China in Africa: Savior or self-interest?

Author(s): David Shinn

Source: Great Decisions , 2013, eat Decisions (2013), pp. 85-96
Published by: Foreign Policy Association

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43682516

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 7
China in Africa:
Savior or self-interest?
by David Shinn

Chinese President Hu Jintao ( c .), walks past delegates ( from left to right , Cape Verde's Prime Minister Neves , Niger's President Issoufou,
Equatorial Guinea's President Mbasogo and South African President Zuma) as he prepares to deliver an opening speech for the 5 th
Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation held at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing , China, Thursday , July
19, 2012. (ANDYWONG/AP/CORBIS)

the creation of a Chinese youth volunteer program in a num-

have been impressed by China's engagement. To- ber of African countries. It has expanded its radio, television
VISITORS have day, China been istodeeply
day, China is impressed
engagedAfrica
almost deeply in engaged
everywhere on recent by China's years almost engagement. almost everywhere certainly To- on and print media outreach to Africa and is establishing Confu-
the continent, although four countries- Swaziland, Burkina cius Institutes (cultural outposts of the Chinese government
Faso, São Tomé and Principe and Gambia- still recognize Tai- with some 350 branches on campuses around the world).
wan. This is in stark contrast to the situation existing before China has some kind of military/security relationship with
the mid- 1 990 's, when China was just one of many interna- every African country that recognizes Beijing and now has
tional actors on the continent. In 2009, China surpassed the about 1 ,500 peacekeepers assigned to six of Africa's seven
U.S . as Africa's largest trading partner. It is important, however, United Nations peacekeeping missions. Since 2008, China
to put this in perspective. Because China is such a major ex- has provided two frigates and a supply ship to the Somali an-
porter and importer, trade with Africa constitutes only about 4
percent of its global trade. In contrast, China accounts for more
DAVID SHINN is an adjunct professor in the Elliott School
of International Affairs at George Washington University .
than 13 percent of Africa's global trade.
He served for 37 years in the U.S. Foreign Service and is the
China is also challenging Western countries in all areas former ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia. He is the
of "soft power," such as student scholarships and specialized co-author of China and Africa: A Century of Engagement
training in Chinese, technical assistance teams in Africa and and blogs at http://davidshinn.blogspot.com.

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 lonialism. In the 1960's, China even
supported a few left-wing movements
that were trying to topple ideologically
conservative governments. Increasing-
ly, the Sino-Soviet conflict dictated Bei-
jing's policy in Africa just as the cold
war (1945-91) and anticommunism
determined U.S. policy. China tended to
support those liberation groups in coun-
tries still under colonial control that did
not have Soviet backing and it made
every effort to minimize Moscow's in-
fluence. This focus continued until the
early 1980's when China and the Soviet
Union reconciled. During the first four
decades of its engagement with Africa,
China had limited financial resources
to devote to the continent and could not
compete on equal terms with the Soviet
Union or the West.

Symbolizing China's eagerness to win new friends in Africa, Mao Zedong (r.) extends the China's policy became increasingly
hand of friendship to Ghana 's President Kwame Nkrumah at a meeting in Hangchow, pragmatic in the 1980s, but was also
China., July 28, 1962. (BETTMANN/CORBIS) marked by an element of indifference,
tipiracyChina did not have good relations or, inespecially inin
operation the last halfthe
of the decade. Gu
China has
the beginning, any relations with Af- China focused on
become a internal economic
major
Africa rica's colonial rulers.has
and As African coun- organized
modernization while the approaching it
main fortries beganthe to achieve independence
long-term. end of the cold war reduced China's ardor
in The
where China
the 1950s and especially in theand 1960s,for engagingthein Africa. One of Wes
China's
such as trade,
China realized that it needed investment
their po-
leading Africanists, He Wenping, said an
cial contracts, and
litical support in the United Nations to there
the guiding principle of Chinese diplo-are
where interests
replace Taiwan on the Security Council. overlap
macy in the 1980s changed from "ideo- and
the West Beginningcould with the 1955 Asian-cooperate,
logical idealism to pragmatic idealism s
peacekeeping, and from unconditional internationalism
African Conference in Bandung, antipiracy
In-
donesia, China workedpolitical
maintaining hard to culti-to a priority of national interest."
stabilitThe de-
moting vate African delegations. China sub-
economic cade ended developm
with the government crack-
The sequently used conferences
future of organized
competition
down on the pro-democracy protests in
eration by hinges
the Afro- Asian People's Solidarity
on an
Tiananmen Square obviou
in 1989, although this
What Organization
are to obtain support from
China's event didlong-term
not adversely impact China's
Does China the so-called nonaligned
only states. Inrelations
desire with African countries. to ex
minerals to
1956, China feed
opened its first embassy in At the
its end of the cold war, decreased
industr
ment? Or are
Africa in Cairo. other
Beijing's efforts paidinterest in Africa byelement
the Soviet Union
such as off in 1971
developing when the UN General As- (now Russia) and the West coincided
another
Chinese sembly
exports admitted the People's Republic
andwith the rapid growth of China's econ-
maintain
litical of China (PRC) into the UN
support ofand alsoomyAfrican
and its increasing need for raw cou
replaced Taiwan on the Security Coun- materials. In 1993, China became a net
Tile cil.drag The PRC obtained 34 percent o of its
importer n of oil; Africa has about 10 per-
awakens m A. fr? ca
votes from African countries; 26 Af- cent of the world's known petroleum re-
rican states supported Beijing and serves.
When the Communist Party of China 15 China's rapidly growing indus-
(CPC) took control of the mainland in Taipei, the Taiwanese capital.
backed trial sector also consumed increasing
Todo-
1949, it was initially consumed with this day, China regularly expresses
quantities of copper, bauxite, iron ore,
mestic issues and concerns on its imme-appreciation to African countries for
cobalt, manganese, uranium, titanium
diate periphery. Africa was not impor- their support in gaining admittance and
to timber, all of which are found in
tant to its foreign policy interests. In anythe UN. abundance in Africa. By the mid-1990s,
event, only Ethiopia, Liberia and white- Throughout the 1950's and 1960's,
almost without notice, China had qui-
ruled South Africa were independent, China backed African wars of national etly begun to increase its engagement
while Egypt had an element of self-rule. liberation, antiimperialism and antico-in Africa. ■

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 China's interests in Africa
ests in Africa. First, Africa is a sourceis to end the diplomatic recognition of
CHINA'S well-advanced
well-advancedbyENGAGEMENT
the beginningbyofthe beginning in Africa, of of raw materials. China obtains about
Taiwan by any country in Africa. Al-
the 2 1 st century, had become so frenetic one third of its oil imports from Afri- though only four African countries still
that in 2000 China created the Forum can countries and significant mineral recognize Taiwan, Beijing has never re-
on China- Africa Cooperation (FOC AC), resources: for example, about 90 per- lented in its pursuit of the "one-China"
which meets every three years at the policy. The 2008 election of Taiwanese
cent of its cobalt, 35 percent of its man-
ministerial or summit level in an effort ganese and 30 percent of its tantalum. President
It Ma Ying-jeou, who quickly
to coordinate China's relations with the would be difficult for China to meet all
developed a more cordial relationship
50 countries in Africa that recognize of its mineral needs from non- African with China, has resulted in an informal,
Beijing. In advance of the third FOC ACsources. but likely temporary, diplomatic truce
summit in 2006, China issued a major Second, China wants to expand between Beijing
its and Taipei. At some
white paper on its African policy, which exports to Africa, which now point,has more
Beijing will almost certainly step
continues to guide the development of than one billion people andupapressure growing on these four African gov-
China's policy toward Africa. The fifth middle class, making the ernments continent a
to recognize China. At the
FOCAC ministerial meeting took place more attractive export market. same time, Beijing has no objection to
Between
in Beijing in July 2012. 2000 and 2010, China increased Taiwan'sits ex-
commercial presence in Africa.
Although China is more economi- ports to Africa thirteenfold.
U.S interests in Africa
cally advanced than every country in Third, China seeks political support.
Africa, it continues to emphasize that African states now constitute more than The U.S. has five hard interests in Af-
it remains a developing country and, one quarter of the membership of the rica. The first three are almost identi-
consequently, claims a special attach-United Nations General Assembly. Chi- cal to China's. First, the U.S. seeks raw
ment to countries at a similar stage inna and many African countries that are materials, especially oil. Although the
Africa. While parts of China's interiorcriticized for their human rights prac- U.S. buys more oil from Africa than
still qualify as underdeveloped areas,tices tend to support each other in the does China, it imports fewer minerals
the coastal region and even some in-United Nations Human Rights Council. and other raw materials.
terior centers such as Chongqing have China also welcomes African support Second, the U.S. wants to increase
clearly emerged from the developing in forums such as the World Trade Or- its exports to Africa, although they re-
category. It is doubtful that China will ganization (WTO) and it, in turn, oftenmain a tiny percentage of global Amer-
be able to claim for much longer that itsupports African positions in the UN ican exports. Third, Washington tries
is a developing country. Security Council. to obtain support for U.S. positions in
President Hu Jintao, speaking at the Fourth, one of Beijing's prioritiesinternational forums from as many Afri-
opening of the 2012 FOCAC ministerial
meeting, emphasized his country's sta-
tus as a "still-developing" country and
said that China and Africa, as develop-
ing states, should align themselves more
closely in global forums such as the
United Nations. He then took a swipe
at the West by adding: "We should op-
pose the practices of the big bullying
the small, the strong domineering over
the weak and rich oppressing the poor."
South African President Jacob
Zuma, speaking after Hu, commented
that "we certainly are convinced that
China's intention is different to that of
Europe, which to date continues to tend
to influence African countries for their
sole benefit." Zuma added, however,
that Africa must be cautious and avoid
allowing that sort of pattern to govern
Gold miners form a human chain while digging an open pit at the Chudja mine in the Ki-
its relationship with China. lomoto concession in north-eastern Congo , February 23, 2009. (FINBARR O'REILLY/REUTERS/
China currently has four hard inter-
CORBIS)

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 State-to-state
can countries as possible. The
ruling party counterparts in each coun-
nese interestand party relations
in Africa try. Except for South not shar
Africa, where the
U.S. , for obvious
The strength of China's relations with reasons,
Communist Party is a junior partner in is
aim of African countries lies in the state-to-
ending diplomatic
the ruling coalition, none of the Africanrec
of Taiwan. state and party-to-party ties. China's ruling parties operates under the name
The U.S. has two additional inter- official governmental relationships withof a communist party. Some of the rul-
ests in Africa. First, the U.S. desireseach
to of the 50 countries in Africa that ing African political parties are ideolog-
recognize Beijing is either excellent or,ically close to the CPC but others have
minimize the impact in Africa of terror-
at least, satisfactory, and it works hardlittle in common with it. For example,
ism, narcotics trafficking, international
crime, piracy and money launderingtosomaintain these cordial ties. The most Sudan's ruling party, the National Con-
telling fact is that every year since 1991 gress Party (NCP), professes to be an
they do not harm U.S . interests in Africa
or at home. These concerns are not as China's foreign minister has made his Islamic party. Yet the NCP and most rul-
first overseas visit to a country in Af-ing parties in Africa have established a
significant to China as they are to the
U.S. rica. African leaders notice this consis- close relationship with the CPC.
Second, the U.S. military continuestency of attention. Between 1997 and 2006, the CPC
to rely on access to African ports for High-level exchange visits with Af-hosted over 60 African party leaders.
visits by naval vessels, on the ability rican counterparts permeate all layersThese visits permitted an exchange of
to overfly African countries, and on the of the Chinese government. Presidentviews, coordination of policies, provi-
Hu has been to Africa six times, two sion of modest financial assistance and
ability to land military aircraft at African
as vice president and four as president.even the voicing of grievances. The
airports. The U.S. has a military base in
Djibouti and small drone intelligence-Between 1956 and 2006, some 160 CPC has provided material support, for
collection capabilities in Ethiopia and
Chinese leaders and foreign ministersexample, to the ruling political party in
the Seychelles. It also operates smallvisited Africa, while 524 Africans with
Zimbabwe. The CPC partners with like-
counterterrorism operations in Kenya,the rank of minister or higher made 676
minded ruling parties and offers cadre
Uganda, South Sudan, Central Africanvisits to China. These exchange visitstraining and party management courses
Republic and Burkina Faso. in countries such as South Africa, Tan-
have proved to be an effective and low-
zania and Namibia.
cost way to build a strong state-to-state
So far, China has expressly denied it
has any interest in establishing militaryrelationship. It is difficult to understate the im-
bases or operations in Africa. However, An especially important aspect of portance of the CPC relationship with
the official connection is the contact be- ruling parties in Africa, especially when
as China expands its naval capacity, this
could change. tween the CPC leadership and African comparing the situation to high-level
U.S. contact with African leaders. Se-
nior U.S. officials make fewer state
visits to Africa and, excluding African
attendance at the annual meeting of the
UN General Assembly in New York,
African leaders receive fewer invita-
tions to come to the U.S. More impor-
tantly, the U.S. has nothing comparable
to the CPC. The Democratic and Re-
publican parties do not function as ma-
jor decisionmaking bodies even when
their leader occupies the White House.
The only foreign engagement provided
by the two major American political
parties consists of low-level technical
assistance and election monitoring by
the National Democratic Institute and
the International Republican Institute.

Military and security ties

Africa is of military and security in-
Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara ( r.) speaks with the Chinese ambassador to Côte terest to China only to the extent that
d'Ivoire, (2nd I.), and the Ivorian Minister for Economic Infrastructure after the official
there might be interruptions in access
launch of the jointly funded construction project of a 30 km highway linking Abidjan to
Grand Bassam, on August 3 , 2012. The infrastructure project is expected to cost $116.7 to and movement of oil and minerals
million. (SIA KAMBOU/AFP/GETTY IMAGES) that support Chinese industrial output.

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 China prefers political stab
rica and wants to minimize
its personnel and interests
estimates that one million Chinese na-
tionals now work and live in Africa, a
number that is well above the figure
for U.S. nationals. The death in 2007
of nine Chinese workers in Ethiopia's
Ogaden region and the evacuation of
35,000 Chinese from Libya during the
2011 revolution were unpleasant sur-
prises. China has not signed a formal
military alliance with any African coun-
try. On the other hand, China has been
a strong supporter of UN peacekeeping
missions in Africa and the international
effort to combat Somali piracy in the
Gulf of Aden.
China's current policy emphasizes
military operations other than war as
a solution to international disputes. As Sailors from China's People's Liberation Army stand on the deck of a Chinese Task Force
in the case of its state-to-state contacts, 525 flagship missile frigate that saw action in Somalia against pirates, as the ship anchored
in Manila on April 13, 2010. (TED aljibe/afp/GETTY IMAGES)
China's military links with Africa rely
heavily on a constant parade of Chi- ertheless, China was a less important in African conflict zones. Together with
nese military personnel visiting Afri- supplier by dollar value of conven- arms from numerous other countries,
can counterparts and African military tional weapons to Africa than Russia they have been found in recent years
personnel hosted in China. The People's or Germany. On the other hand, China in Sudan's war- wracked Darfur re-
Liberation Army (PLA) coordinates its is a more significant supplier of small gion, the brutal war in eastern Congo
activities in Africa with the CPC and arms, ammunition and light weapons, and anarchic Somalia. These weapons
but there are no reliable statistics to
the state bureaucracy. PLA activities probably reached conflict areas after
are political undertakings using mili-document China's global percentagehaving
of been purchased on the interna-
tary means for strategic reasons andthese transfers. tional arms market or were transferred
not independent initiatives conducted Some of these weapons, especially to groups involved in the conflict by
small arms and light weapons, end compliant
explicitly for military purposes. At the up African governments that
end of 2007, China had 16 defense at-
taché offices in Africa, some accredited
to multiple countries, while 28 African
countries had comparable offices in
Beijing as of 2010. The fact that China
has relatively few defense attaché of-
fices in Africa may reflect China's effort
to downplay its military involvement.

Arms

China is a significant supplier of arms

to Africa. From 2002 through 2009,
China transferred (in most cases sold)
$1.1 billion in conventional weapons
to sub-Saharan Africa and another $1 .4
billion to North Africa. The convention-
al weapons transferred to sub-Saharan
Africa constituted about 20 percent of
arms transferred by all suppliers. China
helped Sudan to build its industry for
Members of a special squad of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy Seventh
assembling and producing small arms, Escort Task Force participate in a joint drill with Tanzanian Marine Corps at a Navy base
artillery and armored vehicles. Nev- March 29, 2011, in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. (XINHUA/GAMMA-RAPHO/GETTY IMAGES)

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 Modern China made its first Africanthem
received a major impact on imports from those le
situation countries.
undersc
port calls in 2000 with visits to Tanzania
and South Africa. Following a hiatus,or
inability Most Chinese exports to
unwAfrica are
morethere haseffectively high- value manufactured goods. Trans-
been an upsurge in port calls
weapons since China began sending ships to portation equipment, machinery and
the
into con
Military antipiracy effort in the Gulf of Aden. electronic
trainin products account for half of
ponent This engagement has highlighted
of its exports.
the China's exports are highly
China'
rica. difficulty The of maintaining and supply- diversified,
PLA however, and include largesen
help ing three with navy vessels over an extended educat
quantities of textiles, footwear and plas-
tenance and health care. China trains period of time without any permanent tic products. More than half of China's
Zimbabwe's air defense personnel and base rights in the region. As a result, exports go to five countries: South Afri-
pilots in connection with its equipmentChina has been in discussions with Ke- ca, Nigeria, Egypt, Liberia and Algeria.
sales to the country and trained Equa- nya and the Seychelles concerning the Increasingly, Chinese goods, especially
torial Guinea's military in the use resupply
of of its ships. More importantly,low-end consumer products, are being
heavy weapons. It has sent instructors China is well-advanced in building sold a by Chinese traders who have taken
to maintain military equipment in Su- nuclear submarine capacity and has up residence in Africa and have an inte-
dan, Zimbabwe, Cameroon and Gabon. begun to create an aircraft carrier task grated supply system with friends and
The PLA Navy held a joint training ex- force. China currently must rely on the relatives in China. "Chinatowns" have
ercise with South Africa and conducted U.S. or Indian navies to protect the seaappeared in cities such as Dakar (Sen-
a military medical exercise in Gabon. lanes that carry so much of its importedegal), Lagos (Nigeria) and Cape Town
The most intriguing aspect of Chi- oil and minerals coming from Africa (South Africa). Some critics refer to
na's military connection with Africa is and the Persian Gulf. As PLA Navy China's trade and economic engage-
ment in Africa as an example of neo-
its current effort to expand the capabil- vessels expand into the western Indian
ity of the PLA Navy. While the west- Ocean, they will bump up against bothcolonialism. While there are certainly
ern Indian Ocean is not an immediate Indian and American naval ships and elements of mercantilism, the charge
of neocolonialism misses the mark.
give rise to growing concerns about
priority for China, it is certainly part of
the PLA Navy's long-term planning.
their objectives. China's trading practices are not sig-
nificantly different than those of other
T rade, major trading partners. Nor is there any
investment and aid
effort by China to establish control over
China's total trade with Africa Africangrew
governments.
from $6.3 billion in 1999 to $166 bil- investment in Africa only
Chinese
lion in 201 1 , a twenty-sixfoldbegan in earnest in about 2000, long af-
increase.
When all 54 African countries are taken ter companies from Europe and North
into account, trade over the years has America had entered the market. In re-
generally been in balance, but there arecent years, Western investment in Africa
huge disparities in bilateral trade. Somehas slowed considerably while Chinese
15 African oil/mineral exporting coun- investment has grown rapidly. Even
tries tend to have large trade surplusesusing China's conservative figures,
China is interested in Africa's with China, while more than 30 others,investment increased by more than 60
resources because they are in- generally the poorer ones, usually runpercent between 2009 and 201 1 . China
has established a number of institu-
terested in controlling their own large deficits. Trade for the remaining
African countries is about in balance. tions to encourage overseas investment
economic destiny. And for Chi-
na to control its own economic Roughly three quarters of Africa's ex- such as the China- Africa Development
destiny, it must have a range ofports to China come from five oil/min- Fund and the China Export and Credit
economic relationships and dip- eral exporting countries: Angola, South Insurance Corporation. Initial Chinese
investment in Africa was concentrated
lomatic partnerships that will Africa, Sudan, Libya and the Republic
allow them to procure sufficient of the Congo. In 2009, 80 percent in of mining, energy, construction and
raw material to keep the mother Africa's exports to China consisted of manufacturing. Increasingly, China is
ship going." metals and petroleum products; other moving into finance, aviation, agricul-
raw materials accounted for another 10 ture and tourism. More than 2,000 Chi-
-John Huntsman,
Former UJS. percent. To its credit, China is trying to nese companies, many of them small
Ambassador to China increase imports from poorer Africanand private, have invested so far in
countries by allowing 4,700 items to en-Africa. South Africa, Nigeria, Zambia,
ter duty free from Africa's least-devel-Algeria, the Democratic Republic of the
www.GreatDecisions.org/DVD
oped countries. So far, this has not hadCongo and Sudan account for about 65

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 percent of China's in
It is important to n
this constitutes only
China's global inves
Information on China's direct invest-
ment in Africa lacks transparency and is
sometimes conflicting. As of the end of
201 1 , China stated its total direct invest-
ment in Africa had reached a cumulative
$14.7 billion. The real figure is believed
to be closer to $40 billion because of
investments that go through locations
such as Hong Kong and the Cayman
Islands and are not included in the of-
ficial total. It is probable that in the last
several years China has been the largest
bilateral investor in Africa, outpacing
investment from the U.S. or any single A Zambian worker digs a ditch in the Zambia-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone
country in Europe. Because companiesin Chambishi in the Copperbelt, the first zone of its kind in Africa. A Chinese worker is seen
in the U.S. and those in several majorat the right , January 28, 2011. (Thomas lekfeldt/moment/redux)
European countries started investing in
Africa much earlier than China, theirdoes not provide annual aid figures now for reaping an enormous amount of
cumulative investments exceed China's. individual countries. Specialists who praise from African governments for
China's minister of commerce, have looked at this issue carefully sug- meeting one of their priority needs.
Chen Deming, asserted at the 2012 FO- gest that in the past several years, China While one can only guess at the val-
CAC meeting that China will urge itshas provided about $2.5 billion annually ue of China's development assistance,
companies and banks to participate inin OECD-equivalent aid to Africa. This China's State Council reported in 2009
cross-border and regional infrastruc-compares with about $8 billion from that the almost 46 percent of its aid went
ture projects, encourage regional tradeU.S . The European Union (EU) provides to Africa, the largest regional recipient.
facilitation and eventually establish aeven larger amounts. Although China Between
is 2000 and 2009, China also
comprehensive and diversified China- not yet in the top ranks of aid donors canceled
to $2.8 billion of debt owed by 35
Africa trade and economic cooperation Africa, it now provides enough assis- African countries. There is no clear evi-
system. He said it is China's goal to tance to qualify as a significant donor. dence that China is adding significantly
migrate more production to Africa to The component of Chinese assis- to the debt of Africa's poorest countries.
create more jobs on the continent. Sev-tance that is receiving the most publici- China is also increasingly engaged in
en special economic zones now under ty is the growing number of multibillion multilateral aid organizations that tend
construction in Zambia (two), Nigeriadollar soft loans for large infrastructure to play an oversized role in Africa. It
(two), Mauritius, Egypt and Ethiopia projects such as dams, railroads, roads, makes modest contributions to the Unit-

are intended to help achieve this goal.bridges, pipelines and buildings. ed The Nations Development Programme.
Chen added that China will request terms of these loans are usually better Its voting share in the 188-member In-
more investment protection and double than similar commercial bank loans, ternational but Monetary Fund (IMF) has
taxation agreements. It will promote they usually do not qualify as OECD- reached 6.1 percent compared to 16.5
more experience and knowledge shar-equivalent loans. Except for China's percent for the U.S . and in the 1 87-mem-
ing with African counterparts in devel- insistence on recognizing Beijing ber World Bank, whose mission is to
rather than Taipei, there are no politi- help poor nations develop their econo-
opment concepts, policies, laws, regula-
tions and industrial park development. cal strings attached to the loans, mak- mies, it is now at 4.42 percent compared
Finally, Chen promised to encourage ing them especially attractive to African to 15.85 percent for the U.S. China is
governments that are wary of Western also an active member of the African
Chinese companies to fulfill their social
responsibilities and pay greater atten-conditionality. On the other hand, these Development Bank and African Devel-
tion to environmental concerns. multibillion dollar loans are almost al- opment Fund. The BRICS (Brazil, Rus-
China is even less transparent about ways tied to construction of the project sia, India, China and South Africa) are
the level of its assistance to Africa and by a Chinese company, often a large
exploring the possibility of establishing
there is considerable confusion as to
state-owned company, and sometimesa BRICS development bank to compete
what constitutes aid as defined by include
the with the World Bank and other multilat-
a significant percentage of Chi-
Organization for Economic Co-opera-nese labor. Nevertheless, China filled eral
a development banks. To the extent
tion and Development (OECD). China void left by Western companies and is that China is willing to cooperate with

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 Is China an economic model for Africa?

ment from the Chinese diaspora, developed state institu-

tionofofhasChina
There tion Chinaasbeen
a development
considerablemodel for Africa. discussion model on for the Africa. ques-
as a development
Often called the "Beijing Consensus" (as opposed to the
"Washington Consensus") the argument is made, usually
by African leaders, that their countries need to follow the
economic success of China. Interestingly, China's officials
have been careful to avoid pushing this idea. In fact, some
have publicly warned that it would be inappropriate to
emulate completely China's experience.
These cautions are grounded in several good reasons.
First, there are just over one billion people in Africa's 54
countries compared to more than 1 .3 billion in China. Ni-
geria, Africa's most populous nation, has about 160 mil-
lion people. A number of African countries have popula-
tions of less than one million. The huge population differ-
ence calls into question the wisdom of trying to replicate
China's development policy in any one country.
Moreover, China's success has been based on a high
national savings rate, a large pool of cheap and compli-
ant labor, state-targeted capital investments, a coherent
continent-wide market with a single currency, internal
market integration, a relatively well-educated and highly
motivated workforce with a common language, invest-
tions and political unity within a single ruling party. No
country in Africa has even half of these attributes.
There is also a negative side to China's development:
increasing income inequality between urban and rural
areas, among regions and between the richest and poorest
Chinese; growing pollution problems; and a willingness to
sacrifice human rights and freedom of expression for the
sake of national development. For that matter, there are
different development models in effect across China itself.
The rich coastal region operates on an industrial, export-
dominated model, which is different from the economic
model found in most of the interior. There are elements
of Chinese development policy that might transfer suc-
cessfully to some countries in Africa. One of them, the
special economic zones, is already being established, as
discussed earlier.
China's success at poverty reduction is another pro-
gram that may have positive lessons for Africa. There may
also be some useful borrowing from China's educational
and agricultural policies. But the idea of transplanting
China's development model to any particular country in
Africa is just fantasy. ■

improve
other donors, it prefers to do access the announcement, Hu Jintao comment-
to natural resources."
so within
President Hu announced
the context of the UN system, whereatit the 2012 ed at the 2012 FOCAC that China has

FOCAC
has growing influence, ministerial
rather than meeting
thethat China
trained about 40,000 African personnel
Western-dominated OECD's
will provide Develop-
$20 billion in credits to
in a variety of sectors and provided more
ment Assistance Committee. Africa over the next three years. This
than 20,000 government scholarships to
China constantly reminds otheris double the pledge made at the 2009students from African countries. The
donors that it does not attach politi- FOCAC. He said the loans would sup- scholarship figure actually seems low in-
cal strings to its assistance, and this asmuch as China announced more than a
port infrastructure, agriculture and the
is generally true. On the other hand, development of small businesses. Al- year ago it is offering 5,000 scholarships
should any African leader publicly though he did not offer details of the
annually. In any event, China is making a
criticize China's internal policies on is-loan terms, they probably are similar to
major government effort to attract Afri-
sues such as Tibet or the treatment of previous loans based on attractive com-can students. The U.S. no longer offers a
Uighur Muslims in western China, the mercial terms with repayment in most comparable program except for the small
impact on China's aid to that country
cases made by the shipment of raw ma-
Fulbright Program, started in 1946 to in-
should be observed. There is no criti- crease "mutual understanding," although
terials. In the case of infrastructure proj-
cism either because African leaders
ects, Chinese companies will certainly many African students come to the U.S.
agree with Chinese policies or because at their own expense or are sponsored
obtain the contracts and there will likely
they do not want to risk a rebuke.be In
a percentage of Chinese labor. China by universities. China and countries in
alsoto
any event, African leaders prefer not announced at the 20 1 2 FOCAC that itAfrica have paired 20 universities as part

deal with political conditionality will

thatpromote its currency, the renmimbi,
of a project to link institutions of higher
is often imposed by Western countries. learning. China has also established 29
for settling trade and investment deals in
As one Chinese official told the author Confucius Institutes in 22 African coun-
Africa and encourage more countries to
several years ago, "No African leader tries. Most of them are at African univer-
use it as a reserve currency. The Bank of
has ever asked us to attach conditions Ghana has already taken this step. sities where the institutes offer Chinese

to our aid." While China may not attach language, culture and history.
political strings, World Bank economist Other soft power Since 1963, 18,000 Chinese medi-
Ali Zafar concluded that China uses cal personnel have served in 46 African
Although the official numbers tend to go
aid "principally to facilitate tradeup
and
and down depending on who makes countries. China claims these teams have

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 sincethe in Africa and regional centers
beginning of FM radio station
in Cairothe programin Kenya in 2006 andtrea
ed 200 and Nairobi. It competes
million with Reuters, now has offices
patients. In in 2005,
Cairo (Egypt), La- Chi
began Agence France Presse
sending small gos (Nigeria), Nairobi (Kenya)
and Bloomberg,numbers of andyou
volunteers andorganized
in some countries in Africa it is Harare (Zimbabwe).
by the It broadcasts
CPC You
League. the only international
Between andand
news service.
2009 hosts Web sites in Arabic, Hausa, mor
2012,
than 350 volunteers worked in African Xinhua produces both public news
Swahili, English and Chinese. China
Central Television established a sta-
countries, most of them in health, medi-and "internal reference" reports for the
tion in Nairobi at the beginning of
cine, education and technical fields. Al-Chinese government. Xinhua reporters
2012. China also announced in 2012
though the program is tiny compared towork closely with counterparts in Afri-
the U.S. Peace Corps program in Africa,can governments' official news agen- its intention to create a China-Africa
Press Exchange Center in China to
it is one more example of China's desirecies. As a result, they are often among
to engage at all levels of soft power. the best-connected and informed re- increase interaction between the cor-
Xinhua, China's official news or- porters. China Radio International
respondents of media organizations
from both sides. ■
ganization has more than 20 bureaus (CRI) launched its first overseas-based

Challenges for China in Africa

CHINA favor, HASit but
favor, but facesitsome
MUCH faces working some serious in its
serious
challenges. While China has developed
especially good relations with African
governments, it has done rather poorly
with African civil society, opposition
political parties and independent labor
unions. This comes as no surprise. Civil
society is weak in China. Because there
are no opposition political parties and
no independent labor unions, China
does not understand how to deal with
these components of society. On the
Beijing because they welcome China's
other hand, China has generally beeninvestment capital.
successful in interacting with the Afri- Strong labor unions in the few Af- merchants in the marketplace. Most
can commercial sector, including pri-
vate companies.
this an important policy consideration, rican countries where they exist, such
China will have an advantage in working as South Africa and Nigeria, have
with most African governments. been especially critical of China's im-
Where there is a strong civil soci- pact on Africa. Textile imports from
ety, these groups often deplore China's Asia, including China, decimated
willingness to ignore human rights about one third of Africa's production
abuses and even prop up undemocratic several years ago. Labor unions, not
regimes. African opposition political always accurately, put the blame on
parties also feel ignored by China, al- Asian imports.
though on those rare occasions when
they overturn ruling parties they are Chinese imports
usually quick to improve relations with Africa is being flooded with inexpen-
sive Chinese products and increasingly
Chinese traders are displacing African

Democracy and
human rights
The approach to African countries by
the U.S. and China about democratiza-
tion and human rights practices consti-
tutes the most important difference in
their respective African policies. It is
China's policy to eschew political con-
ditionally such as putting pressure on
countries to improve human rights prac-
tices and to democratize. Most African
governments welcome China's policy.
The U.S., on the other hand, sees this
as a major part of its interaction with
Africa. Autocratic African governments
disdain this approach while democratic
countries such as Botswana and Mauritius
are more receptive. Even the democratic
A Nigerian salesman of soccer balls made in China tosses one up into the air in an outdoor
states, however, are sensitive to political market in Cotonou, Benin. Chinese exports to Africa enter markets here and then go on to
conditionally. So long as the U.S. makes west Africa. February 13, 2008. (JEAN CLAUDE MOSCHETTl/REA/REDUX)

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Chinese employees work at the Nile Textile
Group factory in the free zone of Port Said ,
Egypt, on November 8 , 2009. With cheap
labor, investment incentives and unrestrict-
ed exports, one Chinese textile group has
turned to Egypt as an ideal location to pro-
duce its ready-made garments, beating stiff
competition at home. (KHALED desouki/afp/
GETTY IMAGES)
even remain in business. In addition, these weapons end up in conflict zones.
private Chinese traders with their in- It is China's policy to keep them out,
tegrated supply chains and willingness but their widespread availability guar-
to work longer hours are displacing Af-antees that some get in. China has not
rican counterparts, especially in westshown much interest in monitoring
and southern Africa. This has resulted these transfers and has not taken steps
in growing public criticism of Chinese proactively to prevent their movement
traders and created, in some cases, a into African conflicts.
public relations nightmare for China. Western critics have expressed con-
cern that China's multibillion-dollar
The media
loans to African countries may add ex-
The collaboration between govern-
cessively to African debt and undercut
ment-controlled media organizations
efforts by the West, the World Bank and
in Africa and counterpart organizations
the IMF to encourage good governance.
in China has been noted. The downside While they do serve as a disincentive to
of this arrangement is China's tendency
improving governance, there is no solid
evidence they are leading to excessive
to isolate the growing number of private
sector media organizations in Africa.
debt. Most of the loans go to resource
Some Africans are beginning to expressrich countries that can afford to pay
concern about the motives of China's
down the loans by shipping raw mate-
engagement in this sector. Private Ke-
rials to China. They may be a problem,
however, for countries without natural
nyan media companies were displeased,
for example, when a Chinese companyresources.

received the contract to distribute me-

Labor
African consumers welcome the avail- dia content digitally. They perceived the
ability of Chinese products, althoughdeal as giving China an opportunity to Some Chinese companies have a poor
there are complaints about low quality, interfere in Kenya's press freedom, as
record on worker safety and following
because they are usually cheaper than this does not exist in China. local labor laws. A case in point was
comparable products made in Africa. Chinese involvement in Zambian cop-
Arms transfers
Cheap Chinese imports make it dif- per mines, where an explosion killed a
ficult, however, for African manufac- China is a major supplier of small number of workers and labor conflict
arms
and light weapons to Africa. Some
turers to turn a profit or, in some cases, of
has plagued the operation. In 2011 , the
opposition party even won the election
in part by running on an anti-China plat-
form. Once in power, however, the new
government, after realizing the magni-
tude of China's investment in Zambia,
quickly restored good relations.
Other issues that have confronted
China in Africa are the selling of coun-
terfeit and adulterated products. In the
case of textiles based on African de-
signs, manufactured in China and then
resold in Africa with Made-in- Africa
labels, the situation is only embarrass-
ing. In the case of medicines that may
not have the indicated amount of active
ingredient, the product is dangerous.
China is trying to stop these practices,
but it is difficult to monitor the private
sector and African countries are ill-
equipped to identify the fake and adul-
Members and supporters of the Kwazulu-Natal Christian Council terated products.
and Diakonia China has also been
Council
of Churches held a morning prayer, "Arm-in arm against arms " oncriticized
Durban's for beachfront
some of its environmental
on April 19, 2008 to protest against the offloading of arms from China destined for poverty
practices
stricken Zimbabwe. International sanctions imposed by Western countries in Africa.
against Again, it recognizes
Zimba-
the problem
bwe include a ban on weapon sales to the country. (RAJESH JANTILAL/AFP/GETTY and is trying to do better.
IMAGES)

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 U.S. policy options
Africa is essentially neutral territory for
both the U.S. and China. While the U.S.
has traditionally been more engaged in
Africa in the post- World War II era than
China, Beijing has come on strong in
the 21st century and has surpassed the
role of the U.S. in some countries and in
some areas, such as trade. Both countries
intend to remain engaged in Africa for
the long-term. It was only about six years
ago that the U.S. began to take seriously
China's growing role in Africa. The op-
tions for U.S . policy in dealing with Chi-
na are limited by global economic con-
cerns and increasing restrictions on the
international affairs budget. In addition,
Sudan's leader Omar al-Bashir (r.) and Chinese President Hu Jintao (I.) review a Chinese
the issue is much more complicated than
military honor guard during a welcoming ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in
just China in Africa. A number of emerg- Beijing on June 29 , 2011. (LIU JIN/afp/getty IMAGES)
ing nations such as India, Brazil, Turkey
and Indonesia- and returning ones such ing combined with the sale of Chinese
African Union (AU) peacekeeping op-
as Russia- are joining the rush to Africa. products or bidding on large contracts
erations in Africa, the antipiracy effort
It is hard to deal with competition from by Chinese private and state-owned
in the Gulf of Aden, policy coordination
China in isolation. companies. Private American compa-
in response to African conflicts in areas
The U.S. does not have the financial such as Sudan/South Sudan and Soma-
nies generally operate independently
and are especially handicapped because
resources or the political will to counter lia and the search for political stability
China at every level of its engagementthere is much less U.S. Export-Import generally in Africa. This cooperation
in Africa. In fact, such a policy would Bank financing (which helps sell Amer- should continue.

result in an unnecessary waste of scarceican goods overseas) available, Ameri- There could be much more collabo-

U.S. resources and probably achieve can companies must find ways to be-
ration in the area of development assis-
limited success. Nor does abdication of come more competitive and convince tance. Both countries have major pro-
influence to China make much sense. Congress to provide more government grams for combating malaria that would
Even with its diminished budgets, the financing. benefit from greater cooperation. China
U.S. still brings considerable resources There will also be a continuing com- and the U.S . could pool their respective
to the table. Its aid to Africa is much petition for serving as the example of strengths in efforts to improve pandem-
higher than China's; its cumulative pri-the best way to govern a country. Af- ic preparedness and to reduce neglected
vate investment is greater than China's,rican governments see the advantages tropical diseases such as hookworm and
and disadvantages of the systems in
although the PRC's private and state- schistosomiasis. Both countries also

owned industry investment is growingthe U.S. and China and rarely want to have significant experience in aiding
emulate one or the other in its entirety.
faster. America's military reach is much African agriculture, which consumes
longer than China's. Those African
But those governments that lean toward the labor of 60 percent of the African
Western style liberal democracy, free
countries truly interested in establishing labor force but is still not able to grow
democratic governance will continue and fair elections, a free press, an in- enough food to feed its people.
to look to the West and the U.S., notdependent judiciary and the ability to Some African governments seem
express views openly find themselves in
China, for moral and political support. to be preoccupied with the idea that
tune with the U.S . Others tend to follow
The preferred option for the U.S. it is in their interest for China and

is to compete in some areas and seek

the Chinese system. the U.S. to compete in Africa. This is
cooperation in others. Obvious areasThe policy opportunity that has re- valid in the case of trade, investment
ceived the least attention in the U.S.,
for competition are in the export and and bidding on commercial contracts.
China and Africa is the chance for Chi-
contract sectors where companies from It does not apply, however, to efforts
na and the U.S. (and perhaps others) to to further develop Africa and prevent
both countries routinely vie for busi-
cooperate to the mutual advantage of
ness. China has been winning this com- disease. ■

petition easily over the past decade. African

It states. The obvious areas where

has some advantages in that many of there already has been some coop-
its deals are packages involving gov- eration include providing funding and
✓ Opinion after
afterpage
page Ballots
32 32
ernment financing and political back- personnel for UN and the 54-member

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 CHINA IN AFRICA

1 . Why does China have a ers, can move China more positively
long-term interest in this direction?
in Africa? Is i
desire to extract oil and minerals to keep its industry produ
a high level? Will Africa ever
5. Should become a about
the U.S. be concerned major market
China's military buildup, for C
exports? Now that China especially
is a its global power,
plans to expand the navy? If thedoes it really
PLA Navy becomes
pay so much attention to the political
a frequent support
visitor to the western Indian Ocean, will of African
this pose a threat cou
What are the potential implications of in
to American security interests natural
the region? What resource
should the U.S. extr
on the environment? do about it? Are there potential areas for U. S .-China naval collabora-
tion in the western Indian Ocean?

2. Some writers and even U.S. policy officials have described Chi-
na's engagement in Africa as an example of neo-colonialism. Is this
6. What are the prospects of U. S .-China cooperation in Africa?
a valid criticism? Why or why not? There continues to be considerable criticism of China in the Ameri-
can press, among the public and on Capitol Hill. Will this skepticism
3. Mercantilism is also a frequent charge leveled against China'sprevent the U.S. from collaborating with China in Africa assuming
the Chinese and Africans are even interested in such collaboration?
policy in Africa. What is it? Is it appropriate to describe China's
policy as one of mercantilism? Why or why not?
7. Do you agree with the author's assessment that, taken in its to-
4. So far, China has not been a positive influence on improving hu-tality China does not serve as an appropriate economic model for
man rights practices and encouraging democracy in Africa. Do you Africa? If you disagree, what are the arguments put forth by some
African leaders that China is the best model? In the final analysis,
think this will continue to be the situation in the coming decades?
Are there ways to encourage China to play a more positive role inis the Beijing Consensus about as meaningless as the Washington
Consensus?
this area? Are there ways that the U.S., working with African lead-

Brautigam, Deborah, The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story

Forof
more news and analysis, we recommend the following Internet
China in Africa. New York, Oxford University Press, 2009. 397 pp.
resources:

$21 .95 (paper). Drawing on three decades of experience, Brautigam

emphasizes the role of China's aid, trade and investment in
African Economic Research Consortium, <www.a
Africa. publications/all.asp>. This website contains a 54 pag
graphs dealing with economic issues in Africa, all f
Shinn, David H. and Eisenman, Joshua, China and Africa: A Cen-
There are numerous academic papers on China-A
tury of Engagement. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania
cluded among them.
Press, 2012. 524 pp. $69.95 (hardcover). This is a baseline study
of China and Africa that looks at all aspects of the relationship
Forum on China Africa Cooperation, <www.focac.or
over the past century. It includes four regional chapters that cover
China's official website for the Forum on China Afr
China's bilateral relations with each country in Africa from the date
It contains the key documents and speeches for the
of diplomatic recognition to the present. and summit conferences that have been held so far.
from China's perspective additional background inf
relations with Africa.
Taylor, Ian, China's New Role in Africa. Boulder, Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2009. 226 pp. $24.00 (paper). Taylor argues that Beijing
South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), <www.
is using Africa not only as a source of raw materials and potential
new markets but also to bolster its own position on the international
saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/blog.html>. This website contains a
stage. He traces the history of Sino- African relations and looks
longatlist of occasional papers of 20 to 30 pages each on a variety of
key issues such as oil diplomacy, trade, human rights, arms trade
topics dealing with China in Africa. It also has shorter policy brief-
and peacekeeping. ings on China- Africa issues.

Stellenbosch University, Centre for Chinese Studies (CCS), <www.

ccs.org.za>. This website contains monographs on China-Africa
relations, a monthly newsletter called China Monitor and a weekly
briefing on China- Africa issues.

www.greatdecisions.org
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