 1994). Nevertheless, there is
always the possibility that although individuals could collectively benefit by positively
affecting macro-level structures, concerted action may not actualize in practice because of
potential risks (e.g. in a revolutionary context) that individuals themselves may face.
In other words, individual interests may not always align with collective interests.
5. Complexity
If we define complexity in terms of the number of independent variables comprising a model
(Hayek, 1964; Scriven, 1994), we may expect that theories in the social sciences would be
more complex than theories in the natural sciences (Machlup, 1961). Post qualitative social
scholars talk about a “mangle of people, discourse, matter, and nature” that leads to a
“dynamic space and time of becoming, emerging, unfolding, and of moving, connecting,
diverging” (Greene, 2013, p. 751). However, critics have argued that social phenomena are
QRJ not complex as such, because the level of complexity is a function of the level of description
(McIntyre, 1993). This view, which maintains that social phenomena are in principle are no
different from physical phenomena, also claims that a priori arguments against nomological
laws in any possible descriptive framework are invalid. However, given that social sciences
deal with socially constructed phenomena, any radical redescription (e.g. in terms of
psychological, biological, or physical phenomena) is bound to change the subject matter and
lead to semantic attenuation, or even incommensurability. For instance, even if complex
(higher-level) constructs could be mapped to causally connected underlying (lower-level)
elements, given their different levels of description, it does not necessarily follow that
complex constructs could also be nomologically reduced to their underlying elements
(Davidson, 1994). In other words, in the context of social science, any general laws may not
be statable using the conceptual system used in the explanation, since “Phenomena as such
are never explained, but only phenomena as described in some way” (Fay, 1994, p. 97).
Accordingly, we may accept token-physicalism without accepting type-physicalism
(Fodor, 1974).
Others have argued that complexity does not necessarily exclude social scientific laws
(Fodor, 1974). For instance, when aggregated, some level of psychological indeterminacy
may by the means of the law of averages nevertheless lead to predictable social patterns
(Nelson, 1990). Accordingly, while social sciences that deal with organized complexity
(e.g. organization science) may not be able to accurately predict the evolution of a specific
complex system (e.g. the future performance of an organization), they may nevertheless still
be able to provide contextual probabilistic predictions pertaining to a collection of a large
number of such complex systems (e.g. the average success rate of an organization of a
particular type). This is because complexity leads to the emergence of new abstract patterns
that are independent of the particular values of the underlying elements (Fodor, 1974);
complex wholes are defined through such self-maintaining recurrent patterns (Simon, 1991).
As such, complex phenomena may not lend themselves to predictions of specific
configurations (Searle, 1984). Instead, one may only be able to predict the occurrence of
certain types of phenomena (abstract patterns), which may be compatible with a potentially
large number of specific configurations (Hayek, 1964). As a result, such theories may not be
easily falsifiable. A consequence of this is that intentional discourse may only lend itself to
temporary heteronomic generalizations (Davidson, 1980) instead of precise causal general
laws (Fay, 1994; Searle, 1984). Arguments from analogy that attack this view by
equating social constructs with computer science (logical) and/or biological constructs
(Kincaid, 1990b) may be making a category-mistake (Ryle, 1949).
Another reason why nomological theories that have proven so successful in the realm of
the natural phenomena are not applicable to organized complexity (Weaver, 1948)
underpinning social phenomena (Weber, 1949) is because, in contrast to controlled
laboratory experiments in the natural sciences, a complete and accurate specification of all
relevant initial conditions is not practically feasible in the context of uncontrolled social
(Machlup, 1961; Hayek, 1964) or psychological (Davidson, 1994) phenomena. For instance, it
has been argued that almost any event in a person’s life can have an effect on almost any
other event (Hayek, 1964). Additionally, social sciences lack the sort of constants that
underpin some natural sciences (Machlup, 1961). Nevertheless, the distinction based on the
ability to control experimental conditions is somewhat idealized, since that ability is a
matter of degree (Friedman, 1953). For instance, some natural sciences (e.g. astronomy) do
not make use of controlled experiments at all.
Social scientists usually artificially reduce complexity by discounting independent
variables through simplifying assumptions. Generally speaking, the more abstract the
theoretical construct the more suitable it may be for the formulation of social scientific
“laws.” However, given that such highly abstract constructs by necessity exclude much
relevant detail, their predictive power is severely limited (Weber, 1949). While, generally Philosophy of
speaking, continual progress in the explanatory and predictive power in various social social science
sciences should be possible, this may not equally apply to every case and to an indefinitely
high degree of approximation (Scriven, 1994; Davidson, 1994).
6. Social science and the humanities

Gadamer and Fantel (1975) define interpretation as a reflexive posture toward tradition, which
refuses to naively follow traditionally assumed values and truths. The development of such
historical consciousness is said to negate relativism, instead justifying the development of
objective knowledge (Dilthey, 1991). Viewing man as a self-interpreting animal (Taylor, 1974)
“suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun” (Geertz, 1973, p. 4), interpretive
human sciences aim to contribute to human self-understanding (Gadamer and Fantel, 1975).
By presupposing that all inquiry necessarily proceeds from a specific situation, interpretive
approaches seek to merge descriptive social sciences with the normative humanities (Rabinow
and Sullivan, 1987). Accordingly, they have a much closer relationship to philosophy than
positivist natural sciences (Gadamer and Fantel, 1975).
Interpretivism aims to break out of the extant subjective conceptual frameworks by
redescribing and clarifying phenomena via novel constructs. According to Rancière (2007),
interpreting the world is already a means of transforming or reconfiguring it. Similarly,
Norman Denzin argues that:
As global citizens, we are no longer called to just interpret the world, which was the mandate of
traditional qualitative inquiry. Today, we are called to change the world and to change it in
ways that resist injustice while celebrating freedom and full, inclusive, participatory democracy
(Denzin, 2016, p. 103).
Although positivist (hypothetico-deductive) approaches may start by creatively generating
novel concepts and theories, these are invariably empirically tested via their explicit
correlations with extant subjective conceptual frameworks. Interpretive approaches on the
other hand may be content with remaining within the alternative conceptual framework,
without necessarily explicitly linking it to subjective accounts. As such, positivist approaches
can at best inform us about how individuals perceive the world, whereas interpretive
approaches aim to offer alternative accounts of seeing the world (Rancière, 2007).
Inspired by textual interpretation, interpretivism situates meanings within the context of
the cultural world (Rabinow and Sullivan, 1987). In contrast to positivism, which considers
explanation and prediction as logically equivalent (Hempel, 1942), interpretivism
presupposes that human/social sciences are largely about ex post explanation rather than
prediction (Taylor, 1974). This presupposition is predicated on two assumptions. First, that
some aspects of the conceptual framework employed in such explanations would not have
existed at the time a prediction was required, but would have been developed either within
the course of the said phenomena or during the process of explanation/interpretation.
Second, that we never understand a phenomenon per se, but only as described (Martin, 1969;
Roth, 1988).
Interpretivism also assumes a distinction between meaning and expression, and
views clarification of subjective meaning through re-expression as its primary objective
(Taylor, 1974). However, what exactly meaning is, is a difficult question (Taylor, 1980).
Nevertheless, we can say that meanings are subjective (they are for a subject), they are of
something, and that they only make sense in relation to other meanings (Taylor, 1974).
The third point implies that the meaning of a particular phenomenon can change if
meanings of related phenomena change.
Interpretivism views meaning as depending on cognitive (Kant, 1998) and social (Berger
and Luckmann, 1991) aspects. For instance, any semiotic (Saussure, 1983; Peirce, 1998)
QRJ activity involves pragmatic considerations (Morris, 1938). An obvious example is the
difference between literal and intended (or figurative) meanings, but this also applies to
other-than-language semiotic activities. For instance, material substances may be viewed as
a combination of matter and immaterial form (Cohen, 2014). The claim that interpretation is
an aspect of human activity, and as such is not limited to social sciences, but also applies to
natural sciences (Martin, 1994), confounds the issue of theory-laden observation and
inter-paradigm incommensurability (Kuhn, 2012). For instance, ideologies (religious and
secular) affect how their adherents interpret the world (Lukes, 1967). Interpretation between
paradigms encounters two possible difficulties: interpretation of signifiers found in one
paradigm but not the other; and interpretation of signifiers that are found in both
paradigms, but relate to different signifieds.
Analogous to the claim that physics is the natural science par excellence (Kincaid, 1990b),
history has been put forward as the archetypal social science, since its objective is not to
merely discover events, but to understand the reasoning they embody (Collingwood, 1994);
in other words, to construct rational explanations (Dray, 1979). Others have claimed that
history is more akin to poetry (Mink, 1966). Historians, it is claimed, achieve reflective
equilibrium (Rawls, 2009) though the process of critical interpretation, whereby they
attempt to reconstruct thought processes of historical individuals in the context of their own
background knowledge. A contrasting view claims that since historical explanation
selectively identify and relate relevant events (i.e. some events are thought to have led to
others) they must also rely on causal or probabilistic laws (Hempel, 1994). However, whether
it makes sense to talk about laws with reference to unique historical phenomena is
questionable (Roth, 1988).
Nevertheless, objectively (inter-subjectively) justifying subjective hermeneutic accounts
can be problematic, since each meaning needs to be interpreted in terms of other meanings
(Derrida, 1998), thus, forming a hermeneutic circle (Taylor, 1974). In other words,
inter-subjectivity presupposes a foundation of shared understanding (language), which
itself is rooted in social practice (Berger and Luckmann, 1991; Wittgenstein, 2001; Gadamer
and Fantel, 1975). Accordingly, Gadamer and Fantel (1975) sum up hermeneutics as follows:
“What can we make of the fact that one and the same message transmitted by tradition will
be grasped differently on every occasion, that it is only understood relative to the concrete
historical situation of its recipient?” (p. 24).
Hermeneutics does not offer a way out when two competing interpretations collide
(Wylie, 1992; Taylor, 1974). In view of that, interpretive anthropological accounts prefer
ethnographic thick descriptions of semiotic distinctions over theoretical abstractions
(Geertz, 1973). With Heidegger, for whom pre-reflective understanding precedes
interpretation, the hermeneutic circle is applied to the relationship between human
self-understanding and the understanding of the world (Ramberg and Gjesdal, 2013).
Hermeneutics has also been described as “the hypothetico-deductive method applied to
meaningful material” (Føllesdal, 1979, p. 319). For instance, the notion of simplicity in relation
to scientific theories has been linked with the notion of unitary interpretation found in literary
theory. However, this analogy should not be taken too literally since hermeneutical
interpretations are largely inductive/retrospective, operating in a relatively narrow context
(text). In other words, they do not make any novel predictions that could be tested in different
contexts, but instead merely aim for internal consistency (coherence).
7. Toward critical social science

By largely ignoring intentional concepts, positivist approaches to social science take
meaning for granted (Fay and Moon, 1977; Taylor, 1974). As such, they are limited to
identifying correlations between behaviors and subjective accounts, and are unable to tell us
anything about intersubjective (objective) meanings and institutions (Taylor, 1974). This is
a limitation that interpretive (hermeneutical) approaches aim to overcome. However, pure Philosophy of
humanistic approaches, which largely take rationality and conceptual commensurability for social science
granted (Davidson, 1994; Whorf and Carroll, 1956), predominantly focus on deriving
particular meanings through interpretation, at the expense of generating general causal
theories (Taylor, 1974; Weber, 1949). Yet, according to pluralism, not only are positivism and
interpretivism compatible, they may be two sides of the same coin (Povee and Roberts, 2015;
Truscott et al., 2010). Critical approaches (e.g. Marxism and Feminism), which may adopt
either perspective, contain an ethical component (are normative in nature), and have
radically different objectives, namely, human liberation and emancipation (Martin and
McIntyre, 1994; Fay and Moon, 1977; Howard and Brady, 2015).
Critical theory aims to raise awareness of dominant ideologies in order to further human
emancipation:
Qualitative research scholars have an obligation to change the world, to engage in ethical work that
makes a positive difference. They are challenged to confront the facts of injustice, to make the
injustices of history visible, and hence open to change and transformation (Denzin, 2016, p. 115).
As such, critical approaches embrace free-will and are progressive in outlook. As a result, it has
been argued that research methods as used in positivist social sciences and/or natural sciences
are unsuitable for critical approaches (Comstock, 1982). Instead, the argument goes, critical
methods should treat social reality as a social construction. On the other hand, one may argue
that presupposing social construction does not necessarily entirely invalidate positivistic
approaches to research, since it does not diminish the reality of the constructed world.
Compared to natural sciences, social construction at most lays some constraints on the validity
of findings in the social sphere; i.e., they are not expected to be invariable. While interpretive
approaches are required in order to reinterpret reality, positivist (empirical-analytic)
approaches may be required to justify the need for change. Critical MMR may “be used in
the service of transformative social justice projects” to inspire “generative politics and dialogic
democracy” and help “shape realistic utopian dreams” (Denzin, 2012, p. 80).
In any case, the progressive nature of critical social science suggests partiality. In other
words, critical findings by definition cannot be value neutral. It quickly becomes obvious
that critical approaches are not equally applicable to all contemporary social sciences.
Most applicable are those disciplines with the strongest ethical component and most scope
for emancipation (e.g. political and cultural sciences), while least applicable are the more
instrumental sciences with a negligible ethical element (e.g. management and organization
science). Or putting it differently, critical approaches presuppose an oppressed class with
progressive tendencies. As such, the overall outlook of critical social science is clearly
different from the outlook positivist approaches inherited from the natural sciences.
One of the most frequent criticisms of critical social science is that value judgments have
a strong influence on problem selection, identification of facts, assessment of evidence, and
the forming of conclusions (Nagel, 1994; Kuhn, 2012; Wylie, 1994). This point may be
particularly obvious with reference to feminist research (Wylie, 1992), but it equally applies
to any other social science. For instance, it has been argued that explanatory frameworks in
political science invariably presuppose normative positions (Taylor, 1967). With respect to
problem selection, it is difficult to argue with the fact that social scientists focus on problems
they deem socially important and/or culturally significant. Thus, given the infinite
complexity of the socio-historical context, it must be admitted that value judgments
determine which phenomena (problems and facts) are singled out (Weber, 1949; Roth, 1988).
However, the same argument can be directed at natural scientists, since they also
presumably predominantly focus on problems they find interesting. No scientist randomly
selects problems and relevant facts. Having accepted the premise that all scientists use
value judgments of one sort or another to select relevant problems and facts, it does not
QRJ necessarily follow that the resulting findings are entirely subjective. It may be argued that
any subjective elements, which play a part in natural as well as social sciences, “through the
self-corrective mechanisms of science as a social enterprise” (Nagel, 1994) eventually
converge on something that may be called objective, or intersubjective (Gewirth, 1954).
8. The post-qualitative turn

Critiquing the ontological assumptions of traditional qualitative research, largely from the
perspective of French postmodern thinkers, including Foucault (1970), Derrida (1998),
Baudrillard (1994), Lyotard (1984), and Deleuze and Guattari (1988), post-qualitative scholars
tend to privilege “knowing over being,” argue against “representational and binary logics,”
and for greater entanglement between “Self/Other, subject/object, and human/non-human”
(Lather and Pierre, 2013, p. 630). They tend to prefer semiotics and Deleuzian ontology over
phenomenology, and focus on “connections rather than oppositions, movement rather than
categorization, and becoming rather than being” (Pierre, 2013, p. 653). Lather (2013) notes that
such inquiry, which “might produce different knowledge and produce knowledge differently,”
cannot be “tidily described in textbooks or handbooks” (p. 635). Following Deleuze (2004),
MacLure (2013) advocates focusing on ineffable “sense,” which “works as a sort of “mobius
strip” between language and the world” (p. 658). Others, also adopting ideas from Deleuze and
Guattari focus on rhizomes, “ever-growing horizontal networks of connections among
heterogeneous nodes of discursive and material force” (Martin and Kamberelis, 2013, p. 670).
These ideas, which are notoriously difficult to understand, are much closer to philosophy than
to science as commonly understood, and while growing in popularity, they currently form a
very small minority of the social science literature.
9. Conclusion
As evidenced by the continuing dominance of positivism and quantitative research
methods, many, perhaps most, practicing social scientists tacitly accept unqualified
adoption of natural science as a role model for social science. A consequence of this state of
affairs is the paradoxical tacit denial of human agency and the capacity for critical
self-reflection, the very denial of our humanity and arguably our special status in the
universe. Social sciences can and ought to do more.
Although positivistic natural sciences have been used as a model for the still dominant
quantitative research in the social sciences, in contrast to natural sciences, social sciences
have arguably failed to produce almost any universally valid theories/explanations
(Faber and Scheper, 2003). This theoretical paper explored a range of potential reasons for
that “failure.”
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Qualitative Research Journal

A philosophical discussion of qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods

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3. Nomological prediction and explanation

4. Agency and structure

6. Social science and the humanities

7. Toward critical social science

8. The post-qualitative turn

and benefits of a constructivist pedagogy”, International Journal of Social Research Methodology,

post-qualitative methodology”, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education,

Ramberg, B. and Gjesdal, K. (2013), “Hermeneutics”, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/

No. 4, pp. 317-328.

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