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MARIO M. MAURER,
Complainant,
Labor Arbiter
HON. ERIKA ALIDIO
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PREFATORY STATEMENT
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STATEMENT OF FACTS OF THE CASE
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10. The complainant was later on no longer allowed to report to work.
DISCUSSION
It was reiterated in many labor cases and labor laws that the employer
has every right to terminate contracts of employers under probationary
period upon not having satisfactorily completed his or her probationary
period. Article 281, supported by Section 93 of the 1992 Manual which
provides:
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Sec. 93. Regular or Permanent Status. - Those who have served
the probationary period shall be made regular or permanent.
Full-time teachers who have satisfactorily completed their
probationary period shall be considered regular or permanent.
In the instant case, the complainant did not satisfactorily complete his
probationary period since he clearly failed to comply with the required
license as a reasonable standard set by the respondent school. The
respondent has given the complainant ample time to comply with the license
requirement. The latter was hired in 2017 and his contract was even
extended for another year from 2018 to 2019, but in those period he was not
able to secure the license he is required of.
In view of this, the Supreme Court held in Mofada that, “no vested
right to a permanent appointment shall accrue until the employee has
completed the prerequisite three-year period necessary for the acquisition of
a permanent status. [However, it must be emphasized that] mere rendition of
service for three consecutive years does not automatically ripen into a
permanent appointment. It is also necessary that the employee be a full-time
teacher, and that the services he rendered are satisfactory.”
Two points could be taken out of this ruling, first, the complainant
was hired in 2017 and was only an employee of the respondent for two
consecutive years until 2019 when he was dismissed from work. He has not
yet completed the three-year period necessary for the acquisition of
permanent status. Yet, again his lack of license means he has not
satisfactorily rendered services to respondent despite him being the one who
constructed the school’s curriculum. This could not be used as a legal
ground for him to be reinstated and the respondent could only give him
enough leeway to meet the school’s set policies which for such ample
period, he did not.
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Dismissals based on just causes involve the two-notice rule:
Book VI, Rule I, Section 2 of the IRR of the Labor Code provides:
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court also stated in Mofada that, “if the
termination is brought about by the completion of a contract or phase
thereof, or by failure of an employee to meet the standards of the employer
in the case of probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that a written
notice is served the employee, within a reasonable time from the effective
date of termination.”
Such contract entered into with Mario Maurer allows the School in its
discretion to mandate its instructors to comply with the requirements as set
forth by the academic institution. This includes licensing requirement
needed for all instructors including the complainant. His failure to provide
such compliance shall temporarily prohibit him from practicing without
effect on his employment status particularly him being on probation.
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employment as may be consistent with laws, and institutional
policies, rules and regulations. A copy of the contract shall be
furnished the personnel concerned.
Evidently, the respondents did not violate the statutory right of the
complainant pursuant to the Article 279 of the Labor Code. The dismissal of
complainant from service was reasonably and undoubtedly justified which
does not entail him any award for back wages, inclusive of allowances and
other benefits of their monetary equivalent from the time compensation was
withheld up to the time of reinstatement and civil indemnities.
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The respondents were able to give sufficient and legal proof to justify
the cause of the termination of service of the complainant. Furthermore,
there was no violation of due process clause by the respondent.
PRAYER
By:
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Roll No. 20280
Tel. No. 234-8703
magdaong.john.c.jd@gmail.com
COPY FURNISHED:
MARIO M. MAURER
69 Sesame St.
Brgy. Malibog
Legazpi, Albay
9
Legazpi City, Albay
Tel. No. 782-11-11
mailaw@everyday.com
EXPLANATION
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