Sebastian-Raul, Pavel

ANR: 403400

Context Dependency and Particularism

A moral life is among the elements most often invoked as contributory to a good life. Good life
in itself is a moral concept that is established in the relation between the individual apprehension of
moral standards in the surrounding environments and personal reason. What the western individual
takes as granted is that morality is to be found in individual action and responsibility (which is at the
same time the image that corresponds to the western ideal of self, self which is always constituted by
sets of beliefs)1, even if there are social goading sticks to point us out in the “right” direction. But what
is good and what is wrong tends to invariably pervade us. We do not have moral knowledge, we have
only factual knowledge [Nielsen, 1957, 272]. We cannot derive on “ought” from a description of what
“is”. Particularism accepts this limitation of human reasoning by asserting that moral reasoning is
indistinguishable from any other type of reasoning [Dancy, 2004, 76], thus submitting morality to
theories of rationality and practical knowledge. Unfortunately, particularism can only explain moral
reasoning. But it is silent about the morality that exists separate of reasoning schemes, indifferent to the
moral value of guilt, remorse, altruism or empathy. What it sees is the superordinate structure of
justifiable beliefs, remaining silent about subordinate basic beliefs.
The assumption that will underline our thesis, while trying to respond if particularism is a good
characterization of the fact that moral reasons are context dependent, is that any type of particularism
is, eventually, based on a moral environment (traditions, institutions, practices, settings, roles) which
establishes, before the agent is able to take an action, the limits of that action. The point we want to
make is that there are habitus that supervene on moral agency, thus conditioning and structuring the
moral behavior2. If a choice that consider itself ethical is indifferent to the occurrences that generated it,
1 Koening, Linda J., How is the self conceptualized? Variations among cultures, in The conceptual Self in Context (coord.
Neisser and Jopling), Cambridge University Press,1997, pp 75-92.
2 “The mechanisms governing the self-regulation of moral conduct involve much more than moral thought. Even the
the moral quotient of that action must be questioned. To put the matter in another way, any ethical
behavior is dependent on some sets of values that are rooted in a certain history and tradition (of the
nation, family, state etc.). Because there is always a tension between past and present standards of
behavior, new elements and variables may appear and modify the moral content as practice. If the agent
is using a backward induction on his own behavior, the moment in which he cannot further explain his
behavior is assumed as a critical and basic no man's land, beyond which there is only speculation. Very
often, from here on foundationalism starts. Generally, this point is thought of as a limit of reason
(consciousness) from which the unknown constitution of our mind is beginning. Where explanation
ends, introspection begins3 (qualia, emotions, aches, fleeting thoughts, images, dreams, all of this are
unaccounted for in the moral attitude; “[...]the foundations of rational desire, and thereby the basic
normative reasons for action, are impersonal”[Audi, 1997, 106]). We should admit that few of us are
actually experiencing moral dilemmas that are out of our habitual responses to typical situations. As a
consequence, the idea that there are moral principles that guide our actions is widespread4.

Can particularism, as an embodiment of the Western tradition of thought that reason is universal,
and as such a common arbiter among types of knowledge, upheld the image of moral reasoning as
cognitivist? Particularism ignores the fact that there are distinctive ways of acquiring an agentive self
among different cultures [Neisser&Jopling, 1997]. We should keep in mind that the sense of self that is
the basis of every individual personality is erected upon values, desires, attitudes and representations of
the world that are not always consciously assumed and which have the role of stabilizing the agent 5.
According to Damon and Hart [Hart&Fegley, 1997, 135], the agent is acquiring a systematic
structuring of beliefs, plans and moral evaluations only in late adolescence. Until that period, the
general organizing principle of the self are: categorical identifications (early childhood), comparative
assessments (middle and late childhood), interpersonal implications (early adolescence). The

moral thought is not solely an intrapsychic affair. The way in which moral principles are applied in coping with diverse
moral dilemmas varies, depending on situational imperatives, activity domains and constellations of social influence. It
is not uncommon for sophisticated moral justifications to subserve inhumane endeavors.” William M. Kurtines, and
Jacob L. Gewirtz, eds., Handbook of Moral Behavior and Development, vol. 1 (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, 1991) 46, Questia, Web, 31 Jan. 2011.
3 "[...]introspective reflection need not be explicitly concerned with facts about oneself but may take the form of a search
for grounds, where the target of the search is propositions that might be evidence, rather than any beliefs or internal
attitudes." (Audi, 1997, 13)
4 Robert Audi (1997, 94) is still using the notion of “moral principles” when he refers to moral reasoning, even if he
recognizes the fact that there are no indefeasible obligations or duties, just strong prima facie obligations.
5 Moreover, the likelihood that particular events will be remembered as personally significant is, in part, a consequence of
the persons with whom the experience was lived and their reactions to it. From this point of view, even when explicit
memory is used as factual justification for decision-making, we have no assurance of its real epistemological content or
influence over the agent. Unreasonableness and self-deceit still lurks under our reasoning. Identifying the psycho-social
factors that produced the individual can answer to many problems of irrational behavior and moral reasoning.
functionalism that is constantly publicized in our culture as the nature of reason lacks the
communitarian and the relational perspective [Markus&Mullally&Kitayama, 1997, 13-62]. In this
point we should consider the possibility of collective moral knowledge as a furthering of individual
agency, as the next level of moral reasoning.
What concerns moral philosophy nowadays is the “collapse of morality in purely non-moral
terms” [Mason, 1997, 233], the agent being depicted as functioning individually in its moral decisions,
when there is always a strong communitarian link between the individual and the environment in which
the agent is making its decisions. If particularism proved that there is no need of moral principles, it
still has to prove what ideals are and what the distinction between fact and value is. The latter is
imposing on particularism the burden to distinguish between empirical observations and conceptual
embeddings in the usage of moral reasoning. What this means is that a difference must be explicitly be
made between moral and non-moral properties in the field of empiric moral theory. Even if cognitive
empiricism is able to explain the reasonings behind our practical knowledge of morality, it still remains
mostly a procedural rationality, instrumental even if we accept that it works with unquestioned values.
From this point of view, particularism is a critique of moral theories but not a moral theory per se. Its
generative function serves only the procedural organization of reasons - good and wrong being
perceived as true or false beliefs, depending on the context - without inquiring in the use of concepts as
justice, equality, freedom etc. in moral reasoning.
Another thing to keep in mind is that if we can prove that there is no need for moral principles,
we can hardly say the same thing of moral values. From a historical point of view, these did not
evolved separately. Values also appeared from generalizations and they are atomistic, not holistic in
their inherent structure. Even if it were for us to assume that values are thin and thick concepts in their
interplay with non-moral concepts, this would be a translation and not a defining characteristic. On
what grounds do we recognize something as a value, and is it necessary for a value to have some
invariant properties? I would speculate that values are similar in structure to the Aristotelian concept of
non-coincidental homonym (no single definition will fit all the cases, but nevertheless they are not
merely coincidentally related). In this case, values can be variant even when they still retain their basic
content. As in any given syntax, the complex meaning of a word (not just its signified) is construed by
the words that are connected with it. Even if we use the same word, we will still have different
meanings; as such, a value can be holistic while retaining its atomic form, its focal meaning. That is
why, over the centuries we have retained the concept of beauty as a value, indiscriminate of its different
properties over the time. Beauty, as depicted by Rubens is not the same with beauty depicted by
Fernando Botero, or Picasso. Nevertheless, one cannot argue that they still referred to it. But one will
invariably reach the following question: what grounds a value as a value? From a pragmatic point a
view, there is nothing inherent in any value capable of vouching for it as such. To give an answer to
such a question requires an analysis of moral syntax and the formulation of consistent and adequate
grammars of ethics and value. If values are context-dependent, then any moral judgment built upon
them has the same properties.
I think that discussing what ideals are is a good way of emphasizing the complex nature of our
moral knowledge. This complexity is feeding from the discrepancy between the rational undertaking of
moral reasoning, where axioms and functional conditions are clearly defined, and the vague,
ambiguous and not always self-evident uses of moral concepts in judgments. Following Robert Audi's
own view on the possibility of moral knowledge, I take that an interactionist (much more responsive to
the relation between environment and psychological factors6) perspective suits our purpose.
Interactionism is the chiasm between generalism and particularism and is “consistent both with
rationalism and with the view that experience is a genetic, as opposed to epistemic, requirement even of
a a priori knowledge” [1997, 100]. Stability and change are both context-dependent. The persistence in
time of “moral principles” is no less context-dependent than any other moral construct. If we accept
that ideals are approximations of important elements from the set of the self-image, then we have the
following distinction: the essential elements can be thought of as such through epistemic observation
over time (particularism) or they may be responsive to a psycho-social grounding to which they must
conform (generalism).

Ideals are a supra-organization of existing preferences and beliefs (e.g the ideal of a good life is
to have enough money, or houses etc.) in co-existence with an affective impetus (desires, wants).
Dancy argued that a belief is not a reason [2004, 46], but even if it were to be so it is an enabling
codition that favors a motivational attitude that ultimately entails an action7. Every time an action is
performed, the criterion of judgment for that action is the ongoing performance towards the aggregate
set of properties that define the proposed ideal or outcome. Of course, this is holding only at a
subjective level (even though there are moral ideals such as equality, or freedom, which are not
intrinsically subjective, but neither a priori principles since they are required for the functioning of the
democratic state, playing thus a functional role, even if they still are largely sustained on atomistic
grounds), but the ideal is able to offer us an umbrella under which most of the actions can be explained
6 There still is some disagreement about which emotions are most related to morality, but there is a an accepted set:
anxiety and fear, shame and guilt, anger, love and empathy. [ Knowles&McLean, 1992, 93]
7 It is a questionable thing to say. Every reason entails a degree of belief in the reasonableness of it, as in the deliberation
that asserted it. A belief is not a reason in the sense that a belief is not empowering an act of explanation or deliberation
with justifiedness, even if it is central to the direction the deliberation will take.
because it comprises of the ordering of preferences and beliefs with the highest degree of justification
(the justifications offered by the agent can be challenged) in the individual hierarchy. If a pattern is
formed, then a description is possible, even if the elements of the set are variant or invariant8. Such
descriptive needs are at the base of the agents' conviction in principles (be it moral principles or
principles of reason). An ideal cannot be attained only through reasonable deliberation, but it cannot be
discarded as principles can be. The ideal is a type of desired outcome, but without the requirements of
reasonable assessments of degrees of probability. World peace is an ideal, but if we were to calculate
the probability of such an outcome, we would never consider it as being (mildly said) certain. Its
purpose is, nevertheless, to guide our actions and hopes for the betterment of us. Rationality is also
instrumental - and sometimes it should be used as such when moral goals are envisioned outside any
reasonable means to complete them - not only a generative process of conducts.
The agent always has some preferences and beliefs which are structuring his decisions and
actions. This is a basic precept of rationality, and ethics are deeply related to the theory of practical
rationality. If the agent X is buying a house with a garden, although he cannot afford it, we can give
various account of the agent's reasons (maybe the agent wants to grow turnips to sell or to supply his
household), but these are not enough to classify it. Particularism is an attempt of declassifying
(decoding) habitual patterns of ethical/moral behavior (as principled behaviors) that are given in
variations of anticipated situations (anticipated as in experience-expected, thus less spontaneous for the
ethical judgment of the agent). The real question is if particularism can claim legitimacy as a general
theory of ethical knowledge.
If we say ethical behavior, we have from the start the assumption that behavior is not just
supervenient on a given context. A judgment would be hard to make if that was not the case, because
judgments are constructed at the level of a very complex experience of the surrounding world.
Repeated behaviors and perceptions are sedimented into habitual patterns of action and reaction that are
mostly activated by a degree of similarity between the current context and the prior context through
memory. Is morality a disposition, a set of causal properties? How should we interpret the drive to
cooperation or selfishness? The agent can employ into a context to cooperate with another agent or not.
This is the basic sketch of the prisoners' dilemma. But this is applicable only in situations with
predictable outcomes. When the outcomes are uncertain, in rationality we use the Bayesian function of
probability, to assert the means with the best probability of a positive outcome. But the point I want to
make is that there are strategies that are used to shape the understanding we have of our surroundings.

8 "All the same, it might be argued, we have to admit that there are some invariant reasons—some features whose
practical relevance is invariant." [Dancy, 2004, 77]
In ethics, we can employ such a model of tactical decision. In this case, there are no spontaneous
ethical behaviors, but actions able to satisfy the subjective hierarchy of preferences - “in many
instances, tests of maturity in moral reasoning may be measuring personal preferences more than level
of competence in moral reasoning” [Kurtines&Gewirtz (eds.), 1991, 47] - . This is a critique of the
“open-endedness” premise of particularism. Even if there are no principles that are established a priori,
there are goals (moral goals maybe?) that determine the moral stance one will have. Open-endedness is
nothing more than non-monotonicity, meaning the exposure to new informations and the adjustments
made to current preferences and reasonings. The agent is open to self-regulatory influence. But we
should not exclude the hypothesis that even if today's understanding of morality is more open and
flexible than before (also because our technological advancement, which multiplies the types of
interactions and relations between agents, thus the variability), we could not say the same thing for, let's
say, the Medieval era, where exceptions were infinitely less likely to happen. The difficulty of labeling
an action as moral will get more and more complex (as technology evolves, new variables are created
and the environment is modified producing multidimensional rules and standards), and only if we
tackle it with the same type of reasoning that produced the changes we will not fall in antiquated
antagonisms (unsatisfactory and non-functional). In this point we can definitely say that particularism
is a good characterization that moral reasons are context-dependent. That is to say those moral actions
are not just dependent on the initially provided context, but they are dependent also on the larger
context that produced the initial context9. It would be quite difficult to interpret the moral behavior and
values of tribes from Polynesia using particularist approaches, ignoring social cognitive interactionism
and anthropology. It is not just about the reasonableness of justification, but about the cultural divide.
We must face the fact that particularism is able to function as a valid theory of moral reasoning only as
a particularized take on moral interactions. Even if Spinoza was the first to say that good and wrong
are relative, he still thought of human action as being predetermined. This is the epitome of contextual-
dependency. While it gives us the impression of being preoccupied by the form of moral reasoning and
not its content, contextual-dependency carries with it an inherent content-value that in the end has a
fixed behaviorally mandate. Particularism on its own is not able to provide a thorough and general
theory of ethics or moral action because it never questioned the social content (collective value-

9 I have to make a distinction between individual reasoning, as micro-reasoning, and collective reasoning, macro-
reasoning. Dependency on the given context do not refer only to the reasoning of the individual on the given specifics of
the situation, but also on the macro-reasoning that produced the surroundings (e.g euthanasia is not just a moral dilemma
that regards the individual choice and liberties over one's life, as opposed to the moral duty of the doctors, but is also a
situation created by the possibility of staying alive electronically, even when there is no conscious control over one's
body. This kind of technological life-support is putting a pressure which never existed before on the common meaning of
“life” and “alive”).
reasoning) of moral behavior.

In the question “Is particularism an incorrect characterization of the fact that moral reasons are
context dependent?” the emphasis is not only on “context-dependency” but on “moral reasons” too. Is
“moral reasons” a valid notion10? Moral reasons can be defined as such by the set of preferences that
legitimates them and offers a coherent and consistent justification. So a moral reason is a reason that is
connected to a special set of preferences that the agent has. How is this set of preferences there in the
beginning? If there is a set of preferences that determines a moral action then, for particularism to hold
as an “unanalyzable capacity that is open-ended in character” [Thomas, 2010, 3] it has to separate the
theory of moral action from the theory or practical rationality, or to be able to explain how much can a
set of preferences influence a moral decision. As long as the set of preferences is not complete, thus not
allowing an ordinal utility theory, change and instability are present in the behavior of the agent. It is
questionable, even if the agent has a complete set of preferences, if the agent has a parallel set of values
able to morally justify the hierarchy existing in the preference set. Every preference of the agent is not
locked only on the maximization of utility, but also on distinct needs, such as self-actualization and
identity needs. In this case, every choice has a value for the agent, especially if the choice implies a
desired object or action. As for the moral content of those values, this is something that can be socially
determined.

10 "When people reason about moral conflicts they commonly face in their environment[...] moral reasoning is more a
function of the social influences operating in the situation than of persons' stages of moral competence"
[Kurtines&Gewirtz (eds.), 1991, 47]
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