CHAPTER ON.

Ii

Immanence: A Life

\Vhat is a transcendental field? It can l,e distinguished

Ftom experience in that it doesn't refer to an object
01· belong to a subject (erupirical repres,~11tation).It
appears tl,crefore a8 a pun: strearn of a-subjective
consdousncss, a pre-reflexive impersonal co11scio11s-
ness, a qualitative duration of consciousness without
a self. It may seem curious that thetran,(;endental be
defmcd by such immediate givP.m: we will speak of a
transc.-,udental empiricism· in contrast to everything
that makes up the world of the subject at,d the ol,ject.
There is ,omething wild and powerful in this tran-
scendental empirid8m that is of cow·se not the elc-
mc11tof sensation (simple empiricism), for sensation
is only a break within the flow of absolute conscious•
ness. Ith, rather, however close lwo sensations may
be, the passage frorn one to the other a8 becoming, as
iJ.1,weaseor ,\ecreasc in power (virtual •1uantity). Must

25
we then define tbe transcendental field by a pun: im-
mediate consciou~ness "ith neitlier ob_jectnor self,
as a movement that neither hegins nor en<ls? (Even
Spinoza's cociceplion of this passage or (1uan1.ityo\'
power $till appeals to conscio1L~ncss.)
But the relation of tbe transcendental field to con-
sciousness is only a conceptual one. Consciousness
becomes a fact o~y when a subject is product~d at. the
same time as it.~object, both being ou1side the field
and appearing as "transccndents:' Conversely, a8 long
as consdo,u.-ncss traverses tl,e tnnscender,tal ficld at
an infinite speed eve1·ywhere diffused, 1101.hing is ahle
t<>reveal it. 1 It is expres~cd, in fact, only when it is
rdlec1.cd oJl a subject thal refers it. lo ohjects. That is
whv the transcendental field t:annot be defim~dby the
co~s<.:iousnesslhat is coextemive withil, but removed
from anv revefation.
Tiie ~ansceJldent is not the tra11scen(\ental.Were il
not for consciousneis, tl,c t.ranscendenlal field wouk1
be define(! as a pure pb.ne uf imIJ1a.nence,l,ecaL1Seil
eludes all transcendet1ce of tht: subject and of tl,e
object.2 Absolute imn1ane11ceis in itself: it is not in
something, to 80melhing, it does 11ot tlcpeud on an
object or belong tu a subject. In Spinor.a, immanence
is not imm.'\ncnce to suhstance; rather, substance an<l
modes are in immanence. When the suhjecl or the
26
object falling out.side the plane of immanence is taken
as a universal subject or as any object to whicli imma-
nence is attributed, the tta11scendent.alis entirelv de-
n~tured, for it then simply recloubles the empiric:::ii(as
wtth Kant), and imnmnence is distorted, for it then
fitllh itself euclosed i11the transcendent. Irmnanence
is not. related to Some Thing as a unity superior to all
thin gs or to a Subject as an act tl1at brings about a
synthesis of things: it is only when irnmanence is 110
longer immanence to a11ythiogother lhan itself that
we can speak of a plant\ of immauence. No more than
the transcendental field is defined by consciousnes~
can the ~lane of immanence be dcl1ned by a $ubject
or an obJect that is able to (:ontain it.
We will say of pure immanence that. it is A LIFE,
and nothing else. Il is not immanence to life, bul. the
immanent that is it) nothing is itself a life. A life is the
immanence of immanence, al,.olute im rnanence: it is
complete power, complete hlfas. It is 10 the degree
lhat he goes beyond the aporia~ of the ~ubject anti
,
the object ll,at Joha.1111 Fichte, in his last pl,ilosophy,
presents the transcendental field as a Iij'e,110 longer
dependent on a Being or subtuitted to a11Act- it is ,m
absolute in,mediate consciousn,.._~s whose vcrv activitv
no. I_ongerrefers to a being but is ceaselessly ,po,ed i~
a hk. ! The tra11scendenlal field thc11becomes a gen-
. 27

uine plane of hnman<'.nce that rei1ltroduccs S~i1101~
iilto tlle heart of the philosophical process. Did Mame
de J\iran nol go through soo:,ething similar in his "last
philosophy" (the one he was too tired to bring to
fruition) when he discovered, beneath the transcen-
df".nceof effort, a:n absolute irn manent life? The tran-
1,cendcntal field is defined by a plane of immanence,
and lhe plane of immanence hy a Hfe. . no longer has a name, though he can be mistaken for
What is immanence? A life•.• No one bas descr1bed
what a life is better than Charles Dickens, ff we take
the indefinite article as an index of tht'. transcenden-
ial. A disreputable man, a rogue, held in <,-ontemplby
everyone, is foUtld as he lies dying. Suddenly, those
taking care of him manifest an eagerness, respect, even
love, for his slightest sign of life. Everybody b1.1stles
about to save him, to the point where, in his deepest
coma, this wicled man himself senses something soft
and sweet penetrating him. Hut to the degree that be_
comes back to life, his saviors tum coldc-.r,and he be-
coines on(;e again mean aJJd crude. Between bis life
and his death, there is a mom<:nt that is only that of
a life playing witl• death.◄ The life o~ the in,1:vidual
gives way to an impersonal and yet sn~gular 11£~that
releases a pwe e,,.ent lreed from 1he accidents of 111ter-
na1 aml external life, that i8, from the subjectivily and
ohjecth"ity of what happens: a "Homo tantum " w1·t11
28
IMM,'\Nl:.NCF; I\ LIFF.
whom everyone empathizes and who attains a sort of
beatitude. It is a haeoccity no longer of inllividuatio, 1
hut of singularization: a life of pur-e immanence, neu-
tral, beyond good and evil, for it was 011ly the subj~.(:t.
that incarnated it in the mid.st of things that made it
rod or bad. The life of such individuality fa<lesaway
m favor of the singular life imma11ent to a mar, who
110other. A singular essence, a lifo ...
But we shouldn't enclose life in the 8ingle mo-
ment when individual life confronts universal ,\eath.
A life is everywhere, in all the mornents that a given
living subject goes through and that arc 111easuredby
given lived objects: an immanent life carrying with it
the event.~ 0.1:8ingularities that are merely actuali,.~d
in subjects and objects. This in<lefinite life does not
it>.elfhave moments, close as they_may be one to an•
other, but only between-times, hetween-moments; il
doesn't just come about or come afte.1:but offers the
immensity of an empty time where one sees the event
yCJtto come and already happened, in the absolute of
an immediate consciousness. In his novels, Alexander
Lernct-Holenia places the event in ai1 in-between
time that <:ouldengulf entire armies. The singularitks
and the events that constitute a life coexist with the
accidents of tlie life that corresponds lo it, but they
 PVRE. It.IM AN i:NCf
arc neither grouped nor cli,ided in tbe same way.They
counect with one another in a manner cntirel y differ-
ent from how imlhiduals connect. It even seems that
a singu1ar life might ,lo without any indivicluality,
without any other concomitant that individualiz.es
it. For example, very small chilclren all rese1nble one
another and have hardly any individuality, but they
have singularities: a smile, a. gesture, a funny fa.;c -
not. subjedive qualities. Small d,ildren, through all
their sufferings and weaknesses, are infused with an
j mmanent life that is pure power ancl even bliss. The
indefinite asp-,cts in a life lose: all indetermination to
the degree that they fill out a plane of immanence or,
what amounL~to the same thing, to the degree tbal they
constitute 1.heelements of a transcendental field (in•
dividual life, on the other hand, remains inseparable
from empirical de1.crminalions). TI1eindclh1ite as such
is the mark not of an empirical indetermination but
of a determination by immanence or a vanscendental
determinability. The imlcfi;ute article is the it1deter-
mination of the person only because it is detcrmin;,-
tion of the singular. The One is not the transcendent
that might contain immanence but the immanent ()on-
taincd within a transcen,lcntal field. One is always
the inde:x of a roultiplidty: an event, a singu1arity, a
life ... Althougl, it is always possible to invoke a trail-
JM M .0.h ENCi:: A LIFF
scendent that falls outside the plane of imma:nencc,
or that attributes itnmauenc·e. to 1·tsel[ , all t·ransce11:-
de:ncc is constituted solely in the flow of immaneul
co:nsdousness that belongs to th·,s. plane .1 1iran!-Ccen-
dencc is always a product of itnmanencc.
. ~ life contains only vil-t:uab. It is macle up of virtu-
ahties, evcrits, singularities. Wliat we c:all v irtua.l is
not sorne~hing that lad~s reality hut something that is
engaged m _apr~~ess of _actualfaatiou followiug the
pla11ethat gives 1t ,ts patticular reality. The immanem
event is actuali,.ed i r1 a slate of thin~ a11dof the Jived
th at make it happen. The plane of itumanencc is itself
a(:tuali:,;edin an object aucl a subject to which it atlri-
but~s ilsel[ But !•owcver inseparable an ohjecl. aiul a
suhJect may be from their actualization, the plane of
immanence is itself 1,jrtual, so long as the event.~ tbae
populate it are virl.nalities. J,vents or singul.iritics give
~o the plane all th.eir 11irtuality, just as the plaue of
nnn1ane1tce gives virtu;,l events their fuJIreality. The
~ve1'.tcons1dei-edas non-actualized (indefinite) is Jack-
mg Ill nothing. It suffices to put it in relation to its
conco,nita11ts: a tran~cemlental fie!J, a plane of ilri-
manence, a life, singularities. A wound is inca1·nate,l
~r actualized in a ~tatc of things or of lifo; but it is
itself a pu1·evi rtuality on the plane of immanence that
leads us into a life. My wo1md exislo,d before rne: Hot
 4. Dicken, , Our Afuw al Frl e,,J (Ne w York: Oxford Uuiver-
& t:ranS<:cnd
c:ncc of th e wound as higher actu.allty, but
•ity Prcu , 1989) , p. H 3.
its i mm anence u a virtuality alwl\)'S with in a m ilieu
(pl.i11e or fid d)f There is a big diffp.rco.ce bc t\ ~ee.u the
5. E,-.n Edm und Hu...,rJ ,dm h , thb : •n,ebeing of th•
world is u ec:..,.. 1Uy tT>w<:t.OOcn CS1,""'"" wid>ln
l I<, w u •cio 11J11
virlu als that define th e irmnan c11ce of the uanscen ·
the origlnary evldenu, w d r,m ain• " '":e.•ro ily tnoxcndent to
derrtal field aod the possible forms th at a~tuallze thc.i.n
il . l;lut tbi.,doc, o' t change the fact th•LalI 1., ... , .,cm.1c
m,c i, coo-
and t:ransfonn th em into somethin g \t'an~ceod eot.
wk ly in ~
M.hutc:,cf l!foefconsaolttl)~1'.f
i a~ ir11r.p3.
nb l; Uok<"
d to
thal Wt •. ." (Mulitaticm «u<tdm""' fP.uis: Vrin , 1?17), p. 5 l) .
This will be ,l,o ••.vtin g puint of Sutre 's tut .
No·r,,, 6. Cf. Joti Bou,, 1u,i , 1,£<C.npt,olrJ (P•lis: Le (:ercle du U,n ,
I .• ,._. d,oagh -.•c rtJlc<:ted bac\ l'O,u,ofac:•• the li!(htwhich .
1955).
emana ld fron, 11.. ,u , d..: light "'hi.ell, bad it passt4 ~noppc»c<I,
,.,,, uld never b•v,, bee.I\ , e•• •I« (Henri Ji« gs<>n,.Haua and
Memory [N•w y,,rlr.: 'l.on< Bo<ob.19881,p. 36).
2. er. .l•M -Paul Sartre , whu po,;ts. U"ll•ACCJ
1deoul field
widiout., suhjfd, th.i t re.fort to a a u, sd1msor.ss\.hat i• \Jrlpe
r~
.,oml, ~lu t<:,lm.nwi cnt wich re,pcct to it , th u ubjcc<and~
dtrn« d• l'ligo !Paris:
nbjcc;t art- "tnns cend•n ts" (l.<tuo11s«J?
Vrin, 1966], pp. 74-87 ). OP Jan,<,s, ...,,O•vid u poujvl •'• . ,,.Jy-
ot.noe cbe.• W!llia,n Ja,nu : Phi-
.i,, ·1..t t~ux bm n.Jf de la ,,oJU<

• 46 0""" 1995),
kitopltl ,
3. /,l rea,ly In the secun<l1,.n u,luctioo to Lo O.,,.,rln• dt),,
,.; .nee: -rh e intoi1io1• of Jllll'C.cti-f i ty which ;, nolhJng!bed, but
prog,-r,s : nor. being, but • lif•" {Ow rru d iclsf<Sdola phflosophie
pru»lue tr.rl., v , 10, 1964I, p. 274). On lh • cul\ccpt or llfo
accurdin.&to Fichte, ,u b, itlotio n a lo t it bJcal,t,u...,. (l'ari><
Auhitr , 1944 ), oJ\d M-r ti,1 Gu•ro ul•'• ,;Olllll=W Y (p. 9).