1. LUMAYAG V.
NEMEÑO (2007)
[ G.R. NO. 162112, JULY 03, 2007 ]
SUMMARY
Jacinto, joined by his 5 children conveyed to his daughter
Felipa and the latter’s husband Domingo Lumayag the 2
parcels of land. The instrument of conveyance is denominated
as Deed of Sale with Pacto De Retro.
It was stipulated that the consideration for the alleged sale of
the 2 lots was P20,000.00 and that the vendors a retro have
the right to repurchase the same lots within five 5 years from
the date of the execution of the instrument on February 25,
1985. It was likewise agreed thereunder that in the event no
purchase is effected within the said stipulated period of five (5)
years “conveyance shall become absolute and irrevocable
without the necessity of drawing up a new absolute deed of
sale, subject to the requirements of law regarding
consolidation of ownership of real property.”
The spouses Lumayag filed a petition in the RTC for the
reconstitution of the owner’s duplicate covering one of the two
lots subject in the Deed of Sale of Pacto De Retro.
The spouses alleged that the property was in their possession
but the respondent heirs contended that the actual possession
and custody was in their brother, Meliton.
ISSUE: WON the Pacto de Retro Sale is an Equitable
mortgage?
RULING: YES. Because:
1.) The supposed price for the sale with pacto de retro is
unusually inadequate for the 2 parcels of land.
2.) Respondents heirs remained in possession of the
subject properties even after the execution of the
subject deed of sale with right to repurchase.
3.) Not only did respondent heirs retain possession of the
subject properties, they also paid for the realty taxes of
the same. Indeed, as the trial court found the
transaction was one of an equitable mortgage;
4.) The stipulation in the subject deed reading: “if we fail to
exercise our rights to repurchase as herein granted
within the period stipulated, then this conveyance shall
become absolute and irrevocable without the necessity
of drawing a new absolute Deed of Sale, subject to the
requirements of law regarding consolidation of
ownership of real property,” - is considered a pactum
commissorium. The inclusion of such stipulation in the
deed shows the intention to mortgage rather than to
sell.
FACTS:
During the lifetime of the spouses Jacinto Nemeño and
Dalmacia Dayangco-Nemeño, predecessors-in-interest of the
herein respondent heirs, owned two (2) parcels of coconut land
located in Manaca, Ozamiz City. In 1979, Dalmacia died
survived by her husband, Jacinto, and their six children, to wit:
Meliton, Eleuteria, Timoteo, Justo, Saturnino (now deceased)
and Felipa. Jacinto died while undergoing treatment at the
MHARS General Hospital in Ozamiz City.
Jacinto, joined by his five (5) children, namely, Meliton,
Eleuteria, Timoteo, Justo and Saturnino, conveyed to his
daughter Felipa and the latter’s husband Domingo Lumayag the
Lot Nos. 4049 and 4035 C-4. The instrument of conveyance is
denominated as Deed of Sale with Pacto De Retro.
Thereunder, it was stipulated that the consideration for the
alleged sale of the two (2) aforementioned lots was Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and that the vendors a retro
have the right to repurchase the same lots within five (5) years
from the date of the execution of the instrument on February 25,
1985. It was likewise agreed thereunder that in the event no
purchase is effected within the said stipulated period of five (5)
years “conveyance shall become absolute and irrevocable
without the necessity of drawing up a new absolute deed of
sale, subject to the requirements of law regarding consolidation
of ownership of real property.”
More than a decade later, the spouses Domingo Lumayag and
Felipa Nemeño-Lumayag filed with the RTC of Ozamiz City a
petition for the reconstitution of the owner’s duplicate covering
Lot No. 4049, one of the two lots subject of the earlier Deed of
Sale with Pacto De Retro.
In that petition, the Lumayags alleged that said owner’s of the
property was in Domingo’s possession but the same was lost
when a typhoon hit and destroyed the couple’s house. The
petition was opposed by the other heirs of Jacinto and Dalmacia
who claimed that the owner’s duplicate copy of the same OCT
was actually in the possession and custody of their brother
Meliton Nemeño, the administrator of the property, when it was
burned in a fire. In an order dated December 20, 1996,[4] the
RTC resolved said petition by ordering the issuance of a new
owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 0-1743 and its delivery to
the heirs of Jacinto and Dalmacia.
Such were the state of things when, on December 24, 1996, in
the same RTC, the heirs of Jacinto and Dalmacia, namely, their
children Meliton, Eleuteria, Timoteo and Justo and
grandchildren Ricky and Daisy who are the heirs of Saturnino,
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the respondent heirs) filed
against the spouses Domingo Lumayag and Felipa N. Lumayag
a complaint[5] for Declaration of Contract as Equitable
Mortgage, Accounting and Redemption with Damages
Essentially, the complaint alleged that the subject Deed of Sale
with Pacto De Retro was executed only for the purpose of
securing the payment of a loan of P20,000.00 obtained from
the defendant spouses in connection with the medication and
hospitalization of the then ailing Jacinto Nemeño
ISSUE
Whether or not the Pacto de Retro Sale is an Equitable
mortgage?
RULING:
● YES. In the instant case, it's held that the deed of sale with
pacto de retro is actually an equitable mortgage.
● Article 1602 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances
when a contract, regardless of its nomenclature, may be
presumed to be an equitable mortgage, to wit:
1. When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is
unusually inadequate;
2. When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or
otherwise;
3. When upon or after the expiration of the right to
repurchase another instrument extending the period of
redemption or granting a new period is executed;
4. When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the
purchase price;
5. When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the
thing sold;
6. In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the
real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall
secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any
other obligation.
● Article 1604 of the Civil Code provides that the provisions of
Article 1602 shall also apply to a contract purporting to be an
absolute sale, and, in case of doubt, a contract purporting to
be a sale with right to repurchase shall be construed as an
equitable mortgage
● For one, the supposed price for the sale with pacto de retro
in the amount of P20,000.00 is unusually inadequate for the
two (2) parcels of land, the total area of which is almost 5.5
hectares.
● Also, respondents heirs remained in possession of the
subject properties even after the execution of the subject
deed of sale with right to repurchase.
● If the transaction was really a sale with right to repurchase,
as claimed by the petitioners, then the latter should have
asserted their rights for the immediate delivery of the lots to
them instead of allowing some of the respondents to freely
stay in the premises. Well-settled to the point of being
elementary is the doctrine that where the vendor remains in
physical possession of the land as lessee or otherwise, the
contract should be treated as an equitable mortgage
● Not only did [respondent heirs] retain possession of the
subject properties, they also paid for the realty taxes of the
same. Indeed, as the trial court found the transaction was
one of an equitable mortgage.
● Moreover, the parties intended to enter into an equitable
mortgage is further accentuated by respondents’ continued
payment of the real property taxes subsequent to the alleged
sale. Payment of those taxes is a usual burden attached to
ownership and when, as here, such payment is coupled with
2. Vda de Delfin vs. Dellota, G.R. No. 143697, January
28, 2008
FACTS
During her lifetime, Dionisia Dorado Delfin, herein
petitioner, represented by her heirs, was the registered
owner of a lot in Capiz. She executed an "Escritura De
continuous possession of the property, it constitutes
evidence of great weight that a person under whose name
the realty taxes were declared has a valid and rightful claim
over the land.
● Lastly, the stipulation in the subject deed reading: “if we fail
to exercise our rights to repurchase as herein granted within
the period stipulated, then this conveyance shall become
absolute and irrevocable without the necessity of drawing a
new absolute Deed of Sale, subject to the requirements of
law regarding consolidation of ownership of real property,” -
is considered a pactum commissorium.
● This stipulation is contrary to the nature of a true pacto de
retro sale since in such sale, ownership of the property sold
is immediately transferred to the vendee a retro upon
execution of the sale, subject only to the repurchase of a
vendor a retro within the stipulated period. Undoubtedly, the
aforementioned stipulation is a pactum commissorium
because it enables the mortgagee to acquire ownership of
the mortgaged properties without need of any foreclosure
proceedings which is a nullity being contrary to the
provisions of Article 2088 of the Civil Code. Indeed, the
inclusion of such stipulation in the deed shows the intention
to mortgage rather than to sell.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE the SC decision on the the instant petition is
DENIED, and the assailed decision and resolution of the CA in
CA-G.R. CV No. 63230 are AFFIRMED
Venta Con Pacto de Retro" over a 50,000-square
meter portion of her lot in favor of spouses Ildefonso
Dellota and Patricia Delfin which she failed to
exercise her right of redemption.
Subsequently, she sold another portion of her lot
consisting of 50,000 sqm to Gumersindo Deleña
(respondent herein represented by his estate), as
evidenced by a notarized "Deed of Sale with Right of
Redemption," thus, leaving an unsold area of more
than 43,000 square meters.
Then, Dionisia executed a "Deed of Mortgage and
Promise To Sell" in favor of Salvador Dellota over a
90,000-square meter portion of her lot, however, it was
not specified whether it included the 50,000-square
portion sold to Gumersindo Delena.
Thereafter, Dionisia filed with the then Court of First
Instance a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages, respondent Salvador Dellota was impleaded
as defendant.
The CFI rendered its Decision ordering defendant
Dellota to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the 40,000sqm
portion of the lot after payment by Delfin for the amount
of 2,000. The CFI also declared the ownership of the
remaining 50,000 sqm portion of the lot in favor of
Gumersinda Delena.
The CA affirmed such decision.
Hence, the present petition where Dionisia’s heirs
contend that the sale with right of redemption entered
into by by Dionisia and Gumersindo is an equitable
mortgage under Article 1602 of the Civil Code. They
insist that the price of P5,300.00 for a five-hectare
portion of the lot is grossly inadequate which shows
that the contract is an equitable mortgage, not a sale
with right of redemption.
ISSUE
The issue in this case is whether the sale is an
equitable mortgage.
RULING
NO. What should be determined in this case is whether
the consideration of P5,300.00 paid by Gumersindo to
Dionisa for a five-hectare portion of the lot on June 9,
1949 is "unusually inadequate."
In De Ocampo and Custodio v. Lim, the Court held that
in sales denominated as pacto de retro, the price
agreed upon should not generally be considered as the
just value of the thing sold, absent other corroborative
evidence. This is because, on the part of the vendor,
the right to repurchase the land makes it immaterial to
him whether or not the price of the sale is the just value
thereof. As for the vendee, the price does not induce
him to enter into the contract as he does not acquire
the thing irrevocably.
Subsequently, in Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals,
the Court ruled that there is no requirement in sales
that the price be equal to the exact value of the thing
subject matter of the sale.
Therefore, following De Ocampo and Buenaventura,
the Court held that there is no cogent reason to
conclude that the 1949 price of P5,300.00 as agreed
upon by the parties was unreasonable or unusually
inadequate.
Also, Dionisia failed to prove before the trial court that
the price agreed upon by the parties in 1949 was
grossly inadequate.
Now, even assuming that the contract of sale with right
to repurchase executed by Dionisia and Gumersindo in
1949 is an equitable mortgage, the fact remains that
from 1949 up to the filing of the complaint in 1964, or a
period of 15 years, she failed to redeem the property
 The Court defined equitable mortgage as one which,
although lacking in some formality, or form, or words,
or other requisites demanded by a statute,
nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to
charge real property as security for a debt, and
contains nothing impossible or contrary to... law. The
essential requisites of an equitable mortgage are: (1)
the parties enter into what appears to be a contract of
sale, (2) but their intention is to secure an existing debt
by way of mortgage.
According to Art. 1602 of the Civil Code a contract shall
be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any,
among others, of the following cases: (1) When the
price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually
inadequate.
The Court stated that there is gross inadequacy
in price if a reasonable man will not agree to dispose of
his property. However, citing De Ocampo and Custodio
v. Lim, they held that in sales denominated as pacto de
retro, the price agreed upon should not generally be
considered as the just value of the thing sold, absent
other corroborative evidence.
Also, citing Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals, the
Court ruled that there is no requirement in sales that
the price be equal to the exact value of the thing
subject matter of the sale.
FACTS
In her lifetime, the late Dionisia Dorado Delfin, herein
petitioner, represented by her heirs, was the registered owner of
a lot in Panitan, Capiz with an area of 143,935 square meters
Dionisia executed an "Escritura De Venta Con Pacto de Retro"
over a 50,000-square meter portion of her lot in favor of
spouses Ildefonso Dellota and Patricia Delfin. However, Dionisia
failed to exercise her right of redemption.
Then, Dionisia sold another portion of her lot consisting of
50,000 square meters to Gumersindo Deleña (respondent
herein represented by his estate), as evidenced by a notarized
"Deed of Sale with Right of Redemption," thus, leaving an
unsold area of more than 43,000 square meters.
Dionisia never redeemed this 50,000-square meter portion from
Gumersindo Delena. Records show that Salvador Dellota (also
a respondent represented by his heirs) leased this area from
Gumersindo.
Subsequently, Dionisia executed a "Deed of Mortgage and
Promise To Sell" in favor of Salvador over a 90,000-square
meter portion of her lot, however, it was not specified whether it
included the 50,000-square portion sold (with right of
redemption) to Gumersindo Delena.
Thereafter, Dionisia filed with the then Court of First Instance a
complaint for recovery of possession and damages with an
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Impleaded as defendant was respondent Salvador D. Dellota,
represented by his wife Genoveva D. Dellota and their children.
After the hearing/proceedings lasting for almost three decades,
the trial court rendered its Decision Ordering defendant Dellota
to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the 40,000-square meter portion
of the lots after plaintiffs shall have paid the defendant the
amount of P2,000;
The CFI also declared the ownership of the remaining 50,000
square meter portion of the lot in favor of Gumersinda Delena.
The CA affirmed such decision.
Hence, the present petition where Dionisia’s heirs contend that
the sale with right of redemption entered into by by Dionisia and
Gumersindo is an equitable mortgage under Article 1602 of the
Civil Code. They insist that the price of P5,300.00 for a five-
hectare portion of the lot is grossly inadequate which shows that
the contract is an equitable mortgage, not a sale with right of
redemption.
ISSUE
Whether the sale is an equitable mortgage
RULING
NO. The Court defined what an equitable mortgage is. It
is defined as one which, although lacking in some formality, or
form, or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute,
nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real
property as security for a debt, and contains nothing impossible
or contrary to law. The essential requisites of an equitable
mortgage are:
(1) the parties enter into what appears to be a contract of
sale,
(2) but their intention is to secure an existing debt by way
of mortgage.
Article 1602 of the Civil Code provides:
The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in
any of the following cases: 
 (1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is
unusually inadequate;
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or
otherwise;
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase,
another instrument extending the period of redemption or
granting a new period is extended;
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the
purchase price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing
sold;
(6)  In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real
intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the
payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.
In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other benefit
to be received by the vendee as rent or otherwise shall be
considered as interest which shall be subject to the usury laws.
The Court stated that there is no conclusive test to
determine whether a deed purporting to be a sale on its face is
really a simple loan accommodation secured by a mortgage.
However, case law consistently shows that the presence of
even one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 1602
suffices to convert a purported contract of sale into an equitable
mortgage.
Therefore, what should be determined in this case is
whether the consideration of P5,300.00 paid by Gumersindo to
Dionisa for a five-hectare portion of the lot on June 9, 1949 is
"unusually inadequate."
The Court stated that In Aguilar v. Ribato and
Gonzales Vila, they ruled that there is gross inadequacy in
price if a reasonable man will not agree to dispose of his
property.
 However, in De Ocampo and Custodio v. Lim, the
Court held that in sales denominated as pacto de retro, the
price agreed upon should not generally be considered as
the just value of the thing sold, absent other corroborative
evidence. This is because, on the part of the vendor, the right
to repurchase the land makes it immaterial to him whether or
not the price of the sale is the just value thereof. As for the
vendee, the price does not induce him to enter into the contract
as he does not acquire the thing irrevocably.
Subsequently, in Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals, the
Court ruled that there is no requirement in sales that the
price be equal to the exact value of the thing subject matter
of the sale.
Therefore, following De Ocampo and Buenaventura, the
Court held that there is no cogent reason to conclude that the
1949 price of P5,300.00 as agreed upon by the parties was
unreasonable or unusually inadequate.
Moreover, under the rules of evidence, it is presumed
that a person takes... ordinary care of his concerns. In the
present case, there is no evidence herein whatsoever to show
that Dionisia did not understand the ramifications of her signing
the "Deed of Sale with Right of Redemption."
If the terms of the pacto de retro sale were unfavorable to
Dionisia, the Court held that it has no business of extricating her
3. Jaime B. Biana v. George G. Gimenez
Facts: For failure to pay for a judgment obligation, 4 parcels of
land were levied and attached by the Sheriff Madera. Mendones
won these parcels of land by bidding in a public auction.
Upon being informed, Gimenez issued checks as payment for
the publication fee and the redemption price through Sheriff
Garchitorena. Sheriff Madera, on the other hand, sent an
itemization to Gimenez’s counsel which asks for the publication
from that bad bargain. Courts are not guardians of persons who
are not legally incompetent, like Dionisia.
Also, Dionisia failed to prove before the trial court
that the price agreed upon by the parties in 1949 was
grossly inadequate.
Now, even assuming that the contract of sale with
right to repurchase executed by Dionisia and Gumersindo
in 1949 is an equitable mortgage, the fact remains that from
1949 up to the filing of the complaint in 1964, or a period of
15 years, she failed to redeem the property
Her heirs claim that since Dionisia had been paying the
realty taxes follows that she owns the property, not Gumersindo.
Settled is the rule that tax receipts per se are not conclusive
evidence of land ownership absent other corroborative
evidence.
Moreover, the Court agreed with the CA that the timing of
the payment of realty taxes raises some questions. They noted
that the real estate taxes corresponding to the period from 1955
to 1963 were paid only on December 27, 1963 or barely six (6)
months before Dionisia filed the Civil Case. Thus, the
inescapable conclusion is that she paid the taxes in preparation
for the filing of Civil Case No. V-2760.
fee, but Gimenez disagreed as he already paid them in full.
Nonetheless, Deputy Sheriff Madera executed a Definite Deed
of Sale in favor of Mendones.
Issues: Whether or not there was a valid payment of the
redemption price.
Ruling: Yes. A check may be used for the exercise of the right
of redemption, the same being a right and not an obligation. The
tender of a check is sufficient to compel redemption but is not in
itself a payment that relieves the redemptioner from his liability
to pay the redemption price. In other words, while we hold that
the private respondents properly exercise their right of
redemption, they remain liable, of course, for the payment of the
redemption price.
FACTS: In a labor case entitled Santos B. Mendones vs.
Gimenez Park Subdivision and George Gimenez, the
defendants were ordered to pay Mendones P5248.50, as
computed by Deputy Sheriff Renato Madera. For failure to pay,
Sheriff Madera proceeded to levy and attach 4 parcels of urban
land in the names of Jose F. Gimenez, Tessa F. Gimenez,
Maricel G. Gimenez and respondent George Gimenez.
On Dec. 6, 1978, a public auction was conducted wherein
Mendones won with his bid of P8,908.50, representing the
judgment obligation plus expenses of execution. Thus,
a Provisional Certificate of Sale was issued and registered in
the name of Mendones on Dec. 7 1978.
According to Gimenez, he was not duly informed or notified of
the execution sale and that he knew only when he was asked to
pay the publication fee of the execution sale in the amount of
P3,510.00, which he immediately paid in full.
Gimenez was then informed that the redemption price was
P6,615.89 including interest and sheriff’s fee. He issued 4
checks totaling to said amount in the name of Sheriff
Garchitorena, since he cannot locate Deputy Sheriff Madera.
Sheriff Garchitorena issued a receipt dated July 19, 1979, 4
months and 18 days before the expiration of the 1-year
redemption period, acknowledging he received P5,615.89 from
Gimenez “in full payment and satisfaction of judgment.”
On Dec. 3, 1979, Sheriff Madera informed the counsel of
Gimenez that the 1-year redemption period will soon expire and
that his client still has an unpaid balance of P4,367.81. The
counsel of Gimenez asked for details of said account but
disagreed with the itemization made by Sheriff Madera on the
publication fee since he had already paid for them through
Sheriff Garchitorena. Nonetheless, Deputy Sheriff Madera
executed in favor of Mendones a Definite Deed of Sale.
Gimenez then requested Sheriff Garchitorena to execute a deed
of redemption in his favor. His request having been refused,
respondent then filed with the RTC a special civil action for
mandamus with damages to compel the sheriffs to execute the
desired deed of redemption which includes an alternative prayer
that if a definite deed of sale was already issued in favor of
Mendones, the same be declared null and void.
During the pendency of the case, Mendones assigned his right
he acquired on auction to Jaime Biana in consideration of P1
million.
The trial court ruled in favor of Gimenez, declaring the Definite
Deed of Sale null and void and ordering the Provincial Sheriff to
execute a Deed of Redemption reconveying the parcels of land
to Gimenez. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the decision
of RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the checks issued by Gimenez are valid
payments of the redemption price and therefore entitles him to
the issuance of a Deed of Redemption.
RULING: YES. The instant case involves not the payment of an
obligation but the exercise of a right, i.e., the right of
redemption. What applies is the settled rule that a mere tender
of a check is sufficient to compel redemption.
In the case of Fortunado, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., a
check may be used for the exercise of the right of redemption,
the same being a right and not an obligation. The tender of a
check is sufficient to compel redemption but is not in itself a
payment that relieves the redemptioner from his liability to pay
the redemption price. In other words, while we hold that the
 private respondents properly exercise their right of redemption,
they remain liable, of course, for the payment of the redemption
price.
Also, the Court found it necessary to annul the Definite Deed of
Sale in favor of Mendones to give effect to the judgment
Basa Vs. Aguilar
nte: J. Vasquez
mary:
Seven petitioners are owners co-pro-indiviso of an
ided ONE-HALF share of a parcel of land located in Barrio
Mateo, Arayat, Pampanga. Private respondents Genaro Puyat
Brigida Mesina were the owners of the other undivided half of
ame parcel of land. Genaro Puyat, with the marital consent of
da Mesina, sold his 1/2 share of the parcel of land in question
e price of P1,000.00 PESOS in favor of private respondents
o Tiongson and Macaria Puyat. Primo Tiongson is a son-in-
f Genaro Puyat who is married to Macaria Puyat, a daughter
enaro Puyat. Seven days later, petitioners filed a Civil Case,
ng that they be allowed to exercise the right of redemption
r Article 1620 of the Civil Code, for which they deposited with
ourt the sum of P1,000.00 as redemption money. The trial
dismissed the case stating that the term “third-persons”
r Art. 1620 of the Civil Code Does not include Children.
: 
Whether or not, the term “third-persons” under Art. 1620 of
ivil Code includes children?
Yes, Under the law, a third person, within the meaning of
Article, is anyone who is not a co-owner. In this case, Private
ndent Primo Tiongson is definitely not a co-owner of the land
estion. He is not even an heir of private respondents Genaro
t and Brigida Mesina, nor included in the "family relations" of
aid spouses. Therefore, To deny to the petitioners the right of
mption recognized in Article 1620 of the Civil Code is to defeat
urpose of minimizing co-ownership and to contravene the
c policy in this regard. Moreover, it would result in disallowing
etitioners a way out of what, in the words of Manresa, " might
ordering the sheriffs to execute a Deed of Redemption in favor
of Gimenez. It is in consonance with the finding that Gimenez
had made a valid redemption within the reglementary period for
redemption.
be a disagreeable or inconvenient association into which they have
been thrust."
Facts:
 The seven (7) petitioners are owners co-pro-indiviso of an undivided
ONE-HALF (1/2) share of a parcel of land located in Barrio San
Mateo, Arayat, Pampanga, with an area of 32,383 square meters,
more or less.
 Private respondents Genaro Puyat and Brigida Mesina were the
owners of the other undivided half of the same parcel of land.
 March 6, 1964- Genaro Puyat, with the marital consent of Brigida
Mesina, sold his ONE-HALF (1/2) share of the parcel of land in
question for the price of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS in
favor of private respondents Primo Tiongson and Macaria Puyat.
Primo Tiongson is a son-in-law of Genaro Puyat who is married to
Macaria Puyat, a daughter of Genaro Puyat.
March 13, 1964- petitioners filed Civil Case No. 2513, praying that
they be allowed to exercise the right of redemption under Article
1620 of the Civil Code, for which purpose they deposited with the
court the sum of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) as
redemption money.
 The trial court rendered the judgment dismissing the case. It ruled
that the petitioners are not entitled to exercise the right of redemption
under Article 1620 of the Civil Code reasoning, “to include within the
purview of the term 'third person' the children of a co-owner of a thing
xxx is to stretch the meaning of the law into ludicrous situations.
Issue:
 Whether or not, the term “third persons” includes the children not even an heir of private respondents Genaro Puyat and Brigida
of a co-owner of a thing? Mesina, nor included in the "family relations" of the said spouses.
To deny to the petitioners the right of redemption recognized
in Article 1620 of the Civil Code is to defeat the purpose of
Held:
minimizing co-ownership and to contravene the public policy in this
Yes, Under the law, Legal redemption is nature of a privilege regard. Moreover, it would result in disallowing the petitioners a way
created by law partly for reasons of public policy and partly for the out of what, in the words of Manresa, " might be a disagreeable or
benefit and convenience of the redemptioner. It is to afford him a way inconvenient association into which they have been thrust."
out of what might be a disagreeable or inconvenient association into
Therefore, petitioners are entitled to exercise the right of legal
which he has been thrust. It is intended to minimize co-ownership.
redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code with respect to the
A third person, within the meaning of this Article, is anyone (1/2) share sold by private respondent Genaro Puyat and Brigida
who is not a co-owner. In this case, Private respondent Primo Mesina in favor of their correspondents Primo Tiongson and Macaria
Tiongson is definitely not a co-owner of the land in question. He is Puyat.

5. [G.R. No. 137677. May 31, 2000.]

ADALIA B. FRANCISCO, Petitioner, v. ZENAIDA F.
BOISER, Respondent.
Facts:
>Petitioner Adalia Francisco and 3 of her sisters were co-
owners of 4 parcels of registered lands on which stands the
Ten Commandments Building @ 689 Rizal Avenue Extension,
Caloocan City.  1623
> Their mother, Adela Blas, for P10k, thus making the latter a
co-owner of said property to the extent of the share sold.
Unknown to her children-co-owners, Blas sold her 1/5 share
for P10k to respondent, another sister of petitioner.   not from any other person. The vendor of an undivided
> Petitioner received summons from respondent demanding
her share in the rentals being collected by petitioner from the
building’s tenants.
> Petitioner then informed respondent she was exercising her
right of redemption as a co-owner of said property and thus,
she deposited the P10k as redemption price with the Clerk of
Court.
> Respondent said that petitioner already knew of the sale,
the deed of which was attached
ISSUE:
Whether the letter of May 30, 1992 sent by respondent to
petitioner notifying her of the sale on August 8, 1986 of Adela
Blas’ 1/5 share of the property to respondent, containing a
copy of the deed evidencing such sale, can be considered
sufficient as compliance with the notice requirement of Art.
for the purpose of legal redemption.
HELD: NO. Art.1623, NCC is clear in requiring that the written
notification should come from the vendor/prospective vendor,
interest is in the best position to know who his co-owners are,
who, under the law, must be notified of the sale.
FACTS:
Petitioner Adalia B. Francisco and three of her sisters, Ester,
Elizabeth and Adeluisa, were co-owners of four parcels of
registered lands. Late, they sold 1/5 of their undivided share in
the subject parcels of land to their mother, Adela Blas, for
P10,000.00, thus making the latter a co-owner of said real
property to the extent of the share sold.
On August 8, 1986, without the knowledge of the other co-
owners, Adela Blas sold her 1/5 share for P10,000.00 to
respondent Zenaida Boiser who is another sister of
petitioner.
On August 5, 1992, petitioner received summons, with a copy of
the complaint in Civil Case No. 15510, filed by respondent
demanding her share in the rentals being collected by petitioner
from the tenants of the building. Petitioner then informed
respondent that she was exercising her right of redemption as a
co-owner of the subject property. On August 12, 1992, she
deposited the amount of P10,000.00 as redemption price with
the Clerk of Court.
She alleged that the 30-day period for redemption under Art.
1623 of the Civil Code had not begun to run against her since
the vendor, Adela Blas, never informed her and the other
owners about the sale to respondent. She learned about the
sale only on August 5, 1992, after she received the summons in
Civil Case No. 15510, together with the complaint.
Respondent, on the other hand, contended that petitioner knew
about the sale as early as May 30, 1992, because, on that date,
she wrote petitioner a letter informing the latter about the sale,
with a demand that the rentals corresponding to her 1/5 share of
the subject property be remitted to her.
6. Spouses Si v. CA
GR No. 122047. October 12, 2000. J. Quisumbing
Petitioner: Spouses Serafin Si and Anita Bonode Si
Respondents: Ca and Remedios Almanzor (deceased,
and substituted by heirs: Cynthia Armada, Danilo Armada
and Vicente Armada)
On the same date, letters were likewise sent by respondent to
the tenants of the building, namely, Seiko Service Center and
Glitters Corporation, informing them of the sale and requesting
that, thenceforth, they pay 1/5 of the monthly rentals to
respondent. That petitioner received these letters is proved by
the fact that on June 8, 1992, she wrote the building’s tenants
advising them to disregard respondent’s request and continue
paying full rentals directly to her.
ISSUE:
Whether the letter of May 30, 1992 sent by respondent to
petitioner notifying her of the sale on August 8, 1986 of Adela
Blas’ 1/5 share of the property to respondent, containing a copy
of the deed evidencing such sale, can be considered sufficient
as compliance with the notice requirement of Art. 1623 for the
purpose of legal redemption.
RULING:
Receipt by petitioner of summons in Civil Case No. 15510 on
August 5, 1992 amounted to actual knowledge of the sale from
which the 30-day period of redemption commenced to run.
Petitioner had until September 4, 1992 within which to exercise
her right of legal redemption, but on August 12, 1992 she
deposited the P10,000.00 redemption price. As petitioner’s
exercise of said right was timely, the same should be given
effect.
Summary:
Spouses Armada transferred their property to the names of
their three sons namely, Crisotomo, Jose and Severo.
Crisostomo through Cresencia (atty-in-fact) executed a deed
of sale in favor Anita Si.
Jose Armada filed a complaint to annul the sale on the ground
that there was no written notice of such sale whereas the
deed stated that “the co-owners are not interested in buying
the land”.
Ruling:
There was an actual notice of the impending sale and Jose
even acknowledged such when he told his brother Crisostomo
in a letter “Well you are the king of yourselves, and you can
sell your share of Leveriza. Written notice is no longer
necessary when there is actual notice.
Facts:
1. Property in question was previously owned by
Escolastica, wife of Severo Armada, Sr. During their
lifetime the property was transferred to their 3 sons
(Crisostomo married to Cresencia Alejo; Jose Armada
married to Remedios Almanzor and Severo, Jr.) under a
single TCT (no. 16007)
2. Annotated to the title was the total cancellation of the title
by virtue of sale of Cresenciana Alejo, as atty-in-fact of
Crisostomo Armada, which conveyed 113.34 square
meters of the property (not the whole property) in favor of
Anita Si for P75K. TCT no. 24751 for said area.
3. Jose Armada and wife filed a complaint for annulment
of Deed of Sale and Reconveyance of Title with
damages against sps. Si and Conrado Isada (the one
who brokered the sale)
4. Complaint alleged that Conrado made it appear that
Cresenciana (atty in fact and spouse of Crisostomo) was
a Filipino citizen and when the sale was registered, they
inserted the phrase “co-owners are not interested in
buying the same in spite of notice to them”. Also they
alleged that the co-owners (Jose and Severo) had no
written notice of the sale.
5. Spouses Si on the other hand claimed that the parents of
the 3 sons conveyed the property to them through 3
separate deeds of sales and that the deeds particularly
described the three portions given to each son. Because
of this there was already no co-ownership and that
the 2 brothers had no right of redemption against
Crisostomo.
6. Regional Trial court ruled for Spouses Si. CA ruled in
favor of Jose Armada, held that the portion of land sold to
Spouses Si were unidentifiable and undetermined and
remained part of the whole property. Sale by co-owner of
undivided property is invalid and shall not be recorded in
the registry unless there is an affidavit that written notice
was given to all possible redemptioners.
Issue: WON there was physical division of property which would
allow Crisostomo to sell his portion. YES
Held:
● Trial court was correct in finding that the parents already
partitioned the property which was registered with the
RD. There was physical division through the 3 separate
deeds of sales executed by the parents.
● Every portion conveyed and transferred to the 3 sons
was definitely described and segregated and with the
corresponding technical description. In other words there
has been a Extrajudicial partition
● Every portion belonging to the 3 sons were also declared
for taxation purposes with the Assessor’s office in Pasay.
● The fact that the 3 portions were embraced in one
certificate does not make said portion less determinable
or identifiable or distinguishable, one from another, nor
that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their
respective owners.
 ● No right of redemption among co-ownership exists.
In fact, after the physical division of the lot, the
community ownership terminated, and the right of
preemption and redemption for each brother was no
longer available. (Art. 484. “…no co-ownership when
the different portions owned by different people are
already concretely determined and separately
identifiable, even if not yet technically described.”)
● It was also proven that Jose Armada was well informed of
the impending sale of Crisostomo’s share and even told
his brother: “Well you are the king of yourselves, and you
can sell your share of Leveriza.” If co-owner had actual
notice of sale, no need for written notice, otherwise it
would be superfluous to require it.
7. Sen Po Ek Marketing Corporation v Martinez
February 9, 2000 | De Leon, Jr., J. | Extinguishment of Sale
PETITIONER: Sen Po Ek Marketing Corporation
RESPONDENTS: Teodora Martinez, Juanito Uyping, Jr.,
Nelson Uyping, and Leoncio Uyping
SUMMARY:
Sofia Martinez leased the lots to Yu Siong, father of the
President of Sen Po Ek Marketing Corporation. While the
lease was subsisting, Sofia sold the lots to her daughter,
Teodora. Teodora then sold the property to the Tiu Uyping
brothers. Sen Po Ek Marketing Corporation seeks the nullity
of the first and second deed of sale, invoking its alleged right
of first refusal.
● Petition GRANTED. CA decision ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. RTC decision REINSTATED
No right of redemption among co-owners exists. In fact, after the
physical division of the lot, the community ownership
terminated, and the right of preemption and redemption for each
brother was no longer available. (Art. 484. “…no co-ownership
when the different portions owned by different people are
already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even
if not yet technically described.”)
DOCTRINE:
Article 1622 of the New Civil Code only deals with small urban
lands that are bought for speculation where only adjoining lot
owners can exercise the right of pre-emption or redemption.
Sen Po Ek is not an adjoining lot owner, but a lessee trying to
buy the land that it was leasing.
Facts:
 Sofia P. Martinez was the registered owner of two (2) parcels
of land.
 Sofia leased the lots for 10 years to Yu Siong, father of the
president and stockholders of Sen Po Ek Marketing
Corporation
 The lease contract required the lessee to construct a
commercial building on the leased property which shall
become the property of Sofia upon the expiration of the
lease.
 The building was constructed and was declared for taxation
purposes, in the name of Sen Po Ek.
 The lease underwent several renewals. While the lease was
still subsisting, Sofia sold the lots to her daughter, Teodora
P. Martinez.
 Teodora informed Sen Po Ek of her intention to sell the
leased premises.
 Then, Sen Po Ek filed a complaint against Teodora for the
annulment of the deed of sale executed by Sofia (mother) in
favor of Teodora (daughter)
 Sen Po Ek invoked its alleged right of first refusal or
preferential right to buy the leased premises based on R.A.
No. 1162, as amended in relation to P.D. No. 1517 (Urban
Land Reform Act).
 Teodora sold the property to Juanito Tiu Uyping, Nelson Tiu
Uyping and Leoncio Tiu Uyping.
 Subsequently, Sen Po Ek amended its complaint to include
the Tiu Uyping brothers and also praying for the nullity of the
second sale transaction.
 RTC: in favor of petitioner Sen Po Ek.
 CA: reversed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the
present petition.
Issue: Whether or not the first sale and second sale are valid?
Ruling:
First sale (between Sofia and Teodora) is void
 Basis: Fictitious under Art. 1409 of the CC
o Under Art. 1409 (2) of the New Civil Code, one type of
contract which can be declared void and inexistent is
that which is absolutely simulated or fictitious
 (1) contract of sale was executed in 1079 but it was only
notarized in 1985;
 (2) Teodora signed not as owner but merely as an
instrumental witness;
 (3) Sofia retained enjoyment and control of the leased
premises as she continued receiving rentals until her demise
in 1989  Teodora never asserted her alleged right of
ownership over the leased premises.
Second sale (between Teodora and the Tiu Uyping
brothers) is valid
 Basis: Ratification
 Teodora had no authority to sell the entire lot to the Tiu
Uyping brothers
o She can only sell her undivided portion of the property
o Thus, when she sold the property to the Tiu Uyping
brothers, the sale is unenforceable for having been
ented without rendering the sale unenforceable
having been entered into by Teodora in behalf of her
co-heirs, who gave no authority or legal
representation.
 However, such a contract is susceptible of ratification.
o In this case, the ratification came in the form of a
"Confirmation of Sale of Land and Improvements"
executed by the other heirs of Sofia giving the sale a
color of validity.
Right of first refusal not applicable
 P.D. 1517, R.A. No. 1162 and Article 1622 of the CC which
allegedly gave Sen Po Ek the preferential right of first refusal
not applicable in this case
 P.D. No. 1517, otherwise known as "The Urban Land
Reform Act," pertains to areas proclaimed as urban land
reform zones.
o Lot Nos. 50 and 106 are both located in Tacloban
City, which has not been declared as an urban land
reform zone.
 R.A. No. 1162, on the other hand, only deals with
expropriation of parcels of land located in the City of Manila,
which the leased premises are not.
 Finally, Article 1622 of the New Civil Code only deals with
small urban lands that are bought for speculation where only
adjoining lot owners can exercise the right of pre-emption or
redemption.
o Sen Po Ek is not an adjoining lot owner, but a lessee
trying to buy the land that it was leasing.
 Indeed the right of first refusal may be provided for in a lease
contract. However in this case, such right was never
stipulated in any of the several lease contracts between
petitioner and Sofia.
o Petitioner claims that it was Teodora herself who
assured them that they can have the first priority to
buy the subject parcels of land, but there is absolutely
no proof of this.