CASE REPORT

JOSE DE BORJA vs. TASIANA VDA. DE BORJA

G.R. No., L-28040. August 18, 1972.

Facts:

This case involves a compromise agreement in order to settle all claims, controversies and etc., regarding
the administration, settlement, partition, adjudication, and distribution of all assets and liabilities of the
estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, the first marriage of the Francisco. This agreement is
between the heir and son of Francisco de Borja, who is Jose de Borja the administrator of the testate
estate of Josefa Tangco, in his first marriage; and the heir and surviving spouse of the second marriage,
TasianaVda. de Borja assisted by her law, Atty. Panaguiton.

The compromise agreement was submitted to the Court for approval. It was submitted in the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal and Nueva Ejica. However, only the CFI of Rizal approved the compromise
agreement. The CFI of Nueva Ecija declared said agreement as void and unenforceable.

Tasiana assailed the validity of the agreement applying the doctrine in Guevarra vs. Guevarra that a
probate proceeding is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of
intestacy even though the decedent left a will is against law and public order. On the other hand, Jose de
Borja argued that under Rules of Court of 1940, extrajudicial settlement of estate of the deceased person
is allowed irrespective a will exist or not.

Issue:
Whether or not the compromise agreement is valid even without the will of Francisco being probated.

Ruling:

Yes, the compromise agreement was valid. The object of the contract was merely for the conveyance of
any and all individual share and interest, actual or eventual of TasianaOngsingco in the estate of
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. The intention of settlement and distribution of de Borja’s estate
among the heirs before the probate of his will is non-existent.

Further, the transaction was binding on both parties on their individual capacities, upon the perfection of
the contract, even without the previous authority of the Court to enter the same.

The Supreme Court ruled that the CFI of Rizal acted in accordance with the law and therefore, should be
upheld. On the other hand, the contrary decision of the CFI of Nueva Ecija must be reversed.

Discussion:
MAURICIA ALEJANDRINO VS. COURT OF APPEAL
G.R. No., 114151. September 17, 1998

Facts:

In this case a 219 square meter lot identified as Lot No. 2798 located in Mambaling, Cebu City was left
by late spouses Jacinto Alejandrino and EnricaLabunos to their six children, wherein each of them is
entitled to a share of 36.50 square meters. Later on, a buyer, LicerioNique, purchased portions of the
property from three of the six children, namely Laurencia, Gregorio and Abundio, with a total area of
121.67 square meters of the Alejandrino property.

However, an action for quieting of title and damages against Nique was filed by Laurencia who
questioned the sale, when in fact she is the alleged seller to Nique of most of the property. The RTC
rendered in favor of Nique wherein the Court declared him as the owner in fee simple of the share of
Laurencia, Marcelino, Gregorio, and Abundio of the parcel of land in Lot. 2798.

Despite such Court decision, Laurencia appealed but later on withdrew. Instead, the other sibling,
Mauricia, who is the petitioner in this case, filed a complaint for redemption and recovery of properties
with damages against Nique.

Subsequently, on the basis of the declared decision of the trial court which was in favor of Nique, he filed
a motion for the segregation of the 146 square meter portion of the property and was granted by the court.
Due to such decision, Mauricia then questioned the order of the court through a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction filed before the Court of
Appeals but was dismissed. Mauricia filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied it
for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not, as an heir of the Alejandrino property, Laurencia may validly sell specific portions
thereof to a third party.

Ruling:

Laurencia may validly sell portions of her hereditary rights of her pro indiviso share in the lot to a third
party. However, since the property was not yet divided or partitioned, there can be no specific portion of
the property that could be identified and alienated through sale.

Under 493 of the Civil Code, the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such
inchoate right of the property. He has the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits thereto,
which extends to alienation or mortgage of the property, but shall only be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership.

Further, under Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole
estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the
debts of the deceased. The underlying principle of this provision is that before division of the property,
the co-owners have the right to the use and enjoyment of the property due to joint ownership but, there is
no specific determination of the of each co-owner’s respective share until partition is made.

Moreover, Laurencia’s execution of the deed of extra-judicial settlement together with Mauricia
expressedtheir intention to terminate the co-ownership by physically dividing the property and selling
shares to Nique. Taking into consideration that they have acquired the shares of their other siblings thus,
it shows that only the two of them who needs to settle the estate.

Under Art. 1082 of the civil code, it provides that every act which is intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a
sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. The fact that the document was not notarized
does not make it less effective as regards the two of them. The partition is of inherited property need not
be embodied in a public document.

Therefore, the trial court did not act in abuse of its discretion in issuing the order for the segregation of
the property. The court only reiterated the intent of the partition that was executed by Laurencia and
Mauricia that was embodied in the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate.

Discussion:
DELIA BAILON CASILAO vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No., 78178. April 15, 1988

Facts:

This is a case that involves a parcel of land with an area of 48,849 square meters issued in the names of
Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina, BernabeNenita and Delia, all surnamed Bailon, as co-owners. Each of them
has a share of 1/6 in the property covered by a title. However, Gaudencio and Nenita have passed away,
the latter, being represented by her children.

Sometime in 1948, Rosalia and Gaudencio sold 16,283 square meter of the lot to Donald Delgado. A year
after, the remaining portion of 32,566 square meters of the property was sold to Lazuna and acquired
from Delgado 16,283 sq.m. of the same lot that was formerly sold to him. Later on, the husband of
Lazuna sold the two parcels of land to Afable. In all of these transactions it was presented that the land
was not registered under the provision of Act No. 496 even though it was really registered. Thus,
Rosalia’s siblings filed a case for recovery of property and damages with notice of lispendens.

The Regional Trial Court rendered in favor of Afable having validly bought the 2/6 respective undivided
shares of Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon. This was further confirmed by the decision of the Court of
Appeals on the ground that prescription does not lie against the plaintiff since they are the co-owners with
the original vendors. The prescription is not a ground for the loss of the registered property. Nevertheless
an action to recover the property may be barred by laches, thus dismissing their complaint.Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are barred by laches and prescription.

Ruling:

No, they are not. Under Article 494 of the Civil Code it states that “no co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in
common, as so far his share is concerned.” To interpret this provision it means that the action to partition
is imprescriptible or cannot barred by prescription. This is unavailing not only against the registered
owner but also to the latter’s hereditary successors because they merely steps into the shoes of the
decedent by operation of law, as discussed in the case of Pasion.

Subsequently, laches is likewise unavailing. In the case at bar, there was evident delay in asserting
petitioner’s right. However, the said delay was not attended with any knowledge of the sale by the two
sibling nor with any opportunity to bring the suit. In fact, the petitioners were not notified of the sale
made. As presented, it was Rosalia that was assigned as the lone administrator of the land since the other
siblings were away. Much more that due to the lack of knowledge of the transaction it resulted to the
absence of any opportunity to institute any proper action with regards to the matter.

Further, the Court said that recovery of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted
the co-owners who alienated their share, but the division of the common property as it continued to
remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it. An action of partition
should be the proper recourse of the petitioner co-owners where their consent was not secured in the sale
of the entire property.

Therefore, the petition for certiorari is granted and the decision of the trial court is granted.
Discussion:

DOLORES HACBANG and BERNARDO HACBANG vs. ATTY. BASILIO ALO

G.R. No., 191031. Otober 5, 2015

Facts:

In the case at bar, Bishop SofronioHacbang died and left a will, which he denominated as
UltimaVoluntad y Testamento, to his parents with one-half of his properties and the other half to his sister
Dolores. A petition for probation proceeding was filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila.
During the proceedings, it was found out that the Register of Deeds of Quezon appears to have issued a
TCT over the subject lot in this case, Lot No. 8-A locates in San Juan Rizal, in the name of the respondent
BasilioAlo.

Meanwhile, Dolores HacbangAlo moved to revive the settlement proceedings due to the incomplete
adjudication of properties by the CFI but was denied. Eventually, the petitioners filed a petition to cancel
the TCT on the ground that it was fraudulently secured but the RTC dismissed the petition since they
hadno right to prosecute the case on the subject lot since Dolores is neither a compulsory nor testamentary
heirs of the decedent. Further, the RTC rendered that since the probate proceedings has been granted the
issue of the intrinsic validity of the will is settled and cannot be questioned anymore.

The petitioners appealed to the CA but affirmed the RTC’s decision of dismissal. They moved for
reconsideration but were denied as well. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have a right over the property.

Ruling:

No, the petitioners do not have a right over the property. The petitioners came to the court praying for the
annulment of the respondent’s title but should not be entitled thereto since they have no right over the
subject lot as well as the respondent having no obligation to them with respect to the subject lot. They
have no legal standing to sue for the cancellation of the title of the subject lot because the right only
belongs to the rightful owner of the lot.

The Civil Code has great respect over the decedent’s freedom to freely dispose of his estate. Wherein a
provision of the law provides that person may dispose his estate in favor of anyone capacitated to succeed
him provided no compulsory heirs; otherwise, he still can dispose but should not impair their legitimes.
Hence, testator’s will in a testate succession is preferred over intestacy.Further, there is no reason to
disturb nor to doubt the intrinsic validity of the will since there is no indication that the CFI declared any
of the dispositions in the will invalid.

The decedent, Sofronio, was free to dispose his estate without prejudice to the legitimes of his
compulsory heirs which are only his parents. Their legitime was one-hlaf of Sofonio’s estate and the other
half was a free portion which he gave to his sister, Dolores. Hence, making the will intrinsically valid.
Moreover, the petitioner’s contention on the CFI’s failure to adjuidicate the specific properties is
irrelevant because Sofronio named his heirs and identified the specific properties that formed part in their
inheritiance.

Therefore, the petition is denied for lack of merit.

Discussion:
Determine first the law in force at the time of the decedent’s death which will determine the applicable
laws over the settlement of his estate.

NORA CALALANG-PARULAN, et al., vs. ROSARIO CALALANG-GARCIA, et al.,

G.R. No., 184148. June 9, 2014

Facts:

This case started in a complaint for annulment of sale and reconveyance of property in the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan filed by the respondents against the petitioner. The former asserted their ownership
over a parcel of land they inherited from their mother, EncarnacionSilverio, measuring with an area of
1,266 square meters, Lot.1132, Cad. 222 located in the Province of Bulacan.

The father of the respondents, Pedro Calalang, contracted two marriages during his lifetime. His first
marriage was with the respondent’s mother, Encarnacio, wherein they acquired the land from their
parents grandmother Francisca Silverio. But despite their continuous possession their parents failed to
register the land.

In their father’s second marriage he has two children, the petitioners in this present case. It was only
during his second marriage that he filed an application for free patent over the land with the Bureau of
Lands. And further claiming sole and exclusive ownership over the land despite the existence of his three
children in his first marriage. As a result, the Register of Deeds issued an original certificate of title in
favor of Pedro Calalang only.

Pedro sold the land to Nora Parulan transferring the original title to the latter before he died. Thus, the
respondents assailed the validity of the transaction on the ground that Pedro failed to obtain consent from
them who were co-owners of the land, and the sale was absolutely simulated.

The trial court rendered decision in favor of the respondents. The petitioners appealed to the CA but was
modified. The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Pedro Calalang was the exclusive owner of the disputed property to its transfer to his
daughter Nora B. Calalang-Parulan.

Ruling:

Yes, based from the careful review of the records of the case by the supreme court, Pedro is the sole and
exclusive owner of the property. The evidence that was adduced by the respondents were merely
testimonial and was not able to present any document to evidence the sale nor any tax declaration from
the grandmother to Pedro and Encarnacion. Moreover, over 30 years after the death of Encarnacion and
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first marriage that the free patent was issued
solely in the name of Pedro Calalang. Hence, cannot validate the submission of the respondents that the
subject lot was acquired by Pedro and Encarnacion from the parents of Encarnacion.

Pedro averred that he occupied and made use of the land since 1935 but applied for free patent only in
1974. He was issued the free patent at the time he was already married to ElviricaCalalang, his second
marriage, making it as his exclusive private property excluded from the conjugal partnership of gains of
the second marriage.

Thus, Pedro Calalang had the right to convey his property in favor of Nora Calalang-Parulanby executing
a deed of absolute sale. The respondent had no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the
ground that their father deprived them of their respective share since it is only upon the death of Pedro
that his heirs acquired their respective inheritances giving them pro indiviso shares. But in the case at
hand, the successional right did not arise because at the time of the sale of the property made by Pedro to
Nora was not yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro.

Therefore, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.

Discussion:

CELESTINO BALUS vs. SATURNINO BALUS

G.R. No., 168970. January 15, 2010

Facts:

The subject parcel of land in this case was originally owned by RufoBalus, the father of both parties. He
mortgaged the property as a security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo. He failed to
pay the loan resulting to its foreclosure which was subsequently sold to the Bank in a public auction.
However, the property was not redeemed within one year from the sale, wherein the sheriff executed a
definite deed of sale in favor of the bank which a new title was issued under the name of the bank.

Thereafter, the parties executed an extrajudicial settlement of estate and three years after the execution,
the respondents bought the subject property from the bank. Fortunately, the bank allowed them and
executed a deed of sale of the land in favor to them which later on a Transfer Title was issued under the
name of the respondents.

Despite the grant, the petitioner was still in possession of the subject lot. Due to this, the respondent filed
a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against the petitioner even though