Millett 1986

The Effectiveness of Military Organizations
Author(s): Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray and Kenneth H. Watman

Source: International Security, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Summer, 1986), pp. 37-71
Published by: The MIT Press
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The Effectivenessof AllanR. Millett,
Williamson
Murray,
andKennethH.
Watman
Military effectiveness
is the process by which armed forcesconvertresources into fightingpower.
A fullyeffectivemilitaryis one that derives maximum combat power from
the resources physically and politicallyavailable. Effectivenessthus incor-
porates some notion of efficiency.
Combat power is the ability to inflictdamage upon the enemy while
limitingthe damage that he can inflictin return. The precise amount of
necessary damage depends on the goals of the war and the physical char-
acteristicsof the armed forces committedto its prosecution. Resources are
assets importantto militaryorganizations: human and natural resources,
money,technicalprowess, industrialbase, governmentalstructure,sociolog-
ical characteristics,political capital, the intellectualqualities of militarylead-
ers, and morale.
The constraintsthatmilitaryorganizationsmust overcomeare both natural
and political. Natural constraintsinclude such thingsas geography,natural
resources, the economic system, population, time, and weather. Political
constraintsreferto national politicaland diplomaticobjectives,popular atti-
tudes towards the military,the conditionsof engagement,and civilianmor-
ale.
Obviously, no precise calculation of the aggregatemilitaryeffectsof such
disparate elements is possible. But it is essential to reach a judgment about
thepossibilitiesopen to a particularmilitaryorganizationin a given situation.
Only thencan one compare nationalarmed forces,possessing vastlydifferent
characteristics,problems, and enemies, in a fashion that can explain their
relativeeffectiveness.
Some relationshipexistsbetween militaryeffectivenessand victory.If "vic-
tory"were the sole criterionof effectiveness,however, one would conclude
thatthe Russians were more effectivethan the Finns in the "WinterWar" of
1939-1940 or than the Germans in 1941-1945. However, a detailed exami-
nation of those strugglessuggests that this was simply not so. Rather,the
Finns and Germans functionedmore effectively at the operationallevel with
ProfessorsAllan R. Millettand WilliamsonMurrayteachmilitary at The Ohio State University

history
and are co-principal
directorsof theMershonCenter'sMilitaryEffectivenessProject,sponsoredby the
DirectorofNet Assessment,Officeof theSecretary ofDefense.Theformerexecutivedirectorofthesame
project,Mr. Watmanis nowa research associateofRand-SantaMonica. Thecompleted firstphaseofthe
studywill be publishedin threevolumesbyAllen & Unwinin 1987. The viewsof theauthorsdo not
necessarily
reflectthoseoftheDepartment ofDefense.
Security,Summer 1986 (Vol. 11, No. 1)

International
and FellowsofHarvardCollegeand oftheMassachusetts
C 1986bythePresident ofTechnology.
Institute
37

International
Security138
limitedresources than did theiropponents. Victoryis an outcome of battle;

it is not what a militaryorganizationdoes in battle. Victoryis not a charac-
teristicof an organizationbut rathera resultof organizationalactivity.Judg-
ments of effectivenessshould thus retain some sense of proportionalcost
and organizationalprocess.
Militaryactivityoccurs at four differentlevels: political, strategic,opera-
tional, and tactical.Each categoryoverlaps others,but each is characterized
by differentactions, procedures, and goals. Therefore,one must assess mil-
itaryeffectivenessseparatelyat each level of activity.It is doubtfulwhether
any militaryorganization is completelyeffectiveat all four levels simulta-
neously. No doubt this results fromhuman limitations,but it also reflects
the factthat the prerequisitesforeffectivenessat one level may conflictwith
those at another. For example, American militaryforcesin South Vietnam
might have increased their effectivenessat the tactical level by a greater
willingnessto close with the enemy instead of relyingso heavily on indirect
firepower.However, the price would likelyhave been highercasualties and
thereforereduced political effectiveness.1When such conflictsoccur, the
organization may have to choose to diminish effectivenessat one level in
order to enhance effectivenessat others.
Since the basic characteristicsof militaryeffectivenesscannot be measured
with precision, any examination must rely on more concreteindicators of
effectivenessat the political,strategic,operational,and tacticallevels. There-
fore, we have divided this article into four sections. Each begins with a
general descriptionof a level of militaryactivityand then examines various
aspects of effectivenessforthat particularlevel. The answers provided aim
to focus attentionon the various facetsof militaryeffectivenessat thatlevel
and to determinepreciselywhere and in what ways organizationshave or
have not been effective.The ultimategoal of this analysis is to identifythose
characteristicsof militaryorganizations useful to planners interestedin as-
sessing the effectivenessof potentialadversaries or allies.
PoliticalEffectiveness
For a militaryorganization to act strategically,operationally,or tactically,it

must consistentlysecure the resources required to maintain, expand, and
1. Dave RichardPalmer, SummonsoftheTrumpet:U.S.-Vietnamin Perspective (San Rafael, Calif.:

Presidio Press, 1978); Bruce Palmer, Jr.,The 25-Year War: America'sMilitaryRole in Vietnam
(Lexington,Ky.: UniversityPress of Kentucky,1984); and Shelby L. Stanton,TheRiseand Fall of
an AmericanArmy:U.S. GroundForcesin Vietnam,1965-1973(Novato, Calif.:Presidio Press, 1985).

Effectiveness
ofMilitary
Organizations
| 39
reconstituteitself. Almost always, this necessity requires the militaryto

obtain the cooperation of the national political elite. Hence, the effortto
obtainresourcesformilitaryactivityand the proficiencyachieved in acquiring
those resources constitutepoliticaleffectiveness. Resources include reliable ac-
cess to financialsupport,a sufficient military-industrial base, sufficient
quan-
tityand quality of manpower, and control over the conversion of those
resourcesinto militarycapabilities. The process by which modern militaries
obtain resources follows a general pattern.Militaryleaders assess potential
adversariesand calculate the varietyand level of the threatposed to national
security.On the basis of those conclusions, theyask the politicalleadership
for a share of resources over some period of time to meet the threatsto
national security.Depending upon the regime and the circumstances,mili-
taryservices will face civilianobjections thatotherneeds are more crucialto
national welfare. In a limited sense, a militaryorganization'spoliticaleffec-
tivenessdepends on an abilityto articulateits needs more persuasivelythan
its competitors.
A criticalelement in the abilityto persuade or coerce involves the degree
to which the political elite regards militaryactivityas legitimateand officer-
ship as a distinctprofessionrequiringextended education and special exper-
tise. If the politicalleadership perceives militaryskillsas largelyintuitiveand
undifferentiatedfrom civilian occupations, militaryarguments for a large
share of the nation's resourcesare not likelyto carrymuch weight. However,
to the extent that officersare viewed as experts in a specialized and de-
manding functionnot mastered without long preparation,militaryassess-
ments of the threatconfrontinga nation and recommendationsfora partic-
ular response are much less likely to be directlycontested. Militaryclaims
on resources may still not be granted in toto,but the credibilityof the mili-
tary's argumentsforresources will usually not be the primaryissue in dis-
pute. Withoutpolitical effectiveness,all other types of effectivenessare en-
dangered. The following are measures for evaluating the political
effectivenessof a militaryorganization.
A. CAN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS ASSURE THEMSELVES A REGULAR SHARE OF

THE NATIONAL BUDGET SUFFICIENT TO MEET THEIR MAJOR NEEDS?
Obviously armed forcesneed financialand economic support. The mecha-
nisms through which they meet their requirementsvary from nation to
nation. But in each the essence of the process is similar:the armed forces
must compete both among themselvesand with othersforscarce resources.
They accomplish this by convincingthe politicalleadership that theirneeds

International
Security140
are more importantthan others'. Usually the militarymust persuade bud-

getaryauthoritiesthatthe nationwill faceincreased riskand dangers without
the desired funding.This case is usually made by assessing the capabilities
of potential adversaries and by using that analysis to extrapolatepossible
intentions.Armed forces persuasive enough to secure steady, predictable,
and high levels of support rate highlyin termsof politicaleffectiveness.
Both the Britisharmy and the French air forceduring the interwarperiod
were politicallyineffectiveas measured by theirabilityto secure resources.
The Britisharmy was underfunded in almost every category.Admittedly,
factorsoutside the army's control,such as the popular revulsion over the
slaughteron the WesternFrontin World War I and the politicaldenial of the
strategicnecessityfora continentalcommitment,contributedto this state of
affairs.Nevertheless, the armygenerallyfailed to convey its strategicvision
to those in power. Similarly,the French air forcefailed in the same period
to articulatethe importance of its mission to the politicians of the Third
Republic. Only in 1938 when the mismatchbetween Frenchand German air
strengthhad reached catastrophicproportionswas the Frenchair forceable
to influenceits governmentand, then, the desperate scramble to make up
what the French "locust years" had lost occurredtoo late.2
B. To WHAT EXTENT DO MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS HAVE ACCESS TO

INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL RESOURCES NECESSARY TO PRODUCE THE
EQUIPMENT NEEDED?
Even with an ample budget, armed services still must convert financial
supportinto equipment. They can do thiseitherby depending upon national
industriesor by importingarms fromabroad. Almost all militaryorganiza-
tions need to do some of both, but, as a general rule, more advanced forces
generallyrelyon internalsources of supply. To the degree thatarmed forces
acquire theirequipment fromdomestic sources, they must assess theirna-
tion's industrial,technical,and researchand developmentalcapabilities,com-
municate their requirements, supervise and monitor production of those
items, and test the end products. In a marketeconomy they must consider
the relationshipof investmentriskto price. To operate such a systemrequires
2. For the best discussion of the Britisharmyand its fundingdifficulties,

see BrianBond, British
MilitaryPolicybetweenthe Two WorldWars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). On the failureto
make a Continentalcommitment,see.Michael Howard, TheContinental Commitment (London: T.
Smith, 1972).

Effectiveness
ofMilitary | 41
Organizations
technologistscapable of dealing with such concerns in the languages of

business, engineering, and science. Militaryorganizations dependent on
foreignsuppliers may not need such elaborate arrangements,but they do
requirean abilityto assess products and to enterinto intelligentcommercial
relationshipswith suppliers. A militaryorganizationthatcannot or does not
exploiteitherdomestic or foreignindustrialand scientificcommunitieslimits
its effectiveness.
In the 1920s and 1930s, despite considerableinternaldifficulties, the Soviet
militarywas able to make good use of foreigntechnologyas well as its own
engineeringand productioncapabilities. One example of domestic exploita-
tion of foreigndesign was arguably the finesttank of World War II-the T-
34. In the 1920s the Soviets imported the Christietank suspension system
and incorporatedit into theirtank designs. In the 1930s, building on their
past experiences,they utilized theirown engineeringand industrialcapabil-
ities, including even naval architects,to design a series of vehicles that
culminated in the T-34. They then put their design into production with
relativedispatch, so that the T-34 was available forthe 1941 battles and in
increasingnumbers thereafter.It proved one of the nastiestsurprisesof the
war for German armored forces.3On the other hand, the Italian military
forces,despite the allocation of considerableresources and financialsupport
(outspending the French in the 1935-1938 period), failed to utilize the capa-
bilitiesof Italian industry.4Among otheritems,the Whitehead firmof Fuime
developed an aerial torpedo in the late 1930s: the Italian services showed no
interestdespite its obvious applicabilityto the Mediterraneantheater,and
the weapon was eventually sold to the Germans.5 Such blindness to the
importanceof available technology,foreignas well as domestic, in general
characterized the Italian militaryin the interwarperiod. The formercase
suggests an effectiveuse of national industrialand technologicalresources;
the latter,the opposite.
C. To WHAT EXTENT DO MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS HAVE ACCESS TO

MANPOWER IN THE REQUIRED QUANTITY AND QUALITY?
Access to manpower involves not only legal power, but also moral and
practicallegitimacy.For example, the militarymay possess the legal rightto
3. AlbertSeaton, The Russo-GermanWar 1941-45 (New York: Praeger,1970), p. 96.

4. See the tables in Appendix 2, MacGregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed,1939-41: Politicsand
Strategyin FascistItaly'sLast War (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1982), pp. 292-296.
5. Ibid., pp. 24-25.

Security142
International
universal conscription,but coercion alone cannot provide the personnel, if

the society,or an elite within it, desires to circumventthe legal structure.
The historyof various American draftsillustratesthat societal resistance or
support can influence not only the effectivenessof conscription,but also
combat power.6 Especially importantformilitaryorganizationsis the willing
cooperationand serviceof the educated and skilledmiddle and upper classes.
Without their participation,militaryskills particularlyin the officercorps
cannot be maintained at a sufficiently high level of expertise. In addition,
the absence frommilitaryserviceof the most politicallyactive and influential
segments of society will serve to isolate and alienate the militaryfromthe
nation they protect.The citizenrywill then lose the sense that defense is a
legitimateactivity.Effectivenessby this measure requiresthatthe nation not
stigmatizeits armed forces. Furthermore,officershipmust be regarded by
both the officercorps and civil societyat large as a distinctprofessionincor-
poratinga body of specialized knowledge and a code of self-regulation.7
StrategicEffectiveness
The strategiclevel of militaryactivityrefersto the employmentof national

armed forcesto secure by forcenational goals definedby politicalleadership.
Strategicactivityconsists of plans specifyingtime, geography,mission, and
objectivesand the execution of those plans. Subsumed withinthe definition
are the analysis and selection of strategicobjectivesand the linkage of those
objectives to national goals throughthe mechanism of campaign or contin-
gency plans. A campaign is a sustained operationdesigned to defeat enemy
forcesin a specifiedspace and timewith simultaneousand sequential battles.
Usually several campaigns are required to achieve strategicobjectives. An
example would be the decision by U.S. ArmyAirForces in 1941 thatairpower
could be most effectivelyused in attacks on Germany to destroyits ability
and will to make war. Anotherexample would be the decision by American
6. Marvin A. Kreidbergand Merton G. Henry,HistoryofMilitaryMobilizationin theUnitedStates

Army,1775-1945 (Washington,D.C., 1955).
7. MorrisJanowitz,TheProfessional Soldier,a Socialand PoliticalPortrait(Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press,
1960); Bengt Abrahamsson, MilitaryProfessionalization and PoliticalPower(BeverlyHills, Calif.:
Sage Publications, 1972); and Allan R. Millett,MilitaryProfessionalism and Officership in America
(Columbus, Ohio: Mershon Center of the Ohio State University,1977).

Effectiveness
ofMilitary | 43
Organizations
forcesin the Pacificto launch an island-hoppingcampaign in order to bring

air and seapower withinrange of the Japanese home islands.8
One must not confuse this militaryactivitywith the analysis and desig-
nation of national goals by the political leadership. Germany's total defeat
was the primarypolitical goal of the United States in the European theater;
bombingGermanindustryrepresenteda strategicdecision intendedto secure
thatgoal. However, politicaland militarydecisions at these levels do overlap
and are made iteratively;a purelylinearconceptionthatpoliticalgoals always
drive strategicdecisions is simplistic.Politicalgoals no doubt should inform
strategy,but the strategicalternatives,enunciated by the military,may si-
multaneously shape those goals. The analysis of strategic effectiveness
should aim at capturingthis reciprocity.
A. To WHAT DEGREE WOULD ACHIEVEMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION'S

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES RESULT IN SECURING THE POLITICAL GOALS OF THE
NATION?
The need for consistency between strategicmeans and political ends has
become a truism-especially since the "rediscovery"of Clausewitz. Therefore
a test of that means-ends relationshipmust be a fundamentalmeasure of
strategiceffectiveness.The Japanese decision to attackthe United States in
the Pacificis an interestingcase. Why did the Japanese believe that even a
complete initial strategicsuccess in the Pacificwould result in a victorious
peace with the United States?9An analysis demands more than an answer
to why the Japanese adopted their course of action. Rather, it must also
assess the process of Japanese strategicdecision-making.Since effectiveness
has a normative component, the critique must provide a well-supported
judgment about the fitbetween the available strategicalternativesand Jap-
anese national goals. The applicable normativestandard would be the con-
sistencyor inconsistencybetween means and ends. A gap between means
8. Thomas A. Fabyanic, "A Critique of United States Air War Planning, 1941-1944" (Ph.D.
dissertation,St. Louis University,1973); W.F. Craven and J.L. Cate, eds., TheArmyAir Forces
in WorldWarII, Vol. I, Plans and EarlyOperations
January1939 toAugust1942 (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1948); and Hayward S. Hansell, Jr.,TheAir Plan thatDefeatedHitler(Atlanta,
Ga.: Higgins-McArthur/Longino & Porter,1972).
9. For an analysis of Japanese strategicthinkingboth before and during the early months of
World War II, see H.P. Willmott,Empiresin theBalance:Japaneseand Allied PacificStrategiesto
April1942 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval InstitutePress, 1982), and The Barrierand theJavelin:Japanese
and AlliedPacificStrategies,Februaryto June1942 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval InstitutePress, 1983).
See also Saburo Ienaga, The PacificWar: WorldWar II and theJapanese,1931-1945 (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1978).

International
Security144
and ends beyond prudentriskwould suggest ineffectiveness

at the strategic
level.
B. To WHAT DEGREE ARE THE RISKS ENTAILED IN THE DESIRED STRATEGIC

OBJECTIVES CONSISTENT WITH THE STAKES INVOLVED AND THE CONSEQUENCES
OF FAILURE?
A strategicobjective or course of action may fitdesired political goals, but
still not be prudent if the risks and costs of failure are sufficiently great.
Therefore,an analysis must assess the chances and consequences of failure
of available strategicalternatives.It must then compare these with the ben-
efitsof success and the costs of toleratingthe status quo. Again, the analysis
must emphasize the normative aspect of effectiveness,and it requires a
critiqueof those culturalor psychologicalimpedimentsto strategiceffective-
ness in each particularcase.
To returnto the World War II Pacificcase, one can argue reasonably that
Japan's assumption that America lacked the will to fightsimultaneouslyon
two fronts(Pacific and Europe) constituteda key element in the Japanese
decision forwar. The analysis must evaluate this assessment both in terms
of what the Japanese knew at the time and what they should and could be
reasonably expected to have known. For example, was it intelligentforthe
Japanese to base their entire campaign against the United States upon an
evaluation of national political will, a type of judgment that has historically
proven notoriouslyunreliable?Did the Japaneseimpute too much rationality
to their adversaries? Was it reasonable to devise a strategicplan that con-
tained the possibilityof catastrophicfailure,ifthe predictedenemybehavior
proved incorrect?To the extent that the answers are negative, an analysis
would judge the Japanese strategicallyineffective.
C. To WHAT DEGREE WERE THE LEADERS OF THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION

ABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH AND INFLUENCE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP TO
SEEK MILITARILY LOGICAL NATIONAL GOALS?
The process of selectingnationalpoliticalgoals and strategicobjectivesshould
be interactive.Strategicobjectives chosen in a political vacuum possess no
meaning. Political goals chosen without referenceto what is strategically
possible are futileat best and disastrous at worst. The militarymust com-
municate effectivelyto political leadership what is militarilypossible and
therebyinfluencethe choice of national goals. A militarythat performsthis
task badly is strategicallyineffective.Obviously, such strategiceffectiveness

ofMilitary
Effectiveness Organizations
45 J
requirescertainskills within the militaryleadership, includingthe abilityto

persuade with candor when required and obfuscationwhen necessary.Prac-
ticalprowess in bureaucraticmaneuveringand coalitionbuildingis essential.
An interestingexample is whether the American militaryleaders were
effectivein communicatingtheirlimitsto the civilian leadership during the
Vietnam War. General William C. Westmorelandhas argued that he made
clear thatthe level of available Americanground forcesin Vietnam required
thatmost pacificationtasks would fallto the South Vietnamese. This meant,
argues Westmoreland,that progress toward Americanpoliticalobjectives in
Vietnamwould be farslower than with more Americantroops. On the other
hand, Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr.asserts in his book, On Strategy,that
the American militaryfailed to informPresidentJohnsonand his advisers
about what was and was not militarilypossible with the prescribed goals,
forces, and rules of engagement.10If Westmoreland's view obtains, one
would have to rate the strategiceffectivenessof the Americanmilitarymore
highlythan if Summers's assessment prevails.
One must also note that there have been times in the twentiethcentury
when militaryorganizationshave shown enormous politicaleffectivenessin
persuading the national leadership to accept illogicalnational goals. Wilhel-
mine Germany represents the most clear-cutexample. From Tirpitz's "risk
fleet"theorythroughto Ludendorff'sand Hindenburg's argumentsforover-
ambitiousstrategicand politicalgoals in 1917/1918in both the East and West,
the German militaryseemed to demonstratepolitical effectivenessbut an
effectivenessthat resulted in the most catastrophicconsequences."
D. To WHAT DEGREE ARE STRATEGIC GOALS AND COURSES OF ACTION

CONSISTENT WITH FORCE SIZE AND STRUCTURE?
Although a militaryorganization may possess limitedpower over the ulti-
mate fitbetween strategicdecisions and national goals, it usually has more
control over the extent to which its force structureis appropriate to its
anticipated uses. Accordingly,the military'slevel of accountabilityin this
10. WilliamC. Westmoreland,A SoldierReports(Garden City,N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976); HarryG.

Summers,Jr.,On Strategy:A CriticalAnalysisoftheVietnamWar (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press,
1982); and Leslie H. Gelb with RichardK. Betts,TheIronyofVietnam:TheSystemWorked(Wash-
ington,D.C.: BrookingsInstitution,1979).
11. See the critiqueby Gerhard Ritterin The Swordand theScepter,The ProblemofMilitarismin
Germany, Hollwegas WarChancellor(1914-1917),
Vol. III, The TragedyofStatesmanship-Bethmann
and Vol. IV, The Reignof GermanMilitarismand theDisasterof 1918 (Miami, Fla.: Universityof
Miami Press, 1973).

International
Security146
area ought to be high. Force size, of course, refersto numbers-force struc-

ture to internalorganizationand the compositionof forces.
The Russo-German war provides significantexamples of strategicineffec-
tiveness arising froma poor relationshipbetween available forcesand stra-
tegic objectives. Even in 1941 German forceswere undoubtedly too small,
too ill-equipped, and too badly supported formany of theirstrategictasks.
Above all they lacked an effectivelogistics structureto accommodate the
distances and weather of the theater.Few infantryformationswere mecha-
nized. Strategicplanning was careless and oftenincomplete,and the Ger-
mans generallyrefusedto face the problemsinherentin conqueringa country
of continentalproportions.Similarly,in 1942 the Luftwaffe'sassessment of
its size, forcestructure,and the potentialthreatwas so faultythatits contin-
ued emphasis on bomber productionand otherdecisions lost air superiority
over the Mediterraneanand Eastern frontsby late summer 1943 and over all
of Europe by spring 1944.12
One can contrastthese cases with the Americannaval forcesin the prewar
Pacific. Both the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps anticipated the nature of
amphibious warfareand the requirementfornaval air superioritywith con-
siderable accuracy in the 1920s and 1930s. While force numbers were still
low by the late 1930s, especially in aircraftcarriersand amphibious shipping,
the force structureof the two organizationswas fundamentallysound for
the strategictasks they faced. Therefore,the strategiceffectivenessof these
two militaryorganizationswas high.13
E. To WHAT DEGREE ARE THE MILITARY'S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES CONSISTENT

WITH THEIR LOGISTICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL
AND TECHNICAL BASE? (INCLUDED IN INDUSTRIAL BASE ARE MANUFACTURING
CAPABILITIES AND RATES, RESERVE CAPACITIES, SOPHISTICATION,
VULNERABILITY, AND ACCESS TO RAW MATERIALS.)
Clearly,differentstrategicobjectivesrequirediversesupportingorganizations
and industrial foundations. For example, Anglo-American strategyin the
12. Horst Boog, JurgenForster,JoachimHoffmann,ErnestKlink,Rolf-DieterMuller,and Gerd

R. Veberschar,Das DeutscheReichundderZweiteWeltkrieg, Vol. IV, Der Angriff
aufdie Sowjetunion
(Stuttgart:Deutsch Verlags-Anstalt,1983); and WilliamsonMurray,Luftwaffe (Annapolis, Md.:
Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1985), pp. 92-104.
13. JeterA. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, TheU. S. MarinesandAmphibious War(Princeton:Princeton
UniversityPress, 1951), pp. 14-71; and Clark G. Reynolds, The Fast Carriers:The Forgingofan
Air Nazy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 1-22.

Effectiveness
ofMilitary
Organizations
47 J
Second World War faced enormous logistical problems in waging war far
fromthe centers of Allied power, in fightinga massive aerial campaign to
break German industrialpower, and in mountingand supportinggreat am-
phibious efforts on coastlineswhere well-entrenched,highlymotivatedforces
awaited Allied landings. An industrial-technical base that did not possess
enormous productivepotentialand that did not have access to large, secure
sources of raw materials would have rendered Anglo-American strategy
difficult,if not impossible, to implement. Likewise, the Anglo-American
strategythat heavily emphasized the air arm required a foundationof con-
tinuous technological innovation and the ability to translatethose refine-
ments into mass production. In addition, it demanded large numbers of
highlyskilled support personnel forthe large infrastructure of bases, main-
tenance and repairfacilities,transportationsystems,and storage-distribution
installations.Withoutthose things,a sophisticatedand effectivestrategicair
campaign was unthinkable,however well conceived in militaryterms.
The German case in World War II makes an interestingcomparison. As a
result of their victories in the spring of 1940, the Germans had acquired
access to virtuallythe entiremanufacturingcapacity of Europe. In termsof
available raw materials,the Germans could cover theirneeds in every area
except forpetroleum and a narrowband of specialized metals. At the same
time, German strategicthought clearly began to turn to the problems in-
volved in realizing the Fuhrer's grandiose dreams of destroyingthe Soviet
Union and dealing with the United States.14Throughoutthe period between
the fall of France and the opening of massive militaryoperations against
Russia, German leaders underestimatedthe capacity of Soviet industryand
the massive potential of the United States for industrialmobilization and
production. In a limitedsense Hitler perceived the dimensions of the prob-
lem. In the summerof 1940, he suggested thatGerman industryincrease the
numbersof tanks produced from100 to 1,000 a month. The army'sordnance
authoritiespersuaded the Fuhrer against implementingthat decision with
the argument that such a production level would overstrainthe German
economy.15 Generally,the German militaryechoed the sentimentsof G6ring
thatAmericanindustrycould onlyproduce radios and refrigerators, and they
shared Hitler's optimisticbeliefthatwhen one kicked in the Soviet door the
whole regimewould collapse like a house of cards.16Not untillate 1941/early
14. Boog et al., Das DeutscheReichund derZweiteWeltkrieg,

Vol. I.
15. Heinz Guderian, PanzerLeader(New York: BallantineBooks, 1957), p. 114.
16. Murray,Luftwaffe, p. 82.

International
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1942 with the disasterin Russia and Hitler's declarationof war on the United
States did the Germans begin to mobilize fullythe industrialand technolog-
ical resources available to them-a year and a half too late and the direct
resultof the military'sstrategicincompetence.
F. To WHAT DEGREE ARE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS SUCCESSFUL AT

INTEGRATING THEIR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES WITH THOSE OF THEIR ALLIES AND/
OR PERSUADING THEM TO ADOPT CONSISTENT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES?
Historically,and certainlyin this century,coalitions have conducted a sig-
nificantpercentageof all wars. Coalition warfarecarrieswith it the problems
of deriving full benefit from the partnershipthrough the integrationand
coordinationof individual contributionsinto a joint effort.
The relationsbetween the Britishand French armies during World War I
fallsomewhere in the middle ofthismeasure forstrategiceffectiveness.Initial
relationsbetween the BritishExpeditionaryForce and its Frenchcounterpart
were marked in 1914 and 1915 by considerableformalityand coldness, ifnot
a general failure of understanding. Matters improved under BritishField
Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, who supported his Frenchcolleagues. Neverthe-
less, therewas no combined staff,no centralizedplanning,and littlesharing
of operational concepts. The disastrous impact of Germany's March 1918
offensivefinallyforcedthe two allies to create a supreme allied commander
who could articulateand guide overall strategyforthe Allies.17
On the otherhand, the Axis alliance between Germanyand Italyin World
War II possessed virtuallynone of the characteristicsof a serious alliance.
Mussolini characterizedthe Italian effortin 1940 as a "parallel war."'18The
failuresin coordination,the lack of a grand strategy,and the arrogantdis-
regardof overall alliance strategyculminatedin the ill-consideredand disas-
trous Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940. In a real sense the combi-
nation of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germanyrepresentedan alliance where the
whole was less than the sum of its parts.
The best example of strategicallyeffectivecoalitionwarfareis the behavior
of Britishand American militaryforces in World War II. Consultation and
active coordinationbegan earlyin the war and beforeAmericanbelligerency.
Both sides hammered out strategicobjectives in a series of conferencesat
17. Barrie Pitt, 1918, The Last Act (New York, 1963), pp. 98-102; and JohnTerraine,To Win a
War:1918, The Yearof Victory(Garden City,N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981).
18. Knox, MussoliniUnleashed,pp. 116-133.

ofMilitary
Effectiveness Organizations
49 J
which top politicaland militaryleaders and staffscommunicatedfreely.These

consultations led to the early creation of combined staffsand eventually
combined commands formost deployed forces,at least at the theaterlevel.
The two allies oftenheld significantlydifferentviews on Allied strategy.Yet,
they were almost always able to bridge potential divisions so that actual
militaryoperations, once decided upon, were neitherimpaired nor weak-
ened. To the extentthatthe Britishand Americanmilitaryorganizationswere
responsible for this integrationand cooperation, one must judge them as
strategicallyeffective.19
G. To WHAT DEGREE DO THE STRATEGIC PLANS AND OBJECTIVES PLACE THE

STRENGTHS OF MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS AGAINST THE CRITICAL WEAKNESSES
OF THEIR ADVERSARY?
Ideally, the best strategiccourse should aim to place strengthagainst critical
weakness. Admittedly,this is not always possible since the strengthsand
weaknesses of opponents are oftennot sufficiently complementaryor clearly
recognized. Therefore,in practice,a strategicallyeffectivemilitaryorganiza-
tionmay have to be satisfiedwith a strategiccourse thatat least would allow
it to exploit fullyits own strengths.
Germany's strategyat the beginningof 1916, cast by Chief of the General
StaffErich von Falkenhayn, reflecteda general ineffectivenessin this cate-
gory. In a strategicmemorandum,writtenforthe Kaiser in December 1915,
Falkenhayn argued that Germany faced a mightycoalition that possessed
enormous numerical advantages in resources, population, and industrial
potential. As the war continued, Allied militarypower would continue to
wax while Germany's power could only wane. England, continued Falken-
hayn, was Germany's principalenemy. The Chief of Staffthen proceeded to
argue thatGermanyshould fighta greatbattleof attritionagainst the French
armyin 1916 as a means of destroyingBritain'smost formidableally on the
continent. Indeed, the German high command ensured that the German
forces in frontof Verdun could not launch a quick, decisive thrustat the
19. Maurice Matloffand Edwin M. Snell, StrategicPlanningfor CoalitionWarfare:1941-1942

(Washington, 1953), and Maurice Matloff,StrategicPlanningfor CoalitionWarfare:1943-1944
(Washington, 1959), both in Officeof the Chief of MilitaryHistory,U.S. Army, UnitedStates
Armyin WorldWar II; J.R.M. Butler et al., GrandStrategy:1939-1945, 6 vols. to date (London:
H.M. StationeryOffice),in the United Kingdom MilitarySeries, HistoryoftheSecondWorldWar;
and Kent Roberts Greenfield,AmericanStrategyin WorldWar II: A Reconsideration (Baltimore,
Md.: JohnsHopkins UniversityPress, 1963).

International 150
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French fortresscity,but ratherpossessed only enough strengthto embroil

both French and German troops in a massive killingbattle of attrition-a
disastrous commitmentof the German army against Allied strength,their
manpower and material.20
In the same war the Royal Navy, on the otherhand, understood quite well
the strategicadvantages thataccrued to Britainby geography,trade patterns,
and the Navy's clear numerical superiority.The distant blockade, while
keeping the fleet concentratedand avoiding needless risks, accuratelyre-
flectedthe strategicrealitiesthatobtained between the two nations. It forced
Germanyto take the offensiveto break the deadlock by seeking a major fleet
engagement. At Jutland,Admiral Jellicoefullyunderstood that the annihi-
lation of the High Seas Fleet was desirable,but thatdecisive fleetaction was
not necessary foraccomplishinghis primarystrategicobjective. This under-
standingexplains his oftencriticizedreluctanceto press home his advantages
on the evening of May 31. Whatever the operational failingsof the Royal
Navy, its strategiceffectivenessthroughoutthe war was enormous.
Operational
Effectiveness
The operational level of militaryactivityrefersto the analysis, selection,and

developmentofinstitutionalconcepts or doctrinesforemployingmajor forces
to achieve strategicobjectives within a theaterof war. Operational military
activityinvolves the analysis, planning, preparation, and conduct of the
various facetsof a specificcampaign. Withinthe scope of operationalmatters
lie the disposition and marshallingof militaryunits, the selection of theater
objectives,the arrangementoflogisticalsupport,and the directionof ground,
air, and sea forces. A combinationof militaryconcerns shapes these opera-
tional-leveldecisions: the mission, the nature of the enemy and his probable
objectives,terrain,logistics,the available allied and national forces,and the
time available for mission accomplishment.An example of activitiesat the
operationallevel was the choice by U.S. ArmyAir Forces in World War II to
use massed, daylight,high altitudeprecisionbombingraids againstindustrial
targets for the strategicobjective of reducing or eliminatingthe enemy's
20. AlistairHome, ThePriceofGlory(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963), pp. 27-55.
21. Holger Herwig, "LuxuryFleet":TheImperialGermanNazy 1888-1918(London: Allen & Unwin,
1980), Chapter VIII. For the best shortanalysis of the leadership at Jutland,see ArthurMarder,
FromDreadnoughtto Scapa Flow: The RoyalNavy in theFisherEra, 1904-1919, Vol. 3, Jutlandand
After,
May 1916-December1916 (London, 1966), pp. 180-187.

Effectiveness
ofMilitary j 51
Organizations
abilityto wage war. Anotheris the development and application of ship-to-

shore amphibious assault doctrineas a guide foremployinglanding forces
in the Pacific to bring concentratedair and sea power to bear on Japan.
Measures or indicatorsof operationaleffectivenessmust reflectthis doctrinal
focus.
A. To WHAT EXTENT DO THE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS OF A NATION POSSESS

A PROFESSIONAL ETHOS AND INTEGRITY THAT ALLOW THEM TO DEAL WITH
OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS IN A REALISTIC FASHION?
The militaryorganizationsof the major powers have in the past centurycome
to view the position of officershipas thatof a profession,demanding ethical
sensibilityand considerable intellectualattainments.22 The staffand war col-
leges founded in the nineteenthcenturyattestto a growingbeliefthat only
serious study could prepare officersforthe most senior positions of military
leadership. Yet some doubt remains about how fullyall officercorps have
accepted this particular attributeof the definitionof professionalism.As
MacGregorKnox has noted about the Italian militaryin the past halfcentury:
"The Duce's problems . . . lay in what one mighttermthe Italian general
stafftradition:Custoza, Lissa, Adua, Caporetto. On those occasions the
military,as yet uncontaminatedby contactwith fascism,distinguisheditself
by the lack of the sort of diligent study, carefulplanning, and scrupulous
attentionto detail which characterizedthe Germans, and by a tendency to
confusion of responsibilitiesand of incessant intrigueamong senior offi-
cers."23The degree to which the officercorps of a nation accepts the concept
of professionalismis going to influenceits abilityto performits mission in
the operational and tacticalspheres.
Similarly,the issue of integritybetween the differentlevels of command
represents an importantattributeof a serious professional force. Without
trustand honesty,informationthat is criticalto the evaluation not only of
enemy capabilities,but of one's own as well, will eitherbecome distortedor
in some cases entirelyfalse as it moves between levels of command. In this
case the exceptionalcriticalself-analysisof the German armyafterits victory
in Poland especially deserves attention.In spite of a massive victoryover its
22. Gen. Sir JohnWinthropHackett,TheProfession ofArms(1962 Lee Knowles Lecturesat Trinity

College, Cambridge University),reprintedas Departmentof the ArmyPamphlet 302-360.
23. BernardMacGregor Knox, "1940 Italy's 'Parallel War"' (Ph.D. dissertation,Yale University,
1976), p. 27.

International
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opponents, the army's high command was dissatisfiedby the performance

of combat units. Moreover, the German system allowed subordinate com-
manders full freedomto discuss the weakness of theirown forcesin terms
of equipment, manpower, and training.The resultwas thatthe general staff
was able to evaluate the army's strengthsand weaknesses in realisticfashion
and to design a realistictrainingprogramto correctits defects.Victoryover
Francein May and Juneof 1940was due in no small measure to thatprocess.24
B. To WHAT DEGREE ARE THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION' S OPERATIONAL

METHODS INTEGRATED? To WHAT DEGREE DO ORGANIZATIONS ATTEMPT TO
COMBINE COMBAT ARMS TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THEIR STRENGTHS
WHILE COVERING THEIR WEAKNESSES?
The historyof warfare has been marked by an acceleratinggrowth in the
varietyofweapons, combat arms, operationaltransportation, and specialized
units. Each weapon, unit,and techniquepossesses a unique set ofcapabilities
and vulnerabilities.Taking full advantage of these militaryassets increases
the likelihoodthatan armed forcewill fulfillits mission. Taken in aggregate,
the operationallyeffectivemilitaryorganizationis one thatderives maximum
benefitfromits components and assets by linkingthem togetherformutual
support. Not only does this require complete utilizationof combat branches
withinand between militaryservices, but also the exploitationof weather,
terrain,time, surprise, morale, training,and the physical capabilities of
troops. The greaterthe integrationof these disparate elements, the bettera
militaryorganizationwill generatecombatpower fromits available resources.
In this area, German militaryforcesin the firstseveral years of World War
II exhibited a high level of effectiveness,particularlywith regard to the
evolution of operational concepts dealing with armored warfare. German
armoreddoctrineas developed by its pioneers, Generals Lutz and Guderian,
gave heavy emphasis to developing an all-armsapproach to armoredwarfare.
Consequently, German armored divisions consisted of motorized artillery,
infantry,and combat engineers as well as armored components. With the
addition of Stukas from the Luftwaffe'sspecialized FliegerkorpsVIII, the
Germans were able to test and refine an all-arms doctrine of enormous
effectivenessin the campaigns against Poland and France.25
24. WilliamsonMurray,"The German Response to Victoryin Poland: A Case Study in Profes-

sionalism," ArmedForcesand Society,Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter1981), pp. 285-298.
25. WilliamsonMurray,The Changein theEuropeanBalanceofPower,1938-1939: ThePath to Ruin
(Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1984), p. 35; and Guderian, Panzer Leader,Appendix
XXIV.

Effectiveness
ofMilitary j 53
Organizations
The Israeli ground forcesin the Yom Kippur War provide an interesting
contrast.Afterthe 1967 victory,Israeli operational planners gradually de-
emphasized combined arms in favorof an almost pure armor-aircraft combat
doctrine. They essentially relegated artilleryand infantryto a secondary
status. This decision leftIsraeli forcesvulnerable to weapons against which
artilleryand mechanized infantrywould have been effective.It was only
afterbattlefieldreversesin the firstweek ofcombatin 1973thattheyrelearned
the basic need for a combined arms doctrine. Ultimately,the reintegrated
Israeli ground forcesbreached Egyptianair defenses which, in turn,allowed
Israeli aircraftto functionwith theirfulllethality.In termsof integration,the
Israelis were at firstoperationallyineffective,but throughrapid adaptation
recoveredtheirhigh level of effectiveness.26
Operational effectivenesshas a distincthuman element. The nature of the
professionaland personal relationshipsbetween officersof different branches
within the same service as well as between differentservices provides the
institutionaland psychologicalunderpinningsforintegratedaction. The per-
sonnel and trainingpolicies of militaryorganizationsdeterminein large part
these relationships.Attendance at a service militaryacademy can provide a
common foundationof trustand experiencethatmay endure between class-
mates who have gone into differentcombat branches. Likewise, personnel
policies, as in the German case, that rotate staffofficersthrough various
branches and assignments between line and staffmay have had the same
effect.The practice of assigning officersto a regimentfor the duration of
theircareer may have a positive impact on unit cohesion, but it also may
create narrow professional and psychological perspectives. The result of a
parochial personnel policy may be the creation of officerswith an intense
"us-them" feeling that discourages their full integrationinto an all-arms
concept. If poorly controlledby the leadership, the conflictingperspectives
held by personnel fromdifferentservices,amplifiedby interservicecompet-
itiveness,can hamper combined efforts.
C. To WHAT EXTENT ARE THE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS MOBILE AND FLEXIBLE

AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL? CAN THE ORGANIZATION MOVE RAPIDLY IN BOTH
THE INTELLECTUAL AND PHYSICAL SENSE EITHER IN ANTICIPATED OR
UNANTICIPATED DIRECTIONS?
Existingtechnicalconditions, of course, limitmobility.At the most obvious
level, mobilityconsists of being able to move units in a flexible,timely
26. Chaim Herzog, The WarofAtonement,

October,1973 (Boston: Little,Brown, 1975).

International
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fashion. This requires infrastructure to support them as well as to move

them. At a deeper level, mobilityand flexibility depend at least as much, if
not more, on an appropriate command and control network and on staff
elements that permitmilitaryunits to remain cohesive, distinctiveorganiza-
tions while they maneuver.
There is in fact no single militaryorganizationthat provides an example
of both mobilityand flexibilityin all theirimplied meanings. The Britishand
Americans in World War II had superb mobilityand flexibilitybetween
theatersofwar. Withintheatersthese forcesalso possessed excellentmobility.
However, it is more arguable whetherBritishand American forcesdemon-
stratedthe flexibilityat the operational level necessary to seize the fleeting
opportunitiesthattheirmobilitypresented. By contrast,German forceswere
physicallyless mobile; much of the armyconsisted of nonmechanized units,
while force structureand size severely limitedLuftwaffeairliftcapabilities.
However, the Germans had an unparalleled operational flexibilitythat al-
lowed them to react rapidly with their numericallyinferiorforces to great
effect.German flexibility highlightsthe importanceof command and control
as well as staffwork to operationaleffectiveness.For many reasons, the use
of mission tactics not the least important,German commanders and staffs
possessed both the desire and abilityto shift,recombine,and redirectforces
as the situation demanded. American and Britishforces always possessed
the technicaland physical abilityto do so, forallied communications,mech-
anization, and motorizationwere far superior to those possessed by the
Germans. However, the Allies seldom showed the organizational abilities
and flexiblehabits of mind to make fulluse of those greatresources. To the
extentthat this was true, the Allies were less effectivethan theirGerman
opponent in this aspect of operational effectiveness.27
D. To WHAT EXTENT ARE A MILITARY ORGANIZATION S OPERATIONAL

CONCEPTS AND DECISIONS CONSISTENT WITH AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY?
This measure searches forthe relationshipbetween technicalinnovationand
operational effectiveness,a subject which has endlessly occupied military
historiansand analysts. It is stillnot clear to what extenttechnologydrives
27. Russell F. Weigley,Eisenhower'sLieutenants:The CampaignofFranceand Germany, 1944-1945

(Bloomington:Indiana UniversityPress, 1981); Field Marshal Lord Carver,TheApostlesofMobility
(New York, 1979), pp. 55-86; Kenneth JohnMacksey, TankWarfare: A HistoryofTanksin Battle
(New York: Stein and Day, 1971), pp. 178-244; and Max Hastings, Overlord:D-Day and theBattle
forNormandy(New York: Simon and Schuster,1984), pp. 58-68.

ofMilitary
Effectiveness j 55
Organizations
operations or the reverse. What is certainis that each has powerfullyinflu-

enced the other and that the exploitationof technologyby militaryorgani-
zations has been of increasing significance.Therefore,an armed service's
adeptness at identifying,encouraging,and assimilatinguseful technologies
is an importantmeasure of operational effectiveness.28
Examples of gross failuresto exploit available technologyabound in the
nineteenthcentury;militaryorganizationsfromthe early twentiethcentury
have become more receptiveto technicalinnovationand theirfailuresin this
area have become less dramatic.Perhaps the most famous as well as one of
the most effectiveutilizationsof technologycame in the 1930s and early1940s
in Great Britain.The head of the RAF's researchand developmentestablish-
ment, Air Vice Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, played a major role in encour-
aging the firstexperimentationwith what was to be known as radar. At the
same time, he was negotiatingthe original contractsthat resulted in two
single-engineair superiorityfighters,the Hurricane and the Spitfire.Then,
under his leadership, FighterCommand incorporatedthese new technolog-
ical advances, designed an effectiveoperational air defense system for de-
fendingBritain'sair space, and finallyin the Battleof Britain,met the Luft-
waffewith the technologyand the operational doctrinedesigned to utilize
the RAF's strengths. The resulting triumph represented a true marriage
between technologyand operational doctrine.29
Militaryorganizations may reject new weapons for many reasons. Fre-
quently,insufficientfundingby politicalauthoritiesmay not permitthe de-
velopmentof new and untesteddevices. Obviously,the budget is something
over which militaryorganizationsoftenexerciseincompletecontrol.Rejection
may resultfromthe militaryleadership's judgment thata new technologyis
unreliable or not significantlysuperior to present equipment and therefore
would not enhance fightingpower. Paradoxically,the militarymay recognize
a new technology's merit and still reject it if another technical innovation
seems to possess even greaterpotential.If done oftenenough, the desire to
wait forthe "best" weapon can stifletechnologicalimprovementof military
organizations.An analysis must examine militaryevaluations of technology
28. WilliamH. McNeill, ThePursuitofPower:Technology, ArmedForce,and SocietysinceA.D. 1000

(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1982); Bernardand Fawn M. Brodie,FromCrossbowtoH-
Bomb(Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress, 1973); and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Evolutionof
Weaponsand Warfare(Fairfax,Va., 1984).
29. Murray,The Changein theEuropeanBalanceofPower,pp. 81-82; and Len Deighton, Fighter
(New York: Knopf, 1978).

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forreasonableness and accuracyin the lightof existingknowledge. Military

organizations may only slowly adopt a new technologyif its application is
uncertain. The U.S. Navy's tepid interestin early submarines was in part
the result of these considerations.30Finally, a new technologythat might
increase combat power may still be rejected because it threatenseitherthe
status of existingorganizationsor the social environmentof a militaryorga-
nization. Such was the case with the tank, the airplane, the aircraftcarrier,
and the submarine in the armed services of many nations. Since military
organizationsgenerallyaim to increase theircombat power, rejectionof new
weapon systemsforsociological reasons is a strongindicationof operational
ineffectiveness.
E. To WHAT EXTENT ARE SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES WELL INTEGRATED WITH THE

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS OF THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION? CAN THE MILITARY
ORGANIZATION SUPPORT ITS OPERATIONS WITH THE REQUIRED INTELLIGENCE,
SUPPLY, COMMUNICATIONS, MEDICAL, AND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS?
The most potent and ingenious operational capabilitiesare worthlessunless
a networkof supportingactivitiesbuttressesthem. An example or two can
illustratethis point as well as the application of this measure.
The German invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941 is an
interestingcase in point. Militaryhistorians have quite rightlygiven due
creditto the awesome operational capabilitiesof the invading forces. What
has not received adequate notice is the fact that the underpinningsof that
invading forcefromlogisticalcapabilitiesto basic intelligenceon the Soviet
order-of-battle were completelyinadequate. The expansion of the German
armored forcebetween the battle of France and Barbarossa saw a doubling
in the numberof armoreddivisions througha halvingin the numberof tanks
in each division. Even more harmful,and rarelynoted in the Anglo-Amer-
ican literature,is the fact that the Germans were only able to equip these
divisionswitha hodgepodge of supportingvehicles drawn fromeverynation
in Europe.31 Not only were the vehicles generallyunsuited fortheirlogistical
tasks on the primitiveroads of the Soviet Union, but the verymultiplicityof
supportingvehicles created a logistician's nightmarein terms of parts and
30. Richard K. Morris,JohnP. Holland,1841-1914 (Annapolis, Md., 1966); Ernest Andrade, Jr.,
"Submarine Policy in the United States Navy, 1919-1941," MilitaryAffairs,
Vol. 35 (April 1971),
pp. 50-56; and Edward P. Stafford,The Far and theDeep (Philadelphia, 1967).
31. Boog et al., Das DeutscheReichund derZweiteWeltkrieg,Vol. IV, pp. 186-187.

Effectiveness
ofMilitary
Organizations
| 57
maintenance. German operational planning had foreseen a rapid drive to

Smolensk and a pause to refitas the rail systemback to Brest-Litovskwas
repaired by railroad engineers. The repair units, however, were given the
lowest priorityof all armyunits moving forwardinto the depths of Russia.32
It is no wonder then that the army's logisticians had to warn the high
command in October that the supply systemcould provide eithera buildup
to meet the comingconditionsof winterin Russia orthe fueland ammunition
for a drive on Moscow. The army leadership, reflectingits general disdain
about logistics,drove on towards Moscow, and the wintercatastrophewas
a directresult.33
If the logistical support for the Wehrmacht'sawesome operational capa-
bilities was inadequate, its intelligencesupport was even less impressive.
From its estimationon Russian equipment to its forecaston what the Soviet
Union could mobilize, the Reich's militaryintelligenceservices proved catas-
trophicallywrong. Those miscalculationsare best summed up by Halder's
complaintof August 11, 1941 that:
The whole situation shows more and more clearlythat we have underesti-
mated the colossus of Russia-a Russia that had consciously prepared for
the coming war with the whole unrestrainedpower of which a totalitarian
state is capable. This conclusion is shown both on the organizationalas well
as on the economic levels, in the transportation,and above all, clearly in
infantrydivisions. We have already identified360. These divisions are ad-
mittedlynot armed and equipped in our sense, and when we destroy a
dozen, the Russians simplyestablish anotherdozen.m
It is worth contrastingthe German experience in Russia with the Allied

(British,Canadian, and American) effortin the Battleof the Atlanticduring
World War 11.35 Not only did that sustained campaign depend on a secure
logisticalbase of immense proportions,but the use of intelligence,especially
the decryptingof German messages to theirU-boats, was importantin win-
ning the battle over German submarines. At least in the last half of 1941,
32. For German logisticpreparationsforBarbarossa,see eitherMartinL. Van Creveld, Supplying

War:LogisticsfromWallensteinto Patton(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1977); or Klaus
Reinhardt,Die WendevorMoskau,Das Scheitern derStrategie Hitlersin Winter1941/1942(Stuttgart,
1972).
33. Reinhardt,Die WendevorMoskau,pp. 57, 126-133, 140-141.
34. Franz Halder, Kriegstagebuch,
Vol. III (Stuttgart,1964), p. 170.
35. Donald Macintyre, The Battleof the Atlantic(London: B.T. Batsford,1961); Alfred Price,
AircraftVersusSubmarines(Annapolis, Md., 1973); and Ladislas Farago, The TenthFleet (New
York, 1962).

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"Ultra" alone was almost solely responsible forbluntingthe terriblethreat

posed by the rising numbers and effectivenessof Dbnitz's forces.36That
intelligencesuccess may be one of the few times in the twentiethcentury
when intelligenceby itselfwas of decisive importance.
The importanceof the integrationof intelligenceand operational activity
is equally clear in another example: aircraftcarrieroperations in the Pacific.
Successful carrierair strikesat other ships depend upon precise and timely
intelligence. Given the vastness of the Pacific, inaccurate force direction
resultedin failurewith no accompanying"bonus damage" thatoftenresulted
when land bombers missed theiroriginaltargets.In addition, given aircraft
carriervulnerability,timelyintelligenceon an adversary's location was of
supreme importance.These lessons were replayedmany timesin the Pacific,
and naval intelligencein thattheaterwas an effectivepartof fleetoperations.
Diverse informationsources (e.g., MAGIC, RDF, coast-watchers,submarine
pickets,air patrols) produced data forcentralizedanalysis, which naval in-
telligencestaffswere rapidly able to provide to operatingunits. The extent
of this dissemination,required by the size of the Pacificand the rapid pace
of naval warfare,increased the risksof compromise,but resulted in a series
of crucialAmerican successes.37
F. To WHAT EXTENT IS THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION'S OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

CONSISTENT WITH THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES ASSIGNED TO IT?
Clearly certainmethods of employingmilitaryorganizationsare totallyun-
suited to particulartypes of strategicobjectives. Yet, an age-old problem is
the employmentof militaryforcesto achieve objectives forwhich they are
largelyunsuited.
In this category,the evaluation must look formore than just the problem
of whether an organization's operational concepts are consistentwith the
strategicobjectives assigned to it. Given the difficultyin estimatingenemy
capabilitiesas well as the doctrinaladaptation thatenemy forcesgo through,
the real problem in this area may not emerge in the initial battles of a
campaign. Rather the problem may lie in how well a militaryorganization
recognizes the obstacles placed in the way of reaching its strategicgoal by
36. Patrick Beesly, VerySpecial Intelligence:The Storyof the Admiralty'sOperationalIntelligence

Centre,1939-1945 (Garden City,N.Y., 1978), pp. 92-106.
37. Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two Ocean War,A ShortHistoryof the UnitedStatesNavy in the
SecondWorldWar (Boston: Little,Brown, 1963); and Ronald Lewin, The AmericanMagic: Codes,
Ciphers,and theDefeatofJapan(New York: FarrarStraus Giroux, 1982).

Effectiveness
ofMilitary | 59
Organizations
the enemy,its own technologicalcapabilities,and its operationalweaknesses

in combat.
Thus, considering the difficultiesin traininga vast new army and the
technologicalproblems (largelyunsolved) thataccompanied the introduction
of rapid-fire,long-rangeinfantryweapons and artillery,it is not hard to see
why the Britisharmyhad such a difficulttimeon the Somme.38Where Haig
and his generals on the western frontare particularlyopen to criticism,
however, is the factthat the same operational concepts (which had proved
so unrealisticin 1916) were once again employed in Flanders in 1917. The
pursuitof largelyunrealisticstrategicobjectiveswith inadequate operational
conceptionsled to the blood bath of Passchendaele. Similarly,in World War
II it is not entirelyclear thatthe firstgreatbomberattackon Schweinfurtwas
a mistake, given what was known about the overall situation.39What was
inexcusable was that the Eighth Air Force continued to send massive unac-
companied bomber formationsinto the Reich until the second attack on
Schweinfurtunderlinedin blood the inadequacies ofits operationalconcepts.
The strategicobjective, the destructionof the German ball-bearingindustry,
remained well beyond reach.
G. To WHAT DEGREE DOES THE OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE OF MILITARY

ORGANIZATIONS PLACE THEIR STRENGTHS AGAINST THEIR ADVERSARY S
WEAKNESSES?
The conduct of BomberCommand in the Battleof BerlinfromDecember 1943
through March 1944 may best illustrateoperational ineffectivenessin this
category.Determinedto prove thathis command could replicateits successes
of summer 1943 on a far heavier and more extensive scale, Air Marshal
Arthur T. Harris set as Bomber Command's strategicgoal the complete
destructionof Berlinand victoryover the Reich beforeAllied armies landed
on the coast of France. Berlin, however, lay far fromBomber Command's
bases and thus required an extended flightthat exposed Britishbombers to
the maximum German air defense effort.Moreover,winterweather was so
bad that it was doubtfulwhether Pathfindercrews could find and mark a
sufficientlyclear object on the ground to achieve the necessary bombing
38. For an intriguinganalysis of the complex problems that the First World War posed, see
Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Firepower:BritishArmyWeaponsand Theoriesof War,
1909-1945 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp. 61-148.
39. AnthonyVerrier,TheBomberOffensive (New York:Macmillan, 1968), p. 170; and Craven and
Cate, U.S. ArmyAir Forcesin WorldWarII, pp. 681-687.

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International
concentrations.The result was that Bomber Command did not place its
strengthsagainst German weaknesses. Rather it placed strengthagainst
strengthand a terriblebattle of attritionculminated in the disastrous raid
against Nurembergin March 1944. Harris came close to wreckinghis com-
mand withoutachieving his goals.40
The German campaign against France and the Low Countries in 1940
stands out in starkcontrastto the Berlinair campaign. By takingconsiderable
risks,the Germans placed theirarmored forceswhere theywere most likely
to utilizeoperationalmaneuverabilityand flexibility. Because the Frenchhigh
command had placed virtuallyall its motorized and mechanized forces on
the left wing, it did not possess forces in the area that could meet the
operational capabilities of German forces.Once the German armored forces
had broken out into the open behind the Meuse River,the French did not
have the reserves available in the area to react effectively.
In this campaign
the Germans must be judged effectivein pittingstrengthagainst weakness.4
TacticalEffectiveness
The tacticallevel of militaryactivityrefersto the specifictechniques used by

combat units to fightengagements in order to secure operational objectives.
Tactical activityinvolves the movement of forceson the battlefieldagainst
the enemy, the provision of destructivefireupon enemy forcesor targets,
and the arrangementof logisticalsupportdirectlyapplicable to engagements.
During World War II strategicbombing, the non-evasive flyingby Ameri-
can heavy bombers was a tacticalactivitydesigned to provide a more stable
platformfordefensive machine gun fireand more accurate bombing. Like-
wise, the use of wingmen in fightercombat is a tacticalactivity;so too are
attacksby fightersout of the sun and froma higheraltitude. The increased
relianceby the U.S. Marine Corps on flamethrowersand demolitionsto deal
with Japanese fortifications is another example. The line between the oper-
40. For a thoroughdiscussion of Harris's failurein the Battleof Berlin,see Sir Charles Kingsley
Websterand Noble Frankland, The StrategicAir Offensive AgainstGermany,1939-1945, Vol. II,
Endeavour(London: H.M. StationeryOffice,1961), pp. 190-213. See also Max Hastings, Bomber
Command(London: M. Joseph,1979), pp. 306-363; and MartinMiddlebrook,TheNuremberg Raid,
30-31 March 1944 (New York, 1974), pp. 30-31. See also Lee B. Kennett,A Historyof Strategic
Bombing(New York: Scribner,1982), pp. 125-162.
41. For the best accounts of the 1940 campaign, see TelfordTaylor,TheMarchofConquest(New
York, 1958); AlistairHorne, To Lose a Battle,France1940 (London, 1969); and Hans-Adolf Jacob-
sen, Fall Gelb,Der Kampfumdendeutschen Operationsplanzur Westoffensive
1940 (Wiesbaden, 1957).

Effectiveness
ofMilitary
Organizations
| 61
ational and tacticallevels is oftenblurred, and analysts may disagree over

the classificationof particularmilitaryactions. It is importantto distinguish
tacticalpracticessince theymay provide a clearerfocusforcomparingmilitary
organizationsof differentnationalitiesin differingeras. Some of the charac-
teristicsof tacticaleffectivenessresemblethose foroperationalactivity.Others
are quite different.
A. To WHAT EXTENT ARE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS' TACTICAL APPROACHES

CONSISTENT WITH THEIR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES?
The adoption of particulartactical systems can reverberateso that military
organizations are hampered in theirpursuit of strategicobjectives. For ex-
ample, suppose thatAmericanbomberpilots in WorldWar II had found that
violent evasion greatlyincreased theirchances forsurvival against flak and
enemy interceptors.The effectmost likelywould have been a significantloss
in bombing accuracy with accompanying injury to organizational strategic
purposes, although with a lower attritionrate. It is not always clear that
disharmonybetween strategicobjectives and tacticalmethods indicates tac-
tical ineffectiveness.Ideally what is tacticallyfeasible should shape the se-
lectionof strategicobjectives and plans. Therefore,conflictbetween strategy
and tacticsmay suggest strategicratherthan tacticalineffectiveness.
B. To WHAT EXTENT ARE TACTICAL CONCEPTS CONSISTENT WITH OPERATIONAL

CAPABILITIES?
Here too dysfunctionscan occur thatpose interestingproblemsforthe eval-
uation of tacticaleffectiveness.Consider the case of the Frencharmyin the
opening weeks of World War 1.42 The dubious doctrine of the Du Picq-
Grandmaison school constitutedFrench operational doctrine. The tactical
systemwas accordinglybased on the infantrymen'sabilityto move rapidly
in close order across the artilleryand machine gun killingzone to engage
the enemy in close combat, preferablywith the bayonet. The French saw
littleneed forlarge numbers of machine guns or heavy artillery,and relied
forclose support on light,rapid-firing75-mmcannon. These tacticsproved
so unsuited to combat realities that French infantryessentiallyimposed a
new tacticalsystemon theirmilitaryleadership-trench warfare.
The dysfunctionbetween operational concepts and tactical capabilities
haunted World War I armies for the remainder of the conflict.Staffsand
42. Barbara Tuchman, The Guns ofAugust(New York: Macmillan, 1962), pp. 28-43.

International
Security| 62
generals on the western frontpersisted in thinkingof grandiose operational

movement on a Napoleonic scale. As late as the battle of Passchendaele in
1917, Haig continued to thinkin termsof a greatbreakthroughfollowed by
a cavalrypursuitofthe beaten enemy.43At the same time,Allied commanders
frequentlyneglected the immediate tacticalproblem of how to get through
the killingzone of the enemy's firepower.In the BritishExpeditionaryForce,
some argued that the British army should approach the problem of the
WesternFrontas that of a siege and thus cut down its operational plans to
fitmore realisticallywith available-tacticalconceptions.'4 Interestingly,the
solution-the use of firepowerwith flexiblemaneuver-seems to have come
fromthe front-linesoldiers. Captain Andre Leffargueof the French army
saw very clearlyin 1915 the full dimensions of the problem as well as the
possible solutions. Unfortunately,it was the Germans who built on Lef-
fargue'stacticalconceptions. In 1916 Ludendorffdrew not only on the French
doctrinalconcepts but, forthe firsttime,forcedthe General Staffto seek out
the combat experiences of those in the trenchesin order to create realistic
combat tactics. Only then were the Germans in a position to bringtacticsin
line with operational conceptions; the resultwas the returnof maneuver to
warfare.45
C. To WHAT EXTENT DOES THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION'S TACTICAL SYSTEM

EMPHASIZE INTEGRATION OF ALL ARMS?
This measure of tacticaleffectivenesscloselyresemblesthatof its counterpart
at the operational level. However, tactical effectivenessrequires that the
principleof integrationand combined arms not be strictly
weapons-centered,
but rather be applied to all the factors affectingcombat power. Besides
weapons, these include such elements as terrain,training,qualities of the
troops, morale, and weather. A tactical system that does not deliberately
consider these and other importantmilitaryvariables can not be considered
effective.
The examples of Finnish ground forces during the WinterWar and the
Britisharmy during much of World War I provide a useful contrast.The
43. For a descriptionof the gulf between strategicarms and operational capabilities,see Leon
Wolff,In FlandersFields,The 1917 Campaign(New York: VikingPress, 1963), pp. 103-129.
44. Bidwell and Graham, Firepower, p. 71.
45. TimothyLupfer,The DynamicsofDoctrine:The Changesin GermanTacticalDoctrineDuringthe
First WorldWar (Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute,U.S. Army Command and General
StaffCollege, 1981), pp. 11-23.

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Organizations
| 63
Finns' tacticalsystemmelded the characteristics of Arcticterrainand weather

withthe skills,small size, and lightequipment of theirarmy.46Consequently
theywere able to engage the Red Armyin depth by utilizingski troops and
deep raids to fragmentand destroy enemy columns. The Finns avoided
setpiece combat situations in which the more ponderous and numerous
Soviet forcescould utilize theirstrengths.So long as the battlefieldremained
fluid,the Finnishtacticalsystemgeneratedconsiderablefightingpower from
relativelyfew resources. The Soviets were not successfuluntil they pinned
the Finns in prepared, staticdefenses.
The tacticalsystemof the BritishArmyof WorldWar I, on the otherhand,
was deficientin integrationin a varietyof ways on both offenseand de-
fense.47On the attack, the Britishdepended almost entirelyon a clumsy
integrationof artilleryand infantryarmed with rifles.The Britishwere slow
to utilize small unit attackingformations,to use natural cover and conceal-
ment,to exploitthe forwardemploymentof lightmachine guns and mortars,
and to use adjusted artilleryfire.The resultof this poorlyintegratedtactical
systemwas essentiallyoffensiveimpotenceformuch of the war. The defen-
sive capabilitiesof the Britisharmyin the war also suggest interestingissues.
In 1914 the integrationof armyand artillerywas generallygood, although a
lack of communicationsystemsmeant thatthe artilleryoftenhad to support
the infantry by remainingwithinsight.While effective in the defensivebattles
of 1914, the cooperation proved very costlyto Royal Artillerybatteriesthat
operated in the open, directlyexposed to German counterbattery fire.
In 1918 the Britishwere fullyaware thatthe Germans were about to strike
in the West. Haig's headquarters, in fact,used captured German manuals
and combat experiencefromthe 1917 Flandersbattlesto draw up an effective
scheme of defense in depth thatrelied on close cooperationbetween infantry
and artillery.Unfortunately,the Britishfound it difficultto implementthe
new doctrine, and Gough's FifthArmy,which almost collapsed in March
1918, seems to have done almost nothingto implementthe new concepts.
The disaster of March 1918 provided a real spur to integratingthe army's
capabilities.48
46. Carl Mannerheim,TheMemoirsofMarshalMannerheim (New York,1954); and Allen F. Chew,

The WhiteDeath: Epic of theSoviet-FinnishWar (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University
Press, 1971).
47. Bidwell and Graham, Firepower, pp. 61-148.
48. Martin Middlebrook, The Kaiser'sBattle,21 March 1918: The FirstDay of theGermanSpring
Offensive(London: Allen Lane, 1978), pp. 74-82.

International
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D. To WHAT EXTENT DO A MILITARY ORGANIZATION'S TACTICAL CONCEPTIONS

EMPHASIZE SURPRISE AND A RAPID EXPLOITATION OF OPPORTUNITIES?
Historically,surprise has been a potent multiplierof combat power. It is
difficultto finda militarythatrejectssurpriseas an advantageous condition.
There are, however, tacticalsystemswith attributesthat make surprisedif-
ficultto achieve. There are many sortsof surprise.Tactical surpriserefersto
where an attack will take place, the axes of the attack and its exploitation,
and the timingand the weight of the attack. Tactical surprise differsfrom
strategicsurprise(e.g., in what general geographicalarea will an attacktake
place) and technicalsurprise(e.g., the qualities of the weapons being used),
both of which may be possible in principleregardlessof the tacticalsystem.
The Britisharmy in both world wars provides interestingexamples of
relativeineffectivenessin tacticalsurprise and exploitation.Lloyd George's
memoirscontain an entrypertainingto Field Marshal Haig's unwillingness
to pay attentionto the element of surprisein the conduct of theiroperations:
"Germans accustomed to his [Haig's] heavyfootedmovements."49 The mas-
sive artillerybombardmentsof greatlengthand severityonly served to alert
the Germans as to where the next great British"battle of material" would
occur. It enabled them, well before the Britishinfantryattacks began, to
redeploy reserves of artilleryand otherforcesto meet the threat.Only after
the bloodlettingof Passchendaele had exhausted his armyfora second time
in two years did Haig allow his artilleryand tanks to launch a raid, almost
entirelybased on surprise, against the German position at Cambrai. The
success of Britishtank and artilleryforcessuggests what a more enterprising
use of surprisemighthave achieved in 1916 and 1917.50
Although differentfrom surprise, rapid exploitationrequires similar ca-
pabilitiesand attributes.Effectivenessin this categoryinvolves utilizationof
the wide varietyof opportunitiescreated by the almost random fluidityof
mechanized warfare.These opportunitiesusually appear and disappear sud-
denly. Therefore,a tacticalsystemthat utilizes decentralized decision-mak-
ing, rapid movement, small-unitinitiative,and iimaginationare basic if a
militaryorganization is to convertthese fleetingadvantages into battlefield
success. By contrast,tacticalsystemsthatstresssetpiece battles,rigidsched-
ules forreaching objectives, and tightcentralcontroldo not create the con-
ditionsnecessary fortimelyexploitation.
49. David Lloyd George, Memoirs(London, 1939).

50. Bidwell and Graham, Firepower,
p, 129; and WinstonS. Churchill,The WorldCrisis(Toronto,
1931), pp. 741-744.

Effectiveness
ofMilitary | 65
Organizations
In World War lI the Britisharmy paid more attentionto the element of

surprise.CertainlyMontgomeryis justlyrememberedforhis setpiece battles.
Nevertheless, even Montgomeryattempted to include surprise as a basic
element in his plans. "Market Garden" did not fail because of a neglect of
surpriseas a basic element in warfare.Rather,thatfailurereflecteda consid-
erable Britishunwillingness (with the possible exception of O'Connor's op-
erationsagainst the Italians) to exploittacticaland operationaladvantages to
the fullextentpossible. Consequently, the real Britishblunder in September
1944 came not with "Market Garden" but with the unwillingnessto exploit
fullythe capture of Antwerp and the operational and tactical disarray of
Germanmilitaryforcesstreamingback toward the Reich.51That Britishdesire
fora "tidy" battlefieldand the deliberatenessof tacticalconcepts resulted in
the loss of unexpected tacticalopportunities.
E. To WHAT EXTENT IS THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION'S TACTICAL SYSTEM

CONSISTENT WITH ITS APPROACH TO MORALE, UNIT COHESION, AND
RELATIONS AMONG OFFICERS, NCOS, AND THE ENLISTED RANKS?
Several high-qualitystudies as well as much historicaland anecdotal evidence
have pointed to the value of close relationships between soldiers within
combat units.52Though any tacticalsystemrequires a militaryorganization
to pay attentionto these issues, some systemsrequire unusually strongand
resilientbonds with militaryunits. Militaryorganizations that neglect this
prerequisiteof combat power pay a price in termsof tacticaleffectiveness.
The relativeperformanceof the Egyptianand Israeli armies in the wars of
1948, 1956, and 1967 are cases in point. Obviously, there are a number of
causes for the strikingdifferencesin the social ethos of these armies. But
strongevidence existsthat,in many Egyptianunits,the relationshipbetween
officersand men reduced cohesion and morale. Apparently,many Egyptian
line officerswere corruptand exploited theirunits in various ways. There
was minimalsharingofhardshipsand risks;frontline troopshad littlecontact
with their commanders; and few officersled fromthe front.Most officers
individuallyand the organization as a whole demonstrateda lack of even
51. Murray,Luftwaffe, pp. 274-276.

52. FrankM. Richardson,FightingSpirit:A StudyofPsychological Factorsin War(New York, 1978);
Anthony Kellett, CombatMotivation:The Behaviorof Soldiersin Battle(Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff
Pub., 1982); J.C.M. Baynes, Morale (London, 1967); and WilliamL. Hauser, "The Will to Fight,"
in Sam Charles Sarkesian, ed., CombatEffectiveness: Cohesion,Stress,and the Voluntary
Military
(BeverlyHills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 186-211.

International
Security| 66
minimal sensitivityin such thingsas leave policy,regularpay, living condi-

tions, and bonds between other unit members. Indeed, officersfrequently
did not hide theirfeelingsof social superiorityfromtheirsubordinates.The
Egyptians attempted to ameliorate these problems, and their relative suc-
cesses in 1973 may have been an indicatorof progress.53
The Italian armyin both world wars presentsa picturequite similarto that
of the Egyptians.54In its early World War I battles against the Austrians,an
armyquite similarin everyfashion,the Italiansput up a respectableshowing,
at least in terms of the casualties that they suffered.When, however, the
Italians faced the pressures of combat against the Germans at Caporetto and
against Anglo-American and Soviet units in World War II, their military
structurewas shattered.While it is not the completeanswer, the relationship
between the Italian officercorps and itsmen and the almostcompleteabsence
of a professionalNCO corps to provide additional unit cohesion played a
major role in Italian battlefieldineffectiveness.Italian officersby and large
ignored theirmen, refused to share frontline hardships, and generallyled
fromthe rear. The result was an almost complete lack of trust.The Italian
case may well suggest a paradigm forThird World militaryforces:certainly
the performanceof the Argentinianground forcesin the Falklands suggests
a similarlack of cohesion between different levels withinunits and with the
same result.55To the extent that militaryorganizations are responsible for
these shortcomings,they riskbeing tacticallyineffective.
Some tactical systems require an especially high level of trustbetween
officersand men if they are to function.Any tacticalapproach that stresses
initiative,independent action, day and nightoperations out of contactwith
headquarters or flankunits, and rapid movement depends upon frontline
leadership and an uncommon level of unit cohesion. To develop these char-
acteristics,militaryorganizationsmust pursue deliberatepolicies. These in-
clude stable unit affiliationsand small unitmemberships,timelyand accurate
recognitionof skills and actions by promotion and awards, and an officer
53. Edgar O'Ballance, No Victor,No Vanquished:The YomKippurWar(San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio

Press, 1978); Saad el Shazly, TheCrossingoftheSuez (San Francisco:AmericanMideast Research,
1980); G.P. Armstrong,"Egypt," in Richard A. Gabriel, ed., FightingArmies:Antagonistsin the
MiddleEast: A CombatAssessment(Westport,Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983), pp. 147-165; and
TrevorN. Dupuy, Elusive Victory:The Arab-IsraeliWars,1947-1974 (New York: Harper & Row,
1978).
54. See Knox, MussoliniUnleashed,pp. 25-30.
55. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins,TheBattlefortheFalklands(New York: Norton, 1983).

Effectiveness
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Organizations
| 67
and NCO corps constitutedfrommen with outstandingmartialand intellec-

tual qualities, particularlymoral and physical courage.
F. To WHAT EXTENT IS THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION'S APPROACH TO

TRAINING CONSISTENT WITH ITS TACTICAL SYSTEM?
It is possible fora militaryorganizationto failto trainits personnelto perform
the tasks prescribedby its tacticalsystem. When this occurs, tacticaleffec-
tiveness obviously will be reduced. This sort of disjunctioncan arise when
tacticaldoctrine and trainingare managed by different,semi-autonomous
bureaucracies with littleintercommunicationor when tactical doctrine has
been changed suddenly and traininghas not yet been adjusted.
The separation of trainingand doctrineis a common problemformilitary
organizations.The German army's response to its victoryover the Poles in
1939 suggests a high level of effectivenessin this categoryas well as the
importanceof this index to battlefieldperformance.56 Oberkommandoherres
(OKH) took a close look at how well its doctrinalconceptshad held up under
the combat conditions of the Polish campaign. It then made an across-the-
board effortto ensure that trainingand retrainingprogramsthroughoutthe
entirearmyreflectedthe "lessons learned" fromPoland. In fact,OKH spent
the next six months ensuring that the trainingprogram,closely integrated
with its doctrinalconceptions,broughtthe armyup to a high level of capa-
bility.It is also worthnotingthatthe actual trainingprogramsin the German
army,including basic training,remained largelydecentralizedwith the di-
vision and regimentsmaintainingtrainingcadres both at home and in some
cases close to the frontin order to integratesoldiers directlyinto combat
units. The systemwas probablynot "cost effective"in termsof the number
of frontline officersand NCOs detailed to trainingduties at any given time,
but it did ensure thatGerman soldiers trainedin a realisticenvironmentthat
not only reflectedcurrentdoctrinalpracticesbut frontline conditionsas well.
The American army's effortsto train newly arrivingsoldiers in Vietnam
throughspecialized in-countrycentersserved a similarpurpose. While those
combat divisions had littlecontrol over the nature of the trainingthat re-
placements received in the United States, they tried to prepare the soldier
for the realities of combat in Vietnam and the currentdivisional combat
practices. The trainingreduced the casualties usually sufferedby "green"
56. Murray,"German Response to Victoryin Poland: A Case Study in Professionalism."

International
Security| 68
troops with littleknowledge about conditions in the frontline, at least by

World War II standards.57
The Britishexample in North Africapresentsan interestingcontrastto the
German and U.S. cases. In 1940 the performanceof Britisharmored forces
trainedby Hobart and led by O'Connor suggestsa high concurrencebetween
a realisticdoctrineand effectivetraining.Thereafter,serious problemsarose.
The Britishdo not seem to have developed a mechanism for transferring
combat experience gained in the desert back to the trainingestablishmentin
Great Britain. Consequently, the troops that arrived in the desert theater
fromthe BritishIsles varied widely in theirdoctrinalconcepts and the effec-
tiveness with which their traininghad prepared them for combat against
Rommel. Only with Montgomery'sarrivalwas a more consistentdoctrinal
approach articulatedand then incorporatedinto trainingthe Eighth Army.
The consequent improvementin Britishbattlefieldperformancewas directly
attributableto Montgomery'seffortsin this area.58
G. To WHAT EXTENT ARE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS' TACTICAL SYSTEMS

CONSISTENT WITH SUPPORT CAPABILITIES?
It is not uncommon that a tacticalsystemmay require greatersupport than
a militaryorganizationcan actuallyprovide. This problemis frequentlymost
acute in the area of sustainability.Characteristically,
militaryorganizations
underestimaterequirementsfor transportfuels, ammunition,spare parts,
and support personnel. A related problem is the tendency to misestimate
the demands that a tactical system may place on troops, e.g., sustained
periods of combat, the amount of time without rest, and the impact of
casualties. Such errorsusually result in an inabilityto maintaincombat op-
erations at the tempo required by the tactical system. Therefore,military
organizations that exhibitthis problem would be considered less tactically
effectivethan others where the tactical system or support capabilities are
more realistic.
The archetypalcase is the October War of 1973 in the Middle East. All the
contestantsunderestimatedthe logistical requirementsfor tactical systems
57. Albert N. Garland, ed., A Distant Challenge:The U.S. Infantryman in Vietnam,1967-1972

(Nashville, Tenn., 1983); JulianJ.Ewell and Ira A. Hunt, Jr.,Sharpening
theCombatEdge: The Use
of Analysisto ReinforceMilitaryJudgment (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1974);
Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an AmericanArmy,passim;and Charles Moskos, Jr.,The American
EnlistedMan (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970).
58. CorrelliBarnett,The DesertGenerals(New York, 1960).

Effectiveness
ofMilitary | 69
Organizations
incorporatinglarge numbers of automaticweapons, precision-guidedmuni-

tions,and tanks. Withina shortperiod, the Israelis had to rationammunition
and antitankmissiles, a condition not alleviated until a massive American
airliftof materielhad begun.
H. To WHAT EXTENT DO TACTICAL SYSTEMS PLACE THE STRENGTHS OF

MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS AGAINST THEIR ADVERSARY S WEAKNESSES?
"Strengths"and "weaknesses" referto the range of weapons and human
characteristicsthat affectcombat power. For example, an armed forcebased
on a large national population and a backward industrialbase would ob-
viously be in errorif it adopted tactical systems that required small forces
equipped with sophisticated weapons. Faced with a similar mixture of
strengthsand weaknesses, the People's Republic of China has employed a
tacticalsystem emphasizing a lightlyarmed mass army trained to meet an
invasion with protractedterritorialdefense. Only nuclear weapons vitiated
the concept and then only to the extentthatthe PRC needs to retainits cities.
The armed forces of a society whose population is small and/orwhich at-
taches high value to human lifewould logicallyavoid tacticalsystemslikely
to produce high casualties.
Ideally, a militaryorganization should seek tacticalsystemsdesigned not
only to use national strengths,but also to pit those strengthsagainst the
crucial weaknesses of its likely adversaries. The Israeli case illustratesthis
point. The Israeli tacticalsystemattemptsto minimizecasualties and to utilize
its national technicalbase and highlyeducated population to confrontArab
forceswith combat situations in which the Israelis can exploit Arab weak-
nesses, e.g., situationsrequiringimprovisation,rapid decision-making,and
independent action by small units. The Arabs' inabilityto deal effectively
with such problems is a functionof largersocial and national characteristics
that are difficultto change, especially in combat. On the other hand, Arab
militaryorganizationshave attempteda tacticalresponse that exploits their
larger populations by enmeshing the Israelis in battlefieldconditions that
resultin high levels of attrition,while minimizingtheirpersonnel and tech-
nical superiority.59
The extent to which militaryorganizations place their tactical strengths
against enemy weaknesses-or at least maximize theirstrengthsand mini-
mize theirown weaknesses-is one measure of tacticaleffectiveness.
59. Herzog, The WarofAtonement,

passim.

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| 70
Conclusion
A common thread unites the measures of militaryeffectivenessproposed in

this essay. They all describe various aspects of effectiveness,not as absolutes
but in termsof different means-ends relationships.But the attemptto address
the question "What is militaryeffectivenessand how can it be measured?"
poses a new and equally importantquestion: "What kinds of militaryeffec-
tiveness are most importantand in what conditions?"For example, to what
extentcan tacticalor operationaleffectivenessoffsetstrategicineffectiveness?
While not often clearly articulated,many combat officersbelieve military
effectivenessis synonymous with tacticaleffectiveness.They rightlyargue
that strategiceffectivenessis useless unless a militaryforce can operate
successfullyon the battlefieldonce it has made contactwith the enemy.
On the otherhand, the German experiencein WorldWar II suggests other
conclusions. The Wehrmachtwas a superb tactical instrument.Yet it was
frequentlylaunched in strategicand operational directionsthatnullifiednu-
merous battlefieldsuccesses. This pattern occurred repeatedly in the first
two years of the Russian campaign, 1941 and 1942. Under some conditions,
strategicineffectiveness can rendertacticaleffectiveness less relevantor coun-
terproductive;under other conditions,the reverseis true. The key task is to
determinewhat these conditionsare and when theyare likelyto occur.
Similarly,within the strategic,operational, and tactical categories, what
types of effectivenessare most importantand in what conditions?For ex-
ample, what contributesmost to overall tacticaleffectiveness-technological
sophisticationor unit cohesion? Obviously both are crucial,but which counts
formore and under what circumstances?There is a growingsense, based on
the experience of the Vietnam War, the Falklands campaign, and the wars
in the Middle East, thatunit cohesion may be the key to tacticaleffectiveness.
On the other hand, no amount of unit cohesion can outweigh an extreme
disparityin technicalsophisticationas the Zulus learned in the 1870s.
Similarly,what contributesmore to operational effectiveness-mobilityor
integration?During much of the campaign in North Africa,airpower and
greatersupplies ofvehicles and gasoline gave the Britishforcesgreateroverall
mobilitythan theiropponent. The Germans, on the other hand, integrated
theirforces,especially armor and artilleryinto a potent anti-tankdefense,
offsetthe Britishsuperiorityin material,defeated poorly integratedBritish
armored attacks, and then exploited theiradvantage into significantopera-
tional successes.

Effectiveness
ofMilitary | 71
Organizations
In any event, one cannot limitthe judging of militaryeffectivenessonly to

non-dynamicassessments of tacticalunits. One must include in the analysis
non-quantifiableorganizational attitudes,behaviors, and relationshipsthat
span a militaryorganization's full activitiesat the political,strategic,opera-
tional,and tacticallevels. A morelimitedmethodofassessment onlyprovides
equally limitedconclusions.


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The Effectiveness of Military Organizations

Author(s): Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray and Kenneth H. Watman

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ProfessorsAllan R. Millettand WilliamsonMurrayteachmilitary at The Ohio State University

Security,Summer 1986 (Vol. 11, No. 1)

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limitedresources than did theiropponents. Victoryis an outcome of battle;

For a militaryorganization to act strategically,operationally,or tactically,it

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reconstituteitself. Almost always, this necessity requires the militaryto

A. CAN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS ASSURE THEMSELVES A REGULAR SHARE OF

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are more importantthan others'. Usually the militarymust persuade bud-

B. To WHAT EXTENT DO MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS HAVE ACCESS TO

2. For the best discussion of the Britisharmyand its fundingdifficulties,

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technologistscapable of dealing with such concerns in the languages of

C. To WHAT EXTENT DO MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS HAVE ACCESS TO

3. AlbertSeaton, The Russo-GermanWar 1941-45 (New York: Praeger,1970), p. 96.

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universal conscription,but coercion alone cannot provide the personnel, if

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6. Marvin A. Kreidbergand Merton G. Henry,HistoryofMilitaryMobilizationin theUnitedStates

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forcesin the Pacificto launch an island-hoppingcampaign in order to bring

A. To WHAT DEGREE WOULD ACHIEVEMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION'S

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and ends beyond prudentriskwould suggest ineffectiveness

B. To WHAT DEGREE ARE THE RISKS ENTAILED IN THE DESIRED STRATEGIC

C. To WHAT DEGREE WERE THE LEADERS OF THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION

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requirescertainskills within the militaryleadership, includingthe abilityto

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10. WilliamC. Westmoreland,A SoldierReports(Garden City,N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976); HarryG.

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area ought to be high. Force size, of course, refersto numbers-force struc-

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which top politicaland militaryleaders and staffscommunicatedfreely.These

G. To WHAT DEGREE DO THE STRATEGIC PLANS AND OBJECTIVES PLACE THE

19. Maurice Matloffand Edwin M. Snell, StrategicPlanningfor CoalitionWarfare:1941-1942

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French fortresscity,but ratherpossessed only enough strengthto embroil

The operational level of militaryactivityrefersto the analysis, selection,and

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abilityto wage war. Anotheris the development and application of ship-to-

A. To WHAT EXTENT DO THE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS OF A NATION POSSESS

22. Gen. Sir JohnWinthropHackett,TheProfession ofArms(1962 Lee Knowles Lecturesat Trinity

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opponents, the army's high command was dissatisfiedby the performance

B. To WHAT DEGREE ARE THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION' S OPERATIONAL

24. WilliamsonMurray,"The German Response to Victoryin Poland: A Case Study in Profes-

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C. To WHAT EXTENT ARE THE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS MOBILE AND FLEXIBLE

26. Chaim Herzog, The WarofAtonement,

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fashion. This requires infrastructure to support them as well as to move

D. To WHAT EXTENT ARE A MILITARY ORGANIZATION S OPERATIONAL