Japanese Re-Arm DA: Arizona Debate Institute 2009

Arizona Debate Institute 2009 1
Fellows Pre-Camp Japanese Re-Arm DA
Japanese Re-Arm DA
Japanese Re-Arm DA..................................................................................................................................................1
Japanese Re-Arm DA....................................................................................................................1
1NC – Shell ................................................................................................................................................................3
1NC – Shell ....................................................................................................................................3
1NC – Shell.................................................................................................................................................................4
1NC – Shell.....................................................................................................................................4
Uniqueness – Umbrella High......................................................................................................................................5
Uniqueness – Umbrella High........................................................................................................5
Uniqueness – No Reductions Now.............................................................................................................................6
Uniqueness – No Reductions Now................................................................................................6
Link – Nuclear Posture...............................................................................................................................................7
Link – Nuclear Posture..................................................................................................................7
Link – Disarm ............................................................................................................................................................8
Link – Disarm ................................................................................................................................8
Link – Disarm.............................................................................................................................................................9
Link – Disarm.................................................................................................................................9
Link – Unilateral Reductions....................................................................................................................................10
Link – Unilateral Reductions......................................................................................................10
Impact – Turns The Case – Disarmament.................................................................................................................11
Impact – Turns The Case – Disarmament.................................................................................11
Impact – Noko Prolif – EXT – I/L............................................................................................................................12
Impact – Noko Prolif – EXT – I/L..............................................................................................12
Impact – Noko Prolif ................................................................................................................................................13
Impact – Noko Prolif ..................................................................................................................13
Impact – Global Prolif (1/1) .....................................................................................................................................14
Impact – Global Prolif (1/1) .......................................................................................................14
Impact – Hegemony (1/1) ........................................................................................................................................15
Impact – Hegemony (1/1) ...........................................................................................................15
Impact – Hegemony – I/L - EXT..............................................................................................................................16
Impact – Hegemony – I/L - EXT................................................................................................16
Impact - Hegemony – I/L – EXT..............................................................................................................................17
Impact - Hegemony – I/L – EXT................................................................................................17
2NC – AT: Japan ReArm Good - Noko....................................................................................................................18
2NC – AT: Japan ReArm Good - Noko.....................................................................................18
2NC – AT: Public Opposed.....................................................................................................................................19
2NC – AT: Public Opposed........................................................................................................19
2NC – AT: Feasibility...............................................................................................................................................20
2NC – AT: Feasibility..................................................................................................................20
AFF - Inevitable........................................................................................................................................................21
AFF - Inevitable...........................................................................................................................21
AFF – No Political Will............................................................................................................................................22
AFF – No Political Will................................................................................................................22
AFF – No Link..........................................................................................................................................................23
AFF – No Link..............................................................................................................................23
AFF – Feasibility......................................................................................................................................................24
AFF – Feasibility..........................................................................................................................24
AFF – Link Turn – CTBT.........................................................................................................................................25
AFF – Link Turn – CTBT...........................................................................................................25
AFF – Impact Turn – NoKo......................................................................................................................................26
AFF – Impact Turn – NoKo........................................................................................................26
AFF – Impact Turn – Taiwan...................................................................................................................................27
AFF – Impact Turn – Taiwan.....................................................................................................27
1NC – Shell
A. Uniqueness – The US is increasing it’s nuclear umbrella over Japan now

Reuters 7/16/2009 (“US wants to boost Japan’s Nuclear Umrbella: Paper”)
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE56G0RX20090717
The United States plans discuss with Japan how to boost the nuclear deterrent it provides for its Asian ally, a
senior U.S. official was quoted as saying on Friday amid regional tensions over North Korea's nuclear and missile
tests. Kurt Campbell, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said Washington and Tokyo
planned to hold regular talks on boosting what is dubbed the "nuclear umbrella," starting on Saturday, the
Nikkei newspaper said. His comments come two months after Japan's unpredictable neighbor North Korea raised
tensions in the region by carrying out its second nuclear test. But talk of stepping up defenses in Japan could
raise hackles in other parts of Asia, where many suffered under Japanese militarism before and during
World War Two.
B. Link - Reducing dependence on nuclear weapons weakens US extended deterrence

efforts causing Japan to rearm.
Foster and Payne 2007 (John, Chairman of the Board of GKN Aerospace Transparency
Systems. Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Keith, Head of the Missouri
State Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, President and Co-Found of the
National Institute for Public Policy, “What Are Nuclear Weapons For?” The American Phsyical
Society, October 2007, Vol. 36, No 4)
We could decide that we would prefer to withdraw the nuclear umbrella and provide non-nuclear
extended deterrence. But, with the nuclear proliferation of North Korea and the apparent Iranian aspirations
for nuclear weapons, and the rapid growth of China’s nuclear arsenal, the response of key allies to the U.S.
withdrawal of its nuclear extended deterrent coverage would create new and potentially severe
problems, i.e., nuclear proliferation by U.S. friends and allies who would likely feel too vulnerable in
the absence of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. Japanese leaders have been explicit about the extreme
security value they attach to the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and they have suggested that Japan would be
forced to reconsider its non-nuclear status in the absence of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. Thus,
ironically, nuclear non-proliferation is tied closely to the U.S. preservation of its extended nuclear deterrent.
This point is contrary to the typical contention that U.S. movement toward nuclear disarmament promotes
nuclear non-proliferation. Precisely the reverse linkage may be more the reality: U.S. movement toward
nuclear disarmament will unleash what some have called a “cascade” of nuclear proliferation among
those countries which otherwise have felt themselves secure under the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent
and therefore have chosen to remain non-nuclear. We should be extremely careful before moving in a
direction that carries the risk of unleashing this “cascade,” such as deciding that U.S. nuclear weapons are
unnecessary for assurance and moving toward a non-nuclear force structure.
1NC – Shell
C. Impact
1. Japan armament would eliminate the ability for the US to enforce the NPT – resulting
in proliferation by North Korea
Chanlett-Avery 2009 (Emma, Specialist in Asian Affairs, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy
Debate, Prospects, and US Interests” Congressional Research Service, February 19th 2009)
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf
Japan’s development of its own nuclear arsenal could also have damaging impact on U.S.
nonproliferation policy. It would be more difficult for the United States to convince non-nuclear
weapon states to keep their non-nuclear status or to persuade countries such as North Korea to
give up their weapons programs. The damage to the NPT as a guarantor of nuclear power for
peaceful use and the IAEA as an inspection regime could be irreparable if Japan were to leave or
violate the treaty. If a close ally under its nuclear umbrella chose to acquire the bomb, perhaps
other countries enjoying a strong bilateral relationship with the United States would be less
inhibited in pursuing their own option. It could also undermine confidence in U.S. security
guarantees more generally.
2. Nuclear war would be unsurvivable and wipe out Japan, South Korea, and the US
Chol 6/12/09 (Kim Myong, PhD from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Academy of
Social Sciences, “Nuclear War is Kim Jong-Il’s Game Plan” Asia Times Online, June 12th 2009)
The game plan for nuclear war specifies four types of thermonuclear assault: (1) the bombing of operating nuclear power stations; (2)
detonations of a hydrogen bombs in seas off the US, Japan and South Korea; (3) detonations of H-bombs in space far above their
heartlands; and (4) thermonuclear attacks on their urban centers. The first attack involves converting operating
nuclear power plants on the coastline of the three countries into makeshift multi-megaton H-bombs.
The New York Times on January 24, 1994, quoted Paul Leventhal, president of the Nuclear Control Institute, warning that North
Korea could easily launch de-facto hydrogen bomb attacks on South Korea. "North Korean retaliation to bombing
could result in vastly more fallout in the South than in the North ... North Korean retaliatory bombing
could bring Chernobyls multiplied." If bombed, one average operating nuclear power station is estimated
to spew out as much deadly fallout as 150-180 H-bombs. Bombing one nuclear power station would
render the Japanese archipelago and South Korea uninhabitable. Doing the same to the US may
require bombing one plant on its west coast and another on its east coast. Nothing is easier than
bombing a power plant on a coastline. There is no need to use a ballistic missile. Primitive means will do the job. The US
has 103 operating nuclear power stations with onsite storage of a huge quantity of spent fuel rods and Japan has 53 operating atomic
power stations. Japan has a stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium - enough to assemble more than 1,000 atomic bombs in a short period
of time. South Korea has 20 operating nuclear power stations with onsite storage of a huge quantity of spent fuel rods. The detonation
of sea-borne or undersea H-bombs planted on the three countries' continental shelves will trigger nuclear tsunamis with devastating
consequences. A 2006 RAND study of a ship-based 10-kiloton nuclear blast on the Port of Long Beach had some harrowing
conclusions: "Within the first 72 hours, the attack would devastate a vast portion of the Los Angeles
metropolitan area. Because ground-burst explosions generate particularly large amounts of highly
radioactive debris, fallout from the blast would cause much of the destruction. In some of the most dramatic
possible outcomes:  Sixty thousand people might die instantly from the blast itself or quickly
thereafter from radiation poisoning.  One hundred and fifty thousand more might be exposed to hazardous levels of
radioactive water and sediment from the port, requiring emergency medical treatment.  The blast and subsequent fires might
completely destroy the entire infrastructure and all ships in the Port of Long Beach and the adjoining Port of Los Angeles.  Six
million people might try to evacuate the Los Angeles region.  Two to three million people might need relocation because fallout will
have contaminated a 500-square-kilometer area.  Gasoline supplies might run critically short across the entire region because of the
loss of Long Beach's refineries - responsible for one-third of the gas west of the Rocky Mountains. RAND projects that the economic
costs would exceed $1 trillion. The third possible attack, a high-altitude detonation of hydrogen bombs that
would create a powerful electromagnetic pulse (EMP), would disrupt the communications and
electrical infrastructure of the US, the whole of Japan, and South Korea. Many of the essential
systems needed to survive war would be knocked out, as computers are instantly rendered
malfunctioning or unusable. Military and communications systems such as radars, antennas, and missiles, government offices, would be put out of use, as
would energy sources such as nuclear power stations and transport and communications systems including airports, airplanes, railways, cars and cell phones. Ironically the ubiquity
of high-tech computing gadgets in the US, Japan and South Korea has made them most vulnerable to EMP attacks. The last and fourth attack would be to order into action a global
nuclear strike force of dozens of MIRVed ICBMs - each bearing a thermonuclear warhead on a prefixed target. The Yongbyon nuclear site has always been a decoy to attract
American attention and bring it into negotiations on a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War. Since as far back as the mid-1980, North Korea has assembled 100-300 nuclear
warheads in an ultra-clandestine nuclear weapons program. The missiles can be mounted on medium-range missiles designed to be nuclear capable.
Uniqueness – Umbrella High

( ) US just re-affirmed it’s nuclear umbrella over Japan
Kato 7/23/09 (Yoichi, “US Warm to Proposal to Reaffirm Security Pact”)
http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200907230065.html
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell told The Asahi Shimbun in a recent interview that
Washington embraces a proposal by Tokyo to reaffirm the significance of the bilateral security
alliance to mark its 50th anniversary next year. The proposed reaffirmation is being contemplated to keep
the alliance solid at a time of an expected major political realignment and possible instability following the
Lower House election to be held Aug. 30. Campbell, who made his first regional tour after assuming his post
in June, also discussed a wide range of bilateral security issues, including the credibility of U.S. extended
deterrence and the controversial plan to relocate the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Ginowan to
Henoko in Nago, in Okinawa Prefecture.
( ) More evidence – Japanese government still perceives a strong nuclear commitment

from the US
Kato 7/23/09 (Yoichi, “US Warm to Proposal to Reaffirm Security Pact”)
http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200907230065.html
First and foremost, the United States could not have been more assertive and clear about the fact that
we will not accept a nuclear North Korea. It is completely unacceptable. And that we will continue, in
terms of our planning, to push forward on a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. Second, there is a deep
reflection and recognition that underscoring the importance of an extended deterrence is a clear and enduring
mission of the United States, particularly in Asia. And so you're going to find that almost every senior
interlocutor, in his or her meetings with the Japanese or Korean counterparts, underscores the importance of
nuclear deterrence and extended deterrence, in the Asian context. Third, at the same time, we've also tried to
listen to Japanese calls to de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons in global politics, and that's why one of
the things that was the most heartening to us was the Japanese response to the Prague speech by Obama. It's
clear that Japan seeks two things. One, a de-emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons and, two, an extended
deterrent commitment on the part of the United States that will take us through this interim period. So, if I
could be so bold, I think we are following the script that Japan has asked for so many years. I would also just
underscore one larger point, as it relates to the overall level of arsenals. Even if the START (Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty) agreement (with Russia) goes through, the United States will have thousands and
thousands of nuclear weapons. At this juncture, China still has a very small nuclear arsenal, and we will have
overwhelming nuclear capabilities for the foreseeable future. We believe we have everything necessary to
provide reassurance, not only to Japan but any other country under the nuclear umbrella of the United States.
Uniqueness – No Reductions Now

( ) No reduction is coming now – US has promised to keep extended deterrence over
Japan.
Korea News Service 6/2/09 (“US Double Standards Policy on Nuclear Issue under Fire”)
U.S. President Obama declared in the Czech Republic in last April that the United States would take the lead
in making a "nuclear arms reduction" and "bringing about a world without nuclear weapons." During his
trip to France made later he uttered he would pursue the goal of "working toward a world without
nuclear weapons." But when he was meeting former Japanese Prime Minister Abe, Obama claimed
that the U.S. "nuclear disarmament should not be a hurdle in providing a nuclear umbrella to its
allies." Rodong Sinmun Tuesday observes in a signed commentary in this regard: As seen above, the U.S.
is double-tongued and applies double standards as regards the nuclear issue.
Link – Nuclear Posture

A change in US nuclear posture would result in Japanese nuclearization
Rublee 2007 (Maria Rost, Phd Strategic Insights, “The Future of Japanese Nuclear Policy”
Center for Contemporary Conflict)
U.S. Withdrawal. Should the United States withdraw from the U.S-Japan Security Treaty or otherwise
retract the nuclear umbrella, Japan will take the nuclear option much more seriously. One Japanese
defense expert noted that the most important thing the United States can do to keep Japan from going
nuclear is to maintain and strengthen the U.S.-Japan security relationship.[42] A U.S. withdrawal does
not, however, guarantee that Japan would take the nuclear option. A number of Japanese defense analysts
noted that a very strong conventional defense could take the place of a military nuclear capability. Others
mentioned that because developing a second-strike capability would take years to develop, a nuclear force
was less attractive—especially considering how vulnerable the small island country is to any nuclear strike.
Thus, the Japanese response to U.S. disengagement would not necessarily be a nuclear one, but the potential
for a nuclear Japan certainly increases.
Link – Disarm
A physical reduction in weapons would result in Japanese nuclearization, no other form of

deterrence solves.
Foster and Payne 2007 (John, Chairman of the Board of GKN Aerospace Transparency
Systems. Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Keith, Head of the Missouri
State Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, President and Co-Found of the
National Institute for Public Policy, “What Are Nuclear Weapons For?” The American Phsyical
Society, October 2007, Vol. 36, No 4)
We could decide that we would prefer to withdraw the nuclear umbrella and provide non-nuclear
extended deterrence. But, with the nuclear proliferation of North Korea and the apparent Iranian aspirations
for nuclear weapons, and the rapid growth of China’s nuclear arsenal, the response of key allies to the U.S.
withdrawal of its nuclear extended deterrent coverage would create new and potentially severe
problems, i.e., nuclear proliferation by U.S. friends and allies who would likely feel too vulnerable in
the absence of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. Japanese leaders have been explicit about the extreme
security value they attach to the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and they have suggested that Japan would be
forced to reconsider its non-nuclear status in the absence of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. Thus,
ironically, nuclear non-proliferation is tied closely to the U.S. preservation of its extended nuclear deterrent.
This point is contrary to the typical contention that U.S. movement toward nuclear disarmament promotes
nuclear non-proliferation. Precisely the reverse linkage may be more the reality: U.S. movement toward
nuclear disarmament will unleash what some have called a “cascade” of nuclear proliferation among
those countries which otherwise have felt themselves secure under the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent
and therefore have chosen to remain non-nuclear. We should be extremely careful before moving in a
direction that carries the risk of unleashing this “cascade,” such as deciding that U.S. nuclear weapons are
unnecessary for assurance and moving toward a non-nuclear force structure.
Link – Disarm
Any perception of a retreat from extended deterrence will cause Japan to nuclearize.
Satoh 3/5/2009 (Yukio, Former President of the Japan Institute for International Affairs and a
Permanent Representative of Japan to the United States from 1998 to 2002 “Reinforcing
American Extended Deterrence for Japan: An Essential Step for Nuclear Disarmament” Nautilus
Institute)
For obvious reasons, the Japanese are second to none in wishing for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
However, given Japan's vulnerability to North Korea's progressing nuclear and missile programs and China's
growing military power, ensuring American commitment to deterring threats from nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction is a matter of prior strategic importance for Tokyo. Japan has long been
committed to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and
not permitting their entry into the country. A prevalent and strong sentiment against nuclear weapons among
the Japanese people lies behind the policy to deny themselves the possession of nuclear weapons in spite of
the country's capabilities to do otherwise. The nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain vivid
national memories. Yet, strategically, Japan's adherence to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles depends
largely, if not solely, upon the credibility of theJapan-US Security Treaty, or more specifically, that of
the United States' commitment to defend Japan from any offensive action, including nuclear threats. In
response, the US government has been steadfastly assuring the Japanese in an increasingly clear manner of
American commitment to provide deterrence for Japanby all means, including nuclear. Against this
backdrop, the argument made by the aforementioned four eminent strategists in the tone-setting joint article
published in The Wall Street Journal of January 4, 2007, that "the end of the Cold War made the doctrine of
mutual Soviet-Americandeterrence obsolete", was received with mixed reactions inJapan: welcome for the
sake of nuclear disarmament and caution from the perspectives of security and defense. As depending upon
the US' extended nuclear deterrence will continue to be Japan's only strategic option to neutralize
potential or conceivable nuclear and other strategic threats, the Japanese are sensitive to any sign of
increased uncertainties with regard to extended deterrence.
Link – Unilateral Reductions

Unilateral reductions would increase Japanese uncertainty resulting in militarization
Satoh 3/5/2009 (Yukio, Former President of the Japan Institute for International Affairs and a
Permanent Representative of Japan to the United States from 1998 to 2002 “Reinforcing
American Extended Deterrence for Japan: An Essential Step for Nuclear Disarmament” Nautilus
Institute)
In the meantime, Japanese concern about the credibility of American extended deterrence could
increase if the US government would unilaterally move to redefine the concept of
nuclear deterrence and to reduce dependence upon nuclear weapons in providing deterrence.
The time has come for the governments of Japan and the United States to articulate better the shared concept
of extended deterrence, nuclear or otherwise, in order to assure the Japanese that deterrence will continue to
function under changing strategic circumstances and with technological developments.
Such initiatives designed to reinforce the concept of American extended deterrence for Japan should not be
seen as retrogression in the context of efforts to pursue a world free of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, it is
an essential step in strengthening the efforts.
Impact – Turns The Case – Disarmament

( ) Extended deterrence is necessary to solve for long term nuclear abolition.
Toki 6/4/2009 (Masako, “Japan’s Evolving Security Policies: Along Came North Korea’s
Threats” Monterey Institute for International Studies, James Martin Center for NonProliferation
Studies, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_japan_north_korea_threats.html
With the global movement toward a world without nuclear weapons led by world leaders including president
Obama, Japan still needs to be protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. For Japan, the denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula is an essential condition for Tokyo to get rid of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The
extended nuclear deterrence has been perceived as an essential factor for a strong alliance between the two
countries. In fact, in the wake of this nuclear weapon test, both countries confirmed that the extended
deterrence needs to be reinforced. But once global nuclear disarmament has become more realistic
undertaking after the United Stated and Russia have achieved a significant reduction in nuclear arsenals
through their bilateral arms control negotiation, extended deterrence issues need to be more seriously
discussed among U.S. allies. Japan is now facing a serious dilemma in deciding between nuclear umbrella
and nuclear abolition. Increasing nuclear threats from North Korea force Japan to seriously consider which
direction the country should go. At the same time, this could be the opportunity for Japan to conduct more
pragmatic debate for nuclear disarmament with its allies and other countries, including China. Neither
initiative in creating a more secure and peaceful regional framework nor global nuclear disarmament
movement should be less prioritized.
Impact – Noko Prolif – EXT – I/L

( ) Japanese rearmament causes an Asian arms race
Zhou 2005 (Peter, “Military Mayhem: The Delcine in Japanese Pacifism, Harvard International
Review Vol 27, Issue 2, 2005)
In addition to domestic opposition, the remilitarization of Japan will likely bring about international
disapproval and regional instability. China, North Korea, and South Korea still remember being victimized by the
Japanese military during World War II. The possibility of a nuclear armedJapan, presently outlawed by Japan's
"peace constitution," has reentered the public spotlight with support from top Japanese officials.Japan's nuclear
ambitions would add a new dimension to East Asia's present fears. A belligerent North Korea and a threatened
China would acquire more weapons and resources--leading to a potential Asian arms race that could
destabilize the region. Although the rallying forces of nationalism have raised the spirits of the Japanese people, the
militaristic actions of the government will only divide public opinion. Reasserting Japan's presence in the
international arena may require strengthening its role as a peaceful negotiator, but breaking away from
pacifism harms the credibility of Japan in the eyes of its people and its neighbors.
( ) Japanese rearmament would result in Nuclear Korean nuclerization, collapse of the

NPT, and Asian proliferation
Halloran 5/27/2009 (Richard, Freelance writer, Taipei Times, “Doubts Grow in Japan Over US
Nuclear Umbrella”)
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2009/05/27/2003444613
That anxiety has reinvigorated a debate about whether Japan should acquire a nuclear deterrent of its own
and reduce its reliance on the US. Japan has the technology, finances, industrial capacity and skilled
personnel to build a nuclear force, although it would be costly and take many years. The consequences of
that decision would be earthshaking. It would likely cause opponents to riot in the streets and could
bring down a government. South Korea, having sought at least once to acquire nuclear weapons,
would almost certainly do so. Any hope of dissuading North Korea from building a nuclear force
would disappear. China would redouble its nuclear programs. And for the only nation ever to
experience atomic bombing to acquire nuclear arms would surely shatter the already fragile
international nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Impact – Noko Prolif

Jackson 7/6/09 (Van, Examiner “Obama’s Nuclear Plan Could Prevent Asian Arms Race” The
Examiner Online) http://www.examiner.com/x-16317-DC-Asia-Policy-
Examiner~y2009m7d6-Obamas-nuclear-plan-could-prevent-Asian-arms-race
One of the myriad fears associated with North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons is the potential for it to
spark a nuclear arms race in Asia. The doomsday scenario plays out rather intuitively: 1) North Korea
confirms unequivocally that it will be keeping its existing nuclear weapons or possibly adding to its
stockpile; 2) Japan, which has repeatedly mentioned its belief that a nuclear North Korea is a threat to
Japanese security, dramatically builds up its defensive and offensive military capability, possibly developing
its own nuclear program while it pushes for greater involvement in transnational security issues such as
terrorism; 3) China, continuing to see Japan as the only near-peer realistically capable of challenging its
regional leadership, is threatened by Japan’s remilitarization and responds by increasing its own military
spending; 4) Partly in response to China’s increased military expenditures and partly in response to nagging
historically based concerns over Japan’s remilitarization, both South Korea and Taiwan build up their own
conventional armaments, potentially engaging in secret nuclear programs as well.
Under such circumstances, political risk indicators would shoot through the roof and foreign direct
investment inflows of capital would quickly dry up as multinational corporations seek a safer, more stable
region in which to do business. The region’s resulting economic contraction would place increasing pressure
on national governments to pander to xenophobic and nationalistic sentiments, as has been done many times
before, thus stoking the fire of conflict. The region, in sum, would become a powder keg.
Your generic impact take outs don’t apply – this is a probable scenario
Jackson 7/6/09 (Van, Examiner “Obama’s Nuclear Plan Could Prevent Asian Arms Race” The
Examiner Online) http://www.examiner.com/x-16317-DC-Asia-Policy-
Examiner~y2009m7d6-Obamas-nuclear-plan-could-prevent-Asian-arms-race
This is not overly pessimistic hyperbole but a realistic scenario according to the classic literature on security
dilemmas. Just imagine a world where the most powerful countries in Asia all either possess nuclear
weapons or are engaged in covert programs to develop a nuclear weapons capability, each in the name of its
own security. Such a dreadful possibility is exactly what the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) was designed to prevent.
Impact – Global Prolif (1/1)

( ) Japanese rearmament would spark a new round of global proliferation
Barnaby 2009 (Frank, “Will Japan React to North Korea’s Missile and Nuclear Programmes?”
May 14th 2009, http://www.scitizen.com/stories/future-energies/2009/05/Will-Japan-react-to-North-Korea-s-missile-and-
nuclear-programmes/.)
This discussion is not new. Since the 1950s, leading politicians have, for time to time, argued
that Japan should seriously consider acquiring nuclear weapons (9). Throughout most of this period, the main
justification has been national security, but usually explicit threats have not been defined. Today, the threats
are more explicitly spelt out. Nevertheless, Japan may not acquire nuclear weapons unless it feels its
security is significantly threatened, particularly by a weakening of the American nuclearumbrella.
However, according to a report by the US Congressional Research Service, if it does acquire them it
“could set off an arms race with China, South Korea, and Taiwan. India and/or Pakistan may then feel
compelled to further expand or modernize their own nuclear weapons capabilities” (10).
The consequences for global security would indeed be severe.
Impact – Hegemony (1/1)

( ) Impact - Japanese remilitarization would collapse US hegemony
Asia Times Online 5/27/2009 (“World Powerless to Stop North Korea”)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KE27Dg01.html
For more than 60 years, South Korea and Japan have been protected from either the Soviet Union, China or
North Korea by a US nuclear umbrella. However, if Seoul or Tokyo were to ever experience doubts about the
reliability of this deterrent, they could eventually embark on a nuclear weapons build-up. Although US
presidents have warned North Korea that using nuclear weapons would lead to their own destruction,
Seoul and Tokyo cannot guarantee that Washington would be willing to use nuclear weapons to avenge
the loss of any Korean or Japanese cities if the North had the means to attempt a nuclear strike on the
US itself. Ultimately, a nuclear South Korea and Japan could transform the geostrategic landscape of
East Asia, and possibly the world. It could hasten the end of US hegemony in Asia, since the two would
become less dependent on the US to guarantee their security.
Impact – Hegemony – I/L - EXT

( ) Uncertainty about extended deterrence in the region results in counterbalancing
Goh 2008 (Evelyn, “Hierarchy and the role of United States in the East Asian Security Order”
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 8 (2008) Advance Access Published on July
24th 2008, Oxford Journals)
The future of the East Asian security order is tightly bound up with the durability of the United States’ global
leadership and regional domination. At the regional level, the main scenarios of disruption are an outright
Chinese challenge to US leadership, or the defection of key US allies, particularly Japan. Recent history
suggests, and the preceding analysis has shown, that challenges to or defections from US leadership will come
at junctures where it appears that the US commitment to the region is in doubt, which in turn destabilizes the
hierarchical order. At the global level, American geopolitical over-extension will be the key cause of change. This
is the one factor that Hierarchy and the role of the United States in the East Asian security order 373 could lead to
both greater regional and global turbulence, if only by the attendant strategic uncertainly triggering off regional
challenges or defections. However, it is notoriously difficult to gauge thresholds of over-extension. More positively,
East Asia is a region that has adjusted to previous periods of uncertainty about US primacy. Arguably, the regional
consensus over the United States as primary state in a system of benign hierarchy could accommodate a shifting of
the strategic burden to US allies like Japan and Australia as a means of systemic preservation. The alternatives that
could surface as a result of not doing so would appear to be much worse.
Impact - Hegemony – I/L – EXT

( ) Proliferation undermines the goals of hegemony – extended deterrence is necessary to
sustain global predominance.
Lind 2007 (Michael, New America Foundation, “Beyond American Hegemony” The National
Interest, May/June 2007) http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/beyond_american_hegemony_5381
American military hegemony in Europe, Asia and the Middle East depends on the ability of the U.S.
military to threaten and, if necessary, to use military force to defeat any regional challenge-but at a
relatively low cost. This is because the American public is not prepared to pay the costs necessary if
the United States is to be a "hyperpower." Given this premise, the obsession with the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) makes perfect sense. WMD are defensive
weapons that offer poor statesa possible defensive shield against the sword of unexcelled U.S. conventional
military superiority. The success of the United States in using superior conventional force to defeat Serbia
and Iraq (twice) may have accelerated the efforts of India, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran to obtain nuclear
deterrents. As an Indian admiral observed after the Gulf War, "The lesson is that you should not go to war
with the UnitedStates unless you have nuclear weapons." Moreover, it is clear that the United States treats
countries that possess WMD quite differently from those that do not. So proliferation undermines
American regional hegemony in two ways. First, it forces the U.S. military to adopt costly and
awkward strategies in wartime. Second, it discourages intimidated neighbors of the nuclear state from
allowing American bases and military build-ups on its soil. With this in mind, proponents of
the hegemony strategy often advocate a policy of preventive war to keep countries deemed to be hostile to
the United States from obtaining nuclear weapons or WMD. Preventive war (as distinguished from pre-
emptive attack to avert an impending strike) is not only a violation of international law but also a repudiation
of America’s own traditions. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson all ruled out preventive
wars against the Soviet Union and China to cripple or destroy their nuclear programs, and President Ronald
Reagan, along with Britain’s Margaret Thatcher, denounced Israel’s 1981 attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor at
Osirak. Yet, by 2002, a bipartisan majority in the Congress authorized President George W. Bush to wage the
first -- and to date the only -- preventive war in American history against Iraq. Although it turned out to be a
disaster, it was perfectly consistent with the radical neoconservative variant of U.S.
global hegemony strategy.
2NC – AT: Japan ReArm Good - Noko

( ) If US deterrence doesn’t work against North Korea then Japanese deterrence won’t
either – it’s try or die for the status quo.
Ogawa 2003 (Shinichi, PhD, “A Nuclear Japan Revisited” National Institute for Defense
Studies, Japan. The National Institute for defense Studies News April 2003, No. 64)
http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/briefing/2003/pdf/64.pdf
The argument that a nuclear North Korea might bring about Japanese nuclear weapon
development assumes that while the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent protecting Japan will not work
against North Korea, Japanese indigenous nuclear weapons can deter North Korea, or that Japan has
no credence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella vis-à-vis North Korea. Are these assumptions justified?
First, the view that while the U.S. nuclear umbrella cannot work Japanese nuclear weapons can deter
North Korea cannot be made into a concrete and realistic scenario. If there were any scenario in
which U.S. nuclear forces could not deter a North Korean nuclear strike against Japan, it would be
North Korea’s “final blow.”2 If North Korea were defeated by U.S. forces and the survival of its
regime appeared very unlikely, Pyongyang might launch any surviving nuclear-armed ballistic
missiles. Such a “final blow of a loser about to die” could not be deterred by any means, including
American or Japanese nuclear weapons. Likewise, if it is held that U.S. nuclear forces cannot deter
North Korea because its leadership has a peculiar and irrational way of thinking, then Japanese
nuclear forces cannot either.
( ) Japanese rearmament wouldn’t deter North Korea – it would spark an alliance

between North Korea and China increasing regional tensions.
Martin 2009 (Bradley K., “Opinion: Time to Encourage Japan and South Korea to go Nuclear?”
Global Post Online, May 27th 2009)
If Japan and South Korea used their vastly superior resources to out-nuke North Korea, where would
that leave the legitimacy Kim and his cohorts think they are gaining from their own program, and how
much longer could the regime last? But as emotionally satisfying as it might be for the United States to
thumb its nose at the persistently and exasperatingly provocative Kim by encouraging its neighbors to stand
up to him on his own terms, former State Department Korea desk chief David Straub cautions that it would
likely backfire. The resulting increased tensions would probably bolster the regime internally even
while driving it closer into the embrace of China, said Straub, now associate director of Korea studies at
Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, in an e-mail exchange.
Nuclear arms in the hands of South Korea and Japan, alarming China, could trigger a “massive”
Northeast Asian arms race and at the same time tempt countries in other regions to step over the
nuclear threshold, making a hash of international nonproliferation arrangements.
“In other words, I think that the medicine would be worse than the disease,” said Straub, who was a
stalwart of the pro-engagement camp in the Bush administration’s internecine wars over North Korea policy.
2NC – AT: Public Opposed

The tide has turned in favor of pro-nuclear rearmament in light of the North Korea
nuclear tests.
Toki 6/4/2009 (Masako, “Japan’s Evolving Security Policies: Along Came North Korea’s
Threats” Monterey Institute for International Studies, James Martin Center for NonProliferation
Studies, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_japan_north_korea_threats.html
Unsurprisingly, the recent North Korean tests have induced remarks from Japanese officials and conservative
scholars about Japan's policy concerning nuclear weapons. After the missile test in April a conservative
Japanese politician, Goji Sakamoto, head of LDP Organization Headquarters, indicated his support
for Japan's exploring the nuclear option. Although he later explained that he was fully aware that Japan is
not allowed to possess nuclear weapons, he insisted that Tokyo should take a firm stance against North
Korea.[40] [41] It is not so surprising that such debates may periodically arise in response to the volatile
security environment. Japan's occasional "nuclearization" debate has been a catchy topic among the
media both inside and outside of the country. Media interest in the pro-nuclear side of this debate has
appeared to outweigh Japan's clearly stated nuclear disarmament policy and a strong anti-nuclear
sentiment among the Japanese population.
( ) More evidence – the public can be swayed

Hughes 2005 (Llewelyn, Doctoral Candidate, Department of Political Science @ MIT, “Why
Japan Won’t Go Nuclear (yet)”
The evidence overwhelming shows then, that Japanese policymakers’ have reacted to changes in the
international environment by working to consolidate existing insurance policies against nuclear threats, rather
than rejecting hteir viability and moving to develop and indigenous nuclear deterrent. Novertheless, there is
also evidence that Japan’s public commitment to remain a non-nuclear state is not unconditional, and
may be revised if the US-Japan alliance is perceived as weak by domestic actors.
2NC – AT: Feasibility

( ) Japan can build nuclear weapons
A. Technology
Endo 2007 (Tetsuya, Former vice chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission “How realistic is
a nuclear-armed japan?” Nautilus Institute, Policy Forum Online,
Technologically, Japan is capable of developing nuclear weapons if it invests considerable time and
money. A major nuclear energy user possessing 55 nuclear reactors and committed to its nuclear fuel
cycle program, Japan possesses high-level nuclear technologies, a substantial amount of plutonium and
the capability to enrich uranium. Although nearly all this plutonium is reactor-grade plutonium unsuitable for
nuclear explosion, Japan does possess a small amount of high-grade plutonium. A majority of its uranium
is low-enriched, but Japan is capable of producing highly-enriched uranium if it wishes. Japanindeed
retains highly-enriched uranium for use in research and experiments, albeit in an extremely small amount.
B. Japan has all the necessary capabilities to produce weapons grade plutonium
Halperin 1999 (Morton H., Former Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the US State
Department “The Nuclear Dimension of the US-Japan Alliance” Section 4: Japanese Nuclear
Options, Nuclear Policy, The Nautilus Institute)
At the same time, Japanese governments have done what was politically possible to support
U.S. nuclear policy while quietly putting Japan into a position to be to able to quickly
develop nuclear weapons and sophisticated missile delivery systems should a consensus develop
in Japan that this needed to be done. 22 Specifically, Japan's cooperation with the United States includes
support for U.S. positions onnuclear issues such as the CTBT and a refusal to join informal
international coalitions seeking to press for more vigorous steps toward the elimination
ofnuclear weapons. Documents recently released by the U.S. government furthermore demonstrate that the
Japanese government acquiesced to the U.S. practice of having U.S. ships with nuclear weapons call at
Japanese ports.23 Yet while it insists that it is determined not to develop nuclear weapons, Japan has a
peaceful nuclear power program that generates weapons-grade plutonium, and it also has a space
exploration program; many believe that there are Japanese officials who know exactly how to turn
these activities into a program that producesnuclear weapons mated to effective delivery
systems,24 although there is disagreement about how quickly Japan could have a truly
functional nuclear force. However, it remains true that other than the NPT, Japan, unlike Germany, has not
entered into any international agreements that commit it to abstaining from developing nuclear weapons.
AFF - Inevitable
( ) Re-armament is inevitable in the squo - nationalism
Rublee 2007 (Maria Rost, Phd Strategic Insights, “The Future of Japanese Nuclear Policy”
Center for Contemporary Conflict)
To what extent can we expect this factor to increase in strength over time? Nationalism will likely continue
to grow in the foreseeable future. Of course, rising nationalism gives greater room for right-wing
politicians to advance an agenda of independent military capability, which may include nuclear
weapons. Currently, other factors weigh heavily against a nuclear option, but as those weaken, rising
nationalism could increase that possibility, especially if Japan’s relations with its neighbors continue to
be less than optimal.
AFF – No Political Will

( ) There is no political will for weaponization
International Security Advisory Board 2007 (“Report on Discouraging a Cascade of Nuclear
Weapons States”, October 19th 2007)
As mentioned above, Japan has a huge and growing stockpile of fissionable materials measured in many
thousands of weapons worth. It also has the technical capabilities to produce a nuclear weapon in a short
time if it wishes. But a review by the ISAB shows that Japan does not have the bureaucratic or political
structure to arrive at and overcome the political and bureaucratic obstacles to carry through a
decision to be the first of the three to develop a weapon.2
AFF – No Link
( ) If the US removed nuclear weapons Japan wouldn’t lash out
Halperin 1999 (Morton H., Former Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the US State
Department “The Nuclear Dimension of the US Japan Alliance” Section 5: “US Nuclear Policy
and Japanese Nuclear Weapons”, Nuclear Policy, The Nautilus Institute)
U.S. policy continues to be premised on the assumption that further reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal,
accompanied by no-first use guarantees, would increase the chances that Japan would develop nuclear
weapons. It is true that the official Japanese establishment would be momentarily disconcerted if the
United States moved in this direction, but that concern would soon vanish and would not, in any case,
create a situation in which Japan could and would move to develop nuclear weapons.
( ) Japan won’t make moves to weaponize

Morgan 1999 (Pat, Prof of Global Peace and Conflict Studies @ the University of California
@ Irvine, Commentary on the Halperin Papers, “The Nuclear Dimension of the US-Japan
Alliance” http://www.nautilus.org/archives/library/security/papers/Comment-2.html)
Next, it is undoubtedly important that the US continue to be resist any nuclear proliferation in Northeast
Asia, and Japan would be a good candidate for this if the entire regional security situation disintegrated.
However, the impression the paper creates - despite explicit language to the contrary at times - is that
Japan is poised to develop nuclear weapons if US policy moves in the wrong direction (with a reported
debate in the US as to which direction that would be). In fact, the obstacles to Japan becoming a nuclear
power are much greater than this implies, particularly in view of the newly refurbished alliance. Japan
does not like the idea of nuclear weapons and missiles so close by, in Korea, but it has put up with nearby
nuclear weapons (Russian, Chinese) for years - relying on US nuclear deterrence - so it is unlikely to react
quite differently now. And Japan has been careful to try to avoid antagonizing the entire region with
its military polities, so it would not readily take the one step guaranteed to overturn all regional
security considerations and arrangements.
AFF – Feasibility
( ) Bomb isn’t feasible – no testing site
Endo 2007 (Tetsuya, Former vice chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission “How realistic is
a nuclear-armed japan?” Nautilus Institute, Policy Forum Online,
Nevertheless, it is virtually unthinkable for this country to divert nuclear fuel to make bombs in secret.
Its plutonium and uranium are kept under strict IAEA verification, and Japan is a highly transparent
society. Even if Japan succeeds in manufacturing nuclear warheads, where is it going to test them?
Some people say simulation technology can substitute for an onsite test, but the first nuclear warhead at least
would require an onsite test. However, there is no geographically suitable place for such a test in Japan.
AFF – Link Turn – CTBT

( ) Signing the CTBT would help increase the US-Japan alliance and strengthen the non-
proliferation regime.
Toki 2008 (Masako, Research Associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, “Japan and the Future of Nuclear Disarmament” July 2nd 2008)
Under the current U.S. administration, particularly after September 11, the United States has placed more
emphasis on “coalitions of the willing”, unilateral initiatives, and preemptive action, and less on formal
multinational institutions shaped over the past decades. Due to Japan’s increasing role in international
security and the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan has faced an increasingly complicated dilemma in the last few
years between its support of multilateralism and its reliance on the alliance with the United States.
However, with the coming change in the U.S. administration, which may see Washington restore
support for multilateral institutions, the next few years could provide a great opportunity for
both Japanand the United States to explore a new way to work together to strengthen multilateral
nonproliferation and disarmament regimes. Japan and the United States have been already working
together in the field of nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, and even counter terrorism. However,
cooperation in the field of nuclear disarmament has been virtually nil. With a new U.S. president, perhaps
one who unequivocally supports CTBT, Japan and the United States may enter a new phase of
cooperation to strengthen the NPT regime and to achieve a goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.
AFF – Impact Turn – NoKo

( ) Japanese rearmament guts North Korea’s funding base – China would abandon North
Korea which increase regional security
Bandow 2006 (Doug, “Close America’s Asian Nuclear Umbrella” The American Spectator,
12/15/2006)
North Korea apparently has joined the world's nuclear club. There's still a chance of persuading the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea to give up nuclear weapons -- thus, the resumption of six-party talks
Saturday in Beijing is a welcome development. But Pyongyang routinely disappoints even the most minimal
international expectations, and the closer the DPRK gets to developing nuclear weapons, the less likely the
Kim Jong-il regime is to disarm. The best hope of success is convincing China to place significant pressure
on the North. The best hope of enlisting China's full assistance is to share Washington's nuclear nightmare.
Today Beijing more fears a North Korean economic collapse than a North Korean nuclear arsenal.
The U.S. needs to change China's priorities. Doing so won't be easy -- the People's Republic of China
worries that a DPRK collapse would generate a flood of North Korean refugees and yield a united
Korea allied with America on Beijing's border. But there is something that the PRC might fear more.
The U.S. should privately indicate that it will not discourage South Korea, Japan, and even Taiwan
from following the DPRK if the latter develops nuclear weapons. Washington need not provide assistance
or even endorse such a development, but simply step back and allow events to follow their natural course.
The thought of a Japanese bomb would especially catch China's attention. Obviously, the prospect of
serial proliferation would be as unsettling to the U.S. as to the region. However, the North's activities
may well leave proliferation among America's democratic allies as the best of several bad options.
( ) Japan should develop a nuclear force – key to check a hostile china, deter North Korea,
and maintain US hegemony
Bandow 6/16/2009 (Doug, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. Former Special Assistant to
Reagan, “A Tattered Umbrella” National Interest Online,
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=21606
Given present course, that time is likely, but not certain, to come. However, South Korea has time to prepare.
Rather than relying on America for its protection, Seoul should invest in missile defense and enhance its air-
defense capabilities. The South also should consider creating a conventional deterrent: the ability to respond
to a nuclear strike by eliminating the Kim regime. That means developing potent offensive missile and air
attack capabilities. (Japan, despite its quasi-pacifist constitution, should do the same.)
Such forces would help fulfill a second function: deter an aggressive China, if Beijing ever changed its
policy from the oft-repeated “peaceful rise” to a more belligerent stance. The People’s Republic of
China (PRC) has much to gain from stability in East Asia and has worked to assure its neighbors of its
peaceful intentions. However, the future is unknowable. The best way for Beijing’s neighbors to ensure
China’s rise is peaceful is to maintain armed forces sufficient to deter the PRC from considering
military action. Such a “dual use” capability would benefit the United States as well. The objective would
not be a high-profile attempt at containment, but a low-profile capacity for deterrence, relieving Washington
of any need to intervene. Most important, America should not reflexively extend its “nuclear umbrella”
in response to the future possibility of a nuclear North Korea. Doing so would inevitably deepen
American involvement in regional controversies, potentially turning every local dispute into an
international crisis.
AFF – Impact Turn – Taiwan

( ) Japanese armament is necessary to prevent a war over Taiwan
Kurlantzick 2002 (Joshua, Covers Asian Economics and Politics for the US “Axis of Good:
The Case For Remilitarizing Japan” Washington Monthly, July-August 2002)
Japanese troops, as well as long-range transport aircraft, also could prove vital if the United States
ever has to defend Japanese waters. Without Japanese participation in collective self-defense of the
waters near Japan, it would be extremely difficult for the American military to deter simultaneous
Chinese moves towards Taiwan and North Korean threats towards South Korea or Japan.
( ) War over Taiwan would go nuclear
Straits Times 00 [“Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan,” Jun 25, LN]
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington
were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would
embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the
US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as
belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If
China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers
elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine
Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south
Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and
dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army
which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military
defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy,
Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If
the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a
war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear
warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear
option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons.
Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International
Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He
said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a
result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of
civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem
inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

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Arizona Debate Institute 2009 1

Fellows Pre-Camp Japanese Re-Arm DA

A. Uniqueness – The US is increasing it’s nuclear umbrella over Japan now

B. Link - Reducing dependence on nuclear weapons weakens US extended deterrence

Uniqueness – Umbrella High

( ) More evidence – Japanese government still perceives a strong nuclear commitment

Uniqueness – No Reductions Now

Link – Nuclear Posture

A physical reduction in weapons would result in Japanese nuclearization, no other form of

Link – Unilateral Reductions

Impact – Turns The Case – Disarmament

Impact – Noko Prolif – EXT – I/L

( ) Japanese rearmament would result in Nuclear Korean nuclerization, collapse of the

Impact – Noko Prolif

Impact – Global Prolif (1/1)

Impact – Hegemony (1/1)

Impact – Hegemony – I/L - EXT

Impact - Hegemony – I/L – EXT

2NC – AT: Japan ReArm Good - Noko

( ) Japanese rearmament wouldn’t deter North Korea – it would spark an alliance

2NC – AT: Public Opposed

( ) More evidence – the public can be swayed

2NC – AT: Feasibility

AFF – No Political Will

( ) Japan won’t make moves to weaponize

AFF – Link Turn – CTBT

AFF – Impact Turn – NoKo

AFF – Impact Turn – Taiwan

( ) War over Taiwan would go nuclear

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