ADONG v.

CHEONG SENG GEE

Topic: Validity of foreign marriages in the Philippines and the validity of Muslim marriages in the
Philippines
Ponente: Malcolm, J.

DOCTRINE: To be able to consider the validity of a foreign marriage, proof must be presented as
what the law is in that foreign country showing that the marriage, as celebrated there, is valid.

With respect to Muslim marriages celebrated according to Islamic rites/law within the
Philippines, they are valid. If the legislative power can declare what shall be valid marriages, it
can also render valid [by curative legislation] marriages which, when they took place, were
strictly speaking “against the law.” Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages
and should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages.

QUICK FACTS: A Chinese man (Cheong Seng Gee) laid claim in the estate of his putative father
(also a Chinese man, Cheong Boo) who died intestate in Zamboanga. Seng Gee claims that he is
the legitimate son of Boo, being born of the legitimate union of Boo and his Chinese wife (Tan
Dit), which marriage, Gee claims, was validly celebrated in Amoy, China. His claim was opposed
by Adong (a Muslim woman) and her daughters. Adong claimed that she is Boo's legitimate wife
and that her daughters are Boo's legitimate children. She presented proof of the Muslim
marriage ceremony between her and Boo. The CFI, ruling on the settlement of Boo's estate, held
that Seng Gee failed to prove the validity of the marriage in China, hence, he was only given the
share of an acknowledged natural child. Meanwhile, the CFI judge, albeit convinced that the
Muslim marriage between Boo and Adong did take place, ruled that the marriage is void under
Philippine law and therefore adjudged the no right for Adong in Boo's estate and only granted
the share of natural children to her daughters in the same estate.

FACTS:

Cheong Boo, a native of China, appears to have first landed on Philippine soil sometime prior to
the year 1896. He settled in the island of Basilan where he met Mora Adong (a Muslim woman)
whom he married according to Islamic rites/law in that same year. Their marriage was
solemnized by an Imam1 named Habubakar, which ceremony took place in the house of the
father of the bride, Marahadja Sahibil. The Imam read from the Koran. Then the Imam asked the
bride's parents if they had any objection to the marriage. The marital act was consummated by
the groom entering the woman's mosquito net.

From that marriage day until the death of Cheong Boo, 23 years later, he and Adong cohabited
as husband and wife. To them were born five children, two of whom, Payang and Rosalia, are
living. Both in his relations with Adong and with third persons during his lifetime, Cheong Boo
treated Adong as his lawful wife. He admitted this relationship in several private and public
documents. Thus, in several decrees of registration, Cheong Boo stated that he was married to
the Mora Adong. Also, as late as 1918, he was able to give written consent to the marriage of his
minor daughter, Payang.

1
In the case, it actually says “Mohammedan Iman”. This is a mistake. It should be IMAM, not
IMAN. An Imam is the Muslim counterpart of a priest/minister in the Christian religion.
Cheong Boo died intestate in Zamboanga on August 5, 1919. He left property worth nearly
P100,000. The estate of the deceased was claimed, on the one hand, by Cheong Seng Gee, who
alleged that he was a legitimate child by a marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in
China in 1895. The estate was claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora Adong who alleged that
she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan according to Islamic rites/law,
and her daughters, Payang and Rosalia are Boo's legitimate children.

Conflict Rule: Section IV of the Marriage Law, which provides that "All marriages contracted
without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were
contracted, are valid in these Islands." → This is the present-day Article 26, par. 1 of the Family
Code: “All marriages solemnized outside the Philippine, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they are solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Adong's Contention: Mora Adong claimed that she is the legitimate wife of Boo and that her
daughters are his legitimate children. She presented overwhelming proof to establish her
marriage with Boo, among which are the testimonies of the witnesses to her marriage and the
testimony of the solemnizing Imam. She also presented various private and public documents,
all of which tended to prove the fact of marital relations between her and Boo, as well as, the
legitimate filiation of her daughters and Boo.

Cheong Seng Gee's Contention: The theory advanced by Cheong Seng Gee was that Cheong Boo
was married in the city of Amoy, China, during the second moon of the twenty-first year of the
Emperor Quang Su (February 16, 1985) to a young lady named Tan Dit. Seng Gee presented
witnesses who testified to having been present at the marriage ceremony. There was also
introduced in evidence a document in written in Chinese which turned out to be a traditional
matrimonial letter.

Cheong Boo is said to have remained in China for one year and four months after his marriage to
Tan Dit, during which time there was born to him and his wife a child named Cheong Seng Gee.
Cheong Boo then left China for the Philippine Islands. In 1910, Cheong Boo was followed to the
Philippines by Cheong Seng Gee who, as appears from documents presented in evidence, was
permitted to land in the Philippine Islands as the son of Cheong Boo. The deceased, however,
never returned to his native hearth and seems never to have corresponded with his Chinese
wife or to have had any further relations with her except once when he sent her P10.

TC/CFI Zamboanga – with reference to the allegations of Cheong Seng Gee, the proof he
presented did not sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage. But CFI found that because
Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he
should share in the estate as a natural child. With reference to the allegations of the Mora
Adong and her daughters, the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage between
Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved but that under the laws of the Philippine
Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage. Accordingly, the daughters Payang and
Rosalia would inherit as natural children.

CA – n/a

ISSUE: WoN the Chinese marriage is valid in the Philippines

DECISION: No. The SC Affirmed TC on this issue.

HELD: Cheong Seng Gee failed to prove what the laws are in China which will establish that the
purported marriage between his parents Cheong Boo and Tan Dit had been validly celebrated.
Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that "All marriages contracted
without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were
contracted, are valid in these Islands." To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this
comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of
the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign
marriage by convincing evidence.
A Philippine marriage, followed by long years of uninterrupted marital life, should not be
impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband and administration of his estate,
though an alleged prior Chinese marriage, "save upon proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as
to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such impediment."

IN THE CASE AT BAR, there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the
Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. There is lacking proof so clear, strong, and
unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese
marriage.

ALSO, the following findings of by the trial court are sustained –– that Seng Gee's witnesses,
themselves being Chinese, especially the brother of Cheong Boo, had a strong inclination to
protect the interests of their kin. So they may have overstepped the limits of truthfulness in
their testimonies. It is also noted that reliable witnesses stated that in the year 1895, when
Cheong Boo was supposed to have been in China, he was in reality in Jolo!

Cheong Seng Gee is, however, allowed the testamentary rights of an acknowledged natural
child. This finding is supported by the affidavit of Cheong Boo before the American Vice-Consul
at Sandakan, British North Borneo (immigration documents) which shows the relation of parent
and child existing between the deceased Cheong Boo and his son Cheong Seng Gee. This does
not, however, establish the marriage between the deceased and the mother of Cheong Seng
Gee.

ISSUE: WoN the Muslim marriage between Boo and Adong is valid

DECISION: Yes. The SC reversed the TC on this point.

HELD: The fact that a marriage was indeed contracted between Cheong Boo and the Mora
Adong according to the ceremonies of the Mohammedan religion is already beyond a doubt.
Taking the relevant provisions of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) into consideration, as
well as the greater policy considerations involved, it is clear that the Muslim marriages must be
considered as VALID.

Section V of the Marriage Law provides that "Marriage may be solemnized by either a judge of
any court inferior to the Supreme Court, justice of the peace, or priest or minister of the Gospel
of any denomination..." The words "priest" or “minister” are not limited to the religious persons
of the Christian religion. "Priest," according to the lexicographers, means one especially
consecrated to the service of a divinity and considered as the medium through whom worship,
prayer, sacrifice, or other service is to be offered to the being worshipped. "Minister of the
Gospel" means all clergymen of every denomination and faith. A "denomination" is a religious
sect having a particular name. → A Muslim Imam is a "priest or minister of the Gospel," and
Mohammedanism (Islam) is a "denomination," within the meaning of the Marriage Law.

Section VI of the Marriage Law, meanwhile, provides that "No particular form for the ceremony
of marriage is required, but the parties must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing
the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife." Thus, no precise ceremonial is
indispensable requisite for the creation of the marriage contract. The two essentials of a valid
marriage are capacity and consent. Consent may be inferred from the ceremony performed, the
acts of the parties, and habit or repute. IN THE CASE AT BAR, there is no question of capacity.
There is also no doubt as to consent. While it is true that during the ceremony in question, the
remarks of the Imam (priest) were addressed more to the elders than to the participants, it is
likewise true that the Boo and Adong did in fact take each other to be husband and wife and did
thereafter live together as husband and wife.

Finally, the last controlling provision of the Marriage law which validates a Muslim marriage is
Section IX, reading as follows: "No marriage heretofore solemnized before any person professing
to have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority or on account of any
informality, irregularity, or omission, if it was celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either
of them, that he had authority and that they have been lawfully married ." → The purpose of the
legislators in adding this provision was precisely to legalize a marriage that was celebrated by
any person who thought that he had authority to perform the same, and if either of the parties
thought that they had been married. There is no word or any hint whatsoever which would
restrict this “curative provision” to the Marriage Law to Christian marriages.

In view of the importance of this issue, the Court decided to further elaborated on the BROADER
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS involved in this decision re: validity of Muslim marriages, thus:

 The purpose of the government toward the Mohammedan (Moro) population of the
Philippines has, time and again, been announced by treaty, organic law, statutory law,
and executive proclamation.
 Thus, as early as the Treaty of April 30, 1851, entered into by the Captain General of the
Philippines and the Sultan of Sulu, the US Government has guaranteed "with all
solemnity to the Sultan and other inhabitants of Sulu the free exercise of their religion,
with which it will not interfere in the slightest way, and it will also respect their
customs."
 When, also, in the Treaty of Paris, dominion over the inhabitants of the territories over
which Spain had sovereignty was ceded to the US, there was imposed on the Philippine
Commission the inviolable rule "that no law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever be allowed... That no form of religion and no minister of religion shall be
forced upon any community or upon any citizen of the Islands; that, upon the other
hand, no minister of religion shall be interfered with or molested in following his calling,
and that the separation between state and church shall be real, entire, and absolute."
  The instructions of President McKinley aslo enjoined the Philippine Commission, "to
bear in mind that the Government which they are establishing is designed... for the
happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands" and that,
therefore, "the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their
habits, and even their prejudices...”
 Thus, Act No. 2520 of the Philippine Commission, section 3, provided that "Judges of the
Court of First Instance and justices of the peace deciding civil cases in which the parties
are Mohammedans or pagans, when such action is deemed wise, may modify the
application of the law of the Philippine Islands, except laws of the United States
applicable to the Philippine Islands, taking into account local laws and customs"
 The Philippine Bill and the Jones Law, which followed, reproduced the main
constitutional provisions establishing religious toleration and equality

The retrospective provisions of the Philippine Marriage Law which has the effect of validating
Muslim marriages undoubtedly were inspired by these governmental policy

In the United States, with regard to the marriages of the Indians, the Quakers, and the
Mormons, the rule is also the same – to recognize validity of their marriages.

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but, it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed,
in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not
what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man
and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.

Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard
society by legalizing prior marriages. We can see no substantial reason for denying to the
legislative power the right to remove impediments to an effectual marriage. If the legislative
power can declare what shall be valid marriages, it can render valid, marriages which, when they
took place, were against the law. Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages
and should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages. And Courts should be anle to properly
incline the scales of their decisions in favors of that solution which will mot effectively promote
the public policy. That is the true construction which will best carry legislative intention into
effect.

IN THIS CASE, the consequences entailed in holding that the marriage of the Mora Adong and
the deceased Cheong Boo in conformity with the Mohammedan religion and Moro customs as
void would be far reaching in disastrous result. There are at least 150,000 Moros who have been
married according to their local custom. The Court then have it within its power either to nullify
or to validate all of these marriages; either to make all of the children born of these unions
bastards or to make them legitimate; either to proclaim immorality or to sanction morality;
either to block or to advance settled governmental policy → Our duty is as obvious as the law is
plain.

PILAPIL v. IBAY-SOMERA

Topic: Dissolution of Marriages

Ponente: Regalado, J.

DOCTRINE: After a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to
institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse
shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. HOWEVER, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.

QUICK FACTS: Imelda Pilapil (Filipino) and Erich Geiling (German) got married in Germany. After
3 years of living together, they parted ways and ultimately, Geiling obtained a divorce decree.
Five months after the divorce, Geiling instituted criminal proceedings for adultery against
Imelda.

FACTS

On September 7, 1979, IMELDA Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and Erich Ekkehard GEILING, a German
national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in
Germany. The couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child,
Isabella Pilapil Geiling was born. Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations
between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, GEILING initiated a divorce proceeding against
IMELDA in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court. He claimed that there was failure of
their marriage. IMELDA, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and
separation of property before the RTC of Manila, where the same is still pending .

In 1986, the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of
divorce. The records show that under German law, said court was locally and internationally
competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally
founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, GEILING filed two complaints
for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said him, IMELDA
"had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named
Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". After Preliminary Investigation, the cases were dismissed on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the cases were reinstated which led
to the filing of two complaints for adultery against IMELDA.One of the adultery cases was
assigned to the Branch presided by the respondent Judge Ibay-Somera
IMELDA filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the reversal of the fiscal's
decision to file the cases. The Secretary of Justice gave due course and directed the city fiscal to
inform the DOJ "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to
defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for
review

Thus, IMELDA filed motions in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings thereon. In the adultery case in Judge Cruz's branch, proceedings were duly
suspended. On the other hand, Judge Ibay-Somera merely reset the date of the arraignment.
IMELDA moved for the cancellation of her arraignment and filed also a motion to quash on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. Judge Ibay-Somera denied IMELDA's motions and directed her
arraignment. IMELDA refused to be arraigned. She was cited in direct contempt of court and
was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. Later, IMELDA entered a plea
of not guilty.

This, however, prompted IMELDA to file this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition,
with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of Judge Ibay-Somera's
order denying her motion to quash. The Supreme Court issued a TRO enjoining the further
proceedings of the adultery case. Subsequently, Secretary of Justice Ordoñez ruled on IMELDA's
petitions for review and he upheld IMELDA. Thus, the DOJ Secretary issued a resolution directing
the city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against IMELDA.

Conflict Rules: Article 15, Civil Code – Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition, and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.

Cf. Art. 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code – Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to ramarry
under Philippine law.

IMELDA's Contention: That the court (Judge Ibay-Somera) is without jurisdiction "to try and
decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de oficio,
since the purported complainant, GEILING, does not qualify as an offended spouse having
obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint."

City Fiscal's/GEILING's Contention: The divorce obtained by GEILING does not have effect in the
Philippines so IMELDA is still considered married to GEILING when she cohabited and had sexual
congress with other men. Therefore, GEILING is still her husband at the time material to this
case and was thus qualified to be the private complainant in the crime of adultery.

TC – the RTC Manila, presided by Judge Ibay-Somera, denied IMEDLA's motion to quash. It
rejected the contention that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the adultery complaint
because there was no valid private complainant in the case. Judge Ibay-Somera sustained the
City Fiscal and GEILING and took the view that the divorce obtained in Germany prior to the
filing of the case did not have any effect and insofar as IMELDA is concerned, so she was still
married to GEILING at the time of the filing of the case. Therefore, GEILING was a proper party
to act as private complainant in the crime of adultery, him still being IMELDA's lawful husband.
CA – n/a

ISSUE: WoN the RTC had jurisdiction over the adultery case filed against IMELDA considering
that the purported private offended party/private complainant (GEILING) had already obtained
a valid divorce abroad against the marriage

DECISION: No, the RTC has no jurisdiction in such a case. Judge Ibay-Somera's denial of
IMELDA's Motion to Quash is reversed.

HELD:

Under Article 344, RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse. Compliance with this rule is jurisdictional. The
requirement for a sworn written complaint is jurisdictional since it is that complaint which starts
the prosecutory proceeding and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try
the case.

The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person who
can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the other
offenses against chastity, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and
concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. It is significant that
while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested with the power to initiate the criminal
action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did
not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse,
and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to
do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil
actions. The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not
mean that the same requirement and rationale would not apply.

In the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the offended
spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain
therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option. This policy was adopted out of
consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather
than go through the scandal of a public trial. Article 344, RPC thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery.
Thus, where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender
at the time of the filing of the criminal case, he cannot validly file the case. It is, therefore,
indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be
definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably
exist as of the time he initiates the action.

There does not appear to be any local jurisprudence on the specific issue. American
jurisprudence thus become instructive. Their case law on this matter yields the rule that after a
divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings
against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the
exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been
properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the
prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion.

SIMILARLY, We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-
vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still
married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

IN THE CASE AT BAR, the fact that GEILING obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as GEILING is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law
on the matter of status of persons.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., → “it is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, the foreign spouse is no longer the husband of
the Filipina wife. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as only a
husband is entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.

APPLYING THIS RULING TO THE CASE AT BAR, GEILING, being no longer the husband of
IMELDA, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he
was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. When GEILING initiated the divorce
proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to
protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of
introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the
particular formulation of our law on adultery, since there would thenceforth be no spousal
relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy
on the other.

Para, J (concurring): Even without considering the German absolute divorce as valid in the
Philippines, GEILING, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no
longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has carnal
knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman
to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is
free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same privilege.

Justice Paras cautions that there is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity
of a foreign divorce in the Philippines if one of the parties is a Filipino wife, for then two (2)
different nationalities would be involved. He chides Salonga for his "socially grotesque
situation"-argument, where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her
husband. Per Justice Paras, while under the national law of the husband the absolute divorce
will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the
exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or
residents of the forum. Consequently, since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the
part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would
be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new
Family Code, the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband
and the Filipino wife. Justice Paras believes that Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. cannot applybecause in
said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in
issue.