Madison I65 File Correct

E-Filed Document Nov 9 2020 13:11:34 2020-M-01199 Pages: 35
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

No. 2020-M-01199
IN RE INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. 65
MAYOR MARY HAWKINS BUTLER,

IN HER INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES;
THE CITY OF MADISON, PETITIONERS,
VERSUS
MICHAEL WATSON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

AS SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, RESPONDENT.
PETITIONERS’ COMBINED REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE’S

ANSWER AND THE INTERVENORS’ OPPOSITION
EMERGENCY HEARING REQUESTED
Kaytie M. Pickett (MSB No 103202)

Adam Stone (MSB No. 10412)
Andrew S. Harris (MSB No. 104289)
JONES WALKER LLP
190 E. Capitol St., Suite 800
Jackson, Mississippi 39201
Tel (601) 949-4789
Fax (601) 949-4804
kpickett@joneswalker.com
astone@joneswalker.com
aharris@joneswalker.com
Chelsea H. Brannon (MSB No. 102805)

CITY OF MADISON, CITY ATTORNEY
P. O. Box 40
Madison, Mississippi 39130-0040
Tel (601) 856-7116
Fax (601) 853-4766
cbrannon@madisonthecity.com
Attorneys for Petitioners
{JX451549.5}
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1
II. RESPONDENTS’ INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 273(3)

REQUIRES THE COURT TO REWRITE THE MISSISSIPPI
CONSTITUTION’S UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE......................................... 1
A. Respondents do not claim Section 273(3) is ambiguous, but that

Petitioners’ plain-language approach leads to an undesirable
result. ........................................................................................................ 3
B. Ruling in Petitioners’ favor will abridge no right to amend the

Mississippi Constitution........................................................................... 8
C. The Secretary of State’s interpretation deserves no deference. ........... 10
III. POPULAR SUPPORT FOR INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. 65 CANNOT

CIRCUMVENT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION FACING THE
COURT. ............................................................................................................. 11
IV. THE MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION GIVES THIS COURT

JURISDICTION, WHICH THE LEGISLATURE CANNOT IMPAIR BY
ACTION OR INACTION................................................................................... 14
V. PETITIONERS’ PRE-ELECTION AND PRE-CERTIFICATION

CHALLENGE IS TIMELY................................................................................ 17
A. Respondents’ equitable defenses lack merit. ......................................... 17
B. No statute of limitations or repose impairs Petitioners’ action. ........... 23
VI. OTHER INITIATIVE MEASURES PASSED SINCE MISSISSIPPI

LOST ITS FIFTH CONGRESSIONAL SEAT ARE IMMATERIAL TO
THE COURT’S DECISION. .............................................................................. 25
VII. BARNES V. LADNER DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE COURT FROM

RULING IN PETITIONERS’ FAVOR. ............................................................. 26
VIII. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 27
{JX451549.5} i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Alexander v. State,
441 So. 2d 1329 (Miss. 1983) .................................................................................... 3
Allen v. Mayer,
587 So. 2d 255 (Miss. 1991) .................................................................................... 21
Am. Trucking Ass’n v. New York State Thruway Auth.,

199 F. Supp. 3d 855, 872 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).............................................................. 22
Barbour v. Delta Corr. Facility Auth.,

871 So. 2d 703 (Miss. 2004) .................................................................................... 16
Barnes v. Ladner,
131 So. 2d 458 (Miss. 1961) .............................................................................. 26, 27
Butler v. City of Eupora,

725 So. 2d 158 (Miss. 1998) .................................................................................... 22
State ex rel. Collins v. Jones,

64 So. 241 (Miss. 1913) ............................................................................................. 2
Dye v. State,
507 So. 2d 332 (Miss. 1987) ...................................................................................... 6
Elchos v. Haas,
178 So. 3d 1183 (Miss. 2015) ................................................................ 17, 18, 20, 22
Evanovich v. Hutto,
204 So. 2d 477 (Miss. 1967) .................................................................................... 20
Goddin v. Crump,
8 Leigh 120 (Va. 1837) ............................................................................................ 13
Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965)........................................................................ 17
Hinton v. Pekin Ins. Co.,

268 So. 3d 543 (Miss. 2019) .................................................................................... 22
State ex rel. Holmes v. Griffin,

667 So. 2d 1319 (Miss. 1995) .................................................................................... 4
{JX451549.5} ii
Hughes v. Hosemann,
68 So. 3d 1260 (Miss. 2011) ...................................................................... 7, 9, 26, 27
King v. Miss. Military Dep’t,

245 So. 3d 404 (Miss. 2018) .............................................................................. 10, 11
Knox v. BancorpSouth Bank,

37 So. 3d 1257 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) ..................................................................... 22
Kuhnle Bros. v. Cnty. of Geauga,

103 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 1997)................................................................................... 22
League of Women Voters Minn. v. Ritchie,

819 N.W.2d 636 (Minn. 2012)................................................................................... 3
Legis. of the State of Miss. v. Shipman,

170 So. 3d 1211 (Miss. 2015) .......................................................................... 1, 7, 16
Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) .............................................................................. 3, 25
State ex. rel. McClurg v. Powell,

77 Miss. 543, 27 So. 927 (1900) ................................................................ 2, 4, 12, 13
Meadows v. State,
217 So. 3d 772 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) ..................................................................... 15
Miss. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Molden,

644 So. 2d 1230 (Miss. 1994) .................................................................................. 21
State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus,

578 So. 2d 624 (Miss. 1991) ...................................................................................... 9
Natchez v. Sullivan,
612 So. 2d 1087 (Miss. 1992) .................................................................................... 4
Newell v. State,
308 So. 2d 71 (Miss. 1975) ...................................................................................... 17
Oakland v. Hilton,
69 Cal. 479 (1886) ................................................................................................... 13
Power v. Ratliff,
112 Miss. 88, 72 So. 864 (1916) .............................................................................. 20
Power v. Robertson,
130 Miss. 188, 93 So. 769 (1922) .................................................................. 9, 23, 25
{JX451549.5} iii
In re Proposed Initiative Measure No. 20,
774 So. 2d 397 (Miss. 2000) .............................................................................. 23, 24
Seward v. Dogan,
198 Miss. 419, 21 So. 2d 292 (1945) ......................................................................... 7
Speed v. Hosemann,
68 So. 3d 1278 (Miss. 2011) .................................................................................... 24
State v. Hamm,
423 N.W.2d 379 (1988) ............................................................................................. 4
State v. Wood,
187 So. 2d 820 (Miss. 1966) ................................................................................ 3, 21
Wheeler v. Shoemake,
213 Miss. 374, 57 So. 267 (1952) ............................................................................ 14
Wilson v. Hosemann,
185 So. 3d 370 (Miss. 2016) .................................................................................... 26
Constitutions
Miss. Const. art. 5, § 103 ............................................................................................. 25
Miss. Const. art. 5, § 139 ............................................................................................... 5
Miss. Const. art. 6, § 146 ....................................................................................... 15, 16
Miss. Const. art. 6, § 156 ............................................................................................. 16
Miss. Const. art. 8, § 213-A (1944) ................................................................................ 6
Miss. Const. art. 15, § 273 ....................................... 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 21, 23, 25
Miss. Const. art. 15, § 273(2) ................................................................................. 10, 12
Miss. Const. art. 15, § 273(3) ..................... 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 21, 24, 25
Miss. Const. art. 15, § 273(4) ....................................................................................... 24
Miss. Const. art. 15, § 273(5) ......................................................................................... 3
Miss. Const. art. 15, § 273(9) ................................................... 11, 14, 15, 16, 23, 24, 27
Miss. Const. art. 15, § 273(12) ..................................................................................... 23
Miss. Const. art. 15, § 273(13) ..................................................................................... 15
{JX451549.5} iv
Statutes
Miss. Code Ann. § 19-1-35 ............................................................................................. 5
Miss. Code Ann. § 19-1-53 ............................................................................................. 5
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-639 ....................................................................................... 17
Miss. Code Ann. §§ 23-17-1.................................................................................... 17, 23
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-13 ............................................................................. 23, 24, 25
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-19 ........................................................................................... 6
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-23 ......................................................................................... 24
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-25 ......................................................................................... 24
Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-151 ....................................................................................... 14
1992 Miss. Laws ch. 715 ................................................................................................ 9
Other Authorities
Miss. R. Civ. P. 8(c) ...................................................................................................... 22
Hosemann, Miss. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2009-00001, 2009 WL 367638,

2009 Miss. AG LEXIS 278 (Jan. 9, 2009) ................................................................ 8
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison)................................................................... 12
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)........................................................... 12
{JX451549.5} v
I. Introduction
The rule of law depends upon having predictable interpretations of those laws.
Interpreting the law based on the vagaries of what is popular or expedient
undermines our entire legal system and shifts power beyond carefully drawn
constitutional boundaries. This Court has repeatedly expressed respect for those
boundaries, cautioning litigants who ask it to supplant the role of the Legislature
that it cannot and will not reach beyond the plain language of our state’s laws. The
Court rightly refuses to “add language where [it] see[s] fit.” Legis. of the State of Miss.
v. Shipman, 170 So. 3d 1211, 1215 (Miss. 2015).
But the judicial addition of language to our Constitution is precisely what
Secretary of State and the Intervenors (“Respondents”) advocate. Petitioners ask the
Court to decide two questions: (1) does the text of Section 273 of the Mississippi
Constitution support the liberal interpretation proposed by the Respondents, and (2)
if not, should this Court (or the Secretary of State or the Attorney General) rewrite
the Mississippi Constitution? The procedural challenges raised by Respondents
afford the Court no opportunity to avoid these serious constitutional questions.
Fundamental separation of powers principles demand that the answer to both
questions be “no.” For this reason, the Secretary of State’s determination of the
sufficiency of the petition for Initiative Measure No. 65 was erroneous, and Initiative
Measure No. 65 was unconstitutionally brought to the electorate.
II. Respondents’ interpretation of Section 273(3) requires the Court to

rewrite the Mississippi Constitution’s unambiguous language.
If the Mississippi Constitution forms the bedrock of our State, then its
foundation must be sound. Stable interpretation depends on the text in our
{JX451549.5} 1
Constitution meaning what it says, nothing less and nothing more. This Court held
long ago that “[i]t is the mandate of the constitution itself, the paramount and
supreme law of the land, that [an] amendment cannot become part of the constitution
unless…[it] should be submitted in the mode pointed out….” State ex. rel. McClurg v.
Powell, 77 Miss. 543, 570, 27 So. 927, 930 (1900) (explaining an amendment’s “right
legally to be written and inserted into the constitution” depends on conformity with
Section 273), abrogated on other grounds by State ex rel. Collins v. Jones, 64 So. 241
(Miss. 1913)). All Petitioners ask is for the Secretary of State to follow the law as
written, not as rewritten by the Attorney General’s opinion.
In analyzing this question, the Court should look no further than the
unambiguous text of Section 273(3) to determine that satisfying it is currently
mathematically impossible. The Respondents seek a different interpretation based
on dissatisfaction with this result. The Court should not construe the Mississippi
Constitution liberally or as a living constitution to avoid a result that the Legislature
and the electorate can and should fix.
This is especially true when the Secretary of State concedes that “an
amendment is necessary.” Secretary of State’s Brief at 10. That amendment should
occur just like any other amendment to the Mississippi Constitution: by strictly
following the procedure mandated by Section 273. Powell, 27 So. at 932 (articulating
the “necessity for greater deliberation and strictness of procedure in respect to the
adoption of constitutional amendments than that which applies to acts of the
legislature….”). Neither this Court nor the executive branch can bypass what our
Constitution requires. Our separation of powers in this State depends on it.
{JX451549.5} 2
A. Respondents do not claim Section 273(3) is ambiguous, but that
Petitioners’ plain-language approach leads to an undesirable
result.
No one in this case argues Section 273(3) is ambiguous. Petitioners argue, and
Respondents seemingly agree, that a plain-language approach must be followed. But
Petitioners’ interpretation is the only one faithful to that actual plain language of
Section 273(3). Respondents’ interpretation requires reading non-existent language
into Section 273(3). The Court should reject Respondents’ interpretation, which is
driven only by their desire to avoid a result they find undesirable.
The “Constitution of Mississippi is a solemn document.” State v. Wood, 187 So.
2d 820, 831 (Miss. 1966). It serves a fundamental purpose as our State’s foundational
and supreme written law. It limits the power of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches, and enjoins each from usurping the power of the others. Id.; see also
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803) (“[T]hat those limits
[imposed on those who govern] may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is
written.”). Further, the Mississippi Constitution sets precise limits on how and what
changes may be made to it. See generally Section 273.1 In fact, that we have a written
Constitution sets us apart from other countries whose rights and laws find less stable
footing. Alexander v. State , 441 So. 2d 1329, 1333 (Miss. 1983); see League of Women
Voters Minn. v. Ritchie, 819 N.W.2d 636, 673 (Minn. 2012) (Anderson, J., dissenting)
1For example, Section 273(5) identifies four areas of Mississippi law that the
initiative process may not amend, such as the Bill of Rights in the Mississippi
Constitution or any law relating to the Mississippi Public Employees’ Retirement
System.
{JX451549.5} 3
(quoting State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 382-83 (1988)). This is a characteristic
worth protecting.
This Court should interpret the unambiguous text of Section 273(3) as it is
written, not as Respondents would prefer it to read. See Natchez v. Sullivan, 612 So.
2d 1087, 1089 (Miss. 1992) (“If [statutory text] is not ambiguous, the court should
simply apply the statute according to its plain meaning and should not use principles
of statutory construction.”). Moreover, the Court must apply Section 273(3)’s
requirements strictly. See Powell, 27 So. at 931-32. Failure to hold the Secretary of
State, the Attorney General, and Intervenors to the plain text of the Constitution
undermines the true goal of a written Constitution to set limitations of power.
The Court in Natchez v. Sullivan addressed a similarly unambiguous provision
that led to an unexpected result (from one party’s perspective). 612 So. 2d 1087 (Miss.
1992). A statute granted four years of retirement eligibility for active duty service in
the Armed Forces of the United States. Id. at 1088. As written, the statute did not
limit the credit to active duty service during one’s public employment. Id. at 1089.
Rather, it simply stated that active duty service shall count toward retirement. Id.
The Court refused to read into this unambiguous statute the missing language, even
though it led to the potentially unintended result of awarding credit for active duty
service before one’s public employment. See id. at 1089-90; see also State ex rel.
Holmes v. Griffin, 667 So. 2d 1319, 1325-26 (Miss. 1995) (refusing to rewrite a section
of the Mississippi Constitution).
So too this Court should refuse to read in missing language the Legislature
could have included in 1992. In fact, this is language the Legislature has attempted
{JX451549.5} 4
to add numerous times over the years in proposed amendments to Section 273. The
separation of powers does not allow this Court to do the Legislature’s job for it.
Respondents argue against Petitioners’ interpretation because the word “current” is
absent from the phrases “any congressional district” and “a single congressional
district.” It is true the word “current” is not found in Section 273(3). But that does not
mean Petitioners’ interpretation is wrong. To the contrary, the ordinary meaning of
these phrases refers to Mississippi’s current four congressional districts.
The Court need only consider other provisions in the Mississippi Constitution
to see the fallacy in Respondents’ argument. Does the reference to “any county”
throughout the Mississippi Constitution, e.g., Section 139, refer to the 82 counties as
they exist today, or does it refer to those existing in 1890? This matters, because some
counties, such as Forrest and Humphreys, did not exist in 1890. See Miss. Code Ann.
§§ 19-1-35 & 19-1-53. It is clear, however, that “any county,” just like “any
congressional district,” refers to any current member of the class described.
Respondents’ actual theory is not one of plain language but liberal
construction. They argue that because it is presently mathematically impossible to
satisfy the 1/5th ratio with Mississippi’s current four congressional districts, then
“any congressional district” must be understood to mean “as they existed in 1992.”
But Respondents refuse to address one simple issue raised by Petitioners: if
Mississippi regains a congressional district, will the Constitution still mean what
Respondents now claim? See Petitioners’ Br. at 15-16. They refuse to answer this
question because they know the answer is “no.” The meaning of the words “any
{JX451549.5} 5
congressional district” should not fluctuate from “as they existed in 1992” to “current”
every ten years. Petitioners’ interpretation is the only one that will not change.
The problematic nature of Respondents’ interpretation is highlighted by the
original exhibit submitted in support of Intervenors’ Brief, which Intervenors quickly
replaced. That form, attached here as Exhibit 6, requires each elector to state, “I am
a qualified elector of the State of Mississippi in the city (or town), county, and
congressional district written after my name…” This language is required by
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-19. But there are no congressional districts written after each
elector’s name. This is likely because the electors were from Simpson County, which
was in the Fourth Congressional District in 1992 but is now in the Third
Congressional District. Electors in Simpson County cannot honestly attest to being
qualified in the Fourth Congressional District.
Respondents argue for an interpretative theory redefining the plain language
of “any congressional district” and “a single congressional district” based on other
provisions of the Mississippi Constitution.2 If taken at face value, this argument
actually undermines Respondents’ position. The Mississippi Constitution once set
IHL board seats based on “each congressional district of the state as now existing....”
in 1944, when the provision was added. Miss. Const. art. 8, § 213-A (1944) (emphasis
added). Respondents ignore this argument as well, but it is important because the
Respondents rely in part on Dye v. State, 507 So. 2d 332 (Miss. 1987). As the
2
dissent correctly noted, the error of the interpretation on the facts of that was that it
resulted in a “ballooning effect” by expanding some sections at the expense of others.
Id. at 361 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). Indeed, “the majority fails to give us any reason
to support its” its interpretation. Id. That case does not require this Court to stray
from application of the plain language in Section 273(3).
{JX451549.5} 6
“Legislature is presumed to know of the statutes it is enacting and of the subject
matter affected.” Seward v. Dogan, 198 Miss. 419, 436, 21 So. 2d 292, 294 (1945).
When the Legislature proposed the language “any congressional district” in what
would later become Section 273(3), it knew it needed to include “as now existing” in
1992 to tie the congressional districts to a particular date in time. See also Petitioners’
Br. at 16-17 (citing other statutes existing in 1992 that referred to congressional
district existing at a particular point in time).
Section 273 provides the only means to amend the Constitution. Nowhere does
it permit the executive or judicial branch to change (or even propose a change) to the
Mississippi Constitution. The Constitution reserves that right to the qualified
electors of Mississippi, either in response to an amendment proposed by the
Legislature or via a citizen initiative measure.3 It is unfortunate that the latter
cannot be satisfied because of legislative inaction. But Respondents’ desire to avoid
the current mathematical impossibility to fulfill Section 273(3) is not a viable theory
of constitutional interpretation.
It is not this Court’s role to “‘sit in judgment upon the wisdom or fairness or
utility’” of the Legislature’s choice of language for Section 273(3). See Hughes v.
Hosemann, 68 So. 3d 1260, 1270 (Miss. 2011) (citation omitted). It is this Court’s duty
to interpret and apply the law as written. Legis. of the State of Miss. v. Shipman, 170
So. 3d 1211, 1215 (Miss. 2015) (“We do not add language where we see fit. We do not
‘decide’ what a statue should provide, but…determine what it does provided.”
A third, although less common, alternative would be for the State to

3
commence a constitutional convention.
{JX451549.5} 7
(citations omitted)). If this Court agrees with Respondents’ interpretation, then it will
open any provision of the Mississippi Constitution to challenge because of subjective
dissatisfaction with the outcome. The end result of constitutional interpretation
should not justify the means employed. This Court should adhere to a textualist
approach when interpreting the Mississippi Constitution and rule in Petitioners’
favor.
B. Ruling in Petitioners’ favor will abridge no right to amend the

Mississippi Constitution.
Respondents characterize Petitioners as arguing that Section 273(3) is
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Intervenors’ Br. at 6 (claiming Petitioners “request this
Court to declare Section 273 unconstitutional.”). This is incorrect. Petitioners do not
ask this Court to determine the constitutionality of Section 273(3) (or the entirety of
Section 273, as claimed by Intervenors). Petitioners ask the Court to determine
whether Initiative Measure No. 65 complied with the constitutional prerequisites of
Section 273(3). The simple answer, as acknowledge by the Attorney General’s opinion
in Hosemann, is that it did not because it is mathematically impossible unless one
reads additional language into Section 273(3).
Respondents argue that Petitioners’ reading of Section 273(3) is facially
incorrect because it would divest Mississippians of the right to amend the Mississippi
Constitution. In other words, they argue that if there presently exists no valid citizen
initiative procedure, then the Court must interpret Section 273(3) in a way that saves
it. This argument is wrong, and it overstates the history of the right to place a citizen
initiative on the ballot.
{JX451549.5} 8
In 1922, the Mississippi Supreme Court invalidated as unconstitutional
Mississippi’s former citizen initiative procedure. Power v. Robertson, 130 Miss. 188,
230-31, 93 So. 769, 775-77 (1922). Although the electorate had voted in favor of a
citizen initiative procedure years earlier, the Court determined that the Legislature
presented the amendment to the voters in the wrong form. Id. (finding too many
measures proposed in a single amendment rendered it unconstitutional). A group of
citizens attempted to revive the initiative procedure in 1990 by asking this Court to
reconsider its earlier holding. State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So. 2d 624, 631 (Miss.
1991). The Court refused. Id. at 643-44. In response, the Legislature proposed an
amendment to the Mississippi Constitution that created present-day Section 273(3).
See 1992 Miss. Laws ch. 715. Until the electorate amended Section 273 in 1992,
Mississippians for 70 years had no ability to place an initiative measure on the ballot.
See Hughes v. Hosemann, 68 So. 3d 1260, 1263 n.4 (Miss. 2011) (recounting history
of initiative measures).
This history is important. Respondents suggest that ruling in Petitioners’ favor
will leave this State bound to the current Mississippi Constitution with no way to
change it. Far be it from the case. The Legislature can and should propose an
amendment to restore the citizen initiative procedure to working order. While it is
unfortunate that poor drafting of Section 273(3) in 1992 renders it dysfunctional
today, the lack of an initiative procedure pending a legislative proposal to fix it is no
historical anomaly. It was the case for the better part of the twentieth century.
{JX451549.5} 9
Changes to the Mississippi Constitution should not occur by judicial (or
executive) fiat. The proper course is charted in Section 273(2). The Legislature must
propose and the electorate must adopt a remedy to this textual problem.
C. The Secretary of State’s interpretation deserves no deference.
Intervenors argue that the Court should grant deference to the Secretary of
State’s interpretation of Section 273(3). Intervenors’ Br. at 9. There are several
reasons Intervenors are wrong.
This Court recently abandoned deference to the executive branch’s
interpretation of Mississippi law. King v. Miss. Military Dep’t, 245 So. 3d 404, 408
(Miss. 2018). Intervenors’ attempt to distinguish King ignores the rationale
underlying that decision. The King decision recognized that the constitutional
principle of separation of powers requires the judicial branch to interpret the law. Id.
at 407-08. Accordingly, it rejected the idea that statutory interpretation by executive
branch agencies deserves deference. Id. at 408. King applies with equal force here.
Even if King had not abolished deference to the executive branch, deference
still would be inappropriate. Interpreting Section 273(3) requires no specialized
knowledge possessed only (or to some greater extent) by the Secretary of State. The
analysis is simple: do the phrases “any congressional district” and “a single
congressional district” mean the actual congressional districts that currently exist, or
do they mean “as they existed” at some point in the past? The reading Intervenors
argue deserves deference is not the product of the Secretary of State’s specialized
{JX451549.5} 10
knowledge, but the result of wishful thinking to avoid the mathematical problem only
a constitutional amendment can solve.4
Intervenors’ deference argument also fails on the facts. Neither Secretary of
State Watson nor even former Secretary of State Hosemann is the source of the
opinion that “any congressional district” or “a single congressional district” in Section
273(3) mean the former five congressional districts. That is the opinion of former
Attorney General Hood’s office. Assuming that Intervenors seek to create some
exception to King, this is not the case for it: the Attorney General is not charged with
determining the sufficiency of the petition signatures under Section 273(3). In other
words, Intervenors ask the Court to defer to the wrong executive officer’s opinion.
Finally, this argument conflicts with the plain language of Section 273(9). That
section expressly grants this Court “original and exclusive” jurisdiction over the
Secretary of State’s determination of the sufficiency of signatures. Intervenors’ theory
of executive-officer deference would require this Court to amend not only Section
273(3), but also Section 273(9). This the Court must reject.
III. Popular support for Initiative Measure No. 65 cannot circumvent the
constitutional question facing the Court.
Respondents argue for avoidance of this constitutional question because a
majority of the electorate apparently5 voted in favor of Initiative Measure No. 65.
This point, while facially appealing, is wrong for serious reasons.
Of course, it bears mentioning that if the Court were to defer to the Secretary
4
of State, then it should defer to his belief that “an amendment is necessary” to
“sensibly clarify [Section 273(3)’s] text….” Secretary of State Br. at 10.
5 The Secretary of State has not yet certified the vote.
{JX451549.5} 11
The Court should not confuse popular support for Initiative Measure 65 with
permission to rewrite Section 273(3) to say something it does not. Amendments to the
Mississippi Constitution—whether under Section 273(2) or Section 273(3)—are
subject to rigorous procedural requirements. Powell, 27 So. at 931-32.
The Mississippi Constitution provides checks and balances against
government power, both between the respective branches and in their exercise of
authority over the individual. The provisions of the Mississippi Constitution are not
mere suggestions, but mandates. The prerequisites that must be satisfied before the
Mississippi Constitution may be amended by popular vote address a concern that
dates back to this Country’s founders: protection of the minority against the tyranny
of the majority. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“If a majority be united
by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.”), available at
https://billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents/primary-source-documents/the-
federalist-papers/federalist-papers-no-51/; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78
(Alexander Hamilton) (“Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act,
annulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively,
as well as individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge, of their sentiments,
can warrant their representatives in a departure from it, prior to such an act.”),
available at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed78.asp.
This Court explained the risk of indulging the majority, at the expense of the
minority, by refusing to adhere strictly to the prerequisites for amending the
Mississippi Constitution:
The people of a state may impose a limit upon their own

power, and when this is done by the constitution, it must
{JX451549.5} 12
be regarded as much a portion of the paramount law, and
as obligatory on the whole people, as any other portion of
the whole constitution. If we do not so hold, we would
sanction revolution and violence, and place lawlessness on
a level with law. The majority of the people, according to
law, having adopted the constitution with a mode of
amendment in it, we must regard it as a solemn declaration
to the minority in the state, as binding as a compact with
such minority, that the majority, however large or
overwhelming, will never exercise its irresistible power, its
vis major, to change the law of its organization as a
government in any other way.
Powell, 27 So. at 931-32 (quoting with approval Oakland v. Hilton, 69 Cal. 479
(1886)). Although not binding on this Court, the Supreme Court of Virginia
articulated this idea well nearly two centuries ago:
It must be admitted that at the institution of civil

government founded on the rights of all, the will of the
majority must prevail over the opinions and interests of the
minority: but when such government is established, its
great object is to protect the rights of the minority from the
tyranny of the majority; a tyranny more inflexible and
implacable than the tyranny of a single despot. In the one
case the majority feels no sympathy for the minority. In the
other case the sufferers have the sympathy of the majority
of their fellow subjects, and the force of public opinion may
redress their wrongs. To effect this relief against the
tyranny of majorities, written constitutions were devised
by the American people.
Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh 120 (Va. 1837). In other words, the Mississippi
Constitution stands as a promise to the minority that no matter how popular a
measure may be, the majority will adhere strictly to the rules for amending that
“solemn document.”
Whether Initiative Measures No. 65 received majority support on November 3,
2020, is irrelevant. The people of Mississippi—including whatever faction happens to
be the prevailing majority today—are constrained by a written Constitution that
{JX451549.5} 13
requires more than the simple will of the majority to effect change. It requires strict
compliance with the procedures outlined in Section 273. That is what is missing here,
and that is what requires the invalidation of Initiative Measure No. 65.
IV. The Mississippi Constitution gives this Court jurisdiction, which the
Legislature cannot impair by action or inaction.
The Secretary of State does not dispute this Court’s jurisdiction. The
Intervenors do, but their challenge lacks merit.
The Intervenors argue that absent implementing legislation, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to hear Petitioners’ challenge. Alternatively, they argue that Petitioners
should have filed suit in circuit court rather than petition this Court for relief. The
Intervenors’ arguments conflict with the plain language of Section 273(9). These
arguments also highlight the problem with Intervenors’ liberal, ends-justify-the-
means theory of constitutional interpretation.
The text of Section 273(9) gives this Court “original and exclusive jurisdiction.”
The importance of this straightforward. This Court is the only arbiter of this
challenge because its jurisdiction is “exclusive.” And this Court is the first one to hear
this challenge because its jurisdiction is “original.”
Petitioners’ interpretation of this plain language is consistent with this Court’s
approach to youth court jurisdiction. By statute, the youth court “shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction” over certain proceedings involving children, such as delinquent
or abused children. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-151. Courts in this state have interpreted
that to mean the circuit court is divested of jurisdiction for these matters. Wheeler v.
Shoemake, 213 Miss. 374, 415, 57 So. 267, 286 (1952) (voiding minor’s conviction in
circuit court because grant of “original exclusive jurisdiction” to the youth court
{JX451549.5} 14
divested the circuit court of jurisdiction over the minor); Meadows v. State, 217 So.
3d 772, 778 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (holding grant of exclusive and original jurisdiction
to the trial court divested the circuit court of trial jurisdiction).
If the circuit court cannot convict a minor subject to the youth court’s “exclusive
original jurisdiction,” then a circuit court cannot obtain jurisdiction over a matter the
Mississippi Constitution places within the Supreme Court’s “exclusive and original
jurisdiction.” The Secretary of State tacitly acknowledges this inescapable conclusion:
This Court is the only forum with jurisdiction to hear disputes over the sufficiency of
petitions for an initiative measure.
Intervenors infer that jurisdiction is improper from the absence of a statute
addressing this situation. The negative inference they draw is contrary to the plain
language of the Mississippi Constitution. Section 273 contains a limited grant of
enabling authority to the Mississippi Legislature. It states that the “Legislature shall
provide by law the manner in which initiative petitions shall be circulated, presented
and certified,” and that it “may enact laws to carry out the provisions of this
section….” Section 273(12)-(13) (emphasis added). The Mississippi Constitution is
clear, however, that the Legislature “shall in no way restrict or impair the provisions
of this section or the powers herein reserved to the people.” Section 273(13). The
Intervenors would have this Court “restrict or impair” Section 273(9) because the
Legislature elected not to enact a statute concerning challenges to the sufficiency of
a petition. Section 273(13) controls. It defeats Intervenors’ argument.
Section 146 of the Mississippi Constitution supports this conclusion. It grants
the Supreme Court jurisdiction on matters “specifically provided by this Constitution
{JX451549.5} 15
or by general law.” This provision is in the disjunctive; it does not require a grant of
jurisdiction by both the Constitution and general law. Section 273(9) specifically
provides a grant of jurisdiction over the sufficiency of initiative petitions. This
provision is self-enabling, and no additional Legislative grant of authority is
necessary.
Again, had the drafters of the Mississippi Constitution wanted to require
enabling jurisdiction for Section 273(9), they could have done so explicitly. Section
146 explicitly contemplates enabling legislation for direct appeals from the Public
Service Commission: “The Legislature may by general law provide for the Supreme
Court to have original and appellate jurisdiction as to any appeal directly from an
administrative agency charged by law with the responsibility for approval or
disapproval of rates sought to be charged the public by any public utility.” Likewise,
Section 156 grants the circuit courts “such appellate jurisdiction as shall be
prescribed by law.” Section 273(9) contains no such language. No enabling
jurisdiction is contemplated or required; the grant of original and exclusive
jurisdiction is plain and self-executing.
“‘As the highest state court, this Court has the proper authority and
responsibility to interpret the Mississippi Constitution of 1890.’” Legis. of the State of
Miss. v. Shipman, 170 So. 3d 1211, 1227 (Miss. 2015) (Randolph, J., concurring)
(quoting Barbour v. Delta Corr. Facility Auth., 871 So. 2d 703, 710 (Miss. 2004)). This
cannot be taken away by the Legislature. See id. (“If the Legislature shut down all
the public schools, could this Court be asked to intervene under the current
Constitution? Certainly it has the authority to do so.”). Indeed, this Court explained
{JX451549.5} 16
nearly 50 years ago that “if there be a clash between the edicts of the constitution and
the legislative enactment, the latter must yield.” Newell v. State, 308 So. 2d 71, 77
(Miss. 1975).
V. Petitioners’ pre-election and pre-certification challenge is timely.
The Secretary of State charges Petitioners with laches because they filed their
petition eight days before the vote on Initiative Measure No. 65. Intervenors ask the
Court to infer a statute of limitations or repose from the “penumbra” of Miss. Code
Ann. §§ 23-17-1 et seq. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484, 85 S. Ct. 1678,
1681 (1965) (holding “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give life and substance.”).
Despite their arguments, Respondents fail to demonstrate Petitioners’ action is
untimely.6
A. Respondents’ equitable defenses lack merit.
Laches is an affirmative defense, for which Respondents bear the burden of
proof. Elchos v. Haas, 178 So. 3d 1183, 1193 (Miss. 2015). “All attempts to seek
application of…laches require[s] intense factual analysis, and each case must be
judged separately.” Id. at 1187 (citations omitted).
As a preliminary matter, Intervenors’ complaint that Petitioners failed to
explain why they did not file sooner has it backward. This is an improper attempt to
shift the burden of proof to Petitioners for a defense Respondents must prove.
Intervenors also argue that Petitioners did not file this action “pre-election”
6
because of the distribution of absentee ballots. See Intervenors’ Br. at 22. This
argument is contrary to Mississippi law. An absentee ballot is not deposited into the
ballot box and counted prior to election day. Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-639.
{JX451549.5} 17
Lack of knowledge of a claim is a critical fact that defeats laches. Elchos, 178
So. 3d at 1196 (affirming rejection of both laches and estoppel defense where
landowner did not learn of encroachment when it began, but acted swiftly upon
discovering it). This is a logical outcome because laches is founded in equity and
requires a delay that was inexcusable. Elchos stands for the proposition that lack of
knowledge is a valid excuse.
Respondents fail to demonstrate facts to support their assertion that
Petitioners knew they had a claim yet waited too long to assert it. It is not clear
precisely when Respondents contend the petition should have been filed. The
Secretary of State fails to specify a date, other than to say “Petitioners could have
elected to sue at any point in the process”—a process they define as ranging from the
date the proposed measure was filed in July 2018 through Election Day on November
3, 2020. See Secretary of State’s Br. at 14-15. The Intervenors do not attempt to argue
that Petitioners should have brought their challenge when the Secretary of State
actually determined the sufficiency of the signatures. Instead, they contend that
Petitioners should have challenged the sufficiency of the signatures before any
signatures were gathered. See Intervenors’ Br. at 21.
No facts exist to support application of laches under the Secretary of State’s or
the Intervenors’ theories. It troubles Petitioners, and should trouble the Court, that
the Secretary of State’s office either has lost or never maintained an official record of
key events surround Initiative Measure No. 65. For example, the Secretary of State’s
office represented that it has no official record of the official number of signatures
that then-Secretary of State Hosemann deemed sufficient. See Ex. 3, Affidavit of
{JX451549.5} 18
Adam Stone. And although the Secretary of State’s brief enumerates a lengthy
timeline of events, it provides no evidence that all of this information actually was
available to the public.
Indeed, unlike with the voter ID initiative, the Secretary of State made no
public announcement of acceptance of Initiative Measure No. 65 petition for filing.
The Secretary of State published no notice of it, and nothing on the Secretary of
State’s website reflects the filing date. There is a lack of transparency in this process.
And Respondents cannot attribute knowledge to Petitioners of something the
Secretary of State cannot prove he published.
The Intervenors’ position that Petitioners should have filed suit before any
signatures were collected is infeasible. For example, if the Secretary of State had
determined the signatures were insufficient, whether in number or form, then any
challenge Petitioners might have brought before then would be moot. This
demonstrates that Intervenors advocate for an impossibility. They claim Petitioners
filed suit too late because Petitioners did not file before a suit was ripe. Intervenors’
position is illogical.
The suggestion that Petitioners knew they had a claim but lay in wait for a
strategic advantage is false. See Secretary of State’s Br. at 16 (accusing Petitioners
of “dilatory tactics”). Mayor Hawkins Butler, concerned over the initiative’s potential
effects on the City of Madison’s right to zone, asked City Attorney Brannon to look
into how the initiative came to be. Four days before filing the Petition, Petitioners
realized the Constitutional problem with the sufficiency of the petition signatures.
The City of Madison did not vote to retain outside counsel until the day before the
{JX451549.5} 19
Petition was filed. This does not support laches. See Elchos, 178 So. 3d at 1196
(finding for plaintiff because he complained immediately after learning of
encroachment).
Respondents also fail to satisfy their burden to demonstrate any delay caused
undue prejudice. Laches “is not delay in asserting a right, but delay resulting in
disadvantage, which would make it inequitable to permit the party to assert his
right.” Evanovich v. Hutto, 204 So. 2d 477, 479 (Miss. 1967). The Secretary of State
complains that he has been afforded only days to respond to Petitioners’ action. Truth
be told, the Secretary of State had more time to write his brief than did Petitioners.
Moreover, the Court, not Petitioners, set the deadline for his response. It appears the
Court’s second order giving him additional time was intended to ensure the Secretary
of State had an adequate opportunity to brief the issues.
The Secretary of State also complains generally that his office has expended
resources to place the measure on the ballot and that the electorate has now voted on
something that will be invalid if the Court rules for Petitioners. This Court has
addressed and rejected similar arguments before. For example, in Power v. Ratliff,
the Court refused to enjoin an election based on a challenge to the substance (not the
form) of a proposed amendment. 112 Miss. 88, 93, 72 So. 864, 865 (1916). The Court
noted no irreparable injury where there was no special election and the measure
would “simply lengthen the ticket,” the tax burden on the complainants would be “a
paltry sum” that was “trifling and insignificant,” and it was harmless if the measure
were to pass but later be found void. See id. at 93-94. The argument that “other
interested parties have not had an opportunity to appear and defend,” Secretary of
{JX451549.5} 20
State’s Br. at 16, is moot in light of Intervenors’ appearance and submission of a
lengthy opposition. The Secretary of State’s speculation that this action might impact
other initiative measures is not prejudicial to its ability to defend this dispute.7
The Intervenors do not articulate specific prejudice for their laches argument,
other than to complain in conclusory fashion that they have invested time and energy.
Allen v. Mayer, 587 So. 2d 255, 260 (Miss. 1991) (reversing summary judgment based
on laches where the record lacked proof of actual prejudice). They assert something
much bolder. They contend that Section 273(3) is no longer subject to challenge
because the “Secretary of State, and the people of Mississippi, have relied upon the
current interpretation of Section 273 for twenty years….” Intervenors’ Br. at 23.
Aside from the fact that the Secretary of State appears to disagree with this
argument,8 and the lack of evidence of any reliance (or by whom), laches is no
substitute to a proper amendment to the Mississippi Constitution. Nor should it
prohibit a challenge to the misapplication of the law, especially the misapplication of
such a “solemn document” as the Mississippi Constitution. Wood, 187 So. 2d at 831.
All of Intervenors’ cited cases are distinguishable because they do not involve the
Mississippi Constitution or its amendment. Additionally, this Court has held that
public policy may preclude the application of laches. Miss. Dep’t of Human Servs. v.
Molden, 644 So. 2d 1230, 1234 (Miss. 1994) (holding state was not chargeable with
laches but also that public policy favoring determination of paternity and securing
7 Petitioners respond to these arguments elsewhere in this Reply.
See Secretary of State’s Br. at 10 (conceding “an amendment is necessary” to

8
“sensibly clarify [Section 273(3)’s] text”).
{JX451549.5} 21
child support precluded its application). Public policy favors a faithful and textual
application of the Mississippi Constitution.
Other courts have pointed out the folly of permitting time bars to efforts to
redress constitutional violations. E.g., Kuhnle Bros. v. Cnty. of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516,
522 (6th Cir. 1997) (“A law that works an ongoing violation of constitutional rights
does not become immunized from legal challenge for all time merely because no one
challenges it within two years of its enactment.”). If this were the law, then “Brown
v. Board of Education would have been thrown out of court, on the ground that the
Kansas statute authorizing Topeka to maintain segregated public schools had been
on the books since 1879, and everyone knew about it.” Am. Trucking Ass’n v. New
York State Thruway Auth., 199 F. Supp. 3d 855, 872 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), vacated on other
grounds, 238 F. Supp. 3d 527 (2017).
Intervenors make passing reference to waiver and estoppel, but fail to brief
them. See Intervenors’ Br. at 22-23. Intervenors carry the burden of proof on these
affirmative defenses. Butler v. City of Eupora, 725 So. 2d 158, 160 (Miss. 1998)
(“equitable estoppel is an affirmative defense”); Knox v. BancorpSouth Bank, 37 So.
3d 1257, 1261 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (“waiver is an affirmative defense”); see also Miss.
R. Civ. P. 8(c). In any event, the lack of any evidence that Petitioners knew of a claim
but failed to raise it in a timely manner, or knowingly relinquished such a claim, foils
these defenses. Elchos, 178 So. 3d at 1196 (denying estoppel theory due to lack of
evidence plaintiff knew of a claim); Hinton v. Pekin Ins. Co., 268 So. 3d 543, 557 (Miss.
2019) (“Waiver is defined as an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
{JX451549.5} 22
known right or privilege, and typically must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence.” (citations omitted)).
Finally, history undermines Respondents’ timeliness arguments. This Court
invalidated Mississippi’s former initiative procedure in 1922 after it had been a part
of the Mississippi Constitution for many years. Robertson, 93 So. at 775-77.
Timeliness apparently was no bar to redressing a constitutional violation then. It
should not be so now.
B. No statute of limitations or repose impairs Petitioners’ action.
Intervenors appear to argue that a statute of limitations, or perhaps repose,
should be inferred from Chapter 17 of Title 23 of the Mississippi Code. To be clear, no
deadline to challenge the sufficiency of a petition can be found in the plain language
of Miss. Code Ann. §§ 23-17-1 et seq. or Section 273. The Legislature had no duty or
obligation to legislate a deadline for challenges to the sufficiency of a petition. See
Section 273(12). Further, any legislation relating to Section 273 cannot impair rights
provided in Section 273. As explained above concerning jurisdiction, see supra at Part
IV, Intervenors essentially ask this Court to delete Section 273(9) from the
Mississippi Constitution because the Legislature passed no law creating a deadline
for this action. The Court cannot do this.
Intervenors strain to find a five-day deadline to file based on Miss. Code Ann.
§ 23-17-13 and In re Proposed Initiative Measure No. 20, 774 So. 2d 397 (Miss. 2000).
Neither that statute nor In re Proposed Initiative Measure supports Intervenors’
argument. Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-13 sets a deadline for appealing the ballot title
{JX451549.5} 23
and summary formulated by the Attorney General. It does not address challenges to
the sufficiency of a petition under Section 273(3).
In re Proposed Initiative Measure, a case overruled in part by Speed v.
Hosemann, 68 So. 3d 1278 (Miss. 2011), addressed the failure to include a government
revenue impact statement in a proposed initiative under Section 273(4). This was not
an insufficiency of the petitions under Section 273(9) or under Miss. Code Ann. § 23-
17-23, and so In re Proposed Initiative Measure did not address the specific grant to
the Supreme Court of “original and exclusive” jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of
the petition. And as Speed v. Hosemann, 68 So. 3d at 1281, found that In re Proposed
Initiative Measure was too expansive in its dicta of what may be reviewed pre-
election, the case is likewise overly expansive in its description of the circuit court’s
jurisdiction. Indeed, Speed v. Hosemann specifically cites Section 273(9) in stating
that “‘minimum constitutional and statutory requirements’ must be met before a
measure is placed on the ballot, a pre-election review is limited to matters of form,
i.e., the sufficiency of signatures and/or the ballot title or summary.” 68 So. 3d at 1281
(citing Miss. Const. art. 15, § 273(9); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 23-17-13, -23, -25). In re
Proposed Initiative Measure does not and cannot supplant Section 273(9)’s grant of
“original and exclusive” jurisdiction to this Court. And it certainly did not impose a
five-day limitations period, running from the date a ballot title is published, for
challenging the sufficiency of signatures not even yet gathered.9
9 Intervenors’ original proposed Brief, which attached a sample
{JX451549.5} 24
Even if Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-13, which governs the appeal of a ballot title
and summary, could be somehow be construed to set a limitation for actions
challenging the sufficiency of the petition’s signatures, Intervenors have overlooked
one critical point of law. Intervenors direct all of their ire at Mayor Hawkins Butler,
ignoring the fact that the City of Madison is a Petitioner in this action as well. And it
is a bedrock constitutional principle that “Statutes of limitation in civil causes shall
not run against the State, or any subdivision or municipal corporation thereof.” Miss.
Const., art. V., § 103. Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-13, no matter how construed, cannot
bar the City of Madison’s challenge.
VI. Other initiative measures passed since Mississippi lost its fifth
congressional seat are immaterial to the Court’s decision.
Respondents argue that the Court should avoid applying the plain text of
Section 273 because it may affect the validity of previously-adopted initiative
measures addressing voter ID and eminent domain. Setting aside the validity of
Respondents’ concerns, a history of misinterpretation of Section 273(3) does not
provide this Court with a rational basis to abstain from deciding the constitutional
question presented.
The Court’s decision in Power v. Robertson is instructive. There, the Court
invalidated Mississippi’s former initiative procedure despite it having been the law
for a number of years. Robertson, 93 So. at 775-77. A history of misinterpretation did
not impede the Court from addressing the error when called upon to do so. Indeed,
that is the duty imposed on this Court by our constitutionally-mandated separation
of powers. See, e.g., Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (“It is emphatically the province
{JX451549.5} 25
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule
to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”).
Turning to the merits of what Respondents suggest, they offer no substantive
analysis as to why invalidation of Initiative Measure No. 65 would necessitate
invalidation of any other measure. This is because it need not. Petitioners filed their
challenge to the sufficiency of the petition for Initiative Measure No. 65 before the
election and before the Secretary of State certified the vote. That is not the case for
any other initiative matter long since passed, certified, and codified in the Mississippi
Constitution. This distinction invalidates Initiative Measure No. 65 while permitting
the Court to preserve the voter ID and eminent domain initiatives. This is consistent
with the dichotomy in Hughes v. Hosemann between pre- and post-election challenges
of form and substance. 68 So. 3d at 1264.
VII. Barnes v. Ladner does not preclude the Court from ruling in
Petitioners’ favor.
Respondents argue that Barnes v. Ladner, 131 So. 2d 458 (Miss. 1961),
prevents the Court from ruling for Petitioners. Barnes held that a circuit court could
not issue a writ of prohibition to the Secretary of State because he was acting in a
ministerial and not a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. Id. at 463-64. Traditionally,
writs of prohibition are limited to judicial officers. Writs of mandamus and injunction
are not. The Court ordered the Secretary of State to add a candidate’s name to a ballot
in Wilson v. Hosemann, 185 So. 3d 370, 380 (Miss. 2016), after the candidate sought
a writ of mandamus and injunction. The Court noted in Hughes v. Hosemann, that if
the Secretary of State fails to file a sufficient petition, “the sponsor of the initiative
can seek an order from this Court requiring the Secretary of State to bring the
{JX451549.5} 26
petition before the Court and for a writ of mandamus compelling him to file it.” 68 So.
3d at 1265 n.12. The bar in Barnes on writs of prohibition does not bar the Court from
issuing any other extraordinary writ.
Barnes did not involve a petition to place an initiative measure on the ballot.
Id. at 459. Rather, Barnes addressed an amendment to the Mississippi Constitution
proposed by the Legislature. Id. The Court reasoned that the circuit court (from which
the appeal arose) lacked authority to issue a writ of prohibition to the Secretary of
State because he was acting in a ministerial and not a judicial or quasi-judicial
capacity. Id. at 463-64. Unlike Barnes, Section 273(9) expressly subjects the Secretary
of State to review by this Court under its “original and exclusive jurisdiction.” And
that review is related to the Secretary of State’s determination of the sufficiency of a
petition, which is judicial or at least quasi-judicial in nature. Barnes is inapplicable
here. The Court should grant the relief Petitioners seek.
More importantly, Petitioners have asked for more than an extraordinary writ
relief; they also seek a declaration that the Secretary of State’s certification of
Initiative Measure No. 65 was unconstitutional. Even if Barnes were on point (and it
is not), Respondents’ argument does not foreclose Petitioners’ relief.
VIII. Conclusion
The wisdom of medical marijuana in Mississippi is not on trial here. The issue
is whether the plain language of the Constitution must be followed. The question is
simple but the stakes are high. The rule of law depends on it. Petitioners respectfully
ask that the Court declare the Secretary of State’s determination of the sufficiency of
{JX451549.5} 27
the petition supporting Initiative Measure No. 65 unconstitutional and to issue
whatever extraordinary writs are appropriate to invalidate it.
Dated: November 9, 2020
Respectfully submitted,
MAYOR MARY HAWKINS BUTLER and

THE CITY OF MADISON
By Their Attorneys,
JONES WALKER, LLP
By: /s/ Kaytie M. Pickett

KAYTIE M. PICKETT
Kaytie M. Pickett (MSB No. 103202)

JONES WALKER LLP
190 East Capitol St., Suite 800
Jackson, MS 39201
Tel.: (601) 949-4900; Fax: (601) 949-4804

Post Office Box 40
Tel.: (601) 856-7116; Fax: (601) 853-4766
{JX451549.5} 28
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, KAYTIE M. PICKETT, of JONES WALKER LLP, do hereby certify that I

have this day filed the foregoing document via the Court’s electronic filing system,
which forwarded an electronic copy to all counsel of record.
SO CERTIFIED, this the 9th day of November, 2020
/s/ Kaytie M. Pickett

KAYTIE M. PICKETT
{JX451549.5} 29
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

IN HER INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITTIES;
THE CITY OF MADISON, PETITIONERS
VS. CAUSE NO.: 2020-M-1199-SCT

FOR THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI RESPONDENT
OPPOSITION OF INITIATIVE SPONSOR ASHLEY ANN DURVAL

AND INITIATIVE SUPPORTER ANGIE CALHOUN
By: /s/ Paul H. Stephenson III

PAUL H. STEPHENSON III (MSB # 7864)
MICHAEL O. GWIN (MSB #5086)
WATKINS & EAGER PLLC
400 E. Capitol Street
Post Office Box 650
Jackson, MS 39205
Tel: 601-965-1900
Fax: 601-965-1901
pstephenson@watkinseager.com
mgwin@watkinseager.com
By: /s/ Spencer M. Ritchie

SPENCER M. RITCHIE (MSB # 103636)
CHELSEA C. LEWIS (MSB# 105300)
FORMAN WATKINS & KRUTZ LLP
Post Office Box 22608
Jackson, MS 39225-2608
Tel: (601) 960-7099
Fax: (601) 960-8613
spencer.ritchie@formanwatkins.com
chelsea.lewis@formanwatkins.com
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................1
II. THE PROPOSAL AND IMPLEMENTATION OF INITIATIVE 65 ............................4
III. ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................6
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW ......................................................................................6
B. THE SECRETARY OF STATE PROPERLY ACCEPTED AND FILED
INITIATIVE 65 .............................................................................................................9
C. MAYOR HAWKINS BUTLER’S FILING WAS UNTIMELY ............................16
D. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS MATTER...................23
IV. CONCLUSION............................................................................................................28
ii
Cases
Barbour v. Hood, 974 So.2d 232 (Miss. 2008)............................................................................... 8
Barnes v. Ladner, 131 So. 2d 458 (Miss. 1961) ........................................................................... 27
Burwell v. Mississippi State Tax Comm., 536 So.2d 848 (Miss. 1988) .......................................... 7
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 464 U.S. 837 (1984) ........................ 8
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, 578 So. 2d 644 (Miss. 1991) ............................................. 13, 14, 15
Drane v. State, 493 So. 2d 294 (Miss. 1986). ............................................................................... 11
Dye v. State ex rel. Hale, 507 So. 2d 332 (Miss. 1987). ......................................................... 10, 24
Frazier v. State By & Through Pittman, 504 So. 2d 675 (Miss. 1987) ........................................ 14
Harris v. Harrison County Board of Supervisors, 366 So.2d 651 (Miss. 1979) ............................ 8
Hughes v. Hosemann, 68 So. 3d 1260 (Miss. 2011) ......................................................... 10, 19, 21
In re Fordice, 691 So. 2d 429 (Miss. 1997)............................................................................ 26, 27
In re Proposed Initiative Measure 20 v. Mahoney, 774 So. 2d 397 (Miss. 2000) .. 4, 19, 20, 21, 23
In re: Wilbourn, 590 So. 2d 1381, 1384–85 (Miss. 1991) ............................................................ 28
King v. Mississippi Military Dept., 245 So.3d 404 (Miss. 2018) ................................................... 9
Legislature of State v. Shipman, 170 So. 3d 1211, 1222 (Miss. 2015) ......................................... 25
McKenzie v. City of Ocean Springs, 758 So. 2d 1028, 1032 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) .................... 23
Pryer v. State, 139 So. 3d 713, 719 .............................................................................................. 25
State ex rel. Collins v. Jones, 64 So. 241, 248 (Miss. 1914), ....................................................... 13
State ex rel. Greaves v. Henry, 40 So. 152, 154 (Miss. 1906) ........................................................ 7
State v. Jackson, 81 So. 1 (Miss. 1919) ........................................................................................ 14
Taitz v. Democrat Party of Mississippi, No. 3:12-CV-280-HTW-LRA, 2015 WL 11017373 (S.D.
Miss. Mar. 31, 2015). ................................................................................................................ 28
Trahan v. State Highway Comm’n, 169 Miss. 732, 151 So. 178 (1933) .................................. 3, 10
Tuck v. Blackmon, 798 So. 2d 402 (Miss. 2001) ............................................................................ 9
Southland Mgmt. v. City of Columbia, 744 So. 2d 774, 776 (Miss. 1999) ................................... 23
USF&G Co. v. Conservatorship of Melson, 809 So. 2d 647, 660 (Miss. 2002)..................... 11, 14
Walker v. City of Biloxi, 229 Miss. 890, 92 So. 2d 227 (1957) .................................................... 23
Wesley v. Washington Cty. Democratic Exec. Comm., 235 So. 3d 1379 (Miss. 2017) ................ 16
Statutes
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-13 ................................................................................... 4, 18, 19, 20, 21
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-29 ..................................................................................................... 5, 18
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-45 ........................................................................................................... 6
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-11 ................................................................................................. 3, 4, 17
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-19 ........................................................................................................... 4
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-7 ......................................................................................................... 3, 4
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-9 ................................................................................................... 3, 4, 17
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-715 ......................................................................................................... 6
House Concurrent Resolution No. 39 ........................................................................................... 11
iii
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-5 ................................................................................................... 3, 4, 17
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-367 ......................................................................................................... 5
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-2 ............................................................................................................. 5
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-25 ........................................................................... 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25
Miss. Code Ann. § 9-4-5 ......................................................................................................... 13, 15
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-17 ........................................................................................................... 4
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-211.1 ...................................................................................................... 7
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-21 ........................................................................................................... 5
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-1 ............................................................................................................. 4
Other Authorities
Miss. Att’y General Op. No. 2009-00001, 2009 WL 367638 (Miss. A.G. Jan. 9, 2009). ...... 10, 12
Constitutional Provisions
Miss. Const. art. 15, § 273 .......................................................................... 1, 2, 6, 8, 19, 23, 24, 25
Miss. Const. art. 15, §133 ............................................................................................................... 7
iv
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

IN HER INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITTIES;
THE CITY OF MADISON, PETITIONERS
VS. CAUSE NO.: 2020-M-1199-SCT

FOR THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI RESPONDENT
OPPOSITION OF INITIATIVE SPONSOR ASHLEY ANN DURVAL

AND INITIATIVE SUPPORTER ANGIE CALHOUN
Ashley Ann Durval and Angie Calhoun (for purposes of this opposition, collectively the
Initiative “Sponsors”) oppose the “Emergency Petition” filed by Mayor Mary Hawkins Butler and
the City of Madison (collectively “Mayor Hawkins Butler”) as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION
When Section 273 was added to the Mississippi Constitution in 1992 its intent was crystal
clear—to give the people the ability to propose and enact constitutional amendments. Equally clear
was the procedure spelled out to achieve this constitutional purpose. The intent and meaning of
Section 273 has never been in doubt. For over 28 years all three branches of Mississippi
government—executive, legislative and judicial—have acted consistently with the original intent
and understanding of Section 273. Indeed, the people of Mississippi have relied upon the provision
to successfully place on the ballot several initiatives, including twice successfully amending our
Constitution to implement voter identification and eminent domain protections. Initiative 65 has
now been overwhelmingly approved by Mississippi voters.
1
Yet, Mayor Hawkins Butler seeks to abolish the constitutional right the people of
Mississippi “reserve[d] unto themselves…to propose and enact constitutional amendments by
initiative.” Miss. Const. art. 15, §273(2). Mayor Hawkins Butler flatly asserts the mere “filing” of
Initiative 65 by the Secretary of State in 2018 is unconstitutional. Mayor Hawkins Butler’s Brief
9 (hereinafter “Br.”). She is quick to make clear her challenge is not to the substance of Initiative
65: “The measure could be about any topic, and its constitutional invalidity would remain.” Br.
12. She claims she does not question “the wisdom of legalizing medical marijuana[,]” now
overwhelmingly approved by 74% of the voting populace. Br. 23. Instead Mayor Hawkins Butler
aims for a larger target. She asserts “the entire initiative process” is invalid and unconstitutional.
Id. In light of her newly shared reading of the Constitution, first uncloaked on an emergency basis
in the midst of an election, Mayor Hawkins Butler dramatically claims, “the Constitution should
be amended[.]” Id.
Fortunately, nothing so radical is necessary. Section 273 can simply be applied as it always
has been. As originally intended by the drafters of Section 273, the “one-fifth (1/5)” language of
subsection (3) refers directly and unmistakably to the then existing “congressional district[s]”
referenced in the provision—of which there were indisputably five. Section 273 has been so
applied without controversy for over 28 years. Mayor Hawkins Butler implicitly recognizes that
the language “one-fifth (1/5)” is a constitutionally embedded textual reference to the then existing
five “congressional district[s]” because she recounts the redistricting change from five districts to
four in 2003. Br. 3. But Mayor Hawkins Butler reaches the untenable conclusion that a
constitutional provision perfectly valid for over 10 years, suddenly became unconstitutional in
2003. She simultaneously suggests that Section 273 might drift yet again into constitutionality
sometime in the future with a population fluctuation adding another congressional district. Br. 23.
2
Constitutions do not work that way. Certainly, the drafters did not so intend. Even Mayor Hawkins
Butler recognizes “both the Legislature and the electorate knew that the congressional districts
change every ten years.” Br. 16.
In construing a constitutional provision, “the court shall look to the circumstances under
which the constitutional provision was ordained, the objects designed to be accomplished by it,
the evils to be avoided or cured, and thereby to arrive at the reasonable meaning and real intention
of the provision, keeping in mind that such an ordinance is intended to stand and to serve its
purposes not for today alone but for a long, long time.” Trahan v. State Highway Comm’n, 169
Miss. 732, 151 So. 178, 182 (1933) (emphasis added). Mayor Hawkins Butler’s unique mis-
reading violates this fundamental constitutional principle. Were the Court to concur, it would have
to invalidate the vote of 74% of Mississippians who supported Initiative 65 and hold an entire
section of the Constitution inoperative, while drawing into question past constitutional
amendments by initiative.
This “Emergency Petition” also presents serious issues concerning jurisdiction, timeliness,
procedure, and the very remedy sought. Initiative 65 was published for public comment in August
2018, following its certification by the Attorney General and filing with the Secretary of State. See
Miss. Code Ann. §§ 23-17-5, 23-17-7, 23-17-9, 23-17-11. Yet, Mayor Hawkins Butler, who now
asserts this very August 2018 filing was unconstitutional and “the entire initiative process” invalid,
said and did nothing—for over two years. The Sponsors will first set forth relevant background
and then address Mayor Hawkins Butler’s erroneous interpretation of the Constitution, which is
contrary to the will of the people and contrary to the long-standing interpretation by the very
constitutional officers charged with implementing Section 273. The Sponsors will then address the
other referenced flaws present in the “Emergency Petition.”
3
II. THE PROPOSAL AND IMPLEMENTATION OF INITIATIVE 65
More than two years ago, on July 30, 2018, and pursuant to Section 23-17-1 of the
Mississippi Code, Sponsor Ashley Ann Durval, a qualified elector of the State of Mississippi and
resident of Rankin County, submitted a proposed ballot initiative regarding medical marijuana to
the Mississippi Secretary of State. See Sponsors’ Ex. 1. The initiative measure was then certified
by the Attorney General, given a number by the Secretary of State (i.e., Initiative 65), and named
and described by the Attorney General. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 23-17-5, 23-17-7, 23-17-9; Mayor
Hawkins Butler’s Ex. 2.
Pursuant to his statutory duties, in August 2018 the Secretary of State published notice of
the Petition for Initiative 65, providing for public comment. See Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-11. Any
member of the public—including Mayor Hawkins Butler—was required at that time, “within five
(5) days from the publication,” to express any dissatisfaction with the initiative. Miss. Code Ann.
§ 23-17-13; In re Proposed Initiative Measure 20 v. Mahoney, 774 So. 2d 397, 401 ¶¶ 15–16 (Miss.
2000) (Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-13, “direct[ing] all matters concerning the initiative
process to” Hinds County Circuit Court). Mayor Hawkins Butler did not complain within five days
of publication and is now barred by her failure.
Once the ballot title and ballot summary were finalized, the Sponsors and others began
working diligently to collect signatures from qualified electors across the State on a Petition for
the Initiative to be placed on the ballot (“the Petition”). See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 23-17-17, 23-17-
19. Ultimately, 228,000 signatures were collected for the Petition.
Before submitting the Petition with the signatures that were collected to the Secretary of
State, the signatures were certified by circuit clerks from all eighty-two of Mississippi’s counties.
See Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-21. The circuit clerks are responsible for certifying that each
4
signature is from a qualified elector in the county and in one of the congressional districts. Id. For
this process, as called for by Article 15, Section 273(3) of the Mississippi Constitution, the circuit
clerks apply the former five congressional districts that existed prior to the 2002 redistricting
process. The clerks are readily equipped to apply these former boundaries as the current Court of
Appeals districts are based on the five former congressional districts.
On September 4, 2019, the signed Petition, together with the certifications from the county
circuit clerks, was filed with the Secretary of State. See Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-21.
On January 7, 2020, after ensuring the Petition met the sufficiency requirements set forth
in Section 23-17-23 of the Mississippi code, the Secretary of State accepted and filed Initiative 65
with the Legislature. See Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-29.
On March 12, 2020 the Mississippi Legislature passed a statute expressly recognizing
“under Section 273 . . . the people have the power to propose and enact constitutional amendments
by initiative.” The Legislature then resolved that Initiative 65 “shall be submitted by the Secretary
of State to the qualified electors at an election” on November 3, 2020. See Sponsors’ Ex. 2 (House
Concurrent Resolution No. 39).
On September 8, 2020, the State Board of Election Commissioners met and approved the
official ballot to be used for the November 3, 2020 general election. The official ballot included
Initiative 65. The following day, the statutory deadline for doing so, the Secretary of State
published the official ballot so that county elections commissioners could take it, insert local races,
and print the ballots. See Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-367.
On September 21, 2020, Mississippi voters began casting absentee ballots. See Miss. Code
Ann. § 23-15-715.
5
Between September 30, 2020 and October 13, 2020, the Secretary of State held five public
hearings on Initiative 65. See Miss. Code Ann. §23-17-45. Consistent with Article 15, Section
273(3) of the Mississippi Constitution, these hearings were held in each of the former five
congressional districts.
By October 26, 2020, the Secretary of State reported that 142,591 Mississippians had
already cast their vote via absentee ballots. See Sponsors’ Ex. 3 (2020 General Election Absentee
Report – Week 4). That same day, over two years after Initiative 65 was first published, over one
year after the Petition with certified signatures was filed with the Secretary of State, almost ten
months after the Secretary of State publicly approved the sufficiency of the Petition, and thirty-six
days after voting began in Mississippi, Mayor Hawkins Butler filed this “Emergency Petition” in
Mississippi’s highest court.1
On November 3, 2020, Mississippi voters overwhelmingly voted to adopt Initiative 65 by
a 74% majority of voters. 2 Additionally, according to early reports from the Secretary of State,
Initiative 65 received a majority of votes in eighty of Mississippi’s eighty-two counties.
III. ARGUMENT
A. Standard of Review
Leaving aside for the moment issues of timeliness, jurisdiction, and procedure, Mayor
Hawkins Butler requests this Court to declare Section 273 unconstitutional. In this regard: “It has
long been settled in this state that, when the constitutionality of a statute is drawn into question, a
construction will be placed upon it, if reasonably possible, to enable it to withstand constitutional
1
As seen from the timeline set forth above, Mayor Hawkins Butler’s “Emergency Petition” is no “emergency” at all.
Rather Mayor Hawkins Butler simply let every reasonable time to act expire and improperly brought her petition too
late by any legal or equitable measure.
2
See generally The Associated Press, Mississippi general election results: November 2020, WAPT,
https://www.wapt.com/article/mississippi-general-election-results-november-2020/34416650#.
6
attack and to carry out the purpose embedded in the legislative language.” Burwell v. Miss. State
Tax Comm’n, 536 So. 2d 848, 858 (Miss. 1988) (citations omitted). Specifically referencing
Section 273 of the Mississippi Constitution, the Burwell Court stated: “[O]ut of deference to the
authority and prerogative of the legislature, we will ordinarily afford the gray areas of the
Constitution any reasonable construction that will avoid unconstitutionality of the statute.”
Id. at 859 (emphasis added). “In the final analysis we have been asked to review judicially not just
an enactment of the legislature but a constitutional amendment affirmatively ratified by the people.
More so than in ordinary cases of judicial review, we exercise an authority requiring the utmost
delicacy. . . . We should proceed with caution[.]” Id.
Echoing similar sentiments, the Court in State ex rel. Greaves v. Henry, 40 So. 152, 154
(Miss. 1906) stated:
[I]f there be well-founded reasonable doubt of the constitutionality of a legislative

act, it must be held constitutional. This is a well-recognized rule of the courts, ever
vigilant, as they should be, of the rights and prerogatives of each branch of the
governmental body politic. This rule is based on common sense. Each branch
represents the people. Each branch, legislative, executive, or judicial is the
people, by the intendment of the organic law in its proper sphere, and must be
presumed to act within its powers under the Constitution unless the contrary
plainly appears.
(emphasis added).
The Secretary of State of Mississippi is an elected constitutional officer. See Miss. Const.
art. 15, §133. The Secretary of State is constitutionally charged with overseeing the “returns of all
elections . . . in such manner as provided by law.” Miss. Const. art. 4, § 114. The Legislature in
fact recognizes the Secretary of State “as the Chief Election Officer of the State of Mississippi.”
Miss. Code Ann. §23-15-211.1. As to the specific matter at issue here, when considering “the
excess number of signatures” from a congressional district, the Constitution specifically charges
the Secretary of State with “determining whether the [initiative] petition qualifies for placement
7
on the ballot.” Miss. Const. art. 15, § 273(3). The Constitution additionally charges the Secretary
of State with deciding the “sufficiency of petitions . . . in the first instance . . . subject to review by
the Supreme Court.” Id. § 273(9). Evaluating the Secretary of State’s discharge of his duties, as
with any other public officer: “There is a presumption that public officers perform their duties in
the manner required by law and it is the responsibility of any person challenging the validity
of an official, or official act, to show the invalidity by clear proof.” Harris v. Harrison Cty. Bd.
of Supervisors, 366 So. 2d 651, 655–56 (Miss. 1979) (emphasis added).
Barbour v. Hood, 974 So. 2d 232 (Miss. 2008) is further instructive in reviewing the
Secretary of State’s execution. Attorney General Hood sought an injunction to prohibit Governor
Barbour from enforcing the Governor’s “Writ of Election” setting a date for a special election for
U.S. Senator. As with the Secretary of State here, the Governor’s actions were governed by certain
constitutional and statutory provisions. The Barbour Court stated:
The courts of this state are ever mindful of the wisdom of our predecessors in
exercising caution and exhibiting reluctance to inject themselves in election
matters, and seek to exercise diligence in honor of our Constitution’s clear mandate
regarding separation of powers. Our role is limited to only those cases involving
violation of the Constitution and laws.
Id. at 239. As to the statute at issue, the Court noted that they should first apply the “plain meaning”
of the statute. Id. at 240. However, “if the legislative mandate . . . is ambiguous or silent, then this
Court must determine whether the Governor’s construction of the statute is permissible.” Id.
Explaining this “permissibility” standard, the Barbour Court quoted Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 464 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984) with approval: “We have long
recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction
of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer [.]” (emphasis added by the Mississippi Supreme
8
Court).3 Ultimately, the Barbour Court deferred to the Governor’s interpretation and actions as
“permissible.” In so holding, the Barbour Court noted that it had similarly “granted deference to
the Legislature in the ‘interpretation and application of its procedural rules and . . . internal
operations.’” 974 So. 2d at 241, n.11. (quoting Tuck v. Blackmon, 798 So. 2d 402, 405 (Miss.
2001)). In Tuck this Court stated: “An interpretation by the Senate of the extent of its powers under
the Constitution, while not binding on the courts, should be accepted unless manifestly wrong.”
798 So. 2d at 406 (emphasis added).
Here, as discussed, the Secretary of State properly applied the plain meaning of the
constitutional provision. Nevertheless, as the Secretary of State is constitutionally charged with
“determining whether the petition qualifies for placement on the ballot” pursuant to Section
273(3), deference should be accorded the Secretary of State in his construction of the constitutional
provision he is entrusted to implement.
B. The Secretary of State properly accepted and filed Initiative 65.
Since the adoption of Section 273 in 1992, the Secretary of State has consistently
determined whether an initiative petition qualifies for placement on the ballot by considering the
geographic distribution of the qualified electors based on the five congressional districts that
existed in 1992, which districts continued until 2003.
1. The full text of Section 273(3) makes clear that its reference to
‘congressional district’ is to any one of the five congressional districts
existing at the time Section 273 was adopted.
Article 15, Section 273(3) of the Mississippi Constitution provides:
3
The Court’s decision in King v. Miss. Military Dep’t, 245 So. 3d 404, 407 (Miss. 2018) does not apply in this case
because King, and subsequent cases relying on it, addressed deference owed to statutory interpretations by
administrative agencies, which agencies are themselves created by statute. By contrast, this case, and Barbour v. Hood,
concern the interpretation by elected, constitutional officers with constitutional and/or statutory responsibilities they
are entrusted to administer.
9
The people reserve unto themselves the power to propose and enact constitutional
amendments by initiative. An initiative to amend the Constitution may be proposed
by a petition signed over a twelve-month period by qualified electors equal in
number to at least twelve percent (12%) of the votes for all candidates for Governor
in the last gubernatorial election. The signatures of the qualified electors from any
congressional district shall not exceed one-fifth (1/5) of the total number of
signatures required to qualify an initiative petition for placement upon the ballot. If
an initiative petition contains signatures from a single congressional district which
exceed one-fifth ( 1/5 ) of the total number of required signatures, the excess
number of signatures from that congressional district shall not be considered by the
Secretary of State in determining whether the petition qualifies for placement on
the ballot.
When interpreting the Constitution, this Court gives it “a reading that gives maximum effect to
each relevant provision and assigns each a meaning in harmony with that emanating in the others.”
Dye v. State ex rel. Hale, 507 So. 2d 332, 347 (Miss. 1987).
The term “one fifth 1/5” in Section 273(3) must necessarily be read in conjunction with the
term “congressional district” in light of “the circumstances under which the constitutional
provision was ordained.” Trahan, 151 So. at 182. Those “circumstances” were the existence of
five congressional districts. Accordingly, the plain and unambiguous meaning of “congressional
district,” read together with the one-fifth requirement, means one of the five congressional districts
existing at the time Section 273 was passed.
That this reading is plain and reasonable is evidenced by the fact that many other public
officers, constitutionally charged with interpreting and applying the constitutional provision, have
so read it. As noted, the Secretary of State has so read and applied the provision since 1992. The
state Attorney General also so interpreted the constitutional provision. Miss. Att’y Gen. Op. No.
2009-00001, 2009 WL 367638 (Jan. 9, 2009). Justice Randolph noted in his concurring opinion in
Hughes v. Hosemann, 68 So. 3d 1260, 1267 n. 14 (Miss. 2011)—an opinion that was joined by six
other Justices of the Court—the one-fifth requirement refers to “each of Mississippi’s former five
congressional districts.”
10
In 2019, the Legislature passed a bill directly addressing Section 273 and further directly
addressing Initiative 65. House Concurrent Resolution No. 39 is a legislative finding that: “under
Section 273 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, the people have the power to propose and
enact constitutional amendments by initiative.” Sponsors’ Ex. 2. The Legislature specifically
affirmed that “the procedure for doing so is set forth in Chapter 17, Title 23, Mississippi Code of
1972.” The Legislature further decreed: “The people have proposed an Initiative Measure No. 65”
and “this initiative measure will be presented to the qualified electors at the November 2020
election.” Further confirming legislative ratification of the acts and the procedure leading to the
implementation of Initiative 65, the Legislature proposed its own alternative constitutional
amendment Initiative 65A. The Legislature then specifically resolved that both its proposed
legislative alternative and Initiative 65 “shall be submitted by the Secretary of State to the qualified
electors at an election to be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November 2020, in
the manner prescribed by Section 273 of the Constitution.” Id. Accordingly, the legislative branch
has also specifically affirmed the procedures used for the adoption and presentation of Initiative
65.
When interpreting the Constitution, it is the duty of this Court “to support a construction
which would purge the legislative purpose of any . . . absurdity[.]” USF&G Co. v. Conservatorship
of Melson, 809 So. 2d 647, 660 (Miss. 2002). In other words, the Court will not “impute an . . .
absurd purpose to the legislature when any other reasonable construction can save it from such an
imputation.” Drane v. State, 493 So. 2d 294, 298 (Miss. 1986).
Under Mayor Hawkins Butler’s interpretation of Section 273(3), the people’s
constitutional right to voter initiative hinges upon the United States Census. According to the
Mayor, every ten years Mississippians may lose or gain a fundamental constitutional right. There
11
is of course no rational basis for tying the people’s right to amend their Constitution to
Mississippi’s level of representation before the United States House of Representatives.
The much more sensible, and legally mandated, interpretation is the Legislature intended
for the people’s right to voter initiative measures to stand in perpetuity. But the Legislature also
decided geographical diversity was needed for petitions in support of an initiative measure “to help
assure that the initiative process is not used by citizens of one part of the state to the detriment of
those in another.” Att’y General Op. No. 2009-00001, 2009 WL 367638, at *2 (Miss. A.G. Jan. 9,
2009). To achieve this goal of general geographical diversity, the Legislature simply chose as the
measure of diversity the five former congressional districts.
Mayor Hawkins Butler erroneously suggests that attempts by a minority of legislators to
amend Section 273(3) to adopt a new measure of geographical diversity somehow suggests the
Legislature knows Section 273 has become invalid because of the change in congressional
districts. To the contrary, that a minority of legislators have done so is merely an indication they
think there is a better way to judge geographical diversity than the former five congressional
districts, not that they thought the people had lost the right to amend the Constitution because of
the change in congressional districts.
At any rate, regardless of what these individual legislators may think, the Legislature did
not vote to adopt the minority proposals, if anything signaling both that Section 273 had not
become void by virtue of the loss of a congressional district and their satisfaction with the
geographical diversity requirement as currently based on the former five congressional districts.
Further, applying the geographic boundaries of the five former congressional districts
poses no unique issues or challenges for the circuit clerks of the state, or the Secretary of State.
The Court of Appeals voting districts are currently legislatively mandated to be based on the five
12
former congressional districts. See Miss. Code Ann. § 9-4-5. Attached as Sponsors’ Exhibit 4 is
an exemplar of the Hinds County Circuit Clerk’s certification of 1,039 voter signatures for voters
who actually reside in two different congressional districts of the former five congressional
districts. The circuit clerk simply used the five former congressional districts as applied to Court
of Appeals’ elections for purposes of certifying the address of a “qualified elector” pursuant to
Section 273. This document also evidences there was no “fraud” perpetrated by or upon the voter
or the circuit clerk.
2. Mayor Hawkins Butler’s interpretation of Section 273(3) must be rejected

because it would nullify the people’s constitutional right to voter initiative
measures.
Almost as if it were a trivial point, Mayor Hawkins Butler acknowledges her asserted
interpretation of Section 273 would strip the people of their constitutional right to voter initiative.
See Br. 19 (“It is unfortunate . . . that the Constitution cannot be amended by initiative until either
Section 273(3) is amended or Mississippi regains a congressional seat.”). Contrary to Mayor
Hawkins Butler’s apparent assumptions, Constitutional rights are no trifling matter.
“It is well settled that the Constitution of Mississippi is the supreme law of our state.”
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, 578 So. 2d 644, 648 (Miss. 1991) (internal quotations omitted). “It
is superior to all legislation, to the legislature, to the judiciary . . . and to equity itself.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted). This Court has long held that questions about the meaning of constitutional
provisions must be resolved in favor of upholding constitutional rights. In State ex rel. Collins v.
Jones, 64 So. 241, 248 (Miss. 1914), the Court stated:
The means provided for the exercise of their sovereign right of changing their
Constitution, should receive such a construction as not to trammel the exercise of
the right.
....
13
[E]very reasonable presumption, both of law and fact, is to be indulged in favor of
the validity of an amendment to the Constitution when it is attacked after its
ratification by the people.
Id. (internal quotations omitted). In State v. Jackson, 81 So. 1, 5–6 (Miss. 1919), the Court stated,
“[i]t is scarcely conceivable that a case can arise where a court would be justifiable in declaring
any portion of a written Constitution nugatory because of ambiguity.” In Frazier v. State By &
Through Pittman, 504 So. 2d 675, 694 (Miss. 1987), the Court stated, “[i]t is not the function of
judges to dwarf the grandeur of a Constitution by decisions which stifle any of its promises.” In
Chevron, 578 So. 2d at 659, the Court went on to state:
[W]hen a constitutional provision is fairly open to two constructions, one of which

would carry out and the other defeat, some great public purpose for which it was
designed, the former construction should be adopted.
Id. In USF&G Co. v. Conservatorship of Melson, 809 So. 2d at 660, the Court stated, “[i]t is our
duty to support a construction which would purge the legislative purpose of any invalidity . . . .”).
The numerosity and consistency of the jurisprudence on this matter cannot be causally disregarded.
Between the plain language of the whole text of Section 273(3) and the clear legislative
intent, the only reasonable interpretation of Section 273(3) is that the right to voter initiative
measures has not been nullified and the geographical diversity requirement for petition signatures
remains based on the former five congressional districts. But even if Mayor Hawkins Butler’s
arguments were equally as strong (which they are not), the Court is to resolve the question in favor
of upholding the people’s constitutional right to voter initiative, which means affirming the
Secretary of State’s use of the five former congressional districts as the measure for the
geographical diversity requirement.
14
3. Any practical difficulties and/or uncertainties resulting from continuing to
use the former five congressional districts as the measure for the
geographical diversity requirement have no bearing on the analysis.
Mayor Hawkins Butler asserts several practical difficulties and legal uncertainties she
claims are caused by continuing to base the geographic distribution requirement on the former five
congressional districts. Most of them are red herrings. For example, Mayor Hawkins Butler points
to the requirement in Section 273(3) that petition signers must be “qualified electors” in one of the
congressional districts and that there can no longer be qualified electors in the former fifth
congressional district. This is false. Under the constitutional definition of “qualified elector” found
in the Mississippi Constitution Section 241, an otherwise qualifying individual can certainly offer
to vote “in the election precinct or in the incorporated city or town” that was formerly a part of the
Fifth Congressional District.
Mayor Hawkins Butler also complains of the “practical difficulties of requiring circuit
clerks to certify that an elector is qualified to vote in an extinct congressional district.” Br. 22. Yet,
as noted, circuit clerks and election officials are required to do the same thing when determining
the Court of Appeals district in which an elector resides, as those districts remain based on the
former five congressional districts. See Miss. Code Ann. § 9-4-5.
At any rate, any perceived or actual practical difficulties or uncertainties form no basis to
ignore the plain meaning of whole text of Section 273(3) and the clear intent of the Legislature.
As this Court has explained:
[I]t is not permissible to disobey, or to construe into nothingness, a provision of a

constitution merely because it may appear to work injustice, or lead to harsh or
obnoxious consequences or invidious or unmerited discriminations. Even less
weight should be attached to the argument that the constitutional construction will
result in mere inconvenience.
15
Chevron, 578 So. 2d at 649. Thus, even if the practical consequence of continuing to use the former
five congressional districts as the measure for Section 273(3)’s geographic diversity requirement
were indeed “dire” as Mayor Hawkins Butler characterizes them, which they are not, the Court
still must interpret the provision according to its terms and the legislative intent.
4. The interpretation asserted by Mayor Hawkins Butler would invite

immediate challenges to voter initiatives adopted since the Mississippi
congressional districts went from five to four.
In the 2011 general election, Mississippi voters approved two voter initiatives that appeared
on the ballot via Section 273: Voter Identification and Eminent Domain. For both initiatives, the
Mississippi Secretary of State used the former five congressional districts to determine whether
the petition in support of the initiative met the geographical diversity requirement when reviewing
the petitions for sufficiency and ultimately approving them and filing the initiative with the
Legislature.
Were the Court to adopt the interpretation of Section 273(3) asserted by Mayor Hawkins
Butler, i.e., that the voter initiative power became inoperative when the congressional districts
changed from five to four, the Voter Identification and Eminent Domain laws, now codified in the
Constitution at Article 12, Section 249A and Article 3, Section 17A, would be subject to immediate
challenge for legal validity.
And of course, the November 3rd, 2020 election, in which a majority of Mississippians
voted in support of Initiative 65 would be disregarded. This Court’s role is to “uphold the integrity
of the election process and follow the wishes of the voters,” not to disregard them entirely. Wesley
v. Washington Cty. Democratic Exec. Comm., 235 So. 3d 1379, 1384 (Miss. 2017).
16
C. This petition should be dismissed because it is untimely.
1. Timeliness is of crucial importance in Mississippi’s ballot initiative

measure scheme.
The Code sections governing Mississippi’s voter initiative measure process impose
numerous strict deadlines throughout the process, demonstrating why Mayor Hawkins Butler’s
extreme lack of timeliness is so critical in this case:
 Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-5 (emphasis added): upon receipt of an initiative measure,
“the Attorney General may confer with the person filing the proposed measure and
shall within ten (10) working days from receipt thereof review the proposal for
matters of form and style, and such matters of substantive import as may be
agreeable to the person filing the proposed measure, and shall recommend such
revision or alteration of the measure as may be deemed necessary and appropriate.”
 Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-5 (emphasis added): “Within fifteen (15) working days
after notification of submittal of the proposed initiative measure to the Attorney
General, the person filing the proposed measure, if he desires to proceed with his
sponsorship, shall file the measure together with the certificate of review with the
Secretary of State for assignment of a serial number and the Secretary of State shall
thereupon submit to the Attorney General a certified copy of the measure filed.”
 Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-9 (emphasis added): “Within seven (7) calendar days
after the receipt of an initiative measure, the Attorney General shall formulate and
transmit to the Secretary of State a concise statement posed as a question and not
to exceed twenty (20) words, bearing the serial number of the measure and a
17
summary of the measure, not to exceed seventy-five (75) words, to follow the
statement.”
 Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-11 (emphasis added): “The Secretary of State shall
publish the title and summary for an initiative measure within ten (10) days after
filing such title and summary in a newspaper or newspapers of general circulation
throughout the State of Mississippi.”
 Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-13 (emphasis added): “If any person is dissatisfied with
the ballot title or summary formulated by the Attorney General, he or she may,
within five (5) days from the publications of the ballot title and summary by the
office of the Secretary of State, appeal to the circuit court of the First Judicial
District of Hinds County by petition setting forth the measure, the title or summary
formulated by the Attorney General, and his or her objections to the ballot title or
summary and requesting amendment of the title or summary by the court. The court
may hear arguments, and, within ten (10) days, shall render its decision and file
with the Secretary of State a certified copy of such ballot title or summary as it
determines will meet the requirements of Section 23-17-9. The decision of the court
shall be final.”
 Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-25: as discussed above, this Section imposes a ten-day
deadline for an Initiative sponsor to file challenge in the Supreme Court if the
Secretary of State refuses to file the Initiative with the Legislature on grounds the
initiative petition did not meet the statutory requirements. If filed with the Supreme
Court, the appeal would have been “considered an emergency matter of public
concern and . . . heard and determined with all convenient speed.”
18
 Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-29 (emphasis added): “The Secretary of State shall file
with the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate on the first day of the
regular legislative session the complete text of each initiative for which a petition
has been certified and filed with him. A constitutional initiative may be adopted or
amended by a majority vote of each house of the Legislature. If the initiative is
adopted, amended or rejected by the Legislature; or if no action is taken within
four (4) months of the date that the initiative is filed with the Legislature, the
Secretary of State shall place the initiative on the ballot for the next statewide
general election.”
Within this fast-moving statutory scheme, Mayor Hawkins Butler’s “Emergency Petition”
challenging “the entire initiative process”—and Initiative 65 in particular—should have been
brought within five days from the Secretary of State’s publication of it in August 2018. Miss. Code
Ann. § 23-17-13. In any event, by any measure—legal, equitable or statutory—dissatisfaction with
a ballot initiative must be brought well before the ballots are printed and the actual election
underway.
2. Because Mayor Hawkins Butler’s fundamental claim is that “the entire

initiative process,” is invalid and unconstitutional, it must have been
brought within five days of the Initiative’s publication.
This Court has recognized two ways in which challenges to an initiative-driven
constitutional amendment may be brought: “(1) pre-election, as to form, and (2) post-election, as
to substance.” Hughes v. Hosemann, 68 So. 3d 1260, 1264 (Miss. 2011). Mayor Hawkins Butler’s
challenge is one of form, and although she describes it as being to the sufficiency of the Petition
signatures in support of Initiative 65, she acknowledges it is ultimately to the current validity of
“the entire initiative process.”
19
In In re Proposed Initiative Measure No. 20, 774 So. 2d 397, 401 (Miss. 2000), overruled
on other grounds by Hughes v. Hosemann, 68 So. 3d 1260 (Miss. 2011) and Speed v. Hosemann,
68 So. 3d 1278 (Miss. 2011), this Court analyzed the statutory initiative process, Miss. Code Ann.
§ 23-17-1 et seq., enacted by the Legislature to effect Section 273 of the Constitution. In Measure
20, Elizabeth Stoner filed a proposed initiative to amend the Constitution to prohibit gambling.
After the Secretary of State’s publication of the initiative pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. 23-17-11,
a host of complainants, including the Mississippi Secretary of State, challenged the initiative on
two grounds. The first, a matter of pre-election “form”: the petition failed to include a statutorily
required government revenue impact statement. The second, a matter of post-election “substance”:
the initiative itself was impermissibly violative of the Bill of Rights. Measure 20, 774 So. 2d at
398. The circuit court found against Stoner on both grounds, voiding the initiative. On appeal,
Stoner claimed that the Hinds County Circuit Court was without jurisdiction. She countered her
opponent’s assertion of Miss. Code Ann. 23-17-13, directly referring to the Hinds County Circuit
Court, by claiming the statute referred only to “ballot title and summary” and was therefore
inapplicable. Id. at 400-01 ¶ 15.
This Court’s resolution of Measure 20 is instructive here. The Court first found that Miss.
Code Ann. 23-17-13 dealt “merely with venue, not jurisdiction.” Id. at 401 ¶ 15. But the Court
found that by this statute the Legislature had nonetheless “direct[ed] all matters concerning the
initiative process” to Hinds County Circuit Court – not just matters related solely to “ballot title
and initiative.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court explained otherwise “we would be left with no
place or procedure by which to review the constitutionality of a proposed initiative.” Id. Driving
the point home, the Court addressed the entire statutory initiative process (“[w]e hold today that
§§ 23-17-1 et seq . . .”) and made two key rulings: 1) the Hinds County Circuit Court had
20
jurisdiction of the dispute pursuant to Section 156 of the Constitution and 2) the Hinds County
Circuit Court “ is the proper venue and has jurisdiction to review the facial constitutionality of
proposed initiatives.” Id. at 401 ¶16 (emphasis added).
Important here, as a direct consequence of holding that Miss. Code Ann. 23-17-13 covers
“all matters concerning the initiative process” this ruling therefore applies to not only the venue
provision found in the statute, but also to its five-day deadline in which to bring a complaint.
Mayor Hawkins Butler broadly acknowledge that not just this initiative, but any initiative on any
subject, is automatically destined for unconstitutionality under her reading of Section 273.
Accordingly, her challenge could and should have been brought within the five-day deadline of
Miss. Code Ann. 23-17-13. Mayor Hawkins Butler is therefore time-barred by her failure to
comply with the statutory scheme.
But even hypothetically if the Mayor’s challenge was to the sufficiency of the Petition
signatures (a point not actually asserted), it would still be time-barred. The Court has recognized
“pre-election” challenges to the form of a voter initiative only in the context of having been
asserted “before a measure is placed on the ballot” and has referred to “pre-election” as meaning
the same. Hughes v. Hosemann, 68 So. 3d 1260, 1264 (Miss. 2011). Indeed, the case that
established the right to challenge the form of a ballot initiative “pre-election,” i.e., Measure 20,
framed the scope of that right in terms of timing as: “before the initiative petition is either
circulated among the voters for signatures or before it is placed on the ballot for consideration by
the people in a general election.” Id. at 401. Interpreting “pre-election” as the Court has previously
suggested, i.e., before ballots are approved and printed, means the instant suit must have been
brought, at the very latest, in time for it to be resolved by September 8, 2020, when the ballot was
approved by the State Board of Election Commissioners. Again, by the time the State Board of
21
Election Commissioners approved the ballot, it had been approximately one year since the Petition
in favor of Initiative 65 had been submitted to the Secretary of State and became available for
scrutiny by the public, including Mayor Hawkins Butler.
Arguably, the deadline for anyone to challenge the sufficiency of petition signatures should
be the same deadline initiative sponsors have to challenge a decision by the Secretary of State to
refuse to file an initiative measure on grounds the Petition was insufficient: ten days from the date
the Secretary of State decides whether to file the initiative measure with Legislature or refuses to
file it. See Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-25. It would be inequitable for initiative measure sponsors to
have only ten days to challenge the decision of the Secretary of State but for all others to have
extended, much less unlimited, time to challenge the Secretary of State’s decision concerning the
sufficiency of the petition.
As set forth above, the instant suit was filed over one year after the Petition with certified
signatures was filed with the Secretary of State, almost ten months after the Secretary of State
publicly approved the sufficiency of the Petition, and thirty-six days after voting began in
Mississippi. Not even a literal interpretation of “pre-election” would support allowing Mayor
Hawkins Butler to file, as the election had already begun weeks before when voting by absentee
ballot began.
The November 3, 2020 general election has already occurred, and Initiative 65 was
overwhelmingly adopted by Mississippi’s voters. There is simply no authority or precedent that
would support the filing of the instant challenge and the Court’s resolution of it at this late date.
3. Given the late filing, the doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and laches bar this
petition.
Alternatively, given the last-minute filing of Mayor Hawkins Butler, the doctrines of
waiver, estoppel, and laches must be invoked and should bar this “Emergency Petition.” As
22
detailed in the argument above, and the facts in the Mayor’s own filing, she was on notice about
the certification of the Petition signatures for months ahead of her filing. She has offered no reason
for the belated filing the week before the election.
In analogous situations, this Court has held that despite technical problems with the passage
or language of a local law, when the community has relied upon that law for over twenty years,
the doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and laches demand that the practical time has passed to challenge
such a law. See Southland Mgmt. v. City of Columbia, 744 So. 2d 774, 776 (Miss. 1999) (citing
Walker v. City of Biloxi, 229 Miss. 890, 92 So. 2d 227 (1957)); McKenzie v. City of Ocean Springs,
758 So. 2d 1028, 1032 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). The same is true here. The Secretary of State, and
the people of Mississippi, have relied upon the current interpretation of Section 273 for twenty
years, and multiple initiative measures have been certified and passed based upon this
interpretation. Furthermore, the Sponsors invested significant time and energy into the certification
and passage of Initiative 65, all based upon the Secretary of State’s interpretation and application
of Section 273.
D. The Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter.
1. Mississippi Code § 23-17-25 limits the Court’s original and exclusive

jurisdiction to the exclusion of this matter.
Mayor Hawkins Butler argues that Article 15, Section 273(9) of the Mississippi
Constitution grants this Court “original and exclusive” jurisdiction to hear her challenge, which
she characterizes as a challenge to the Secretary of State’s determination of the sufficiency of the
Petition in support of Initiative 65. Section 273(9), in pertinent part, states:
The sufficiency of petitions shall be decided in the first instance by the Secretary of
State, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the state, which shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all such cases.
(emphasis added).
23
As discussed above, the Mayor’s argument is belied by this Court’s holding in Measure
No. 20, 774 So. 2d at 401 (Miss. 2000) (“[The Hinds County] circuit court is the proper venue and
has jurisdiction to review the facial constitutionality of proposed initiatives.” ) (emphasis added).
While on its face Section 273(9) suggests this Court holds original and exclusive jurisdiction over
a challenge to the Secretary of State’s determination of the sufficiency of a petition, Mayor
Hawkins Butler’s argument is flawed because it reads Section 273(9) in isolation, instead of
reading it harmoniously with its constitutional and legislative counterparts. See Dye v., 507 So. 2d
at 342 (“constitutional provisions should be read so that each is given maximum effect and a
meaning in harmony with that of each other”) (citations omitted).
Paragraph 12 of Section 273 required the Mississippi Legislature to enact legislation
specifically governing the petition process, including the Secretary of State’s review of the
petition. In the legislative session immediately following the people’s adoption of Section 273, the
Mississippi Legislature enacted corresponding enabling legislation, codified at Sections 23-17-1
through 23-17-61 of the Mississippi Code. Sections 23-17-23 and 23-17-25 specifically concern
the Secretary of State’s review of the sufficiency of petitions. Section 23-17-25 states in full:
If the Secretary of State refuses to file an initiative petition when submitted to him
for filing, the person submitting it for filing, within ten (10) days after his refusal,
may apply to the Supreme Court for an order requiring the Secretary of State to
bring the petition before the court and for a writ of mandamus to compel him to file
it. The application shall be considered an emergency matter of public concern and
shall be heard and determined with all convenient speed. If the Supreme Court
decides that the petition is legal in form, apparently contains the requisite number
of signatures of qualified electors, was filed within the time prescribed in the
Constitution and was accompanied with the proper filing fee, it shall issue its
mandate directing the Secretary of State to file the petition in his office as of the
date of submission.
Pursuant to this code section, read in conjunction with Sections 273(9) and 273(12) of the
Constitution, the Court’s original and exclusive jurisdiction is triggered only when the Secretary
24
of State exercises his authority and refuses to file an initiative measure and the initiative sponsor
seeks judicial review of the refusal. For any other challenge related to the form of a ballot initiative,
such as this one (from a third party and concerning the Secretary of State’s approval of an initiative
petition), this Court lacks jurisdiction. See Pryer v. State, 139 So. 3d 713, 719 (Miss.
2014) (Dickinson, J., dissenting) (“While we are indeed the Supreme Court,
our jurisdiction is limited to that granted to us by the Mississippi Constitution and the
Legislature.”) (emphasis added). Mayor Hawkins Butler does not meet any of the requirements
necessary for this Court’s original and exclusive jurisdiction under Mississippi Code Section 23-
17-25.
Any other reading of Section 273(9) of the Constitution and Mississippi Code Section 23-
17-25 would render Section 23-17-25 meaningless: if any elector can challenge in this Court at
any time a determination by the Secretary of the State regarding sufficiency of an initiative’s
petition, then that right would also have to belong to an initiative’s sponsor when the Secretary of
State refuses to file a petition. As Mayor Hawkins Butler admits, all other modern challenges to
ballot initiative measures have been brought in circuit courts, and she can point to no other
challenge that has ever been brought directly before this Court.
This Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. See Pryer, 139 So. 3d at 719. Disregarding
Section 23-17-25 and assuming unlimited jurisdiction will result in this Court becoming the regular
battleground for challenges to initiative petitions, rather than allowing for such challenges to
proceed as they have in the past. Furthermore, assuming such jurisdiction would be inconsistent
with the Legislature having put Section 273 on the ballot for voters to decide and then, once it
passed, adopting the laws governing the initiative process. Allowing this Court to play such a role
is contrary to this Court’s prior reluctance to issue opinions on matters within the clear discretion
25
of other branches of government. See generally Legislature of State v. Shipman, 170 So. 3d 1211,
1222 (Miss. 2015) (Randolph, J., concurring) (“The doctrine ‘excludes from judicial review those
controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally
committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.’”)
(citations omitted).
2. Mayor Hawkins Butler is not entitled to an extraordinary writ. Mississippi

Code Section 9-1-19 and Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 21 do not
cure the Mayor’s lack of jurisdiction.
Unequivocally, the original and exclusive jurisdiction of this Court is limited by Section
23-17-25. Mayor Hawkins Butler claims the relief she seeks is pursuant to Mississippi Code
Section 9-1-19 and Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 21, and they seek “a writ prohibiting
the Secretary of State’s official declaration of the election results on any measure initiated through
a constitutionally insufficient process.” Br. 1. Neither of those code sections provide the Mayor
with jurisdiction in this Court, and this Court has refused to entertain similar requests for such
relief. Without jurisdiction, a court lacks the ability to issue relief to resolve a dispute, and thus,
the matter becomes one that lacks justiciability.
Though not a ballot initiative case, In re Fordice, 691 So. 2d 429 (Miss. 1997) provides
guidance to this Court on how the jurisdiction and ultimate relief Mayor Hawkins Butler seeks is
incredibly rare. There, similar to Mayor Hawkins Butler here, the Governor sought a writ of
mandamus and declaratory judgment from this Court to prevent the Attorney General from
proceeding with a lawsuit in Jackson County Chancery Court. See id. The Governor urged this
Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and act as a trial court pursuant to Section 9-1-19 and
Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 21, again, just as the Mayor has done here. See id. at 432.
This Court declined to exercise its jurisdiction because the Mississippi code explicitly accounts
26
for instances when “the Petitioner seeks to direct or prohibit action on behalf of an officer within
the executive branch of government.” Id. at 433. That sort of mandamus is provided for in
Mississippi Code Section 11–41–1, et al. See id.
Seeking to prohibit the action of an executive branch officer is exactly what Mayor
Hawkins Butler is seeking here. But the Mayor avoids staking her action on that portion of the
code; likely because it clearly vests jurisdiction for such a writ in circuit court. See Miss. Code.
Ann. § 11-41-3. For this same reason, the Fordice Court refused to issue the Governor’s requested
relief. See 691 So. 2d at 433 (“Here, the Petitioner does not allege that any attempt has been made,
in any trial court, to seek the same or similar relief the Petitioner requests in this original action,
nor does the Petitioner explain why the remedies available at the trial level would be inadequate.”).
Similarly, the case of Barnes v. Ladner, 131 So. 2d 458 (Miss. 1961) is particularly on
point here. The petitioners in Barnes, as here, requested “a writ of prohibition be issued restraining
and prohibiting Heber Ladner, Secretary of State, from . . . the issuance of a proclamation
certifying the results of the special election” adopting a right-to-work constitutional amendment
to the State Constitution. Id. at 459. Applying long-standing precedent, the Court found it “was
without power in this case to restrain or prohibit the Secretary of State from performing the acts
mandatorily required of him by Code Section 3280 and Section 273 of the State Constitution.” Id.
at 464. The Barnes court quoted, with approval, Cartledge v. City Council of Augusta, 5 S.E.2d
661, 665 (Ga. 1939):
In the instant case, the Secretary of State having canvassed the returns of the
election, ascertained the result and certified the same to the Governor, a certificate
showing that a majority voted in favor of ratifying the same, and the Governor
having issued his proclamation in accordance therewith, the courts are not
permitted to go behind the same. The Legislature had the right to clothe the
Secretary of State with the power to determine the result; they have done so; that
official has acted; and the amendment must be given effect as part of our
constitution.
27
See also In re: Wilbourn, 590 So. 2d 1381, 1384–85 (Miss. 1991); Taitz v. Democrat Party of
Mississippi, No. 3:12-CV-280-HTW-LRA, 2015 WL 11017373, at *10 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 31,
2015).
Additionally, the comments to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 21 make clear that
“[w]ith the exception of the writ of mandamus required by Rule 15, a party must seek relief in the
trial court before obtaining the extraordinary relief of a remedial writ from the Supreme Court.”
IV. CONCLUSION
The people of Mississippi should not be stripped of a fundamental constitutional right by
virtue of a tortured and novel reading of the Constitution. For the foregoing reasons, the
“Emergency Petition” should be summarily denied.
Respectfully submitted, this the 6th day of November 2020.
ASHLEY ANN DURVAL AND ANGIE CALHOUN
By: /s/ Paul H. Stephenson III

PAUL H. STEPHENSON III (MSB # 7864)
MICHAEL O. GWIN (MSB #5086)
WATKINS & EAGER PLLC
400 E. Capitol Street
Post Office Box 650
Jackson, MS 39205
Tel: 601-965-1900
pstephenson@watkinseager.com
mgwin@watkinseager.com
By: /s/ Spencer M. Ritchie

SPENCER M. RITCHIE (MSB # 103636)
CHELSEA C. LEWIS (MSB# 105300)
FORMAN WATKINS & KRUTZ LLP
Post Office Box 22608
Tel: (601) 960-7099
spencer.ritchie@formanwatkins.com
chelsea.lewis@formanwatkins.com
28
SPONSORS EX. 1
I ·,
'
I
i
l
I
:
··~R Eel~ 1V.
11
,
l__ '
I AFFIDAVIT [ J~L G ~ ~~8
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI /;LECTIONS..,DIVISION
i '
COUNTY OF HINDS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
\ : PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE ME the undersigned in and for the aforesaid jurisdiction,
1• , the within named ASHLEY ANN DURVAL, who after being by me duly sworn, stated under oath the
following is true and correct according to his personal knowledge:
I , 1. My name is ASHLEY ANN DURVAL.
\
I ,
2. I am a qualified elector of the State of Mississippi.
I ,
' I
3. I intend for this affidavit to accompany the filing with the Mississippi Secretary of State of
r- the proposed voter initiative measure to amend the Mississippi Constitution.
1
t_ .
WITNESS THE SIGNATURE of the undersigned, this t
I I
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
COUNTY OF HINDS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PERSONALLY AffEARED BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority in and for the said county
and state, on this the,3 0 'f!J day of July, 2018, within my jur·sdiction, the within named ASHLEY ANN
DURVAL who acknowledged that he executed the above arid regoing instrument.
My Commission Expires:
I '
: i
[Notary Seal Required} ,
••••• ·t= ·;;; ••••
• ~Q ..... ;~8,1··
...~'(f p..RY P£i;;.ri,•
_.,.. .. ~
..
r.,:·.~·.
: "'1/ ID# 16318 °\-o•.
1.--: f ~HIRLEY M. coo:C- ~

Cl C• • •
•• \ ommission Expires / :
·.~..;·••March 18, 2020 ••~: /
o7,t.•, •"~"""•
• 'V. '• •' •
........
•.:Jr',····"'\)~··
•,.NCO .•.
SPONSORS EX. 1
-~RECElVIfil~·
SUBJECT MATTER
Medical marijuana
JUL 3 0 2018
_..---~11:.· - .
ELECTIONS DIVISION
PRQPQSED PUBLIC J3ALLOT_ TITLE(19 words/20-word limit) __________ _

Should Mississippi allow qualified patients with debilitating medical conditions, as certified by
Mississippi licensed physicians, to use medical marijuana?
PROPOSED PUBLIC BALLOT SUMMARY (70 words/75-word limit)

The proposed amendment to the Mississippi Constitution would allow qualified patients with
debilitating medical conditions, as certified by Mississippi licensed physicians, to use medical
marijuana. This amendment would allow medical marijuana to be provided only by licensed
treatment centers. The Mississippi State Department of Health would regulate and enforce the
provisions of this amendment in order to ensure safe access to and use of medical marijuana
only by qualified patients.
r
I
'
I :
SPONSORS EX. 1
PROPOSED AMENDMENT
JUL 3 U 2018
ElEcTIONs~TvisToM
Section 1.
-The-purpose-oHhis-artiele-is-to-ensure-the-availability-of-and--safe-access-to-medical-marijuana-----·-
for qualified persons with debilitating medical conditions.
Section 2.
(1) Except as otherwise provided for in this article, a qualified patient or caregiver shall not
be subject to criminal or civil sanctions for the use of medical marijuana, obtained from a
medical marijuana treatment center, for a debilitating medical condition.
(2) Except as otherwise provided for in this ar:_ticle, a physician shall not be subject to
criminal or civil sanctions solely for issuing a physician certification to a person diagnosed
with a debilitating medical condition.
(3) Except as otherwise provided for in this article, a medical marijuana treatment center
and its officers, owners, operators, employees, contractors, and agents shall not be
subject to criminal or civil sanctions for processing medical marijuana in compliance with
! '
regulations prescribed by the department.
i
i ' Section 3.
I
(1) Except as otherwise provided for in this article, nothing in this article shall:
(a) Affect or repeal laws relating to the use of marijuana that is not intended for use for
I i a debilitating medical condition.
' '
(b) Authorize the use of medical marijuana for anyone other than a qualified patient,
r-1
II ___ I'
and, where authorized by this chapter, for caregivers and officers, owners, operators,
employees, contractors, and agents of treatment centers.
. -
(c) Permit a person to operate any motor vehicle, aircraft, train, or boat while
I, I
' I
consuming or impaired by medical marijuana.
I_' (d) Require accommodation for the use of medical marijuana or require any on-site use
of medical marijuana in any public or private correctional institution, detention facility,
i i
I '
or place of education, or employment.
(e) Require any health insurance provider or any government agency or authority to
reimburse any person for expenses related to the use of medical marijuana.
I ~-
1
I
(f) Override any public laws, ordinances, regulations, or rules or any private rules,
regulations, or provisions related to smoking in or on public or private places.
(g) Affect any existing drug testing laws, regulations, or rules.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to smoke medical marijuana in a public place. Any person
who violates this subsection may, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more
I
I
• than One Hundred Dollars ($100.00).
\ __ I
SPONSORS EX. 1
Section 4.
For purposes ofthis article, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
(1) "Caregiver'' shall mean a person who is at least twenty one (21) years of age, who
complies with the regulations prescribed by the department, and who assists with a
qualified patient's use of medical marijuana. The department may limit the number of
qualified patients a caregiver may assist at any one time. A qualified patient may have
more than one caregiver. A caregiver is prohibited from consuming medical marijuana
provided for use by a qualified patient.
(2) "Criminal or civil sanctions" shall mean arrest; incarceration; prosecution; penalty; fine;
sanction; the denial of any right, privilege, license, certification; and/or to be subject to
disciplinary action by a licensing board or commission; and/or to be subject to seizure
and/or forfeiture of assets pursuant to any Mississippi law, local ordinance, or board,
commission, or agency regulation or rule.
(3) "Debilitating medical condition" shall mean cancer, epilepsy or other seizures,
Parkinson's disease, Huntir;igton's disease, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis,
cachexia, post-traumatic stress disorder, positive status for human immunodeficiency
virus, acquired immune deficiency syndrome, chronic or debilitating pain, amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis, glaucoma, agitation of dementias, Crohn's disease, ulcerative colitis,
sickle-cell anemia, autism with aggressive or self-injurious behaviors, pain refractory to
appropriate opioid management, spinal cord disease or severe injury, intractable nausea,
r I
severe muscle spasticity, or another medical condition of the same kind or class to those
\-~
herein enumerated and for which a physician believes the benefits of using medical
marijuana would reasonably outweigh potential health risks.
(4) "Department" shall mean the Mississippi State Department of Health or its successor
agency.
(5) "Medical marijuana" shall have the meanings given as of July 1, 2018 in Section 41-29-
lOS(r) and/or Section 41-29-105(0), of the Mississippi Code of 1972, and which is used to
treat the symptoms and/or effects of a debilitating medical condition as provided for in
,-1 this article.
i:__:,
(6) "Medical marijuana identification card" shall mean a document, prescribed by and
issued by the department, which identifies a person as a qualified patient or caregiver or
r : officer, owner, operator, employee, contractor, or agent of a medical marijuana
I___ I
treatment center.
(7) "Medical marijuana treatment center'' shall mean an entity that is registered with and
licensed and regulated by the department and that processes medical marijuana, related
supplies, and/or educational materials. A treatment center may engage in one or more
of the activities involved in the processing of medical marijuana.
L (8) "Physician" shall mean a person with a valid Doctor of Medicine or Doctor of Osteopathic
.Medicine degree and who holds an unrestricted license to practice medicine in the state
of Mississippi by the Mississippi Board of Medical Licensure, or its successor agency.
i !
(9) "Physician certification" shall mean a form approved by the department, signed and
dated by a physician, certifying that a person suffers from a debilitating medical
r I
I , condition for which the use of medical marijuana may mitigate the symptoms and/or
i
effects. The certification shall remain current for twelve months, unless the physician
specifies a shorter period of time, and shall be issued only after an in-person examination
I
of the patient in Mississippi. A certification shall only be issued on behalf of a minor
i,
SPONSORS EX. 1
when the minor's parent or guardian is present and provides signed consent. Nothing
herein shall require a physician to issue a certification.
(10) "Process" shall mea~ to acquire, administer, compound, convert, cultivate, deliver,
develop, disburse, dispense, distribute, grow, harvest, manufacture, package, possess,
prepare, process, produce, propagate, research, sell, test, transport, or transfer medical
marijuana or any related products such as foods, tinctures, aerosols, oils, or ointments.
(11) "Qualified patient" shall mean a person who has been diagnosed with a debilitating
_ medical_ condition and who has been issued a physician certification.- - --
(12) "Use" shall mean the acquisition, possession, preparation, use or use with an accessory,
delivery, transfer, or administration of medical marijuana by a qualified patient or
caregiver. For purposes of this chapter, "accessory" shall have the meaning given in
Section 41-29-lOS(v) ofthe Mississippi Code of 1972, as of July 1, 2018.
Section 5.
(1) The department shall implement, administer, and enforce the provisions of this article
and shall issue reasonable rules and regulations, pursuant to the Mississippi
Administrative Procedures Act, in the discharge of its responsibilities.
(2) The department shall prescribe reasonable rules and regulations pursuant to this section
that shall include, but not be limited to, tracking and labelling of medical marijuana;
qualifications for and safe and secure processing of medical marijuana by medical
marijuana treatment centers; restrictions on advertising and marketing; issuance of
medical marijuana identification cards; standards for testing facilities; use of medical
marijuana in nursing homes, hospices, and assisted living facilities; reciprocal agreements
with other states for patients registered in medical marijuana programs; qualifications of
and limitations on caregivers and officers, owners, operators, employees, contractors,
and agents of treatment centers; implementation and operation of a statewide data base
system to support the utilization of identification cards; and penalties for violations of
this article.
(3) The rules and regulations may include a reasonable fee of up to Fifty Dollars ($50.00) for
issuing an identification card and reasonable fees for licensing treatment centers, which
shall be fixed by and paid to the department, pursuant to Section 6.
(4) The rules and regulations shall not limit the number of licensed medical marijuana
I_ treatment centers nor set the price of medical marijuana.
(5) The rules and regulations shall require the department to issue an identification card or a
'! II
l __ l
license for a treatment center within a reasonable time following an application for a
card or license.
(6) The department shall issue a qualified patient a medical marijuana identification card
upon presentation of a physician certification. Such card shall be renewed, as applicable,
upon presentation of a new physician certification, but in no case shall a card have an
r' : i
expiration term longer than twelve (12) months. A qualified patient is authorized to
l __)
_
receive medical marijuana from a treatment center upon presentation of his or her
I - :
identification card.
I I (7) The department and medical marijuana treatment centers shall protect the
i i
--' confidentiality of all qualified patients. All records containing the identity of qualified
patients, caregivers, and physicians shall be confidential and exempt from disclosure
SPONSORS EX. 1
under the Mississippi Public Records Act or any related statute, regulation, or rule
pertaining to the public disclosure of records.
(8) The department may establish an advisory committee to assist the department in the
promulgation of rules and regulations and the regulation and enforcement of the
provisions of this article.
(9) The department shall adopt final rules and regulations pursuant to this article no later
than July 1, 2021. The department shall begin issuing identification cards and treatment
_ centeOice_ns~s nQ l~t~r than AYglJ_st is, 2021. _ _ __ __ _ __ __ _ _ ___ _ _
(10) To ensure timely implementation of this chapter for qualified patients, and only for
activities associated with implementation and operation, the department is exempt from
the Mississippi Department of Information Technology Services laws, rules, and
regulations for any information technology procurements made up to Two Hundred Fifty
Thousand Dollars ($250,000) for two years from the effective date of this chapter. This
exemption shall not apply to any reporting requirements.
(11) The department is authorized to adopt and levy administrative fines to enforce the
provisions of this article. Payment of any fines shall be deposited in the special fund
created by Section 6 of this article.
(12) The department is authorized to adopt and levy the following sanctions, singly or in
combination, when it finds an applicant or licensee has committed any violation of this
' I
article or department rules or regulations: revoke or suspend a license, censure a
licensee, impose a fine in an amount not to exceed Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) for
the first violation and an amount not to exceed Twenty Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000)
for each subsequent violation, place a licensee on a probationary status, require the
licensee to file regular reports and submit to reasonable requirements and restrictions,
revoke probationary status of a licensee and impose other authorized sanctions, and
refuse to issue or renew a license, restrict a license, or accept a voluntary surrendering of
a license. The department is authorized to deny, suspend or revoke a license in any case
in which it finds that there has been a substantial failure to comply with the
requirements of a licensee. The notice and hearing requirements and judicial review
provisions contained in Section 43-11-11 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, as of July 1,
2018, shall apply to the denial, suspension, or revocation of a license.
Section 6.
In addition to the fees applied to issuing identification cards and licensing medical marijuana
treatment centers, the department may assess up to the equivalent of the state's sales tax rate
to the final sale of medical marijuana. Revenue generated under this section or through the
issuance of identification cards or the licensing of medical marijuana treatment centers shall
pay for the costs incurred by the department in implementing and enforcing the provisions of
this article and shall be deposited into a special fund in the state treasury to be expended by
the department without prior appropriation or authorization. The department shall administer
- the fund and make expenditures from the fund for costs or other services or programs
associated with this article. Fund balances shall not revert to the General Fund. The
department shall have the authority to utilize these special funds to escalate personnel
positions in the department where needed, as non-state-service, to administer and enforce the
provisions of this article. Upon request ofthe department, the State Treasurer shall provide a
line ofcredit from the Working Cash Stabilization Fund or any other available special source
SPONSORS EX. 1
funds maintained in the state treasury in an amount not to exceed Two Million Five Hundred
Thousand Dollars ($2,500,000), for deposit to this special fund to provide sufficient working
cash to implement the provisions ofthis article. Any such loans shall be repaid from the
· available funds received by the department under this article.
i
!
Section 7.
A medi_cal marijuana identification card issued pursuant to this article shall serve to identify a
person as a qualified patient or caregiver or officer, owner, operator, employee, contractor, or
agent of a medical marijuana treatment center and thus exempt such person from criminal or
[j civil sanctions for the conduct authorized by this article.
Section 8.
(1) Medical marijuana treatment centers shall not provide to a qualified patient, during any
one fourteen-day period, an amount of medical marijuana that exceeds 2.5 ounces by·
weight. At no one time shall a qualified patient possess more than 2.5 ounces of medical
marijuana. The weight limitation herein shall not include any ingredients combined with
,---
medical marijuana to prepare edible products, topical products, ointments, oils,
u
I I
tinctures, or other products.

(2) Medical marijuana shall only be dispensed to a qualified patient or caregiver with a
current medical marijuana identification card by a medical marijuana treatment center.
(3) All contracts under this article and related to the operation of medi.cal marijuana
treatment centers shall be enforceable and rules applicable to other similar businesses
by the Department of Revenue shall apply to medical marijuana treatment centers
created pursuant to this article, except that the processing and use of medical marijuana
shall be exempt from the application of any state and/or local sales tax or other fee,
I 1
L..i other than that authorized by this article.

(4) No medical marijuana treatment center shall be located within five hundred (500) feet of
I a pre-existing school, church, or licensed child care center.
I I
(5) Except as otherwise provided in this article, any zoning ordinances, regulations and/or
provisions of a municipality or county shall be consistent with Section 1 of this article and
shall not impair the availability of and reasonable access to medical marijuana. Zoning
provisions applicable to retail dispensaries shall be no more restrictive than those for a
licensed retail pharmacy and zoning provisions applicable to other businesses that fall
within the definition of medical marijuana treatment centers shall be no more restrictive
than other comparably sized and staffed lawful commercial or industrial businesses.
)l~I
[!
SPONSORS EX. 1
Section 9.
No later than two years from the implementation of this article, and every two years thereafter,
the department shall provide to the Legislature a comprehensive public report ofthe operation
of this article.
Section 10.
The provisions of this article are declared to be severable, and if any provision, word, phrase, or
clause of this article or the application thereof shall be held invalid, such invalidity shall not
I
LJ affect the validity ofthe remaining portions ofthis article.
r--,
' {
I I
I ,
I_'
r:
I t
LJ
11
I I
'~/
SPONSORS EX. 1
AMOUNT AND SOURCE OF REVENUE

i:
The amendment is required to pay for itself and would require no general fund appropriation.
The amendment creates three sources of operating revenue for the State Department of Health
to use in implementing and enforcing the provisions of the amendment: fee for identification
cards, fee for treatment center licenses, and a charge that the Department of Health may
assess at the point of retail sale of medical marijuana. The revenue generated by the medical
marijuana program in Arizona was used as a basis for a projection in Mississippi. Based on
those calculations, implementation of this amendment would generate an estimated $6 million
in special fund revenue on an annual basis.
r-
\
-...._~I
:
11
I ,
I_;
\ i
I ,
I\_ .I
,-,
i ;
u
\ i
I I
I
'-~'
L
SPONSORS EX. 2
MISSISSIPPI LEGISLATURE REGULAR SESSION 2020
By: Representatives Lamar, Powell To: Rules
HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION NO. 39
1 A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION PROPOSING TO CREATE NEW ARTICLE 16,

2 SECTION 290 OF THE MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION OF 1890, OFFERED BY
3 THE MISSISSIPPI LEGISLATURE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO INITIATIVE
4 MEASURE NO. 65, TO ESTABLISH A PROGRAM TO ALLOW THE MEDICAL USE OF
5 MARIJUANA PRODUCTS BY QUALIFIED PERSONS WITH DEBILITATING MEDICAL
6 CONDITIONS; AND FOR RELATED PURPOSES.
7 WHEREAS, under Section 273 of the Mississippi Constitution of
8 1890, the people have the power to propose and enact
9 constitutional amendments by initiative, and the procedure for
10 doing so is set forth in Chapter 17, Title 23, Mississippi Code of
11 1972.
12 WHEREAS, following those provisions, the people have proposed
13 Initiative Measure No. 65, which has a subject matter stated to be
14 "medical marijuana for qualified persons with debilitating medical
15 conditions," and this initiative measure will be presented to the
16 qualified electors at the November 2020 election.
17 WHEREAS, when an initiative measure is proposed under this
18 procedure, the Legislature may submit an alternative measure for
19 the original initiative measure, which must be presented to the

20 qualified electors at the same election at which the original
H. C. R. No. 39 *HR26/R1961* ~ OFFICIAL ~ G1/2
20/HR26/R1961
PAGE 1 (RF\KW)
SPONSORS EX. 2
21 measure is proposed, and under Section 23-17-29, Mississippi Code
22 of 1972, such a constitutional initiative may be adopted or
23 amended by a majority vote of each house of the Legislature.
24 NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE
25 STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, That the following amendment to the
26 Mississippi Constitution of 1890 is proposed to the qualified
27 electors of the state at the November 2020 election, as an
28 alternative to the amendment proposed by Initiative Measure No.
29 65:
30 Article 16, Section 290, Mississippi Constitution of 1890, is
31 created to read as follows:
32 "Section 290. There is established a program in the State of
33 Mississippi to allow the medical use of marijuana products by
34 qualified persons. The program shall be structured to include, at
35 a minimum, the following conditions and requirements:
36 (a) The program shall be based on sound medical
37 principles;
38 (b) The program shall be administered by an appropriate
39 state agency;
40 (c) The administering state agency shall seek the input
41 of health professionals to help design the program;
42 (d) The program shall be limited to qualified persons
43 with debilitating medical conditions as certified by health
44 practitioners who are licensed under state law;
H. C. R. No. 39 *HR26/R1961* ~ OFFICIAL ~

20/HR26/R1961
PAGE 2 (RF\KW)
SPONSORS EX. 2
45 (e) Marijuana products that are used by qualified
46 persons in the program shall be of suitable pharmaceutical quality
47 and prepared by state-licensed manufacturers;
48 (f) Treatment of qualified persons in the program shall
49 be carried out by physicians, nurses and pharmacists who are
50 licensed under state law;
51 (g) The program shall provide for limited categories of
52 marijuana preparation of suitable and verified quality standards
53 for oral administration;
54 (h) The smoking of marijuana products shall be
55 restricted to the treatment of qualified persons who have terminal
56 medical conditions as certified by health practitioners who are
57 licensed under state law;
58 (i) The program shall provide for a limited number of
59 state-licensed manufacturers of marijuana products;
60 (j) The program shall have a patient registry for
61 program enrollment, patient tracking, and treatment outcomes

62 assessment; and
63 (k) The program shall provide for reporting
64 requirements that include research, analysis, and outcomes
65 assessment."
66 BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the amendment proposed in this
67 resolution as a legislative alternative to Initiative Measure No.
68 65 shall be submitted by the Secretary of State to the qualified

69 electors at an election to be held on the first Tuesday after the

20/HR26/R1961
PAGE 3 (RF\KW)
SPONSORS EX. 2
70 first Monday of November 2020, in the manner prescribed by Section
71 273 of the Constitution and by Chapter 17, Title 23, Mississippi
72 Code of 1972.
73 BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the ballot title for this
74 amendment is proposed to read as follows: "Shall Mississippi
75 establish a program to allow the medical use of marijuana products
76 by qualified persons with debilitating medical conditions?"
77 BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the explanation of this proposed
78 amendment for the ballot shall read as follows: "This
79 constitutional amendment is proposed as a legislative alternative
80 measure to Initiative Measure No. 65 and would establish a program
81 to allow the medical use of marijuana products by qualified
82 persons with debilitating medical conditions."

20/HR26/R1961 ST: Constitution; legislative alternative to
PAGE 4 (RF\KW) Initiative No. 65 regarding medical marijuana.
Press Release
SPONSORS EX. 3
PRESS RELEASES
Michael Watson
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: October 26, 2020

CONTACT: Kendra James (!Pages/Mai1 Form.aspx?m=&pr=1144), (601) 359 6349
2020 GENERAL ELECTION ABSENTEE REPORT WEEK 4

JACKSON - As of Sunday, October 25, 2020, the Statewide Election Management System (SEMS) reported a total of
169,087 absentee ballots reguested. 165,846 absentee ballots sent. and 142,591 absentee ballots received in
the state of Mississippi for the 2020 General Election.
As a reminder, the reguested total reflects the number of Mississippi voters who have requested an absentee ballot
through their local Circuit Clerk's Office. The sent total reflects the number of absentee ballots sent to voters from
Circuit Clerk Offices. The received total reflects the number of completed absentee ballots returned to Circuit Clerk
Offices.
Important Election Dates

) The deadline for in-person absentee voting is this Saturday. October 31. 2020, at 5 p.m.
> All mai l-in absentee ballots must be postmarked by Election Day (November 3) and received within five
business days of Election Day in order to count.
Click here to view a 2020 Election Calendar.

(https://www.sos.ms.gov/content/documents/elections/2020%20Website%20Calendar.pdf)
For additional voter information, visit our

Y'all Vote website at yallvote.ms. (https://www.sos.ms.govNote/Pages/default.aspx)
Print Press Release
https:/lwww.sos.ms.gov/AbouVPages/Press-Release.aspx?pr=1144 1/2
SPONSORS EX. 4
C OURT T E RM S COUNTY CO U RT
CIRC UIT 2 N D M OND AY
1 ST MONDAY JANUARY E ACH M O NTH
1ST
1 ST
MON D AY
MO N DA Y
MARCH
M AY
®ffice of toe (!Circuit (!Court SECO ND DIS T R IC T
1S T MONDAY JULY C OUN T Y
1 ST
1ST
MONDAY
MON D AY
SEPT E M B ER
NOVEMBER
T!)inbs C!Countp 2ND MONDAY MARCH
2ND MONDAY JUNE
SECOND DISTRICT 2ND MON DAY S E P TE MBE R
CIR C U IT Zack Wallace Circuit Clerk 2 ND MONDAY D E CEMBER
4 T H M ON DAY J A NU AR Y
2 ND MONDAY JULY www.hindscountyms.com
4 T H MONDAY SEPTEMBER
CERTIFICATION OF PETITION SIGNATURES

COUNTY REGISTRAR
STA TE OF MISSISSIPPI
COUNTY OF HINDS
I, Zack vVallace, Circuit Clerk and County-Registrar in and for said State and
County do hereby certi fy that LQ3.'l. signatures on the attached petitions are names
of qualified electors of Hinds County, Mississippi. For the Initiative Measure No.
65 , entitled SHOULD MISSISSIPPI ALLOW QUALIFIED PATIENTS
WIT H DEBILITATING MEDICAL CONDITIONS, AS CERTIFIED BY
MISSISSIPPI LICENSED PHYSICIANS, . ~ ro USE MEDICAL
MARIJUANA?
2nd Dist Court of Appeals Y \g

4th Dist Court of Appeals__8'& __
Gi ven under my hand and seal of-office, this the (£lib day o f ~ 2019.
~ -
Circuit Clerk and Registrar
-- - ~_(_
·. .
Depu(y)C:1/
FI RST DISTRICT-JACKSON OFFICE SECO ND DISTRICT- RAY MOND OFFICE

P.O. BOX 327 • JACKSON, MS 39205 P.O. BOX 999 • RAYMOND, M S 39154
PHON E: 601-968-6628 • FAX:601-973-5547 PHONE: 601-857-8038 • FAX: 60 1-857-0535
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
No. 2020-M-01199
IN RE INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. 65:

in her individual and official capacities,
and the CITY OF MADISON PETITIONERS
VS.
MICHAEL WATSON, in his official

capacity as Secretary of State for the
State of Mississippi RESPONDENT
_____________________________________________________________________________
THE SECRETARY OF STATE’S ANSWER TO

PETITIONERS’ “EMERGENCY PETITION FOR REVIEW
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 15, SECTION 273(9) AND WRIT
OF MANDAMUS AND/OR OTHER EXTRAORDINARY WRITS”
_____________________________________________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Section 273 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 expressly preserves the
people’s right to amend the Constitution by ballot initiative. Over two years ago,
proponents of Initiative Measure 65 started the process to put it on the November 3,
2020 general election ballot. A few days before election, which has now occurred and
where Mississippians overwhelmingly adopted Initiative Measure 65, Mayor Mary
Hawkins-Butler and the City of Madison (collectively “petitioners”) filed this
purported “emergency” lawsuit against Secretary of State Watson challenging part of
the initiative process that former-Secretary Hosemann completed over a year ago.
Section 273(3)’s text, together with the State’s shift from five congressional
districts to four in 2002, created a constitutional interpretation question regarding
1
whether and how Section 273(3)’s petition signature requirements can be satisfied.
In September 2019, former-Secretary Hosemann certified Initiative Measure 65
based on the view that the initiative petitioners supplied sufficient signatures from
the State’s former five congressional districts. An interpretation of Section 273(3)
supports that decision, although petitioners’ interpretation that Section 273(3)’s
requirements can never be satisfied cuts against it. As the ultimate arbiter of the
Constitution’s meaning, this Court needs to resolve that question here, and
ultimately determine petitioners have failed to prove former-Secretary Hosemann’s
decision should be overturned.
Even if their interpretative argument is correct, petitioners’ action is woefully
untimely. They could have asserted their so-called “procedural” challenge years ago,
and certainly when former-Secretary of State Hosemann officially filed Initiative
Measure 65 in September 2019. Petitioners’ inexcusable and unreasonable delay has
prejudiced the Secretary of State, the State, and the public-at-large. Laches bars
petitioners from their requested relief.
Additionally, and not least important, common law equity principles and clear
precedent of this Court prohibits petitioners from obtaining a writ of mandamus or
other extraordinary writ against the Secretary of State. The Secretary’s ministerial
duties of receiving and reporting the results of the November 3, 2020 election, as this
Court already held nearly fifty years ago, are not subject to a writ.
This Court should deny petitioners’ requested relief and dismiss their petition.
2
FACTS
Section 273 of the Constitution provides the exclusive process for amendments
to provisions of the Constitution. At issue here, Section 273(3) establishes how the
Constitution can be amended through citizen-initiated ballot initiatives:
The people reserve unto themselves the power to propose and enact
constitutional amendments by initiative. An initiative to amend the
Constitution may be proposed by a petition signed over a twelve-month
period by qualified electors equal in number to at least twelve percent
(12%) of the votes for all candidates for Governor in the last
gubernatorial election. The signatures of the qualified electors from any
congressional district shall not exceed one-fifth (1/5) of the total number
of signatures required to qualify an initiative petition for placement
upon the ballot. If an initiative petition contains signatures from a single
congressional district which exceed one-fifth (1/5) of the total number of
required signatures, the excess number of signatures from that
congressional district shall not be considered by the Secretary of State
in determining whether the petition qualifies for placement on the
ballot.
MISS. CONST., art. 15, § 273(3). Other provisions in Section 273 provide various
substantive and procedural requirements for ballot initiatives, legislative
alternatives to ballot initiatives, and amendments by concurrent resolution of the
Legislature. See generally MISS. CONST., art. 15, § 273. The Mississippi Code also sets
forth various requirements for the process. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-17-1 et seq. All
of the mechanisms for amendment ultimately require approval of a majority of the
electorate at an election. See MISS. CONST., art. 15, § 273(2), (8), (10).
In July 2018, proponents of what has become known as Initiative Measure 65
filed an initiative seeking to amend the Constitution to provide a legalized system for
3
medical marijuana.1 After Initiative Measure 65 was finalized in September 2018,
pursuant to Section 273(3), the proponents gathered petition signatures and obtained
certifications from the 82 county circuit clerks pursuant to Code Section 23-17-21. In
September 2019, the proponents submitted the initiative petition and certifications
to then-Secretary of State Hosemann for a determination, under Section 273(3), of
whether the initiative should be placed on the ballot. On September 4, 2019, the
Secretary of State’s Office determined that the proponents had provided the requisite
number of signatures by qualified electors as required by Section 273(3) to be placed
on the ballot for the November 3, 2020 general election, based on an equal division
among the five congressional districts existing as of 2000.
Between September 2019 and October 2020, the Secretary of State’s Office and
other officials performed their required duties and tasks associated with Initiative
Measure 65. In March 2020, consistent with Section 273(8), the Legislature passed
2020 House Concurrent Resolution 39 providing for a legislative alternative, Measure
65A, which the electorate voted on at the same time as Initiative Measure 65 in the
November 3, 2020 election. On September 8, 2020, the State Board of Elections
approved the sample ballot containing the two measures for the ballot initiative
election, as well as all other election races appearing on the statewide ballot. A few
weeks later, on September 21, 2020, general absentee balloting began.
1 The relevant facts at issue here are matters of public record, not disputed, and are set out in
petitioners’ submission, their exhibits, as well as in their cited documents available on the Secretary
of State’s website.
4
On October 26, 2020, petitioners in this case filed their “emergency” petition
challenging former-Secretary Hosemann’s September 4, 2019 certification of
Initiative Measure 65’s petition signatures, and seeking relief by extraordinary writ
to prevent Secretary Watson from declaring the outcome of the ballot initiative
following the election. On October 27, 2020, this Court initially ordered Secretary
Watson to answer the petition by 5:00 p.m. on October 28, 2020. On the afternoon of
October 28, this Court extended the deadline to November 6, 2020.
Meanwhile, on November 3, 2020, county election officials across the State
conducted the statewide general election. As of this writing, county officials have not
certified the official results from election day. But, it has been widely-publicized that
Initiative Measure 65 exceeded the necessary vote thresholds prescribed by Section
273(8). By the evening of November 5, 2020, with nearly all precincts reporting, the
vote total “For Either” Initiative Measure 65 or Initiative Measure 65A was 689,840
(68%) to 326,311 (32%), and Initiative Measure 65 prevailed over Initiative Measure
65A by a margin of 660,160 (74%) to 233,483 (26%). See Mississippi General Election
Results, available at <https://www.wdam.com/politics/election-results/>.
ARGUMENT
I. The Secretary of State’s Office Appropriately Interpreted Section 273(3) and

Certified Initiative Measure 65 in September 2019.
Petitioners contend that a change in congressional district lines nearly two
decades ago created a “mathematical impossibility” of compliance with their reading
of Section 273, and thereby rendered Mississippians powerless to propose and enact
constitutional amendments. Pet. at 2. They allege that under Section 273(3), because
5
only four congressional districts currently exist in the State and only 1/5 of the
required signatures for a ballot initiative can come from a particular district, the
Section’s signature requirement can never be satisfied. Pet. at 2. Petitioners’ creative
theory of nullification by interpretation is misplaced.
“In interpreting the Mississippi Constitution,” this Court seeks “the intent of
the draftsmen, keeping in mind, the object desired to be accomplished and the evils
sought to be prevented or remedied.” Myers v. City of McComb, 943 So. 2d 1, 7 (¶22)
(Miss. 2006) (internal quotes omitted). In performing that task, “constitutional
provisions should be read so that each is given maximum effect and a meaning in
harmony with that of each other.” Dye v. State ex rel. Hale, 507 So. 2d 332, 342 (Miss.
1987). Further, the Constitution “is a document presumed capable of ordering human
affairs decades beyond the time of its ratification under circumstances beyond the
prescience of the draftsmen.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
This Court also looks to statutory interpretation principles when analyzing
constitutional provisions. See Leslie H. Southwick, 8 MS PRAC. ENCYCLOPEDIA MS
LAW § 68:107 (2d ed.) (“Almost all rules that apply to interpretation of statutes also
apply to the terms of a constitution.”). When applying those principles, “the ultimate
goal of this Court is to discern the legislative intent.” Matter of Adoption of D.D.H.,
268 So. 3d 449, 452 (¶12) (Miss. 2018) (internal quotes omitted). “To determine
legislative intent, the Court first looks to the language of the statute.” Id. (internal
quotes omitted). However, “[t]he intention and purpose of the Legislature is to be
deduced from the whole and every part of the statute taken together—from the words
6
and context—and such a construction adopted as will best effectuate the intention of
the law-giver.…Further, the Court may also look to the statute’s historical
background, purpose, and objectives.” Id. (internal quotes and citation omitted).
Section 273(3) contains three component provisions. The first provision
expressly provides: “The people reserve unto themselves the power to propose and
enact constitutional amendments by initiative.” M ISS. CONST., art. 15, § 273(3). The
second provision establishes the time limitations and requisite total number of
petition signatures to achieve placement on the ballot. Id. And the third provision
requires that the total number of signatures be divided equally among five
geographical areas designated by congressional districts. Id. The second and third
requirements, as this Court has recognized, are intended to “discourage regionalism
by requiring broad-based support for any proposed initiative.” In re Proposed
Initiative Measure No. 20, 774 So. 397, 402 (¶21) (Miss. 2000), overruled on other
grounds, Speed v. Hosemann, 68 So. 3d 1278 (Miss. 2011). When read together as a
whole, the intent and purpose of the three provisions is to preserve the people of the
State’s substantive right to enact ballot initiatives, and provide a manner to do so
that ensures proposed initiatives have support from electors all over the State.
Consistent with that view of Section 273(3)’s text and original intent, former-
Secretary of State Hosemann interpreted and applied the third provision to Initiative
Measure 65 as requiring “’signatures from each of the five congressional districts as
they existed in the year 2000.’” Pet at. 6 (quoting Initiative Measure 65’s publication,
available at https://www.sos.ms.gov/elections/initiatives/InitiativeInfo.aspx?IId=65).
7
Petitioners do not dispute that the initiative’s proponents satisfied that criterion.
Instead, they complain that the initiative was improperly certified because only four
congressional districts currently exist, and Section 273(3)’s “phrase ‘qualified electors
from any congressional district’ can mean only the current congressional districts.”
Pet. at 15. Petitioners’ arguments lack merit for numerous reasons.
First, petitioners’ literalism actually cuts against them. They assert “[t]here is
no textual support for replacing ‘any congressional district’ to ‘from each of the five
congressional districts as they existed in the year 2000.’” Pet. at 15. But, using that
test, there is also “no textual support” for petitioners’ reading either. To reach their
desired outcome, petitioners read “any congressional district” as “any current
congressional district” and “single congressional district” as “single current
congressional district.” There is no textual reason that “any” district or a “single”
district cannot reasonably be interpreted to mean a past or present district. And there
is no logical reason “any” district or “single” district cannot be interpreted as the
former five congressional districts to harmonize the provisions with the “one-fifth”
requirements in Section 273(3). See Dye, 507 So. 2d at 342 (“constitutional provisions
should be read so that each is given maximum effect and a meaning in harmony with
that of each other”).
It is true, as petitioners argue, that if the drafters of Section 273(3) “wanted to
bind the congressional districts to a particular redistricting plan, [they] could have
explicitly done so.” Pet. at 16. But they did not. The drafters also did not explicitly
“bind” the congressional districts to the current plan either. The drafters’ failure to
8
do so does not make former-Secretary Hosemann’s application of Section 273(3)
improper.
Second, petitioners’ interpretation of Section 273(3) effectively eliminates the
most important sentence of the section: “The people reserve unto themselves the
power to propose and enact constitutional amendments by initiative.” M ISS. CONST.,
art. 15, § 273(3). Petitioners’ 33-page brief conveniently omits any mention of that
penultimate sentence of Section 273.
When interpreting the Constitution, this Court “will look to the dominant
object to be accomplished by the constitutional provisions rather than to a literal or
technical interpretation.” W. Horace Williams Co. v. Federal Credit Co., 21 So. 2d
582, 583 (Miss. 1945); see also Owens Corning v. Mississippi Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 947 So.
2d 944, 946 (¶7) (Miss. 2007) (“In determining the proper construction of a statute,
the entire legislation on the subject matter, its policy, reason, as well as the text,
must be considered.”). Petitioners’ reading of Section 273(3)’s third provision violates
that principle. In contending that the geographical division provision can only mean
it could never be procedurally satisfied, petitioners’ view eliminates Mississippians’
substantive constitutional right to propose and enact petition initiatives established
in the section.
Third, petitioners’ interpretation creates a currently insurmountable hurdle
for the Initiative Measure 65 proponents (and a problem for past and future initiative
petitioners). This Court does not read impossible requirements into constitutional
provisions. See Gulf Refining Co. v. Stone, 21 So. 2d 19, 21 (Miss. 1945)
9
(“Constitutional and statutory provisions do not require to be done that which is
impossible or thoroughly impracticable,…which is another way of saying that what
is impossible or thoroughly impracticable is not within a constitutional or statutory
requirement.” (internal citation omitted)). Petitioners’ proposed procedural obstacle
which could never be satisfied is a reason to reject their argument, not credit it.
Fourth, the Legislature’s “repeated failures to amend Section 273(3)” does not
improve petitioners’ position. Pet. at 18. Over the past several years, members of the
Legislature have proposed resolutions to amend Section 273(3)’s language to account
for the State’s current four congressional district configuration. In fact, when he was
a Senator, Secretary of State Watson introduced a resolution during the 2015 Session
that would have changed the words “one-fifth (1/5)” appearing in Section 273(3) to
“pro rata share.” 2015 S.C.R. 549. The resolution did not pass.
Secretary Watson still believes an amendment is necessary. Making a “pro rata
share” or similar alteration to Section 273(3) would sensibly clarify its text, be
consistent with its purpose of ensuring that proposed initiatives have sufficient
support from electors throughout the State, and eliminate any possibility that the
2002 reduction of congressional districts prevents a proposed initiative from ever
satisfying Section 273(3)’s signature requirements. A divergence of viewpoints
regarding Section 273(3)’s text shows there is room for a good faith interpretative
dispute, not that the section can only be interpreted to effectively bar any initiative
from ever making it on the ballot, as petitioners erroneously contend.
10
Finally, petitioners’ attacks on prior Attorney General opinions do not improve
their argument. In 2009, the Attorney General’s Office opined that “the geographic
distribution requirement of Section 273 requires that not more than 20% of the total
number of initiative petition signatures must come from the last five-district
congressional district plan which was in effect prior to the adoption of the current
four-district plan.” Hosemann, 2009 WL 367638, at *3 (MS AG Jan. 9, 2009).
Petitioners attempt to discredit the opinion for not “citing any constitutional text,
precedent, canons of constitutional construction, or other law” in arriving at that
conclusion. Pet. at 20. Contrary to petitioners’ rhetoric, Section 273 is quoted in the
opinion at length. See Hosemann, 2009 WL 367638, at *2.
In any event, it is unsurprising that Hosemann did not directly refute
petitioners’ argument. The question presented in Hosemann was: “Should the
Secretary of State require that a minimum of 20% of the initiative petition signatures
come from each of the five ‘old’ congressional districts, or should he require that 25%
of the initiative petition signatures come from each of the ‘new’ congressional
districts?” Hosemann concluded that the purpose of Section 273(3)’s geographical
distribution provision, and the Section’s silence as to which congressional district
plan must be used, proved that a twenty-percent/five-district requirement was the
better reading of Section 273(3). Hosemann, 2009 WL 367638, at *3. If, as petitioners
contend here, the issue had been whether nobody can ever presently satisfy Section
273(3), then Hosemann would have analyzed that issue and cited all the
“constitutional text, precedent, cannons of constitutional construction, or other law”
11
discussed above. Bashing Hosemann for failing to address an unasked question gets
petitioners nowhere.
Petitioners also mistakenly contend that a conflict exists between Hosemann
and the analysis in Turner, 2015 WL 4394179 (MS AG Jun. 5, 2015). In Turner, the
issue was whether a presidential preference primary candidate could satisfy Code
Section 23-15-1093 by filing “petitions signed by not less than one hundred (100)
qualified electors of the ‘old’ five congressional districts as the same existed prior to
the adoption of the four current congressional districts.” Turner, 2015 4394179, at *1.
The opinion provided: “a candidate may file a petition or petitions signed by a total of
not less than five hundred (500) qualified electors of the state, or petitions signed by
not less than one hundred (100) qualified electors of each congressional district of the
state, in which case there shall be a separate petition for each congressional district.”
MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-1093. Unremarkably, because the statute used the
conjunction “or,” Turner concluded that a candidate could qualify with either 500
signatures (100 from each former congressional district) or 400 signatures (100 from
each congressional district). Turner, 2015 4394179, at *1-2.
Turner and Hosemann are different opinions about different issues involving
different statutory and constitutional schemes. Turner does not prove Hosemann was
wrong. Turner, more importantly, does not prove petitioners are right. There were no
competing constructions of the statutory language in Turner—and certainly not an
alternative interpretation, like petitioners’, that would have undermined the plain
and original intent of the statute.
12
For all these reasons, this Court should dismiss the petition.
II. Laches Bars Petitioners’ Claim.
Even wrongfully crediting petitioners’ interpretation of Section 273(3), this
Court should still reject their petition. Laches independently defeats petitioners’
claim.
Laches applies when a party “(1) delay[s] in asserting a right or claim; (2) the
delay was not excusable; and (3) there was undue prejudice to the party against whom
the claim was asserted.” Allen v. Mayer, 587 So. 2d 255, 260 (Miss. 1991); see also
Tucker v Hosemann, No. 2:10cv178-P-S, 2010 WL 4384223, at *4 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28,
2010) (applying laches in elections matter when all three elements are met).
As to the first two elements, petitioners have inexcusably delayed in asserting
their claim. To measure delay, similar to a statute of limitations inquiry, courts look
to when plaintiffs objectively knew or reasonably should have known of their cause
of action. Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155, 1161-62 (5th Cir.
1982); see also White v. Daniel, 909 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying laches in
voting rights lawsuit). However, unlike a limitations analysis, laches does not turn
on the time elapsed between a claim’s accrual date and when a lawsuit is filed. See
Barrios v. Faye, 597 F.2d 881, 884 (5th Cir. 1979) (laches “is not, like limitations, a
mere matter of time; but principally a question of the equity or inequity of permitting
the claim to be enforced”).
Petitioners’ inexcusable delay is obvious. Their theory is that an alleged defect
in Section 273(3)’s procedural requirements has existed since a federal court redrew
13
the State’s congressional districts in 2002, such that no initiative petition could ever
satisfy the requirements. Petitioners did not need to develop any facts to attack
Initiative Measure 65 under their theory. They knew or should have known of their
claim for years now.
The process which led to Initiative Measure 65 started over two years ago. As
a matter of public record, all of the following steps (and others) in the process required
pursuant to Section 273, Code Sections 23-17-1 et seq., and other provisions of the
Election Code, have occurred:
● July 30, 2018 – Initiative Measure 65 filed;
● August 8, 2018 – Certificate of Review received from Attorney General’s Office;
● August 9, 2018 – Serial number assigned;
● August 17, 2018 – Ballot Title/Summary received from Attorney General’s Office;
● August 27, 2018 – Notice of Initiative published by newspaper;
● September 6, 2018 – Initiative Petition final for signature collection;
● September 4, 2019 – Initiative Petition filed with Secretary of State’s Office;
● January 7, 2020 – Initiative Petition delivered to the Legislature;
● March 17, 2020 – House Concurrent Resolution for Initiative Measure 65A enrolled;
● September 8, 2020 – State Board of Elections approved ballot;
● September 19, 2020 – Absentee voting by military and overseas voters began;
● September 21, 2020 – General absentee voting began;
● September 30 – October 13, 2020 – Public Hearings held; and
● November 3, 2020 – Election day.
14
Petitioners could have elected to sue at any point in the process. But they sat
idle and failed to file their challenge until a few days before election day. Now, election
day has come-and-gone, and hundreds of thousands of Mississippians have approved
Initiative Measure 65. Petitioners’ inexcusable delay in asserting their claim
establishes the first two elements of laches.
As to the third laches element, petitioners’ inexcusable delay has already
caused undue prejudice in many ways. First, petitioners’ delay prejudiced the
Secretary’s ability to defend against their claim. While petitioners had months to
prepare their 106-page filing, Secretary Watson has only been afforded days to
respond to their arguments leveled against a decision made by his predecessor.
Petitioners’ delay has also prejudiced the Secretary, and the Court, by leaving
insufficient time for the parties to litigate petitioners’ procedural objections to
Initiative Measure 65, and leaving no time for the Court to review the parties’
submissions and act on petitioners’ claim before the November 3, 2020 general
election took place.
Second, the Secretary of State expended significant funds and resources
related to the processing, publication, and public notice requirements associated with
Initiative Measure 65. The Secretary of State’s Office produced and distributed
pamphlets, held public hearings across the State, and spent resources in taking other
required actions associated with the initiative process. If petitioners had timely
asserted their claim, it could have been resolved before the Secretary of State’s Office
expended all those resources.
15
Third, the undue prejudice caused by petitioners’ delay obviously extends to
the State, the proponents of Initiative Measure 65, and the public-at-large.
Petitioners delayed filing their purported procedural challenge until the last second
before the November 3, 2020 election, and even then, failed to demand relief before
election day. Due to petitioners’ inexcusable delay, and how they framed their belated
challenge, to this point, proponents of Initiative Measure 65 and other interested
parties have not had an opportunity to appear and defend the petition. Moreover,
because of petitioners’ dilatory tactics, hundreds of thousands of citizens have now
approved Initiative Measure 65. All that obvious prejudice to everyone could have
been avoided if petitioners had timely asserted their claim.
Fourth, petitioners want what amounts to a judicial declaration that not only
directly affects Initiative Measure 65 but also could threaten past, present, and future
measures. Crediting petitioners’ theory could mean that all ballot initiatives enacted
since the 2002 redistricting are “void ab initio” because of a signature deficiency,
including Initiative Measure 31 (Eminent Domain) and Initiative Measure 27 (Voter
Identification). Effectively backdoor litigating the procedural validity of those long-
settled enactments in a belated fashion, without all interested parties involved, would
unduly prejudice the Secretary, the State, and the public-at-large.
As explained above, there are numerous reasons that petitioners’ challenge to
Initiative Measure 65’s September 2019 certification is wrong on the merits. But,
even if their contentions could prevail, the Court should apply laches and hold the
doctrine independently requires dismissing petitioners’ action.
16
III. Petitioners Are Not Entitled to a Writ of Mandamus or Any Other
Extraordinary Writ Against the Secretary of State.
The last page of petitioners’ submission asks this Court “to issue whatever
extraordinary writs appropriate, including but not limited to mandamus, to prohibit
the Secretary of State’s declaration of the votes under MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-17-41
and MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(10) on Initiative Measure No. 65 and 65-A.” For the
reasons explained above, petitioners are not entitled to any relief whatsoever. But
even wrongfully assuming that their claim has merit, any writ against the Secretary
of State designed to prevent him from declaring the results of the upcoming election
is barred.
Mississippi courts cannot issue extraordinary writs that would prevent an
executive officer from performing their ministerial acts and duties imposed by law in
regard to an election. Barnes v. Ladner, 131 So. 2d 458, 463 (Miss. 1961). In Barnes,
just like in this instance, a group of petitioners sued for a writ prohibiting Secretary
of State Heber Ladner “from taking any steps or other proceedings in connection with
the issuance of a proclamation certifying the results of the special election held on
June 7, 1960, at which there was submitted to the qualified electors of the state for
ratification or rejection the ‘right to work’ amendment to the State Constitution.” Id.
at 459. This Court rejected the petitioners’ procedural and substantive arguments
attacking the validity of the proposed constitutional amendment. Id. at 461-62.
In addition to the lack of merit in petitioners’ claim, this Court also denied
relief because “the petition sought to restrain [Secretary Ladner] from doing the very
acts and performing the specific duties imposed on him by law.” Id. at 463.
17
Particularly, at that stage of the process, Secretary Ladner was charged by
constitutional and statutory law to perform two duties. Id. First, by statute, Secretary
Ladner was required to receive the results of the election on the constitutional
amendment from county election commissioners, tabulate the results, and submit
them to the legislature at its next regular session. Id. Second, if the constitutional
amendment received a majority of the vote at the election, the provisions of Section
273 then in place provided the amendment “shall be inserted as a part of the
Constitution by proclamation of the secretary of state certifying that it received the
majority vote required by the Constitution.” Id. (quoting MISS. CONST., art. 15 § 273
(Rev. 1959)).
Relying on the common law purpose of extraordinary writs and its prior
precedents, this Court recognized that writs may only be employed to control the
exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers by an inferior court or tribunal. Id. at 463-
64.2 This Court recognized that “the Secretary of State under our statutes has
multiple duties to perform and is vested with quasi-judicial powers under some
statutes.” Id. at 464. However, the Secretary’s “functions in receiving and tabulating
the election returns sent in by the election commissioners of the 82 counties, and in
issuing his proclamation certifying the result of the election on a proposed
constitutional amendment are not in our opinion judicial or quasi-judicial.” Id. As a
result, courts lacked authority “to restrain or prohibit the Secretary of State from
2 This Court’s rules mirror the common law practice. See MISS. R. APP. P. 15 (Mandamus to
Require Trial Court Decision); MISS. R. APP. P. 21 (Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition Directed to a
Judge or Judges and Other Extraordinary Writs).
18
performing the acts mandatorily required of him” to tabulate and proclaim the results
of the election under the constitutional provision and statute. Id.; see also In re
Wilbourn, 590 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (Miss. 1991) (recognizing Barnes “declared that a
court by writ of prohibition could not prohibit the Secretary of State from receiving
and tabulating election returns and issuing a proclamation certifying the results of
an election on a proposed constitutional mandate as he was constitutionally
mandated to do”).
In this case, Secretary of State Watson is identically situated as Secretary of
State Ladner in 1961. The Secretary of State’s Office has already performed each of
the acts and duties with respect to Initiative Measure 65 and the November 3, 2020
general election that could arguably be considered judicial or quasi-judicial. See MISS.
CONST., art. 15, § 273(3), (9); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-17-19, § 23-17-23, § 23-17-25, §
23-17-27. The only remaining acts for the Secretary of State to perform with respect
to the initiative following the general election include the ministerial duties to receive
election results from the counties and issue an official declaration of the results. See
MISS. CONST., art. 15, § 273(10); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-603, § 23-15-605, § 23-17-
41.
Because there is no future judicial or quasi-judicial act for the Secretary to
perform regarding Initiative Measure 65, there is no basis for a writ compelling or
prohibiting the Secretary from declaring the results of the November 3, 2020 general
election regarding the initiative. Even if petitioners’ substantive arguments could
19
have merit, which they do not, then no writ should issue from this Court, or any other
court, against the Secretary.
CONCLUSION
This Court should dismiss petitioners’ claim for lack of merit, and/or on laches
grounds. Further, regardless of any determination regarding the merits of
petitioners’ claim, this Court should reject petitioners’ request for a writ of mandamus
or other extraordinary writ preventing the Secretary of State from declaring the
results of the vote on Initiative Measure 65 at the November 3, 2020 general election.
THIS the 6th day of November, 2020.
LYNN FITCH,
Attorney General
By: S/Justin L. Matheny

Krissy C. Nobile (Bar No. 103577)
Deputy Solicitor General
Justin L. Matheny (Bar No. 100754)
Assistant Solicitor General
MISSISSIPPI ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE
P.O. Box 220
Telephone: (601) 359-3680
krissy.nobile@ago.ms.gov
justin.matheny@ago.ms.gov
Counsel for Respondent Michael Watson, in

his official capacity as Secretary of State of
the State of Mississippi
20
I hereby certify that the foregoing document has been filed using the Court’s
MEC system and thereby served on all counsel of record and other persons entitled
to receive service in this action.
THIS the 6th day of November, 2020.
S/Justin L. Matheny
Justin L. Matheny
21
The Honorable Delbert Hosemann, 2009 WL 367638 (2009)
2009 WL 367638 (Miss.A.G.)
Office of the Attorney General
State of Mississippi
Opinion No. 2009-00001
January 9, 2009
Re: Voter initiative law
*1 The Honorable Delbert Hosemann

Secretary of State
State of Mississippi
P. O. Box 136
Jackson MS 39205-0136
Dear Secretary Hosemann:

Attorney General Hood has received your request for an official opinion and it has been assigned to me for research and
reply.
Questions Presented
Should the Secretary of State require that a minimum of 20% of the initiative petition signatures come from each of the five
“old” congressional districts, or should he require that 25% of the initiative petition signatures come from each of the four
“new” congressional districts?
Response
The Secretary of State should require that 20% of the signatures of an initiative petition be from each of the “old” five
congressional districts as they existed immediately prior to the adoption of the four current congressional districts.
Background
Your letter reads as follows:

I have received and forwarded to you two proposed initiative measures to amend the Mississippi Constitution of 1890. The
first proposed measure was filed with my office by W. O. “Bill” Luckett, Jr. and Rory Reardon on November 21, 2008, and
forwarded to your office pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 23-17-5 on November 25, 2008. I have received a second
proposed initiative measure filed by P. Leslie Riley Jr. On December 3, 2008. This second proposed measure was forwarded
to you on December 4, 2008.
Pursuant to section 273 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, an amendment to the Constitution may be proposed by the
qualified electors of the State of Mississippi by petition. The number of signatures required from qualified electors is “at least
twelve percent (12%) of the votes for all candidates for Governor in the last gubernatorial election.” The same section places
a limit on the number of qualified electors from any congressional district and request an amendment to the Mississippi
Constitution of 1890. “The signatures of the qualified electors from any congressional district shall not exceed one-fifth (1/5)
of the total number of signatures required to qualify an initiative petition for placement on the ballot.
Citizens of our State have the right to amend their Constitution when a sufficient number of citizens desire to do so. The
current initiative procedure was proposed by Senate Concurrent Resolution 516 in 1992, when Mississippi had five
congressional districts. At that time Mississippi had not had a change in apportionment resulting in a change in the number of
United States Congressmen since 1963. The concurrent resolution was written to require any future proposal for amending
the Mississippi Constitution to have broadly-based support among the existing congressional districts.
© 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

I fully expect that one or both of these proposed initiatives will receive petition support with a sufficient number of
signatures. Further, I would like to give the proponents correct information as they start this process. Please give me your
official opinion, if I am presented with a petition that contains signatures equal or greater to twelve percent of the votes for
Governor in the 2007 election, should I require twenty percent of the signatures to come from each of the five “old”
congressional districts or twenty-five percent of the signatures to come from each of the four “new” congressional districts? I
appreciate your early consideration of this matter.
Applicable law
*2 Section 273 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 reads in pertinent part as follows:
(3) The people reserve unto themselves the power to propose and enact constitutional amendments by initiative. An initiative
to amend the Constitution may be proposed by a petition signed over a twelve-month period by qualified electors equal in
number to at least twelve percent (12%) of the votes for all candidates for Governor in the last gubernatorial election. The
signatures of the qualified electors from any congressional district shall not exceed one-fifth (1/5) of the total number of
signatures required to qualify an initiative petition for placement upon the ballot. If an initiative petition contains signatures
from a single congressional district which exceed one-fifth (1/5) of the total number of required signatures, the excess
number of signatures from that congressional district shall not be considered by the Secretary of State in determining whether
the petition qualifies for placement on the ballot.
***
(12) The Legislature shall provide by law the manner in which initiative petitions shall be circulated, presented and
certified…
***
(13) The Legislature may enact laws to carry out the provisions of this section but shall in no way restrict or impair the
provisions of this section or the powers herein reserved to the people.
Several statutory provisions of the initiative process are applicable, including Miss. Code Ann. Section 23-17-21 (1972),
which provides in pertinent part:
Before a person may file a petition with the Secretary of State, the petition must be certified by the circuit clerk of each
county in which the petition was circulated. The circuit clerk shall certify the signatures of qualified electors of that county
and shall state the total number of qualified electors signing the petition in that county. The circuit clerk shall verify the name
of each qualified elector signing on each petition… When the person proposing any initiative measure has secured upon the
petition a number of signatures of qualified electors equal to or exceeding the minimum number required by Section 273(3)
of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 for the proposed measure, and such signatures have been certified by the circuit clerks
of the various counties, he may submit the petition to the Secretary of State for filing…
Miss. Code Ann. Section 23-17-23 (1972) provides in pertinent part:

The Secretary of State shall refuse to file any initiative petition being submitted upon any of the following grounds:
***
(b) That the petition clearly bears insufficient signatures;
***
Analysis and Conclusion
The general purpose of geographic distribution requirements for the signatures appearing on initiative petitions is to help
ensure that an initiative has broad support throughout the state and to help assure that the initiative process is not used by
citizens of one part of the state to the detriment of those in another.
*3 In the context of appointments to boards and commissions, this office has previously opined that statutory provisions
requiring board member appointments from congressional districts, and where the statute is otherwise silent, requires that the
residence of appointees be residents of congressional districts under “the last five-district plan which was in effect.” See MS
AG Op., Canon (January 16, 2003), as well as MS AG Op., Neelley (May 20, 1998).
It is likewise our opinion that the geographic distribution requirement of Section 273 requires that not more than 20% of the
total required number of initiative petition signatures must come from the last five-district congressional district plan which
was is effect prior to the adoption of the current four-district plan. It would be mathematically impossible to satisfy the
requirements of Section 273 using just four districts. We note that at least one initiative sponsor has stated their intention to
gather sufficient signatures to satisfy the 20%/five-district threshold as well as the 25%/four-district threshold.
We are aware of the difficulties circuit clerks and their staffs may encounter when attempting to verify the congressional
district under a previous redistricting plan of large numbers of initiative petition signers. One remedy to this problem would
be to amend Section 273 to reflect four congressional districts.
Please let me know if you would like to discuss this matter or if I can be of further assistance.
Sincerely yours,
Jim Hood
Attorney General
By: Reese Partridge
Assistant Attorney General
2009 WL 367638 (Miss.A.G.)

End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

~ r':'i ~~!'I ~r! !AL
~~'~H]UJA J1JJ0-m-Jt11
u IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI,:'JLED
No. _ __
I i
\
I
OCT 26 2020
I . OFFICi::. OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT
I . MAYOR MARY HAWKINS BUTLER,
I !
COURT OF APPEALS
IN HER INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES;
VERSUS
\ I

/ I

u I
{i I EMERGENCY PETITION FOR REVIEW PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 15,

SECTION 273(9) OF THE MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION OF 1890
AND WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND/OR OTHER EXTRAORDINARY WRITS

JONES WALKER LLP
L_. 190 E. Capitol St., Suite 800
Jackson, Mississippi 39201
Tel (601) 949-4 789
Fax (601) 949-4804
astone@j oneswalker .com
L aharris@j oneswalker .com

P. 0. Box 40
I
I
I_
Tel (601) 856-7116
Fax (601) 853-4766
'
I
I I
MOTION# JoJtJ-Jl{iPS cbrannon@madisonthecity.com
fl
L
{JX449521.9}
I' I
/_I IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
No. _ __
(
!
L_', IN RE INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. 65

IN HER INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL pAPACITIES;
VERSUS
fl
I
l_,'
;
[i
EMERGENCY PETITION FOR REVIEW PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 15,
SECTION 273(9) OF THE MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION OF 1890
AND WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND/OR OTHER EXTRAORDINARY WRITS

i I
L'
i '
I-I Andrew S. Harris (MSB No. 104289)
JONES WALKER LLP
r: 190 E. Capitol St., Suite 800
1 1
' _, Jackson, Mississippi 39201
Tel (601) 949-4 789
l-' Fax (601) 949-4804
l !
L_
kpickett@j oneswalker .com

P. 0. Box 40
[ Tel (601) 856-7116
Fax (601) 853-4 766
{JX449521.9}
(
/ '
i
! I
TABLE OF CONTENTS
'I I
j i
SUMMARY ................................................................................................... 1
,-
i I
STATEMENT OF FACTS NECESSARY TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF ISSUES
\
PRESENTED ................................................................................................ 3
I. Mississippi's Four Congressional Districts ................................................. 3
1 -,
I
II. The Initiative Process ............................................................................ 4
!
III. Initiative 65 ......................................................................................... 6
'/ '
I I
I ' STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND RELIEF SOUGHT ........................ 9
( STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR GRANTING THE RELIEF REQUESTED ......... 10

1 '
I I
\.._
I. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction ................................................ 10

i
i !
! II. The matter is ripe ................................................................................ 12
I i
I : III. Petitioners have standing ..................................................................... 12
'
i - IV. The secretary of State's certification of Initiative Measure No. 65 was

I I
unconstitutional. .......................................................................................... 14
I
A. "Congressional district" does not mean former congressional
I I district ..................................................................................... 14
,- 1 B. There is no legal support to the Secretary of State's interpretation ...... 19
J I
C. The Secretary of State's interpretation has dire consequences ............ 22

i_ /
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 23
I i
I. :
{JX449521.9} 1
Cases Page(s)
Basil v. Browning,
175 So. 3d 1289 (Miss. 2015) .................................................................................. 20
Bd. of Supervisors v. Hattiesburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,

I
I
,
!' 448 So. 2d 917 (Miss. 1984) .................................................................................... 15
',
Branch v. Smith,
I :- 538 U.S. 254 (2003) .................................................................................................. 3
Chevron U.S.A. v. State,

578 So. 2d 644 (Miss. 1991) .................................................................................... 14
Czekala-Chathamfiled v. State ex rel. Hood,

195 So. 3d 187 (Miss. 2015) .................................................................................... 20
Dialysis Sols., LLC v. Miss. State Dep't of Health,

96 So. 3d 713 (Miss. 2012) ...................................................................................... 10
Dunn v. Yager,
58 So. 3d 1171 (Miss. 2011) .................................................................................... 14
I
Ex parte Dennis,
I
I I
,1
334 So. 2d 369 (Miss. 1976) .................................................................................... 14
Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368 (1963) .................................................................................................. 3
Hughes v. Hosemann,
68 So. 3d 1260 (Miss. 2011) .............................................................................. 11, 12
In re Fordice,
691 So. 2d 429 (Miss. 1997) .................................................................................... 10
In re Hooker,
87 So. 3d 401 (Miss. 2012) ...................................................................................... 20
In re Proposed Initiative Measure No. 20 v. Mahoney,

774 So. 2d 397 (Miss. 2000) .............................................................................. 11, 12
Kinney v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, Inc.,

142 So. 3d 407 (Miss. 2014) .................................................................................... 13
{JX449521.9} 11
Legis. of the State of Miss. v. Shipman,
170 So. 3d 1211 (Miss. 2015) ............................................................................ 11, 21
Mauldin v. Branch.,
866 So. 2d 429 (Miss. 2003) ...................................................................................... 3
Merwin v. State Bd. of Elections,

593 N.E.2d 709 (1st. Dist. Ill. Ct. App. 1992) ........................................................ 10
Mississippi v. Louisiana,
r• 506 U.S. 73 (1992) .................................................................................................. 11
I I
[ I
Montgomery v. Lowndes Cty. Democratic Exec. Comm.,
969 So. 2d 1 (Miss. 2007) ....................................................................................... 20
Oktibbeha Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Sturgis,

/
' - 531 So. 2d 585 (Miss. 1988) .................................................................................... 10
I '
I ,
Pascagoula Sch. Dist. v. Tucker,

I i
/
91 So. 3d 598 (Miss. 2012) ......................_................................................................ 14
Power v. Robertson,
93 So. 769 (Miss. 1922) ................................................................................. 4, 12, 19
Scott v. Sandford,
I
, I 60 U.S. 393 (1857) .................................................................................................. 20
Shepard v. McDonald,
64 S.W.2d 559 (Ark. 1933) ..................................................................................... 10
i--
1
Smith v. Clark,
189 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D. Miss. 2002) ..................................................................... 3
I i
Smith v. Clark,
I ': 189 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D. Miss. 2002) ............................................................... 3, 22
Smith v. Dorsey,
599 So. 2d 529 (Miss. 1991) .................................................................................... 15
,-- I
',
Smith v. Hosemann,
. l__
852 F. Supp. 2d 757 (S.D. Miss. 2011) ......................................................... 3, 22, 23
: i
I
' I Speed v. Hosemann,

I '
68 So. 3d 1278 (Miss. 2011) .............................................................................. 11, 12
{JX449521.9} 111
State v. Hall,
187 So. 2d 861 (Miss. 1966) .............................................................................. 14, 21
State ex rel. Holmes v. Griffin,

667 So. 2d 1319 (Miss. 1995) ............................................................................ 17, 18
State ex rel. Howie v. Brantley,

r--, 74 So. 662 (Miss. 1911) ............................................................................................. 4
I ,
I_ !
State ex rel. Jones v. Husted,
[ ', 73 N.E.3d 463 (Ohio 2016) ..................................................................................... 10
State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus,

\ '
578 So. 2d 624 (Miss. 1991) ................................................................................ 4, 19
: I
State v. Maples,
402 So. 2d 350 (Miss. 1981) .................................................................................... 11
Stidham v. State,
lI ,' 750 So. 2d 1238 (Miss. 1999) .................................................................................. 15
Statutes
2 U.S.C. § 2c ................................................................................................................... 3
52 U.S.C. § 10301 ........................................................................................................... 3
i
Miss. Code Ann. § 9-1-19 ......................................................................................... 1, 10
I .
: ___ 1
Miss. Code Ann. § 9-3-9 ............................................................................................... 10
Miss. Code Ann.§ 21-7-1 ............................................................................................. 13
I~ I Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-1037 ....................................................................................... 3

i !
i_,_
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-1093 ..................................................................................... 21

f-
I I
Miss. Code Ann.§ 23-17-1 ......................................................................................... 4, 6
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-3 ............................................................................................. 4
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-5 ......................................................................................... 5, 6
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-7 ............................................................................................. 5
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-9 ............................................................................................. 5

{JX449521.9} IV
Miss. Code Ann.§ 23-17-11 ........................................................................................... 5
r -,
l I
I .
l_. Miss. Code Ann.§ 23-17-13 ........................................................................................... 5
j' .
i
I Miss. Code Ann.§ 23-17-15 ........................................................................................... 5
\
Miss. Code Ann.§ 23-17-17 ........................................................................................... 5

I1__ 1;
Miss. Code Ann.§ 23-17-19 ......................................................................................... 22
r: Miss. Code Ann.§ 23-17-21 ........................................................................................... 5
j_ !
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-23(b) ............................................................................... 2, 5, 9
Miss. Code Ann.§ 23-17-29 ........................................................................................... 5
Miss. Code Ann.§ 23-17-31 ........................................................................................... 7

- -
Miss. Code Ann.§ 23-17-41 ..................................................................................... 5, 24

l·---':
Miss. Code Ann. § 37-3-2(2)(a) .................................................................................... 18
Miss. Code Ann. § 37-101-3 ......................................................................................... 16
Miss. Code Ann.§ 63-17-57 ......................................................................................... 18
Miss. Code Ann. § 73-5-1 ............................................................................................. 16
Miss. Code Ann.§ 73-19-7 ..................................................................................... 16, 17
Miss. Code Ann.§ 73-21-75 ......................................................................................... 18
Miss. Code Ann. § 73-30-5 ........................................................................................... 18
Miss. Code Ann. § 73-57-7 ........................................................................................... 18
Miss. Code Ann. § 75-57-101 ....................................................................................... 18
(~ Miss. Code Ann. § 75-60-4(1) ................................................................................. 16, 17

r .
MISS. CONST. art 4, § 3 ................................................................................................... 4
MISS. CONST. art. 6, § 154 ........................................................................................ l 7, 18
MISS. CONST. art. 8, § 213-A (1944) ............................................................................. 16
{JX44952I.9} V
MISS. CONST. art. 12, § 241 .................................................................................... 13, 15
MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(3) .............................................................................. passim
MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(4) ........ ,............................................................................ 11
MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(6) ....................................................................................... 5
u MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(8) ....................................................................................... 7
MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(9) .............................................................................. passim
MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(10) ............................................................................... 5, 24
MISS. CONST. art. 146 .................................................................................................. 10

( I
I
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 .................................................................................................... 3
Other Authorities
City of Madison Zoning Ordinance§ 7.02, art. VII. ............................................. 7
City of Madison Zoning Ordinance § 8.02, art. VIII ............................................. 7

( '
I I Competing ballot initiatives confuse MS medical marijuana issue, NEMISS.NEWS
I_'.
(Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.nemiss.news/competing-ballot-initiatives-confuse-ms-
medical-marijuana-issue/............................................................................................... 6
\ I
/ __ ;
Hosemann, Miss. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 2009-00001,
2009 WL 367638, 2009 Miss. AG LEXIS 278 (Jan. 9, 2009) .............. 20, 21, 22
R.R. Con. Res. 22, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2014) ......................................... 18
( -'-,
I ;
I ',
l_ R.R. Con. Res. 26, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2015) .................................... 18, 19
Miss. R. App. P. 21 ......................................................................................... l
Miss. Sec'y State, Initiative Information, Initiative 65, available at

https://www.sos.ms.gov/elections/initiatives/Initiativeinfo.aspx?IId=65 ......... 6, 14, 15
{JX449521.9} vi
Miss. Sec'y State, Initiative Measure No. 65, Section 4(7), available at
https://www.sos.ms.gov/Elections-Voting/Pages/Initiative-Measure-65 .aspx .............. 7
r-.
I i
Miss. Sec'y State, Initiative Measure No. 65, Section 8(5), available at
l
https://www.sos.ms.gov/Elections-Voting/Pages/Initiative-Measure-65.aspx .............. 7
r-,
) '
\ I Miss. Sec'y State, Initiative Measure No. 65, Section 10, available at
https://www.sos.ms.gov/Elections-Voting/Pages/Initiative-Measure-65.aspx .............. 7
Miss. Sec'y State, Initiatives, Mississippi's Initiative Process, available at

https://www.sos.ms.gov/Elections-Voting/Pages/Initia tives. aspx ................................. 2
S. Con. Res. 510, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2007) .......................................... 19
f I
I
I
,
, S. Con. Res. 523, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009) .......................................... 19
S. Con. Res. 549, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2015) ........................................... 19
Steven Henshaw, Reading police arrest 5 in theft of $100,000 worth of medical

marijuana from growing facility, READING EAGLE (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.
readingeagle.com/news/crime/reading-police-arrest-5-in-theft-of-100-000-worth-of-
medical-marijuana-from-growing/article_2e0ce4a0-832b-llea-9al6-
afb23ac34a30.html. ......................................................................................................... 7
Turner, Miss. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 2015-00158,

2015 WL 4394179, 2015 Miss. AG LEXIS 117 (June 5, 2015) ................ 21, 22
Vivian Leigh, Surge in Theft of Medical Marijuana Plants in Maine, NEWS CENTER
I
I
I
I MAINE (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.newscentermaine.com/article/news/local/surge-in-
theft-of-medical-marijuana-plants/97-481172485 ......................................................... 7
11
( '
j~
'-·- '
'
{JX449521.9} vu
(
I
\_ -
COMES NOW, Mayor Mary Hawkins Butler, in her individual and official
capacities, and the City of Madison, pursuant to Article 15, Section 273(9) of the
Mississippi Constitution of 1890; Miss. Code Ann. § 9-1-19; and Mississippi Rule of
Appellate Procedure 21, and file this, their Petition for Review Pursuant to Article
15, Section 273(9) of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, and Writ of Mandamus
r and/or Other Extraordinary Writ, seeking review of the sufficiency of the petitions
i:
l_
submitted in support of Initiative Measure No. 65 and a writ prohibiting the
,-
\ I
I! Secretary of State's official declaration of the election results on any measure
r-- initiated through a constitutionally insufficient process. Because the election will
, I
I .
i__~
take place on November 3, 2020, and because the Secretary of State has not longer
[J than thirty days following the election to officially declare the vote, Petitioners
(
! i respectfully ask that the Court hear this matter on an emergency basis.
L!
SUMMARY
In 1992, Mississippi amended the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, Section
273, to allow for indirect ballot initiatives. An initiative measure to amend the
Constitution must be supported by a petition signed by qualified electors. Mrss.
CONST. art. 15, § 273(3). "The signatures of the qualified electors from any
( --
i:
l __ _ congressional district shall not exceed one-fifth (1/5) of the total number of signatures
( ~
II :. required to qualify an initiative petition for placement upon the ballot." Id.
u
Because Mississippi has four congressional districts, it is a mathematical
\--,
I I
\___,
certainty that the number of signatures submitted in support of Initiative Measure
No. 65 from at least one of the four congressional district exceeds 1/5 of the total
L:
number required. Twenty percent (20%) from each congressional district equals
[\
{JX449521.9} 1
(~'
I !
J
\.. --'
eighty percent (80%) total; to reach one hundred percent (100%), the number from at
least one district must exceed twenty percent (20%).
The Mississippi Legislature is aware of this mathematical impossibility. Seven

r -
L_i concurrent resolutions have been introduced since 2003 to propose an amendment to
correct for the change in congressional districts. Each resolution has died, and
r- Section 273 stands unchanged.

1
i·-·i
Despite the Legislature's failure to propose an amendment to the voters, the
Secretary of State nonetheless has followed an "amended" Section 273(3) and has
r-, inserted "the last five-district congressional district plan which was is effect prior to
J_j
the adoption of the current four-district plan" into the text of the Constitution.1
)_J Ignoring the plain language of Section 273(3) and violating Miss. Code Ann.§ 23-17-
23(b), the Secretary of State determined the petitions in support of Initiative Measure
No. 65 were sufficient.
The Supreme Court has "original and exclusive" jurisdiction to review the
,--
/ !,
sufficiency of the petitions. MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(9). Petitioners ask that the
Court exercise this jurisdiction to determine that the petitions are constitutionally
insufficient because the number of signatures from at least one of Mississippi's four
·,
i
I I'
I I
L_: congressional districts exceeds 20% of the total signatures required. Petitioners
further ask that the Court issue whatever extraordinary writs necessary to effectuate
its determination, including but not limited to a writ of mandamus to the Secretary
,_J
1 See Miss. Sec'y State, Initiatives, Mississippi's Initiative Process, available at
https://www.sos.ms.gov/Elections-Voting/Pages/Initiatives.aspx.
I i
,,_!
{JX44952I .9} 2
of State to prevent the official declaration of the vote on any proposal initiated
through the filing of the petition for Initiative Measure No. 65.
STATEMENT OF FACTS NECESSARY TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF

ISSUES PRESENTED
I. Mississippi's Four Congressional Districts
"Following the 2000 decennial census, Mississippi's delegation to the United
States House of Representatives was reduced from five to four representatives.
However, the Legislature failed to act and left the old five-district plan in place."
Mauldin v. Branch, 866 So. 2d 429, 431 (Miss. 2003); Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-1037;
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. As a result, on February 26, 2002, a three-judge panel of
federal judges issued an injunction to the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and
Governor for the State of Mississippi to implement a court-drawn congressional

'1 !
I '
I '
redistricting plan. Smith v. Clark, 189 F. Supp. 2d 548, 549 (S.D. Miss. 2002). Under
the federal Constitutional mandate of "one person, one vote," Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368, 381 (1963), the districts were drawn to equalize the size of the population
and to comply with the Voting Rights Act's mandate to avoid minority vote dilution.
I
j
Smith v. Clark, 189 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525 (S.D. Miss. 2002); see also 52 U.S.C. § 10301.
The court-drawn congressional redistricting plan reflected four districts, not five.
Smith, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 525, affirmed by Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003)
(holding 2 U.S.C. § 2c mandated single-member districts); see also Maudlin, 866 So.
1;
I . 2d at 431.
L
Following the 2010 Census, the three-judge panel of federal judges modified
the 2002 injunction and reapportioned the four congressional districts to equalize the
population and to preserve minority voting strength. Smith v. Hosemann, 852 F.

{JX449521.9} 3
1:
I :
( Supp. 2d 757, 764 (S.D. Miss. 2011). The Mississippi Legislature has not enacted a
new apportionment plan, and the federal injunction remains in place. Under this
plan, Mississippi has four congressional districts.

I ,
I :
\ '
II. The Initiative Process
In 1914, Mississippi enacted an initiative and referendum process as Article 4,
r~ Section 3, to the Mississippi Constitution. Though the Mississippi Supreme Court

I' I,
'- _)
initially held that the amendment was constitutionally enacted, State ex rel. Howie
v. Brantley, 7 4 So. 662, 665-67 (Miss. 1917), five years later the Court struck the
amendment as "unconstitutional and void." Power v. Robertson, 231, 93 So. 769, 776
(Miss. 1922). Sixty-eight years later, then-Attorney General Michael Moore sought
i' -,
\ i
I. __ I
to overturn this holding, but the Court refused to judicially resurrect the initiative
and referendum amendment. State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So. 2d 624, 633 (Miss.
1991). The Legislature did so instead, enacting Senate Concurrent Resolution No.
516, ratified by the electorate in the 1992 fall election, to again allow voter initiatives.
This became codified as subsections 3-13 of Article 15, Section 273 to the Mississippi
Constitution. 2
i
,_,I
,i
Article 15, Section 273, and related statutes codified in Title 23, Article 17 of
( '
I '
I I
\ __ .1
the Mississippi Code, provide the initiative process. It begins with the filing of a
(-'
I !
proposed initiative measure with the Secretary of State. Miss. Code Ann.§§ 23-17-1,
..
I _ . )'
23-17-3. After a review by the Attorney General, the proposed initiative measure is
refiled with a certificate of review, and the Secretary of State assigns a serial number.
2 Section 273 also was amended in 1998 to only allow a state resident to circulate an
initiative petition.
{JX449521.9} 4
I '
:_ I
Miss. Code Ann. §§ 23-17 -5, 23-17-7. Following publication and filing of the proposed
(
'1 i ballot title, the initiator of the measure gathers signed petition pages. Miss. Code
I ' '
'
~ )
Ann. §§ 23-17-9 through 23-17-17. The circuit clerks of the various counties must
certify the signatures. Miss. Code Ann.§ 23-17-21. Upon obtaining certification, the
initiator must file the petition with the Secretary of State, who shall refuse to file any
petition that "clearly bears insufficient signatures." Miss. Code Ann.§ 23-17-23(b).
\ i
\._'
Article 15, Section 273(3) is plain:
I
L .·
i
The signatures of the qualified electors from any
congressional district shall not exceed one-fifth (1/5) of the
total number of signatures required to qualify an initiative
petition for placement upon the ballot. If an initiative
petition contains signatures from a single congressional
district which exceed one-fifth (1/5) of the total number of
required signatures, the excess number of signatures from
that congressional district shall not be considered by the
\
I
'
I
Secretary of State in determining whether the petition
' ' qualifies for placement on the ballot.
The Constitution provides that "The sufficiency of petitions shall be decided in the
first instance by the Secretary of State, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the
! I
I :
\. ....:
state, which shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all such cases." MISS.
r :
I
I '
I CONST. art. 15, § 273(9). Upon determining the sufficiency of the petition, the
( .
Secretary of State accepts the petition for filing and thereafter files it with the Clerk
J /
t_,
of the Mississippi House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Mississippi
Senate. MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(6); Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-29. Even if an
initiative measure is approved by the electors, it does not take effect until thirty days
after the Secretary of State renders an "official declaration of the vote," absent
I
' I
I
(_:
language to the contrary in the measure. MISS. CONST. art 15, § 273(10); Miss. Code
Ann. § 23-17-41.
{JX449521.9} 5
r-----
/_ !
[! III. Initiative 65
1-:,
__ .)
On July 30, 2018, Ashley Ann Durval sponsored a proposed amendment to the
Constitution by filing the proposed measure with the Secretary of State under Section
273(3) and Miss. Code Ann.§ 23-17-1. Ex. 1, Proposed Amendment. The Attorney
General issued a Certificate of Review pursuant to Miss. Code Ann.§ 23-17-5. Ex 2,
I ,
,- ' Certificate of Review. Thereafter, the Secretary of State accepted for filing the
u proposed measure with the certificate for review and assigned the proposed measure
I
I
~-I
! the serial number Initiative Measure No. 65.
, '
In November 2019, Ms. Durval, the sponsor of Initiative Measure No. 65,
I :
l_:
submitted 214,000 signatures, 105,686 of which were certified as valid by the circuit
I ,
!_ __ ! clerks of each county in which the petition was circulated.3 In his publication of
j i Initiative Measure No. 65, the Secretary of State stated, "According to Mississippi
<. ___ :
law, for an initiative measure to be placed on the ballot, a minimum of 86,183 certified
signatures must be gathered, with at least 17,237 certified signatures from each of
the five congressional districts as they existed in the year 2000." See Miss. Sec'y
[' State, Initiative Information, Initiative 65, available at

' I
I __ _.I
\.._
https://www.sos.ms.gov/elections/initiatives/Initiativeinfo.aspx?IId=65. The
Secretary of State deemed the signatures sufficient and presumably accepted and
\ ; 3 The
'
I
I Secretary of State has no official record of the official number of sufficient
signatures. Ex. 3, Affidavit of Adam Stone. This count is what has been reported to
the media. See Competing ballot initiatives confuse MS medical marijuana issue,
NEMISS.NEWS (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.nemiss.news/competing-ballot-
initiatives-confuse-ms-medical-marijuana-issue/. The Secretary of State produced
uncertified copies of the sponsor's signature count. Ex. 4, Sponsor's Signature Count.
{JX449521.9} 6
l__i
r~
Il ' filed the petition with the office of the Secretary of State and with the Clerk of the
House and the Secretary of the Senate. Ex. 3, Affidavit of Adam Stone.
Initiative Measure No. 65 prohibits zoning "medical marijuana treatment
centers" any more restrictively than comparably sized businesses. See Miss. Sec'y
I~ State, Initiative Measure No. 65, Section 8(5), available at

i
r-~, https://www.sos.ms.gov/Elections-Voting/Pages/Initiative-Measure-65.aspx. A
I '
l__
I I
"medical marijuana treatment center" is not just a "treatment center"; it is allowed
to "grow, harvest, ... produce, propagate" marijuana. See id. at Sections 4(7) and (10).
[' The City of Madison's Zoning Ordinance allows horticultural uses in areas zoned
u
Residential Estate District RE-A and RE-B. See City of Madison Zoning Ordinance
at § 7.02, art. VII and § 8.02, art. VIII, available at
http://www.madisonthecity.com/sites/default/files/Zoning0rdinance2012-l.pdf.
Initiative Measure No. 65 would likely allow any licensed "medical marijuana
treatment center" to grow marijuana within residential areas, substantially harming
the City's legitimate interest in conserving the value of property and protecting the
health and safety of its citizenry. 4

f :
l __
Pursuant to Article 15, Section 273(8) of the Mississippi Constitution and Miss.
Code Ann. § 23-17-31, Mississippi State Legislature passed House Concurrent
I
r-, 4 Steven Henshaw, Reading police arrest 5 in theft of $100,000 worth of medical
I .
'· -' marijuana from growing facility, READING EAGLE (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.
,, readingeagle.com/news/crime/reading-police-arrest-5-in-theft-of-100-000-worth-of-medical-
I : marijuana-from-growing/article_2e0ce4a0-832b-llea-9a16-afb23ac34a30.html; Vivian
·~
' '
_) Leigh, Surge in Theft of Medica.l Marijuana Plants in Maine, NEWS CENTER MAINE (Oct. 5,
2017), https://www.newscentermaine.com/article/news/local/surge-in-theft-of-medical-
i. marijuana-plants/97-481172485.
t I
{JX449521.9} 7
) i
I
[-
Resolution 39 as a legislative alternative to Initiative Measure No. 65, which will
appear on the ballot as Alternative 65A. The vote was 72-49 in the House on March
10, and 34-17 in the Senate on March 12, 2020.

r -;
I I
\._)
! '
iL__ ,'
r-:
I
I, __ ,
I
r-
1 :
[_:
I:
1....,_·
i
ILJ:
/- I
I ;
I_,
{JX449521.9} 8
i :
I _j
'
i
I,_
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The Mississippi Constitution of 1890, Article 15, Section 273(3), prohibits the
Secretary of State from considering any signatures from any congressional district
exceeding one-fifth (1/5) of the total number of signatures required. Miss. Code Ann.
§ 23-l 7-23(b) bars the Secretary of State from filing any initiative petition clearly
bearing insufficient signatures. Because the State of Mississippi has four
congressional districts, the signatures supporting Initiative Measure No. 65 for at
least one congressional district exceed one-fifth (1/5) of the total required. Did the
Secretary of State therefore violate Section 273(3) and Miss. Code Ann. § 23-l 7-23(b)
by filing Initiative Measure No. 65?
Petitioners seek review of the Secretary of State's determination of the
sufficiency of the petition for Initiative Measure No. 65; a declaration that Initiative
Measure No. 65 and all amendments thereto were not constitutionally enacted
through the initiative process; and the issuance of any appropriate extraordinary
,--
I '
I : writs to prohibit the Secretary of State from officially declaring the vote for any
I '
measures placed on the November 3, 2020 ballot pursuant to Section 273(3).
u
{JX449521.9} 9
STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR GRANTING THE RELIEF REQUESTED
I. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction.
MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(9) grants the Court "original and exclusive"
jurisdiction to review the Secretary of State's determination of the sufficiency of the
initiative petition. MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(9) (emphasis added). While the Court's
jurisdiction ordinarily is appellate, this constitutional grant of jurisdiction requires
the Court to hear this limited class of cases in the first instance. See MISS. CONST.
art. 146; Miss. Code Ann. § 9-3-9; cf. In re Fordice, 691 So. 2d 429, 435 (Miss. 1997)
(denying jurisdiction to hear declaratory judgment action in the absence of grant of
original jurisdiction). The Legislature can neither divest nor bestow jurisdiction in
contravention of the Mississippi Constitution. Dialysis Sols., LLC v. Miss. State Dep't
of Health, 96 So. 3d 713, 717 (Miss. 2012). Here, the constitutional grant of
jurisdiction is plain, and the Court's jurisdiction is secure.
Section 273(9) is self-executing; it grants an explicit right of review and
requires no enabling legislation. See Oktibbeha Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Sturgis, 531 So.
2d 585, 588 (Miss. 1988) (holding Sections 17 and 19 of the Mississippi Constitution
are self-executing, but Section 211 is not). The courts of other states have interpreted
similar constitutional grants of original jurisdiction to allow a direct action in an
u
i
appellate court. See Shepard v. McDonald, 64 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Ark. 1933); Merwin
v. State Bd. of Elections, 593 N.E.2d 709, 711 (1st Dist. Ill. Ct. App. 1992); State ex
r .
~' rel. Jones v. Husted, 73 N.E.3d 463, 468 (Ohio 2016). To the extent any Legislative
r ·.
C _' grant of authority is necessary, that authority exists under Miss. Code Ann. § 9-1-19,
I
;
!
\ '
{JX449521.9} 10
which empowers the Court to order issuance of writs of mandamus, grant injunctions,
and issue all other remedial writs. State v. Maples, 402 So. 2d 350, 353 (Miss. 1981).
The four modern cases challenging initiatives were all brought in the Circuit
Court of Hinds County, not in the Supreme Court. See In re Proposed Initiative
Measure No. 20 v. Mahoney, 774 So. 2d 397, 398 (Miss. 2000), (upholding challenge
to an initiative measure to prohibit gambling for failure to contain a revenue impact
statement under MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(4)); Speed v. Hosemann, 68 So. 3d 1278
(Miss. 2011) (declining review of proposed amendment to restrict transfer of land
taken by eminent domain); Hughes v. Hosemann, 68 So. 3d 1260, 1262 (Miss. 2011)
(declining review of the constitutionality of the content of the proposed Personhood

11
\ ' Amendment); Legis. of the State of Miss. v. Shipman, 170 So. 3d 1211, 1213 (Miss.
2015) (declining review of title of a Legislative amendment to a measure). None of
these cases challenged the Secretary of State's determination of the sufficiency of the
petition signatures, 5 and none addressed the Supreme Court's "original and
r--
I I
exclusive" jurisdiction under Section 273(9).
l - '
The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted its own "original and
exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States" to bar suit in
any other court. See Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77-78 (1992). As the
Supreme Court found, there is no logical reason why "exclusive" should be given any
(~
I
I
5 In a concurring opinion in Hughes v. Hosemann, 68 So. 3d 1260, 1262 n.14 (Miss.

(
2011), Justice Randolph noted in passing that the proponents of Initiative Measure No. 26
/ '
had exceeded "the requirement of 89,285 certified signatures, at least 17,857 of which were
from each of Mississippi's former five congressional districts." But the sufficiency of the
number of signatures was not at issue in Hughes.
{JX44952L9} 11
meaning other than its ordinary meaning. MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(9) therefore
bars Petitioners from bringing suit to challenge the sufficiency of the petition in any
other Court. This Court, and only this Court, has jurisdiction over this action.
II. The matter is ripe.
The Court has refused to exercise jurisdiction over challenges to the substance
of a proposed initiative measure because any challenge to substance is unripe until
the initiative passes. See Speed, 68 So. 3d at 1269-70; Hughes, 68 So. 3d at 1264
i
I , (overruling Mahoney, 77 4 So. 2d at 402, to the extent it suggested pre-election review
i '
of the substance of an initiative is allowed). But there is a distinction between form
I
and substance. Indeed, Justice Pierce memorably illustrated this by comparing the
different forms of water (ice, snow, and steam) with the substance of water itself.
Hughes, 68 So. 3d at 1264. The Court has unequivocally recognized that a pre-
election challenge to the form of an initiative-driven constitutional amendment is
justiciable. Id.
I '
Petitioners' challenge to the filing of the petition for Initiative Measure No. 65
is a challenge to form. The measure could be about any topic, and its constitutional
invalidity would remain. No matter what the content of the measure is, the petition
signatures are insufficient under the plain language of MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(3).
III. Petitioners have standing.
Both Mayor Hawkins Butler and the City of Madison have standing to bring
this action. Under Power v. Robertson, 93 So. 769, 773 (Miss. 1922), "any qualified
I ,
elector has a right to question the sufficiency and validity of the petition." See also
! '
Mahoney, 77 4 So. 2d at 402, partially overruled on other grounds, Speed, 68 So. 3d at
{JX449521.9} 12
1281 ("As qualified electors and taxpayers of the State of Mississippi, the appellees
in this case had standing to assert their claims questioning the sufficiency of
Initiative Measure No. 20."). MISS. CONST. art. 12, § 241 defines a qualified elector:
Every inhabitant of this state, except idiots and insane

persons, who is a citizen of the United States of America,
eighteen (18) years old and upward, who has been a
resident of this state for one (1) year, and for one (1) year
in the county in which he offers to vote, and for six (6)
months in the election precinct or in the incorporated city
or town in which he offers to vote, and who is duly
registered as provided in this article, and who has never
been convicted of murder, rape, bribery, theft, arson,
obtaining money or goods under false pretense, perjury,
forgery, embezzlement or bigamy, is declared to be a
qualified elector, except that he shall be qualified to vote
for President and Vice President of the United States if he
meets the requirements established by Congress therefor
and is otherwise a qualified elector.
Mayor Hawkins Butler is an inhabitant of the state, a citizen of the United States,
and she has resided in the City of Madison for over forty years. Ex. 5, Affidavit of
Mary Hawkins Butler. She is oflegally sound mind, and she has never been convicted
of a crime. Id. Mayor Hawkins Butler is a qualified elector, and she has individual
standing. Id.
! I
The City also has standing. "Mississippi parties have standing to sue when
they assert a colorable interest in the subject-matter of the litigation or experience
an adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant, or as otherwise provided by law."
Kinney v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, Inc., 142 So. 3d 407, 412-13 (Miss. 2014) (internal
citation omitted). The City is likely to experience an adverse effect different from any
adverse effect suffered by the general public. Specifically, the City has an interest in
protecting its zoning rights. The Secretary of State's unconstitutional acceptance of
{JX44952 l .9} 13
the petition for Initiative Measure No. 65 and potential declaration of the vote
threatens those rights. This threat of injury is real, immediate, and direct. The City
has the right and capacity to sue under Miss. Code Ann. § 21-7-1, and it is a proper
party to this action.
IV. The Secretary of State's certification of Initiative Measure No. 65 was

unconstitutional.
A. "Congressional district" does not mean former congressional

district.
The key issue in this action is the Secretary of State's interpretation of MISS.
CONST. art. 15, § 273(3). That Section states, "The signatures of the qualified electors
i _:
from any congressional district shall not exceed one-fifth (1/5) of the total number of
signatures required to qualify an initiative petition for placement upon the ballot."
The Secretary of State has replaced "any congressional district" with the words, "from
each of the five congressional districts as they existed in the year 2000." See Miss.
Sec'y State, Initiative Information, Initiative 65, available at
https://www.sos.ms.gov/elections/initiatives/Initiativeinfo.aspx?IId=65. The Court
should reject this interpretation as "tantamount to a constitutional amendment

I
i_ -
devoid of the people's concurrence." Chevron U.S.A. v. State, 578 So. 2d 644, 648
(Miss. 1991) (citing State v. Hall, 187 So. 2d 861, 863 (Miss. 1966)).
A fundamental canon of constitutional construction is to give effect to the plain
language of the Mississippi Constitution. Exparte Dennis, 334 So. 2d 369, 373 (Miss.
l__
1976) ("The construction of a constitutional section is of course ascertained from the
/
l __
I
plain meaning of the words and terms used within it."); see also Pascagoula Sch. Dist.
v. Tucker, 91 So. 3d 598, 604 (Miss. 2012); Dunn v. Yager, 58 So. 3d 1171, 1189 (Miss.
{JX449521.9} 14
I ,
I I
'
2011); Stidham v. State, 750 So. 2d 1238, 1244 (Miss. 1999); Smith v. Dorsey, 599 So.
2d 529, 535 (Miss. 1991); Bd. of Supervisors v. Hattiesburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
448 So. 2d 917, 922 (Miss. 1984). That canon controls here.
The plain language of Section 273(3) supports only one interpretation. The
phrase "qualified electors from any congressional district" can mean only the
I~ current congressional districts. MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(3) (emphasis added).
I
i _:
Currently, there are four, not five, congressional districts.
Our Constitution requires a qualified elector to have resided "for six (6) months
in the election precinct or in the incorporated city or town in which he offers to
vote." MISS. CONST. art. 12, § 241 (emphasis added). No elector may offer to vote in
a fifth congressional district. It is non-existent. And so there are no "qualified

i
i : electors" in the former fifth congressional district.
( - :
I I
Section 273(3) provides that an initiative measure to amend the Constitution
I ,
I
l __
must be supported by a petition "signed over a twelve-month period by qualified
electors equal in number to at least twelve percent (12%) of the votes for all
candidates for Governor in the last gubernatorial election." (Emphasis added).
This sentence ties the signature process a point in time beyond when Section 273(3)
was enacted. There is no textual support for replacing "any congressional district" to
"from each of the five congressional districts as they existed in the year 2000." See
Miss. Sec'y State, Initiative Information, Initiative 65, available at

: I
I ,
https://www.sos.ms.gov/elections/initiatives/Initiativelnfo.aspx?Ild=65. Indeed, if
I ,
the congressional redistricting plan had changed the district lines, but not the
number of districts, then surely the Secretary of State would not maintain that the
Ii
I
'- -
{JX449521.9} 15
geographic boundaries of the five-district plan in effect in 2000 would apply. And if
I
I , Mississippi regains a congressional seat following the 2020 census, surely the
I
\ -~·
i
Secretary of State will not hew to the 2000 congressional districting plan.
MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(3) forbids the Secretary of State from considering
any signatures from "a single congressional district which exceed one-fifth (1/5) of the
r-1 total number of required signatures." When this constitutional amendment was
i
I
enacted, both the Legislature and the electorate knew that the congressional districts
I
I
\__,
change every ten years. Populations in different parts of the state grow and decrease
unevenly, and reapportionment is necessary to preserve one person, one vote. Section
) I
273(3) is not fixed to a particular date in time; "a single congressional district" must
mean a "single congressional district," not "a single congressional district as existing
in 2000."
Had the Legislature wanted to bind the congressional districts to a particular
redistricting plan, it could have explicitly done so. For instance, Section 213-A of the
,-
1
Mississippi Constitution, which governs the appointment of members to the Board of
Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning, was enacted in 1944. It then
stated, "There shall be appointed one (1) member of such board from each
congressional district of the state as now existing .... " MISS. CONST. art. 8, § 213-A
! : (1944) (emphasis added). Consistent with this language, the enabling legislation,
I I
Miss. Code Ann. § 37-101-3, provides for "one member from each congressional
!
district of the state as existing as of March 31, 1944." The Legislature similarly has
I
~-.
I .
l__ l frozen the congressional districts from which other board appointees are drawn. See
Miss. Code Ann. § 73-5-1 ("[O]ne (1) member [of the Board of Barber Examiners] to
I ;
{JX449521.9} 16
I ,
be appointed from each of the congressional districts as existing on January 1,
1991."); Miss. Code Ann. § 75-60-4(1) (filling seats on the Mississippi Community
College Board with persons from each of the five congressional districts as they
existed on January 1, 1992); Miss. Code Ann.§ 73-19-7 (using January 1, 1980, as the
congressional district benchmark date to fill seats on the Board of Optometry). The
words "as now existing" were plain in Section 213-A. Section 273(3) contains no words
of similar meaning or effect. There is no hint of textual intent to tie "congressional
J_: district" to the 1992 five-district plan.
rI I
The Court relied on a similar analysis in State ex rel. Holmes v. Griffin, 667 So.
2d 1319, 1325 (Miss. 1995). There, the Court considered Article 6, Section 154 of the
Mississippi Constitution of 1890, which states, "No person shall be eligible to the
I : office of judge of the circuit court or of the chancery court who shall not have been a
!___'
r
practicing lawyer for five years and who shall not have attained the age of twenty-six
I
I
' I
years, and who shall not have been five years a citizen of this state." In Griffin, the
parties disputed whether the words "immediately preceding his election" should be
read into the Section 154. Id. The Court noted that similar language was included
i\ __ ,
I
in Sections 41 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to require persons running for

i i
I
the House of Representative to be a citizen of the county for "two years immediately
,-
iL_
preceding his election." Id. at 1326.
Based on the inclusion of the disputed language in one Section of the
Constitution but not the other, the Court found that the drafters intentionally chose
not to include the "immediately preceding" language: "It appears to this Court that
after four opportunities to draft such a Section as 154, that the drafters would have
{JX449521.9} 17
1,
I
I/~ _1 I
included the immediately preceding language if they had intended to do so, as they
did for other positions." Id. at 1326-27. Relying on the plain meaning of Section 154,
the Court refused to rewrite it.
The same reasoning applies here. The drafters of Section 273(3) could have
I
I '
included "as now existing" behind the words "any congressional district" but did not
do so. Under Griffin, the Court should find this omission intentional.
'i
i '
I
What makes this even more apparent are the Legislature's repeated failures
r--,
I ,
)_; to amend Section 273(3). The Legislature has amended numerous statutes to address
the change in congressional districts. See Miss. Code Ann. § 37-3-2(2)(a) (amended
l__ i
,-
in 2019 to refer to the four congressional districts as they existed in January 2011);
1 I
I
Miss. Code Ann. § 63-17-57 (amended in 2006 to fill board seats based on the four
I . congressional districts when the members of the previous five districts began to roll
i I
off the board); accord Miss. Code Ann.§ 75-57-101; see also Miss. Code Ann. § 73-21-
i
I
\. ___ ,
75 (amended in 2002 to refer to congressional districts as of July 2001); Miss. Code
I I
J, I
Ann. § 73-30-5 (amended to add this caveat in 2003); Miss. Code Ann. § 73-57-7
(amended in 2012 to remove any reference to congressional districts). The Legislature
is well-aware that a petition cannot be constitutionally certified under Section 273(3)

( --
as the congressional districts now stand. Seven times since the congressional
districts changed has the Legislature proposed concurrent resolutions to change the
i
'--
1/5 requirement. Seven times the Legislature has failed to bring a proposed
i I
l' __,:
amendment remedying the mathematical problem to the electorate. 6
I :
\_ __/
6 See H.R. Con. Res. 58, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2003); S. Con. Res. 510, 2007
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2007); S. Con. Res. 523, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); H.R. Con.
Res. 22, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2014); H.R. Con. Res. 26, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss.
{JX449521.9} 18
It is unfortunate that the Legislature's failure means that the Constitution
cannot be amended by initiative until either Section 273(3) is amended or Mississippi
regains a congressional seat. In State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So. 2d 624 (Miss.
1991), then-Attorney General Moore argued that Power v. Robertson, 93 So. 769, 775-
77 (Miss. 1922), which struck the first initiative amendment as unconstitutionally
enacted, was wrongly decided and should be overturned. The Court rejected this
argument, under principles of both stare decisis and collateral estoppel. In doing so,
; I
' I!
!
the Court noted that the Constitution has been successfully amended many times
I
without an initiative process: "Over a hundred amendments have been made and
I i
I
enacted since 1890, as we have seen. If the people want [Initiative and Referendum]
,--
u
1
in Mississippi, their course is clear." Id. at 638. The course is also clear here: the
Legislature should amend Section 273(3). Neither the judicial nor the executive
branch should do so for it.
B. There is no legal support to the Secretary of State's

interpretation.
More than 150 years ago, in dissenting from the infamous Dred Scott decision,
Justice Curtis wrote,
[W]hen a strict interpretation of the Constitution,

according to the fixed rules which govern the interpretation
of laws, is abandoned, and the theoretical opinions of
individuals are allowed to control its meaning, we have no
longer a Constitution; we are under the government of
individual men, who for the time being have power to
declare what the Constitution is, according to their own
views of what it ought to mean.
/ I
2015); S. Con. Res. 549, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2015); R.R. Con. Res. 43, 2020 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Miss. 2020).
{JX449521.9} 19
11
I Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 621 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting); see also
In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, 423 (Miss. 2012) (Randolph, J., dissenting); Czekala-
Chathamfiled v. State ex rel. Hood, 195 So. 3d 187, 200 (Miss. 2015) (Coleman, J.,
dissenting). In this case, the Secretary of State's interpretation of the sufficiency of
a petition to amend our constitution is based not on a strict construction of Section
(,
273(3), but on one man's views of what it ought to mean.
I ,
l
Specifically, then-Attorney General Jim Hood issued an advisory opinion in
2009 on this issue, and doubtless this is the slim reed of authority upon which the
i ;
Secretary of State relies. See Hosemann, Miss. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 2009-00001, 2009
I :
I__ ,
WL 367638, 2009 Miss. AG LEXIS 278 (Jan. 9, 2009). The Attorney General's opinion
I I
!\..._)
of course does not bind this Court, nor is it a persuasive interpretation of the
I
!
i
'
I
'
Mississippi Constitution. See Basil v. Browning, 175 So. 3d 1289, 1293 (Miss. 2015);
'- _)
Montgomery v. Lowndes Cty. Democratic Exec. Comm., 969 So. 2d 1, 2-3 (Miss. 2007).
f
t__,
Without citing any constitutional text, precedent, canons of constitutional
I ,
construction, or other law, the Attorney General Opinion states, "It is likewise our
opinion that the geographic distribution requirement of Section 273 requires that not
more than 20% of the total required number of initiative petition signatures must
I ,
I '
I '
:1...__1
come from the last five-district congressional district plan which was is effect prior to
\ ; the adoption of the current four-district plan." The only reason given is that "[i]t
I I
would be mathematically impossible to satisfy the requirements of Section 273 using

i ;
: '
l__ _,
just four districts." Id.
The mathematical impossibility is a reason to amend Section 273(3). As the
I, Attorney General admitted, "One way to remedy this problem would be to amend
, I
u
{JX449521.9} 20
Section 273 to reflect four congressional districts." Id. But it is not the role of the
Secretary of State or the Attorney General to amend the Constitution when the
Legislature fails to act. And the Court "does not 'decide what a statute should
provide, but [] determine[s] what it does provide."' Legis. of the State of Miss. v.
Shipman, 170 So. 3d 1211, 1218 (Miss. 2015). This canon of statutory construction
applies with equal force to constitutional construction.

11
Ii...__ l1
The weakness of the reasoning in Hosemann is shown in Turner, Miss. Att'y
Gen. Op. No. 2015-00158, 2015 WL 4394179, 2015 Miss. AG LEXIS 117 (June 5,
2015}. In Turner, the Attorney General construed the statutory requirement for
having one's name placed on the presidential preference primary ballot. Miss. Code
Ann. § 23-15-1093 provides that one way to do so is for a candidate to file "petitions
signed by not less than one hundred (100) qualified electors of each congressional
district of the state, in which case there shall be a separate petition for each
congressional district." The Attorney General opined that this plain language
unambiguously means "since we now have only four (4) congressional districts, a
potential candidate would only need a total of four hundred (400) signatures to satisfy
the statutory requirement to gain ballot access." Turner, No. 2015-00158. There is
no reasoning offered why "qualified electors from any congressional district,"
as used in MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(3) (emphasis added), must be rewritten, but
"qualified electors of each congressional d.istrict," as used in Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-
1093, unambiguously means the current congressional districts. Hosemann is wrong,

r-·
I
(__;
I
I and Turner is right.
\ I
I I
,, , I
{JX449521.9} 21
)-'
I I
I '
C. The Secretary of State's interpretation has dire consequences.
Profound statutory and practical difficulties arise from the Secretary of State's
interpretation. An elector signing the petition must attest under penalty of fine,
imprisonment, or both that he is a qualified elector in the congressional district
written after his name. Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-19. The Secretary of State's
interpretation requires the electors in the former fifth congressional district to

f i
t '.
contradict their own voter registration cards, because they are not qualified electors
i: (nor can they be) in a congressional district that is non-existent. Turner, No. 2015-
) ___ '
i i
00158, recognizes this: "[S]ince there is no congressional district five (5), a legitimate
/ I
affirmation that each signer is a qualified elector of district five (5) ... would not be
possible." The Constitution cannot require the petition signers to lie.
Furthermore, under the five-district plan, eleven counties were split; under the
I
current four-district plan, four counties are split. See Smith v. Clark, 189 F. Supp.
' I
i :
,_,
2d 512, 525 (S.D. Miss. 2002); Smith v. Hosemann, 852 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766 (S.D.
i :i
I Miss. 2011). The practical difficulties of requiring circuit clerks to certify that an
\
I ' elector is qualified to vote in an extinct congressional district, particularly one

i \
I
,, __,
dividing a county, are obvious.
The Attorney General Opinion speculates that the "general purpose of
geographic distribution requirements for the signatures appearing on initiative
petitions is to help ensure that an initiative has broad support throughout the state
(__
and to help assure that the initiative process is not used by citizens of one part of the
state to the detriment of those in another." Hosemann, No. 2009-00001. But the use
of the old five-district plan does not effectuate this purpose. The districts have been
{JX449521.9} 22
\ :
redrawn over the last twenty years as the growth of certain areas of the state, like
Madison County, has outpaced the growth of other areas. See Smith v. Hosemann,
852 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766 (S.D. Miss. 2011) ("The large population in Hinds and
r~.
! '
i___ ; Madison Counties, as well as the need to prevent retrogression in District 2,
r-
necessitated the splitting of those counties between Districts 2 and 3.").
1 '
By its plain language, Section 273(3) is not tied to the congressional districting
map as it existed in any point in the past. "Congressional district" means merely
"congressional district," of which we currently have four. In the future, we may have
fewer or we may have more. If the Legislature and the people wish to guarantee that
the apportionment of a petition's signatures be mathematically possible and not tied
to the fluctuations of our population, then the Constitution should be amended. Until
it is, and so long as our congressional districts are fewer than five, then the signature
apportionment of Section 273(3) cannot be satisfied. The Secretary of State's
acceptance of the petition for Initiative Measure No. 65 for filing was
unconstitutional, invalidating the entire initiative process.
CONCLUSION
I !
This action is not about the wisdom of legalizing medical marijuana. It bears
( -
repeating that the City of Madison and Mayor Hawkins Butler are not opposed to a
! well-regulated medical marijuana program for the truly suffering. What the City and
I
the Mayor oppose is the failure of the Legislature to amend Section 273(3) and the
\
I
{__ '
failure of the Secretary of State to follow the plain language of the Constitution. A
constitutional amendment must be enacted constitutionally. Petitioners respectfully
I ,
ask that the Court declare the Secretary of State's determination of the sufficiency of
\ i
LJ
{JX449521.9} 23
,------~
\ I
l _J
[i the petition supporting Initiative Measure No. 65 unconstitutional and to issue
whatever extraordinary writs appropriate, including but not limited to mandamus,
to prohibit the Secretary of State's declaration of the votes under Miss. Code Ann.
r- ,
I :
( __
§ 23-17-41 and MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(10) on Initiative Measures No. 65 and 65-
[! A.
[ MAYOR MARY HAWKINS BUTLER and
THE CITY OF MADISON
I- I
I__,__ i
Kaytie M. Pickett (MSB No. 103202)

r--i Adam Stone (MSB No. 10412)
l! Andrew S. Harris (MSB No. 104289)
r--i
JONES WALKER LLP
I I 190 East Capitol St., Suite 800
/__ I
Jackson,MS 39201
Tel.: (601) 949-4900; Fax: (601) 949-4804
aharris@j oneswalker .com
i

1--i CITY OF MADISON, CITY ATTORNEY
c~ Post Office Box 40
; Tel.: (601) 856-7116; Fax: (601) 853-4766
u cbrannon@madisonthecity.com
I- :
u
I '
t_;
j '1
l_J
{JX449521.9} 24
I, KAYTIE M. PICKETT, of JONES WALKER LLP, do hereby certify that I

have this day filed the foregoing PETITION FOR REVIEW PURSUANT TO
ARTICLE 15, SECTION 273(9) OF THE MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION OF 1890
AND WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND/OR OTHER EXTRAORDINARY WRITS, with
the Clerk of the Court; and, served copies of same, by hand-delivery and U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, to the following:
Secretary of State Michael Watson

125 S. Congress Street
Jackson, MS 39201
Attorney General Lynn Fitch

550 High Street, Suite 1200
Billers Building
; :
Jackson MS 39201
I I
I_ ,
SO CERTIFIED, this the 26th day of October, 2020
r ;
I I
\ __ I
I ,
I:
I :
I I
[i
i i
I '
{JX449521.9} 25

Madison I65 File Correct

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Madison I65 File Correct

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

E-Filed Document Nov 9 2020 13:11:34 2020-M-01199 Pages: 35

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

IN RE INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. 65

MAYOR MARY HAWKINS BUTLER,

MICHAEL WATSON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

PETITIONERS’ COMBINED REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE’S

EMERGENCY HEARING REQUESTED

Kaytie M. Pickett (MSB No 103202)

Chelsea H. Brannon (MSB No. 102805)

II. RESPONDENTS’ INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 273(3)

A. Respondents do not claim Section 273(3) is ambiguous, but that

B. Ruling in Petitioners’ favor will abridge no right to amend the

C. The Secretary of State’s interpretation deserves no deference. ........... 10

III. POPULAR SUPPORT FOR INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. 65 CANNOT

IV. THE MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION GIVES THIS COURT

V. PETITIONERS’ PRE-ELECTION AND PRE-CERTIFICATION

A. Respondents’ equitable defenses lack merit. ......................................... 17

B. No statute of limitations or repose impairs Petitioners’ action. ........... 23

VI. OTHER INITIATIVE MEASURES PASSED SINCE MISSISSIPPI

VII. BARNES V. LADNER DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE COURT FROM

VIII. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 27

Am. Trucking Ass’n v. New York State Thruway Auth.,

Barbour v. Delta Corr. Facility Auth.,

Butler v. City of Eupora,

State ex rel. Collins v. Jones,

Hinton v. Pekin Ins. Co.,

State ex rel. Holmes v. Griffin,

King v. Miss. Military Dep’t,

Knox v. BancorpSouth Bank,

Kuhnle Bros. v. Cnty. of Geauga,

League of Women Voters Minn. v. Ritchie,

Legis. of the State of Miss. v. Shipman,

State ex. rel. McClurg v. Powell,

Miss. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Molden,

State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus,

Miss. Const. art. 5, § 103 ............................................................................................. 25

Miss. Const. art. 5, § 139 ............................................................................................... 5

Miss. Const. art. 6, § 146 ....................................................................................... 15, 16

Miss. Const. art. 6, § 156 ............................................................................................. 16

Miss. Const. art. 8, § 213-A (1944) ................................................................................ 6

Miss. Const. art. 15, § 273(2) ................................................................................. 10, 12

Miss. Const. art. 15, § 273(4) ....................................................................................... 24

Miss. Const. art. 15, § 273(5) ......................................................................................... 3

Miss. Const. art. 15, § 273(12) ..................................................................................... 23

Miss. Const. art. 15, § 273(13) ..................................................................................... 15

Miss. Code Ann. § 19-1-35 ............................................................................................. 5

Miss. Code Ann. § 19-1-53 ............................................................................................. 5

Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-639 ....................................................................................... 17

Miss. Code Ann. §§ 23-17-1.................................................................................... 17, 23

Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-13 ............................................................................. 23, 24, 25

Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-19 ........................................................................................... 6

Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-23 ......................................................................................... 24

Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-25 ......................................................................................... 24

Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-151 ....................................................................................... 14

1992 Miss. Laws ch. 715 ................................................................................................ 9

Miss. R. Civ. P. 8(c) ...................................................................................................... 22

Hosemann, Miss. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2009-00001, 2009 WL 367638,

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison)................................................................... 12

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)........................................................... 12

Interpreting the law based on the vagaries of what is popular or expedient

v. Shipman, 170 So. 3d 1211, 1215 (Miss. 2015).

But the judicial addition of language to our Constitution is precisely what

the Mississippi Constitution? The procedural challenges raised by Respondents

afford the Court no opportunity to avoid these serious constitutional questions.