CASE DIGEST : Restituto Ynot Vs IAC

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,

vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION
COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC
NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a

pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated
by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the
violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner
questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the
recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case,
the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on
the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to
the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of
RTC.

Issue:

Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling:

The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police

power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule
prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose sought
to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the
Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-
provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no
less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining
the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there,
any more than moving them to another province will make it
easier to kill them there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The

executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant
case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police
station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he
had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond
of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon
the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus
denying due process.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Vda. De Castellvi (G.R. No. L-
20620) - Digest
Facts:
In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement over a land
in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When
Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP
refused because of the permanent installations and other
facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and
already established on the property. She then instituted an
ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the
republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the
land in question.

Issue: Whether or not the compensation should be

determined as of 1947 or 1959.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be
reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation should not
be determined on the basis of the value of the property that
year .

The requisites for taking are:

1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such
a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial
enjoyment of the property.

Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore,

that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes of
eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in
1947 when the republic commenced to occupy the property
as lessee thereof.

Requisite number 2 is not present according to the Supreme

Court, “momentary” when applied to possession or
occupancy of real property should be construed to mean “a
limited period” -- not indefinite or permanent. The aforecited
lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from
year to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is
temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the
Republic, through AFP, constructed some installations of a
permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into
the lant was transitory, or intended to last a year, although
renewable from year to year by consent of the owner of the
land. By express provision of the lease agreement the
republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in
substantially the same condition as at the time the property
was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention
of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be
inferred from the construction of permanent improvements.
But this “intention” cannot prevail over the clear and express
terms of the lease contract.

The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the instant case the

entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization of
the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive
her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Cstellvi
remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as
owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease
contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease
contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the
property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither
was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the
property, because the Republic was bound to pay, and had
been paing, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the
time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June
26, 1959.

It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property

for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to
have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to
occupy the property as lessee thereof, and that the just
compensation to be paid for the Castellvi’s property should
not be determined on the basis of the value of the property
as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error when
it held that the “taking” of the property under expropriation
commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case.

Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just

compensation” is to be determined as of the date of the filing
of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the
taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides
with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or
takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for
eminent domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA VS. REYES G.R. NOS. L-60549
TO 60555
FACTS : The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4)
Complaints with the Court of First Instance of Cebu City for the
expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in
barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express
authority "to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by
condemnation proceedings any private land within and without the
tourist zones" for the purposes indicated in Section 5, paragraph
B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD 564), more specifically, for the
development into integrated resort complexes of selected and
well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value

The defendants in Civil Cases Nos. R-20701 and R-21608 filed

their respective Opposition with Motion to Dismiss and/or
Reconsideration. The defendants in Civil Case No. R-19562 filed
a manifestation adopting the answer of defendants in Civil Case
No. R-19864.
In their motions to dismiss, the petitioners alleged, in addition to
the issue of public use, that there is no specific constitutional
provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism
purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power, the intended
use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as a
land reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by
Legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since the
land is under the land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian
Relations and not the Court of First Instance that has jurisdiction
over the expropriation cases.

The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with The

Philippine National Bank, Cebu City Branch, an amount
equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1533. the lower court issued separate
orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the
premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession.

On May 25, 1982, petitioners filed this petition questioning the

orders of the respondent Judge

ISSUE : WON The Expropriation for Tourism Purposes of Lands

Covered by the Land Reform Program Violates the Constitution

HELD : There are three provisions of the Constitution which

directly provide for the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Section 2, Article IV states that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. Section 6, Article XIV
allows the State, in the interest of national welfare or defense and
upon payment of just compensation to transfer to public
ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by
the government. Section 13, Article XIV states that the Batasang
Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just compensation the
expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and
conveyed at cost to deserving citizens.

While not directly mentioning the expropriation of private

properties upon payment of just compensation, the provisions on
social justice and agrarian reforms which allow the exercise of
police power together with the power of eminent domain in the
implementation of constitutional objectives are even more far-
reaching insofar as taking of private property is concerned

There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditions'

purposes as the construction of roads, bridges, ports, waterworks,
schools, electric and telecommunications systems, hydroelectric
power plants, markets and slaughterhouses, parks, hospitals,
government office buildings, and flood control or irrigation
systems is valid. However, the concept of public use is not limited
to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the Idea that "public
use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has
been discarded. As long as the purpose of the taking is public,
then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted,
the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt,
determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to
be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The
other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of
utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is
accurate to state then that at present whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use.

The petitioners' contention that the promotion of tourism is not

"public use" because private concessioners would be allowed to
maintain various facilities such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc.
inside the tourist complex is impressed with even less merit.
Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other
private businesses using public streets end highways do not
diminish in the least bit the public character of expropriations for
roads and streets. The lease of store spaces in underpasses of
streets built on expropriated land does not make the taking for a
private purpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private
airlines and shipping companies are still for public use. The
expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban
development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is
later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment
and service companies, and other private concerns

The public respondents have stressed that the development of

the 808 hectares includes plans that would give the petitioners
and other displaced persons productive employment, higher
incomes, decent housing, water and electric facilities, and better
living standards. Our dismissing this petition is, in part, predicated
on those assurances. The right of the PTA to proceed with the
expropriation of the 282 hectares already Identified as fit for the
establishment of a resort complex to promote tourism is,
therefore, sustained.

EPZA VS. DULAY G.R. No. L-59603, April 29, 1987

Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case
is where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu
(EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio
Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which
these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were
expropriated to the government without them reaching the
agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay
then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to
determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the
payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per
square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that
under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and
according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever
is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the
reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed
this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent
from further hearing the case.

Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of

determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of

just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes

impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to
render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the
Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The
valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one
of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not
substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should
be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination
of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determination
but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of
Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use
without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive
order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over
the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from
looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.
PUNZALAN VS. THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF
MANILA, G.R. NO. L-4817, MAY 26, 1954

Facts: Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 3398

imposing municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various
professions in the city and penalizing non-payment of the same.
Punsalan, et al paid the same under protest and filed suit with the
court. Petitioners contend that the ordinance is unjust and
oppressive and amounts to double taxation. The lower court
upheld the validity of the provision of law authorizing the
enactment of the ordinance but declared the ordinance itself
illegal and void on the ground that the penalty there in provided
for non-payment of the tax was not legally authorized. Both
parties appealed the court’s decision.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No 3398 constitute double
taxation?
Decision: Decision reversed. The Legislature may select what
occupations shall be taxed, and in the exercise of that discretion it
may tax all, or it may select for taxation certain classes and leave
the others untaxed. Manila offers a more lucrative field for the
practice of the professions, so that it is but fair that the
professionals in Manila be made to pay a higher occupation tax
than their brethren in the provinces. The ordinance imposes the
tax upon every person “exercising” or “pursuing” – in the City of
Manila naturally – any one of the occupations named, but does
not say that such person must have his office in Manila. The
argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one
tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city.
LLADOC VS. CIR G.R. NO. L-19201, JUNE 16, 1965
Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated
P10,000 in cash to the parish priest of Victorias, Negros
Occidental; the amount spent for the construction of a new
Catholic Church in the locality,m as intended. In1958, MB Estate
filed the donor’s gift tax return. In 1960, the Commissioner issued
an assessment for donee’s gift tax against the parish. The priest
lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the withdrawal
thereof.
Issue: Whether the Catholic Parish is tax exempt.
Held: The phrase “exempt from taxation” should not be
interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. The
exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such
properties as property taxes as contradistinguished from excise
taxes. A donee’s gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax
imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. It
does not rest upon general ownership, but an excise upon the use
made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of
receiving the properties. The imposition of such excise tax on
property used for religious purpose do not constitute an
impairment of the Constitution.
The tax exemption of the parish, thus, does not extend to excise
taxes.
Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail
Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not
citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the people’s
economic life.
 a prohibition against aliens and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly
owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail
trade 
 aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15,
1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses
are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary
retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the
approval of the Act or until the expiration of term. 
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted
from this Act.
 provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail
business for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic
control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to
trade, commerce and industry. 
 provision against the establishment or opening by aliens
actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or
branches of retail business 
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action
to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
1. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws
and deprives them of their liberty and property without due
process 
2. the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title 
3. the Act violates international and treaty obligations 
4. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens
of their retail business thru hereditary succession 
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection
of the laws.

HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not
deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real
and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an
alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification
adopted.

RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality
among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons

of one class are treated alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a
basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.

Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and

control by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control
that is the legislature’s target in the enactment of the Act.

The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction

between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien is
naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the
Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien
owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot
rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.

While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject
to the needs of the country, the alien may become the potential
enemy of the State.

The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his
customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Through
the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien
now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nation’s economy
endangering the national security in times of crisis and
emergency.
G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989 PHILIPPINE
COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
respondents.

Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an

Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of
the National Telecommunications Commission

Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving

telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that
were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz
Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission.
The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%)
due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power
to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and
hearing.

Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt

from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now
respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196
issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the
jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC

Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service

Commission the Supreme Court said that although the rule-
making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules
and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind
throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character.
Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-
judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains
exclusively to petitioner and to no other

The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued

pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that
notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is
merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore,
temporary in nature but the supreme court said that While
respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination
of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary
though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural
requirements of notice and hearing

The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-
fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without
first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or
permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didn’t scheduled hearing
nor it did give any notice to the petitioner

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

ESCOLIN, J.:

FACTS:
Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public
concerns as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable they must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated, Lorenzo Tañada, et.al. filed for
a writ of mandamus to compel Juan Tavera, Executive Secretary
to President Ferdinand Marcos, to publish and/or cause to publish
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations, and administrative orders.

ISSUE:

Whether the publication in the Official Gazette is required before

any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.

RULING:
Yes, Article 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement
of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides
for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to
give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which
are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application
of the maxim, ignorantia legis nominem excusat. It would be the
height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of the CA 638 reads, there shall
be published in the Official Gazette. The word “shall” therein
imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty
must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance
and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or

general applicability is indispensable and a requirement of due
process. The Court declared that presidential issuances of
general application which have not been published have no force
and effect.
ANG TIBAY VS. CIR, G.R. NO. L-46496

FACTS:

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather

company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to an alleged
shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his
employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU)
questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said
employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of
the rival labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid
off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and
Toribio was merely busting NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)

where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the
Supreme Court invoking its right to a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. The Court granted a new trial. Thus,
the Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for
reconsideration.

The petitioner has filed an opposition both to the motion for

reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Labor Union (respondent) is entitled

to a new trial.

HELD:

YES. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or

documents obtained by NLU, which they attached to their petition
with the Supreme Court, were evidence so inaccessible to them
at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence
they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.

Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-

reaching importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered (said newly obtained records include books of
business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not
previously accessible but already existing).

The Supreme Court also outlined that administrative bodies, like

the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must
also make sure that they comply with the requirements of due
process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied
with by observing the following:

(1)     The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof.

(2)     Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present

his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights
which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.

(3)     While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation
to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached.

(4)     Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding

or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.

ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for
Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.
On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received
billions of pesos through any or a combination or a series of overt
or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly
enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since
for him:
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already
punishable under The Revised Penal Code.
Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of
preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of
offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but was
denied.
Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case
No. 26558 finding that a probable cause for the offense of plunder
exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the
accused.
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No.
26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did NOT
constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was
based was unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended
Information for Plunder charged more than one offense. Same
was denied.
The questioned provisions of the petitioners are Secs. 1, par. (d),
2 and 4 of the Plunder Law which states that:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset,
property, business, enterprise or material possession of any
person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by
him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or
series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at
the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any
public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination
or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d)
hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty
million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in
the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder
shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of
penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by
the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The
court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests
and other incomes and assets including the properties and
shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof
forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and
every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
ISSUE:
WON the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?
HELD:
NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or
rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct
would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the
language of the law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various
elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have
committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous
that will confuse petitioner in his defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for
the statutory definition of the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These
omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and
deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to
due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because
general terms are used herein, or because of the employment of
terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence most
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In
such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two
(2) respects – it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to
one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon
protected speech.  The possible harm to society in permitting
some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred
and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the
law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
CASE DIGEST NO. 2
ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN CASE DIGEST
Estrada vs. SandiganbayanG.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
FACTS:
On April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution in
Criminal Case No. 26558, finding probable cause thatpetitioner
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then the President of the Philippines has
committed the offense of plunder, and that he beprosecuted
under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder). The petitioner contended that RA 7080
wasunconstitutional, on the grounds
that 1.) it was vague; 2.) it dispenses with the “reasonable doubt”
standard in criminal
prosecutions; and 3.) it abolishes the element of mens rea in
crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code,
thusviolating the fundamental rights of the accused. The said law
allegedly suffers from vagueness on the terms it uses,
particularly:
‘
combination
’ 
,
‘
series
’ 
, and
‘
unwarranted 
’ 
. Based on this, the petitioner used the facial challenge to
question the validity of RA7080.
ISSUES:
1.
 
WON the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.2.
 
WON the fact that the Plunder Law requires less evidence for
proving the predicate crimes of plunder leads to itsviolation of the
right of the accused to due process.3.
 
WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a
malum prohibitum
, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress toclassify it
as such.
RULE:
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms sovague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application, violates the firstessential of due
process of law.The over-breadth doctrine states that a
governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which
sweepunnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area
of protected freedoms.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to
one which is overbroad because of a possible “chillingeffect” upon
protected speech.
 This rationale does
NOT
apply to penal statutes.
 ANALYSIS:
1.
 
NO. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because
of the employment of general terms or the failure todefine the
terms used therein. The validity of a law is sustained, so long as
that law provides some comprehensible guideas to what would
render those subject to the said law liable to its penalties. The
petitioner cannot rely on the void-for-vagueness doctrine, since
this doctrine does not apply to laws that merely consist of
imprecise language.
2.
 
NO. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of the accused in
criminal prosecutions to be presumed innocent until
provenotherwise. Thus he is entitled to an acquittal unless the
State succeeds in demonstrating the guilt of the accused
withproof beyond reasonable doubt. The contention that Sec. 4 of
RA 7080 does away with proof of each and everycomponent of
the crime is a misconception. Rather than proving each and every
criminal act done, it is enough that theprosecution proves beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of
the crime as a whole.
 3.
 
NO. Plunder is a
malum in se
 which requires proof of criminal intent. The legislative declaration
in RA No. 7659 (whichhas been declared as constitutionally valid
in a previous ruling) that plunder is a heinous offense implies that
it is amalum in se.
CONCLUSION:
Premises considered, the Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise
known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659,
isCONSTITUTIONAL. Thus, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro
G.R. No. 14078, March 07, 1919
Facts:  The provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, selected a
site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Pursuant to the provisions
of section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, all the
Mangyans in the vicinities of the townships of Naujan and Pola
and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the
districts of Dulangan and Rubi’s place in Calapan are directed to
take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other
Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the
Mangyanes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are
said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro,
against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the
custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having
run away from the reservation.

Issue: Whether Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives

a person of his liberty of abode and is therefore unconstitutional
Held: No. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not
deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and
does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that
confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does
not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The court further
ruled that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate
exertion of the police power and thus constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their
liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered
with when the degree of civilization of the. Manguianes is
considered. They are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process
of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due
process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a
law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to
the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike
to all of a class.

The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is

shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The
Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be
confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the
good of the country.

STONEHILL V. DIOKNO - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW
FACTS:
l Stonehill et al, herein petitioners, and the corporations they form
were alleged to have committed acts in “violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code.”
l Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against
petitioners personally, and/or corporations for which they are
officers directing peace officers to search the persons of
petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences to search for personal properties “books of
accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarette
wrappers)” as the subject of the offense for violations of
Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
Code, and Revised Penal Code.
l The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged
authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major
groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations and
 (b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.

 l Petitioners averred that the warrant is null and void for
being violative of the constitution and the Rules of court by:

 (1) not describing with particularity the documents, books
and things to be seized;
 (2) money not mentioned in the warrants were seized;
 (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation
cases filed against the petitioner;
 (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner; and
 (5) the documents paper and cash money were not delivered
to the issuing courts for disposal in accordance with law.

 l The prosecution counters that the search warrants are valid
and issued in accordance with law; The defects of said
warrants were cured by petitioners consent; and in any
event, the effects are admissible regardless of the
irregularity.
 l The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of
preliminary injunction. However, by a resolution, the writ was
partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and things seized
from the offices of the corporations.

 ISSUE:

 WON the search warrant issued is valid.

 HELD:

 NO the search warrant is invalid.

 l The SC ruled in favor of petitioners.

 l The constitution protects the people’s right against
unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe
the things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are
met.

 l The warrant was issued from mere allegation that
petitioners committed a “violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code.”
 l In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the
offense committed were abstract.

 l As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws.

 l As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do
not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners.
It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict
anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned applications —
without reference to any determinate provision of said laws
or codes.

 l The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of
records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.

 l Thus, openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill
of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly
described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective:
the elimination of general warrants.

 l However, SC emphasized that petitioners cannot assail the
validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation
because petitioners are not the proper party.

 l The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality
of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in
pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate
and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest
of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the
offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled
that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impaired thereby and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
 BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF - CASE DIGEST -
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF G.R. No. L-64261 December 26,
1984

FACTS:

l The "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum” newspapers were

searched and its office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as
well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written
literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner
Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper,
were seized based on the strength of the two [2] search warrants
issued by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano.
l Petitioners averred that the search warrant should be declared
illegal because:
1. The judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the
above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court.
2. There are two (2) search warrants issued but pinpointed only one
place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping
and concealing the articles listed.
3. That the articles belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr.,
Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were
seized although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos,
Jr. Alone.
4. That real property was seized under the disputed warrants like
machinery, receptacles, instruments, etc.
5. The search warrant was based only on the affidavits of Col.
Abadilla’s that they conducted surveillance of the premises could
not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable
cause.
l Respondents insinuates that petitioners are estopped by laches
that they only impugned the search warrant six months later.

ISSUE:

WON there is probable cause for the issuance of the search

warrant.

HELD:

l NO. The search warrant is in the nature of general warrants.

l Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and

circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant
applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in
connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the
case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must
contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged
 subversive material he has published or is intending to
publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.

l The broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is

in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which
were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under
Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." is a mere conclusion of
law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the
existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as the
basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave
error for the respondent judge to have done so.
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)

FACTS: The challenged search warrant was issued by the

respondent judge on May 10, 1984.  The petitioner's house was
searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the
warrant was discovered. However, the officers conducting the
search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and
eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the
bases of the charge against the petitioner.
Respondent Judge said that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa
personally filed his application for a search warrant on May 10,
1984, he appeared before him in the company of his two (2)
witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom
likewise presented to him their respective affidavits taken by Pat.
Josue V. Lining, a police investigator. As the application was not
yet subscribed and sworn to, he proceeded to examine Captain
Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain, among others, if he
knew and understood the same. Afterwards, he subscribed and
swore to the same before him.

ISSUE: Whether the Respondent Judge failed to comply with the

proper procedure in issuing the Search Warrant.

HELD: Yes, mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses

are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce and attach them to the record. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable
cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be
found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality
by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites
of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the
record, rendering the search warrant invalid. (See Rule 126,
Sec 4)
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have
applicant Quillosa's deposition taken considering that he was
applying for a search warrant on the basis of the information
provided by the witnesses whose depositions had already been
taken by the undersigned.
In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the
search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of
information personally known to him, as required by settled
jurisprudence.
Terry v. Ohio

Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, John W. Terry (the

“Petitioner”), was stopped and searched by an officer after the
officer observed the Petitioner seemingly casing a store for a
potential robbery. The officer approached the Petitioner for
questioning and decided to search him first.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. An officer may perform a search for

weapons without a warrant, even without probable cause, when
the officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed and
dangerous.

Facts. The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another

individual on a street corner while repeatedly walking up and
down the same street. The men would periodically peer into a
store window and then talk some more. The men also spoke to a
third man whom they eventually followed up the street. The officer
believed that the Petitioner and the other men were “casing” a
store for a potential robbery. The officer decided to approach the
men for questioning, and given the nature of the behavior the
officer decided to perform a quick search of the men before
questioning. A quick frisking of the Petitioner produced a
concealed weapon and the Petitioner was charged with carrying a
concealed weapon.

Issue. Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for

arrest is an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution (“Constitution”)?

Held. The Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme Court”)

held that it is a reasonable search when an officer performs a
quick seizure and a limited search for weapons on a person that
the officer reasonably believes could be armed. A typical beat
officer would be unduly burdened by being prohibited from
searching individuals that the officer suspects to be armed.

Dissent. Justice William Douglas (“J. Douglas”) dissented,

reasoning that the majority’s holding would grant powers to
officers to authorize a search and seizure that even a magistrate
would not possess.

Concurrence.
Justice John Harlan (“J. Harlan”) agreed with the majority, but he
emphasized an additional necessity of the reasonableness of the
stop to investigate the crime.
Justice Byron White (“J. White”) agreed with the majority, but he
emphasized that the particular facts of the case, that there was
suspicion of a violent act, merit the forcible stop and frisk.
Discussion. The facts of the case are important to understand
the Supreme Court’s willingness to allow the search. The
suspicious activity was a violent crime, armed robbery, and if the
officer’s suspicions were correct then he would be in a dangerous
position to approach the men for questioning without searching
them. The officer also did not detain the men for a long period of
time to constitute an arrest without probable cause.

Constitutional Law: Manalili vs Court of Appeals (GR 113447)

Oct. 9, 1997

Manalili v CA　(GR 113447) Oct. 9, 1997

Facts:
At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of
Kalookan City conducted surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in
front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. This was done after
receiving information that drug addicts were roaming around said
area.
Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon a male
person, the petitioner, in front of the cemetery who appeared high
on drugs. The petitioner had reddish eyes and was walking in a
swaying manner.
Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were
able to introduce themselves and asked him what he was holding
in his hands. Petitioner resisted. Policeman Espiritu asked him if
he could see what the petitioner had in his hands. The petitioner
showed his wallet and allowed the officer to examine it.
Policeman Espiritu found suspected crushed marijuana residue
inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents and took
petitioner to headquarters to be further investigated.
The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry
Section for analysis.

Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected
marijuana is unreasonable, and hence inadmissible as evidence.

Held:
The general rule is a search and seizure must be validated by a
previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such a search and
seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Any evidence
obtained in violation of this constitutionally guaranteed right is
legally inadmissible in any proceeding.
The exceptions to the rule are: (1) search incidental to a lawful
arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4)
customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused of their right
against unreasonable search and seizure. In these cases, the
search and seizure may be made only with probable cause.
Probable cause being at best defined as a reasonable ground of
suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s)
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by is in the place to be searched.
Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another
exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant.
In the present case, petitioner effectively waived the
inadmissibility of the evidence illegally obtained when he failed to
raise the issue or object thereto during the trial.
 The Supreme Court affirmed with modifications the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the respondent court.

NOLASCO V. CRUZ-PANO - CASE DIGEST -

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
NOLASCO V. CRUZ-PANO G.R. No. L-69803October 8, 1985

FACTS:

(At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th) Aquilar-Roque and Nolasco were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group
(CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street, Quezon City. The record does not disclose that a warrant of
arrest had previously been issued against NOLASCO.
(At 12:00 N. on August 6th) On the same day, a searched was conducted. Ct. Col. Virgilio Saldajeno;

(On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M)applied for search warrant from the respondent judge Cruz-Pano, to
be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined to be the leased residence of AGUILAR-
ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected
underground house of the CPP/NPA." after a month of “round the clock” surveillance of the premises as
a “suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA”,

AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist
Party of the Philippines, particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases.

The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, and additionally a portable typewriter
and 2 wooden boxes.

The City Fiscal filed the information for violation of PD No. 33, Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents.

Petitioners contend that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not
sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure and that probable
cause had not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant’s
witness.

ISSUE:

WON the search warrant is a general warrant

HELD:

YES. It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal
properties vaguely described and not particularized.  It is an all-embracing description which includes
everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic
Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not
otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the
crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be
lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as,
in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general
warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring the particular description of the things to
be seized.
 Moreover, the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not
sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance
of a search warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely
upon them and act in pursuant thereof.

Out of the 10 Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd, and 4th pertain to Identity.

The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching questions.

The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities to be seized, which is Identical to that in
the Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of particularity.

The examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of the said
witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause
upon which a warrant may issue.