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MARINES IN VIETNAM
FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E
196 7
by
Major Gary L . Telfer, USM C
and
V . Keith Fleming, Jr .
1984
Other Volumes in the Marine Corps
Vietnam Operational Histories Serie s
This is the fourth volume in a planned 10-volume operational and chronological serie s
covering the U .S . Marine Corps ' participation in the Vietnam War . A separate topica l
series will complement the operational histories . This volume details the change in focu s
of the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), which fought in South Vietnam ' s nor-
thernmost corps area, I Corps . III MAF, faced with a continued threat in 1967 of North
Vietnamese large unit entry across the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Vietnams ,
turned over the Chu Lai enclave to the U .S . Army's Task Force Oregon and shifted th e
bulk of its forces—and its attention—northward . Throughout the year, the 3d Marine
Division fought a conventional, large-unit war against the North Vietnamese Arm y
(NVA) near the demilitarized zone . The 1st Marine Division, concentrated in Thu a
Thien and Quang Nam provinces, continued both offensive and pacification operations .
Its enemy ranged from small groups of Viet Cong guerrillas in hamlets and villages up t o
formations as large as the 2d NVA Division . The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing provided ai r
support to both divisions, as well as Army and allied units in I Corps . The Force Logistic
Command, amalgamated from all Marine logistics organizations in Vietnam, served all ,
major Marine commands .
This volume, like its predecessors, concentrates on the ground war in I Corps and II I
MAF's perspective of the Vietnam War as an entity . It also covers the Marine Corps par-
ticipation in the advisory effort, the operations of the two Special Landing Forces of th e
U .S . Navy's Seventh Fleet, and the services of Marines with the staff of the U .S . Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam . There are additional chapters on supporting arms an d
logistics, and a discussion of the Marine role in Vietnam in relation to the overal l
American effort .
The nature of the war facing III MAF during 1967 forced the authors to concentrate
on major operations, particularly those characterized by heavy combat . The uneve n
quality of the official reports submitted by combat units also played a role in select-
ing the materials presented in this volume . This is not meant to slight those whose com-
bat service involved long, hot days on patrol, wearying hours of perimeter defense, an d
innumerable operations, named and un-named . These Marines also endured fights jus t
as deadly as the ones against large enemy regular units . III MAF's combat successes i n
1967 came from the efforts of all Americans in I Corps .
All three authors have been historians in the History and Museums Division . Majo r
Gary L . Telfer, now a retired lieutenant colonel, has a bachelor of arts degree fro m
Muskingum College, Ohio . He had two tours in Vietnam, first as an advisor with a Viet -
namese Army artillery battalion and, three years later, with the 12th Marines . Majo r
Telfer began this history project and produced the initial manuscript . His replacement ,
Lieutenant Colonel Lane Rogers, now also retired, expanded the materials into a secon d
draft . He is a member of the class of 1953 of the U .S . Naval Academy and was an adviso r
with the Vietnamese Marine Corps . The third author, Dr . V . Keith Fleming, Jr ., is a
iv
E . H . SIMMON S
Brigadier General, U . S . Marine Corps, Retired
Director of Marine Corps History and Museums
Prefac e
U.S . Marines in Vietnam : Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967, like its predecessors, i s
largely based on the holdings of the Marine Corps Historical Center . These official file s
include the monthly unit command chronologies, after action reports, messages, units '
daily journal files, the oral history collection, comment files, and previously classifie d
studies prepared by members of the division . Especially useful in the latter category wer e
Lieutenant Colonel Ralph F . Moody and Major Thomas E . Donnelly, "Introduction o f
North Vietnamese Regulars," and Lieutenant Colonel Ralph F . Moody, "A Highe r
Order of Warfare," parts IV and V of a then-projected single-volume history of the war .
The authors supplemented the above sources with research in the records of the othe r
Services and pertinent published primary and secondary sources . Although none of th e
information in this history is classified, some of the documentation on which it is base d
still has a classified designation . More than 250 reviewers, most of whom were par-
ticipants in the events described in this volume, read a comment edition of th e
manuscript . Their comments, where applicable, have been incorporated into the text . A
list of all those who commented is included in the appendices . All ranks used in th e
body of the text are those held by the individuals in 1967 .
The production of this volume, like its predecessors, has been a cooperative effort . Al l
of the Vietnam historians, past and present, in the Histories Section, History an d
Museums Division, have reviewed the draft manuscript . Mrs . Joyce Bonnett, head ar-
chivist, and her former assistant, Mrs . Linda T . Benedict, aided our access into th e
records in the Archives Section . Miss Evelyn A . Englander, head librarian, and her assis-
tant, Mrs . Patricia E . Morgan, were very helpful in obtaining needed references . Th e
Reference Section, headed by Mr . Danny J . Crawford, and earlier by Mrs . Gabrielle M .
Santelli, made its voluminous files available and answered the authors' numerous ques-
tions cheerfully and professionally . Mrs . Regina Strother, formerly with the Defens e
Audio-Visual Agency, but now with the History and Museums Division, graciousl y
assisted in the photographic research . Mr . Benis M . Frank, the head of the Oral History
Section, was equally helpful in making his tapes and transcripts available .
Mr . Robert E . Struder, head of the Publications Production Section, skillfully guide d
the manuscript through the various production phases . Mr . Struder also served as th e
project officer supervising the contract with the University of Maryland's Cartographi c
Services Laboratory, which made the maps in this volume . Mrs Bonnie Kane and Ms . Le e
Ritzman Ebinger were the cartographers, under the supervision of Mrs . Sue Gibbons
and her successor, Ms . Vickie Taylor . The typesetting of the manuscript was done b y
Corporals Paul W . Gibson, Joseph J . Hynes, Mark J . Zigante, and Stanley W . Crowl .
Mrs . Catherine A . Kerns contributed significantly to the typesetting effort, and provid-
ed considerable technical expertise on typesetting procedures . Mr . William S . Hill, the
Division's graphics specialist, completed the design and layout of the book, incor-
porating some work completed earlier by his predecessor, Mr . Dennis W . Kirschner .
vi
The authors give special thanks to Brigadier General Edwin H . Simmons, the Directo r
of Marine Corps History and Museums, whose policies guide the Vietnam series . Fou r
successive Deputies for Marine Corps History—Colonel Herbert M . Hart, Colonel Joh n
E . Greenwood (now editor of the Marine Corps Gazette), Colonel Oliver M . Whipple ,
Jr ., and Colonel John G . Miller—have shepherded this project to its completion . Mr .
Henry I . Shaw, Jr ., the Chief Historian, aided all three authors by giving us the benefi t
of his considerable experience in writing Marine Corps History, encouragement and ad -
vice when needed, and general editorial guidance . Mr . Jack Shulimson, now the senio r
Vietnam historian, provided advice to all three authors and aided research through hi s
knowledge of Vietnam-era Marine Corps records . The historians in the historical offices
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force have freely exchanged information with the author s
and assisted in locating documents needed to complete our research . We express our
gratitude to all those who reviewed the comment edition and pointed out needed cor-
rections . They also were generous in providing personal photographs, documents, an d
the insights available to participants in events . Finally, the authors are responsible for
the contents of the text, including the opinions expressed and any errors in fact .
Pag e
Foreword iii
Preface v
Table of Contents VII
Maps x
vii
vii'
Deckhouse/Desoto 57
Desoto Continued 61
Operation Union 63
Union II 68
Chapter 6 Task Force Oregon 75
NOTES 26 1
APPENDICE S
A. Marine Command and Staff List, January-December 1966 27 3
B. Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations 28 7
C. Chronology of Significant Events 29 3
D. Medal of Honor Citations, 1966 29 7
E. List of Reviewers 31 3
F. Distribution of Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 31 7
G. Distribution of Personnel, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 31 9
INDEX 325
Maps
x
XI
Reference Map
(
v\i nam
/
OR'kP
PART I
THE DMZ IN EARLY 1967
CHAPTER 1
terrelated " wars ." The 3d Marine Division conducte d not relinquished in 1966 his responsibilities as Nava l
basically a conventional war along the DMZ agains t Component Commander for all American nava l
regular NVA formations . At the same time, the 1st forces in Vietnam .
Marine Division continued its combination of larg e At the beginning of 1967, the 18 infantry bat-
unit and counterguerrilla operations south of th e talions of III MAF occupied bases throughout the I
Hai Van Pass . CTZ . I Corps, the name commonly given to I CTZ ,
which consisted of the five northernmost province s
Command Relations of South Vietnam, stretched 225 miles from th e
DMZ in the north to the northern border of II CTZ
As the commander of III MAF, General Walt
in the south . Twenty-one fixed-wing and helicopte r
operated under a complicated web of command rela-
squadrons of the 1st MAW supported the allie d
tions that put him virtually under two masters .
ground forces . These units and the numerous sup -
Operational control of all United States forces i n
porting organizations gave General Walt a total o f
South Vietnam rested with General William C .
more than 70,000 troops in I CTZ .
Westmoreland, whose Military Assistance Com-
mand, Vietnam (MACV), was a unified comman d The enemy's two major thrusts across the DM Z
under Admiral U .S . Grant Sharp, the Commande r during the summer and fall of 1966 resulted in the
in Chief, Pacific Command (CinCPac) . On the othe r shifting of some 10,000 Marines north to meet thes e
hand, Lieutenant General Victor H . Krulak, wh o threats . The prolonged commitment of substantia l
headed Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac), retain- Marine forces in the north forced a realignment o f
ed command of III MAF in the areas of administra • operational commands within III MAF . On 10 Oc-
tion and logistics . Further, the air war in most o f tober 1966 Major General Wood B . Kyle of the 3 d
North Vietnam, in which some III MAF aircraft par- Marine Division assumed control of all U .S . force s
ticipated, remained under the personal control o f committed to Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces .
Admiral Sharp . Finally, General Walt, as the senior Brigadier General Lowell E . English established a
American officer in I Corps, served as the senior ad - forward command post at Dong Ha, in Quang Tr i
visor to the South Vietnamese forces in the corp s Province . At the same time, the main 3d Division
area . His burden would have been heavier had he command post moved from Da Nang to Phu Bai ,
Senior Marine commanders pose at Da Nang with MajGen Bruno A . Hochmuth upon
his arrival to assume command of 3d Marine Division . They are, from left, MajGen
Louis B. Robertshaw (1st MAW), MajGen Herman Nickerson, Jr . (1st MarDiv), LtGen
Louis W. Walt (III MAP), Gen Hochmuth, and MajGen Wood B . Kyle (3d MarDiv) .
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A19456
THE SITUATION AT THE START OF THE YEAR 5
Marine Bases in
/
South
-
January 1967 -
0 5 ¶0 ¶5
•GoLinh \
k,IomMere
.3 57O
-
—
DE UCon rh
C
— M..
S
- Dq
RockpiIe • Can, Lo H,
•Canip Carroll
Quarig Tn
t UCaLu
Khe \
Sanhu \ r
pacification efforts. General Westmoreland, ad- DMZ. Strong enemy pressure south of the DMZ
dressing a joint session of Congress in April 1967 possibly could gain a prestige victory, perhaps even
said, "The only strategy which can defeat such an the conquest of the two northern provinces, Quang
organization is one of unrelenting but dis- Tn and Thua Thien. Such pressure would also divert
criminating military, political, and psychological the Marines from the pacification program which
pressure on his whole structure—at all levels."l was beginning to fragment the guerrilla infrastruc-
Ironically, just when allied strategy placed increas- ture further south.
ed emphasis on pacification, the Marines found
The Enemy Organization
themselves hard-pressed to pursue their
own
pacification program, initiated as early as 1965. The Marines of III MAF faced a hierarchy of
Spread throughout the five provinces, III MAF forces enemy units ranging from local, part-time guerrillas
simultaneously faced large-scale attacks by NVA and to conventional North Vietnamese Army divisions.
VC units throughout I Corps. There was a substan- At each level, an appropriate political headquarters
tial increase in the tempo of guerrilla warfare, as well controlled various subordinate units' operations. The
as the threat of a major invasion in. the DMZ area by village Communist Party chapters supervised their
an enemy force of possibly three divisions. At the own squads of guerrillas. Viet Cong local force com-
same time, III MAF's mission still included the panies and battalions came under the Party commit-
defense of the three large base areas which contained tees of the province or district. Main force Viet Cong
the five principal I CTZ airfields. or North Vietnamese units received their orders from
The 3d Marine Division's area, along the DMZ, the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) or
caused the greatest Marine concern. III MAF head- other major headquarters which, theoretically, were
quarters expected the enemy to exploit his shorter subordinate to COSVN. In practice, however, these
supply lines. U.S. policy, well known in North Viet- headquarters usually took their orders directly from
nam, prohibited the pursuit of Communists into the Hanoi.
Military Region 5 (MR-S), commanded by a Nort h prohibited such action . Many Marines disagree d
Vietnamese general officer, controlled enemy unit s with the policy, including the commander of the 9t h
in the northern part of South Vietnam . Two sub - Marine Amphibious Brigade on Okinawa, Brigadier
regional headquarters shared the command respon- General Louis Metzger, who later became the assis-
sibilities for this large area . The B-3 Front command- tant commander of the 3d Division, General Metz-
ed Communist units in Darlac, Kontum, and Pleik u ger recently commented :
provinces . South of the DMZ, the important Quan g
Tri and Thua Thien provinces operated under th e It has long been my belief that the most significant
Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region, which, for all prac- aspect of operations along the DMZ was the publicly ate d
United States policy that U .S . forces would not enter
tical purposes, was subordinate to North Vietnam' s
North Vietnam . This allowed the enemy to deploy his
Military Region 4 . forces across the DMZ at the time and place of his choos-
ing, and to withdraw to a sanctuary when it suited his con-
MR-S commanded two infantry divisions tha t
venience ; to utilize his artillery against U .S . positions and
threatened the Marines in southern I Corps . The 2d bases while at the same time denying the Marines the mos t
NVA Division, also known as the 620th, and com- effective means of destroying the enemy weapons, i .e ., to
posed of two NVA regiments and the 1st Viet Cong overrun them ; [and] to free his infantry elements from
Regiment, operated in Quang Ngai and Quang Ti n guarding his artillery so that they could be employed
against U .S . forces and positions south of the DMZ . 3
provinces . The 3d NVA Division, also made up o f
two NVA and one VC regiments, worked further to
In response to the enemy challenge in the DM Z
the south in Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai, and Kontu m
area, MACV began working on two sets of con-
provinces .
tingency plans in the latter part of 1966 . First, if
North of the DMZ were four NVA divisions, th e necessary, General Westmoreland would shift U .S .
304th, the 320th, the 324B, and the 325C, all under Army units north to reinforce III MAF . In addition ,
the command of North Vietnam's Military Region 4 . he planned, at the urging of the Secretary o f
The 324E suffered heavy casualties in combat with Defense, to build an elaborate anti-infiltration bar-
the 3d Marine Division in July and August 1966 an d rier system south of- the DMZ to seal off the are a
withdrew back across the DMZ to refit . The 325 C from North Vietnamese incursions . Both actions
served as the strategic reserve for MR-4 . would have a profound effect upon III MAF's opera-
tions in 1967 as it struggled to fight both a
Tactical Considerations counterinsurgency war against the VC infrastructur e
As 1967 began, III MAF could not attack the NV A and a conventional war against regular NVA infantr y
divisions in and north of the DMZ ; American policy divisions .
Some principal figures in the war in I Corps discuss the situation on 3 May 1967 . Those
present include, from left, an unidentified Marine colonel; BGen John R . Chaisson, th e
senior Marine on the MACV staff,• Col Archelaus L . Hamblen, USA, who commande d
the Army Advisory I Corps Headquarters ; Gen William C . Westmoreland, USA, th e
MACV commander; BGen Ngo Quang Truong, commander of the 1st ARVN Division ;
MajGen Hoang Xuan Lam, the I Corps commander ; LtGen Lewis W. Walt, the III
MAF commander; MajGen Bruno A . Hochmuth of the 3d Marine Division ; and an
unidentified Vietnamese colonel wearing the shoulder patch of the 1st AR VN Division .
Department of Defense Photo (USMC)801029
CHAPTER 2
battalion at a time involved in mobile operation s Vietnamese could no longer consider the DMZ are a
while the remainder of its units defended the com- as a safe haven ; staging and support areas and ar-
bat bases . Meeting the latter responsibility require d tillery positions now could be interdicted on a
the frequent shifting of rifle companies and thei r 24-hour basis .
operational control . Rifle companies, as a result , The Communists reacted quickly to the sudde n
often found themselves under the operational con- vulnerability of their previously safe positions . O n
trol of other battalions or even directly under th e the 27th of February, heavy enemy mortar, rocket ,
commander of the 3d Marines . and artillery fire struck Con Thien and Gio Linh .
To expand artillery coverage, the 12th Marine s The composite artillery battalion at Gio Linh bore
shifted some units . The February artillery distribu- the brunt of these attacks ; on the 28th more tha n
tion was : 400 rounds landed on the battalion's position in a
17-minute period .
Khe Sanh : two 4 .2-inch mortars, two 155mm, and six
105mm howitzer s The morning of the 27th, the same day the NV A
Rockpile : two 175mm guns, two 155mm guns, si x began the artillery attacks, a Marine reconnaissanc e
105mm howitzers team 5,000 meters northwest of Cam Lo attempte d
Ba Long : six 105mm howitzers to ambush what appeared to be only two enem y
Ca Lu : six 105mm howitzer s
Camp Carroll : six 175mm guns, four 155mm, and si x soldiers . The team actually engaged an enemy com-
105mm howitzer s pany which proved to be the lead element of th e
Cam Lo : two 155mm howitzers 812th Regiment, 324B Division . By 1045, the recon-
Cua Viet : six 105mm howitzers (LVTH-6 ) naissance team reported that it was surrounded by a t
Gio Linh : four 175mm guns and six 105mm howitzer s least 100 North Vietnamese . The closest friendly
force was Captain Alan H . Hartney ' s Company L, 3 d
The 12th Marines' firing fans covered almost all o f Battalion, 4th Marines which, minus one rifle pla-
Quang Tri Province, and stretched well north of th e toon but reinforced with a platoon of tanks, was
DMZ and several miles into Laos . patrolling north of Cam Lo . Colonel Lanigan im-
mediately ordered Captain Hartney' s force to go t o
Except for mortar attacks, enemy activity during the reconnaissance team ' s relief. Captain Hartney
the first week of Operation Prairie II was confined t o reported slow progress ; brush 4-12 feet high blocked
reconnaissance and screening actions, similar to ac-
his route .
tivity during the last two months of Prairie I . Wit h
the bombing halt during the Tet Nguyen Dan truc e With the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines already in-
period, 0700 8 February - 0700 12 February, enem y volved in an operation near the Rockpile, Colone l
movement dramatically increased, both north an d Lanigan had few reserve forces . He turned to Lieu -
south of the Ben Hai River .* Of special significanc e tenant Colonel Victor Ohanesian's 2d Battalion, 3 d
was the activity immediately north of the DMZ . Marines, located at Camp Carroll . Most of this bat-
Aerial observation and photographic readout s talion was already on board ships prior to sailing fo r
revealed heavy truck and boat traffic throughout th e Okinawa after being relieved by the 3d Battalion ,
area . There was little doubt that the NVA had take n 9th Marines . Now, however, Company G, the onl y
advantage of the truce to accomplish resupply an d intact company still ashore, would have to go to th e
personnel replacement . aid of the endangered reconnaissance team .
As a result of the detection of a large concentra- Ironically, only a few hours previously the com-
tion of enemy troops and material north of the Be n manding officer of Company G, Captain Carl E .
Hai River, the Marines on 25 February asked for an d Bockewitz, had been assured by Major Robert F .
received permission to fire into and north of th e Sheridan, the battalion S-3 officer, that there wer e
DMZ against purely military targets .** The North no plans to send the company on an operation . Th e
latter officer recalled :
*Ter Nguyen Dan, or festival of the lunar new year, usuall y The morning before his unit was committed . . . Cap-
called "Tet," is the most important holiday of the Vietnames e tain Bockewitz, who was on an extension of his tour, cam e
year . to see me in the S-3 bunker and asked if there was an y
**The code name for these artillery attacks against targets i n chance we would be going north of the Cam Lo River . A s
and north of the DMZ was Operation Highrise . over half of our battalion was already on ships ready to go
to Okinawa and our in-place relief was almost completed, I naissance team . The tanks now proved to be a han-
told him there was no way we were going north . Onl y dicap ; one of them threw a track . Company G coul d
Company G, Company F (-), and a token command grou p not leave it . Captain Hartney reported his dilemm a
were left in country . Captain Bockewitz was visibly reliev-
and was ordered to establish a night position an d
ed as he stated, "That's good . Last night I had a dream tha t
if I went north of the Cam Lo I would die ." ' evacuate his wounded .
To exploit the two enemy contacts, Colone l
Despite his forebodings, Captain Bockewitz led Lanigan decided to commit the remaining availabl e
his company from Camp Carroll and began to mov e elements of Lieutenant Colonel Ohanesian's 2d Bat-
overland to link up with the reconnaissance team . talion, 3d Marines, which consisted of a small com-
Bockewitz, as had Captain Hartney, also foun d mand group and part of Company F . On the morn-
tough going and did not reach the reconnaissanc e ing of the 28th, Lieutenant Colonel Ohanesian, wh o
team until 2342 that night . Captain Bockewitz had operational control of all units in this action ,
established a defensive position and stayed there fo r planned to move his group overland to link up wit h
the night . Company G . Then the united force was to swee p
About the same time that Company G was leavin g east to Cam Lo . Company L was to act as a blockin g
Camp Carroll, Captain Hartney 's company, whil e force and then move back to its original position a t
trying to cross a stream, came under fire from a larg e Cam Lo after linkup . That was the plan ; the Nort h
enemy force . After a heavy firefight in which th e Vietnamese had other ideas .
tanks played a decisive role, the company was able to
At 0630 a vicious mortar and infantry attack
break contact and began to move toward the recon -
stunned Company L . More than 150 82mm mortar
rounds hit the company's position and NVA force s
A Marine of Company L, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines struck from three sides with heavy automatic
helps a casualty to a medevac helicopter durin g weapons, small arms, and antitank (RPG) fire . *
Operation Prairie 's heavy fighting on 28 February . RPG rounds hit two tanks ; one caught fire, but bot h
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A188455 tanks continued to support the company with thei r
turret-mounted .50-caliber machine guns . By 090 0
the Marines had repulsed three enemy attacks . Dur-
ing the attack, Captain Hartney and his artillery
observer had called in artillery fire to within 3 0
meters of the company position .
The enemy continued to alternately shell and [attemp t Members of Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marine s
to] overrun our small position the remainder of the night . who had finished Operation Chinook II, rest while
Lieutenant Colonel Ohanesian died around midnight as it waiting for the helicopters that will transport the m
was impossible to secure a landing zone . Sergeant Major to Cam Lo Province to participate in Operatio n
Wayne N . Hayes died about the same time of wounds suf-
Prairie II just south of the Demilitarized Zone .
fered in hand-to-hand combat and grenade and mortar
blasts . Constant artillery, night air strikes within 50 meters
of our position and the courage of the Marines on th e Earlier, upon learning that Lieutenant Colone l
ground finally took their toll and the NVA withdrew . ' Ohanesian had been wounded, Colonel Laniga n
ordered his executive officer, Lieutenant Colone l
Earl R . " Pappy " Delong to take command of the 2 d
Battalion, 3d Marines . In addition, Lieutenant Col-
onel Delong received operational control of Com-
pany F, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines which, fortuitous-
ly, was at Dong Ha after serving as escort for a
"Roughrider" vehicle convoy from the south . Com-
pany F went by truck to Cam Lo where it woul d
begin moving overland to reinforce the hard-presse d
2d Battalion, 3d Marines . Lieutenant Colone l
Delong attempted to reach his new command b y
helicopter but enemy fire prevented a landing . H e
ordered the helicopter to Cam Lo where he joine d
Company F for the overland march . At 0340 on 1
March, Delong arrived at the battalion ' s positio n
and begari reorganization and preparation for th e
evacuation of casualties .
The 2d Battalion remained in position the entir e
day . About noon it was joined by Companies G an d
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189092 M . The Marines searched the surrounding area an d
LtCol Victor Ohanesian, the commanding officer of recovered a large amount of enemy equipment .
the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, shown here in Opera- Company M made several contacts with small enem y
tion Allegheny in August 1966, died early on 1 groups, but the NVA force was withdrawing . The 2 d
March 1967 from shrapnel wounds suffered th e Battalion, 3d Marines could continue its interrupted
previous afternoon as he carried a casualty to safety . embarkation for Okinawa .
Trucks of the 9th Motor Transport Battalion move over Highway 9 from Dong Ha t o
Khe Sanh on 28 March . The 11th Engineer Battalion had opened the road on the 19t h
after months of effort that involved coping with adverse weather and enemy attacks .
Marine Corps Historical Collection
from Da Nang by LCUs (landing craft, utility) u p approximately 6,000 meters north of Camp Carroll .
the Cua Viet River to Dong Ha . On 18 March, a ma- The seven-day operation ended on the 21st havin g
jor step in easing the logistic burden occurred whe n made little contact with the enemy, but discovere d
an LST (landing ship, tank) ramp opened at Cu a numerous mortar positions and rocket launching
Viet . These LSTs could discharge their cargo for tran- sites, which probably were the positions used in th e
shipment up the river by LCUs and LCMs (landin g attack against Camp Carroll on 7 March . A search of
craft, medium) . The Cua Viet facility more than the area uncovered 125 large rockets and 3 rocke t
tripled the daily tonnage that could be brought in b y launchers . Both battalions received orders to swee p
ships . north from Cam Lo in support of Operation Beaco n
A second significant logistic event occurred on th e Hill being conducted to the east by Seventh Fleet ' s
19th . Route 9 opened from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh , SLF .
thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Ross L . Mulford's 11th For some time General Walt had been troubled b y
Engineer Battalion . Mulford's engineers had worke d growing enemy activity in the region northeast o f
on the road for months, hindered by terrible weathe r Dong Ha . His greatest concern was the possibility o f
conditions, mines, and the NVA . The military an NVA attempt to overrun the Gio Linh artillery
significance of their effort was considerable, since i t base . Its 175mm guns were capable of firing at posi-
reduced the requirement to commit aircraft fo r tions deep in North Vietnam . To counter this threat ,
logistic support of the Khe Sanh outpost until lat e General Walt asked the commander of U .S . Military
summer, when enemy activity closed the road .
Assistance Command Vietnam (ComUSMACV) to
When Operation Prairie III started, it appeare d have the SLF committed to this area .* CinCPac ap-
that Marine forces continued to face elements of th e proved the request on 15 March . Operation Beaco n
324B and the 341st NVA Divisions north of the Be n Hill moved into the planning phase, with 19 Marc h
Hai River . Battalion-size elements of both enem y set as D-Day .
divisions were in Quang Tri Province, conducting ex- Bad weather postponed the scheduled landin g
tensive screening and reconnaissance missions, a s from ships of the Seventh Fleet's Amphibious Read y
well as attempting to disrupt the Revolutionar y Group until the early afternoon of the 20th . Initial
Development Program . Additionally, ARVN unit s operations were unopposed, but BLT 1/4 element s
reported that the 808th VC and 814th NVA Bat- near Gio Linh received fire from enemy supportin g
talions were east and south of Quang Tri City . arms that night . Company B made contact on th e
On 20 March Lieutenant Colonel William H . 21st, and the BLT engaged well-entrenched enem y
Rice ' s Composite Artillery Battalion at Gio Lin h units through the 26th . On 28 March, BLT 1/4 pass-
came under attack by mortars, rockets, and artillery . ed to the operational control of the 3d Marines . On 1
The attack demonstrated the enemy's ability t o April Beacon Hill ended, and III MAF released th e
employ artillery from positions north of the Ben Ha i BLT to SLF control .
River . Although the bombardment on the 20th was
The contribution of Beacon Hill to the Prairie II I
the heaviest, both Gio Linh and Con Thien receive d
operation, going on 10 miles to the west, can b e
almost daily attacks during the next two weeks .
measured, in part, by casualty figures . During 1 2
Further evidence of increased enemy activity i n
operational days, BLT 1/4 killed 334 NVA soldier s
the area occurred on 21 March . At 0200 an enem y
who otherwise would have been available for us e
force ambushed an ammunition resupply convoy on-
against the battalions involved in Prairie III . Beacon
ly 300 meters south of Gio Linh . As the convoy ap-
Hill tied up a substantial enemy force . Marin e
proached the artillery position, the enemy struck
casualties totaled 29 SLF Marines killed and 23 0
with heavy small arms and mortar fire, destroyin g
wounded .* *
eight trucks and damaging six others . Fortunately ,
friendly casualties totaled only eight wounde d
because of the rapid reaction of both the convo y
guard and the Gio Linh security company, Compan y *General Westmoreland, as ComUSMACV, could no t
I, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines . authorize the landing of the SLF ; CinCPac was the authorizin g
When Prairie III began, the 3d Battalion, 3 d command .
Marines and the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines were con- **Chapter 11 contains the detailed account of SLF participatio n
ducting a mission in the mountains west of Cam Lo in Beacon Hill/Prairie III .
18 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E
To the west of Beacon Hill, other Marines involv- Communist bunker complex, Lieutenant Colone l
ed in Operation Prairie III experienced similar ligh t Wilder's battalion, on the left, engaged an NV A
contact during the opening phases . The two bat- company . This unit was also well entrenched, i n
talions under command of the 3d Marines— the 3 d camouflaged, reinforced bunkers . The enemy's ligh t
Battalion, 3d Marines and 1st Battalion, 9t h mortars were dug in below ground level, makin g
Marines—had moved from the Dong Ha/Dong M a them even more difficult to locate . Artillery, follow-
Mountain complex to Cam Lo on 21 March i n ed up by an assault by Company I, cracked the posi-
preparation for a sweep north to Con Thien . Th e tion . The NVA broke contact and withdrew, leavin g
next morning both battalions jumped off at firs t behind 28 bodies, including two uniformed women .
light ; Lieutenant Colonel Wilder ' s 3d Battalion, 3 d The enemy attempted to delay the Marine ad-
Marines was on the left and Major Day ' s 1st Bat- vance with harassing mortar and sniper fire for th e
talion, 9th Marines was on the right . They en - next two days . By the evening of 26 March the Com-
countered light contact during the first two days, bu t munist force had broken contact and withdrawn int o
on 24 March Day's battalion found an NVA bat- the DMZ .
talion southeast of Con Thien . The enemy was i n
well-prepared defensive positions consisting o f On the 28th, the 3d Marines pulled both bat-
mutually supporting bunkers . After two hours o f talions out of the area and replaced them wit h
heavy fighting, which included concentrated air an d Lieutenant Colonel James S . Wilson's 3d Battalion ,
artillery strikes, the enemy withdrew, leaving 3 3 9th Marines . Wilson's mission was to conduct night
bodies . * ambushes in the area immediately north of Cam Lo .
While Major Day's 1st Battalion attacked th e There was very little contact for the first two days ,
but on the 30th, as Company I complete d
establishing platoon ambush positions, the NVA at-
*During this action Sergeant Walter K. Singleton of Company tacked the company command post and the 2d pla-
A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, assaulted the key enemy stron g toon's position . Company I's positions were approx-
point with a machine gun . Though mortally wounded, he drov e
the enemy from the position . Sergeant Singleton was awarded th e imately six miles northwest of Cam Lo . The Com-
Medal of Honor posthumously . See Appendix D for complete munists walked mortar fire over the position twice ,
citation . then followed with a ground assault in company
strength . The first assault failed when the compan y cluded in the development of a strongpoint system ,
commander, Captain Michael P . Getlin, called in was intended to stop large-scale infiltration in th e
supporting arms . As the first attack started, both th e critical area along the eastern DMZ . *
1st and 3d Platoons tried to help the command
On 12 April, Major General Bruno A . Hochmuth ,
group and the 2d Platoon, but the enemy stoppe d
a lanky Texan who had assumed command of the 3 d
the Marines with a cross-fire of automatic weapons .
Marine Division from Major General Kyle th e
The NVA assaulted a second time . This time they
previous month, established a task force aroun d
overran the position .
Lieutenant Colonel Theodore J . Willis' 1st Battalion ,
With the help of UH-1E gunships, the compan y
4th Marines .** Its mission was to provide security for
managed to drive off the enemy . The NVA lost 6 7
Company C, 11th Engineer Battalion . The engineer
killed and 2 captured in both attacks, and a search o f
company was to clear a 200-meter-wide strip fro m
the area the following morning turned up a heav y
Gio Linh to Con Thien, a distance of 10,600 meters .
machine gun and 12 automatic weapons . Compan y
Willis' task force was reinforced with a platoon o f
I's losses were heavy . Sixteen Marines died, including '
tanks, an armored amphibian tractor (LVTH-6) pla-
the company commander, executive officer, and the
toon, a platoon of M-42 track-mounted dual 40m m
weapons platoon commander ; 47 more were wound-
guns of the 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery, USA, and
ed, including the company first sergeant . *
some ARVN forces . From the onset the clearin g
Enemy activity around Quang Tri City increase d
operation proceeded under constant harassment b y
during the first week of April . The NVA launched a enemy artillery, mortars, mines, recoilless rifles, an d
series of mortar and ground attacks against ARVN small arms . Despite enemy activity, the Marines ha d
positions in the area . On 6 April a Viet Cong unit
completed approximately half of the strip by 1 9
broke into the Quang Tri provincial jail, freeing April when Operation Prairie III ended .
more than 200 prisoners .
In spite of this surge of enemy activity to th e Prairie III cost the enemy 252 killed, 4 captured ,
south, the Marines ' main concerns in the Prairie are a and 128 weapons seized . Marine losses were 56 killed
continued to be blocking major invasion attempts b y and 530 wounded . The Prairie series was far fro m
the NVA and clearing an anti-infiltration trace be- over ; Prairie IV began the next day in the same plac e
tween Gio Linh and Con Thien . The second task, in - and with the same forces .
Operation Prairie IV Begins Wilson's 3d Battalion, 9th Marines was charged with
the security of Camp Carroll and the outpost at Mai
Enemy concentrations of troops and artillery i n Loc . Wilder's 3d Battalion, 3d Marines held th e
the DMZ area dictated the reinforcement of the 3 d Rockpile and placed companies at Ca Lu and B a
Marine Division . Responding to the demands of th e Long . The latter battalion was also responsible fo r
situation, MACV deployed Army Task Force Orego n providing security for the 11th Engineers, who kep t
to the southern two provinces of I Corps in April to
allow Marine units to reinforce the northern thre e
provinces .* As a result of the northward shift o f
Marine forces, Colonel Robert M . Jenkins' 9t h
Marines headquarters moved from Da Nang to Don g
Ha during 12-16 April . At the same time, III MAF
shifted the 2d Battalions of the 4th and 26th Marine s
from the 1st Marine Division area to the vicinity o f
Phu Bai .
Route 9 open into Khe Sanh . In the 9th Marines' plain . It afforded the best observation in the area ,
area of operation, the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine s overlooking the DMZ to the north and west, as wel l
defended the Dong Ha combat base and provide d as the Marine base at Dong Ha to the southeast . As a
one company for security of the Cua Viet petroleum , strategic terrain feature, Con Thien was important t o
oil, and lubricants (POL) facility . The 1st Battalion , the .Communists ; before the summer was over, i t
4th Marines protected the engineers clearing th e achieved an additional symbolic importance .
trace between Gio Linh and Con Thien, referred t o At the time of the attack, the outpost contained a
as " Ryan's Road " because of Brigadier General small command group of the 1st Battalion, 4th
Michael P . Ryan's frequent visits and interest in th e Marines, reinforced companies A and D of the bat-
project . The battalion also continued to provide a talion, and a civilian irregular defense group (CIDG )
company for security for the Gio Linh Composite Ar - unit . The Marines were there to provide security fo r
tillery Battalion . the engineers, who, having completed the trace on 1
Although contact with enemy infantry was light a t May, were busy clearing a 500-meter-wide strip
the beginning of the operation, reconnaissanc e around the perimeter of the outpost . At 0255, the
reports indicated an NVA buildup northwest of th e morning of 8 May, a green flare lit the sky south o f
Rockpile . Mortar, rocket, and artillery attacks con- the hill, followed immediately by a savag e
tinued against the Marines clearing "Ryan's Road, " 300-round mortar and artillery attack . Concurrently ,
as well as against the Con Thien and Gio Linh out - Camp Carroll, Gio Linh, and Dong Ha also cam e
posts . Attacks on these two positions and agains t under fire .
Lieutenant Colonel Willis ' 1st Battalion, 4th Marines At Con Thien, enemy units maneuvering unde r
and the engineers became almost daily affairs, an d cover of the barrage breached the defensive wire wit h
included not only mortar and rocket fire from th e
bangalore torpedoes, and small elements moved in -
southern half of the DMZ, but also medium and side . At approximately 0400, two NVA battalions ,
heavy artillery fire from a growing number of for- armed with flamethrowers, RPGs, and automati c
tifications north of the Ben Hai River .
weapons, attacked through the breach in the wire .
On 24 April a major battle broke out in th e The brunt of this assault fell on the right flank of
western DMZ near Khe Sanh, the beginning of Company D . The Marines engaged the enemy forc e
heavy fighting which continued throughout the in bitter hand-to-hand fighting . An engineer pla-
summer all along the demarcation line .* In conjunc- toon moved to reinforce Company D . The situatio n
tion with the battle being fought in the west, th e became serious when the Marines ran out of 81m m
enemy stepped up activity in the east . Enemy force s mortar illumination rounds ; artillery illuminatio n
cut Route 9 between Cam Lo and Khe San h from the nearest artillery at Gio Linh could not reac h
repeatedly in an effort to isolate the Marines in tha t Con Thien .* A flare plane finally arrived and pro-
area . In consort with this effort, the NVA attacke d vided much-needed illumination until daylight .
the Marine installations at Gio Linh, Camp Carroll , Meanwhile, Company A sent a platoon to hel p
and Dong Ha with mortars, rockets, and artillery . Company D, as well as to protect an ammunitio n
The period 27-28 April was particularly savage . Ap- resupply convoy composed of an attached Army M4 2
proximately 850 rounds of artillery, plus 200 mortar "Duster," two LVTHs, and two 1/4-ton trucks . A s
rounds blasted Gio Linh, while more than 5 0 these elements moved up to support the hard -
140mm rockets hit Dong Ha . pressed Marines of Company D, the relief vehicle s
came under enemy fire . The Army M42, which was
Attack on Con Thie n the lead vehicle, stopped and burst into flames afte r
On 8 May, the 13th anniversary of the fall of Die n being hit by an enemy RPG antitank projectile . A
Bien Phu, the NVA tried to overrun the Marine posi- satchel charge exploded under the following LVTH .
tion at Con Thien . The outpost, less than two mile s It began to burn but its crew managed to get out .
from the southern boundary of the DMZ, was on a The trailing LVTH, trying to get around the burning
hill only 158 meters high in the middle of a red mud vehicles, which now included the 1/4-ton trucks ,
*For a detailed account of the action at Khe Sanh see Chapter *There is no illumination round for the 175mm gun .
22 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
became entangled by barbed wire around its left rea r the enemy 197 killed and 8 captured . The Com-
sprocket . The tractor was stuck . Despite their losses , munists left behind 72 weapons, including 19 an-
the reinforcing Marines continued to Company D' s titank weapons, 3 light machine guns, and 3
position . With these reinforcements, Company D flamethrowers . *
halted the enemy penetration and sealed off th e The 8 May attack on Con Thien had been carefully
break in the wire just before daylight . By 0900, th e rehearsed, but the enemy displayed an inherent in -
enemy soldiers still within the perimeter were eithe r ability to alter plans . The NVA attacked th e
dead or captured . ' strongest point of the defensive perimeter and con-
tinued to press the attack at this point, even when i t
The recently completed brush clearance aroun d
was clear that it had encountered heavier resistanc e
the perimeter paid early dividends . It permitted the
than anticipated . The enemy planners were no t
Marines to catch the retreating North Vietnamese i n
aware of the arrival of the two Marine companies .
the open as they crossed the cleared strip . Tanks and
Company D had replaced an ARVN unit only a few
LVTHs firing both conventional and "beehive" an-
days before the attack .
tipersonnel ammunition were particularly effective . *
Following this battle, enemy activity intensifie d
Supporting fires of the Composite Artillery Battalio n
throughout the "Leatherneck Square" area .** Th e
at Gio Linh ripped into the enemy as it withdre w
number and volume of artillery attacks increase d
north to the DMZ .
greatly . More than 4,200 mortar, rocket, and ar-
The defending Marines lost 44 killed and 11 0 tillery rounds were fired at Marine positions durin g
wounded, as well as two LVTHs and one 1/4-ton the month . The enemy revealed the degree an d
truck destroyed, but the hard and bloody battle cos t
*This was the first instance of NVA use of flarnethrower s
against the Marines .
** " Leatherneck Square" was the quadrilateral between Co n
*See Chapter 13 for discussion of " beehive ammunition ." Thien, Gio Linh, Dong Ha, and Cam Lo .
0
kilometers I
See Reference Map, Sections 2,3.6 .7
Gio
Lin h
n
Con
nThien
xx
Hickory
®
ARV N
Rockpile
n
Cam p
Carrol l
Air Force and the Seventh Fleet . The majority of the forces . In addition, SLF Bravo was to act as 3d Divi-
support focused on enemy concentrations and gu n sion Reserve . The same day Colonel Edward E . Ham-
positions in the northern portion of the DMZ an d merbeck, the new regimental commander, deploye d
the adjacent area to the immediate north, and, if re- the 9th Marines command post to a position jus t
quired, as counterbattery fire against North Viet- north of Cam Lo .
namese shore batteries .
During the night of 17-18 May the NVA directe d
A buildup of Marine forces in the Prairie area pre - heavy mortar, rocket, and artillery attacks against al l
ceded the operation . Lieutenant Colonel Charles R . Marine positions along the DMZ . Gio Linh an d
Figard ' s 2d Battalion, 26th Marines arrived fro m Dong Ha suffered the most . From 2350 on the 17t h
Phong Dien on 15 May ; the 3d Battalion, 4th until 0401 on the 18th, over 300 rounds hit Gio
Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colone l Linh, killing 1 Marine and wounding 12 others .
Wendell N . Vest, came in from Okinawa on th e During the attack on Dong Ha, at 0315, 150 140m m
15th ; and the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, command- rockets killed 11 and wounded 91 . One rocket score d
ed by Lieutenant Colonel John J . Peeler, arrive d a direct hit on the roof of the 3d Marine Divisio n
from Phu Bai on the 16th .* At the beginning of th e Combat Operations Center (COC), but there wer e
operation three battalions, the 1st Battalion, 4th no casualties . The rocket detonated prematurel y
Marines and the 1st and 3d Battalions, 9th Marine s upon hitting a tin roof the division recently ha d
provided augmentation from Operation Prairie I V built a few feet above the original sandbagged bu t
leaky roof. 2 Next door, the ARVN COC had no
*At the request of ComUSMACV, CinCPac directed th e sandbag protection and suffered numerou s
deployment of BLT 3/4, the last element of the Pacific Comman d
reserve, to I Corps . In a massive 42-plane Air Force and Marin e casualties . The rockets also damaged considerabl e
airlift the BLT moved directly from Okinawa to Dong Ha . The en- amounts of equipment, including minor fragmen t
tire lift of the 1,233-man force took exactly 31 hours . damage to several helicopters of Major Marvin E .
North Vietnamese soldiers captured in Operations Hickory and Lam Son 54 stand blind -
folded outside the 9th Marines' headquarters at the Dong Ha combat base on 25 May .
Day's Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363 . * turned to the west and then southward abreast th e
The Communist artillery attacks, nevertheless, wer e advance of the 1st Division units east of th e
fortuitous for they allowed the allied forces to bom- highway .
bard the NVA positions in and north of the DMZ , On the 19th, the airborne battalions engage d
under the guise of counterbattery fire, thereby main- elements of the 31st and 812th NVA Regiments .
taining tactical surprise for the forthcoming opera- From then until the 27th, when Lam Son 54 ended ,
tion . ARVN units were in constant contact with th e
Operation Lam Son 54 enemy . Their casualties were 22 killed and 12 2
wounded . The enemy suffered more substantial
Hickory/Lam Son 54 started on schedule . The 1s t losses : 342 killed, 30 captured, and 51 weapons seiz-
ARVN Division elements jumped off at 0500, mov- ed . Most of the casualties occurred in the area know n
ing in column up Route 1, into the DMZ . Surprise as the "rocket belt" north of Dong Ha .
was complete ; the ARVN units encountered n o
resistance as they moved to the Ben Hai and wheele d Operation Beau Charge r
south . The two 1st ARVN Division battalions started East of the Lam Son 54 operational area, Opera-
their sweep south on the east side of Route 1, while tion Beau Charger began at the scheduled L-hou r
the three airborne battalions, supported by tanks , and H-hour of 0800, 18 May . Just before and durin g
the launching of the assault, a duel started betwee n
*While the damage to the helicopters was minor, this and Navy fire support ships and NVA shore batteries .
subsequent attacks disrupted helicopter operations by preventin g Although the NVA batteries hit no ships, 10 salvo s
normal maintenance . This caused the rotation of squadrons in Ju- bracketed the USS Point Defiance (LSD 31) . After
ly and the subsequent abandonment in the fall of Dong Ha as a
permanent helicopter base in favor of Quang Tri . LtCol Horace A . return fire silenced the shore batteries, the surfac e
Bruce, Comments on draft ms, 14Ju181, (Comment File, MCHC , landing proceeded without further incident ; there
Washington, D .C .) . was no opposition .
The Beau Charger heliborne force experienced a enemy defended from well prepared bunkers an d
different reception . Landing Zone Goose was a "hot" trenches . As the battalion moved against the NV A
zone, and only one platoon of Company A, the positions, the right flank came under viciou s
assault company, managed to land . The Com- automatic weapons and mortar fire . Casualties were
munists closed in and the situation was very much in heavy . Among them were Lieutenant Colonel Figar d
doubt . At 1100 elements of Company D and the rest and his S-3, both of whom required evacuation .
of Company A, reinforced with tanks, succeeded in Despite the heavy enemy fire, the Navy hospita l
joining up with the isolated assault platoon . The corpsmen continued their treatment of the wound-
Communists withdrew only after air strikes began t o ed . 3 By 1600, Peeler's 2d Battalion, 9th Marines ha d
hammer their positions . moved up on the right of the 2d Battalion, 26t h
On the 18th, NVA gunners ranged in on suppor- Marines and was also in close contact . Fighting con-
ting Marine SLF artillery positions, knocking out two tinued until nightfall when the Marines broke con -
guns . Ships of the Seventh Fleet returned fire , tact and pulled back to evacuate casualties . Durin g
silencing the North Vietnamese batteries . The the day, enemy fire killed 5 Marines and wounded
Marines relocated their remaining guns at positions 142 ; 31 enemy soldiers were known to have been
5,800 meters further south . killed .
Action during the rest of Beau Charger consiste d The 3d Marine Division already had replaced th e
of light contact and continuing artillery harassmen t wounded Lieutenant Colonel Figard with a new bat-
until the operation ended on 26 May .* West of the talion commander . As soon as it learned of Figard' s
Beau Charger operational area the 3d Marine Divi- condition, the division immediately ordered Lieu -
sion was faced with a much different situation . tenant Colonel William J . Masterpool, who had jus t
There, the enemy had come to fight . joined the division staff after command of 3d Bat-
talion, 4th Marines, to assume command of the 2 d
Operation Hickory Battalion, 26th Marines .
Adjacent to the Lam Son 54/Beau Charger opera- That night, 75 radar-controlled air strikes hit th e
tional area, 3d Marine Division units launche d NVA positions in front of the two Marine battalions .
Operation Hickory on the morning of 18 May . At 0500 on 19 May, heavy artillery fire fell on th e
Lieutenant Colonel Figard's 2d Battalion, 26t h enemy defenses and both battalions jumped off i n
Marines and Lieutenant Colonel Peeler's 2d Bat- the attack at 0700 . During the "prep" fires severa l
talion, 9th Marines, supported by tanks and Ontos , short rounds landed on Company F, 2d Battalion ,
advanced northward from positions near Co n 9th Marines, killing 3 and wounding 2 Marines .
Thien .** Concurrently, Lieutenant Colonel Vest' s Within minutes, the 2d Battalion, 26th Marine s
3d Battalion, 4th Marines moved by helicopters int o again checked its advance because of savage fire fro m
a landing zone (LZ) within the DMZ near the Ben its front and right, while Peeler's battalion en -
Hai River, northwest of Con Thien . The heliborne countered only light small arms fire and pushe d
battalion was to act as a blocking force to prevent th e rapidly ahead to relieve the pressure on Masterpool' s
enemy from escaping to the north, or to stop th e flank . By 1030 the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines ha d
movement of reinforcements into the area from the overrun the enemy bunker complex, accounting fo r
north . 34 North Vietnamese killed and 9 wounded .
Shortly after 1100 the lead element of Figard's 2 d As the 3d Marine Division begins Operation Hickory
Battalion, 26th Marines made contact with a forc e on 18 May, CH-46A Sea Knight helicopters com-
which intelligence officers later determined to hav e mence lifting the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines to a
been two battalions . All elements of the Marine bat- blocking position within the DMZ near the Ben Ha i
talion quickly became engaged in the battle ; th e River, northwest of the important Con Thien base .
Marine Corps Historical Collection
During the rest of the morning both battalion s cost the Marines 7 killed and 12 wounded ; enem y
continued to advance against negligible resistance . casualties were unknown .
At 1330, Captain Robert J . Thompson ' s Compan y In the meantime, Lieutenant Colonel Vest's 3 d
H, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, on the easternmos t Battalion, 4th Marines, after the heavy action involv-
flank of the advance, met heavy automatic weapo n ing the 2d Battalions, 26th and 9th Marines, swep t
and mortar fire from the east . The company re - to the southeast to block the NVA withdrawal . O n
turned fire, but then received additional enemy fir e 18' May the battalion made little contact, bu t
from a tree line 60 meters to the front . Again th e discovered a large, abandoned, fortified position ,
Marines returned fire and a tank moved up in sup - well stocked with food and equipment . For the nex t
port . It silenced the enemy with cannister fire . A two days Vest's battalion maneuvered toward th e
squad sent forward to check out the area also cam e other Marine battalions which were moving north .
under heavy automatic weapons fire . The tank, mov- Contact was light, but the battalion encountered in-
ing to support the squad, halted after being hit by termittent mortar and artillery fire . The battalio n
RPG rounds and began to burn . A second tan k continued to uncover large caches of rice and am-
maneuvered forward to help ; RPGs disabled it also . munition—over 30 tons of rice and 10 tons of am-
Captain Thompson, unable to use other supportin g munition—but due to the heat and distance to th e
arms because of wounded Marines to his front , landing zones much of the rice could not be move d
moved the entire company forward to retrieve th e and had to be destroyed . *
dead and wounded . After moving the wounded t o *High temperatures reduce helicopter lift capability, hence the
the rear, the company pulled back and called in sup - inability to evacuate the large quantities of rice without diversio n
porting arms fire on the evacuated area . The action of additional helicopters from other missions .
Hickory and the artillery operations to the east . responded with 82mm mortars . The following day ,
Nevertheless, the Marines found and destroye d the 29th, Companies M and I, the latter led b y
numerous well-fortified areas before the operatio n Lieutenant Walter E . Deese's 1st Platoon, attacke d
terminated on 28 May . In addition, they captured o r up the hill . Despite being hit by friendly 60m m
destroyed more than 50 tons of rice and 10 tons o f mortars, the Marines made contact with the NV A
ordnance . Total enemy casualties for the combine d defenders around 1600 . Enemy resistance remaine d
Marine/ ARVN operation were 789 killed (th e firm ; 5 more Marines died, 33 suffered wounds . This
equivalent of two NVA battalions), 37 captured , time, however, the Marines managed to hold posi-
and 187 weapons taken . Of this total 447 were killed tions on the western and northern slopes of Hill 174 .
by Marines (85 in Beau Charger, 58 in Belt The crest remained in enemy hands .
Tight/Hickory, and 304 in Hickory) . Allied losse s
for the operation were by no means small ; the On 30 May, I and M Companies attacked again .
Marines lost 142 killed and 896 wounded, whil e Despite heavy supporting arms fire and the Marines '
ARVN losses were 22 killed and 122 wounded . use of flame throwers and 3 .5-inch rocket launchers ,
The first large-scale allied entry into the souther n the enemy retained control of the hill . Another
half of the DMZ signified that the rules ha d Marine died ; 45 were wounded . There were seve n
changed . The area was no longer a guaranteed Com- confirmed enemy dead . The North Vietnamese ,
munist sanctuary from which they could launch at - however, decided to give up the contest . Compan y
tacks . More immediately, the operation had upset , M reached the crest of Hill 174 on 31 May, meetin g
at least temporarily, the NVA organizational struc- no resistance . ?
ture in the DMZ . The Marines realized that this in- Operation Prairie IV, the last of the Prairie serie s
itial search and destroy operation would not per- of operations was over . It, like its predecessors, hur t
manently deny the enemy's use of the area . Never- the enemy : 505 died, 8 captured, and 150 weapon s
theless, while total friendly control had not bee n seized . Friendly losses were 164 killed and 1,24 0
established over the region, the removal of th e wounded .
civilian population from the area, some 11,000 peo- On 1 June, Operation Cimarron began in th e
ple, now permitted the Marines complete freedo m same area and with the same formations . The opera-
of use of supporting arms . tion lasted through 2 July, producing only light con -
Operation Prairie IV Ends tact . The Marines discovered and destroyed severa l
large, abandoned, fortified positions in the are a
At the end of Operation Hickory, all participatin g
southwest of Con Thien and unit sweeps locate d
forces joined Operation Prairie IV and continue d
sweeps of " Leatherneck Square" and the are a numerous enemy graves and several supply caches .
southwest of Con Thien . On 28 May, the 3d Bat- While Cimarron progressed, the land clearin g
project from Con Thien through Gio Linh to th e
talion, 4th Marines made heavy contact on Hill 174 ,
high water mark on the coast reached completion b y
approximately four miles southwest of Con Thien .
1 July . The Marine engineers widened the previousl y
The NVA were in bunkers, similar to the comple x
encountered on Hill 117 . Two Companes, M and L , cleared area to 600 meters for the entire 13 . 5
kilometers of its length . The 11th Engineer Battalio n
attacked late in the afternoon, only to be "blown off
174" 6 by a heavy volume of fire from enemy smal l contributed more than 10,000 man hours and 4,500
tractor hours to this hazardous effort .
arms, automatic weapons, 57mm recoilless rifles ,
and 82mm mortars . Accounting for all personne l During the last days of Cimarron a sharp increase
took much of the night . Results of this initia l in enemy artillery activity, coupled with several smal l
engagement were 2 Marines killed and 21 wounded . but intense engagements between patrols and dug-
Known enemy casualties were 4 dead ; with another 4 in NVA units around Con Thien, indicated that th e
probably killed . enemy was preparing for renewed offensive opera-
The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines called in artiller y tions in the area . There was to be much hole diggin g
throughout the night ; the North Vietnamese and sandbag filling before the summer ended .
CHAPTER 4
31
-800
To Ca L u
meters
Initially, Battery B, reinforced with two 155m m pany and the platoon of the 3d Reconnaissance Bat-
howitzers and two 4 .2-inch mortars, provided th e talion working from the base, but reconnaissanc e
battalion's only immediate artillery support . Late i n contacts did indicate an increase in enemy activity .
October, additional artillery became available whe n Five reconnaissance patrols came under attack fro m
U .S . Army 175mm guns moved into positions at NVA 'units during this period and helicopters ex-
Camp Carroll 13 miles to the east . While the fires of tracted them under fire . Then, on 25 February, a
the 175s augmented the base's defensive plans, the y sharp contact occurred only 3,000 meters from th e
normally fired interdiction missions and support o f airstrip ; the days of watchful waiting were over .
Marine reconnaissance units operating from th e
base . A squad patrol from the 2d Platoon, Company B ,
led by Sergeant Donald E . Harper, Jr ., was movin g
Air support for the battalion came from thre e up a small hill west of the airstrip when an NVA uni t
UH-34 helicopters assigned to Khe Sanh on a dail y opened up with small arms fife, killing one Marine
basis . These aircraft provided routine and emergenc y and wounding another . The patrol pulled back im-
resupply, evacuation, troop lifts, and reconnaissanc e mediately and called in artillery fire . When the ar-
missions . Additional helicopters and fixed-wing air - tillery stopped, Harper's squad again moved agains t
craft were available on request . * the enemy position and this time made contact with
As 1967 began, the battalion experienced no about 50 North Vietnamese . Once more the Marines
significant contacts . On 31 January, Operatio n backed off the hill and called in artillery fire . Cap-
Prairie I ended . Wickwire's battalion could clai m tain Sayers sent a second squad to reinforce Harper's
only 15 enemy killed during the four months it ha d patrol . The Marines assaulted the position for th e
participated in Prairie . While the casualty figures for third time and after heavy fighting were able to tak e
the operation were not impressive, the battalion had the hill . They found only nine enemy bodies on the
established control of the Khe Sanh Plateau, and th e position, but a search of the area uncovered fire
extended airstrip provided a terminus from which II I direction center equipment, an 82mm mortar, 38 0
MAF could challenge the movement of enemy force s 82mm mortar rounds, 3 mortar base plates, 2 in-
through the area . dividual weapons, some clothing, and 10 enem y
packs . Friendly losses in the action were one kille d
After Operation Prairie I, III MAF reduced opera- and 11 wounded . '
tions from Khe Sanh to reconnaissance efforts . As a
result, when the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines moved t o Although the area remained quiet after this shar p
Okinawa on 6 February, only a single company , encounter, an unfortunate incident occurred at Lang
Company B, 9th Marines, augmented by a 45-ma n Vei on the evening of 2 March . Two USAF aircraft
security platoon and Battery I, 12th Marines, re- mistakenly bombed the village, killing 112 civilians ,
mained to defend Khe Sanh Base .** The mission o f wounding 213, and destroying 140 buildings . The
Captain Michael W . Sayers' company was essentiall y Marines immediately sent helicopters and trucks t o
the same as the 1st Battalion ' s had been : To defen d the village to help with the evacuation of casualties .
the airstrip and patrol the surrounding area out to a A KC-130, carrying a group of 1st Marine Aircraf t
distance of 15,000 meters . The company also main- Wing personnel especially organized for such event s
tained a 30-man force as emergency support fo r and under the command of Major William F .
Marine reconnaissance patrols operating in the area . Morley, arrived at the airfield and flew out 53 of th e
wounded before weather closed the field . 2
Poor weather, primarily fog, through Februar y
hampered the activities of both Captain Sayers' com - The NVA took this opportunity to hit the bas e
with more than 90 82mm mortar rounds, killing two
Marines and wounding 17, while damaging two
CH-46s and two UH-lEs . Three days later, on th e
*The number of helicopters assigned to the Khe Sanh Bas e
increased during January to six : two CH-46s, two UH-lEs, an d 5th, 14 enemy soldiers probed the airfield perimete r
two UH-34s . from the north and west . The defending Marine s
**Battery I replaced Battery B/ 13 on 26 January . Two detected and drove them off with command -
155mm howitzers and the two 4 .2-inch mortars reinforced Battery detonated claymore mines before they could do an y
damage .
The 3d Marine Division responded to the increas- tied the wounded out to the LZ and they becam e
ed enemy activity by reinforcing Khe Sanh with Cap- casualties themselves . Captain Terrill recalled, "Th e
tain William B . Terrill's Company E, 9th Marines o n platoon commander tried to move the LZ down t o
7 March . With the addition of the second company , the reverse slope of the hill, but by this time ther e
the Marines increased their patrols of the surroun- were not enough able-bodied men in the platoon t o
ding area, with particular emphasis given to th e move all the dead and wounded ." 3
861-881 hill complex northwest of the base . Recon- At 1705, a helicopter carrying the 3d squad, 2 d
naissance teams there had made numerous sighting s Platoon, Company B attempted to set down in th e
during the past few weeks . Patrols and ambushes i n landing zone on the reverse slope, but the CH-4 6
the area saw signs of enemy activity, but made no overshot the zone and crashed at the base of the hill .
contact ; on 16 March, however, the NVA provide d A second helicopter picked up the squad, but it ha d
the Marines with all the contact they could handle . to return to Khe Sanh because of casualties caused by
At 1000 on the 16th, the 1st Platoon of Compan y the crash . Then Captain Terrill and the 2d Platoon ,
E was returning from a night ambush position o n Company E moved by helicopter into the LZ . Th e
new platoon moved to the top of the hill and bega n
Hill 861 . As the point squad, under Sergean t
Donald Lord, moved past some dense bambo o to bring down the wounded . By 2100, when fo g
bordering the trail, it came under heavy crossfir e stopped helicopter operations, all but three of th e
from both sides . The two remaining squads advanc- wounded had been evacuated and by 1300 on th e
ed to help the point element . After 15 minutes the y 17th all the dead and the rest of the wounded ha d
drove the enemy away . The Marines then move d been lifted out . The Marines attempted but faile d
back up the hill about 100 meters to a suitable land- to extract the CH-46 that had crashed, forcing Cap-
ing zone to evacuate their casualties, one killed an d tain Terrill ' s unit to remain at the LZ as security fo r
five wounded . Nearing the zone they came unde r the aircraft . Another helicopter finally lifted th e
heavy fire again ; six more Marines died, four suf- damaged one out by 1100 on the 18th and Terril l
fered wounds, and one was missing . Another and his Marines, now reinforced by 1st Platoon ,
firefight started and the Marines directed artiller y Company B, began a two-day sweep of the are a
fire against the enemy, but this time the NVA di d north and west of the hill . The search was to n o
not withdraw . avail ; the enemy force had departed . The action o n
In the meantime, two squads of Second Lieute- the 16th had been costly for the Marines : they suf-
fered 19 killed and 59 wounded, almost all of whom
nant Gatlin J . Howell's 2d Platoon, Company B ,
which had been operating about 1,500 meters east o f were from Company E . The Marines found the body
Hill 861, received orders to move to help the 1st Pla- of the missing man the next day . Enemy losses in the
toon, Company E . As they moved up they came engagement were only the 11 known killed .
under fire from the top of the hill . Air strikes drove Immediately after this contact, reconnaissanc e
the enemy from the crest ; they left 11 bodies teams operating northwest of the hill complex
behind . Both Marine units moved to the summi t reported several sightings of large enemy forces mov -
and began clearing a landing zone (LZ) . ing southeast . There were several exchanges of smal l
By 1600 the Marines had cleared the LZ and three arms fire between Marine patrols and small enem y
CH-46s were on station to evacuate the casualties . units, but in all cases the enemy quickly broke con -
The first helicopter landed, and took off, but as th e tact and withdrew .
second one touched down the NVA hit the zon e Captain Sayers, responsible for the defense of th e
with mortar fire . The CH-46 made its pickup and Khe Sanh perimeter, recognized the growing threa t
managed to get out of the zone, but the Marines o n to the combat base . He expressed his concerns dur-
the ground were not as lucky . Both units' corpsme n ing one of the frequent visits to the base by Brigadie r
were killed ; several other men were wounded . Th e General Michael P . Ryan, the commander of 3 d
Marines called in artillery fire on suspected enem y Marine Division (Forward) . General Ryan agree d
mortar positions, then requested the helicopter to and asked what Sayers needed to defend the base .
come in to evacuate the new casualties . As the air- Sayers provided his "shopping list" and, as soon a s
craft approached the zone, the NVA struck agai n the Marine engineers opened the road from Dong
with mortar fire . The helicopter broke away, but th e Ha to Khe Sanh, General Ryan sent additiona l
exploding rounds caught the Marines who had car - firepower . Sayers gained a light section of Marine
tanks and a heavy section of Ontos . Each of the latter Opening Moves of the Battle
mounted six 106mm recoilless rifles, which, with th e
proper ammunition, could be devastating antiper- On 23 April, two of Company B ' s platoons, th e
sonnel weapons . Equally deadly were two light sec- 1st and 3d, were operating from patrol bases nort h
tions of Army truck-mounted heavy weapons . One and east of Hill 861 . Late that afternoon Captai n
section had dual 40mm automatic cannon ; the other Sayers ordered them to link up and establish a nigh t
had quad- .50 machine guns . Offsetting these gains , position north of the hill in preparation for a swee p
however, was the loss of Company E, 9th Marines , the following morning of a cave complex located to
which, depleted by the fighting on 16 March , the northwest .
returned to Dong Ha on 27 March to rebuild . 4 . The morning of the 24th, Second Lieutenan t
The reinforcements to the base's firepower seeme d Thomas G . King and 30 men from his 2d Platoon ,
even more important in the early weeks of Apri l with an 81mm mortar section, moved from the air -
when agent reports indicated two NVA regiment s field to Hill 700, south of Hill 861 . Their missio n
moving into the region northwest of Khe Sanh . was to provide additional fire support for a compan y
These reports and earlier sightings prompted th e sweep then starting to the northwest . Once the mor-
Marines to intensify reconnaissance and patrolling i n tars were in position, First Lieutenant Phillip H .
the area . In spite of these efforts, the Marines di d Sauer took four men, including a forward observe r
not determine the full extent of the enemy' s (FO) to the top of Hill 861 to establish an observa-
buildup . tion post .* As the FO team entered a bambo o
Allied personnel in the Khe Sanh area numbere d thicket 300 meters from the crest of the hill, it step-
less than 1,000 men . Among these were the CID G ped into an enemy ambush . When the NVA opened
force at Lang Vei and the Marines' Combined Actio n fire the point man yelled, "I'm hit," and went down .
Company Oscar, located between Khe Sanh Villag e Lieutenant Sauer ordered the rest of the team to pul l
and the combat base and within mortar range of th e back and then stood firing at the enemy with hi s
latter .* The Khe Sanh combat base housed Com- pistol to cover their withdrawal . Only the forward
pany B, 9th Marines, reinforced by an aggregation o f observer managed to escape . Although the actio n
support detachments, and a Marine reconnaissanc e lasted but a few minutes and appeared to be just
platoon . Organic artillery support for these unit s another small unit encounter, it marked the begin-
came from Captain Glen Golden's Battery F, 12t h ning of the "First Battle of Khe Sanh," one of th e
Marines, which replaced Battery I on 5 April . Whil e bloodiest and hardest fought battles of the Vietna m
the allied forces were too small to be a deterrent t o War . '
major enemy incursions, they did serve as an advance Lieutenant King, having lost radio contact with
warning unit . the forward observation team but aware of the
On 20 April, operational control of forces at Kh e firefight on the hill, sent a squad to investigate . As
Sanh passed to the 3d Marines which had just begun the squad moved forward it came upon the FO, th e
Operation Prairie IV, though Khe Sanh was not in- lone survivor of the ambushed team . The squad, ac-
cluded as part of the Prairie IV operational area . companied by the FO, moved back into the area o f
Rather it was a territorial appendage, attached fo r contact to recover the other four members of th e
control purposes to the 3d Marines because that regi- team . They saw two of the bodies but were unable t o
ment was in the best position to oversee the base an d get to them because of heavy enemy fire . The uni t
reinforce it if the need arose . The time of need was withdrew to Lieutenant King's mortar position . King
imminent . directed mortar and artillery fire at the hill and the n
took another squad and went back to the ambus h
site . The enemy had gone . The Marines recovere d
*III MAF created the Combined Action Program to increase th e
ability of the local Vietnamese militia units to defend their ow n
villages . These units included Marines who lived, worked, an d
conducted operations with their Vietnamese counterparts . Th e
company at Khe Sanh formed in February 1967 and was unique i n *First Lieutenant Sauer was the commander of the Onto s
that its indigenous forces were Montagnards rather than Viet- heavy section that had recently been attached to Captain Sayer 's
namese . A more complete coverage of the Combined Action Pro - Company B . He accompanied Lieutenant King 's unit to assist the
gram is contained in Chapter I I . forward observer .
the two bodies seen by the other squad, but afte r ly blinded by dirt and rock fragments blown into hi s
searching the area they still could not find the othe r eyes by enemy fire . Within an hour, however, he wa s
two Marines .* King pulled back and threw a smok e assisting in the care of the wounded . *
grenade to bring in a helicopter to evacuate the tw o Helicopter pilots made two attempts to get the
bodies . Just as the UH-34 's wheels touched th e wounded out, but each time they came in the enem y
ground the whole crest of Hill 861, approximatel y hit the Marine position with mortars and automatic
300 meters wide, erupted with automatic weapon s weapons, causing more casualties . After the second
fire . The infantrymen took cover without casualties , rescue attempt, the Marines received orders to mov e
but the enemy fire hit the helicopter 35 times in a to a more secure position and dig in for the night . ?
matter of seconds . Two UH-1E gunships escorting After expending all of their mortar ammunition on
the UH-34 immediately strafed the hilltop . As th e Hill 861 and in support of the 1st and 3d Platoons ,
enemy fire let up, King's Marines loaded the bodie s the mortar section, Captain Sayers, and the securit y
aboard the helicopter, and after it took off King an d platoon on Hill 700 moved back to the base jus t
his men returned to the mortar position . before dark on the 24th . There, Captain Sayers, hi s
company command group, and the 22-man 2d Pla-
While the mortars on Hill 700 and the artillery a t
toon prepared to join the 1st and 3d Platoons b y
Khe Sanh base shelled the enemy positions, Captai n
helicopter at first light on the 25th . Casualties for
Sayers, who had joined King after a forced marc h
the first day included 12 Marines killed, 17 wound-
with a security platoon, ordered his 1st and 3d Pla-
ed, and 2 missing . There were five known NV A
toons to sweep southeast across Hill 861 and strik e
dead .
the enemy from the rear . Sayers' Marines wer e
roughly 2,000 meters northwest of their new objec- Captain Sayers ' Marines had forced the North
Vietnamese into the premature revelation of thei r
tive . When the two platoons turned toward thei r
new direction of advance, five 82mm mortar round s plans to overrun Khe Sanh Combat Base . Their plan
resembled the one they used so successfully against
hit, killing one Marine and wounding several others .
the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 . In both cases
The Marines continued on and the point squad mov-
the enemy buildup occurred over a period of about a
ed down the reverse slope of a small knoll unti l
halted by heavy fire from its right flank . month and included the occupation of key terrain .
Before the main attack, they engaged in a prolonged
The Marines returned fire in an attempt to gai n
supply staging activity and, just prior to the main at -
fire superiority . Lance Corporal Dana C . Darnel l
tack, made coordinated attacks against support
disregarded the enemy fire and brought his 60m m
facilities, particularly airfields and lines of com-
mortar into action . Unable to set up the weapon pro-
perly, he placed the base of the tube in a helmet bet- munication .
After-the-fact reconstruction by General Walt of
ween his legs and steadied the mortar with hi s
the NVA plans for Khe Sanh indicated that the firs t
hands . The firing quickly heated the tube ; another
step was the buildup of troops and supplies in th e
Marine kept Darnell's hands from being burned by
region north of the base . Step two was to be the
urinating on the mortar tube to cool it . Darnell kep t
isolation of the base by knocking out the transpor t
firing until he exhausted his immediate supply o f
helicopters based near the coast and by cutting ke y
ammunition . Ignoring the enemy fire, he severa l
times gathered additional rounds from nearb y stretches of Route 9 . Next, Camp Carroll, Co n
Thien, Dong Ha, Gio Linh, and Phu Bai were to b e
Marines to keep up his firing . 6
The enemy answered with its own mortars and th e hit with supporting arms, both as a diversion and t o
Marines moved back over the crest of the hill to fin d reduce their ability to provide fire and logistic sup -
cover and call in helicopters to evacuate casualties . port . A diversionary attack was to be carried ou t
During the move, Lance Corporal Darnell dragge d against the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp to presen t
two wounded Marines toward cover until temporari- a threat from that direction . All of these efforts wer e
in support of the main attack from the nort h
through the Hill 881/861 complex by regimental -
size units of the 325C NVA Division* . Fortunately , provide security for the battalion command grou p
the contact made by Lieutenant Sauer's FO party o n and the 60mm mortar section .
the morning of the 24th and subsequent action b y Captain Spivey had his forces in position for hi s
Company B alerted III MAF to enemy intentions . attack by 1525 . Artillery check fire was in effect ,
however . Captain Spivey requested and received per -
Hill 861 mission to continue up the hill without further ar-
The job of stopping the NVA fell to Colonel Joh n tillery preparatory fires .
P . Lanigan's 3d Marines . Although Lanigan wa s The 1st Platoon moved upward through the heav y
unaware of it at the time, this assignment was to b e growth on the ridgeline . When the platoon was 30 0
similar to one 22 years before on Okinawa whic h meters from the crest, it made contact with an
earned him the Silver Star Medal . Both involved enemy company . The platoon found itself under
driving a determined enemy force off a hill . heavy, grazing fire from well-fortified, expertly con-
Originally, Colonel Lanigan planned that Com- cealed bunkers, as well as from mortars sited on th e
pany K, 3d Marines, would relieve Captain Sayers ' reverse slope of the hill . The vegetation mad e
Company B on 29 April, so liaison personnel were locating the bunkers difficult . Countermortar an d
already at Khe Sanh when the action began . On the artillery fire were relatively ineffective in silencin g
morning of the 25th, heavy fog at Khe Sanh delaye d the enemy mortars ; the grazing fire from the enem y
the arrival by helicopter of the remainder of Com- automatic weapons and small arms continued fro m
pany K as well as Lieutenant Colonel Gary Wilde r the mutally supporting bunkers .
and his 3d Battalion, 3d Marines command group . The 1st Platoon fought its way uphill for abou t
By the time they arrived, Captain Sayers and his 2 d 200 meters, but by 1730 only about 10 men re-
Platoon had already departed by helicopter to joi n mained effective . With darkness fast approaching, it
the rest of Company B . was imperative for the company to get more Marine s
There had been no chance for coordination be- on the line . The 3d Platoon could provide no im-
tween the battalion command group and Compan y mediate assistance ; its advance up the adjacen t
B . Inevitably, communications proved difficult sinc e ridgeline encountered no enemy opposition but th e
Company B did not have the battalion's codes an d rugged terrain slowed its movement . Captain Spive y
radio frequencies . Captain Sayers, convinced tha t had no option but to ask for the 2d Platoon . Awar e
the enemy monitored his transmissions, relayed hi s of the gravity of the situation, the battalio n
coded position reports through his company's rear assented .
command post at Khe Sanh . This problem plague d The 2d Platoon moved forward and quickl y
the two units throughout the coming fighting . 8 became engaged in heavy fighting that continue d
Shortly after landing at Khe Sanh, Lieutenan t until nightfall . Since it could not evacuate it s
Colonel Wilder started his force moving north t o casualties, the company spent the night in place ;
assist Company B . By 1500, the lead elements were Captain Spivey ordered all elements to dig in . The
moving up Hill 861 . battalion command group and 60mm mortar sec-
When Company K of the 3d Marines reached th e tion, located on a small knoll only 300 meters fro m
slopes of Hill 861, its commander, Captain Bayliss L . the hill, forced to provide its own security, also du g
Spivey, Jr ., ordered his platoons to move on tw o in for the night . 9
axes . The 1st Platoon moved up a ridgeline, follow- Progress of Company B during the day had bee n
ed by the company command group . The 3d Platoo n equally difficult ; it too had no luck evacuating it s
started up another ridgeline to the right . The 2d Pla- wounded . Each time a helicopter attempted to land ,
toon, understrength because one squad was still at- it met a screen of enemy small arms and mortar fire .
tached to another company, remained behind to One helicopter did get into a nearby zone aroun d
1000 when the fog lifted, bringing in Captain Sayer s
and the 22 men of the 2d Platoon, but it could pic k
*Apparently the enemy launched all of the diversionary attack s up only three wounded before being driven off b y
on schedule . On 27 and 28 April, the previously mentione d incoming mortar rounds . Slowed by numerous litte r
Marine positions were hit by 1,200 rockets, mortar, and artiller y cases and sporadic enemy contact which required th e
rounds . They cut Route 9 in several places . Other enemy units at -
tacked and severely battered the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp o n seizure of each succeeding ridgeline, Company B
4 May . The Marines detected and subsequently thwarted only th e succeeded in moving only to a point 800 meter s
main effort . FMFPac Ops USMC Vn, Apr67, pp . 27-28 . northwest of Hill 861 .
As a result of the heavy resistance encountered by ting the point man in half. Four or five others, in-
both companies, Captain Jerrald E . Giles' Company cluding Captain Sayers and members of the com-
K, 9th Marines flew in from Camp Carroll . By 180 0 mand group, received wounds . At the same time ,
on the 25th, the company had arrived at Khe Sanh the enemy hit the entire column with mortar fire .
base ; it remained there for the night . Casualties were heavy . With the aid of gunships an d
At about 0500 on the 26th, the 3d Battalion com- artillery, the company finally gained fire superiorit y
mand post (CP) shook under more than 200 82m m and at 1200 it broke contact, pulling back to the to p
mortar rounds . At the same time, Khe Sanh bas e of a small knoll . There the company attempted t o
was the target of 100 mortar and recoilless rifl e evacuate some of its wounded, but as the helicopter s
rounds, most of which, thanks to fog which obscure d came into the area the infantrymen waved them off ;
the enemy's aim, landed outside the perimeter . they were helping the NVA mortars to pinpoint th e
While the shelling did not cause any damage, it di d Marines ' position . At 1445, Captain Sayers reporte d
confirm that the NVA were on Hill 881S . Th e to Lieutenant Colonel Wilder that he had so man y
Marines replied by hitting suspected enemy posi- casualties that he could not move . "
tions with artillery and air strikes ; the NVA fir e The battalion ordered Captain Sayers to leave hi s
quickly ceased . dead behind and bring out his wounded . Sayer s
Captain Sayers later recalled : replied that he could not move, even with only th e
. . . B-1/9 was close enough to the NVA recoilless rifles wounded . Resupply was impossible, the compan y
to see and hear their backblast in the fog . They were on the had only five operational radios, powered by wea k
eastern slope of 8815 . We directed artillery on the batteries . Sayers reported he would move into th e
recoilless rifles and silenced them . We could hear the fog, assume a defensive posture, and " . . . fight until
82mm mortars but couldn' t see the muzzle flashes . We it was over . "12 This option proved unnecessary ,
drected
i artillery by sound . By [ 105mm artillery illumina-
however .
tion rounds] and holes in the fog, we confirmed destruc-
tion of the recoilless rifles . (The fog was in layers—the hil l As Sayers later recalled :
masses were covered and the valleys were clear .)10 . Captain Glen Golden [the commander of Battery F ,
12th Marines at Khe Sanh] found me in the fog by walkin g
At 0800 on the 26th, Captain Giles' company artillery rounds to me . (Once in the fog I could only mak e
an educated guess as to my exact position .) Artillery put a
moved out from the airfield toward Lieutenant
"ring of steel" around my defensive position that was s o
Colonel Wilder's position, using the rear elements o f tight we were taking dirt from the impact . It was the mos t
Company B as guides . The company arrived at th e professional and accurate piece of artillery work that I hav e
battalion command post shortly after noon . Spivey' s ever seen . No doubt it saved our lives "
Company K had been heavily engaged on Hill 86 1
all morning . The enemy unit, fighting from a Lieutenant Colonel Wilder sent Captain Giles an d
strongly fortified position, repulsed a second Marin e his one remaining platoon to assist Sayers . It too k
attempt to take the hill, this time by the 3d Platoon . Giles' party almost four hours to hack their way to
All efforts to break off contact and withdraw faile d the battered company . Under the cover of a heav y
because of numerous casualties . Lieutenant Colonel ground fog, darkness, and periodic downpours, an d
Wilder ordered Captain Giles to send two platoon s preceded by artillery fire from Battery I, the unite d
up the hill to help Spivey disengage and evacuat e force began its move toward the battalion CP ,
the dead and wounded . By 1400, the two companies skirting the south edge of Hill 861 . Progress was
linked up, but, despite the effective use of slow . Every man, except the point and rearguard ,
helicopter gunships in a close support role to sup - was burdened with stretchers and the equipment o f
press enemy fire, it was not until 1900 that the las t the casualties . Sayers remembered :
Marine elements got off the hill . We were carrying KIM and WIAs in ponchos [borne by ]
four men to a litter . The heat deteriorated the bodie s
In the meantime, Company B's advance also stop- rapidly and they bloated fast . Almost impossible to carr y
ped . The company had been moving southwesterl y in the dark, the mud, and the rain . Many times we stop-
to skirt Hill 861 and link up with the battalion . As ped our march to retrieve a body that had fallen out of a
poncho and rolled down a hill . Identification was difficul t
the Marines turned south, they met fierce enem y
[as] KIA tags were lost . . . . not until we arrived back a t
resistance . The NVA troops, well-concealed in th e Khe Sanh and matched our company roster with th e
thick underbrush, allowed the Marines to move t o evacuation list was I convinced that we had not left a fello w
within five meters before opening fire, almost cut- Marine in the hills . i4
The weary column arrived at a safe area south o f observed fire and 270 of harassment and interdic-
the 3d Battalion CP at 0500 on the 27th . Helicopters tion, but the preponderance of support came fro m
soon arrived and by 0730 had evacuated all of th e the air . During this period, the 1st Marine Aircraft
casualties and salvaged equipment . The remnants o f Wing dropped 518,700 pounds of ordnance on th e
Company B refused the offer of trucks to transpor t target area . As each flight arrived on station, th e
them back to Khe Sanh ; they marched back . " Marine and Air Force airborne forward air con-
trollers, (FAC[A]) directed them to orbit on the to p
Reinforcing the Hi11861 Attac k of a large holding pattern . The flights graduall y
worked their way downward as preceding flight s
After the fierce action of the morning of the 26th ,
dropped their ordnance and headed for home .
the 3d Marine Division realized the 3d Battalion, 3 d
Marines did not have the strength to carry Hill 86 1 To destroy the solidly built and well-camouflage d
alone . Major General Hochmuth shifted the SL F bunkers, the FACs devised a new technique . Many
Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Delong ' s 2d Bat- of the bunkers were so thick that even a direct hi t
talion, 3d Marines back to its parent regiment for th e with a 500-pound bomb would not completel y
Khe Sanh operation . At the time, the battalion ha d destroy them . Napalm was ineffective until the
been conducting Operation Beacon Star, 16 mile s jungle growth was cleared because the jellie d
gasoline .burned out in the treetops . Consequently ,
north of Hue . Picked up in the middle of the opera-
aircraft armed with 250- and 500-pound "snakeye "
tion at noon on 26 April, Delong's battalion flew t o
Phu Bai in helicopters from HMM-164 i6 and then to bombs were called in on low runs to ripple thei r
Khe Sanh by transport aircraft . By 1600, companie s loads, stripping the trees and heavy foilage from the
E, G, and H and the battalion command group had hill.* With the bunkers exposed, other aircraft arm-
ed with 750-, 1,000-, and 2,000-pound bombs cam e
arrived at the Khe Sanh Combat Base and starte d
moving toward Hill 861 . The battalion established' in on high-angle passes to destroy the bunkers .
night positions approximately 500 meters east o f Late in the afternoon of the 28th, the Marine in-
Wilder's battalion . fantrymen were ready to resume the attack . The con-
The 27th was a day of preparation . By 1130, th e cept of operations involved a two-battalion assault ;
3d Battalion had completed all its medical evacua- Hill 861 became Objective 1, Hill 881S was Objec-
tions and moved overland from Hill 861 to Kh e tive 2, and Hill 881N was Objective 3 . From its posi-
Sanh base for replacements for its battle-depleted tion south of Hill 861, Lieutenant Colonel Delong' s
companies . Colonel Lanigan transferred both Com- 2d Battalion was to seize Objective 1 on 28 April .
panies M of the 3d Marines and 9th Marines t o Lieutenant Colonel Wilder ' s 3d Battalion was to
Wilder's battalion in relief of Companies K, 3 d follow the 2d Battalion . After taking the first objec-
Marines, and B, 9th Marines, which had sustaine d tive, Wilder's Marines were to turn west, secure th e
the heaviest casualties . Company F, the remaining ground between Hill 861 and 881S, then assault Ob-
company of the SLF battalion, arrived and assume d jective 2 from the northeast . As the 3d Battalion at -
the mission of regimental reserve . Battery B, 12th tacked, the 2d Battalion was to consolidate Objectiv e
Marines, the SLF artillery battery, arrived at 190 0 1, then move out toward Hill 881N, screenin g
and was ready to fire by 2050 . By the end of the day , Wilder's right flank, reinforcing it if necessary: Afte r
Battery B and Battery F, the resident artillery unit at securing Objectives 1 and 2 Delong's battalion was
Khe Sanh, had established an organization that per- to seize Objective 3, Hill 881N .
mitted them to function as an artillery group, with After the preparatory fire lifted, the 2d Battalio n
one battery in direct support of each battalion . Th e assaulted Hill 861 with two companies abreast . Th e
two 155mm howitzers and two 4 .2-inch mortars at- Marines moved up the hill against sporadic mortar
tached to Battery F assumed the general support mis- fire, but met no other resistance ; the NVA ha d
sion for the operation . withdrawn . Both assault companies dug in on th e
Artillery and air took on the job of softening up
the objective area . For the better part of the 27th
*The "snakeye" is a 250- or 500-pound bomb with large tail fins
and 28th of April, the Khe Sanh artillery group an d
that unfold after release to retard the descent of the bomb . Fo r
the Army's 175mm guns, further east, poured tons greater accuracy, it was dropped at a low altitude . The slo w
of high explosives onto Hill 861 . During the two-day parabolic trajectory of the "Snakeye" gives the aircraft time t o
period, artillerymen fired more than 1,800 rounds of clear the blast and fragmentation pattern .
objective while the command group and the reserve the lead element . At 1120, the point engaged a n
company took up positions on the southern slope o f enemy platoon in a small draw . The compan y
the hill . A search of the objective revealed that the deployed, took the platoon under fire, and called fo r
enemy's withdrawal had been professional ; the area artillery and air support . At the same time, th e
was well policed, with no equipment or anything of second element of the battalion column, Compan y
intelligence value left behind . Though the NV A M, 3d Marines, passed south of the firefight, conti-
withdrawal had been orderly, it had not been nuing the attack toward the battalion objective .
without cost ; the strong odor of dead bodies
At 1915, Company M, 3d Marines secured the in-
saturated the area . Supporting arms had done a
termediate objective with no contact, and dug in fo r
thorough job . The hill was heavily fortified with 2 5 the night . Shortly after occupying the position, th e
bunkers and more than 400 fighting holes, al l
company spotted North Vietnamese soldiers emplac-
mutually supporting, but the Marines took the hil l
ing mortars on Hill 881S . The company called in ar-
without losing a man . Bombs and artillery had strip-
tillery, and the enemy fired only four rounds befor e
ped most of the vegetation, leaving only charred an d
being dispersed . An hour later, the Marines spotte d
splintered trees .
more North Vietnamese moving toward thei r
perimeter . Although it was dark by then, the F O
Attacking Hill 881 S
with Company M adjusted variable time (VT) fuze d
After Hill 861 was secured, the 3d Battalion, com- artillery fire on the enemy's position .* As the rounds
posed of Companies M, 3d Marines and K and M , exploded over their heads showering the enemy with
9th Marines moved from Khe Sanh to take position s fragments, screams of the wounded could be heard .
on the west flank of the 2d Battalion . A small hil l The NVA force quickly withdrew and the Marine s
mass, 750 meters northeast of Hill 881S, was the bat- passed the rest of the night without incident .
talion's intermediate objective . Lieutenant Colone l
Wilder planned to secure the intermediate objectiv e At first light on 30 April, while Wilder's battalio n
the next day, as a jumping off point for the assaul t prepared to assault Hill 881S, Delong's battalio n
on Objective 2, Hill 881S . moved off Hill 861, along a ridgeline toward Hil l
881N . Its mission was to clear the area on Wilder' s
Early in the morning of 29 April the battalio n right flank, and to secure positions for a final assaul t
started its advance, with Company M, 9th Marines a s on Objective 3, Hill 881N . Company H, 3d Marine s
moved into the area where Company M, 9th Marine s
had made contact the previous day . As soon as i t
entered the area, the company ran into two NV A
platoons in a bunker complex . After a brief, viciou s
firefight, the Marines backed off to evacuat e
casualties, 9 dead and 43 wounded, of who m
helicopters evacuated 29 while artillery and air work-
ed over the enemy positions . Later that afternoon ,
Company G assaulted the bunker complex and afte r
heavy preparation fires, the Marines overran the
position .
The men of Company G, like those of Compan y
H, knew that they had been up against a tough an d
well-disciplined foe . Staff Sergeant Ruben Santos ,
platoon sergeant of the 1st Platoon, witnessed th e
tenacity of the defending North Vietnamese . One o f
his squads found two enemy soldiers in a bunker . Marines were able to carry their wounded with them ,
The Marines threw in several hand grenades killin g but not their dead . The cost had been high : 4 3
one man, but the other grabbed a grenade and sa t Marines died and 109 suffered wounds . Heavy
on it to smother the blast . Although the explosio n casualties rendered Company M temporarily ineffec-
" blew his ass off," it did not kill him . When one of tive as a fighting unit .
the Marines went into the bunker to clear it, the
enemy soldier shot and wounded him . Sergeant San- The cost was even greater to the enemy . Marin e
tos grabbed the Marine and tried to drag him to safe- infantry, artillery, and air strikes killed 163 . Marin e
ty but the NVA soldier fired another burst into the aircrews flew 118 sorties and the Khe Sanh artiller y
Marine, killing him . Santos tried to flush the enemy group fired 1,685 rounds that day, but it had no t
soldier from the bunker by throwing in tear gas bu t been enough . More supporting arms preparation fir e
he still would not come out . The Marines then thre w was needed before the hill could be assaulted again .
fragmentation grenades in until they were sure tha t
The next day the air space over Khe Sanh wa s
he was dead . Sergeant Santos later said, " . . . there
stacked high with Marine aircraft ; 166 sorties attack-
was no way of getting them out . . . unless you drag-
ed hills 881N and 881S . Over 650,000 pounds of
ged them out after they were dead . " ' 7
ordnance, including 130 2,000-pound bombs an d
The Marines of the 3d Battalion learned the same 1,445 artillery rounds, plastered both hills . On on e
lesson before the day was over . The strength an d occasion, the constant bombardment of Hill 881 S
dispositions of the NVA forces on Hill 881S wer e became too much for the enemy to endure . After
unclear on the morning of the 30th . Thirty-three air - three very heavy airstrikes, one enemy platoon ra n
craft sorties had slammed 250 2,000-pound bomb s from its bunkers . Once the NVA soldiers were in th e
into the positions on the evening of the 29th an d open, they came under fire by aircraft, as well a s
over 1,300 rounds of artillery rained down on the hil l mortar and small arms fire from Wilder's battalion .
during the night . At 0800, as the last rounds of the Most died before they could escape . By the end o f
preparation fires hit, the Marines of Wilder's bat- the day close air support pilots reported 140 mor e
talion began their assault . enemy killed, including 81 killed by a single strik e
west of the battle area .
The rough and broken terrain restricted the ap-
proach to the ridge ; the Marines could no t While Hill 881S was being pounded, the 3d Bat-
maneuver . The 3d Battalion jumped off in the at - talion remained on its intermediate objective north -
tack against the hill from the northeast with Com- east of 881S, reorganizing its companies . At 1200 ,
pany M, 3d Marines in the lead, followed by Com- Company M, 3d Marines relinquished position t o
pany K, 9th Marines . By 1025, the lead platoon the regimental reserve, Company F, 2d Battalion, 3 d
reached the western end of the top of the hill afte r Marines .* The depleted Company M returned t o
encountering only occasional small arms fire . A se- Khe Sanh and flew to Dong Ha that evening .
cond platoon moved up and the two companie s
With the reserve committed, Major General
closed on the enemy . Suddenly the NVA struck bac k
Hochmuth transferred Company E, 9th Marines to
with automatic weapons in camouflaged bunker s
the control of the 3d Marines and by 1910, 1 May ,
and with accurate sniper fire from the trees . Thirty
the company was in position at Khe Sanh . During
mortar rounds fell on the attacking platoons . They
the day both battalions brought up thei r
were stuck, unable to move forward or backwards .
"Mule"-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles to assist i n
NVA infantrymen from bypassed bunkers and hole s
the reduction of enemy bunkers and fortifications b y
blocked the way back down the hill . Company K
direct fire .* *
and the remaining platoon of Company M advance d
into the savage firefight . "Huey" (UH-1E) gunships
and attack aircraft streaked in, covering the enemy
*Captain Raymond H . Bennett, who was ashore from one o f
positions with ordnance as close as 50 meters fro m the carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin on a 30-day indoctrinatio n
the Marines . At 1230, Lieutenant Colonel Wilder assignment, temporarily commanded Company M .
ordered both companies to disengage and pull bac k **The "Mule" is a small, rough terrain vehicle, primarily used
off the hill, but it took several hours to break con - for resupply . It is the standard platform and transportation for th e
tact . When they did move back down the hill, the 106mm recoilless rifle, an antitank weapon .
42 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E
The 3d Battalion was ready to go again on th e eight layers of logs, in addition to 4 feet of dirt o n
morning of the 2nd, and after a final artillery top of the logs . The extent of the fortifications o n
preparation, the 9th Marines' Companies M and K 881S caught the Marines by surprise, but thei r
moved out against Hill 881S . By 1420, the Marine s discovery alerted Delong's battalion as to what to ex-
had secured the hill, having encountered only snipe r pect on Hill 881N .
fire in the process . That evening Lieutenant Colonel
Wilder established his CP on 881S and dug in fo r
The Final Objective : Hill 881 N
the night with two assault companies . Company F ,
the most recent arrival, remained behind on the in- With Hill 881S secured, the Marines turned thei r
termediate objective . The Marines, at last, had th e attention to Objective 3, Hill 881N . Since 28 April ,
opportunity to see what they had run up against o n when the battalion took Hill 861, Lieutenant Col-
the 30th . onel Delong's Marines had been sweeping the are a
The enemy had dug about 250 bunkers on th e northwest of the hill, checking out each successiv e
hill ; after four days of heavy air strikes and artiller y ravine and ridgeline . By the morning of 2 May th e
preparation fire, 50 remained . Wire communica- battalion was ready to move against 881N . At 1015 ,
tions connected the bunkers and they mutually sup - the action began with Company E attacking the hil l
ported each other with interlocking fields of fire . from the south and Company G assaulting from th e
Two layers of logs and as much as five feet of dir t east . Company H was in a supporting position bet-
covered small bunkers, leaving only a small two-foo t ween the two units . Company G made contac t
opening . Larger fortifications, capable of holdin g almost immediately and after a brief firefight pulle d
four men, were equipped with small storage shelves , back to employ artillery fire . After the artillery at-
bamboo mat floors, and a simple but effectiv e tack, the company moved in, but again came unde r
drainage system . The largest dugouts, command automatic weapons and mortar fire . Additiona l
posts, had two entrances and roofs covered by four to Marine supporting arms silenced the enemy . Corn-
pally H, moving to a position to support Compan y cupied some of the bunkers which the engineers ha d
G, also came under enemy mortar attack whic h not yet destroyed .
ceased when Company G called in fire support re - About 10 minutes after the first attack, Firs t
quests . At the same time, Company E battered its Lieutenant Frank M . Izenour, Jr ., whose platoo n
way almost to the top of the hill . Suddenly, a heavy held the western half of the perimeter, receive d
rain squall driven by gusts up to 40 miles per hou r orders to take a squad to attempt to seal off th e
lashed the hills . Lieutenant Colonel Delong, realiz- penetration ., With his second squad, the lieutenan t
ing that control was impossible and that the coor- moved forward, but immediately came under fir e
dinated assault by his units could not be made, pull- from two machine guns which hit several of his men .
ed the battalion back to more defensible terrain fo r Lieutenant Izenour reported that he needed rein-
the night . forcements . Company commander Captain Alfre d
A strong enemy counterattack, early in the morn- E . Lyon did not want to weaken the 1st Platoon fur-
ing of 3 May disrupted Marine plans to continue the ther so he organized 11 attached engineers as a
assault . At 0415, Company E, in night positions on a squad and sent them into the fight . Both squad s
small hill 500 meters south of Hill 881N, endure d took positions on the left edge of the penetratio n
small arms and mortar fire followed by an aggressiv e and fired into the enemy's flank . With the help of
ground attack . Two reinforced NVA companies artillery, gunships, and jets, the Marines stalled th e
struck the Marines ' perimeter from the northeast attack, but the platoon commander still did not have
and, after bitter hand-to-hand fighting, penetrate d enough force to drive the enemy out of the penetra-
that portion of the defenses . The attackers either tion . 1 8
killed or wounded all Marines in this area . After A flareship arrived and its two-million-
penetrating the lines, the NVA units moved into a candlepower parachute flares practically turne d
tree line in the middle of the position and reoc - night into day . From Hill 881S, the Marines of th e
3d Battalion could see approximately 200 NVA of the compound . There, they destroyed vital in-
soldiers moving toward Company E from the west . stallations and killed many key personnel, includin g
They quickly moved the battalion ' s 106mm recoilless the U .S . Army Special Forces detachment com-
rifles into positions and fired more than 100 round s mander and his executive officer . Despite artiller y
into the enemy's flank, breaking up the attack . Then fire from the Marines at Khe Sanh, the attacker s
artillery pounded the North Vietnamese force as it withdrew with only light casualties . The South Viet-
withdrew . namese irregulars defending Lang Vei were not a s
By first light, the Marines had shattered the NV A lucky ; 20 died and another 39 disappeared . T o
attack, but some enemy soldiers still remained insid e counter any further threats from the southwest, th e
Company E's position . At 0700, Company F reverte d 3d Marine Division ordered Company C, 1st Bat-
to the operational control of its parent unit, the 2 d talion, 26th Marines, airlifted from Phu Bai later i n
Battalion, 3d Marines . From its position on the 3 d the afternoon of 4 May and added to the Khe San h
Battalion's intermediate objective, one platoon o f reserve .
the company flew in helicopters from HMM-164 to a
The next morning Lieutenant Colonel Delong' s
landing zone next to the Company E perimeter . Th e
Marines advanced toward the final objective, Hil l
reinforcing unit immediately attacked the souther n
881N . His three companies had spent most of 4 Ma y
edge of the penetration . In the meantime, Lieu -
reorganizing, while additional preparatory fire s
tenant Colonel Delong ordered Company H to close
blasted the hill . At 1530, the battalion moved into
in on the enemy's rear from the northeast . Movin g
assault positions on the southern slopes of the objec-
toward each other the two units finally managed t o
tive . At 0850 5 May, Companies E and F jumpe d
seal the breach .
off, meeting gradually increasing resistance as the y
Company H then began the difficult task o f
advanced . Both units temporarily disengaged so tha t
eliminating the NVA soldiers in the bunkers an d
air and artillery could again work over the hill . A t
tree line . The effort required bitter close-quarter s
1300, Company F resumed the attack while Com-
fighting which continued until 1500 when the com-
pany E established a base of fire and Company G
pany reported the final bunker cleared . The NVA
enveloped the north . The two attack Companies, F
soldiers fought virtually to the last man . The NVA
and G, met only sniper fire and secured the objective
attack killed 27 Marines in the action and wounde d
at 1445 . The Khe Sanh hill complex belonged to th e
84, but enemy bodies covered the area . The NVA at-
Marines .
tackers left behind 137 dead, and the Marines cap-
tured three prisoners, plus a large quantity o f
weapons and equipment . End of the Battle
Interrogation of the prisoners revealed the enemy For the next three days, there was little contac t
planned another attack for that night . As a result , with NVA units . Both battalions thoroughly search-
Lieutenant Colonel Delong consolidated his com- ed Hills 881N and 881S, while engineers destroye d
panies on the southern slope of Hill 881N an d the remaining enemy fortifications . Marine aircraft
established a tight perimeter defense . After dark , struck suspected enemy positions to the north an d
helicopters from HMM-164 flew in extra defensiv e west, while platoon patrols covered the area im-
equipment, including concertina wire, trip flares , mediately west of the two hills . Airborne observer s
and Claymore mines . The Marines were ready for th e remained on station to call in artillery and air strike s
assault, but the attack failed to materialize . Instea d on likely avenues of escape . Air support achieved a
an NVA unit hit the Special Forces Camp at Lan g unique first during the period . An AO sighted a
Vei 10 kilometers to the southeast . 1 9 lone NVA soldier waving a flag, indicating his desir e
At 0435, 4 May, a reinforced NVA compan y to surrender . A helicopter flew in and picked up th e
assaulted the Lang Vei camp . The attack was to hav e rallier .
served as a diversion for the major NVA thrust from Observers spotted enemy troops to the northwest .
the northwest which the Marines had preempted o n The sightings indicated that the 325C NVA Divisio n
24 April . The action had a little effect on the battl e was withdrawing toward North Vietnam and Laos .
taking place in the hills, but was a tactical victory fo r On 9 May, a patrol of two platoons of Company F
the Communists . The NVA attackers quickly over - finally caught up with one of the evading enem y
ran the camp's defenses and penetrated to the heart units . The patrol had just swept down the northern
finger of Hill 778, 3,200 meters northwest of Hil l his own position . In addition, he killed several
881N, when it ran into sniper fire from a ridgeline to enemy soldiers at close quarters with his M-16 . 2 '
its front . The lead element deployed on line an d Helicopters made two attempts during the nigh t
started up the slope, only to be met pointblank by a to extract the team and another in the early morn-
heavy fusillade . The action remained furious for 2 0 ing ; all three failed because of heavy ground fire . A t
minutes as the Marines tried to gain fire superiorit y 1145, they made a fourth try . After sealing off th e
and call in artillery fire . area with fixed-wing and gunship coverage, a UH-l E
landed and picked up the three survivors . Fou r
Getting artillery support was not an easy matter .
members of the reconnaissance team and on e
Company F's forward observer, Second Lieutenan t
helicopter pilot died in the action, as did a know n
Terrence M . Weber, tried feverishly to contact Kh e
total of seven enemy soldiers .
Sanh Fire Support Control Center ; apparently it wa s
out of radio range . Finally, Weber raised anothe r This action ended the First Battle for Khe Sanh ,
Marine unit which relayed his fire requests . Abou t one of the finest examples of an air-ground team ef-
30 minutes after the firefight started, the Nort h fort during the war . The men of the 3d Marine s
Vietnamese began to disengage and withdraw . As fought a conventional infantry battle against a well -
they pulled back, artillery and gunships tore into th e entrenched NVA force . Although aggressive infantr y
enemy ranks . The battalion ordered Company E , assaults finally took the various objectives, much o f
south of the engagement, to go to Company F's aid . the credit for overwhelming the enemy force belong s
Company E's 60mm mortar hit the right flank of th e to the supporting arms . The 1st Marine Aircraft
NVA unit . The battalion also sent two 81mm mor- Wing flew more than 1,100 sorties, expending ove r
tars, two 106mm recoilless rifles, and a security pla- 1,900 tons of ordnance during the operation . Air at -
toon by helicopters to Company E's position . As a tacks proved particularly effective in uncovering and
result of the rapid reaction by reinforcing units an d destroying enemy bunkers and fortifications . Whil e
supporting arms fire, the enemy's orderly withdrawa l Marine air provided all the close and direct air sup -
turned into flight .2 0 port for the operation, 23 U .S . Air Force B-52 strike s
hit enemy troop concentrations, stores, and lines o f
When the fighting ended, the Marines counted 3 1 communications . Artillery also provided a larg e
NVA bodies in the area . A search of the position un- share of combat support, especially during the man y
covered large amounts of equipment and rice as wel l periods of reduced visibility . Artillery units fire d
as 203 freshly dug graves . The bitter fighting cost th e more than 25,000 rounds in support of their com-
Marines 24 dead and 19 wounded, most of who m rades on and around the Khe Sanh hills .
became casualties in the opening minutes of the bat- The battle was also the first major test of the M-1 6
tle . Bad weather prevented a withdrawal, so Com- rifle by the Marine Corps . Opinions of the results
panies E and F set up a defensive perimeter and pass - were mixed . The light weight of the rifle and th e
ed the night without further contact . ability of the troops to carry more ammunition than
with previous rifles were important positive factors .
To the west, another encounter between a seven -
One Marine officer attributed the success of the final
man reconnaissance team from the 3d Recon-
naissance Battalion and an enemy company marke d assault on Hill 881 to the M-16s used by the attack-
the last significant action of the operation . ing Marines . Others, however, strongly criticized th e
Helicopters inserted Reconnaissance Team Breaker a t weapon for a tendency to jam . 22 *
1650 on 9 May . Shortly after midnight it becam e The First Battle for Khe Sanh did not turn into the
heavily engaged . The enemy easily could have over - spectacular victory that the North Vietnamese
run the outnumbered Marines, but they chos e desired . Reported enemy casualties in the action
not to do so . Apparently they were more intereste d from 24 April through 11 May stood at 940 confirm =
in shooting down helicopters attempting to extrac t ed killed . The cost of stopping the Communist effor t
the team . The heroic performance of 18-year-ol d was not light ; 155 Marines died and another 425 suf-
Private First Class Steve D . Lopez highlighted the ac- fered wounds .
tion . Wounded four times, twice in the head, th e
young Marine remained on his radio for 12 hours , *See Chapter 14 for a discussion of the problems with the M-1 6
calling in artillery and air strikes practically on top of and the efforts to correct them .
repulsed the enemy charge and called artillery in o n costly to the Marines ; it killed nine and wounde d
the attackers . A platoon from Company A arrived by 125 . Another attack occurred at 0525 by 50 102m m
helicopter to help . By 1630, when the enem y rockets . Casualties resulting from the second attac k
withdrew, the two Marine units had killed 66 Nort h totaled one killed and 14 wounded . The Marines' ar-
Vietnamese and lost 18 of their own men . Twenty- tillery answered both attacks with unknown results .
eight Marines suffered wounds .
Two days later the enemy shot down an armed At 1230 on 27 June, Company I, 26th Marines ,
UH-1E in the same area, killing the pilot and woun- while searching for a suspected mortar position t o
ding the copilot . Friendly forces rescued the copilo t the west of the base, ran into two NVA companies .
and two crew members, but the aircraft had to b e Company L landed by helicopter to reinforce th e
destroyed . Due to the increasing number of enemy engaged Marines . By 1900 the NVA broke contact
contacts, Lieutenant Colonel Kurt L . Hoch's 3d Bat- and withdrew to the northwest leaving 35 bodies o n
talion, 26th Marines returned to the operational con- the battlefield . This was the last significant actio n
trol of the 26th Marines (Forward) at Khe Sanh ; the during June .
battalion arrived at Khe Sanh on the 13th . Operation Crockett continued as a two-battalio n
During the two weeks after the 3d Battalion's ar- effort until it ended the 16th of July . During the Ju-
rival, both Marine battalions had many contacts wit h ly period of the operation there was a gradual in -
isolated enemy forces throughout the TAOR . In the crease in the number of sightings, but only occa-
early morning of the 27th, 50 82mm mortar round s sional contact . Nevertheless, the Marines knew th e
hit the Khe Sanh base . The attack was extremely NVA was not ready to abandon the Khe Sanh area .
Following the battles of April and May for the Khe Sanh area, shell-scarred Hill 88 1
South, shown here in an aerial view, became a combat base for a 26th Marines company .
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189356
0
PART I I
SPRING FIGHTING I N
SOUTHERN I CORPS
CHAPTER 5
February . Three Marine battalions participated i n significant results, it is, and was, impossible t o
the operation's first phase on Go Noi Island, a measure the full impact of the "unsuccessful" opera-
12-kilometer-long island formed by the river sout h tions, much less the small unit patrols and ambushe s
of Company H's action . Phase II took place north of that encountered no enemy . "No contact" had to b e
the river and included the Thuy Bo area . However , considered as a potential victory in the war for are a
only a single reinforced battalion, the 1st Battalion , and people control .
1st Marines, conducted the remainder of the opera- The Vietnamese-U .S . 1967 Joint Combined Cam-
tion . paign Plan specified several areas of southern I Corp s
The 1st Battalion managed to establish a cordo n for allied operations in early 1967 . The Thu Bon are a
on 19 February around elements of the Viet Con g between Da Nang and An Hoa and the rich, densel y
R-20 Battalion . Beginning the following morning , populated Que Son Valley were main areas of con-
the Marine battalion's companies took turns sweep- cern . The results of Marine and ARVN efforts i n
ing back and forth across the cordoned area . By th e these regions for the past two years were tangible ,
end of the operation on 12 February, the 1st Bat- but continued pressure was required to extend an d
talion had killed a confirmed total of 68 Viet Con g consolidate government authority there . Pacified
soldiers and captured 25 prisoners and 17 weapons . areas, and those undergoing pacification, required
Marine casualties for all of Operation Stone total- protection, as did military bases and :populatio n
ed 9 dead and 76 wounded . One Kit Carson Scou t centers . The gradual increase of Communis t
also died . The 1st Marines claimed 291 Viet Cong capabilities made it necessary to pay higher costs fo r
killed in the entire operation and listed another 11 2 the security of these locations .* At the same time ,
as probably killed, plus 74 enemy captured . the enemy sanctuary in the Duc Pho-Mo Duc sec-
While such actions established a tedious balanc e tions of Quang Ngai, demanded immediate atten-
in the "cat-and-mouse" game of subduing local guer- tion . Intelligence reports indicated that NVA unit s
rillas, operations of a larger scale, responding to con - had moved north into these two districts from I I
firmed intelligence reports, attempted to smas h Corps .
larger, established Communist concentrations . Fou r
major operations, Desoto, Deckhouse VI, Union ,
and Union II, produced the most significant result s *On 27 February 1967, the enemy attacked the Da Nang air
base complex with 140mm rockets, which had a range of 8,000
during January June 1967, and are discussed in thi s meters . This was the first use of the weapon in the war . To counter
chapter as being representative of the major uni t the increased firepower capability the Marines extended their
fighting in southern I Corps during this period . search areas by approximately 2,500 meters . (See Chapter 6 for a
Although these operations produced tangible and more detailed account of this attack .)
A peasant family's bomb shelter provides a place for a machine gun team from the 3 d
Battalion, 7th Marines to set up to provide covering fire for infantymen searching a
village during Operation Arizona in June . Arizona was one of the many conducted by
the 1st Marine Division to maintain control over the populated areas south of Da Nang .
Duc Pho, the southernmost district of Quan g five feet high . The majority of the streams are for-
Ngai Province, had been under Communist in- dable . Hedgerows border vitually all the rice paddie s
fluence for many years . The salt flats at Sa Huynh, a s and cane fields and bamboo groves are scattere d
well as the rich and populated, fertile coastal plain , throughout the area .
were a vital source of supply for the Viet Cong wa r Operation Desoto
effort . Furthermore, the Tra Cau inlet and the coas t Operation Desoto originated from the join t
immediately to the north had long been suspected as Vietnamese-U .S . 1967 Combined Campaign Plan i n
infiltration points . Intelligence reports also indicate d which III MAF forces were to relieve ARVN unit s
that the district harbored the Viet Cong political from outpost duty so that they could be employe d
subdivision of the region . South Vietnamese Arm y more effectively elsewhere in the Revolutionar y
activity in Duc Pho had been restricted to the out - Development Program . The 4th Battalion, 4th Regi-
posting of two predominant hills, Nui Dang an d ment, 2d ARVN Division, stationed in Duc Pho
Nui Dau . An ARVN battalion occupied thes e District, was one of the units selected to concentrat e
hilltops and controlled the area around the distric t on the pacification program . In turn, General Stiles '
capital of Duc Pho, but nothing more . As a result , Task Force X-Ray assigned one of its battalions t o
the guerrillas developed extensive fortifications and relieve the ARVN battalion . Lieutenant Colonel
supply installations throughout the countryside . Raymond J . O'Leary's 3d Battalion, 7th Marine s
Astonishing as it may seem, the Communist contro l received this mission . *
over the area was so complete that many of the in -
habitants had never come in contact with militar y *LtCol O'Leary 's 3d Battalion came to the operation with con-
forces other than the Viet Cong . siderable experience in fighting both NVA and VC units . During
the latter part of 1966, the battalion participated in Operatio n
Geographically, the Duc Pho region is a Prairie I in the DMZ and in the Dai Loc /Hill 39 TAOR west of D a
predominantly flat rice paddy interspersed wit h Nang . Col Francis V . White, Comments on draft ms, 22Nov8 2
numerous small streams having steep banks four to (Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)
FIGHTING THE Ni kill vll:lNANII.sl
54
Area of Action
Operation Desoto
27 - 30 January 1967
Qoang (2)
kilometers Ld!
0
f
Thuy :
Trieu
N
Sa Binh
ve' --.::)
Tan To Ill
Truant
Sanh
Nw Dang
-N
/ /?\\,\ / L
': :-,2'
Duc Pho
7
NJ
THE WAR IN SOUTHEPJJ I CORPS
55
Duc
I To exploit this information, the battalion com-
mand group, Company M, and one platoon moved
east of the stream south of the hamlet. As the lead
Lb"1 South
elements began to move into Tan Tu (2) they came
China under sniper fire, and when they tried to close with
the snipers a strong VC bunker complex stopped
Sea
Li. their advance. The company called in artillery and
air strikes against the positions. After the bombard-
ment, the Marines attacked again, but stopped once
more because of heavy fire from machine guns and
automatic weapons to the north and northeast. The
Marines directed more supporting arms fire against
the Communist positions. Under its cover, Company
M recovered its dead and wounded and, following
orders from the battalion, withdrew across the
stream and established company night positions.
Due Pho and Viciny Because of the sharp engagement east of the Song
Operation Desoto Quan, Lieutenant Colonel O'Leary decided to use
I.',',
January1967
-
*Col Francis V . White, then the 3d Battalion 's S-3 officer , ammunition and to assist in casualty evacuation . Col Francis V .
recalled in 1982 that, at the height of this firefight, Capt Alan L . White, Comments on draft ms, 22Nov82 (Vietnarn comment file ,
Orr, the battalion S-4 officer, led an ammunition party to Com- MCHC, Washington, D .C .)
pany M's position, then to Company I, to deliver badly needed
Service Company security troops stopped the attac k 26, were so extensive that the battalion called i n
in the outer wire of their defenses, killing two of the engineers to determine the amount of explosive s
enemy . Marine losses were 14 wounded, eight o f needed to seal them . By the time the last cave on th e
whom required evacuation . The battalion's 81m m hill had collapsed, the engineers had used 3,60 0
mortars and supporting artillery fired on possibl e pounds of explosives . The well-prepared defensiv e
escape routes to catch the withdrawing enemy, but a positions and the skillfully laid fields of fire confirm-
followup search of the area turned up only two ed that the Communists had expected an attac k
Russian-made rifles, several grenades, and some sat- from the west ; the assault from the east caught them
chel charges . by surprise . Possession of the village enabled the
During early February, the battalion remained i n Marines to control the southern bank of the Song Tr a
the new TAOR and conducted repeated search an d Cau inlet .
destroy operations . On 2 February, Lieutenant Col- Desoto continued during February, consisting o f
onel Edward J . Bronars relieved Lieutenant Colone l frequent platoon and company sweeps and extensiv e
O'Leary as commanding officer of the battalion . Th e patrolling and ambushing throughout the area . The
next day, 3 February, Companies L and M, 5th battalion's area of operations expanded with eac h
Marines, which joined the operation on 31 January , passing day . The villages of Thuy Trieu, An Trung ,
conducted a two-day sweep in the village comple x Dong Quang, Vinh Lac, and Thanh Lam appeare d
southeast of Nui Dang . Although contact in the are a on daily situation reports, but for the Marines on th e
was light, the Marines found the hamlets to be wel l ground each one was just another "ville" that had to
fortified, and discovered more than 100 tons of ric e be seized and cleared, a dirty and often painfu l
which they bagged and turned over to ARV N task . 2 Attrition among company grade officers wa s
authorities . After searching this community, th e quite high, and the high tempo of daily operation s
Marines again turned their attention to Hai Mon an d had a noticeable deleterious effect on the rifle com-
Hill 26 east of it . panies . 3
Aerial observation reports and Company I's Snipers were a constant threat and the majo r
bloody experience of the 30th indicated that most of source of Marine casualties . The Marines countere d
the enemy fortifications in the village pointed west . with scout-sniper teams positioned at carefull y
Lieutenant Colonel Bronars decided to attack th e selected vantage points ; however, the teams had dif-
position from the east by vertical envelopment, us- ficulty in locating an enemy who fired from cleverl y
ing Companies L and M . The morning of 5 constructed spider trap s
February, artillery, naval gunfire, and air bombard- Throughout the month the battalion exploite d
ment blanketed the objective area . The assault reports of Viet Cong positions with artillery an d
helicopters from Lieutenant Colonel Ural W . naval gunfire and extensively used radar-controlled
Shadrick ' s HMM-262 followed approach and retire- aerial bombing of suspected enemy concentrations .
ment lanes which allowed the artillery at Nui Dan g Surveillance reports indicated that the supportin g
and the naval guns offshore to maintain suppressiv e arms attacks were very effective against the Com-
fire throughout the landing . munist sanctuaries .
Light machine gun fire and several rounds o f Deckhouse/Desoto .
57mm recoilless rifle fire greeted the companies a s While Lieutenant Colonel Bronars' battalio n
they moved into the hamlets . They responded b y gradually expanded control of the Nui Dang-Nu i
calling in artillery and naval gunfire . At this time , Dau area, the Marines of Colonel Harry D . Wort-
Marines spotted a number of sampans carrying abou t man's SLF landed near Sa Huynh at the southern ti p
30 Viet Cong fleeing northward across the Song Tr a of the district . The SLF's amphibious operation are a
Cau . Bronar's Company M sprayed the withdrawing included the only area in I Corps where the An-
force with small arms fire and fixed-wing aircraft namite Mountains extend to the coastline . It was a
made several strikes, destroying several of the sam- predominantly Communist-controlled area . The
pans . heavily forested hills concealed the supply route s
After seizing Hill 26 and Hai Mon, the Marine s leading to major enemy base areas further inland . A
searched the area and uncovered a vast, intricat e sheltered harbor and anchorage, and several landin g
bunker and cave system . They promptly destroye d beaches on the coast enhanced Sa Huynh's infiltra-
the bunkers, but the caves, particularly those on Hill tion potential .
SLF Operation Deckhouse VI had several goals : to tion of the Desoto TAOR . Intelligence reports in-
prevent free movement of Communist forces in th e dicated that the 38th VC Battalion was infiltrating
area ; to conduct harbor, beach, and airfield survey s into the Duc Pho area from the northwest . General
to locate a site from which to provide mor e Stiles arranged to exploit this information by a n
economical logistic support for allied forces in operation involving his Task Force X-Ray, the SLF ,
southern Quang Ngai ; and to provide security for and 2d ARVN Division units in Quang Ngai Pro-
the construction of a CIDG camp which woul d vince .
establish permanent government control in th e One Marine and two ARVN battalions were to b e
region . Upon completion of these tasks, the SLF was helilifted into the area northwest of Duc Pho an d
to join with Bronar's battalion to continue searc h sweep eastward . At the same time, other 2d ARVN
and destroy operations throughout the Duc Ph o Division units would screen the northern flank of the
region . operational area while elements of the 3d Battalion ,
The first phase of the operation began at 0800 1 6 7th Marines secured the southern flank from block-
February when the naval gunfire support ships, in- ing positions within its TAOR . The plan ordered the
cluding the rocket ships USS Clarion River (LSM R SLF Marines to make an amphibious assault between
409) and USS White River (LSMR 536), began the Mo Duc-Duc Pho district boundary and the Son g
preparation fires . When the naval fires ended, two Tra Cau, then sweep southwest to entrap any V C
UH-lEs of VMO-2 directed air strikes on the primar y withdrawing from the other allied forces advancin g
and alternate landing zones . At 0855, the first wav e eastward .
of helicopters from Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth E . On the morning of 26 February, Lieutenant Colo-
Huntington's HMM-363 lifted off the deck of the nel Peter L . Hilgartner's 1st Battalion, 5th Marine s
USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) with Company A of Lieu - and two ARVN battalions landed northwest of Duc
tenant Colonel Jack Westerman's 1st Battalion, 4th Pho and began sweeping northeast . They en -
Marines . The helicopters landed on high ground fiv e countered , only long-range sniper fire, bu t
miles inland . Two UH-1E gunships accompanyin g discovered numerous caves and bunkers, all oriente d
the flight suppressed a platoon-size ambush, killing toward the east .
12 of an estimated 30-man VC force near the LZ . With the insertion of three battalions in the
On 20 February, operational control of the SL F western portion of the area of operation, General
passed to General Stiles' Task Force X-Ray . Lack of Stiles ordered the SLF withdrawn, and by 1825 that
evening the BLT completed its withdrawal . Less than
opposition around Sa Huynh allowed General Stile s
15 hours after the last elements of the KT left the
to reorient the BLT's efforts . He ordered Westerman
to begin deliberate search and destroy operations t o beach near Nui Dau, the SLF made another am-
the northeast, while elements involved in Operatio n phibious assault, 10 kilometers further north in Du c
Desoto moved into blocking positions south an d Pho District .
west of Nui Dau . By the afternoon of the 25th, th e Following preparation of the beach area and lan-
BLT had passed through Lieutenant Colonel ding zones by naval gunfire and aircraft, th e
Bronars' battalion and moved into positions nea r helicopterborne assault elements launched from th e
Nui Dau, thus ending the first phase of Operatio n USS Iwo Jima at 0830 on 27 February . Two arme d
Deckhouse VI . UH-lEs escorted the 12 UH-34s and two CH-46s car -
During their sweep north, Lieutenant Colone l rying the first wave of Company A into LZ Bat ,
Westerman's Marines found numerous bunkers , 1,500 meters from the beach .
tunnels, caves, and supply caches ; they demolis h As the troop-laden helicopters from HMM-36 3
ed 167 fortifications, captured 20 tons of supplies , made their approach into LZ Bat, enemy soldiers ,
and destroyed 10 caves and 84 booby traps . In th e located in and around the landing zone, opened u p
with a heavy volume of small arms fire . Marine
process of defending these positions, the enem y
helicopter crewmen immediately returned fire wit h
force killed six Marines and wounded another 61 .
Most of the enemy casualties came from supporting their door-mounted machine guns ; the UH-lEs
arms fire called in by reconnaissance teams operatin g closed in to provide suppressive fire with rockets an d
to the west ; these fires killed 201 enemy soldiers . machine guns .
The operation plan scheduled the second phase o f The first wave of Company A got into LZ Bat a t
Deckhouse VI to take place along the northern por - the cost of battle damage to eight medium
The rest of the BLT continued to land and by mid - tinned to pursue and captured the VC wearing whit e
day the command group was controlling the opera- trousers . This VC was carrying a pack with assorte d
clothing . Marines continued to pursue third VC wit h
tion from ashore and the two artillery batteries wer e
negative results . 4 A
set up, ready to support the battalion . Company D
landed by helicopter at 1430 and the battalio n When Deckhouse VI ended on 3 March, the 1s t
began to sweep to the southwest . Battalion, 5th Marines, had accounted for 17 Com-
The SLF remained in almost constant contact wit h munists killed and 11 captured . The 1st Battalion
fleeing groups of VC for two days after the landing , suffered two killed and 12 wounded .
but by the afternoon of 1 March the contac t Both the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines and the 1s t
diminished . The morning of 3 March the operatio n Battalion, 5th Marines departed the Duc Pho are a
terminated . Phase II of Operation Deckhouse VI cos t after Deckhouse VI . The 1st Battalion, 4th Marine s
the enemy 76 dead ; but they killed a Marine an d reverted to SLF control while the 1st Battalion, 5th
wounded 50 others . * Marines returned to Chu Lai . With the departure o f
For Hilgartner's 1st Battalion, 5th Marines , these units, responsibility for the Duc Pho TAO R
operating inland with the ARVN battalions, the en - again rested with the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines .
tire operation had been frustrating . Although th e
Desoto Continued
Marines found and destroyed numerous fortifica-
tions, they had very little enemy contact . The follow- Operation Desoto continued through the month s
ing excerpt from a report of 2 March typifies the bat- of March and April . The 3d Battalion conducted dai-
talion's encounter with the enemy during the perio d ly company- and platoon-size search and destro y
26 February-3 March : operations while maintaining and improving the
Nui Dang base camp and LSA area and positions o n
Company D while sweeping through a hamlet observe d Nui Dau . Throughout this period, brushes wit h
3 VC carrying packs . One VC was dressed in black, one i n local VC were frequent . Constant pressure by th e
white, and one in green trousers . The VC spotted th e
Marines forced the VC to give up attempts to defend
Marines and began to run in a westerly direction . Com-
pany D fired 10 rounds of small arms fire and physicall y the hamlets and resort to delaying actions, harass-
pursued the VC . VC wearing green trousers was captured . ment, and only an occasional attack .
The VC carried a well-stocked firstaid kit . Marines con - The most damaging enemy action during th e
period took place early in the morning of 24 March
when an enemy force hit the battalion base camp
*See Chapter 8 for detailed descriptions of SLF participation i n and logistic support area with 250 mortar an d
Operation Deckhouse VI . recoilless rifle rounds . The first rounds landed in the
Operations in the Que Son Basin brought an increase in the base and logistics structur e
in the area. Here, a Marine CH-46 lands on a newly constructed helicopter platform sur-
rounded by the sand-bagged bunkers at the fortified hilltop position of Nui Dang .
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A421627
The same day, Company K conducted a searc h Captain Wilson suspected there might be addi-
and destroy operation northwest of Nui Dau, accom- tional mines hidden in the chest-high elephant gras s
panied by the village chief and National Polic e on the hill . He advised the UH-1E pilot by radio t o
representatives . Company G, 7th Marines, whic h hover, rather than land, when picking up the casual-
had joined the operation on 23 March, assume d ty . The pilot hovered just above the ground an d
blocking positions outside the village while a plan e several infantrymen loaded the wounded Marine o n
flew over the village, broadcasting advice to th e board . As the loading occurred, a second, larger ex -
villagers to remain in their homes .* As the Marine s plosion disintegrated the UH-1E, causing numerou s
of Company K began moving into the hamlets, the y additional casualties . Other nearby Marines rushe d
saw several VC slipping into the waters of the Da m to the scene to provide assistance only to be caugh t
Lam Binh and into sampans moored nearby . Th e by a third explosion as large as the second .
Marines captured these, and found 13 more hidin g Darkness made it difficult for Captain Wilson to
in a bunker . The pilots of UH-lE helicopters suppor- get an accurate casualty count ; the reported figure
ting the operation saw more Communists was 10 dead and 13 wounded . (Not until a wee k
camouflaged with moss in shallow swamp water . The later did Marines recover the body of an 11th victim ,
gunships made several strafing runs to force the V C a crew member of the UH-1E . The crewman ' s body ,
toward shore . After each pass, some of the enem y still strapped in its seat, lay more than 200 meter s
waded to shore to be captured by Company K . Th e from the site of the explosion .) ,
aviators flushed 3 VC from the swamp in this man- Company G searched the area around the thre e
ner and killed another 23 . The number of prisoner s craters and found two wires leading from the hill to a
reached 49 during the operation . cane field 500 meters away ; the VC had comman d
By 31 March, the battalion had swept approx- detonated the last two mines . Analysis of the crater s
imately 75 percent of the assigned area of respon- from the last two explosions revealed they had bee n
sibility . Reconnaissance teams operating in the hill s made by bombs of 250 pounds or larger .
to the west and aerial observers continued to repor t
While all the enemy's harassing actions were no t
moving enemy, which supporting arms took unde r
as successful as the one on 5 April, Marine casualtie s
fire with good results . Targets outside the TAOR, ac-
were high . Lieutenant Commander Robert M .
quired through intelligence sources, suffered attack s
O'Brien's Company B, 1st Medical Battalion ,
by Marine radar-controlled air strikes and USA F
operating with the Marines at Duc Pho, treated a n
B-52s . The steady pressure exerted by the Marine in-
average of 12 casualties and performed two major
fantrymen in the rice paddies and hamlets began t o
surgical operations a day . On one day alone, they
pay dividends . The harassed local Communist force s
handled 49 wounded . One of these casualties, a
reverted to guerrilla tactics as evidenced by an in -
young Marine who was seriously wounded and under
crease in their use of mines and booby traps .
the influence of sedation, asked O'Brien if he woul d
The most costly mining incident during thi s
live . A few minutes later the chaplain arrived and, a s
period occurred at dusk on 5 April . As full darknes s
he approached, heard the wounded man say
approached, Captain Robert B . Wilson began t o
"Chaplain, I don't need you . The doctor says I'm go-
move his Company G, 7th Marines into a nigh t
ing to live ."6
defensive position on a small hill southeast of Nu i
Dang . Someone in a security element tripped an an- The return of local Viet Cong units to guerrill a
tactics was not the only indication of the Marines '
tipersonnel mine devised from a 105mm round . Th e
growing influence in the region . District official s
explosion wounded two Marines, one of whom re-
reported that the populace, enjoying more security ,
quired immediate evacuation . Unfortunately, th e
became increasingly pro-Government . Indicative o f
medevac helicopter, which had been in the area al l
growing anti-Viet Cong feeling among the peopl e
day, had departed for Ky Ha . Instead, the pilot of a
was the fact that they often volunteered information
UH-lE gun ship volunteered to make the evacua-
tion . pinpointing VC locations .
Unfortunately, military success outpaced civic ac-
tion progress, particularly in the resolution of th e
*Company G, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines replaced Company F , refugee problem . About 11,000 Vietnamese becam e
2d Battalion, 7th Marines which had relieved Company M, 3 d refugees from the heavy combat in the Duc Ph o
Battalion, 5th Marines on 23 February . area . Of these, local government officials considered
about 7,500 as "permanent" refugees who were to b e alongside LCU at the same time they reloaded fo r
resettled on an island 10 miles off the coast . another mission to Duc Pho . A forward supply point
However, since there were few vessels available t o at Quang Ngai backed up the logistic support ship .
move such numbers, food and housing becam e Bulk items, fuel, and ammunition arrived there b y
critical in the Desoto area of operations . ? trucks from Chu Lai . A detachment of the Marines'
Local factors complicated the 3d Battalion, 7th new heavy-lift helicopters, Sikorsky CH-53D Sea
Marines' civic action problems . The area was th e Stallions from HMM-265, commanded by Lieu -
home of the vice premier of North Vietnam, a fact i n tenant Colonel William R . Beeler, lifted the bul k
which many local Vietnamese took great pride . I n items to the operational area when required . Th e
addition, intelligence sources gave indications th e new helicopters made possible air transportation o f
province chief was a Viet Cong sympathizer, as wer e heavy equipment such as Ontos, 155mm howitzers ,
many of the refugees . Despite positive efforts by th e and D-4 Caterpillar tractors for which there ha d
commander of the Marine battalion, including ob- been no previous means of aerial delivery .
taining new leadership for the attached Army civil
Logistical problems during the operation almost
affairs platoon, the civic action aspects of Operatio n
Desoto remained unsolved long after the operatio n equaled the operational difficulties of eliminatin g
ended . 8 the Communists from the area . From 27 January
when Desoto began, until 7 April when it ended an d
By 7 April, when Operation Desoto ended, th e control of the area passed to elements of the U .S . Ar-
Marines had expanded positive military control ove r my's 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), the Marine s
43 square kilometers of the Duc Pho District an d killed a reported 383 enemy soldiers . But in terms o f
had ensured relatively safe movement in another 5 0 American casualties the cost was high— 76 Marine s
square kilometers . Revolutionary Developmen t died and another 573 received wounds .
teams were able to work effectively, a virtual i m
possibility three months earlier . Desoto was a land -
mark in that it was an initial step toward restoratio n Operation Unio n
of Government control in southernmost I Corps . Operation Union, like Desoto, was an outgrowt h
Logistically, Operation Desoto had been unique . of the 1967 Joint Combined Campaign Plan and th e
The terrain and tactical situation required that al l
requirement for III MAF to replace ARVN units a t
logistical support be provided by helicopter . At th e isolated outposts . The hill complex of Nui Loc Son ,
beginning of the operation, the Marines establishe d
overlooking the Que Son Valley, is 25 kilometer s
a logistical support area at the Quang Ngai airfield , northwest of Tam Ky .* In 1967 it was the site of on e
and for the first six days flew all supplies from ther e . of the ARVN manned outposts .
directly to units in the field . Thereafter, six CH-4 6
helicopters arrived daily from Chu Lai, to supply a n The Marines realized that dominance of the fer-
LSA at Duc Pho . On 8 February, to preserve th e tile, densely populated Que Son Basin region astrid e
wing's helicopters and conserve critical flight time , the Quang Nam-Quang Tin boundary was one o f
III MAF obtained a Navy logistical support ship the keys to control of the five northern provinces o f
which established a forward supply point providin g Vietnam . The enemy needed this agriculturally rich
all operational support . The ship, an LST, loaded a t and populous area to support operations in th e
Chu Lai with all classes of supply and then statione d coastal lowlands . Despite a number of operations i n
itself off the coast, only five miles from the Duc Ph o the basin by both Marine and ARVN forces, Govern-
LSA . Helicopters, hovering over the ship, picked u p ment control continued to be negligible .
supplies as external lifts and moved them to th e The principal enemy force in the basin was the 2d
LSA . This technique reduced the daily helicopter re- NVA Division . Although headquarters elements o f
quirement from six to four . The Navy further im- the division appeared there in July 1966, units of it s
proved the system later in February by providing a 3d and 21st NVA Regiments did not arrive in force
helicopter refueling capability by mooring an LC U until late February 1967 . As the year progressed, the
(landing craft, utility) alongside, loaded with tw o
10,000-gallon reinforced rubber tanks full of avia-
tion gas . Helicopters landing on the cargo deck o f *Some sources refer to this area as the Nui Loc Son Basin . The
the LST could have their fuel tanks filled from the term Que Son Basin is used for consistency within this volume .
64 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
1 RNGR
Action of 21 - 25 April1967 ft
Operation Union I
3 4
I
Oup
-on 'I
I III-p
From DaNang
t
FmmchuLa,
-
F I 3 1
3d VCRegiment, also part of the 2dNVA Division, goals: establish a modicum of control over VC/NVA
joined them after moving north into theL region from access to this rice producing area; initiate a much
Quang Ngai Province. needed civic action effort in a region frequented
The demand for Marine units elsewhere long regularly by U.S. Forces; and force the 2dNVA Divi-
denied the permanent assignment of a battalion or sion into open battle.
larger formation to the valley, and ARVN troops Company F, reinforced with an 81mm mortar sec-
lacked the strength to carry the burden alone. tion and a 106mm recoilless rifle section from the
However, the deployment of U.S. Army units to battalion and a 4.2-inch mortar battery from the 1st
southern I Corps during April freed the 1st Marine
Battalion, 11th Marines, engaged small enemy units
Division for operations in this critical area. * Opera-
attempting to cross the valley floor. The company
tion Union marked the beginning of the bitter cam-
undertook civic action projects which generated a
paign for control of the Que Son Basin.
good relationship with the Vietnamese and produc-
In mid-January 1967, Captain Gene A. Deegan's ed accurate intelligence of NVA/VC activities in the
Company F, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines had relieved area. The successful combination of small unit
the ARVN unit on Nui Loc Son and began opera- operations and civic action disturbed the NVA who
tions under the direct control of Colonel Emil J. had previously operated with impunity in the Que
Radics' 1st Marines. By positioning Marines on this Son Basin. Colonel Radics described these actions as
small hill mass, III MAF hoped to achieve three the planned and premeditated utilization of a
Marine rifle company to create a situation." The 2d
*Two battalions of the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Air. NVA Division took the bait; in April it came out in
mobile) temporarily moved into Duc Pho pending the arrival of
Task Force Oregon units which were to be assigned to I Corps to
force to fight.
reinforce III MAE later in April. See Chapter 4 for a detailed ac- The enemy's desire for a fight did not go unnotic-
count of the U.S. Army's arrival in I CTZ. ed. As Colonel Radics recalled:
During early April, while making one of my twice week- elements encountered almost no resistance as they
ly visits to Nui Loc Son, Captain Deegan advised me of in -
jumped off in the attack, but as they started to ente r
creasing enemy movement in the hills to the west an d
south of the Que Son Basin . We deduced that, perhaps , the village they were stopped cold by heavy fire . Th e
he was at last making his move . On April 15, [the enemy] 1st Platoon tried to flank the enemy position, but a s
started infiltrating small units into the valley floor east of F it moved it came under equally heavy fire . Despit e
Company's position . This buildup continued through th e repeated artillery and air strikes on the NVA posi-
16th and 17th, and on the night of April 18, Captai n
tions the company was stuck, unable to maneuve r
Deegan reported . . . that he believed the enemy [force] t o
be of at least two regiments in size . because of the volume of enemy fire .
My options were two . Let the enemy initiate actio n
against F Company on Nui Loc Son and the n Lieutenant Colonel Hillmer F . DeAtley, 3d Bat-
react—or—assume the initiative and strike him first . I talion, 1st Marines, his command group, and Com-
chose the latter option . . . The concept of a heliborne panies I and M, joined the fight, entering a hotl y
assault had been on the books and we only needed to kno w
contested landing zone 1,500 meters from the Com-
where the enemy would locate his major elements . . . . His
option to locate east of Nui Loc Son was just what the 1s t pany F action . The force fought its way to help
Marines wanted . This would enable the regiment to in- Deegan, who, despite serious wounds, continued t o
hibit the enemy from [either] assaulting F Company's posi- direct his company until evacuated after DeAtley' s
tion or rapidly seeking sanctuary in the mountains to th e battalion arrived . At 1610, the lead elements of
south and east . 1 0
Lieutenant Colonel Dean E . Esslinger's 3d Battalion ,
The 1st Marines staff worked throughout th e 5th Marines from Chu Lai began landing east of th e
night of 18-19 April developing its final plan of at - battlefield . Esslinger's Marines moved west through
tack . The plan provided for the following : Compan y scattered resistance to link up with DeAtley' s
F was to make contact from its outpost position , Marines . Lieutenant Colonel Van D . Bell, Jr .'s 1s t
covered by supporting arms fire ; elements of the 3 d Battalion, 1st Marines arrived from Da Nang ,
Battalion, 1st Marines would make a helicopter- landing in darkness near the 1st Marines comman d
borne assault into the operational area, followed b y post at the Nui Loc Son outpost . Bell's battalion
the 1st Battalion (-), 1st Marines ; and another, as ye t moved out immediately to join the battle .
undesignated, battalion from Chu Lai would act as To support the rapidly committed battalions ,
regimental reserve . Artillery from the 1st Battalion , helicopters lifted Battery B, 1st Battalion, 11th
11th Marines would move by helicopters to Que So n Marines to Que Son village and a platoon of U .S . Ar-
village for direct support . The 1st Marines comman d my 175mm guns from the 3rd Battalion, 18th Fiel d
group would control the operation from the Nui Lo c Artillery moved from Chu Lai to Tam Ky . The
Son outpost . heaviest supporting arms fire power for the openin g
The 1st Marines presented its plans to Genera l phase of the operation came from planes of the 1st
Nickerson on the morning of the 19th, with th e Marine Aircraft Wing .
recommendation for execution that same day .
General Nickerson approved the plan but delayed it s During the first day's action, the men of Compan y
execution because of another operation in progres s F and the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines bore the brunt of
within the division TAOR . On the afternoon of the the fighting, but by dawn of the 22nd, all elements
20th, he gave permission to begin Operation Unio n were locked in battle . The Marines drove the enem y
the following day . soldiers out of their positions and maneuvered to
force them northward . While withdrawing, th e
Early on the morning of the 21st, Company F
Communists suffered severe casualties from air
moved out from Nui Loc Son . By 0700, the compan y
strikes and artillery . Bell's and Esslinger's battalions
had several brief encounters with small NVA
attacked northeast, while the three-battalion ARV N
elements and had seen a large enemy force movin g
1st Ranger Group moved southwest from Than h
into the village of Binh Son (1) four kilometers t o
Binh to catch the fleeing enemy .
the northeast . At 0930 the Marine company cam e
under heavy small arms fire and pulled back to a tre e The pursuit continued as the infantrymen search-
line where it called in artillery and air strikes on the ed north and east of Nui Loc Son, but there were on-
enemy positions . At 1100, Captain Deegan moved ly scattered contacts . On the 25th, Colonel Kenneth
his 2d and 3d Platoons against the village, while th e J . Houghton's 5th Marines arrived from Chu Lai an d
1st Platoon provided covering fire . The assault moved into the valley, allowing the 1st Marines to be
returned to their Da Nang TAOR .* By 26 April, all they swept their respective zones . Despite the lack of
elements of the 1st Marines had returned to D a contact, intelligence reports indicated that majo r
Nang, with the exception of Company F which re- enemy forces were still in the area .
mained at the Nui Loc Son outpost . Colonel Houghton, an experienced combat com-
Lieutenant Colonel Esslinger's battalion began a mander in two wars, responded to this informatio n
thorough search of the mountains south and west o f by helilifting Lieutenant Colonel Hilgartner's 1s t
the basin to find the NVA . Action was generally Battalion, 5th Marines into the mountains 1 3
light, but an incident on the night of the 27th prov- kilometers east of Hiep Duc on 1 May . Initially, th e
ed that the enemy remained active in the area . A battalion encountered only light opposition, but a s
Marine stepped on a mine which triggered a series of it swept west along the Song Chang, there was a
explosions throughout a landing zone . Marine sharp increase in the number of engagements .
casualties were one killed and 43 wounded, 35 o f On 5 May, Hilgartner's Company D came upon a n
whom required evacuation . enemy regimental storage site three kilometers nort h
On 28 April, Colonel James A . Gallo, Jr .'s ne w of Hiep Duc . The cache contained recoilless rifl e
SLF Alpha, which landed by helicopters southeast o f rounds, shoes, 8,000 uniforms, 3 complete surgica l
the Nui Loc Son outpost, joined Esslinger's bat- kits, maps, and other assorted equipment . "
talion .** Both battalions met only light resistance a s As the two battalions of the 5th Marines con-
tinued to sweep north, Lieutenant Colonel Peter A .
*The 5th Marines consisted of only the regimental CP and th e Wickwire's 1st Battalion, 3d Marines helilifted int o
1st and 3d Battalions . The 2d Battalion guarded the industria l the Que Son area of the basin and began a swee p
complex at An Hoa in the Da Nang TAOR under the operationa l northwest of Que Son village . As the operation pro-
control of the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division .
**The code name for SLF Alpha 's participation in the operatio n gressed, all -three battalions had brief contacts wit h
was Beaver Cage . See Chapter 10 for a detailed account of SLF ac- small enemy units, but in each case the NV A
tion during Beaver Cage . withdrew .
On 10 May the Marines engaged a larger and mor e quickly consolidated their position and began t o
determined Communist force . Hilgartner's Com- provide covering fire for the Marines below . Under
pany C was moving up the southwestern slope o f the cover of supporting fire from above, the BLT
Hill 110, 4,000 meters north of Que Son, when i t companies maneuvered against the NVA in the
came under heavy fire from a battalion entrenche d sugar cane field and on the northern slope of Nu i
along the face of Nui Nong Ham to the southeast . Nong Ham . By evening the Marines drove th e
The Marines took Hill 110, but when they reached enemy force from its position and forced it to
the summit they found themselves still under deadl y withdraw to the northeast . Artillery and air strikes
fire from a cane field below and from caves in th e followed the retreating North Vietnamese . Not all o f
lower slopes of Nui Nong Ham . Captain Russell J . the NVA escaped . The Marines found the bodies o f
Caswell, the company commander, called for help . 116 enemy soldiers the following day . Marine losses
Companies B and C of Wickwire's battalion wer e were also high : 33 died and another 135 receive d
the nearest units to Caswell's Marines ; they were wounds, including the casualties from the misguid-
northeast of Hill 110 . The two companies shifted t o ed air strikes on Company A .
Hilgartner's operational control . They moved to joi n On 12 May, BLT 1/3 turned over its respon-
the action but a determined enemy and heavy NV A sibilities to the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and th e
fire halted their advance . The Marines adjusted sup - SLF flew by helicopters to its ships off the coast .
porting arms fire on the Communists' positions, bu t Although the operation was over for the SLF, it was
it was not effective ; friendly and enemy forces wer e far from over for Lieutenant Colonel Bell's battalio n
too close . The two companies requested rein- and the two battalions of the 5th Marines . On th e
forcements . Marine helicopters flew a platoon o f 12th and 13th of May, all three elements stayed i n
Wickwire's Company A to the area . The platoon me t almost continual contact with enemy platoons an d
such fierce resistance while landing that furthe r companies in the valley . Esslinger's battalio n
helicopters could not land . The enemy shot dow n engaged an enemy battalion five kilometers east o f
one UH-34 in the landing zone which further com- Que Son the evening of the 13th . After an exchang e
plicated the situation . of mortar and small arms fire, the battalion called i n
artillery and air strikes . As the Marines began thei r
Hilgartner's Company A, 2,000 meters to the east ,
assault, aerial observers shifted supporting fires t o
moved to help Wickwire's companies . As the com-
block possible withdrawal . The attacking Marine s
pany approached the battle area it also came under
met only token resistance as the assault move d
fire . The company commander, Captain Gerald L .
through the area, but 122 Communist bodies scat-
McKay, quickly deployed his troops to push throug h
tered over the position attested to the ferocity of th e
the enemy positions . Just as the company began it s
battle .
assault, an airborne forward air controller mistakenl y
marked the company's position with rockets and fou r For the next two days firefights continued and ar-
Marine F-4s strafed the company, killing five tillery missions and air strikes harried enemy units as
Marines and wounding another 24 . The combina- they tried to avoid the Marines in the valley . Th e
tion of the attack and the enemy fire halted Com- devastation caused by supporting arms became mos t
pany A's advance . apparent on the afternoon of 14 May when Bell' s
Hilgartner's command group and Company D Company D found 68 dead enemy soldiers in on e
were on the slope of Nui Nong Ham, southeast o f location, all killed by fragments or concussion .
Hill 110 . They climbed over the crest of Hill 185 to The last major battle of the operation took place
assist Company D and BLT 1/3 below them . B y on 15 May, when the 5th Marines' Companies A an d
1500, they had arrived at a position from which the y M found another bunker complex . Artillery and air
could support by fire . The battalion's mortarme n strikes pounded the fortifications as the Marine s
could see the enemy in the valley below and coul d maneuvered into assault positions . After the heavy
immediately adjust their weapons . They fired at a preparation fires, the Marines attacked . They me t
rapid rate ; the tubes were "just about red hot ."1 2 only light resistance and secured the position quick-
At 1530, Esslinger's Company M landed a t ly . They counted 22 enemy bodies in what remaine d
Hilgartner's position from helicopters and Compan y of the fortifications .
D moved into Nui Nong Ham to join up with Cap- The next day, Lieutenant Colonel Bell's battalion ,
tain Caswell's Company C . The two companies following its orders, departed the valley and return-
Operation Union II
Nui Loc Son Basin
Action of 26 - 29 May
26 May
0 I 2 3 4 5 8
km I
—
29 May
26 May ActIon /
LZ Eagle
3 5(-)
LZ Robin El)
70 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
Low rice paddy dikes provided the only available cover for these men from the 3d Bat-
talion, 5th Marines after debarking on 26 May from helicopters of HMM-361 . This
photograph, taken from a helicopter, shows the barrel of the crew's M-60 machine gun .
positions at 1630, they counted 118 dead NVA reentered the basin and moved northwest generall y
soldiers scattered over the battlefield . The 3d Bat- toward the site of the original 26 May contact .
talion lost 38 killed and 82 wounded, includin g On 2 June, the Marines moved out, two battalion s
Lieutenant Colonel Esslinger, who was wounded i n abreast, with the 1st Battalion on the right . Objec-
the eye . tive Foxtrot in the Vinh Huy Village complex wa s
While the Marines of Esslinger's battalio n their destination . By 0930, the two lead companie s
engaged the enemy force, Hilgartner's Marine s of the 3d Battalion were under heavy fire from 20 0
established blocking positions to the northwest a s dug-in North Vietnamese troops 1,000 meters eas t
planned . The ARVN ranger and infantry element s of the objective, and roughly 3,000 meters east o f
closed from the northeast and southeast to box in th e the scene of the 3d Battalion 's heavy action on 2 6
enemy . For the next three days, all four forces swept May . By 1300, after savage fighting and extensiv e
the area . There were only isolated exchanges of fire ; use of supporting arms, the Marines overran th e
once more the 3d NVA Regiment had withdraw n position . As the companies consolidated and began
from the basin . Convinced that the enemy had to evacuate their casualties, a helicopter took a direc t
escaped, the South Vietnamese ended their opera- hit from a 57mm recoilless rifle, killing one Marin e
tion, but Colonel Houghton did not believe that al l and wounding seven others .
the NVA forces had left the Que Son region . While the units of the 3d Battalion, now com-
After analyzing available intelligence, Houghto n manded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles B . Webster ,
decided to change the direction of attack toward th e engaged the enemy, Hilgartner's 1st Battalion push-
hills along the southern rim of the basin, southeas t ed forward to relieve the pressure . The battalio n
of the 3d Battalion's battle area of the 26th . On 3 0 moved with Company D on the right and an attach-
May, he had his two battalions flown into the area b y ed company, Company F, 5th Marines, on the left .
helicopter and began a sweep to the northeast . Thei r About 1130, Company D began crossing a
advance encountered only long-range sniper fire . B y 1,000-meter-wide rice paddy that contained a
the afternoon of 1 June, both battalions had horseshoe-shaped hedgerow . The location of the
THE WAR IN II IERN I CORPS It
Op eration Union II
Nui Loc Son Basin
Action of 30 May-2 June
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
I
2
Que
So
2 June ActIon
I June
Nw
bc
Son Objective
Foxtrot
I.Jo
(.
May 30
1
Li Robin
During the last few days of May, two Marine battalions, engaged in Operation Union II ,
searched the rugged mountains found along the southern rim of the Que Son Basin .
panies had landed . They were unopposed and quick- ground crews counted approximately 58 holes in th e
ly organized the position . helicopter . t s
As night fell, one of Jackson's companies still ha d The sudden presence of a strong force on it s
not arrived . Aware of the urgency of the tactical northern flank caused the NVA units to disengag e
situation facing Hilgartner's battalion, and concern- and make a hasty withdrawal to the southwest, bu t
ed about the fate of Captain Graham's compan y the move proved costly . Once NVA soldiers left the
from his own battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Jackso n protection of their fortifications, they were eas y
requested permission to begin his attack without th e targets for Marine supporting arms fire . Air strikes
missing company . 14 Colonel Houghton concurred . were devastating. On one occasion two F-4 aircraft
Leaving a security platoon in the landing zone , used an unusual technique of target acquisitio n
Jackson maneuvered his force south against th e which proved especially effective . The first aircraft
. enemy . The battalion had not gone far in th e approached the area at low speed and switched on it s
darkness before it collided with an NVA force tryin g landing and running lights . When the enemy fire d
to withdraw to the north . The Marines quickly drove at the plane, the second aircraft, following closel y
through the Communists and continued south . behind without lights, spotted the enemy and drop-
ped napalm on the firing positions .
The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines suffered almost 2 0
casualties in this initial contact . To evacuate th e While supporting arms fire hastened the Com-
wounded, the battalion's forward air controller call- munist departure from the battlefield, the 5th
ed in a passing CH-53 . The pilot landed hi s Marines spent the night regrouping and evacuatin g
helicopter in the middle of the command post, no t casualties . The following morning, all three bat-
far from where Company E still engaged the enemy . talions swept the battle area . The Marines counte d
As Marines completed loading the wounded, a n 476 dead North Vietnamese in and around the con -
enemy mortar round landed just to the rear of th e tested rice paddy and its formidable hedgerow com-
aircraft and enemy automatic weapons took it unde r plex . The Marines themselves suffered 71 killed an d
direct fire . The pilot quickly took off. The 2d Bat- 139 wounded in the fight .
talion later heard that, on its arrival at Da Nang, During the sweep of the battle area, Lieutenant
74 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
Thien
DaNang South
China
Quang Union
Nam
21 AprIl-
May *1 An
Hoa?\\ Sea
LAOS / Union II
26 May- '7
1'
Quang 5June17
Tin
C
/
/ Quang
Ngai
1
Desoto
27 January-
Major MAF Operations 7 April
Southern ICTZ
January—June 1967 C-.-)
Deckhouse VI
0 25 50
I I flip' rS 6 February
3 March
Colonel Hilgartner received a radio message from The NVA force escaped.17
one of his companies that enemy working parties The action on 2 June marked the last significant
were out collecting the NVA dead. The company battle of Union II. Total enemy casualties were 701
commander asked if he should open fire. Hilgartner killed and 23 captured, a favorable ratio to 110
declined for he saw this as a chance to recover his Marines killed (the same number as during Union I)
own dead, including Captain Graham's body. For and 241 wounded.*
the remainder of the day there was an undeclared Despite the heavy losses suffered during the two
truce; the two sides intermingled but ignored each Union operations, throughout the summer the
other as they went about collecting their dead.'6 enemy continued to pump replacements into the
When the enemy main body withdrew, they region in a determined effort to regain control of the
transported their wounded on two poles lashed Que Son Valley. Elements of III MAF met and
together, similar to the "travois" used by the thwarted each Communist thrust into the area.
American Plains Indians. The day after the Government control was returning to the region,
undeclared truce, Hilgartner's battalion tried to and forcing the Communists to pay a big price in
follow the travois skid marks but could not catch up men and material.
with the main body of the NVA force. Halts to call *For action in both Union I and II the 5th Marines and units
in helicopters to evacuate casualties caused by the under its operational control received the Presidential Unit Cita-
enemy's rear guard hindered the Marines' progress. tion.
CHAPTER 6
The heavy fighting of early 1967 had been an- Vietnamese domestic problems, contributed t o
ticipated by the American command . Throughou t reduced III MAF troop availability . The necessity of
the fall of the previous year, both III MAF an d protecting large bases and the resulting extension o f
MACV expressed concern over the NVA buildu p the protective TAORs around them tied down a
north of the Demilitarized Zone and along the Lao- large number of men . The requirement to reliev e
tian border to the west . In a 13 September 196 6 ARVN units for redeployment to the revolutionary
message to Admiral U . S . Grant Sharp, Commande r development program also drained available forces .
in Chief Pacific (CinCPac), General Westmorelan d The most threatening situation was the enemy troo p
outlined his appreciation of the threat to I Corps : buildup in Quang Ngai Province . Infiltration from
Laos and the influx of NVA troops and supplies int o
the A Shau Valley and the mountains west of Hu e
The current enemy buildup . . . constitutes a direct caused some very touchy and precise repositioning o f
threat to US/FW GVN forces in I CTZ and to the security units . As January began, most of General Walt' s
of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces . The seriousness reserve consisted of already committed forces ear -
of this threat underscores the importance and urgency of marked for oncall helicopter redeployment .
utilizing all practicable means to prevent the enemy fro m
MACV Headquarters appreciated the proble m
generating a major offensive designed to ' liberate ' the pro-
vinces in question and to inflict maximum casualties o n facing III MAF but viewed things from a different
US/FW GVN forces . . . . perspective . As Brigadier General Louis Metzger, th e
assistant division commander of the 3d Marine Divi-
He continues to use the DMZ as a troop haven and as a
sion, recalled :
supply head for his forces moving into northern I CTZ . . . .
The size of his buildup, disposition of forces, forward
stockage of supplies, AA weapons systems being deploye d On one occasion General Westmoreland told me that he
southward, and depth of patrols are developing an offen- knew that the 3d Marine Division was overextended, bu t
sive as opposed to a defensive posture . By October, th e that he was achieving a victory (words not exact but that
weather in Laos will be clearing and the enemy may be ex- was the meaning) in the II Corps Area, and we would jus t
pected once again to move personnel and supportin g have to hold on . One really cannot fault his position as he
material in quantity through the area. . . . Utilizing tradi- was following the principle of war "Economy of Force ;"
tional [infiltration] routes through the Laos panhandle, h e holding with the Marines while expecting his Army
will be able to reinforce large scale diversionary attacks fur- elements to the south to achieve a victory . It did make it
ther south in coordination with a main assault through th e lonesome along the DMZ . '
DMZ and the western flank . . .
South
China
Sea
Ouang Nam
Laos
Chu Lii Area
USMC
Quang Tin
OSMi
'-C--.--- .5
V
/ N
Quang Ngai
L
I—
5-- 4.
(
Sout h V\i e t n a m S
\
Cambodia
r.
r
I
III MAF to counter enemy infiltration across th e vince on 6 and 12 March and another attack on D a
borders and regain momentum in pacifying th e Nang on 15 March .* The rockets were the enemy's
populated coastal areas . 2 At the beginning of th e most economical weapon of the war . They were easi-
year these forces did not exist . ly transported, usually backpacked, and required on-
After the Tet cease-fire of 8-12 February, enemy ly a few personnel for installation and employment .
activity intensified . The NVA initiated aggressive ef- The February Da Nang attack demonstrated th e
forts to offset the embryonic Revolutionary Develop- speed with which the rockets could be launched .
ment Program, while continuing the buildup of More than 50 rockets hit the base in less than a
forces in I and II Corps . The 2d NVA Division an d minute .
supporting battalions moved south from Quang Ti n With the introduction of rockets, the Marines ex-
Province to Quang Ngai Province . This move ap- panded their protective patrolling out to a range o f
peared related to movement of other subordinat e 9,000 meters, rather than 5,000 meters, the max-
units at the turn of the year in preparation for a pro - imum effective range of heavy mortars which ha d
posed dry season offensive in Quang Ngai . been the primary concern before the rocket threat .
As enemy activity continued to intensify, both i n The speed with which the rockets could be employe d
southern I Corps and immediately south of th e also required the Marines to deliver counterbattery
DMZ, on 19 February General Westmorelan d fire on the rocket launching positions in a matter of
directed his Chief of Staff, Major General Willia m two to three minutes, a factor which complicated th e
B . Rosson, to develop a contingency plan for the already complex problem of coordinating the use of
organization and deployment of a divisional tas k air and artillery in populated areas .
force to the troubled northern provinces . The pur- Rocket attacks were not the only indication tha t
pose of the proposed shift was twofold : to release the enemy's main target was I Corps . During the first
Marine units for action along the DMZ and to us e six weeks after Tet, enemy attacks increased by ap-
the new force to expand the scope of operations i n proximately twice the 1966 rate . Enemy expen-
southern I Corps . Westmoreland's headquarters ditures of artillery, mortar, recoilless rifle, and rocke t
code-named the proposed task force, "Oregon . " ammunition for the month of March were 5,05 7
The Oregon plan was not the first contingenc y rounds, compared to 2,183 in January and 2,656 i n
plan prepared for the reinforcement of III MAF . At February .
the time of the first NVA thrust across the DMZ i n
mid-1966, MACV Headquarters developed severa l At the same time, the NVA buildup continued
schemes . The Tennessee plan proposed the move- along the DMZ . Intelligence agencies reported tha t
ment of a U .S . Army brigade to Chu Lai . Another , elements of another division, including fire suppor t
dubbed the South Carolina plan, was to deploy a n units, had reinforced the 324B and 341st NVA Divi-
Army brigade to the 3d Marine Division's area o f sions . Captured prisoners and documents verifie d
operation in northern I Corps, while North Carolin a the presence of the new units . Increased mortar fire
would have introduced an Army brigade into and the employment of artillery and rockets con -
southern I Corps . The latter two contingency plan s firmed the arrival of the fire support units . The
included the movement of a Republic of Korea Ar- seriousness of these developments was even more ap -
my regiment to Chu Lai . During November 1966 , parent when Marine intelligence officers learned tha t
General Westmoreland gave consideration to th e the NVA forces in the northern provinces of Quan g
deployment of the 9th Infantry Division to I Corp s Tri and Thua Thien were under the control of North
when it arrived in South Vietnam, but shelved th e Vietnamese Army Military Region 4, with head -
idea in December 1966 and the division moved into quarters in Vinh above the DMZ . The North Viet-
the region east of Saigon . namese considered the targeted provinces as a
subregion of this command .
While General Rosson and his staff were develop-
ing the Oregon plan, events in I Corps forced th e
planners' hand . On 27 February, NVA forces attack-
ed Da Nang Airbase with 140mm rockets, the firs t *The rockets employed in the attack against Camp Carroll wer e
known use of large tactical rockets by the enemy i n 102mm Communist copies of the U .S . 4 .5-inch barrage rocket ,
South Vietnam . The Da Nang attack preceded with a range of 5,000 meters . The 140mm Soviet rocket used a t
rocket attacks on Camp Carroll in Quang Tri Pro - Da Nang had a range of almost 9,000 meters .
78 FIGHITNG THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
USMC
'St
Ba'
Thua !Da
2 South
Thien Hang DaNang
Area
tg.'n.t 21151 China
US MC
Sea
USMC
USMC
ng Nam
-7
Laos
Q uang
V
/ N
Quang Ngai USA
I
N.
5.—-—"
I
(
Cambodia
American soldiers (top) of the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry advance toward a tree lin e
under enemy fire near Duc Pho in May in Operation Malheur, conducted by Task Forc e
Oregon after it assumed control of the Chu Lai area . As enemy fire increases (below), a n
armored personnel carrier of the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment fires in support.
Department of Defense Photo (USA) SC 640811
to eliminating the guerrilla infrastructure . During
the ensuing months, the Viet Cong found it increas-
ingly difficult to obtain support from the people i n
the surrounding countryside .
The introduction of Task Force Oregon was onl y
the first step in the buildup and realignment o f
forces in I Corps . The second step was the temporary
commitment of the CinCPac reserve, the Sevent h
Fleet's Amphibious Ready Group with Special Lan -
ding Forces Alpha and Bravo . In mid-May, BLT 3/4 ,
the last major element of the Marines' Wester n
Pacific reserve, arrived in a 42-plane shuttle at Don g
Ha to participate in Operation Hickory . The 26th
Marines' regimental headquarters followed fro m
Okinawa to provide the operational control of unit s
in the Khe Sanh area in northwestern Quang Tr i
Province . *
The large number of enemy casualties in I Corp s upset the Communists' plans . They did not find the
during the month of May reflected some of the im- coastal plains undefended as expected, and Hano i
pact of the sudden III MAF reinforcement . In I demanded adherence to the plan . The ability of the
Corps 6,119 enemy died fighting the Americans , allies to reinforce I Corps against the anticipated
compared with a total of 3,723 in the other thre e summer campaign cost the Communists a high pric e
corps areas . The surprise arrival of 12 new U .S . bat- in troops lost and doomed North Vietnam's hope s
talions and the reshuffle of forces already in I Corps for a resounding 1967 summer victory .
PART III
CONTINUING ACTIO N
ALONG THE DMZ
CHAPTER 7
86
barrier system must be tended ; if not, it could b e implementation of the idea would directly affect
breached with ease, while the flow of men an d that command . His only guidance to General Kyle ,
material to the VC/NVA continued ." An aerial the division commander, was that he wanted the
delivered obstacle would not be expected to sup - report to begin with a statement that III MA F
plant the need for soldiers on the ground, and th e disagreed with the barrier idea and preferred th e
time, effort and resources of men and material re- mobile defense currently being employed . 3 General
quired to establish a ground barrier would b e Kyle, briefing Walt on the division plan, also in-
tremendous . "2 dicated his preference for a mobile concept, stating :
While military leaders showed little enthusias m
for the barrier schemes, Secretary of Defens e A mobile defense by the size of the force envisioned for
manning the barrier system (one and one-third divisions)
McNamara believed that the ideas had merit . On 1 5 would in itself provide an effective block to infiltration
September, he appointed Lieutenant General Alfred south of the DMZ, and in the process negate the necessit y
D . Starbird, USA, director of the Defense Com- for construction of the barrier . 4
munications Agency, to head a joint task forc e
within the Department of Defense with the missio n After the III MAF staff reviewed General Kyle's
of devising an anti-infiltration system that woul d plan, General Walt forwarded it to General
stop, or at least inhibit, the flow of men an d Westmoreland . His covering letter made III MAF's
material from North to South Vietnam . The mission view quite clear, stating, " . . . this plan was bein g
envisioned wide usage of air dropped munitions an d submitted in response to a directive, and that it wa s
electronic sensors to establish the barrier . This direc- the opinion of the Commanding General III MA F
tive formally established the program that was t o that such a barrier, in effect, was not going to b e
become known as Project Practice Nine . worth the time and the effort that would be put int o
In October 1966, General Westmoreland sug- it .
gested to Secretary McNamara, as an alternative t o On 26 November, General Westmoreland for -
previous recommendations, that a conventional bar- warded the plan to the Secretary of Defense after ad-
rier utilizing strong points could be constructed ditional refining at MACV Headquarters . As sub-
across all of northern South Vietnam . This barrier mitted, it called for a linear barrier immediatel y
would be augmented by selective use of air delivere d south of the DMZ, extending from the South Chin a
munitions and sensors in Laos . Key terrain was to be Sea to a point near Dong Ha Mountain, a distance o f
organized behind the barrier, with observation post s approximately 30 kilometers . This portion of th e
and patrols integrated into the scheme . Reaction barrier was to be 600-1,000 meters wide, consistin g
forces were to be emplaced to respond if the barrie r of wire obstacles, minefields, sensors, watch towers ,
was breached . General Westmoreland believed that and a series of strong points . The line was to be back-
a division, supported by an armored cavalry regi- ed up by an armored unit . From the west end of this
ment, would be needed as the containment force . linear barrier to the Laotian border there were to be a
Secretary McNamara told General Westmoreland series of about 20 defile barriers, each to consist of a
that he was receptive to the concept and requeste d minefield and wire obstacles extending roughly
that the idea be refined into a requirement plan . At 1,000 meters across the avenue of approach to b e
the same time, the Secretary charged the Starbir d blocked by the barrier . Manned strong points were
task force with functioning as an expediting agenc y to occupy commanding hills and ridgelines overlook-
to obtain and deliver munitions, sensors, and equip- ing these obstacles . The plan called for a division t o
ment to support the MACV concept . man this portion of the system .
General Westmoreland ordered his staff and all The plan also required the construction of artiller y
involved subordinate commands to develop th e positions along Route 9 to provide fire support for
plan . The burden of preparing the aviation portio n the system . These positions also were to house the
fell on the Seventh Air Force ; III MAF and th e reaction forces needed to support the strong points .
MACV Combat Operations Center were to provid e Other construction projects included in the pla n
the concept for the conduct of mobile defense an d were the improvement of Routes 1 and 9, expansio n
conventional barrier aspects . of the Cua Viet port facility, and the establishmen t
General Walt ordered the 3d Marine Division t o of a major airfield near Hue .
prepare the Marine portion of the concept, since any After reviewing the proposal, Secretary McNamara
Despite opposition from concerned Marine an d establishing a strong point/obstacle system south o f
Navy commanders, on 8 March Secretary McNamar a the DMZ initially will be given to the U .S .
ordered General Starbird to procure the materials fo r Marines ." 11 General Walt expressed his concern in a
strong points and base camps, and enough sensor s 26 April message to General Westmoreland, statin g
and surveillance devices to service a 10-kilometer sec - that the assignment committed his entire 3d Marine
tion of the obstacle system . At the same time, h e Division to the Practice Nine Plan . He pointed ou t
directed the improvement of Route 1 and the port s that ARVN participation in the anti-infiltration bel t
at Hue and Cua Viet . He also arranged with th e construction accelerated the anticipated reduction in
State Department to secure South Vietnam Govern- his forces .
ment support for required land acquisition and The clearing of the area between Con Thien an d
civilian relocation . Gio Linh was nearing completion, opening the wa y
On 17 March at III MAF headquarters, General for the installation of towers, wire, strong points ,
Westmoreland met with General Walt, General La m mines, sensors, and communications . General Walt
of the ARVN I Corps, and other GVN represen- emphasized that the manpower required to con-
tatives to explain the basic concept of a strong poin t struct and man even that portion of the system
system in northeastern Quang Tri Province . The would not only use up all of the division's personnel ,
ARVN representatives warmly endorsed the idea an d but also would fix all available division units in
suggested that an early start should be made on th e place . General Walt observed that this was contrary
project to take 'advantage of the weather . They did to all previous MACV positions .
not believe that land procurement or civilian reloca- From the outset the plan had :
tion would pose any problem . Consistently protected [the] integrity of Marine Corp s
As a result, General Westmoreland ordere d forces in [the] northern portion of ICTZ (i .e ., have infer-
General Walt, in coordination with General Lam, t o red that forces now in northern Quang Tri have not undul y
prepare a plan to locate, construct, organize, and oc- been tied to any of the projected barrier systems) .
Recognized the requirement for significant forces ove r
cupy a SPOS . He also informed General Walt that
and above those now in place to construct and man
discussion of Practice Nine with the South Viet- whatever system is finally adopted .
namese at this time should be limited to the SPOS . t o
General Walt contended that both of these posi-
General Walt, in turn, ordered his chief, G- 3 tions remained valid, and maintained that unless h e
Plans Division and III MAF Practice Nine officer , received the additional forces required to install an d
Lieutenant Colonel Marvin D . Volkert, to meet with man the Practice Nine system, his capability to con-
his ARVN counterpart and begin the preparation o f duct offensive actions in northern I Corps woul d
a combined barrier plan . Walt instructed Volkert t o cease almost immediately . 1 2
lead the planning and to complete the total effor t There were no additional forces available in South
without divulging details of the Practice Nine pla n Vietnam at the time . The posting of the U .S . Army's
such as equipment and forces required . By early Task Force Oregon to southern I Corps had reduce d
April, although no written document was in ex- troop strength in the other three corps areas to a
istence nor even expected for at least 30 days, com- minimum . These facts, and the 1 November targe t
bined planning had progressed sufficiently to permi t date for the completion of the first portion of th e
initial ground clearing between Con Thien and Gi o SPOS, forced General Westmoreland to place th e
Linh . At that time Marine spokesmen described th e responsibility for the system's construction on II I
project as a modest effort to clear fields of fire and t o MAF, but the MACV commander did indicate tha t
install a limited obstacle system, but Lieutenant Col- as additional forces became available he would us e
onel Volkert had ensured that the work would fit in - them to reinforce the Marines .
to the Practice Nine concept . By 2 May the 11th Engineer Battalion had cleare d
Although the number of Marine units involved i n a 200-meter trace between Con Thien and Gio Lin h
the initial clearing effort was small, it precipitated and was starting to clear a 500-meter perimete r
the basic problem that III MAF had feared would around each position . Once the battalion complete d
result from the barrier project : the loss of flexibility . this task it planned to widen the 200-meter trace t o
On 19 April, a message from Westmoreland t o 600 meters and then extend it eastward beyond Gi o
CinCPac intensified the problem . Genera l Linh to the flood plain . While the engineers wer e
Westmoreland indicated that, "The mission of clearing the laud, at least one infantry battalion, but
South
China
Sea
Gio Lin h
Con Thie n
n
A-4 ..e' 1Cua Viet
normally two, provided security and screening fo r tice Nine code name . MACV assigned the interi m
the engineering effort . name Illinois City for use until 14 July when th e
One of the major problems encountered by th e code name Dye Marker became effective . At th e
engineers during the initial clearing of the trace wa s same time, 14 July, the air-supported portion of th e
the large number of civilians living in the area . program, which was still in a conceptual stage, ac-
Although the government had begun the removal of quired the code name Muscle Shoals . *
the population in this region, it appeared that thi s Renaming of the project was not the only chang e
would be an extremely difficult and extended task , to occur in June . On 1 June, Lieutenant Genera l
but the inception of Operation Hickory on 18 Ma y Walt, the burly Marine veteran from Colorado, wh o
changed the picture completely . One of the objec- had led III MAF since June of 1965, relinquished hi s
tives of Hickory was to clear the entire SPOS area o f
command to Lieutenant General Robert E .
civilians . By 23 May, GVN authorities reported that
Cushman, Jr ., recipient of the Navy Cross as a bat-
there were 6,000 people already at the Cam Lo tem- talion commander on Guam during World War II .
porary resettlement site . By the end of Hickory, o n
General Cushman had been deputy commander a t
29 May, the population at Cam Lo had grown to over
III MAF since early in the year . The new comman-
11,000 ; the construction zone was virtually free o f
ding general was well aware of the problems involv-
civilians .
ed in the construction of the anti-infiltration system ,
On 18 June, III MAF published Operation Pla n
but, unlike his predecessor, he believed that, onc e
11-67, outlining the SPOS concept . This plan envi-
completed, the system would free his forces for mis-
sioned that, in its completed form, the system woul d
sions elsewhere .* *
require one U .S . regiment and one ARVN regiment ,
disposed at six strong points and three battalion bas e During Secretary McNamara's visit to the 3 d
areas . The U .S . portion of the defense was to includ e Marine Division in July, the division briefed him o n
four company strong points and two battalion bas e the status of Dye Marker and flew him over the con-
areas . An additional U .S . battalion was to be base d struction sites . The Marines had cleared the stron g
at Dong Ha to be employed in tactical operations i n points at Con Thien and Gio Linh to a 500-mete r
support of the defense . radius and had begun building bunkers in both
The plan divided the construction and mannin g positions . They had cleared the 600-meter-wide
of the system into two phases . The first phase con- trace between the two strong points and extended i t
sisted of expansion of the trace to a 600-meter width , to the flood plain east of Gio Linh . The staff opinion
installation of a linear obstacle system, and clearin g was that with release of the Dye Marker materials ,
and construction of four strong points and three bas e the division could finish Phase 1 of the system by th e
areas . Concurrently, III MAF units would improve 1 November target date . Since the monsoon woul d
Routes 1, 9, and 561 and prepare a fortificatio n greatly reduce trafficability in the area, the engineer s
materials storage site at Dong Ha . The plan set the made a major effort to improve Routes 1, 9, and 56 1
completion date for Phase 1 as 1 November 1967 . * which linked the strong points to the base areas .
The Marines planned to begin Phase 2 of the pla n These accomplishments had been costly for II I
MAF . All of the forces used for clearing the stron g
at the end of the monsoon season . It required the
construction of the final two strong points west o f point obstacle system had come from III MAF and
Con Thien and continued obstacle construction o n they had not begun installation of wire and othe r
both flanks of the Phase 1 line . III MAF anticipate d obstacles . The amount of Marine efforts devoted t o
that the entire system would be completed by Jul y the Dye Marker project to that stage had been :
1968 . (1) Direct labor : 5,795 mandays ; III MAF estimated the
11th Engineer Battalion was applying 50 percent of it s Those working within the perimeter endured over
resources to Dye Marker . 100 rounds of incoming enemy artillery and rockets ,
(2) Equipment hours : 18,440 . which dictated strict flak jacket discipline . " Th e
(3) Equipment losses : destroyed tractors, 15 ; dump
Marines much preferred to take their chances o n
trucks,. 2 .
(4) Personnel losses : KIA 4 ; WIA, 77 . 1 3 patrol, " recalled Lieutenant Colonel Bendell, "tha n
be sand bag fillers and bunker construction 'experts '
At the same time, the construction effort wa s interrupted by incoming barrages . "l s
meeting increased enemy resistance, requiring mor e By mid-August, the enemy situation in the DM Z
security forces . Further, Marine units still had area was becoming critical . In a 16 August messag e
responsibility for their respective TAORs . The 9t h to General Westmoreland, General Cushman state d
Marine s' TAOR, for example, stretched from the se a that although he had increased his own troo p
above Cua Viet to Con Thien in the west and as fa r strength in the area, he had received none of th e
south as the newly constructed airfield at Quang Tri . forces considered as the minimum essential augmen-
"Although the 9th Marines was reinforced with a t tation by the 26 January 1967 plan . The enem y
least one additional infantry battalion and often threat in the DMZ had increased progressively to th e
two, " recalled Colonel George E . Jerue, " the addi- degree that Marine units were fully occupied wit h
tional mission of assisting in the construction of th e holding back the Communists in the Con Thien-Gi o
trace precluded any rest for the combat troops in- Linh region . Allied forces along the trace (four bat-
volved ." 14 talions plus combat support and combat service sup -
One example of the effort required was that o f port, with the effective assistance of extensive an d
Lieutenant Colonel Lee R . Bendell's 3d Battalion , continuous artillery, air, and naval gunfire support )
4th Marines at Con Thien in late August and earl y were unable to defend their front and at the sam e
September . As one company worked on constructio n time construct, man, and operate the SPOS in thei r
projects within the perimeter, company-sized patrol s rear . General Cushman concluded by stating that h e
conducted sweeps north, east, and west of Co n required more forces in northern Quang Tri if h e
Thien while platoon-sized patrols covered the south . were to meet the 1 November target date for the
The construction of the barrier system, also called the strong point obstacle system ,
created severe logistics problems for III MAF . For example, the heavy timbers used i n
this partially completed bunker at Strong Point C-2 had to be acquired and then haule d
to the site over dirt roads made almost impassable by the monsoon rains late in the year .
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189849
SPOS . His only alternative, barring the arrival of cluded relocation of Base Area C-3 nearer to Cam L o
reinforcements if he was to continue the project, was and the addition of a fourth base area north of th e
to shift one Task Force Oregon brigade north to free Cua Viet POL facility . One other change, not involv-
elements of the 5th Marines for deployment i n ing construction, was the provision for manning al l
Quang Tri . i6 four strong points with ARVN forces, freeing a
Marine battalion for security of the new Quang Tr i
General Westmoreland responded to CG III airfield . Operations in the western, or defile, are a
MAF's request by ordering another Army brigade t o were to be conducted from battalion combat
I Corps to permit the 5th Marines to deploy furthe r operating bases (COBs) . This plan envisioned that
north . He also informed General Cushman that h e the COBs would support the area between Cam p
planned to send a second brigade into the area i n Carroll and Khe Sanh . Subsequently, the Marine s
October . As a result, the III MAF commander in - would establish bases in the vicinity of Lang Ru'o u
formed General Westmoreland that he would us e and Lang Vei .1 9
nine Marine battalions ; seven committed t o
searching, clearing, and screening in support of th e The onset of the seasonal monsoon further com-
construction effort, while the other two infantry bat- plicated construction efforts . The heavy rains i n
talions and an engineer battalion would construc t September, for example, turned Route 561 betwee n
the obstacles and man them as the work was com- Cam Lo and Con Thien into a quagmire impassable
pleted . All of these forces would be in the range o f to any type of vehicle . While CH-53 helicopters ,
enemy artillery . Moreover, increased NVA use of often guided by TPQ-10 radar, attempted to ferr y
proximity fuzes posed a greater threat to those troop s sufficient supplies to Con Thien, the 11th Enginee r
who would have to do the work, expected to take si x Battalion received orders to make Route 561 useable ;
weeks . Because of this, General Cushman emphasiz- this became the battalion ' s top priority . The majo r
ed that the flow of equipment and materials woul d problem facing the engineers was the location an d
have to be timely . The general pointed out that th e movement of sufficient crushed rock to build a sub -
3 September artillery attack on Dong Ha also ha d base for the road . The nearest supply was near Cam p
reduced his ability to proceed with the project .' ? Carroll, which required hauling the rock in dum p
trucks more than 15 miles . "When the project wa s
On 7 September, General Westmoreland directe d completed and the first vehicles made it to Co n
III MAF to assess the cost of installing the SPOS i n Thien," commented Lieutenant Colonel Willard N .
terms of casualties resulting from enemy fire . At th e Christopher of the 11th Engineer Battalion ,
same time, he requested that the Marines submit a n
"General Hochmuth told me that he was elated t o
alternate plan to be executed between then an d `get them off my back,' and congratulated the me n
November should a decision be made not to procee d in the battalion who had done the bulk of th e
with the Dye Marker plan . On 10 September, III work . "2 0
MAF presented its analysis of the casualties that
could be expected if it pursued the existing plan . By mid-October General Westmoreland was ex -
The Marines based this analysis on actual casualtie s pressing dissatisfaction with the rate of progress o n
from previous operations in support of the SPOS , the Dye Marker project . He realized that the heav y
with an adjustment made for the increased enem y rains in late September and early October had re-
artillery capability . They estimated the system in- quired a large effort to keep the roads open, and h e
stallation time as 29 days . Total projected casualtie s also appreciated that there had been some dela y
were : 672 U .S . killed and 3,788 wounded ; projecte d because construction materials had not arrived o n
South Vietnamese casualties for the same perio d schedule, but, despite these recognizable problems ,
were 112 killed and 642 wounded . 1 8 he believed that more progress should have bee n
Three days after the submission of the casualt y made . On 22 October, he told General Cushman
analysis, General Westmoreland approved III MAF' s that, as a result of his own observations and inspec-
alternate plan, Operation Plan 12-67 . The majo r tions by his staff, he had concluded that quality con-
change in the new plan was the cessation of obstacl e trol of the project was inadequate, that the Dy e
construction until after completion of the stron g Marker system had not received the priority consis-
points and base areas and stabilization of the tactica l tent with its operational importance, and that th e
situation . Other changes outlined in the plan in - project required more command emphasis and bet-
ter management .* He ordered General Cushman to Both A-3 and C-3 were approximately 70 percen t
take immediate steps to correct deficiencies and t o finished, as was the Ca Lu COB . The total Dye
institute a positive system of quality control over th e Marker effort and its associated security tasks had re -
entire Dye Marker project . 2 1 quired 757,520 mandays and 114,519 equipmen t
General Cushman appointed the assistant III MA F hours by 31 December . Equipment lost to enemy ac-
commander, Major General Raymond L . Murray, a tion during the construction effort amounted to a
distinguished and highly decorated veteran of tw o monetary loss of $1,622,348 . 23
wars, to head a permanent Dye Marker special staff . By the end of the year the Marine command ' s opi-
At the same time, III MAF informed all commanders nion of the barrier concept had not changed . On e
concerned that the Dye Marker project had high na- Marine officer stated, "With these bastards, you'd
tional interest and a priority second only to emergen- have to build the zone all the way to India and i t
cy combat requirements . In addition, Genera l would take the whole Marine Corps and half the Ar-
Cushman planned to move another regiment nort h my to guard it ; even then they ' d probably burro w
to provide more troops for tactical requirements . under it ." General Wallace M . Greene, Jr . the Com-
General Cushman pointed out that although all con- mandant, testifying before the Senate Subcommit-
struction was incomplete, all the A and C sites, ex- tee on Preparedness in August 1967, declared ,
cept A-3, included in his 12-67 plan were manne d "From the very beginning I have been opposed to
and engaged in anti-infiltration operations . H e this project ."24
assured the MACV commander that the task of com-
pleting construction and improving the cases an d Each of the strong points in the barrier system con-
strong points would be pursued as a matter of ut- tained bunkers designed to withstand enemy ar-
most urgency . 22 tillery and rocket fire . These South Vietnames e
On 10 December, General Cushman reported soldiers are adding a thick layer of dirt to the top of
that III MAF had made significant progress . Al l this bunker at Strong Point C-2 in mid-October .
bunkers at sites A-4, C-2, and C-4 were complete . Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189856
Engineers had completed the wire and min e
emplacement at C-2, and had finished most of th e
other two sites . Construction had started on th e
combat operating base at Ca Lu and Marines wer e
conducting tactical operations to clear the A-3 site .
Vietnamese Army construction at sites A-1 and C- 1
did not meet the new 1 December target date, bu t
completion was near . Engineers had prepared Rout e
561 to handle a 60-ton capacity and opened it fro m
Cam Lo to Con Thien, but delayed asphalting th e
road because of weather . The new Quang Tri airfiel d
was completely operational, substantially easing th e
logistic burden in the area .
By the end of the year, III MAF units finished al l
strong points and base areas, except A-3 and C-3 .
95
The second attempt came in September . A heavy Albert C . Slater, Jr .'s Company A to conduct a
weapons attack of greater volume and duration sup - sweep north of the cleared trace . At 0800 on th e
ported a multipronged infantry assault on Co n 2nd, both units began moving north . Company A
Thien, but this endeavor, too, ended in failure fo r was on the left . Company B moved along Route 561 ,
the Communists . an old 8- to 10-foot-wide cart road bordered b y
In reviewing the enemy invasion attempts acros s waist-high hedgerows . The road led to trouble ; two
the DMZ during 1967, analysts found the Com- NVA battalions waited in prepared positions .
munists used fewer troops as the year progressed, bu t Company B's movement started smoothly and b y
greatly increased their attacks by fire . The enem y 0900 the 2d Platoon had secured its first objective, a
sanctuary in the northern half of the DMZ, pro- small crossroads 1,200 meters north of the trace .
tected by U .S . policy, was always available fo r There was no contact . As the 3d Platoon and th e
regrouping and employment of heavy artillery . Thi s command group moved up the trail, enemy snipe r
unique situation caused considerable frustration fo r fire started . The 3d Platoon and Captain Coates '
the allied commanders . Even so, Communist plan s command group moved to the left to suppress the
for a significant victory in the DMZ area remaine d enemy' s fire, but as they pushed north the NVA fir e
unfulfilled at the year's end, and construction of th e intensified, halting the platoon . Captain Coates
allied strong point obstacle system continued a s directed his 2d Platoon to shift to the right in a
planned . second attempt to outflank the Communist posi-
tion ; at the same time he ordered the 1st Platoon
Operation Buffal o forward to provide rear security for the company .
Operation Buffalo began on 2 July utilizing The 2d Platoon tried to move, but enemy fire force d
Lieutenant Colonel Richard J . Schening's 1st Bat- it back onto the road . The number of wounded and
talion, 9th Marines in and around Con Thien . Com- dead mounted as NVA fire hit the unit from th e
panies A and B operated north-northeast of th e front and both flanks . To worsen matters, the enem y
strong point near a former market place on Rout e began pounding the Marines with artillery and mor-
561, while Company D, Headquarters and Servic e tars .
Company, and the battalion command group re- Shortly after the sweep began, Company A trip-
mained within the outpost perimeter . Company C ped two Claymore mines and the need for casualty
was at Dong Ha at Colonel George E . Jerue's 9t h evacuation delayed its movement . Afterward, Cap-
Marines command post . Colonel Jerue described th e tain Slater moved his company eastward to help
origins of the operation : Company B, but could not link up because of heav y
small arms fire . Soon the company had so man y
The TAOR assigned to the 9th Marine Regiment was s o casualties that it was unable to fight and mov e
large that the regiment could not enjoy the advantage o f simultaneously .
patrolling any particular sector on a continuing basis . As a
result, an area would be swept for a few days and then i t Company B's position deteriorated . Enemy ar-
would be another week or so before the area would b e tillery and mortar fire cut off the 3d Platoon and th e
swept again . Consequently, it became evident that th e command group from the 2d Platoon . The NVA
NVA, realizing this limitation, would move back into a n
troops then used flamethrowers to ignite th e
area as soon as a sweep was concluded .
In an attempt to counter this NVA maneuver, it wa s hedgerows on both sides of Captain Coates' unit, a s
decided to send two companies of 1/9 ("A" and "B" Cos . ) well as massed artillery in close coordination with a
into the area (1,200 yards east of Con Thien and north of ground attack .° Many of the Marines, forced into th e
the Trace) which had just been swept during the last few open by the flamethrowers, died under the enem y
days in June . This is the reason the two companies wer e
fire . The Communist artillery and mortar fire shifte d
(there on 2 July] .=
to the 2d Platoon as it attacked to help the 3d Pla-
toon and the command group . This fire killed Cap-
That morning, Captain Sterling K . Coates' Com- tain Coates, his radio operator, two platoon com-
pany B, a company which gained a reputation fo r manders, and the artillery forward observer . The at-
finding the enemy during earlier actions at Kh e tached forward air controller, Captain Warren O .
Sanh, walked into the heaviest combat of its Viet- Keneipp, Jr ., took command of the company, but
nam assignment . It had moved a mile east of Co n he soon lost radio contact with the platoons . Only
Thien the day before in company with Captain the company executive officer, at the rear of the 2d
U )N TUIEN ANDTHE "L'IMI:R BA1TI L" ALONG THE DMZ
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3d MarDiv ComdC, July 196 7
Much of the terrain around Con Thien and the area south of the DMZ was well suite d
for armored vehicles . These infantrymen from Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marine s
have teamed up with M-48 tanks from the 3d Tank Battalion during Operation Buffalo .
mand of Company B if link-up could be made . Firs t the company reached the landing zone it cam e
Lieutenant Gatlin J . Howell, the battalion in- under devastating artillery and mortar fire again ,
telligence officer, went also because he was familia r hitting many of the wounded who awaited evacua-
with the area where the enemy engaged Company tion . Litter bearers and corpsmen became casualtie s
B . 6 The remainder of the battalion command grou p as well .
remained at Con Thien . Casualties increased in the landing zone, amon g
The small rescue force moved down the cleare d them were the platoon commander and platoo n
trace from Con Thien to the junction of Route 56 1 sergeant from Company D who had been directin g
without incident, but as it turned north up the road the defense of the zone . In the resulting confusion ,
it came under fire . A North Vietnamese unit, trying someone passed the word to move the casualties bac k
to encircle Company B, had moved south and wa s to Con Thien . A group of almost 50 started makin g
opposite Radcliffe's small force . Helicopter gunships their way back until Marines at Con Thien spotte d
and the fire from the four tanks dispersed th e them in the cleared trace . Lieutenant Colonel Schen-
enemy . Company C began arriving by helicopter ing sent out a rescue party, headed by his executive
and Captain Radcliffe ordered the Company D pla- officer, Major Darrell C . Danielson, in a truck, jee p
toon to secure the landing zone and evacuat e and ambulance . Upon reaching the wounded
casualties . As the lead elements of Company C cam e Marines, Major Danielson saw that many were in a
into the zone they met a heavy artillery barrage , state of shock ; some seemed in danger of bleeding t o
which wounded 11 Marines . death . Fortunately, two helicopters landed in th e
Despite enemy fire, the platoon of tanks and th e area and the Marines loaded the more seriou s
lead unit of Company C continued to push nort h casualties on board . Enemy artillery fire delayed th e
toward Company B . Half a mile up the road, the ad- evacuation of the remainder but, despite the fire ,
vancing Marines found the 1st Platoon . Captai n Major Danielson and his party managed to ge t
Radcliffe told Burns that he was the acting comman- everyone into the vehicles and back to Con Thien fo r
ding officer and asked where was the rest of the com- treatment and further evacuation . 9
pany . Sergeant Burns replied, " Sir, this is the com- During the battle, friendly and enemy supporting
pany, or what's left of it . " arms engaged in a furious duel . In the first few hours
After organizing the withdrawal of the 1st Pla- of the engagement Marine aircraft dropped 90 ton s
toon's wounded, Radcliffe and the relief force, ac- of ordnance during 28 sorties . Artillery fired 45 3
companied by Burns, continued to push forward t o missions, while Navy destroyers fired 142 5-inch
Company B's furthest point of advance to recover th e rounds into enemy positions . The NVA force fired
company's casualties . The Marines set up a hast y 1,065 artillery and mortar rounds during the day a t
defense, making maximum use of the tanks ' Gio Linh and Con Thien ; more than 700 rounds fell
firepower, and brought the dead and wounded int o on Lieutenant Colonel Schening's 1st Battalion, 9t h
the perimeter . Marines alone .
For Lieutenant Howell the scene had a particular Captain Slaters Company A remained heavily
impact . He had commanded Company B's 3d Pla- engaged . When the necessity of carrying the increas-
toon for more than eight months . Howell was seem- ing numbers of wounded brought the company to a
ingly everywhere as he searched for the wounded . halt, Slater had his 3d Platoon establish a hast y
Captain Radcliffe estimated that Howell and Cor- landing zone in the rear of the company . After th e
poral Charles A . Thompson of Company D were in- first flight of medevac helicopters departed the zone ,
strumental in the evacuation of at least 25 Marines . e the enemy hit the 3d Platoon with mortars an d
The Marines then loaded their casualties on the assaulted the position . Slater moved his 2d Platoo n
tanks . Lacking space on the vehicles for the arms an d and company command group to reinforce the 3 d
equipment of the wounded, Radcliffe ordered them Platoon .* The enemy advanced to within 50 meter s
destroyed to prevent capture . The rescue force foun d of Company A's lines before small arms and artiller y
it impossible to recover all the bodies immediately ;
some bodies remained along the road .
*In the confused fighting, the 1st Platoon of Company A brok e
The company came under heavy enemy artiller y through the surrounding enemy and joined Captain Radcliffe' s
fire as it began to pull back . Two of the tanks hi t relief force . LtCol Albert C . Slater, Comments on draft ms ,
mines which further slowed the withdrawal . When 12May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)
fire broke up their attack . Enemy pressure and the vancing from positions north of Con Thien . Battery
remaining casualties kept Company A in the defen- E, 3d Battalion, 12th Marines fired on them and kill-
sive position until the NVA force withdrew later i n ed 75 . To the east, Major Woodring called in con-
the evening . to tinuous air strikes for 12 hours to prepare for an at -
tack the following day . The same day, 3 July, Lieu -
At 1500 Schening, at Con Thien, notified th e tenant Colonel Peter A . Wickwire's BLT 1/3 fro m
regimental commander that all of his companies SLF Alpha joined the 9th Marines and tied in with
were hard pressed, that he had no more units to Woodring's right flank . The regiment planned a
commit, and that the situation was critical . Colone l drive north to recover missing bodies and push th e
Jerue, commanding the 9th Marines, ordered Major
NVA out of the Lang Son area, only 4,000 meter s
Willard J . Woodring's 3d Battalion, 9th Marines t o northeast of the Con Thien perimeter .
move by helicopter to Schening's assistance . Thre e The attack started early the morning of the 4th .
companies and the command group of the 3d Bat-
The 3d Battalion encountered heavy resistance fro m
talion were in position north of the trace by 1800 . * concealed enemy positions southwest of the site o f
After landing, Major Woodring assumed operationa l Company B's engagement on 2 July . A prolonged
control of Companies A and C of the 1st Battalion . fight followed, involving tanks, artillery, and clos e
The combined force made a twilight attack on th e
air support . By 1830 when the final Marine assaul t
enemy's left flank, while elements of Company B
ended, Woodring's 3d Battalion, 9th Marines ha d
and the platoon from Company D holding the lost 15 dead and 33 wounded . BLT 1/3 had 1 1
landing zone pulled back to the Con Thie n wounded during the same action . The same day Ma-
perimeter in expectation of an attack on the outpost .
jor Wendell O . Beard's BLT 2/3 from SLF Brav o
The increased pressure provided by the 3d Battalio n
joined the operation ; the battalion landed b y
caused the enemy to break contact .
helicopter north of Cam Lo at LZ Canary and move d
When the worn and exhausted survivors of th e west and then northward on the western edge of th e
morning's encounter mustered for a head count, th e battle area toward Con Thien .
Marines found the total casualty figure shocking .
During daylight on 5 July all units northeast o f
Staff Sergeant Burns, subsequently awarded th e
Con Thien came under enemy mortar and artiller y
Navy Cross, stated that only 27 Company B Marine s
fire, but there was relatively little ground contac t
walked out of the action . Lieutenant Colonel Schen-
while completing the grim task of recovering Com-
ing's battalion lost 53 killed, 190 wounded, and 3 4
pany B's dead . That afternoon an air observer spot-
missing . Not until 5 July did the battalion complet e
ted a large concentration of enemy troops 3,00 0
the recovery efforts that reduced the number of miss -
meters northeast of Con Thien . He called in artillery
ing to nine, but the number of dead increased t o
and tactical air strikes and reported seeing 200 dead
84 :** The battalion established no accurate count o f
NVA soldiers .
enemy killed . "
Following preparatory fires on the morning of 6
During the next three days, 3-5 July, enemy con - July, all battalions continued moving north . Majo r
tact continued . At 0930 on the 3rd, an Air Force ai r Beard's BLT 2/3 ran into an enemy force supporte d
observer reported more than 100 NVA soldiers ad - by mortars less than 3 kilometers south of Co n
Thien . In the brief engagement that followed th e
battalion killed 35 Communist soldiers, while suffer-
*Enemy artillery quickly zeroed in on 3/9's LZs . Helicopters ing five killed and 25 wounded .
could not land in the LZs during later resupply missions, whic h
Northeast of the outpost, Wickwire's and Wood -
caused 3/9 to go entirely without water for a day and a half. Co l
John C . Studt, Comments on draft ms, 9Ju1S1 (Vietnam Com- ring's battalions advanced under intermittent NV A
ment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . ) artillery and mortar fire . Major Woodring decided t o
**The XO of 3/9, Maj John C . Studt, supervised the recover y move a reinforced company 1,500 meters to th e
of Company B's dead, " . . . a grisly task after 3 days in the hot su n north-northwest to cover his left flank . He chos e
. . . .[Most] appeared to have been left right where they fell . The y Captain Slater's attached Company A, 9th Marines ,
were in flank security positions too close to the road to hav e which now included the survivors of Company C ,
prevented an ambush or in the [sunken] road itself which . . . [of-
and a detachment from 3d Reconnaissance Bat-
fered] some cover . . . [Company B] clearly had walked into a [ver y
well executed] ambush ." Col John C . Studt, Comments on draft talion . Slater's company moved into positio n
ms, 9Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) without opposition and established a strong combat
Marine Corps Historical Collectio n
Members of Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines move behind one of their attache d
tanks from the 3d Tank Battalion as it skirts a large bomb crater during Operation Buf-
falo . This tank-infantry combination, aided by artillery and air strikes, destroyed a
North Vietnamese defensive position in heavy fighting near Con Thien on 4 July 1967 .
3d MarDiv ComdC, July 196 7
101
outpost . Slater ' s composite force dug conceale d fireteam for the rest of the night without medical
fighting positions and sent reconnaissance patrol s assistance .1 4
north in an attempt to discover where the enem y Despite heavy Marine artillery fire that effectivel y
crossed the Ben Hai River .1 2 boxed in Slater's position, the NVA maintaine d
While Slater ' s move was unnoticed, the same wa s pressure on the Marines until 2200 . For the rest o f
not true for the advance of the main elements of th e the night, enemy small arms and mortar fire harass-
two battalions . As they advanced, they encountered ed Company A, but the NVA units were withdraw-
increasingly heavy artillery fire and by 1600 the y ing . First light revealed 154 enemy bodies strew n
could go no further . Wickwire 's battalion had lost a around Company A's perimeter ; the defenders ha d
tank and, because of the enemy fire, pulled bac k 12 casualties . Among the wounded Marines was
without recovering it . Captain Burrell H . Landes , Lance Corporal Stuckey ; only tattered flesh remain-
Jr ., commanding Company B, BLT 1/3, climbed a ed where his hand had been . *
tree to spot for air strikes and artillery fire in front o f
his position . An aerial observer radioed that a large While the attack on Company A took place, th e
enemy force was approaching his position . When rest of what intelligence officers later determined t o
Landes asked how big the force was, the reply was , have been the 90th NVA Regiment assaulted th e
" I'd hate to tell you, I'd hate to tell you ." The A O two Marine battalions . To add to the effect of thei r
had spotted a 400-man force crossing the Ben Hai preparatory fires, the attacking North Vietnames e
River in approach march formation ; it was headin g threw fuzed blocks of TNT into the Marine position s
directly for the two battalions . After the sightings , to keep the Marines down as the assaulting troop s
both battalions, less Slater ' s company, came under moved in . The Marines countered with supportin g
heavy, accurate artillery fire . Between 500-60 0 arms ; flare ships, attack aircraft, helicopter gun -
rounds hit the 3d Battalion's position and abou t ships, naval gunfire, and all available artillery con-
1,000 landed on BLT 1/3 . centrated their fire on the attacking enemy . By 2130 ,
During the Communist bombardment, one o f the Marines had repelled the assault and the Com-
Slater' s reconnaissance patrols also spotted th e munist forces began withdrawing to the north .
400-man NVA force and reported it moving toward At 0520 the next morning, Major Woodrin g
the 3d Battalion . The enemy, still in column forma- ordered Captain Slater to pull back into the bat-
tion, was unaware that it was heading directly int o talion perimeter . The decision was most opportune ;
Captain Slater's concealed unit . The Marines opene d immediately after Company A cleared the nigh t
fire at less than 150 meters distance . Captain Slate r position, a 30-minute NVA artillery concentratio n
recalled : landed within its old lines .** Company A returne d
When the point of the enemy column was brough t to the battalion's perimeter without incident . Bot h
under fire, the NVA alerted their unit with a bugle cal l battalions spent the rest of the 7th trying to deter -
. . . . Their initial reaction was [one] of confusion and the y mine the extent of the damage inflicted on the 90th
scattered, some of them toward Marine lines . They quickl y NVA Regiment. By 8 July the Marines raised th e
organized and probed at every flank of the 360 degre e NVA casualty count to more than 800 . Counting
perimeter . Concealed prepared positions and fir e
discipline never allowed the NVA to determine what siz e enemy bodies proved to be a most difficult task ; th e
of unit they were dealing with . When the enemy forme d grisly carnage was beyond description . Hundreds o f
and attacked, heavy accurate artillery was walked to withi n bodies covered the scarred battleground, some half
75 meters of the perimeter . The few NVA that penetrate d buried, others in pieces, all surrounded by a carpe t
the perimeter were killed and all lines held . 1 ;
of battered equipment and ammunition . Counting
Heavy enemy probes, mortar fire, and small arm s enemy canteens was one method used to try t o
fire continued through the early evening . Som e
NVA soldiers crept close enough to hurl han d *Corporal Stuckey received the Navy Cross for his actions on 6
grenades into the Marine lines . One of the attache d July 1967 .
Company C fireteam leaders, Lance Corporal James **Colonel John C . Studt, the XO of 3/9 in July 1967, said thi s
L . Stuckey, responded by picking up the grenade s incident was typical of the battalion commander . "Major Wood -
ring, a former drill instructor, a woodsman and a deerhunter ,
and throwing them back toward their source . He was possessed that rare instinct which enabled him to frequently an-
wounded when the third grenade exploded as it left ticipate enemy actions . " Col John C . Studt, Comments on draft
his hand . He continued, however, to lead his ms, 9Jul81, (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)
establish realistic figures . The vast area which th e large-caliber, long-range NVA artillery . On 7 July ,
bodies covered further complicated the morbid enemy artillery scored a direct hit on the comman d
undertaking . As late as the afternoon of the 8th , bunker of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines at Co n
Captain Gerald F . Reczek's Company C, BLT 1/ 3 Thien, killing 11, including First Lieutenant Gatli n
found about 200 enemy bodies more than 60 0 J . Howell, the intelligence officer who had gone to
meters east of Route 561 . the aid of Company B, 9th Marines on 2 July .
The scattering of bodies to the north occurred Eighteen others sustained wounds ; one was the bat-
when air and artillery hit groups of North Viet- talion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Schening . *
namese moving toward or away from the main battl e The cause of the damage was a 152mm howitze r
area . The lateral scattering from the 3d Battalion ' s round, which penetrated five feet of sand bags, loose
dirt, and 12x12-inch timbers .
position eastward across the front of BLT 1/ 3 was th e
result of the NVA attempt to outflank Majo r The same day, at Dong Ha, a delay-fuzed 130mm
Woodring's unit without realizing that the BLT wa s round landed at the base of the north wall of the 9t h
on line . Trying to move further east, they lost eve n Marines' command post, exploding six feet belo w
more men to the guns of Wickwire's Marines ." Th e the bunker floor . Luckily, there were no injuries .
Marines found it impossible to compute an accurat e The NVA also scored a direct hit on the Dong H a
total of Communist losses to supporting arm s chapel during Catholic services, killing th e
because of the inability of allied forces to continu e chaplain's assistant . Storage areas, helicopte r
the count on the north side of the Ben Hai River . maintenance areas, and medical facilities wer e
The last significant engagements of Operatio n among the targets of the long-range weapons . Th e
Buffalo took place on 8 July, southwest of Co n frequency and accuracy of the enemy fire caused Col -
Thien . After BLT 2/3 closed on Con Thien durin g
its northward sweep, it had turned west, and the n
headed south toward the Cam Lo River . Moving
south, at 1030 Captain James P . Sheehan's Compan y
G discovered a bunker complex . When small arm s
fire and grenades interrupted further investigation ,
Sheehan wisely backed off and called in air and ar-
tillery . At 1300, Company G moved in, but som e
NVA soldiers continued to fight . Later that after-
noon, after clearing the complex, Company G
reported 39 dead Communists, 2 Marines killed, an d
29 wounded, including the company commander .
At 1430 while Company G cleared the bunkers, a
Company F squad patrol, located some 1,200 meter s
southwest of Company G, engaged another enem y
force . When the Communists counterattacked, th e
company commander, First Lieutenant Richard D .
Koehler, Jr ., sent in the rest of his Marines . Whe n
82mm mortar rounds began falling, Koehler kne w
he was in trouble and called in artillery and ai r
strikes . The concentration of supporting arms crack- Marine Corps Historical Collectio n
ed the enemy position, and when Company F move d The heat during the summer battles south of th e
in, it counted 118 enemy bodies . The Marine s DMZ made water a precious commodity . Following
estimated the Communist unit to have numbere d a helicopter resupply mission, these two Marines us e
between 200 and 250 . Marine losses totaled 14 kille d a Vietnamese technique to carry a five-gallon can of
and 43 wounded . Apparently the NVA had ha d water to their squad during Operation Buffalo .
enough ; for the next five days BLT 2/3 encountere d
only mines and harassing fires . *Lieutenant Colonel Schening also suffered wounds at Cap e
One ominous development which accompanie d Gloucester and Peleliu in World War II, as well as in Korea . H e
the Buffalo fighting was the accurate employment of thus survived wounds in three wars .
onel Jerue to move his command post to a locatio n of the Communist operations conducted in I Corps .
northeast of Cam Lo . There, relative quiet prevaile d The most savage aspect was the heavy employmen t
for the remainder of the operation . * of supporting arms by both sides . Of the know n
Another indication of the Communist buildup enemy killed, more than 500 came from air, ar-
tillery, and naval gunfire . In addition, supportin g
along the DMZ and around Con Thien during thi s
arms destroyed 164 enemy bunkers and 15 artiller y
period was the increased employment of surface-to -
and rocket positions, and caused 46 secondary explo-
air missiles (SAMs) . While an A-4 aircraft was attack -
ing the NVA in front of BLT 1/3 on 6 July, th e sions . To accomplish this, Marine aviation use d
1,066 tons of ordnance, Marine and Army artiller y
enemy launched eight SAMs from sites north of th e
Ben Hai River . One hit Major Ralph E . Brubaker ' s consumed more than 40,000 rounds, and ships of
VMA-311 jet, causing the aircraft to crash in enem y the U .S . Seventh Fleet fired 1,500 rounds from thei r
territory . Brubaker, only slightly wounded, remain- 5- and 8-inch naval guns . On the other hand, enem y
artillery accounted for half of the Marine casualtie s
ed in enemy territory until picked up the next morn-
ing by an Air Force rescue helicopter . during the operation and posed a constant threat t o
Operation Buffalo closed on 14 July 1967 . The the Marine logistical support installations .
Marines reported enemy losses as 1,290 dead an d The July fighting around Con Thien reaffirme d
two captured . Marine losses, in contrast, totaled 15 9 the Marines' faith in supporting arms . In spite of th e
killed and 345 wounded . The Marines found the appearance of SAMs and the presence of excellent ,
enemy's large-scale July offensive against Con Thie n long-range Communist artillery, the Marines coul d
a short one, but considerably more vicious than mos t prove that the latest enemy offensive had failed . Co n
Thien had held and at least one firstline enemy regi-
*Colonel Joseph J . Kelly recalled in 1981 that the requirement ment was in shambles . The Buffalo victory did no t
to find room for a forward division headquarters to be reopened a t breed overconfidence, but the body-strew n
Dong Ha also influenced this move . In addition, regimental staff wasteland along the DMZ provided mute evidenc e
officers knew the old French barracks housing the regimenta l
of the effectiveness of III MAF's defenses . The sum-
headquarters were prominent features on maps used by the Nort h
Vietnamese . Col Joseph J . Kelly, Comments on draft ms , mer was far from over ; they would be challenge d
29May81 (Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) again .
Con Thien proved that Marines, although offense-minded, also had to know how t o
build sturdy bunkers to fortify their defensive positions . This Marine inspects a bunke r
constructed of dirt-filled ammunition boxes which collapsed after being hit by artillery .
Marine Corps Historical Collection
PART IV
FALL COMBAT, NORTH AND SOUTH
CHAPTER 9
Raids and Rockets in Quang Na m against elements of the 2d NVA Division in the Qu e
Son Basin, while the other battalion of the 5t h
During June allied units intensified operation s
Marines, the 2d, provided security for the An Ho a
against elements of the 2d NVA Division and Viet
industrial complex and Nong Son coal mine ,
Cong units in the southern three provinces of I
southwest of Da Nang .
Corps . The enemy continued to pump replacement s
into the region in a determined effort to regain con- Further south, the nine U .S . Army battalions o f
trol of the area, particularly the Que Son Basin . Th e Task Force Oregon, now commanded by Majo r
allied forces, in greater numbers and with increase d General Richard T . Knowles, USA, continued their
firepower, thwarted each Communist move as i t operations in southern I CTZ . Four of the Army bat-
developed . As a result of continuing enemy defeats , talions operated in and around Chu Lai, while th e
the pacification program began to show positiv e remainder of the force expanded allied control ove r
results as demonstrated by its expansion into virgi n the populated coastal plain of Quang Ngai Province .
territory . The Korean Marine Brigade of three battalions re-
As July began, the 1st and 7th Marines, both fro m mained in its TAOR south of Chu Lai .
the 1st Marine Division, which Major General Don n The combined efforts of these units forced NV A
J . Robertson still commanded, were operating in th e and VC main force units to pull out of the populate d
densely populated area around Da Nang . Two bat- regions and move back into the mountains . Despite
talions of the 5th Marines continued operations this setback, the enemy tenaciously maintained a
Two battalions of the 5th Marines, the 1st and 3d, remained in the Que Son Basin afte r
the arrival at Chu Lai of Army units of Task Force Oregon . Marines of the 3d Battalio n
maneuver under fire on 21 July while in contact with units of the 2d NVA Division .
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37021 6
107
presence in the three provinces by cutting lines o f Newlin regained conciousness, remanned hi s
communication and attacking allied installations b y machine gun, and opened fire . His fire caused th e
fire . The Communists targeted Revolutionar y VC to break off their assault of the remaining Marin e
Development teams and isolated units for their mai n bunkers and once again they attacked him . Newli n
efforts . These tactics enabled the enemy to limi t withstood two additional enemy attempts to silenc e
force commitments and still gain moral and his gun before he died . *
propaganda victories while, at the same time ,
When the attack started, Lieutenant Scuras too k
reconstituting regular units . Communist actions in
two squads and moved to relieve the 1st Platoon i n
Quang Nam Province during July 1967 provide a n
the upper outpost . Arriving at the top of the hill a t
excellent example of this modus operandi.
about midnight, the reinforcements, with th e
The Communists chose the relatively isolate d
assistance of the surviving defenders, drove th e
Marine outpost at Nong Son, the site of the onl y
enemy out of the position . As the VC withdrew fro m
producing coal mine in South Vietnam, as their firs t
the hill, the Marines remanned their 81mm mortar s
target . First Lieutenant James B . Scuras' Company F ,
and brought them to bear on the retreating force . I n
5th Marines provided security for the mine . The
addition, they called in artillery on suspected escap e
company manned two positions near the mine itself
routes .
and a third, with an attached 81mm mortar sectio n
At approximately 0100, the battalion ' s Compan y
and two 4 .2-inch mortars, on top of the hil l
E arrived at Nong Son and assumed responsibility fo r
overlooking the mine . The enemy chose the mortar
the two lower positions . The remaining elements of
position as his objective .
Company F then moved to the top of the hill t o
At 2327 on 3 July, a Marine listening post outsid e
reconsolidate their position and evacuate th e
the upper position reported, "I have movement t o
my front," and within seconds, "They're all aroun d casualties . The attack had killed 13 Marines an d
wounded 43 .
me, " and then, "We've been overrun ."' Next, th e
For the Viet Cong, the attack on the position was
main position came under mortar attack . One of th e
expensive . They did not overrun the entire outpos t
first rounds blew up the 4 .2-inch mortar ammuni-
as they hoped, and the loss of 44 of their member s
tion dump . Immediately following their mortar bar-
made the effort very costly, but they succeeded i n
rage, enemy sappers moved into the position, throw-
destroying the two heavy mortars in the position . 2
ing grenades and satchel charges into the Marine
The Communists executed two other attacks to in-
bunkers . Simultaneously, other enemy units made a
fluence the people in Quang Nam Province . Bot h
mortar attack on the Marine artillery positions at An
mutually supporting actions took place on the nigh t
Hoa to neutralize their support of the Nong Son out -
of 14 July . The first attack occurred in the town o f
post . The Marines of Captain John Pipta ' s Battery E ,
Hoi An at 2300 when an enemy force hit the U .S .
2d Battalion, 11th Marines, however, immediatel y
began firing in support of the Company F Marines . advisors ' compound with mortar fire . At the sam e
time, two platoons of VC, dressed in ARVN
By the time Pipta's first artillery barrage lande d uniforms, attacked the nearby provincial jail . Th e
around the edge of the position, the enemy assaul t enemy force broke into the jail and released 1,19 6
had already faltered . The attackers had not caught military and political prisoners . During the confuse d
all of the Marines in their bunkers . Private First Class fighting that followed, the ARVN recaptured 20 6
Melvin E . Newlin, an 18-year-old machine gunne r
prisoners and killed 30, but 960 escaped . Only 5 of
from Wellsville, Ohio, and four other Marines had
the Viet Cong died in the attack ; ARVN unit s
been manning a perimeter position when the attac k
wounded another 29 . The return of almost 1,00 0
started . Although the initial attack killed his four cadre to the VC ranks increased their capacity to op -
campanions and wounded him, Newlin kept hi s pose the September elections, but the psychologica l
machine gun in action . He fought off two additional blow caused by the untimely "liberation" had a n
attempts to overrun his position before a grenad e
equally severe impact .
wounded him again and knocked him unconscious . The Communists chose their other target equall y
With Newlin temporarily silenced, the Viet Con g well : the Da Nang Airbase, center of America n
moved into the center of the outpost and destroye d
both 4 .2-inch mortars . As the enemy prepared to at- *For his actions Private First Class Newlin received a
tack the Marines on the other side of the perimeter, posthumous Medal of Honor . (See Appendix D for his citation .)
presence in the northern provinces . The home of cessful attack to the 300,000 people living aroun d
Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), Marine, and U .S . Air Da Nang . That the VC carried out the attack suc-
Force tactical squadrons, the Da Nang Airbase stood cessfully, while the Marines and ARVN forces ha d
as an undisputed symbol of U .S . and GVN strength . been actively trying to prevent it, vastly increased its
The Communists were aware that an attack on D a propaganda value .
Nang would be more difficult than their earlier at - The 14 July attack forced immediate adjustments
tempts to strike the base . Since the first rocket attac k of III MAF ' s defense of the airfield . III MAF extend-
on the base in February, the Marines had intensifie d ed the rocket belt to include the space between tw o
their defensive efforts, instituting as many as 80 0 radii of 12,000 and 8,000 meters, the maximu m
daily patrols and ambushes . Allied aircraft con - ranges from which the VC could launch bot h
ducted overflights of the rocket belt itself to detec t 140mm and 122mm rockets . The new belt also in-
any movement in the area, and artillery fired mor e cluded the most likely areas of penetration by enem y
than 2,000 rounds every 24 hours to interdict likel y launching units . The Marines established a central-
avenues of approach to the rocket belt . ized control system for all aspects of the counter -
Despite these impressive Marine countermeasures , rocket effort and increased their patrols an d
the Communists were confident they could attac k overflights . They also instituted a waterway contro l
the base successfully . The reason was their ne w plan which included an 1800-0600 movemen t
122mm rocket, a weapon which they had not use d curfew on all streams within the belt . Deep recon-
south of the DMZ . This rocket was a high trajectory naissance patrols along the enemy's approach route s
weapon, capable of being emplaced virtuall y outside the belt increased by 40 percent . In addi-
anywhere . A trained crew could prepare a 122m m tion, the 1st Marine Division developed an elaborat e
rocket for firing in less than 30 minutes . Its range of psychological operations (PsyOps) campaign t o
12,000 meters, 2,000 meters greater than that of th e counter the threat, including the offer of 10,000 -
140mm rocket, allowed emplacement beyond wha t piastre rewards for information on rockets, locatio n
the Marines had established as the rocket belt . of caches, and routes used to bring rockets into th e
During the night of 14 July, enemy rocket unit s Da Nang area . On a day-to-day basis, the divisio n
moved out of "Happy Valley," southwest of Da allocated more than 90 percent of its PsyOps assets t o
Nang, and established six firing positions, divide d this program . 3
into two clusters of three positions each . Each firin g For the Marines operating in the rocket belt the
position contained six individual launcher sites . war was particularly frustrating . Each patrol con-
Shortly after midnight the enemy fired their rockets tended with the probability of encountering mine s
at the airfield ; within five minutes 50 projectiles hi t and booby traps . So called secure areas were neve r
the base . entirely free from these threats . Over 50 percent o f
Marines responded swiftly to the first volley . the division's casualties during the first half of 196 7
Almost instantly, a number of friendly unit s resulted from explosive devices encountered whil e
reported the firing and three minutes after th e patrolling in these dangerous though densel y
enemy launched the rockets an Air Force plane at - populated areas . There was no easy solution, and i n
tacked one of the sites . At the same time, artillery spite of the Marines' efforts rocket attacks continued .
units plotted the launch site locations and commenc-
ed firing at both the sites and the probable escap e
Operation Cochise
routes . This rapid reply by supporting arms was ex-
emplary, but it was only a countermeasure and not a While the Communist rocket gunners were an-
solution to the problem of defending the Da Nan g noying the Da Nang TAOR, intelligence agencie s
complex against the new, long-range threat . In the reported that the 3d NVA Regiment had moved into
attack, the rockets destroyed 10 aircraft, 13 barracks , northern Quang Tin Province during late July . In-
and a bomb dump, and damaged 40 more aircraft . telligence also indicated the headquarters of the 1s t
Eight Americans died and another 176 suffered VC Regimentalso had moved from Quang Ngai Pro-
wounds . vince to a new location east of Hiep Duc in the Qu e
The Communists had not only succeeded i n Son Basin . Reacting to these reports, on 9 Augus t
destroying a large quantity of material, but the General Robertson reactivated Task Force X-Ray ,
resulting fires provided visible evidence of a suc- again under the command of his assistant division
commander, Brigadier General Foster C . LaHue . landing zone . McCracken then hovered 30 feet over
General LaHue received orders to strike the enem y the zone, and Corporal Bauer lowered the ramp an d
wherever possible within the Que Son Basin and sur- most of the ammunition dropped into the zone .
rounding hills, with emphasis on the Hiep Duc are a While repeated enemy small arms hits shook the
which intelligence officers believed contained the 2 d helicopter, Corporal Bauer kicked out the rest of the
NVA Division 's headquarters and logistic base . For ammunition . As the last box dropped, enem y
this operation, code named Cochise, Genera l bullets severely damaged the helicopter, but Mc-
LaHue's Task Force X-Ray controlled the 1st and 3 d Cracke n 's resupply permitted the rangers to continu e
Battalions of Colonel Stanley Davis' 5th Marines an d the battle 4 . At 2300, the NVA units finally pulle d
Lieutenant Colonel Alfred I . Thomas' BLT 1/3 from back, leaving 197 bodies behind . The ranger losse s
SLF Alpha . also had been heavy, 81 killed and 153 wounded .
General LaHue's concept of operations for Cochise During the next three days, there were numerou s
consisted of three phases . The first phase involved encounters with small VC elements . On the night of
the insertion of the two 5th Marines battalions south 16 August, enemy units twice attempted to infiltrat e
of Nui Loc Son outpost between the tactical BLT 1/3's night positions, but turned back in th e
elements of the 2d NVA Division and its suspecte d face of small arms and artillery fire, leaving 3 6
logistic base . The two battalions were to drive eas t bodies behind . The next morning, Lieutenant Col-
toward friendly blocking positions and eliminat e onel Joseph A . Nelson, commanding officer o f
Communist tactical forces in the vicinity of th e VMO-6, in a UH-1E gunship, was escorting resuppl y
logistic installations . Phase II called for a helilift o f helicopters when he sighted more than 50 VC i n
two battalions into the suspected enemy base area , the open . The VMO-6 commander expended all o f
and the third phase a two-battalion sweep from th e his ordnance in the process of fixing the enem y
Hiep Duc region northeast to Que Son . group in place . He then directed a fixed-wing mis-
South of the Cochise area of operation the 2 d sion against the target . Meanwhile, a company o f
ARVN Division was about to conduct companio n Lieutenant Colonel Charles B . Webster's 3d Bat-
operation Lien Ket 112 ; its concept resemble d talion, 5th Marines moved into assault positions
Cochise . Two ranger battalions were to be helilifted under cover of the air strike . After Webster's attack ,
into landing zones southeast of Hiep Duc and sweep
eastward, while three battalions of the 6th ARV N
Regiment occupied blocking positions west of Tam
Ky . Both operations began early on the morning o f
11 August . _
The ARVN rangers made the first significant con -
tact . On the morning of the 12th, three battalions o f
the 21st NVA Regiment attacked the rangers . Heav y
fighting continued throughout the day and by 170 0
the rangers reported heavy casualties . Dangerousl y
low on ammunition, with darkness approaching ,
and with no sign of a letup on the part of the enemy ,
the rangers requested an emergency resupply . A t
1730, a CH-46 from HMM-165, accompanied b y
two UH-1E gunships from VMO-6 arrived overhead
with the badly needed ammunition . The gunships
scouted the intended landing zone and reported tha t
the CH-46 could not land in the contested zone . The
pilot, Captain Jack H . McCracken, well aware . of Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37034 8
what would happen to the rangers without ammuni- Col Stanley Davis, commanding the 5th Marines ,
tion decided to try to deliver his cargo anyway . H e and the regimental operations officer, Maj Richard J.
ordered his crew chief, Corporal James E . Bauer, t o Alger (right), confer in the field on 16 August wit h
stack the ammunition on the rear ramp . Captain Mc - LtCol Charles B . Webster of the 3d Battalion, 5th
Cracken nosed over his helicopter and raced for the Marines during Cochise in the key Que Son Basin .
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the company lines . The enemy pulled back . As th e advancing in column . Company K, accompanied by
fire let up, Vacca completed the perimeter Lieutenant Colonel Hilgartner's command group ,
reorganization and requested helicopter evacuatio n led the movement . "We were alerted to the impen-
for his casualties . At the same time, he reported tha t ding conflict," said Hilgartner, "when one of our
he faced at least an enemy company and needed scouts brought in a Chinese-made, magazine-fed ,
help . His battalion commander, Lieutenant Colone l light machine gun which was found teetering bac k
Peter L . Hilgartner, responded by ordering Captai n and forth on a large rock ." Hilgartner radioed this
Thomas D . Reese, Jr .'s Company B, then 4,00 0 information to Major Richard J . Alger, the regimen-
meters to the west and near the battalion CP on Hil l tal operations officer . Alger replied that he had jus t
51, to move overland to Vacca's position . received an intelligence report that a large enem y
Company B arrived in the vicinity of the battle b y force was in the area . 6
0820, and within the hour it came under fire fro m These two events gave Hilgartner time to begin t o
another enemy force, apparently a company, entren- change his tactical formation from a column to tw o
ched in the town of Dong Son (1) . Captain Rees e companies on line . He ordered Company M to move
asked for a tear gas drop on the dug-in NVA, an d up on Company K's right . As Company M advanc-
" Hueys" from VMO-2 obliged by dropping 40 0 ed, both companies came under intense fire from a
pounds of the agent on the enemy lines . The Com- large NVA force in what the Marines later found t o
munists broke and ran north toward the Ly Ly River . be an L-shaped, entrenched position . ?
Company B attacked, killing 26 of the enemy, an d Company M's 1st Platoon was crossing a rice pad-
secured the eastern end of Dong Son (1) . Whil e dy about 1430 when it first came under heavy fir e
Company B fought in the east end of town , from an estimated enemy company . First Lieutenant
HMM-363 helicopters arrived over the battle area t o John D . Murray, commanding Company M, sent his
pick up Company D's casualties . The NVA forc e 2d Platoon to assist the 1st Platoon . While crossing a
greeted the aircraft with heavy fire and decoy smok e small knoll near the village of Chau Lam (1), the 2 d
signals . They hit two UH-34s and shot one down Platoon ran head-on into still another entrenche d
over Company D . They also shot down one of NVA company . The 1st Platoon's commander, Se-
VMO-2's UH-lEs, piloted by Major David L . Ross , cond Lieutenant Edward L . Blecksmith, ordered his
who managed to land in the Company D perimeter . Marines to pull back to the top of the knoll . Whil e
Ross changed his "Deadlock" radio call sign t o the 2d Platoon fought the by now attacking Nort h
"Deadlock on the deck" and continued to help direc t Vietnamese, Lieutenant Murray ordered the re-
air strikes on the enemy . He also provided ammuni- mainder of the company to move onto the knoll wit h
tion and machine guns from his aircraft to help i n the 1st Platoon and set up a perimeter . The enem y
the defense of the perimeter . , quickly encircled Company M and pounded it wit h
At 0925, Lieutenant Colonel Webster's 3d Bat- more than 200 mortar rounds, as well as extremel y
talion, 5th Marines, based at the regimental com- heavy automatic weapons fire . Murray requested a
mand post seven miles east of Que Son, received or- tear gas drop on the enemy positions to help the 2 d
ders to prepare two companies for a helilift to th e Platoon disengage . While the gas did slow up th e
Dong Son area for attachment to Hilgartner's bat- Communist assaults, it did not help the man y
talion . By 1245 both of the 3d Battalion companies , Marines who had lost or discarded their gas mask s
K and M, and Hilgartner's 1st Battalion comman d during the action .
group had landed four kilometers east-northeast o f As the gas lifted, the NVA renewed their attac k
Dong Son (1) and were preparing to move towar d and, on at least one occasion, succeeded i n
Companies B and D . Meanwhile, Company B foun d penetrating the 2d Platoon's lines . Sergean t
another enemy pocket in the west end of Dong So n Lawrence D . Peters, a squad leader, stood up t o
(1) . After an air strike, the company moved in an d point out NVA positions until hit in the leg : Despite
cleared the west end ; they killed nine more Com- his wound, he led his men until they drove th e
munists in this action . Fighting in the tow n enemy from the position . Sergeant Peters died late r
diminished as Companies B and D consolidate d that evening from a fragment wound . *
their positions in the western edge of the village ;
Hilgartner's force was less fortunate .
*Sergeant Peters received a posthumous Medal of Honor for hi s
At 1430, Hilgartner's Companies K and M were actions . See Appendix D for the citation .
The enemy attacks separated Hilgartner's two panies B and D to the west . Early on 5 September ,
companies ; each had to fight independently . Cap- Webste r ' s force reached the two companies, at whic h
tain Joseph R . Tenny, commanding Company K , time he assumed operational control .
fought and maneuvered his company against th e
The same morning, 5 September, Hilgartner' s
enemy in a 'firefight that lasted until nightfall . Final-
troops searched the battle area and reported 13 0
ly, he had to back off and set up night positions with
dead NVA soldiers and 37 captured weapons .
Hilgartner's command group .
Marine casualties were 54 killed and 104 wounded ;
As darkness fell over the Que Son Valley, the
among those killed was the 3d Battalion ' s chaplain ,
Marines called for air strikes . Captain Robert J . Fitz-
Lieutenant Vincent R . Capadonno, USNR . During
simmons and his aerial observer, First Lieutenan t
Company M's heavy fighting, Chaplain Capadonno
Robert H . Whitlow, arrived over the battlefield in a
made repeated trips out of the perimeter to help 2 d
Cessna 0-1 Bird Dog to control the strike .* Napalm
Platoon casualties . Wounded twice, he refuse d
and 500-pound bombs exploded as close as 5 0
medical aid, continuing to help wounded until kill-
meters to Company M's lines . To the west, Marine
ed by the enemy . Lieutenant Capadonno received a
artillery from Que Son fired in support of Com-
posthumous Medal of Honor for his gallantry ; h e
panies B and D . Early in the evening the fightin g
was the first Navy chaplain killed in action in Viet-
reached a crescendo when the North Vietnames e
nam . *
opened up against the attacking planes with heavy
machine guns . Marine A-6A Intruders, directed b y Although the NVA broke contact with the
Whitlow, attacked the main cluster of enemy an- Marines, they did not leave the basin area . The 5th
tiaircraft positions on Hill 63 . After silencing thes e Marines commander, Colonel Davis, ordered his 1s t
guns, the A-6As struck at Communist mortars and 3d Battalions to sweep toward the foothill s
within 60 meters of Company K . By 2000 the one - bordering the southern edge of the basin . The morn-
sided air-ground duel was over . Although scattere d ing of the 6th, the two battalion command group s
action continued on the ground, the destruction o f exhanged operational control of their respectiv e
the NVA antiaircraft positions signaled the end o f companies and the 5th Marines continued the attac k
major fighting . Corporal Joseph E . Fuller, a Com- to the southeast . At 1515 that afternoon Hilgartner' s
pany M squad leader, was one of many infantryme n companies ran into two battalions of the 1st VC
who recognized the value of Marine close air suppor t Regiment near Vinh Huy (3) . Lead elements of th e
during the night of 4 September . Referring to th e Marine battalion came under fire from snipers and a s
strikes, Fuller later commented, "I'd like to than k the Marines continued to advance, heavy automati c
the FAC that called it in . . . I think that is what real- weapons fire stopped the lead platoon, the 3d Pla-
ly saved us . " e toon of Company B, in an open rice paddy . Captai n
Marine artillery fire from Que Son and Than g Reese sent his 2d Platoon around to the right of th e
Binh continued to pound the North Vietnames e stalemated platoon to provide covering fire so that i t
after the heaviest fighting subsided . Under the cover could withdraw, but the 2d Platoon also came unde r
of artillery fire, UH-34 helicopters from Lieutenant extremely heavy and accurate fire which stopped it s
Colonel Robert Lewis, Jr .'s HMM-363 delivered sup- advance . The Marines took cover behind some grave s
plies and evacuated casualties . At 0100, Captai n and a hedgerow and once more tried to establish a
Francis M . Burke's Company I, 5th Marines fought base of fire to cover the 3d Platoon's withdrawal .
its way to Hilgartner's positions . After its arrival, the Again, enemy fire superiority prevailed . Reese the n
enemy backed off and the rest of the night passe d sent the 1st Platoon further to the right in stil l
quietly . another attempt to outflank the NVA . As the 1st
While these events took place, Lieutenant Colone l Platoon moved, it found itself outflanked an d
Webster's 3d Battalion Command Group and Com- almost surrounded . Forced to pull back almost im-
pany D, 1st Marines received orders to join Corn - mediately, the platoon had to leave some of its dea d
behind, but managed to bring out all of the wound -
*The 0-1 observation aircraft were not part of VMO-2 at thi s ed . While the North Vietnamese concentrated o n
time . Instead they had their own officer-in-charge who functione d the 1st Platoon, there was a lull in the firing in fron t
directly under MAG-16 . Colonel Philip M . Crosswait, comments
on draft ms, 14Jul81 (Vietnam comment files, MCHC ,
Washington, D .C .) . *See Appendix D for Chaplain Capadonno 's citation .
of the 3d Platoon, so at last, it managed to pull bac k Northeast of the 1st Battalion action, the 3d Bat-
from the exposed paddy . talion also became heavily engaged on the afternoo n
Next, the NVA hit the 2d Platoon position with a of 6 September . By 1400, Lieutenant Colonel
frontal assault, as well as an envelopment of the Webster's Marines had seized Hill 48, withou t
right flank . Lance Corporal Lonnie R . Henshaw meeting significant resistance . Webster then ordere d
recalled : Captain Francis M . Burke's Company I to seize Hil l
We looked up and saw many NVA in full uniforms , 43, 1,100 meters southeast of Hill 48 . When Burke' s
packs, and cartridge belts running across the rice paddy a t company was about 200 meters from the base of th e
us . We started shooting and we could see them falling, bu t hill, the lead elements saw two camouflaged NV A
they didn't stop and more and more of them kept coming . soldiers and opened fire on them . Automatic
Nothing could stop them, it was like they were doped up . 9
weapons fire erupted from the left front, but initial
The platoon commander, First Lieutenant John E . Communist resistance was light and the lead platoon
Brackeen, seeing the enemy's flanking attempt , continued to push through . Resistance began to stif-
ordered the platoon to fall back 50 meters to a trenc h fen and Captain Burke ordered his other two pla-
line and set up a new perimeter . The NVA closed toons up on either flank of the lead platoon . All
quickly and the enemy attack turned into a grenade three platoons continued to push on . At 1630, heavy
duel . One landed in the trench near Lieutenant machine gun fire hit Burke's left platoon . The ad-
Brackeen and some of his men . The platoon guide , vance stopped . Burke ordered the other two platoon s
Sergeant Rodney M . Davis, seeing the danger to hi s to shift over to help the stalled platoon, but they also
lieutenant and the others, jumped on the grenade , became heavily engaged . Finally the company
taking the full impact of the explosion with hi s managed to consolidate its position . Lieutenant Col-
body . For thus giving his life, Sergeant Davis receiv- onel Webster ordered Company K to go to Burke' s
ed the Medal of Honor . * assistance . By the time that Company K had fough t
its way to Burke' s position, Company I had man y
By now the enemy, in strength, was so close tha t
casualties, some of whom were still forward of th e
Lieutenant Brackeen realized he could not hold th e
company front . With' the arrival of the second com-
position much longer . He requested tear gas to cover
pany, the Marines recovered most of their casualtie s
the withdrawal of what was left of the platoon to th e
and established a better perimeter .
battalion perimeter . The tear gas worked and the
Marines moved back to the battalion position with While the Marines consolidated their position, a
their wounded, but , not their dead . UH-1E gunship from Lieutenant Colonel Philip M .
After the gas attack to support Brackeen' s Crosswait's VMO-2 reported a large number of NV A
withdrawal, enemy fire slackened, but as the ga s immediately south of the perimeter . The pilot cu t
dissipated the NVA renewed their assault . Artillery short his report, saying that the enemy was, " . . .
fire from Lieutenant Colonel Robert E . Hunter, Jr .' s swarming all over the' top of this hill and I've got t o
2d Battalion, 11th Marines landed within 50 meter s get to work ." 10 The gunship killed 23 NVA before i t
of the Marine lines, while air strikes hit as close a s had to break off the attack to rearm and refuel .
100 meters from the position . The NVA assaults Between 1900 and 2300, Companies I and K
stopped ; however, as night fell the battalion came repulsed two determined NVA assaults . Heav y
under heavy mortar and rocket fire . NVA soldiers , machine guns supported both attacks and the secon d
crawling as close as 15 meters to the perimeter , broke into the Marine positions before the Marine s
began lobbing grenades into the lines, while others threw it back after furious hand-to-hand fighting .
attempted to slip through the defenses . The bat- At 2300, Lieutenant Murray's Company M, the bat-
talion's S-3, Major Charles H . Black, checking a sec- talion reserve, joined Companies I and K . Th e
tor of Company D's lines, discovered some of the in- enemy pressed the position until just after midnigh t
filtrators . Major Black killed several of them as h e when the Marines used tear gas to drive them off .
rallied nearby Marines to drive out the others . Th e Only a few mortar rounds interrupted the rest of th e
enemy attacked until about 0200, at which time the y night . Dawn revealed 88 enemy bodies around the
withdrew, leaving behind 61 bodies . The Marines position . Webster's losses were 34 killed and 10 9
had lost 35 killed and 92 wounded in the action . wounded .
At first light on 7 September, both battalion s
*See Appendix D for Sergeant Davis' citation . began searching the enemy dead for items of in-
Major Engagements
Operation Swift
4 - 15 September 1967
0 2
kilometers t
See Reference Map, Sections 58,5 9
>~ r
()Caches Found Here
001 ,,-o-o i
I(
telligence value . They found a map which reveale d There were two more significant encounters dur-
the defensive positions of a battalion of the 1st VC ing the last days of Operation Swift . The first occur-
Regiment . It pinpointed company and command red on 10 September during a patrol northeast o f
post locations, as well as mortar positions and am - Hill 43 by Captain Gene W . Bowers' Company H ,
munition storage sites . This information triggere d 2d Battalion, 5th Marines . *
an attack to the east by Hilgartner's battalion . Sup - Early in the afternoon, Company H searched a
porting arms blasted the plotted enemy positions small village and found it empty except for a fe w
and then the infantry swept through them . As th e women and children . The Marines noted, however ,
operation progressed, on the 9th, the 1st Battalion that the enemy had fortified the village wit h
Marines found 91 cases of small arms ammunition , bunkers, interlocking trenches, and barbed wire .
27 cases of mortar rounds, hundreds of hand Upon completion of its search of the village, Com-
grenades, and 6 cases of 75mm recoilless rifle round s pany H continued its patrol . After moving another
as well as a vast assortment of loose ordnance . Th e 1,500 meters, the company established a defensiv e
Marines saved samples for intelligence purposes, an d position on a small hill at about 1400 and requeste d
blew the rest in place . * resupply by helicopter . To provide additional securi-
At this time, General Robertson again activate d ty, Captain Bowers ordered Second Lieutenant Alla n
Task Force X-Ray under the command of Brigadie r J . Herman's 3d Platoon to patrol around the hill in a
General LaHue . X-Ray now included the U .S . circle with about a one-mile radius . The 3d Platoon
Army's 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, commanded b y departed the perimeter and a heavy rain began fall-
Lieutenant Colonel Peter P . Petro, USA . ing .
Simultaneously, the Vietnamese started their com- The patrol route took the 3d Platoon back to th e
panion Operation Lien Ket 116 . small village which Company H had recently search -
ed . In the interim, however, a reinforced North
*Lieutenant Colonel William K . Rockey arrived by helicopte r Vietnamese company had slipped back and reoc-
around noon that day, 7 September 1967, and assumed command
of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines from Lieutenant Colone l
Webster . Colonel William K . Rockey, Comments on draft ms , *Captain Bowers' company served under the operational con-
28Jul81 (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) trol of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines at this time .
Elements of two enemy battalions hit the rangers 1st Marines continued to prod the VC around Ho i
again at 1700 on the 13th . The enemy closed to An . Operation Pike, conducted in early August, wa s
grenade range and heavy action continued unti l one of the more significant operations in this area .
about 1900 . That night, more ARVN units arrived Two Marine battalions, Lieutenant Colonel George
in the area in helicopters to help the rangers . Both E . Petro ' s 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and Lieutenant
the 1st and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines debarke d Colonel Webster's 3d Battalion, 5th Marines ex-
from helicopters in a secure LZ northeast of th e ecuted a box and sweep maneuver that accounted fo r
engaged ranger group . The Marine battalions attack- 100 enemy dead and four captured . South of the
ed south-southeast to relieve the pressure on th e basin, General Knowles' Task Force Oregon con -
rangers, and by dawn, the NVA broke contact leav- ducted Operation Benton in the hills west of Chu La i
ing 49 bodies on the battlefield . The rangers suf- during the latter part of August . Army troops made
fered 69 wounded and 15 killed in the engagement . a helicopter assault of a suspected enemy base cam p
This action was the last sizable encounter of both and then drove south and east, encountering enemy
Swift and Lien Ket 116 . platoons and companies . When Benton ended, on 1
Operation Swift ended on 15 September . Onc e September, Task Force Oregon reported 397 NV A
more allied forces had driven the 2d NVA Divisio n soldiers killed and nine captured .
from the basin . The enemy's 1967 dry season offen-
Much further south, between Quang Ngai an d
sive in the southern part of I Corps had failed . By th e
Duc Pho, Task Force Oregon ' s Operation Malheur
end of September allied commands regarded the 1st
series, lasting from 11 May through 2 August, pro-
VC and 3d NVA Regiments unfit for combat . Mor e
duced a total of 857 enemy troops killed . A more
than 4,000 enemy troops reportedly died between 2 1
important result was the opening of Route 1 fro m
April, when Union I began, and the last day o f
the border of II Corps to Dong Ha, the last section o f
September . A prime reason for this turn of event s
this vital artery to be cleared in I Corps .
was the sudden arrival of a large U .S . Army force i n
Southern I Corps, which allowed III MAF units t o Hood River followed Malheur II in a locale 2 5
operate in the Que Son Basin on a permanent basis , miles south of Quang Ngai City . Hood River occur-
thereby breaking the Communist stranglehold o n red in conjunction with the Korean Marine Brigade' s
the area . Dragon Head V and the 2d ARVN Division' s Lie n
Operation Swift's heavy, sustained combat create d Ket 110 . The soldiers on Hood River claimed credi t
personnel accounting problems which were unusua l for 78 enemy dead and 45 prisoners . Army casualtie s
in the kind of war most of the 1st Marine Divisio n were only three killed .
fought in 1967 . The 5th Marines and the divisio n All of these operations maintained constan t
encountered many difficulties during Swift wit h pressure on the 2d NVA Division . Continual use of
casualty reporting, recovery, evacuation, an d the search and destroy process in the basin and adja-
disposition of the dead, as well as with what Colone l cent areas from April through August by the 5th
William R . Earney termed "the big No-No," missing Marines, the Special Landing Force, and ARVN
in action . "They [5th Marines] could tell you," com- units forced the enemy to move south . As the Com-
mented Colonel Earney, "where the enemy v .-as an d munists tried to regroup in the hills west of Chu Lai ,
their body count [of enemy dead] but not a com- Task Force Oregon pushed them back to the Qu e
prehensive report as to what their own conditio n Son Basin to face the Marine and ARVN Swift-Lie n
was ." 13 The task of answering many of the personne l Ket 116 operations . Once more the enemy
questions fell to the division staff, including, accor- withdrew, this time trying to escape to the hills near
ding to Colonel Earney, determining which morgu e Tam Ky . There four U .S . Army battalions were on
held the corpse of Medal of Honor ,recipient hand to meet the remnants of the 2d NVA Division
Capadonno before his brother arrived in South Viet- during Operation Wheeler . Task Force Oregon
nam to view the body . " became the Americal Division on 22 September an d
Other allied activity, both north and south of the by the end of that month the soldiers of the Arm y
Que Son Basin, also hurt Communist formations in I division had killed an additional 442 Communists .
Corps . The enemy, buffeted between the allied Once more they drove the NVA units back into th e
forces in the basin and those in contiguous areas, los t basin . A new opponent was waiting for the Nort h
the initiative . To the north, Colonel Herbert E . Ing's Vietnamese division .
A Busy Calm Before the Storm In each instance, the village had a wire fence around th e
perimeter . . . concisting of three to six strands of cattle
Increased September activity in I Corps once mor e fence with woven wire running up and down through th e
caused General Westmoreland to send rein- horizontal strands . The wire fence line was either conceal-
forcements north . On 4 October, Colonel James D . ed in bamboo tree lines or camouflaged with bamboo an d
McKenna's 3d Brigade, 1st U .S . Cavalry Division , shrubs . Behind these perimeter fences, the enemy had dug
a communication trench . . . that was four to six feet dee p
having been transferred to III MAF and, in turn, t o with firing positions and deep caves for protection agains t
the Americal Division, began Operation Wallowa i n artillery and air attack . Some of these caves were fiftee n
the Que Son Basin . With the arrival of this brigade , feet deep . Spider holes, caves, and bunkers were found i n
the Americal Division took over responsibility fo r depth through the village . Fortifications were carefull y
the entire basin and the 5th Marines moved to Ho i located to achieve an interlocking and mutually suppor-
ting series of defensive positions . Both [villages] were
An, relieving Colonel Ing's 1st Marines there . located such that attacking infantry had to cross strea m
Operational control of the 1st Marines shifted fro m barriers [to reach] the defensive positions . As attacking
the 1st to 3d Marine Division and Colonel Ing the n troops emerged from the stream beds, they foun d
moved his headquarters and two battalions to th e themselves to be within close range (50-150 meters) of th e
enemy perimeter defenses with open rice paddy in be-
northern provinces of I Corps .' ,
tween . [Both villages were] situated on the sides of th e
Most operations in southern I Corps during th e valley adjacent to high ground such that the enemy had
last three months of 1967 reflected the enemy ' s ready routes of egress into the mountains . i6
desire to avoid casualties, but even in this the enem y
Both Marine attacks took place during afternoo n
was unsuccessful . The Americal Division, now com-
hours and the enemy force successfully defended its
manded by Major General Samuel W . Koster, USA ,
positions into the night . In each case, however, th e
continued to harry the 2d NVA Division in the Qu e
NVA defenders withdrew from the fortified posi-
Son Valley as the Communists frantically tried t o
tions under cover of darkness in spite of continuou s
collect rice and supplies there . During October, th e
artillery fire in and behind the village . " I n
Army units, engaged in Operation Wheeler an d
summary," wrote McNaughton, "when Marine units
Wallowa, were in almost constant contact with smal l
attacked the villages in the afternoon, the enem y
NVA units . By the end of the month Operatio n
defended with vigor . When Marine units delayed an
Wheeler had reported 498 enemy killed, while
attack until dawn and conducted heavy preparatio n
Wallowa recorded another 675 NVA dead .
by air and artillery, the NVA units made thei r
During November, the Americal Division com-
escape .' "
bined Operations Wheeler and Wallowa as Opera-
Company H, commanded by Captain Gene W .
tion Wheeler/Wallowa and a force of seven U .S . Ar-
Bowers, conducted one of the fortified villag e
my battalions, more than twice the numbe r
assaults . Bowers used tactics similar to those that ha d
previously available, deployed in the area . The army
succeeded so well in a similar situation durin g
battalions systematically pursued NVA elements as
Operation Swift .
they tried to escape to the mountains in the west .
Company H had landed by helicopter in Antenna
Ancillary operations such as the 2d Battalion, 5t h
Valley earlier in the day, as had the rest of the 2 d
Marines ' Essex in "Antenna Valley," six miles sout h
Battalion, 5th Marines .* The company then pro-
of An Hoa, drove the enemy back against the Arm y
ceeded toward its assigned objective, the village of
units in the basin .
Ap Bon (2) in the northeast portion of the valley . As
There were two main engagements with NV A
it approached the objective, Company H mad e
forces in Antenna Valley during Operation Essex . *
heavy contact with a large enemy force within the
Both involved company-sized attacks on fortifie d
village .
villages which the North Vietnamese chose to de -
fend . Lieutenant Colonel George C . McNaughton , Captain Bowers ordered Second Lieutenan t
commander of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines , Duane V . Sherin to maneuver his 2d Platoon to the
described these fortified villages in his after-actio n left of the village and then envelop the enemy . The
report : platoon, however, ran into more NVA soldiers in th e
*In Operation Mississippi in Antenna Valley during the fall of *Company F, according to the original plan, was not schedule d
1966, the Marines evacuated more than 2,000 refugees . Less than to participate in Operation Essex . It was to remain in the bat-
600 civilians remained in the entire valley in 1967 . talion's primary TAOR as a rapid reaction force .
Wheeler/Wallowa cited 3,188 enemy killed, 87 cap- The Marines retaliated with Operation Foster ,
tured, and 743 weapons seized, while U .S . Arm y conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Roger H .
units listed their own losses as 258 killed and 1,19 0 Barnard's 3d Battalion, 7th Marines and Operatio n
wounded . As 1967 ended there could be little ques- Badger Hunt utilizing SLF Bravo 's BLT 2/3, com-
tion that control of the Que Son Basin was returnin g manded by Lieutenant Colonel Henry Englisch .
to the South Vietnamese Government . Both were coordinated search and destroy endeavor s
North of the Que Son Valley, in the 1st Marin e in the river complex of the Dai Loc District and i n
Division ' s Quang Nam Province zone of action, th e the flatlands and foothills west of the An Hoa in-
level of enemy contacts dropped during this period . dustrial complex . Intelligence reports placed th e
Fifth Marines units executed Operations Onslow an d Viet Cong R-20 and V-25 Battalions and the Q-1 3
Essex, while elements of the 7th Marines conducte d Company in these areas .
Knox, Foster, Pitt, Citrus, and Auburn . All of these The operation began at 0900 on 13 November .
operations were designed to keep the enemy out o f BLT 2/3 landed by helicopter west of An Hoa, an d
the Da Nang rocket belt . The most significant of two hours later Barnard's Marines landed northwes t
these was Foster and a companion SLF operation , of the complex near Dai Loc . Initially there wer e
Badger Hunt . * numerous contacts with small groups of VC trying t o
escape . The Marines uncovered many VC bunker s
Foster/Badger Hunt followed two savage Viet
Cong attacks against the district headquarters an d and logistic areas . With the exception of on e
refugee settlement at Duc Duc and Dai Loc, 15 miles company-size fight on 29 November, the enem y
concentrated on escaping . Marine reconnaissance
southwest of Da Nang . The attacks killed 3 4
and air observers sighted numerous fleeing enemy
civilians, wounded 42, and another 51 were reporte d
missing . In addition, the enemy destroyed 55 9 groups ; artillery and air strikes directed against thes e
houses and left 625 families homeless . groups caused the majority of enemy casualties in-
flicted during Foster . For the Marine infantry units ,
*See Chapter 10 for the SLF participation in Badger Hunt . the operation was more successful in terms of
The rotor wash from a medevac helicopter, not to mention the proximity of the aircraft
itself forces men of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines to duck during Operation Foster, on e
of the operations protecting the Da Nang air base complex from enemy rocket attacks .
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A371016
124 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E
Operation Kingfisher tack into the DMZ . The main body, including th e
tracked vehicles, moved north on Provincial Rout e
After the conclusion of Operation Buffalo, II I 606 with Companies E and G providing security o n
MAF ordered a sweep of the southern half of the the flanks . Company F remained in a landing zon e
DMZ . The Marines intended for the operation , south of Con Thien, ready to board helicopters an d
Hickory II, to destroy enemy fortifications, mortar , exploit any heavy contact with the enemy .
and artillery positions in the southern portion of the There was no contact ; the armored column move d
buffer zone . The concept resembled that employe d north without incident . The terrain, however ,
during Operation Hickory, the Marines' initial entry restricted the tracked vehicles to the road and thic k
into the area on 18 May . vegetation made movement difficult for the flankin g
During Hickory II, two Marine battalions, on e companies . Further, the terrain canalized the col-
from SLF Alpha, attacked north to the Ben Ha i umn into a relatively narrow "V" of land bounded b y
River, wheeled about, and swept southward to th e the Ben Hai River on the west and north and a
Cam Lo River . BLT 2/ 3 of SLF Bravo screened the in - tributary stream to the east . The reinforced battalio n
land left flank, while to the east three ARVN bat- would have to return by the same route by which i t
talions and an armored personnel carrier troop ad- entered the DMZ .* The North Vietnamese wer e
vanced up Route 1 to the Ben Hai, then turned an d already moving units into previously prepared posi-
attacked southward . On the coast east of the ARV N tions covering Route 606 .
thrust, Lieutenant Colonel Albert R . Bowman II' s The North Vietnamese did not molest the Marine s
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion drove northwar d in their night defensive positions near the Ben Ha i
through the coastal sand dunes from Cua Viet . River . The following morning, the 2d Battalion
There was little resistance . The sharpest action occur - scouted the objective area and destroyed severa l
red on 15 July, when Bowman's battalion engage d small abandoned fortification complexes .
an enemy unit four miles east of Gio Linh, killin g Late in the morning the battalion began its move-
25 . Marine casualties, when the operation ended o n ment south out of the DMZ . It would move in a col-
16 July, were four killed and 90 wounded . Total umn led by Company E and followed by Comman d
NVA losses totaled 39 killed and 19 weapons cap- Group A, H&S Company, Command Group B, an d
tured . Companies F, H, and G . An airborne forward ai r
controller circled overhead ; he would soon be busy .
At the close of Hickory II, the two SLF battalions ,
Company E began moving south at 1000 ; at 111 5
upon release by III MAF, returned to a ready statu s
the enemy detonated a 250-lb bomb buried in th e
off the coast of I Corps, but the remaining five bat-
road, wounding five Marines . Nearby, engineers
talions which comprised the 3d and 9th Marine s
found a similar bomb, rigged as a command -
began a new operation in the same general area .
detonated mine, and destroyed it .
Called Operation Kingfisher, its mission, as i n
Upon the second explosion, North Vietnames e
previous operations along the DMZ, was to bloc k
soldiers near the road opened fire on the colum n
NVA entry into Quang Tri Province . From the 16t h
with machine guns, rifles, and 60mm and 82m m
through the 27th there were only minor contacts .
On 28 July the 3d Marine Division sent Lieutenan t
*Major Willard H . Woodring, commanding the 3d Battalion ,
Colonel William D . Kent's 2d Battalion, 9t h 9th Marines, raised these objections at a division briefing prior t o
Marines, reinforced with a platoon of tanks, thre e the operation . Colonel John C . Studt, Comments on draft ms ,
Ontos, three LVTEs, and engineers, on a spoiling at - 9Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)
125
mortars, initiating a running battle that did not en d umn, it received instructions to establish a helicopte r
until dark . The NVA units, using heavy fire fro m landing zone for evacuating casualties from Com-
prepared positions combined with the maneuver o f pany E and H&S Company . When the tanks carryin g
other units, quickly fragmented the armored colum n the dead and wounded reached the zone, the enem y
into roughly company-sized segments . Each isolate d opened up with RPGs, machine guns, and 60mm
segment fought its own way through the gauntlet o f and 82mm mortars . The mortar fire walked acros s
fire . the entire landing zone . In addition to the earlie r
The tracked vehicles became more of a liability casualties, the Marines now had anothr seven me n
than a tactical asset . They were restricted to the road killed and 31 more Marines and Navy corpsme n
because the thick brush provided excellent cover fo r wounded .
NVA soldiers armed with antitank weapons . Instead A gap then developed between the rear of H& S
of providing support to the infantry Marines, th e Company and Company F . The latter company load-
tracked vehicles required infantry protection . Usin g ed the casualties in the zone on the tanks and attack-
them as ambulances to transport the wounded fur- ed to close the gap . It did so at the cost of a further
ther reduced the vehicles' ability to fight . two dead and 12 wounded by NVA mortar fire . The
Tracked vehicles suffered all along the column . company resumed its fight south .
An RPG round penetrated both sides of an LVT E Late in the afternoon, Company E and Command
moving with Company E . Another RPG explosion Group A managed to break through the enemy t o
disabled the turret of a tank with Company F, woun- safety . They left behind, however, two Company E
ding three crewmen . When Company H brought u p squads which could not move because of intens e
an Ontos to suppress NVA fire that was holding u p enemy automatic weapons and rifle fire that killed
its movement, an RPG gunner hit the vehicle an d two and wounded nine Marines . Company E and the
wounded three crewmen . A second Ontos came for - command group continued on until they linked up
ward, beat down the enemy fire with its machine at 1830 with Company M, 3d Battalion, 4th Marine s
gun, and permitted the company to move again . which had moved up from Con Thien .
The infantry's primary fire support came from the By this time the other companies of the 2d Bat-
airborne controllers, one of whom was on statio n talion were no longer able to continue south ; there
throughout the day . The controller maintained con - were too many casualties to move . At 1930, Com-
tact with air representatives with each company an d pany H drew back and established a defensive posi-
with the battalion air liaison officer . The airborn e tion on high ground at the edge of the clearin g
forward air controller directed fixed-wing air strike s through which Route 606 passed at that point . Join-
whenever needed . The Marine infantrymen neede d ing Company H were Company F, two other squad s
them often . from Company E, two squads from Company G ,
The North Vietnamese units knew the dange r plus H&S Company . It was an all-infantry force ; th e
from American supporting arms and attempted t o tracked vehicles, carrying some of the wounded, ha d
stay close to the Marine column . Company F had broken through to join the lead elements at the posi-
hardly cleared its night defensive position when i t tion of Company M, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines .
realized an NVA unit had immediately occupied th e Company G's movement came to an end abou t
position . At another point, Marine engineers with the same time . It could no longer both fight an d
Company E spotted a 12 .7mm antiaircraft machine transport its wounded . By 2100, the company was i n
gun just off the road . They attacked, killed seven a defensive position for the night .
NVA soldiers, and destroyed the weapon and its am - The two isolated squads from Company E foun d
munition . At the rear of the column, Company G themselves rescued early in the evening . Lieutenant
had problems with enemy units following in its trac e Colonel Kent had taken operational control of Com-
and maneuvering back and forth across the road . pany M, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines and accompanie d
Company G killed 12 and wounded 10 of thes e that unit back to the two squads . They accomplishe d
soldiers ; an attached scout-sniper team kille d the mission by 1930 and Company M moved into a
another 15 . Shortly afterward, an enemy assaul t good defensive position for the night . To the south ,
from the flank almost cut the company in two, bu t the bulk of Company E organized its defenses an d
the attack failed . called in medevac helicopters for the casualties .
Shortly after Company F took its place in the col - The remainder of the night was relatively quiet ;
the NVA units were pulling back . Company G and an end to vehicle convoys to Khe Sanh ; thereafter ,
Company F both heard much shouting west of thei r the base relied upon aerial resupply .
respective positions and called in artillery missions . III MAF supplied Khe Sanh at the time by aircraf t
The final event of the fight occurred at 0330 when and " Rough Rider" vehicle convoys from Dong Ha .
an NVA soldier crept up to Company F's perimeter One of the largest of the convoys, composed of ove r
and killed one Marine and wounded three with a 85 vehicles and several U .S . Army 175mm guns, 2
burst of automatic weapons fire . Other Marines departed Dong Ha on 21 July . Part of its route pass-
opened fire and the NVA soldier withdrew . ed through the TAOR of Lieutenant Colonel Robert
The following morning, the 30th, helicopters C . Needham ' s 3d Battalion, 3d Marines . This gave
evacuated all casualties located at Company G's posi - the battalion the responsibility for securing that por-
tion . Company M, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines an d tion of Route 9 .
Lieutenant Colonel Kent moved north to link u p Lieutenant Colonel Needham ordered his Com-
with the rest of the 2d Battalion . The Marines pany M to send a platoon out that morning to swee p
evacuated the remainder of the casualties by 090 0 Route 9 from Ca Lu west to the boundary betwee n
and all units were out of the DMZ by 1150 behind a the regimental TAORs of the 3d and 26th Marines .
screen provided by the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines . The convoy departed Dong Ha at about the sam e
The gauntlet had been costly for Lieutenant Col- time as the 2d Platoon, Company M began its chec k
onel Kent's 2d Battalion . Twenty-three Marines died of the road .
and the wounded totaled 251, of whom 191 re- The 2d Platoon searched Route 9 without inciden t
quired evacuation . There were 32 confirmed NV A for about five kilometers . Then the point surprised
dead but the battalion estimated another 175 pro- an NVA soldier urinating beside the road . 3 The
bably died . point opened fire ; other NVA soldiers answered with
While the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines ' battle quick- rifle fire from high ground north of the road an d
ly entered the division's folklore as "2/9's armored from a tree line south of it . The whole platoo n
thrust into the DMZ," t an earlier and relatively quickly became engaged with what the platoon com-
minor action on Route 9 had a more lasting impact mander first believed was an NVA platoon . He soo n
on the tactical situation in northern I Corps . It led to changed his estimate to an NVA battalion .
Infantrymen of the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines move into the safety of the perimeter of
the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines on 30 July after a running battle the previous day with
NVA units that fought to fragment the column and destroy the reinforced Marine bat-
talion piecemeal as it came back south from the Ben Hai River and out of the DMZ .
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A 189064
The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines ordered the platoo n NVA ambush site on Route 9 . Company K ran int o
to disengage but the unit could not do so . The bat- heavy machine gun fire from a bunker complex o n
talion staff at Ca Lu worked quicky to coordinate ai r the hill's east slope which killed one Marine an d
and artillery support and alerted the rest of Com- wounded two . The company called in an artillery
pany M to prepare to move to the 2d Platoon ' s mission and the supporting tracked vehicles opened
rescue . In the midst of this activity, the Rough Ride r fire on the enemy . Company K then pulled back t o
convoy's arrival at Ca Lu created some confusion . 4 allow fixed-wing aircraft plenty of room to bomb th e
The battalion requested and received permission t o bunkers . At the completion of the strike, Compan y
halt the convoy immediately since there was only on e K attacked, but the NVA unit had gone . The
place between Ca Lu and the 2d Platoon's position Marines continued to the crest of Hill 216 .
where the convoy could be turned around . , Later that afternoon, fixed-wing aircraft bombe d
Company M moved toward the firefight with tw o Hill 247, located west of Hill 216 and which als o
U .S . Army vehicles in support . One of these overlooked Route 9 . Following the air strike, Com-
mounted dual 40mm cannon, the other carried a pany L, 3d Marines moved west on Route 9 and link-
quad- .50 machine gun . As the force neared the 2 d ed up with Company B, 26th Marines which ha d
Platoon, the enemy fired approximately 200 round s cleared the road from the western edge of the 26t h
from 82mm mortars at the road . Enemy rifleme n Marines' TAOR .
opened fire from the high ground north of the road . During its move, Company L uncovered 3 0
Under the cover of fixed-wing aircraft strikes o n Chinese-made anti-personnel mines buried along
the high ground and heavy fire from the two Arm y approximately 2,000 meters of the southern margi n
vehicles, Company M reached its 2d Platoon and th e of Route 9 . The enemy had rigged the mines wit h
Marines disengaged . Two tanks came up from Ca Lu trip wires to catch the Marines and soldiers from th e
and provided additional fire against the tree line t o Rough Rider convoy as they sought cover from th e
the south . The combined force then returned to C a planned ambush .
Lu . With Route 9 cleared, the Rough Rider convoy ,
The Rough Rider convoy could not continue t o minus any 175mm guns, completed the trip to Khe
Khe Sanh until the road was secure . The division Sanh on the 25th . The whole episode, however ,
ordered it to turn around and return to Camp Car - changed the thinking about resupply for Khe Sanh .
roll . There was one more large convoy to Khe Sanh and a
At noon the following day, the 22d, the 3d Bat- few to the Lang Vei Special Forces camp, but thes e
talion, 3d Marines, using its own Company L an d ended in early August . There were no other convoys
Companies A and C of the 9th Marines, move d to Khe Sanh until Operation Pegasus opened Route
against the enemy positions north of Route 9 . There 9 at the end of the "siege" of Khe Sanh in 1968 . *
was only scattered contact with the enemy ; however , For the next few weeks only scattered, small-scal e
the Marines found ample evidence the previous day' s fighting took place . Intelligence analysts reporte d
action had prevented a major ambush of the Roug h the probability of a major enemy offensive in th e
Rider convoy to Khe Sanh . They found 150 well - region . They reported a large buildup of supplies
camouflaged fighting holes in the area where the 2 d north of the DMZ, and estimated at least five Com-
Platoon had engaged the enemy . The North Viet- munist battalions were preparing for offensive
namese obviously had constructed the fighting hole s operations . Sighting reports of vehicles north of th e
for a horseshoe-shaped ambush whose killing zon e Ben Hai increased substantially, including, for th e
was the open road . Nearby was a large, abandone d first time, reports of armored vehicles there .
NVA base camp containing another 200 fightin g The first outburst of renewed NVA ground activi-
holes and 25 two- and four-man log bunkers ty in the Kingfisher area happened in the
camouflaged with dirt and elephant grass . The cam p southwestern portion of the TAOR on the mornin g
also contained several huts, some for sleeping an d of 21 August . A North Vietnamese battalion am -
others for cooking .
*Robert Pisor' s The End of the Line : The Siege ofKhe Sanh
The following day Company K, 3d Marines, sup -
(New York : 1982), p . 94 says the convoy with the 175mm gun s
ported by tanks and Army M42 "Dusters" (the latter had " . . . run into 'one horrendous ambush' and turned
mounting dual 40mm cannon), joined the operatio n back . . . . " The NVA's planned ambush literally might have bee n
and attacked Hill 216 north of, and overlooking the "horrendous" except for one NVA soldier's bladder discomfort .
CH-53 helicopters bring 105mm howitzers of Battery I, 12th Marines to Hill 881 South
near Khe Sanh on 3 August following intelligence reports of an NVA buildup nearby .
bushed a small Marine convoy traveling south o n Additional indications that the Communists re-
Route 9 from the Rockpile to Ca Lu . In the firs t mained determined to achieve a victory at Co n
moments of the attack, enemy antitank rockets hi t Thien became evident during late August . To gai n
and put out of action two Marine trucks and two maximum propaganda effect, the North Vietnames e
Army track-mounted, dual 40mm guns of the 1s t timed their new offensive to coincide with the Sout h
Battalion, 44th Artillery . The security force with th e Vietnamese elections scheduled for 3 September . As
convoy returned fire and radioed for air and artillery the date for the elections approached, the NVA fire d
support . Company L of Lieutenant Colonel Rober t an increasing volume of artillery and rockets across
C . Needham's 3d Battalion, 3d Marines came dow n the DMZ at Cua Viet, Gio Linh, and Con Thien . O n
from the Rockpile, and a reinforced platoon fro m 26 August these hit Dong Ha in three separate at -
Company M moved up from Ca Lu . Thes e tacks ; 150 rocket and artillery rounds destroyed two
maneuvers trapped the ambushers . The action laste d helicopters and damaged 24 others .
for more than six hours as the Marine units, sup - The most effective and spectacular of these attack s
ported by air and artillery, converged on the NV A took place on election day . Forty-one artillery round s
battalion . As night fell the enemy broke contact an d slammed into Dong Ha base that morning, destroy-
fled to the west . Confirmed Communist losses were ing the ammunition storage area and bulk fuel far m
light, but 3 Marines and 3 Army artillerymen died , and damaged 17 helicopters of Major Horace A .
with another 35 wounded . Bruce's HMM-361 . Damage control teams fough t
The North Vietnamese tried again on 7 the fire and explosions for four hours before the y
September at almost the same location, but agai n controlled the situation . Miraculously, no one died ,
the enemy commander miscalculated the location o f but 77 suffered wounds, one seriously . Spectators as
Marine forces, their ability to maneuver, and th e far away as Phu Bai could see the billowing smoke
speed with which the Marines could bring suppor- cloud that rose over the base . Because of this and
ting arms to bear . The NVA ambushed a convoy a t similar attacks, III MAF moved the logistics base i n
1010, and again Marine units converged on the sit e 1968 from Dong Ha to Quang Tri, beyond the rang e
from the north and south . This time the battle con- of the enemy's 130mm guns . ,
tinued for more than eight hours . The Marines kille d The attack on 3 September ended the use of Don g
92 of the enemy before the fight ended at dusk . Ha as a permanent helicopter squadron base facility .
American casualties in this encounter totaled fiv e HMM-361 personnel flew back to the Marble Moun-
killed and 56 wounded . tain facility that day in the CH-53s of HMM-463 . All
Marines fight to save the fuel storage area at Dong Ha after a rocket attack on 26 August .
Some are trying to put out the fire while others cool down the remaining fuel bladders.
3d MarDiv ComdC, August 1967
1615H—Co M and Co K received estimated 60 round s to take the place of [the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines] which
of 140mm rockets followed by a coordinated attack b y had been mortared [severely] in their position northwest o f
NVA (reportedly) wearing USMC flak jackets and helmets . Con Thien . We then became the roving battalion outsid e
1630H—Co I and Co L came under attack by NV A Con Thien . . . the battalion moved every day but still was
wearing USMC equipment and supported by mortars . shelled as much, if not more than Con Thien . The dif-
1637H—Co K and Co M were hit by 12 140mm rockets ference was that we had to dig new holes in every position
followed by 12 more at 1645H . . . . we were hit pretty hard during our month-plus alon g
1655H—Co I and Co L came under an extremely heavy the DMZ .1 3
assault from the north and west sides of their perimeter by
Both sides shed more blood around Con Thie n
an estimated NVA battalion . Fixed-wing air, which was on
station, began making strikes immediately, and napal m before the month ended . At 0325 on the 13th, a
consistently fell 50 to 75 meters from the friendly lines . North Vietnamese company attacked the north -
The flame tank and gun took d irect hits from RPGs fired northeast sector of the perimeter of the outpost .
from approximately 75 meters . The flame tank was Even though artillery, mortars, and heavy machin e
destroyed and burned the remainder of the night, and the
gun tank was rendered useless and rolled into a draw . . . . guns supported the attacking force, the Communist s
The crews of both tanks withdrew into the perimeter . failed to penetrate the wire . They gave up an d
1700H—The tank supporting Co K fired on 100 NV A withdrew after a heavy pounding from the Marines '
in front of their lines with unknown results . supporting arms .
From 1705H to 1754H—Each company reporte d Following the attack of the 13th, Colonel Richard
numerous sightings of NVA in various sized units
B . Smith,* the new commanding officer of the 9t h
maneuvering around both defensive perimeters .
1825H—The [battalion] CP received heavy incomin g Marines, moved two battalions to a position behin d
mortar fire and the NVA appeared to be massing for an at - Con Thien from which they could react if the enem y
tack . attacked in force . Lieutenant Colonel John J .
1825H—M-1 [1st Platoon, Company M] was pinne d Peeler ' s** 2d Battalion, 9th Marines occupied th e
down in a bomb crater 70 meters west of the CP .
1900H—Co M pulled back towards the CP to con- area southeast of Con Thien while Lieutenant Colo-
solidate the lines and was forced to abandon a disable d nel James W . Hammond, Jr .'s 2d Battalion, 4th
tank . Marines moved to the southwest of the hill . 14 At th e
1905H—An emergency resupply was attempted to Co I same time, Colonel Smith ordered the 3d Battalion ,
and Co L and although suppressive fires were delivered , 9th Marines, now commanded by Major Gorton C .
the enemy fire was too intense and the helicopter could
Cook, to move inside the main perimeter . The an-
not land .
1905H—A flareship arrived on station . Co K and Co M ticipated assault did not materialize ; instead th e
had formed perimeter around the CP and were boxed i n NVA bombarded all three battalions with savage ar-
with well aimed artillery . tillery and mortar attacks for the next seven days .
2030H—The enemy ground attack ceased althoug h
60mm mortar [rounds] were still being received by Co I With the passing of the immediate threat to Co n
and Co L . Thien, the Marines there went on the offensive . O n
21 September, Hammond's battalion started a
The next morning the companies searched the
search and destroy operation 1,800 meters east o f
battlefield for casualties and abandoned equipment ,
Con Thien . The battalion front, Companies E and F ,
and evacauted all casualties by 1000 . The Marines
moved out on line . Movement was cautious bu t
recovered a large quantity of enemy material, in-
steady, but maintaining alinement proved difficul t
cluding cartridge belts, packs, ammunition, and
in terraced terrain broken up by hedgerows . The
weapons ; 140 enemy bodies lay scattered throughout
command group and Companies G and H had to
the area . The 3d Battalion's losses totaled 34 killed
stop, waiting for the rear elements to clear their
and 192 wounded . Alderman called it " . . . th e
previous position .
hardest fighting [the battalion] encountered sinc e
arriving in Vietnam ."1 2 *Colonel Smith, an experienced combat commander an d
Following this fight, the 3d Battalion, 26t h veteran of two wars, assumed command of the 9th Marines from
Marines moved to near Phu Bai to refit . As it s Colonel Jerue on 13 September, the day of the attack on the out -
post .
replacement in the DMZ area, the division pulle d **Lieutenant Colonel Peeler had the distinction of servin g
Lieutenant Colonel James W . Hammond, Jr .'s 2 d twice as the commanding officer of the 2d Battalion, 9th Marine s
Battalion, 4th Marines off an operation near Cam p during 1967, from 1 January to 4 July and 13 September - 28 Oc-
Evans and sent it north . Hammond later wrote : tober . He assumed command in September after enemy morta r
fragments severely wounded Lieutenant Colonel William D . Ken t
We stopped overnight at Cam Lo and then went north near Con Thien .
monsoon hit . Failing in attacks from three different ed in artillery to cover their return march . The
directions, the NVA resorted to a massive attack b y Marines observed no NVA casualties, but had n o
fire against Con Thien . During the period 19-2 7 doubt the Communists were still active .
September, more than 3,000 mortar, artillery, and Several days later the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines
rocket rounds blasted the position . relieved BLT 2/3 as the defense force for the recentl y
The Americans retaliated by massing one of th e built bridge north of Strongpoint C-2 .* The con-
greatest concentrations of firepower in support of a struction of the bridge had permitted the reopening
single division in the history of the Vietnam war . II I of the vital road to Con Thien which the heav y
MAF artillery units fired 12,577 rounds at know n September rains washed out . The battalion defend-
and suspected enemy positions in the region, whil e ed the bridge** because the 3d Marine Division was
ships of the Seventh Fleet fired 6,148 rounds at th e concerned that if the enemy destroyed it, they woul d
same area . Marine and Air Force fighter pilots flew cut the only supply line to Con Thien . i6
more than 5,200 close air support sorties and B-5 2 The defense of the bridge was no easy task fo r
bombers of the Strategic Air Command dropped Lieutenant Colonel Hammond's battalion . Since its
tons of ordnance on the enemy in and north of th e move north from Camp Evans on 11 September, th e
DMZ . The Con Thien garrison applauded th e constant combat around Con Thien had worn the
results ; North Vietnamese pressure on the outpost battalion down from a "foxhole strength" of 952 to
subsided as September drew to a close . about 462 . The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines had grea t
Although enemy activity gradually diminished a t difficulty in manning all the defensive position s
Con Thien ; defense of the base remained a continu- prepared by the departed full-strength BLT-2 / 3 .1 7
ing ordeal . Marine searching and patrolling activity The defensive position around the bridge wa s
discovered a multitude of bunker and trench com- divided into quadrants by virtue of the road, whic h
plexes around the hill mass, most of which were ran roughly north and south, and the stream, whic h
about 1,500 meters from the main perimeter . The ran east and west . Company G had the northwes t
Marines destroyed the bunkers, but often durin g quadrant ; Company H was on the same side of the
subsequent patrols they found them rebuilt again . road but across the stream in the southwes t
During early October the Marines continued to fin d quadrant . Company F was in the northeast ; Com-
bunkers, but by then these were usually unoccupied . pany E in the southeast . The battalion comman d
Experiences of the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines dur- group set up beside the stream in Company G's are a
ing October typify the trend of activity around Co n and near the center of the position .
Thien during the fall . On 4 October the battalion , At 0125 on 14 October, 25 artillery rounds ,
still under the command of Lieutenant Colone l rockets, and 135-150 mortar rounds hit Company H .
Hammond, conducted a sweep southwest of Co n An ambush squad posted in front of the compan y
Thien in conjunction with Lieutenant Colonel Henr y reported an enemy force moving toward it, and im-
Englisch's BLT 2/3 from SLF Bravo . Leaving the line mediately took the advancing enemy under fire . Th e
of departure at 0645, the battalion had found thre e Marine squad leader notified his company that h e
NVA shelters by 0830 . An hour later and 1,000 had three casualties and that the enemy seriousl y
meters further, the Marines found several more am - outnumbered his squad . The company commander ,
bush sites and 16 bunkers . Shortly after that, Com- Captain Arthur P . Brill, Jr ., ordered the squad to
pany H came upon 13 more bunkers while skirtin g pull back and, at the same time, called for nigh t
the southwest side of the Con Thien slope . Similarly , defensive fires to block the avenues of approach to
Company G found abandoned mortar positions , his position . The battalion requested flare ships to il-
loose 82mm mortar rounds, and powder-charge in- luminate the area . Using starlight scopes, snipe r
crements . Just before 1500, the unmistakable odo r teams watched the enemy as they massed only 5 0
of decaying human flesh led the Marines to the par-
*BLT 2/3 phased out of Operation Kingfisher to resume it s
tially covered graves of 20 North Vietnamese . duties with the Special Landing Force .
Backtracking, Company G discovered fresh enem y
In 1981, Lieutenant General Metzger described the defens e
footprints around the previously destroyed bunkers . of this bridge as an " . . . illustration of how our forces were tied t o
Tension heightened . The three companies move d defending terrain and not free to operate ." Lieutenant Genera l
back to the perimeter west of Con Thien, but whil e Louis Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n .d . (1981) (Vietnam
pulling back Company G heard movement and call- Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)
meters in front of the company . The snipers and two counterattack to push the NVA forces out of th e
tanks attached to the company opened fire, forcin g perimeter . Illumination and automatic weapons fir e
the North Vietnamese to start their assault from " Puff, " the AC-47 requested at the beginning
prematurely . The rest of the company held fire unti l of the fight and which arrived about 0330, aided th e
the NVA troops reached a clearing 20 meters fro m counterattack . By 0430, the enemy began retreatin g
the wire . Of the entire attacking unit, only two NVA out of the position, pursued by Company E .
soldiers reached the wire and Marines killed both a s The next morning the battalion reconsolidate d
they tried to breach that obstacle . and evacuated casualties . Twenty-one dead, in-
The enemy withdrew, leaving bodies behind, bu t cluding five officers, and 23 wounded were th e
they were far from finished . At 0230, enemy mortar s night's toll . The NVA lost at least 24 killed . That
shelled Company G . Direct hits by RPGs destroyed a afternoon, Lieutenant General Cushman and Majo r
machine gun emplacement and several backup posi- General Hochmuth visited the bridge site . The y
tions on the primary avenue of approach into th e granted a request from Lieutenant Colonel Ham-
company position .* The NVA force attacke d mond that the new bridge be named Bastard' s
through this break, overran the company comman d Bridge* to honor the 21 Marines of the 2d Battalio n
post, and killed the company commander, Captai n who gave their lives in its defense . At 1400, Ham-
Jack W . Phillips, and his forward observer . Three mond's battalion turned over the bridge to Lieute-
platoon leaders, two of whom had just arrived i n nant Colonel Needham ' s 3d Battalion, 3d Marines
Vietnam that morning, also died . The battalion sent and then moved to Dong Ha where it assumed th e
its S-3A, Captain James W . McCarter, Jr ., to replace mission of regimental reserve after 42 days of clos e
Phillips, but enemy fire killed him before he reache d combat .21 .
Company G . 19 During the confused, hand-to-han d The last major action of Kingfisher took place dur-
combat some of the North Vietnamese fought thei r ing a 9th Marines operation on 25-28 October . By
way within grenade range of the battalion comman d this time Hammond ' s battalion (minus Company G
post in the center of the position . which was attached to the 3d Battalion, 4t h
In the command post, although wounded by a Marines), had moved to Cam Lo to take part in th e
grenade, Sergeant Paul H . Foster, a member of the operation . The 1st Battalion, 9th Marines was at Con
fire support coordination center, continued to direc t Thien and Needham ' s 3d Battalion, 3d Marines wa s
mortar and artillery fire upon the enemy . Another at C-2 Bridge . 23 The regimental frag order directe d
grenade landed among a group of six Marines . Hammond's Marines to sweep north on the west sid e
Sergeant Foster threw his flak jacket over the grenad e of Route 561 while the other two battalions provide d
and jumped on top of the jacket . The grenade blas t blocking forces .
mortally wounded him, but this action saved hi s The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines began its sweep a t
fellow Marines .** Before the melee ended, th e 0600 on the 25th . Lieutenant Colonel Hammon d
North Vietnamese killed or wounded the entire for - planned to move his understrength battalion all day
ward air control team . 20 The enemy also killed th e to reach the objective before dark . There was no
battalion medical chief, and wounded the fire sup - enemy contact but heavy brush slowed the move . A s
port coordinator, headquarters commandant, an d darkness approached, the battalion was still abou t
battalion sergeant major . 2 1 1,000 meters from the objective . Hammond decide d
to halt the battalion and request additional am -
Lieutenant Colonel Hammond moved what was
left of his command group to a better location munition before darkness .
Hammond's decision was prudent, given th e
within Company H's position . He ordered Company
nature of the enemy in the DMZ region and the re -
F to move to Company G's right flank an d
*Lieutenant Colonel James E . Murphy commented in 1981 that *The nickname "Magnificent Bastards" has been claimed by th e
the NVA force used tear gas in their attack . " Company G got the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines for many years . Tradition traces th e
brunt of it and it lasted only for a few minutes but [the gas) great- nickname to World War II ; however, the Marine Corps Historica l
ly added to the confusion." Lieutenant Colonel James E . Murphy , Center has no evidence to substantiate the claim . It appears likely
Comments on draft ms, 6Aug81(Vietnam comment file, MCHC , that the battalion borrowed the phrase from the book, The
Washington, D .C . ) Magnificent Bastards by Lucy Herndon Crockett (New York :
**Sergeant Foster subsequently received a posthumous Meda l 1953) which is a fictionalized account of Marines in the Sout h
of Honor . See Appendix D for Sergeant Foster ' s citation . Pacific in World War II .
cent combat losses that reduced his entire battalio n operation ; he had drafted the regimental frag orde r
to just over 400 men . Additional ammunition coul d implementing the division's directive for the opera-
partially compensate for the loss of firepowe r tion . 24 Colonel Smith sent Studt to the Dong Ha air -
resulting from personnel shortages and the absenc e field to catch a helicopter to the 2d Battalion .
of Company G . He controlled, at the time, a " bat- Lieutenant Colonel Studt reached the airfiel d
talion" only a little larger than a standard reinforce d shortly after medical personnel removed the 2d Bat-
rifle company . The resupply helicopters would give talion's casualties from Lieutenant Colonel Allgood' s
away the battalion's location, of course, but he too k helicopter . Studt explained his mission and the tw o
the risk that his command could receive its addi- officers discussed the chances of succeeding i n
tional ammunition and move on to the objectiv e reaching the 2d Battalion safely . Having had grea t
before the enemy responded . difficulty in evacuating the four casualties, Allgoo d
Helicopters were in short supply at this time , advised Studt that he wasn't sure he could make i t
following the grounding of all CH-46s after a serie s into the battalion's position . He also pointed out
of accidents . III MAF by necessity reserved th e that fog was increasing throughout the whole area .
available helicopters for meeting emergency request s Both officers decided, however, that the situation re-
from units in the field . Hammond ordered an quired that the flight be attempted . Studt climbed
" emergency resupply" of ammunition . into the passenger compartment of the helicopter ,
Lieutenant Colonel Hammond took a calculate d which, he noted, still had fresh blood on the floor .2S
risk and lost . The resupply helicopters did not bring Allgood lifted off from the airfield and managed t o
everything he ordered but, worse, also delivere d land the UH-34D inside the battalion perimete r
significant quantities and types of ammunition tha t around 0300 on the 26th .
the battalion had not ordered, including thre e Studt immediately climbed into Captain Brill' s
pallets of tactical wire . There was more material than foxhole to get an appraisal of the 2d Battalion' s
the battalion could use or move . Hammond's situation . The first thing that struck Studt were the
Marines would have to spend the night in place an d gaps in the battalion staff. Each time Studt aske d
try to get the excess ammunition flown out the nex t about a key staff position, Brill reported that th e
morning . Unfortunately, the helicopters had reveal- respective officer was either a casualty in some
ed the Marines' position to the enemy . hospital or a new officer was filling the position . 2 6
The North Vietnamese hit the battalion' s The battalion had been ground down during a
perimeter about 2330 with 10 rocket rounds .* The month and a half of heavy fighting .
battalion executive officer, Major John J . Lawen- Company G, released back to the 2d Battalion' s
dowski, died and Lieutenant Colonel Hammon d control, arrived at the defensive perimeter th e
and two others required evacuation for wounds . following morning . The additional strength wa s
Lieutenant Colonel Frankie E . Allgood, the newl y welcome since Lieutenant Colonel Studt had learne d
promoted executive officer of HMM-363, landed his he would have to leave one company behind t o
UH-34D at the battalion command post and fle w guard the pile of excess ammunition . Due to other
the casualties to Dong Ha . Captain Arthur P . Brill , commitments, the regiment reported, there were n o
Jr ., who had moved up the previous day from com- helicopters available to move it . "I could not hel p
manding Company H to be the battalion operation s but note," wrote Studt, " that this , short-sighte d
officer, took command of the battalion . policy resulted in [III MAF] providing a number of
Upon learning that Hammond and Lawendowsk i helicopters for emergency medevacs, which migh t
were casualties, Colonel Richard B . Smith, comman- not have been necessary had they been a little mor e
ding the 9th Marines, decided to send an officer t o flexible and appreciative of the tactical situation o n
take temporary command of the 2d Battalion, 4t h this operation . " 27
Marines . The obvious choice was right at hand .
Leaving Company F to guard the ammunition ,
Lieutenant Colonel John C . Studt, the regimental
the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines moved toward its ob-
operations officer, knew the details of the curren t
jective and occupied it by 1300 . Shortly afterward ,
*The official reports describe these as rockets, however, Colone l enemy 60mm mortars hit the battalion as it organiz-
Hammond believes they were actually artillery rounds . Colonel ed its defenses . One hour later, the NVA struck with
James W . Hammond, Jr ., Comments on draft ms, 18May8 1 a heavy mortar barrage, followed by small arms fir e
(Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) from the west and northwest . The Marines began
taking casualties and requested a helicopte r ordered the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines at C-2 Bridge
medevac . to send two companies and a small command grou p
In an effort to pick up some of the casualties, Cap- to the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines ' position . 2 9
tain Ronald D . Bennett of HMM-363 attempted t o Company F still occupied its exposed position an d
land his UH-34D within the 2d Battalion ' s Studt decided to move it within the battalio n
perimeter . Those on the ground waved him off perimeter . He directed the company to have its at-
because of intense enemy fire . As Captain Bennet t tached engineers blow up the excess ammunition ,
pulled away, enemy fire hit the rear of th e but they were unable to do so .* After several hour s
helicopter, separating the tail pylon . The aircraft of fruitless attempts by the engineers, Studt told th e
crashed, rolled and began burning about 150 meter s company to leave the ammunition and join the res t
outside the Marine lines . Bennett and a gunner , of the battalion . The battalion had direct observa-
Corporal Edward Clem, died in the crash . Second tion of the ammunition pile and would cover it b y
Lieutenant Vernon J . Sharpless and Lance Corporal fire . a °
Howard J . Cones, both seriously injured, manage d Company F reached the perimeter near dusk . Th e
to crawl from the burning wreckage . two companies from the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines ar-
A second helicopter from HMM-363, piloted b y rived at about the same time . 31 With these rein-
Captain Frank T . Grassi, tried to land to pick up th e forcements, the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines was read y
survivors but could not . Enemy fire hit Grassi in th e for any NVA attacks that evening . Studt recounte d
leg and arm, damaged the helicopter, and slightl y the night's subsequent events :
wounded one of the gunners and a Navy hospital From before dusk . . . until almost 0200 in the morning ,
corpsman . The aircraft limped away as far as Stron g we were under almost continuous attacks by both direc t
Point C-2 where it made a forced landing . and indirect fire, and our perimeter was hit again an d
Captain James E . Murphy, the 2d Battalion, 4th again by ground attacks . . . . The wounded were being ac-
cumulated in the vicinity of my CP, which consisted o f
Marines' air liaison officer, who had been calling i n
foxholes, and their suffering was a cause of anguish . After
air strikes in front of Company E, saw Bennett ' s several attempts to medevac them by helicopter wer e
helicopter go down . With his radio still on his back , aborted due to intense enemy fire, we came up with th e
Murphy crawled out to the downed helicopter, mov- plan that on signal every man on the perimeter woul d
ing past NVA soldiers in his path . He found the two open fire on known or suspected enemy positions . . . for a
few minutes with an intense volume of fire . During thi s
survivors near the burning helicopter . The thre e
brief period, a volunteer pilot . . . succeeded in zipping in -
Marines were surrounded and there was no way Mur- to the zone and removing our emergency medevacs . The
phy could get them back to Marine lines . Fortunate- [trick] . . . probably would not have worked again . 3 3
ly, the enemy soldiers in the area either did no t
know the three men were there or simply did no t The ground attacks ceased around 0200 in th e
care . Captain Murphy could hear NVA soldiers near - morning of the 27th, but the Marines heard enem y
by and see some movement, however, and called i n movement for the rest of the night as the Nort h
air strikes within 50 meters of the crashed helicopte r Vietnamese removed their dead and wounded .
with the aid of an airborne observer in an 0-1C air - Dawn revealed 19 enemy bodies within or in sight o f
craft overhead . The latter eventually managed t o the Marine positions . Lieutenant Colonel Stud t
direct a Marine A-4 attack aircraft to deliver a line o f decided not to send anyone to sweep the area sinc e
smoke so that a UH-1 helicopter could land an d any movement still drew enemy artillery and morta r
rescue the three Marines . 28 fire . "
The rescue helicopter was a UH-1C from the U .S . The enemy completed its departure by dawn . The
Army's 190th Helicopter Assault Company whos e Marines soon did likewise ; on orders from the 9t h
Marines, the battalion made a tactical withdrawal .
pilot volunteered to make the pickup . Enemy fire hi t
the aircraft twice during the rescue and the pilot suf- Still harrassed by enemy rocket and mortar fire an d
carrying the remainder of its dead and wounded, th e
fered a minor wound in the arm . The UH-1C als o
managed to reach Strong Point C-2 where it, too , 2d Battalion, 4th Marines moved by echelon to
made a forced landing .
*The reason for the failure to detonate the ammunition is no t
Lieutenant Colonel Studt's observation during hi s clear from the records . Studt himself wrote in 1981 that he never
short period of command convinced him of the nee d knew the reason . Col John C . Studt, Comments on draft ms ,
for reinforcements . At his request, the 9th Marines 9Jul81 (Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)
C
lxi
K.
Ct
to
UC
2 C4
batteries, it was the largest artillery regiment in th e Major General Hochmuth died on 14 Novembe r
history of the Marine Corps . The reinforced regi- when his UH-1E exploded and crashed five mile s
ment's 220 weapons 37 were located throughout th e northwest of Hue .
division TAOR . Each infantry regiment could cal l Colonel William L . Dick, commanding the 4t h
upon a direct support battalion of 105m m Marines at Phu Bai, learned of the crash around 140 0
howitzers . In addition, the artillery regiment' s on 14 November . Since he had a helicopter sittin g
medium 155mm howitzers and guns, and heav y on a pad at his headquarters, Dick, accompanied b y
8-inch howitzers and 175mm guns, provided rein - his operations officer, Major James D . Beans, an d
forcing or general support fires . the regimental sergeant major, quickly reached th e
While the new operations were beginning, the crash scene . Colonel Dick described the rescue at -
division headquarters at Phu Bai prepared for a visi t tempt :
from Vice President Hubert H . Humphrey on 1 After several passes, I spotted the Huey upside down i n
November . After the stop at the division comman d a rice paddy filled to the brim by the heavy rains which
post, the Vice President flew over the division 's are a had been falling for several weeks . . . . I directed the
of operations ; Upon his return to Da Nang, h e helicopter pilot to land on the paddy dike nearest the cras h
presented the Presidential Unit Citation to the 3 d site from where the three of us walked through about 20 0
yards of.paddy water until we reached the wreckage . There
Marine Division for "extraordinary heroism an d were flames on the water's surface around the aircraft .
outstanding performance of duty in action agains t While the sergeant major attempted to extinguish these ,
North Vietnamese and insurgent Communist force s Major Beans and I commenced diving beneath the surface ,
in the Republic of Vietnam from 8 March 1965 to 1 5 groping through the water for possible survivors . We had
no idea just how long it had been since the crash had oc-
September 1967 . "
curred . This was a difficult task, as you can imagine, sinc e
After pinning the streamer on the division colors ,
the water was full of silt, not to mention leeches, and im-
the Vice President warmly congratulated the divisio n possible to see through . The three of us were joined by a
commander, Major General Hochmuth . This wa s Vietnamese farmer who refused to identify himself an d
the last official ceremony that the general attended . could be distinguished only by a small gold crucifix around
A machine gun team from Company F, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines pauses during it s
movement in November in Operation Lancaster in the 9th Marines' portion of th e
former Operation Kingfisher area. The team wears its ammunition bandolier-style .
3d MarDiv ComdC, November 1967
his neck . The four of us, after getting rid of the aviatio n
fuel flames, repeatedly went below the surface into th e
helicopter cabin and by touch, finally found the bodies ,
one by one, of the six who had died in the crash . The
helicopter had turned upside down just before impact
which made the situation even more difficult . The last
body recovered was General Hochmuth . I found him in
the rear seat of the helicopter, the spot where he usually
traveled when visiting the various command posts . 38
squad patrols routinely operated 2,000 meters nort h damaging the tractor . The LVTH-6 destroyed th e
of C-4 as forward security for both the strongpoin t antitank gunners' position with direct 105m m
and the battalion ' s position at Cua Viet port facility . howitzer fire .
Early in the afternoon of the 10th, two squad s The number of enemy troops involved in the bat-
patrolled near the fishing village of Ha Loi Tay . tle increased . A 30-minute firelight began ; Gavlick' s
Their operational area was a sea of sand dunes, inter- composite company took heavy small arms fire fro m
rupted by a strip of scrub pine growth an d three sides, then the Communists began hitting th e
hedgerows dotting the coastline . As they approache d Marines with mortars . Throughout the action, th e
a break in the coastal tree line south of the village , two LVTH-6s maneuvered back and forth to engage
sniper fire surprised them . The Marines fired back , the enemy, often firing at ranges between 50 to 15 0
killing eight North Vietnamese . The enemy fire kill- meters . The remaining four LVTH-6s at Cua Vie t
ed one Marine and wounded three in this brief en - and a detachment of 4 .2-inch mortars at C-4 adde d
counter . their fire to the battle .
As the Marines checked the area, they discovere d As the Marines tightened their perimeter, th e
20-25 NVA soldiers, some wearing American NVA made a second assault . Fifty-five of the enem y
helmets and flak jackets . The Marines opened fire attacked from the north, 12 more came in from th e
and called for reinforcements . The company com- northeast, and 20 others from the south . Again ,
mander, First Lieutenant Michael H . Gavlick , mortar fire supported their assault . The Marine s
radioed the situation to the battalion CP, and then responded with artillery, and used naval gunfire to
took a platoon and the third squad of the engage d hold back enemy reinforcements . The Communis t
platoon forward to join the battle . assault failed, but individual soldiers continued t o
pop up around the perimeter . One audacious NV A
Contact continued throughout the afternoon .
mortar crew, protected by infantry, went into actio n
Before dark, Lieutenant Colonel Toner ordered tw o
on an exposed sand dune only 90 meters from th e
provisional rifle platoons from his Company B and
Marine perimeter . They fired six rounds before
two LVTH-6s to go to the scene of contact to assist .
machine guns and direct fire from one of the
As darkness settled, Lieutenant Gavlick drew hi s
LVTH-6s killed them .
composite force into a tight perimeter . At 0630 on
the 11th, the composite unit moved out under a
light drizzle toward the area of the previous day's ac-
tion . At 0800, lead elements spotted 40 of the
enemy trying to move south across the break in the
tree line . The Marines observed 11 NVA soldiers dig-
ging a mortar position and another 15 movin g
behind a sand dune to the north . While the Marine s
took these enemy under fire with artillery and th e
LVTH-6s, Lieutenant Colonel Toner moved hi s
Company A, organized as an infantry unit, and hi s
command group to Strong Point C-4 . At the sam e
time, the U .S . advisor with the ARVN battalion oc-
cupying Strong Point A-1, 2,500 meters across th e
sand dunes west of the contact, asked if his battalio n
could help . Toner asked the ARVN battalion to
move a unit into a blocking position southwest o f
the action . The NVA force had moved around to th e
west of the Marines and were now attacking from th e
south . The advisor informed Toner that an ARV N
company would move to the desired blocking posi-
tion . Fifteen of the enemy had already attacked th e 3d MarDiv ComdC, December 196 7
Marines and, although driven off, had fired 10 RP G PFC F. N. Bunton carries a small Christmas tree o n
antitank rounds . One of these rounds hit a LVTH- 6 his pack while on Operation Kentucky with Com-
on the bow, but the round glanced off without pany C, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines in December .
By this time, the ARVN company had crossed th e camouflaged their trap-door entrances . The Marines
sand dunes and was moving into its blocking posi- destroyed the bins as they discovered them, afte r
tion . As it entered the position, the company spot- which they returned to Stongpoint C-4 . The day-
ted a mortar crew that had been giving the Marine s long battle resulted in 54 enemy known killed ,
trouble from the southwest . After a brief fire fight while the composite Marine unit suffered 20 wound -
the enemy mortar crew ran away to the north, leav- ed .
ing two bodies behind . After this, the fightin g As the year came to a close, all of the operation s
dwindled to sniper fife . which had started in November remained in pro-
Lieutenant Colonel Toner ordered Company A t o gress . Although contact was light, there were signs of
sweep the area north of C-4 and clear it of any re- renewed enemy activity in the Scotland TAOR . In-
maining NVA soldiers . At the same time, h e telligence officers reported at least two NVA divi-
ordered Lieutenant Gavlick to withdraw his com- sions, the 325C and 304th, moving into the Khe
posite company to C-4 . Artillery and naval gunfir e Sanh region . Because of these reports, General Tom-
continued to shell the tree line north of the battl e pkins strengthened Khe Sanh with an additiona l
position . As Lieutenant Gavlick's force moved south , battalion during December and prepared to deplo y
they found a supply dump bordered by communica- more reinforcements on short notice . The year 196 7
tions wire strung waist high from trees as a guide . ended as it had begun ; a major invasion of norther n
The site contained many full storage bins, dug int o Quang Tri Province appeared to be the enemy's nex t
the sand dunes next to the trail . Live vegetation move .
PART V
SPECIAL EFFORTS
CHAPTER 1 1
of a second SLF and directed CinCPac to commit on allied units in order to immobilize or at leas t
both SLFs to extended operations in Vietnam . distract them . The year 1967 tested the validity o f
Neither of these decisions were restrictive as far as the SLF concept as the Communists forced the expe-
the location of SLF landings, but the provision of th e dient of long and often unrewarding SLF com-
required logistic support provided a major reaso n mitments on the Marine commanders in I Corps .
why SLF operations became a purely I Corps func-
tion . Operation Deckhouse V
Under the heading of "Logistic Support for th e 6 - 15 January 1967
Special Landing Force" in April, FMFPac's report of
Marine operations in Vietnam revealed a major The first SLF operation of 1967, Deckhouse V, was
reason for concentrating SLF operations in I Corps ; significant for two reasons . It was a sizable, combin-
the support structure dictated operational location . ed U .S . Marine and Vietnamese Marine amphibious
The report stated : operation . More ominously, for the proponents o f
the SLF concept, it was the last SLF landing to take
With the decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff` . . . to
place beyond the boundaries of I Corps .
commit the SLFs to extended operations in Vietnam, the
normal logistic support procedure required some changes . The ARG, under Captain John D . Westervelt ,
The CG, III MAF now provides logistic support when the USN, with Colonel Harry D . Wortman's SLF em -
SLF operates in areas contiguous to III MAF logistic in- barked, steamed south to the coast of Kien Ho a
stallations . When operating in areas isolated fro m Province in IV Corps for the landing . Deckhouse V
established logistic support areas, ground units of the SLF
was the only SLF operation for Major James L . Da y's
utilize their own resources, with -stocks reconstituted a s
practicable from the Force Logistic Command . While BLT 1/9 and it marked the end of SLF duty for Lieu -
operating from the LPH, aviation units of the SLF will b e tenant Colonel Marshall B . Armstrong's HMM-362 .
supported by the LPH but, when operating ashore in the D-day for Deckhouse V was 6 January . Both BLT
III MAF area of operations, support by the 1st Marine Air - 1/9 and elements of Vietnamese Marine Brigad e
craft Wing will augment that positioned by 9th MA B
aboard ship . If the operations ashore extend beyond 1 5 Force Bravo, primarily consisting of the 3d and 4t h
days, support of helicopters will become the responsibility Vietnamese Marine Battalions, enjoyed support
of CG, III MAF . When the SLF operates ashore in loca- throughout the operation from HMM-362's mixe d
tions other than I CTZ (after 15 days), CG, III MAF wil l force of UH-34 and CH-46 helicopters operating
provide only aeronautical spares and special support from the USS Iwo Jima (LPH 2) . The combine d
equipment . All other logistic support responsibilities wil l
remain with CG, 9th MAB [on Okinawa] . * seaborne and heliborne force assaulted an area o f
suspected Viet Cong concentrations on the coast be-
A final determinant for SLF commitments which tween the Co Chien and Ham Luong reaches of th e
received due consideration was the Communist plan Mekong River . Lasting until 15 January, the opera-
for 1967 . As the year opened with the sour memor y tion produced unspectacular results . The combine d
of an uneasy and far from inviolate 48-hour Ne w force killed only 21 Viet Cong, destroyed two smal l
Year's truce, there were continuing indications of arms workshops, and captured 44 weapons and 4 2
enemy buildups and unit movements in and north tons of rice . Seven U .S . Marines died and one Viet-
of the DMZ . As events proved, the Marine occupa- namese Marine died accidentally .
tion of the bases at Con Thien and remote, but vital , Some participants attributed Deckhouse V's
Khe Sanh alarmed the Communists, but at this earl y failure to information leaks . The Marines en -
stage of the year there were no clear indications o f countered only local force VC in the operational
Communist intentions in northern I Corps . area, but prisoners stated that larger VC units had
Elsewhere in the corps area, the enemy obviously been there before the landings . Someone told Cap-
would continue to exert as much pressure as possibl e tain Westervelt—he did not hear it himself—that a
Philippine radio station broadcast the news when th e
*"When the 9th MAB assumed responsibility for Marine avia-
tion and ground units in the Western Pacific which were not i n ARG departed Subic Bay that the Marines wer e
Vietnam, it became an important part of SLF operations . . . . Th e headed for the Mekong Delta . 3
Brigade's aviation component, MAG-15, became a composite Many other difficulties marred the execution o f
MAG consisting of helicopters, KC-130s, and fixed-wing attac k the combined operation . Communications wer e
and fighter aircraft, and, as such, was one of the largest air group s
we have ever had ." Col David O . Takala, Comments on draft ms, bad, rough seas interfered, planning was hurried ,
2Jun81 (Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) and on D plus 1 the 4th Battalion VNMC endured a
152 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E
near record-breaking ship-to-shore landing-craft days late . However, even on the 6th it was not possible t o
move of 23 miles, rivaled only by some of the U .S . load the [Vietnamese Marines] from the Henrico into
LCM6's alongside, so Henrico, Thomaston and Vancouver
shore-to-shore operations in the Pacific durin g
returned to Vung Tau, transferred Henrico s troops to the
World War II . Captain Westervelt recalled these dif- LPD and LSD so loading could take place in the wel l
ficulties : decks . The [Vietanamese Marines] actually landed on th e
7th . 4 *
The Navy aspects of the Deckhouse V landings were for-
midable . Normal operating depths of water for the LPH , The operation encountered problems at an even
LPD and other deep draft ships in the Amphibious Read y higher level . Amphibious doctrine called for the am-
Group were about 8 to 10 miles to seaward off the coasta l phibious task force commander to control all aircraft
areas of Kien Hoa between the Co Chien and Ham Loun g in the amphibious operations area . Normally, these
Rivers . The 8-inch gun cruiser Canberra had a fire support
station some eight miles, as I recall, from the impact area s aircraft would come from the Navy and Marin e
for her pre-assault bombardment . Water depths adequat e Corps . The location of Deckhouse V created specia l
for LST and rocket ship passage over the shallow bar int o circumstances, however, that dictated that all ai r
positions for the assault landings obtained only at hig h support come from the Seventh Air Force . A s
tide . Because an early morning landing time was require d Brigadier General John R . Chaisson later recalled ,
for the Marine assault forces in the LVT5 vehicles, thi s
the commander of Seventh Air Force, Major General
meant that, to protect the surprise features of th e
landings, the LSTs and rocket ships had to proceed ove r William W . Momyer, agreed with Navy control o f
the bar late in the preceding evening at high tide to be i n aircraft in a traditional amphibious assault against a
position by dawn . . . . hostile shore . In the Mekong Delta, however, wit h
The long distance off-shore required by the principa l the Air Force air control system already in place ,
ARG ships plus the fact that some landing beaches wer e
General Momyer saw no valid reason to change, th e
well upstream from the seaward beaches accounted for th e
long boat rides (up to 23 miles) required for some of the existing system just because an amphibious forc e
troops .
The seas were very rough on the original D-Day (4 Jan ) *See Chapter 12 for the U .S . Marine advisors' accounts of th e
and again on 5 Jan, so the actual D-Day on 6 Jan was 2 VNMC participation in Deckhouse V .
temporarily was operating in the area . General Because of the insistence of MACV a NOTAM [Notic e
Westmoreland backed the Navy in this argument in to Airmen] was published several days before each am-
phibious operation, I suppose to protect any commercia l
this case but all future SLF operations were to be i n
air in the area . It didn't take a very effective intelligenc e
the I Corps area where such complicated comman d system for the Viet Cong and/or NVA to know just wher e
relationships could be avoided . , and when a landing was going to take place . Secondly, I
was concerned that even though this landing was takin g
place in a populated area, the amphibious force carried ou t
Deckhouse VI/Desoto routine naval gunfire and air strikes . . . . Civilian
casualties did result . Following the operation, I discusse d
16 February - 3 March 196 7
the matter with Commander 7th Fleet [Admiral John H .
During late January the two main components o f Hyland] and he supported my position . At least as long as
I was CG 9th MAB the NGF and Air Strikes in futur e
the SLF changed . Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth E .
landings in populated areas were on call a
Huntington's HMM-363 relieved HMM-362 an d
Lieutenant Colonel Jack Westerman's BLT 1/ 4 Captain Westervelt later commented on a numbe r
replaced BLT 1/9 . Sailing from the Philippines, the of problems encountered during the assault landing
newly constituted SLF arrived off the coast of Viet- in Deckhouse VI . He wrote :
nam on the 14th of February .
Deckhouse VI was treated as a regular assault landin g
While the SLF underwent its transition, signifi- complete with heavy pre-assault fires for the boat landings .
cant changes occurred in I Corps . To release mor e In retrospect, because of the U .S . Army forces operatin g
just to the south and west and U .S . Marines operating t o
ARVN troops for pacification work, U .S . Marin e the north and west of the assault area, the pre-assault fire s
Task Force X-Ray, commanded by Brigadier Genera l should have been "on call ." There were weather problem s
William A . Stiles, relieved Vietnamese troops o f at Deckhouse VI when heavy fog and rain obscured the
combat duties in southern Quang Ngai Province i n landing zones on D-Day and caused a one-day postpone-
ment . Surface landings could have been carried out . The
January . General Stiles promptly initiated Operatio n
cruiser firing pre-assault fires commenced fire in spite of
Desoto, a search and destroy operation directe d D-Day cancellation and probably gave some indication to
against known Communist strongholds in th e any VC in the area that something unusual might b e
region . To augment Desoto, the SLF received order s scheduled . However, this was improbable because the area
to operate in an area south of Task Force X-Ray ' s was normally frequented by gunfire support destroyers .
AO . The SLF operation was Deckhouse VI . As in The population of the villages just south of Sa Huynh
congregated on the eastern face of a ridge, which slope d
Deckhouse V, Colonel Wortman commanded the
up from the boat landing area, to watch the Marine lan-
SLF and Captain Westervelt, the ARG . 6 ding show . Originally, the pre-assault fires had included
The mission assigned to the SLF ground element , this area, but this had been changed on the advice of a
representative from the Province Chiefs staff on board the
BLT 1/4, called for it to disrupt enemy movement i n
flagship . He pointed with a dirty finger to the ridge an d
the Sa Huynh salt flats, search northward in the Nu i forced out his interpretation of " Friend" in English . We
Dau area, and, finally, link up with the 3d Bat- took him at his word and put those particular fires "on
talion, 7th Marines, then operating around Nui Da u call ."8
in Operation Desoto . The opening phase of Deckhouse VI was unevent-
At 0800 on 16 February, two rocket-firing landin g ful . The SLF planners had suspected this would b e
ships started the naval gunfire preparation for th e the case . True to form, local Communist units con-
Deckhouse VI landings . Fifty-five minutes later, th e centrated on delaying and harassing tactics . The BLT
first wave of HMM-363 's helicopters lifted off th e confirmed the Communist presence in the area b y
deck of the Iwo Jima and headed inland with th e destroying 167 fortifications and capturing 20 ton s
assault company, Company A . Company C lande d of assorted supplies during the 32 days of Phase I .
in LVTs near Tach By and helicopters ferried the res t Though there never were any major contacts, th e
of the battalion inland . The landings were unoppos- BLT claimed 201 VC killed during this period ; onl y
ed . six Marines died . Unfortunately, on 25 February, th e
Brigadier General Louis Metzger, the comman- HMM-363 commander, Lieutenant Colone l
ding general of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigad e Huntington, and his copilot received wounds durin g
based on Okinawa, was there to observe this landin g a troop lift ; the squadron executive officer, Majo r
and commented later on the assault phase . H e Marvin E . Day, assumed command on the 28th an d
wrote : continued in command for the duration of
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Wendell N . designated SLF Bravo . As Navy Captain Richard L .
Vest, a regular line battalion scheduled fo r Cochrane's ARG steamed toward northern I CTZ ,
rehabilitation on Okinawa, started loading on boar d Colonel Wortman, the SLF commander sinc e
the empty ships of the ARG shipping on 2 April . September 1966, experienced normal prelandin g
The transports sailed on the 5th . doubts and anxieties . One reassuring factor was tha t
While this exchange of units, ships, and roles too k both of his major subordinate units were I Corp s
place, Marines on Okinawa were implementing the veterans . The helicopter squadron, HMM-164, com-
twin SLF concept . HMM-363 and the 1st Battalion , manded by Lieutenant Colonel Rodney D .
3d Marines joined SLF Alpha (Task Group 79 .4) and McKitrick, had been in Vietnam since Februar y
the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines and HMM-164 becam e 1966, and Lieutenant Colonel Earl R . Delong ' s BLT
part of SLF Bravo (Task Group 79 .5) battalion . Task 2/3 originally arrived "in country" in May of 1965 .
Group 79 .5 had operated as the single SLF sinc e Additional confidence stemmed from the fact tha t
1965, but during the transitional period of March - the BLT had just come from a one-month rehabilita-
April 1967, TG 79 .5, now designated SLF Bravo , tion period on Okinawa . It was at full strength an d
went through a standdown phase . Neither of th e all equipment was ready for combat .
SLFs were in an offshore ready position during earl y The target area for Beacon Star was a major V C
April 1967 . SLF Alpha, on board the ARG ship s stronghold and supply area along the border o f
which sailed on 10 April, arrived on station near th e Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces . The small 0
DMZ on the 18th . The ships carrying SLF Brav o Lau River is the natural terrain feature whic h
followed shortly thereafter, sailing on 17 April . delineates the provincial borders in the coasta l
region . The center of the Beacon Star amphibiou s
Beacon Sta r
objective area (AOA) was 27 kilometers northwest of
22 April - 12 May 1967 Hue, on the edge of what French soldiers called "La
Beacon Star was the first operation for newly Rue Sans foie," or "The Street Without Joy ." The
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A19388 0
Col James A . Gallo briefs senior Marines on 7 May on SLF Alpha's progress in Operatio n
Beacon Star near the border of Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces . Prominent amon g
the officers present are (seated, left) LtGen Victor H . Krulak and MajGen Robert E .
Cushman, Jr. MajGen Herman Nickerson, Jr . and BGen Foster C. Lahue stand at left.
AOA was known for its heavy concentration of Com- hours . The new SLF Bravo was about to undergo its
munists ; intelligence officers reported two battalion s first real combat test . On 26 April, the name Khe
of the 6th Regiment and two main force battalions , Sanh was just another place name to many of Lieute-
the 810th and the 814th, were operating in th e nant Colonel Delong's Marines ; by mid-March thos e
region . who survived would never forget it .
The Beacon Star scheme of maneuver consisted o f While Phase I of Beacon Star proceeded, th e
a waterborne and heliborne BLT landing on th e Marines of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines discovered
coast . The battalion was to move inland, generall y strong Communist formations in the hills west of
following the 0 Lau River, while, at the same time , Khe Sanh, 43 miles from the Beacon Star area .
gradually expanding its TAOR in a southwesterl y Realizing that one battalion could not carry the hil l
direction . mass, the 3d Marine Division commander, Majo r
Bad weather and poor visibility delayed operation s General Hochmuth, ordered BLT 2/3 to break off
on D-day, 22 April, but the first heliborne compan y operations in the original Beacon Star AOA and pro-
landed at 0809 . It met no opposition .* Beacon Sta r ceed to Khe Sanh .
progressed according to plan ; enemy resistance wa s The tactical move to Khe Sanh was a transporta-
minimal . On D plus four the battalion launche d tion triumph . At 1200 on the 26th, the divisio n
a combined helicopter and overland assault in th e placed BLT 2/3, in the field and in contact with th e
southwestern portion of the expanded TAOR to at - enemy, under the operational control of the 3 d
tack an estimated 250 VC spotted in the target area . Marines . By 1400, three of the BLT's companies an d
Unfortunately, the BLT was not able to capitalize o n the command group were at Khe Sanh, and by 160 0
this intelligence . the BLT effected a link-up with elements of the 3 d
Urgent orders from the Commander Task Grou p Battalion, 3d Marines northwest of the Khe Sanh
79 .5 interrupted Beacon Star . The Phase I casualties , perimeter . The BLT moved by helicopter from th e
one killed and 10 wounded, would seem insignifi- Beacon Star AOA to Phu Bai, and from Phu Bai t o
cant in the face of what happened in the next 2 4 Khe Sanh by Marine and U .S . Air Force KC-130 and
*BLT 2/3 suffered approximately 60 heat casualties withi n C-130 Hercules transports . The total elapsed tim e
about a three-hour period after landing . Colonel Rodney D . from receipt of the warning order until the link-u p
McKitrick later cited such incidents as part of the justification fo r near Khe Sanh totaled less than seven hours .
the placing of an acclimatization room in the new Tawara class
LHAs. Colonel Rodney D . McKitrick, Comments on draft ms , The second phase of Beacon Star is more common-
n .d . (1981) (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) ly known as "The Khe Sanh Hill Fights" or the "Firs t
157
Beaver Cage/Union I
28 April - 12 May 196 7
the attached Marines of 4 .2-inch Mortar Battery, 1s t Marine Divison units, Beau Charger for SLF Alpha ,
Battalion, 12th Marines, repulsed the Communists . Belt Tight for SLF Bravo, and Lam Son 54 for the
Despite the intensity of the attack and reduce d South Vietnamese task force .* The overall concept
visibility caused by oncoming darkness, Lieutenan t envisioned the movement of SLF Bravo into th e
Colonel Kirby ' s helicopters successfully extracted 20 0 Hickory Operation by means of Operation Bel t
men and more than 1 and one-half tons of ammuni- Tight, while SLF Alpha was to operate east of th e
tion without loss . Hickory/Lam Son 54 operational areas under th e
To the north, while BLT 1/3 conducted Beave r aegis of Beau Charger . The Beau Charger/Bel t
Cage, the 5th Marines engaged in Operation Unio n Tight/Hickory plan was unique in that it called fo r
I . On 9 May the Beaver Cage scheme of maneuver the employment of both SLFs in the same opera-
reoriented to include an eastward sweep toward th e tional area at the same time .
coast coordinated with the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine s The opening scheme of maneuver called for th e
on the BLT ' s right . In this manner the final stage of movement of three separate assault forces to the Be n
Beaver Cage became a part of the Union I plan , Hai River where they were to face about and drive
although the BLT designed its maneuver to place i t south on roughly parallel axes, destroying all enem y
in position for an amphibious withdrawal .* Durin g units and installations in their paths . The plan in-
the last week of the operation, 6-12 May, the BL T cluded the establishment of a free-fire zone whic h
endured continuous mortar attacks and sniper fire . would require the evacuation of more than 10,00 0
On 10 May, as the eastward sweep continued , noncombatants from the buffer zone, a monumen-
Companies B and C engaged in a day-long actio n tal task assigned to the Vietnamese National Police .
with a sizable VC force . After much maneuvering , D-day for Beau Charger, SLF Alpha ' s show, was
air strikes, mortar missions, and the insertion of a 18 May . Fifteen UH-34s of Lieutenant Colonel Kir-
40-man Sparrow Hawk unit, the VC broke off th e by's HMM-263 lifted from the flight deck of the US S
action, but only after the BLT killed 86 enem y Okinawa (LPH-3) and headed inland, each loade d
soldiers . Beaver Cage/Union I ended for the SL F with five Marines from the assault element, Com-
Alpha units on 12 May as they returned to thei r pany A, BLT 1/3 . L-hour was 0800 . The landin g
respective ships . zone, Goose, was less than six kilometers from the
The first operation for SLF Alpha had been a cost- North Vietnamese boundary of the DMZ, an d
ly venture, but all units had demonstrated their almost within small arms range of the north bank o f
fighting qualities . Battalion casualties totaled 5 5 the Ben Hai River .
Marines killed and 151 wounded, but in 16 days o f The SLF planners studied aerial photographs of
continuous operations the BLT claimed 181 enemy the terrain before the operation, but conducted n o
dead and a . bag of 66 prisoners . The next test of SLF prelanding overflights to preserve secrecy . For the
Alpha was only five days away . same reason, they requested no air and naval gunfir e
preparations of the LZ . Intelligence sources ha d
Beau Charger/Belt Tight/Hickory reported the presence of many enemy antiaircraf t
PrairielV/ Cimarro n machine guns in the area .
Flying lead, Kirby led his 34s toward the poten-
18 May - 10 June 1967
tially dangerous zone, flying at altitudes of less tha n
Because of the Communist rocket and artiller y 50 feet to reduce the enemy gunners' effectiveness .
buildup in the DMZ during the spring of 1967 , A maximum speed approach, about 80 knots, lack o f
General Westmoreland issued a directive authoriz- prominent landmarks, and the tenseness of th e
ing the entry of forces into the DMZ buffer zone situation made navigation difficult at best . Kirb y
south of the Ben Hai River, actually South Viet- landed at the north end of the zone, but as he did
machine gun fire ripped into his helicopter . Th e
namese territory . The authorization triggered plan-
ning for a series of simultaneous operations to b e enemy bullets wrecked the helicopter's radio an d
conducted in the new manuever area, one by ARVN wounded the copilot, crew chief, gunner, and thre e
forces and three by the U .S . Marines . The cod e infantrymen . Another infantryman, killed, fell ou t
names for these operations were Hickory for 3 d of the helicopter . The wounded gunner returned fir e
*See Chapter 3 for the 5th Marines ' account of Union I . *The non-SLF operations appeared in Chapter 1 .
and, as Kirby later related, " . . . saved [our ] died down, the Marines counted 67 Communis t
bacon ."1 0 bodies .
Kirby managed to get the helicopter back in th e Belt Tight started on 20 May . The initial missio n
air, but without a radio he had no contact with th e of SLF Bravo was to land in the northeastern corne r
rest of his flight or with the Okinawa . Four other of the 3d Division's Hickory operational area an d
UH-34s in the assault wave and two escorting UH - conduct search and destroy operations within a
1Es suffered damage from enemy fire, but the entir e designated TAOR .* At 0714 on the 20th, Com-
wave unloaded its troops . As soon as Kirby got hi s panies F and H with a BLT 2/3 command grou p
crippled helicopter back to the Okinawa, he briefe d started landing at LZ Parrot . Companies E and G
the SLF commander, Colonel Gallo, on the ba d followed with another command group landing a t
situation at LZ Goose . Colonel Gallo ordered the LZ Mockingbird at 0850 . The initial enemy reactio n
cancellation of all further lifts to Goose and th e was deceptive ; the Marines encountered only ligh t
substitution of the alternate LZ, Owl, 800 meter s resistance .
south of Goose . The assault element of Company A The general trace of SLF Bravo's sweep in its
at Goose was very much alone and in trouble . TAOR was in a southerly direction . The Hickory
Second Lieutenant Dwight G . Faylor's 2d Platoon , planners wanted the SLF to dislodge enemy units i n
Company A spread over 800 yards at LZ Goose . A the area, thereby driving them into 3d Division unit s
well-organized enemy force pressed his thinly hel d moving up from the south . Neither the 3d Marin e
position from the northwest . The BLT naval gunfir e Division nor SLF Bravo ever determined how man y
liaison officer, Ensign John W . McCormick, vainly enemy troops Belt Tight displaced, but the SLF ex-
tried to call in naval gunfire . The ships denied his re - perienced four days of close combat during th e
quests ; no one was certain of the exact location o f operation, certainly an indication that its presenc e
friendly positions and in many cases the enemy was had a spoiling effect on enemy intentions .
too close to use naval guns without endangering th e Throughout the Belt Tight period, BLT 2/3 en -
Marines . Rescue was on the way, but the Marines a t countered well-trained enemy troops who fough t
Goose were in desperate straits . with skill and determination . The enemy's soundly
constructed positions and excellent weapons employ -
While the abortive assault at LZ Goose was takin g
place, Company D landed in LVTs at Green Beach , *A description of 3d Marine Division participation in Opera-
900 meters southeast of LZ Owl . This landing wa s tion Hickory appears in Chapter 1 .
unopposed . By 0855, the remainder of Company A Two riflemen from BLT 1 /3 pass carefully through a
had landed at Owl . Overland reinforcements arrive d Vietnamese village while on Operation Beaver Cage .
at Owl in the form of one platoon from Company D Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A371988
and a section of tanks . At 0930 the lead elements of
Company B began landing . The force at Owl the n
moved out to rescue the beleaguered platoon at L Z
Goose .
ment caused severe problems for the battalion as i t Operation Cimarron . Cimarron lasted from 1 Jun e
fought its way south . During one of the many mor- until 2 July, though SLF Bravo ' s involvement lasted
tar attacks, Lieutenant Colonel Delong, the BLT only through 10 June .
commander, aggravated an old back injury whic h The SLF participation in Cimarron succeeded, i n
necessitated his evacuation . His experienced ex- the sense that there was no local enemy activity . Th e
ecutive officer, Major Wendell O . Beard, a forme r enemy stayed away, the road remained open, an d
Amphibious Warfare School instructor who joine d Con Thien maintained its defensive integrity . Th e
the battalion in February, took command . BLT spent 9-10 June reorganizing and moving bac k
Belt Tight ended at 1559, 23 May 1967 . At thi s to Dong Ha combat base . Reembarkation on th e
time BLT 2/3 shifted to the operational control o f 11th marked the end of the longest SLF comba t
the 9th Marines which assigned the BLT a new are a deployment ashore since its formation, 23 days o f
of operations as part of Operation Hickory, represen- continous operations . The shipboard respite woul d
ting a continuation of the Belt Tight sweep . Until be short ; SLF Bravo would land again in only a
Hickory ended at midnight on the 28th, the bat- week's time .
talion continued its deliberate sweep operations .
The highlight of this period was a sharp engagemen t Day On, Stay On—SLF
between Company E, commanded by Captain Stuar t Operational Tempo Increases
R . Vaughan, and a determined NVA force defend-
ing the village of Xuan Hai . The battle started o n The spring and early summer of 1967 challenge d
the afternoon of the 24th and did not end until th e the flexibility of the SLF concept in I Corps . Varia-
Marines completed a detailed sweep of the villag e tions ranged from SLF Bravo's April "fire brigade "
ruins at 2155 on the following day . The enemy forc e action at Khe Sanh during Operation Beacon Star to
had built 40 defensive bunkers in and around th e dull, but necessary, "housekeeping" duties assigne d
town . Company E destroyed them and counted 2 7 to BLT 2/3 during its 10 days with Operation Cimar-
dead NVA soldiers on the site . SLF casualties were ron . As the year progressed, SLF operational com-
light during the nine days of Belt Tight/Hickory , mitments increased, not only in frequency, but als o
considering the fact that the battalion was either i n in days ashore . During the first four months of 1967 ,
contact or under artillery attack during most of th e the average number of days of monthly combat com-
period . SLF Bravo had 17 Marines killed and 15 2 mitment for a SLF was only 12 .* SLF Alpha ' s Opera-
wounded . North Vietnamese losses totaled a con - tion Beaver Cage landing in April signaled a drasti c
firmed 58 killed and one prisoner taken by th e increase in operational tempo . The May combat-da y
Marines . average jumped to 16 and one-half days per BLT ,
When Hickory finished on 28 May, BLT 2/3 re- while June operations resulted in a new high of 2 2
mained in the field, still under the operational con- days for SLF Alpha and 24 for SLF Bravo .
trol of the 9th Marines . During the next three days The remainder of the year reflected a muc h
the battalion participated in Operation Prairie I V heavier reliance on the SLFs . Average commitments
which ended on the 31st . The BLT's assignment in- remained above the 20-days-per-month figure . Not
volved primarily a security operation in relief of bot h only did the number of combat days increase, bu t
the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines and the 1st Battalion , the number of individual operations involving the
4th Marines . BLT 2/3 protected artillery positions SLFs more than doubled .
immediately north of the Cam Lo Bridge, the bridge The reasons for the increase in tempo were not
itself, and provided route security for both truc k related to a single cause . The forthcoming Viet-
convoys and engineer units on Route 61 from nort h namese National elections, continuing Communist
of the Cam Lo Bridge to Con Thien, an air distanc e unit moves in northern I Corps, and offensive sweep s
of slightly over 10 kilometers . to protect Marine fire support bases were only som e
of the factors which demanded SLF participation .
Although the Prairie IV assignment was of short
duation, the end of the operation did not eliminat e
the security requirements for Route 561 and nearb y *SLF Bravo provided the basis for this computation because of
positions . As a consequence, SLF Bravo, still unde r SLF Alpha's late entry into RVN, in April 1967 . SLF Bravo's com-
operational control of the 9th Marines, retained it s bat days by month in early 1967 were : January, 10 ; February, 13 ;
Prairie IV mission as part of a new 3d Division plan, March, 15 ; and April, 10 .
Even though many of the SLF operations were in - HMM-362, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nic k
conclusive, their harried staffs deserve tribute . In J . Kapetan, relieved HMM-263 as the SLF Alph a
spite of the stepped-up operational tempo of 1967 , helicopter squadron, and the next day the BLT
the SLF planners kept abreast of the often confusing , reembarked . "
and always demanding, I Corps tactical situation . June was a trying time for SLF Alpha . Fou r
separate operations, none of which achieved signifi-
Bear Bite/Colgate/Choctaw/Marylan d cant results, could only be called "good experience . "
2-SJune, 7- 11 June, For the Marines of the SLF, the loss of three men and
the wounding of 51 others served as a terse reminde r
12 - 23 June, 23 - 27 June 196 7
of the price of experience . The SLF Alpha BLT no w
Bear Bite, a conventional LVT and helicopte r had six operations to its credit, and, since its firs t
assault, was the first of SLF Alpha's June operations . landing on 28 April, it had killed 307 Communists .
It targeted the Viet Cong operating along the coas t
40 kilometers southeast of the DMZ in the "Th e Beacon Torch/Calhou n
Street Without Joy " region . Starting at 0730 on 2 18 June - 2 July, 25 June - 2 July 196 7
June, BLT 1/3 spent the next 72 hours probing and Operation Beacon Torch placed SLF Bravo sout h
destroying unoccupied enemy positions . Enemy of Da Nang in the coastal region near the Quang
snipers and a troublesome Marine tank stuck in a Nam and Quang Tin provinical border . A conven-
paddy were the only hindrances to the operation . tional search and destroy operation, Beacon Torch
There were no SLF casualties, but the Marines kille d covered an enemy-controlled area east of the Troun g
only two of the enemy and picked up nine suspects . Giang River and southeast of the city of Hoi An .
On 5 June the BLT returned to the 4th Marines ' A companion operation, Calhoun, targete d
perimeter by helicopter . against the "Pagoda Valley" west of the Beaco n
Two days later, the battalion moved out again o n Torch AOA, started on 25 June . The area received
the uneventful Operation Colgate . During the in- this name because of the many small pagodas on th e
tervening day the new SLF Alpha commander, Col- valley floor . III MAF suspected "Pagoda Valley" of
onel John A . Conway, assumed command . The being a Communist forward logistic base . In essence ,
subsequent Operation Choctaw, southwest of th e BLT 2/3 phased into Calhoun and, when Calhoun
Bear Bite AOA, involved 11 days of tedious sweep s ended, it withdrew as originally planned in Beaco n
west of Route 1 along the Thac Ma River . About as Torch .
productive as Bear Bite, Choctaw netted only 1 5 Beacon Torch started at 0630 on 18 June as assault
more detainees and nine enemy killed . Ninetee n elements of Company F, followed by Comman d
Marines suffered wounds . At 1300 on 23 June th e Group Alpha landed in what the helicopter pilot s
last elements of the battalion returned from the fiel d thought was 12 Cardinal . Actually, the heliborne
to the 4th Marines' Camp Evans, 23 kilometer s troops landed 2,000 meters south of Cardinal . Com-
northwest of Hue . pany H landed at what the pilots believed was L Z
When it started Operation Maryland on 25 June , Wren . It, too, landed in the wrong place and 2,00 0
BLT 1/ 3 moved by helicopters into the same genera l meters south of its planned starting position .
area where it had been for Colgate . The battalion' s While the first heliborne companies untangle d
zone of action included the southwestern edge of th e their LZ problems, Company G landed on Re d
grave-covered Maryland area . Elements of a VC bat- Beach, followed by the 2d Platoon (Reinforced) ,
talion operated in the region . The Marine battalio n Company A, 3d Tank Battalion . Once the squadro n
did not find them, but ARVN units advancing fro m resolved the LZ location problems, it lifted Com-
the north encountered what probably were two V C pany E into the correct LZ Cardinal .
companies . The ARVN units killed 114 Com- Company H made the first contact at 0930 . Ligh t
munists . In its own zone, the BLT killed seven Com- encounters continued throughout the day until 154 0
munists, took 35 prisoners, and salvaged almost nin e when Company H engaged about 100 enemy troops .
tons of rice at the cost of three Marines wounded . B y In the ensuing firefight, 43 of Company H's Marine s
mid-morning on the 27th, the BLT departed th e succumbed to nonbattle causes ; most were hea t
area in helicopters as Maryland ended after fou r casualties . The enemy killed five Marines an d
weeks of probing graves and tunnels . On 28 June, wounded 14 while the Communists left 23 bodies
behind . The enemy disengaged at sunset . ships of TG 76 .4, prepared for Operation Bear Claw ,
The BLT moved out again on the 19th . Small ac- a proposed landing in eastern Quang Tri Province .
tions flared up throughout the day and the advanc- The SLF cancelled Bear Claw at 0100 on the 3rd
ing Marines began discovering hidden enemy foo d when it received orders alerting BLT 1/3 for im-
stocks . mediate employment in the 9th Marines TAOR at
After another quiet night, the BLT renewed swee p Con Thien . The 9th Marines was in trouble .
operations at 0845 on the 20th when Company E Lieutenant Colonel Richard J . " Spike " Schening's
crossed the Troung Giang River . That afternoon , 1st Battalion, 9th Marines provided the security of
Company H had great difficulty fording the Troun g the Con Thien perimeter . Two of the battalion's
Giang, but by late afternoon the battalion began companies, A and B, on patrol a mile and a half
moving westward again . Scattered contact continue d northeast of Con Thien, had discovered a large NV A
west of the river for the next three days . The force, at least two battalions of the 90th NVA Regi-
highlight of this period was Company E's discovery ment . The initial contact took place as the Marin e
of three tons of rice and two tons of potatoes early o n companies were trying to link up . In this awkward
the morning of the 24th . At 0600, 25 June, Opera- situation, the North Vietnamese managed to punis h
tion Beacon Torch phased into Operation Calhoun . each company separately . Additionally, the Com-
By 1300, 25 June Company E had discovered munists hit the Marines with massed artillery fir e
another 1,000 pounds rice and at 1600 Company G from north of the DMZ . Casualties mounted o n
uncovered a two-ton cache . The rice hunt continued both sides as the battle intensified . Company B lost
and on the 26th the Marines bagged and helilifte d most of its officers ; the company commander, his
another 7,600 pounds to the ARVN-controlled tow n FO, the FAC, and two platoon commanders wer e
of Dien Ban, nine kilometers west of Hoi An . The casualties . *
largest single find of the operation was a five-ton Responding to this serious situation, Lieutenan t
cache discovered by Company F on the morning o f Colonel Schening committed Company C, 1st Bat-
the 27th . Complementing this discovery, Company talion, 9th Marines, reinforced by tanks . The action
G, assisted by ARVN troops, rounded up and intensified as the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines arrive d
evacuated 84 stray cattle . from Dong Ha to help regain control of the situa-
Minor skirmishes and the detention of scattere d tion . At this stage, III MAF requested SLF Alpha .
suspects continued until Calhoun ended at 1200, 1 Similarly, SLF Bravo, also at sea, went on alert . The
July . Reverting to the Beacon Torch plan, the BLT mission assigned to SLF Alpha during Operatio n
began its retraction . As the last units returned t o Buffalo, the name given the continuing engagemen t
their respective ships, Beacon Torch ended at 1300 , with the 90th NVA Regiment, was to tie in to the
2 July . right flank of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines an d
Beacon Torch/Calhoun hurt the Communists i n sweep the battle area to recover 1st Battalion, 9t h
central I Corps . The BLT captured more than 40 ton s Marines' casualties .
of rice and other food stocks, over 31 of which the y The original 0100 warning order for SLF Alph a
evacuated for ARVN use . The rest they destroyed i n preceded a regimental briefing at 0700 which se t
place . The BLT's casualty ratio was favorable . Eighty - L-hour at 1030 . After much frenzied action on th e
six enemy died in contrast to only 13 SLF Marines . part of the SLF, the launch took place on schedule .
The BLT suffered 123 nonbattle casualties . Throughout the late morning of 3 July, Lieutenan t
Beacon Torch/Calhoun, however, had no lastin g Colonel Kapetan's HMM-362 flew BLT 1/3 into th e
impact, as emphasized by the fact that the departin g zone of action, supplemented by CH-46s from SLF
Marines sighted enemy troops near the beach are a Bravo's HMM-164 . 12 Unfortunately, the lead assaul t
during the retraction . The Communists could not af- elements of the BLT landed 2,500 meters south o f
ford to lose control of the population and im- the designated landing zone, a mile southeast o f
mediately reoccupied the area to repair the damag e Con Thien . Readjusting the battalion cost valuabl e
caused by the operation . time . The first physical contact with the right flank
of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines occurred at 1315 .
SLF Alpha in Bear Claw/Buffalo/Hickory II
By the time all of BLT 1/3 had moved into the cor -
3 - 16 July 196 7
The first two days of July, SLF Alpha on board the *See Chapter 5 for additional description of this action .
rect positions, however, the level of fighting ha d received orders to move to a phase line approximate -
waned, and only Communist gunners remained ac- ly 15,000 meters south of its position by 1700 th e
tive . The night of 3-4 July was relatively quiet, as wa s next day . As a consequence, though the deploye d
the next day . The 5th opened with an early morning battalion formations remained prepared to engag e
enemy mortar attack against Companies A and C . the enemy, the required speed of advance prevente d
Exchanges of artillery and mortar fire punctuate d the battalion from making a detailed search of its
most of the day . The battalion continued its sweep zone of action . During Hickory II, BLT 1/3 ex-
operation . On the 6th, enemy rockets knocked out a perienced no enemy contact, and the net result was
Marine tank . The fighting around the disabled tank the capture of 17 suspects . There were no friendl y
became so savage that the BLT did not reach th e casualties . The operation ended at 1600 on 16 Jul y
burnt-out hulk until 1000 on the 7th of July . Th e and the next day SLF Alpha returned to the TG 79 . 4
Marines recovered the bodies of the crew early th e ships .
next morning .
At 1330, 8 July, the BLT received orders to make SLF Bravo in Beaver Track/Buffalo/Hickory II
an immediate withdrawal . This was a challenging 4 - 16 July 196 7
operation even under ideal circumstances .
Wickwire's battalion faced a dangerous situation . When SLF Alpha joined Buffalo on 3 July, SL F
There were five complications : it was daylight ; th e Bravo went on standby, and it entered the Buffal o
battalion was in contact ; the withdrawal would occu r area on 4 July on Operation Beaver Track . At 0640 ,
over 600 meters of open ground ; two of the attache d Major Wendell O . Beard,* the BLT 2/3 com-
tanks were crippled ; and the battalion had just mander, and Company H loaded in Lieutenant Col-
received resupplies and had no organic transport t o onel Rodney D . McKitrick's Ch-46s and flew off th e
move the vital, though cumbersome, material . A USS Tripoli (LPH 10) ; destination : Cam Lo .
sixth factor added to the BLT's problems . Just as th e McKitrick's HMM-164 ferried the rest of the bat-
withdrawal began, the Communists opened up wit h talion to an assembly area north of Cam Lo wher e
small arms, mortars, and artillery . In spite of thes e the BLT prepared for employment as directed by th e
difficuties, the battalion carried out this complex 3d Marine Division . At 1300, BLT 2/3, under opera-
maneuver with only light casualties . tional control of its parent regiment, gained the 1s t
The next four days of Buffalo involved patrolling Platoon of Company A, 3d Tank Battalion . The bat-
the Con Thien perimeter . Buffalo ended on th e talion spent the afternoon moving into position i n
morning of 14 July . The Marines of BLT 1/3 ha d preparation for impending search and destroy opera-
recovered the bodies of 11 fellow Marines from th e tions .
The Beaver Track operation order directed th e
1st Battalion, 9th Marines, but their efforts wer e
costly ; the BLT's price was eight killed and 17 9 battalion to move out at 0700 on 5 July and attack
northward on a four-kilometer front to a point jus t
wounded . Operation Buffalo produced a total of 42 4
verified North Vietnamese dead for the BLT . south of the southern limit of the DMZ . There, th e
While Buffalo neared its terminal phase, Com - battalion was to turn and move roughly thre e
USMACV directed that a followup sweep be con - kilometers west . During Phase II, a return sweep ,
ducted of the area south of the DMZ and east of Con the battalion was to maneuver south to the Cam Lo
Thien . In response, III MAF initiated Operatio n River from its DMZ position, following an axi s
Hickory II . The plan called for SLF Alpha's BLT 1/ 3 parallel to but west of the Phase I axis of advance .
to move out from its final Buffalo positions with th e Friendly units had occupied the area as recently a s
1st Battalion, 4th Marines on the BLT's right . The two days before the start of Beaver Track, but in-
combined force would sweep southward in a searc h telligence sources reported that elements of the 29th
and destroy operation . Three other battalions were NVA Regiment were making a reconnaissance of th e
to block north and south of the operational area . Al l region .
Hickory II battalions came under the operationa l At 0700, 5 July, Major Beard's troops moved out .
As in many similar operations, nothing happened a t
control of the 9th Marines, with the exception of SLF
Bravo which served the 3d Marines as a blockin g
force on the western edge of the sweep zone . *Major Beard's nickname was "Moose," a reference to his size .
LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n .d . (1981) (Com-
The evening of the first day of Hickory II, BLT 1/ 3 ment files, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)
hour and a half later when Company G engaged in a ing battalions . ** Since BLT 2/3 was already locate d
sharp action in one of the many Communist bunke r northwest of Cam Lo, it became a blocking battalio n
complexes . Air and artillery smashed the enem y on the western edge of the zone of action .
position . The Company G Marines found 35 NVA SLF Bravo received the Hickory II operation orde r
bodies in the wreckage after the bombardment . on the morning of 13 July . At 0700 the next morn-
ing the battalion moved out, securing designate d
The fortunes of war smiled on the BLT that after -
objectives en route to its final blocking position . A t
noon . As the battalion patrol actions continued ,
1000, the battalion commander, Major Beard ,
Company F executed a classic example of fire an d
became a casualty and his executive officer, Majo r
maneuver . One squad, immobilized by enem y
John H . Broujos, took over the battalion . By 123 0
automatic weapons fire coming from a well -
the battalion reached the blocking positions an d
developed position, became a pivot for the rest o f
searched the surrounding terrain . During BLT 2/3' s
the company . The Marines fixed the Communists i n
brief two-day involvement in Hickory II, Com-
their dug-in positions and called in supporting arms .
munist antipersonnel devices were the most seriou s
The Marines counted 73 NVA bodies in th e
threat . Grenades rigged as booby traps killed two
followup sweep and captured three 82mm mortars .
Marines and wounded 13 . Other than mortar fire ,
During the following days, the BLT Marine s the 2d Battalion had no contact with the enemy dur-
discovered and destroyed more bunkers, fightin g ing Hickory II .
positions, and shelters, but the Communists chos e The BLT reconstituted at 0600 on 16 July as
not to fight . Meanwhile, at sea on board the USS Hickory II ended . Reembarkation began immediate-
Tripoli, Lieutenant Colonel McKitrick's HMM-16 4 ly . SLF Bravo's participation in the Beaver Track /
turned over its SLF assignment on 12 July t o Buffalo/Hickory II operations produced an im-
HMM-265, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel pressive, verified kill ratio . Sixteen SLF Bravo
William R . Beeler . Marines gave their lives, while the battalion kille d
To capitalize on the results of Operation Buffalo , 148 NVA soldiers .
which had paralleled Beaver Track, ComUSMAC V Bear Chain/Fremon t
ordered that another sweep be made south of th e
Ben Hai River to destroy enemy weapons positions i n 20 - 26 July 196 7
the southern half of the DMZ . Known as Operatio n At sea on 17 July 1967, Lieutenant Colonel Emi l
Hickory II, the plan was similar in concept to th e W . Herich assumed command of BLT 2/3, relievin g
13-battalion Hickory I sweep conducted in the sam e
area during May . Hickory II was smaller in scale ; i t **See Chapter 6 for the account of other III MAF units ' par-
employed seven maneuver battalions and four block- ticipation in Hickory II .
midway between Hue and Quang Tri . They had Another variation of the multiple duties shared b y
operated there on Operation Beacon Star in April - the BLT occurred on 18 August . Company F move d
May and again in July on Bear Chain . Kangaro o to Quang Tri to occupy the airfield there and to pro -
Kick, almost a carbon copy of the two previous vide a show of force . At 0930 19 August, Lieutenant
operations along the 0 Lau, precipitated the stan- Colonel Herich received authorization to start reem-
dard VC reaction ; they fled, only to return after th e barkation . The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines relieve d
BLT departed . BLT 2/3 of its Camp Evans duties and the SLF gladl y
went back to sea . III MAF released BLT 2/3 to CT G
At 0800, 3 August, BLT 2/3 shifted to the 4th
79 .5 at 1600 22 August .
Marines' operational control and rejoined Operatio n
The BLT commander, Lieutenant Colonel Herich ,
Fremont . Operation Fremont assumed almos t
commenting on Kangaroo Kick and the 16 Augus t
marathon proportions ; it did not end until 31 Oc-
Fremont sweep, expressed the growing frustratio n
tober . The BLT's mission during its second tou r with operations along the 0 Lau :
under the 4th Marines required relieving the 2d Bat-
talion, 4th Marines of its many and complicate d Operation Kangaroo Kick was . . . in an area generall y
duties, including providing security for Camp Evans , controlled by the enemy . Although this operation prove d
successful in completing the assigned mission, as in th e
Hill 51, and Hill 674 ; interdicting enemy lines of
past, the entire area . . . was reoccupied by the enemy as
communications in the nearby Co Bi-Thanh Ta n evidenced by his presence during the S&D [search an d
Valley ; detaching one rifle company to the 2d Bat- destroy] operation conducted by this BLT on 16 Augus t
talion, 4th Marines for operational use by that bat- 1967 on Operation Fremont . 1 3
talion ; providing security for road sweeps betwee n
the 4th Marines' perimeter and Route 1; providin g Beacon Gate/Cochise
one company for " Sparrow Hawk" rapid reaction 7-11 August 1967, 11-27 August 1967
missions ; and being prepared to provide one com-
pany for " rough rider" truck convoys between Phu At 0700 on 7 August, SLF Alpha started Opera-
Bai and Dong Ha . tion Beacon Gate by landing southeast of Hoi A n
along the coastal boundary of Quang Nam an d
Respite from the Camp Evans routine came on 1 6 Quang Tin Provinces . Intelligence reports fixed
August . The BLT, actually only Company F and elements of the V25 Local Force Battalion and othe r
Command Group Alpha reinforced by Company E ,
2d Battalion, 4th Marines, conducted a daylon g A radioman from BLT 1 /3 pauses in Operation
sweep . The operation took place in the My Chan h Beacon Gate to look over a cow and a calf in a she d
area north of the 0 Lau River, the scene of recentl y during a routine search of a Vietnamese village .
completed Operation Kangaroo Kick . The sweep Denartment of Defense Photo (USMC) A650000
was in conjunction with ARVN units operation i n
the same area .
BLT 2/3 lost one Marine killed and six wounded
during the day's sweep . Unfortunately, a supportin g
tank returning to the 4th Marines command post ra n
over a mine, believed to have been made from a dud
500-pound bomb . The blast killed four Marines and
wounded five . Later that afternoon a tank retrieve r
hit another mine six kilometers west of the disable d
tank . The explosion wounded another six Marines .
Tank problems continued ; while trying to destroy
the tank lost on the 16th, an engineer tripped stil l
another exploding device ; one more Marine died .
The engineers finally destroyed the tank by 1530 . *
smaller VC units in the battalion's operational area . densely vegetated high ground on both sides of th e
During the five-day southerly sweep, the Marine s small Nhung River, less than nine kilometers south
endured continuous sniper fire . The infantryme n of Quang Tri City . The operation involved a spoilin g
made extensive use of armed UH-1E helicopters t o attack against Communist units that could have in-
suppress the snipers . Operation Beacon Gate ende d terfered with the voting in Quang Tri City durin g
on 11 August at 0800 ; the Marines killed only 1 2 the impending national elections . Small unit actions
enemy soldiers . flared up during the next five days as the battalio n
The same day, SLF Alpha shifted to the opera- encountered minor enemy formations, but no con -
tional control of Task Force X-Ray of the 1st Marin e tact involved any determined enemy resistance .
Division for the start of Operation Cochise . BLT 1/ 3 The battalion commander, Major Beard, reported
made a heliborne assault from the Beacon Gat e two interesting enemy reactions :
AOA into a landing zone approximately seven mile s The use of demolitions by the enemy when attacking a
east of Que Son . There the battalion occupied block- defensive position . . . is a tactic with which the battalio n
ing positions to support elements of the 5th Marine s had not yet been confronted . It is believed that it was
which were attacking to the east . definitely designed to simulate mortar fire in order to kee p
the defenders down deep in their positions . The exploding
On 16 August, BLT 1/3 started search and destroy
charges were almost immediately followed by three or fou r
operations, also in an easterly direction, in conjunc- probers armed with automatic weapons who sought to
tion with the 5th Marines . The BLT made heavy con - penetrate the perimeter .
tact with an enemy force late on the 16th, but th e During this operation . . . the enemy failed to . . . leave
enemy broke off the engagement during the night . a clean battlefield after an engagement . This situation is
by all means contrary to their principle of battle and the
The rest of the first phase of Cochise consisted o f first time in which the BLT was able to capture weapon s
sweep operations, still to the east, with contac t and equipment without an immediate physical pursuit .
limited to sniper fire . Enemy KIAs, one WIA, and weapons . . . lay undisturbed
Phase II of Cochise began on 19 August . BLT 1/ 3 overnight in killing zones and were easily recovered at firs t
transferred to the operational control of the 5t h light on the morning following the encounter . On one oc-
casion, two enemy KIAs and one weapon were recovere d
Marines . Enemy contact, as in Phase I, was negligi-
almost two days later by a patrol which swept an area i n
ble, but the Marines uncovered several rice cache s which an air strike had been run . These instances ar e
and an ammunition dump . Phase III opened on 2 5 reflections of the combat discipline and training of the
August . The BLT continued search and destro y enemy which the BLT engaged in its operating area . "
operations northeast from Hiep Duc to Que Son .
At 0800 1 September, the BLT once more shifte d
It encountered only snipers . When the battalon ar-
to the 4th Marines' operational control, this time to
rived at Que Son on 27 August Cochise ended .
participate in Operation Liberty while holding Bel t
The next day the BLT moved by helicopters to Ch u
Drive in abeyance . The Liberty operation orde r
Lai where it began reembarkation . Beacon assigned BLT 2/3 to sweep operations in the Ha i
Gate/ Cochise produced good results for SLF Alpha ;
Lang District of Quang Tri Province . The battalio n
the BLT claimed 59 VC/NVA killed and 65 detaine d
was to assist the 4th Marines in blocking enemy ap-
at a cost of nine Marines dead and 51 wounded .
proaches to Route 1, as well as Quang Tri City .
Belt Drive/Liberty Liberty simply was a minor reorientation of Bel t
27 August - 5 September, 1 - 4 September 196 7 Drive, with the provision of a command structur e
change .
Major Beard returned from hospitalization an d At midnight 4 September, SLF participation i n
reassumed command of BLT 2/3 on 23 August , Liberty ended and Belt Drive resumed immediately .
replacing Lieutenant Colonel Herich . The same day , The last operational day, 5 September, involved
Major Gregory A . Corliss and his CH-46A squadron , moving the battalion and its supporting units out o f
HMM-262, landed on board the USS Tripoli to the TAOR . By 2000, SLF Bravo had complete d
relieve the departing SLF helicopter squadron , reembarkation .
HMM-265 . Four days later, SLF Bravo was in actio n Four dead Marines and 59 wounded represente d
again . At 0545, 27 August, HMM-262 lifted the firs t the price of Belt Drive and Liberty, but 19 Com-
elements of Company H from, the Tripoli back to the munists died . The BLT Marines captured one dazed ,
familiar terrain of eastern Quang Tri Province . wounded NVA soldier on the morning of 1
The Belt Drive operation's objective area was the September . Unfortunately the BLT did not fully ex-
ploit his knowledge and mistakenly evacuated hi m Bravo until the end of the year, though the rest o f
to Camp Evans rather than to the Tripoli . What h e the squadron left in mid-October .
knew of enemy locations might have changed th e Necessarily, SLF operations reflected the reduce d
outcome of Belt Drive . flexibility and lift capability . To provide better sup -
Trouble of a different nature developed durin g port for a landing force ashore, a new tren d
Belt Drive, trouble which caused serious problems developed . The SLF BLTs would land, conduct a
not only for the SLFs, but for all Marine activities in I preliminary operation, and then shift to the opera-
Corps . On 31 August, during a medical evacuation , tional control of a Marine regiment operating in th e
the lead helicopter, a CH-46A, disintegrated i n same area . Though this represented a reasonabl e
flight while en route to the Tripoli. The crew and solution under the circumstances, during the fall o f
their passenger died . The next day, another CH-46 A 1967 SLF BLTs found themselves assigned to mis-
experienced a similar failure at Marble Mountain Ai r sions ranging from fortification construction to roa d
Facility . These two similar accidents forced III MA F security, a far cry from the stoutly defended SL F
to restrict CH-46A missions to emergency categories . tenets of early 1967 .
For all practical purposes, they were " down . " In a
matter of hours, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing lost 5 0 Beacon Point/Fremont/Ballistic Charge/Shelbyville
percent of its helicopter capability, and the LPH s 1 - 9 September 1967, 16 - 28 September 196 7
became little more than troop transports .
On 1 September SLF Alpha landed in Thua Thie n
A Change In Scenario — The 46s are Grounde d Province on Operation Beacon Point for a southerl y
sweep of the by-now all too familiar "Street Withou t
The grounding of the CH-46As was a severe blo w
Joy . " Snipers and surprise firing devices were the on-
to the SLFs . SLF Bravo's CH-46A Squadron ,
ly resistance encountered . At 1800 on 4 September ,
HMM-262, was "down . " SLF Alpha fared better ,
Lieutenant Colonel Kapetan ' s HMM-362 detache d
since HMM-362 was a UH-34D squadron . However ,
from the SLF and reverted to MAG-16 control . For -
MAG-16 recalled HMM-362, though another UH -
34D squadron, HMM-163, replaced it only 4 day s A ruined church dominates the skyline as infan-
later . The USS Tripoli, the amphibious assault shi p trymen of Company D, 1st Battalion, 3d Marine s
carrying SLF Bravo ' s helicopters, temporaril y move through a area of the coastal plain known t o
withdrew from ARG duties to ferry faulty helicopters both the French and the Americans as the "Stree t
to Okinawa for modification . The 1st Marine Air- Without Joy " in the quiet Operation Beacon Point .
craft Wing rescheduled all planned squadron rota- Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189242
tions . Emergency requests prompted shipment of 1 0
CH-53s and 23 more UH-34Ds from west coast U . S .
ports, but they would not arrive until October . On
31 August 1967, III MAF had 150 available transpor t
helicopters, and the SLF could muster 39 more . The
next day, as the result of the grounding order, II I
MAF counted only 23 CH-53s and 73 UH-34Ds ,
while SLF Alpha could provide another 17 UH-34s .
Five squadrons of CH-46As could operate under ex-
treme emergency conditions .
Initially, SLF operations suffered from th e
helicopter strength reduction . Both landing forces ,
by necessity, operated as conventional ground unit s
until resolution of helicopter allocations . SLF Bravo
spent the rest of the year relying upon interim sup -
port from HMM-463's CH-53s operating from Mar-
ble Mountain . A detachment from HMM-262 re-
mained on board the Tripoli to provide emergency
CH-46A support for SLF Bravo . This detachment ,
known as the "Poor Devils," remained with SLF
tunately, the lack of enemy activity did not subjec t marched out of the operating area to the Libert y
the BLT to the full impact of the loss of its assigne d Bridge, and then moved by trucks to Da Nang wher e
helicopters . The most tangible result of Beaco n it reembarked . CTG 79 .4 assumed operational con-
Point was the evacuation or destruction of more tha n trol of SLF Alpha at 1715, 28 September .
35 tons of Viet Cong rice . After the BLT marched to September was not a spectacular month for SL F
an assembly area near Camp Evans on 5 September , Alpha . Twenty-two operational days resulted in 2 6
Operation Beacon Point concluded at 0600 on th e Communists killed, 3 prisoners, and 108 detainees .
6th . To achieve this, eight Marines gave their lives an d
Later that morning BLT 1/3 phased into Opera- another 97 sustained wounds .
tion Fremont, again under the operational control o f
the 4th Marines . Elements of the battalion trucked Fortress Sentry/Kingfisher
to their blocking and screening positions south of 17 - 25- September 1967 ,
Quang Tri . As during Beacon Point, snipers were th e
27 September - 15 October 1967
only active enemy troops .
A solution to SLF Alpha 's helicopter needs occur- On 16 July 1967, the 9th Marines initiated Opera-
red on 8 September . Lieutenant Colonel Walter C . tion Kingfisher near Con Thien . This lengthy opera-
Kelly's HMM-163, UH-34D equipped, reported o n tion employed a force varying from three to six bat-
board the USS Okinawa just in time to prepare for talions . As Kingfisher progressed, a new enem y
the following day's extraction . SLF Alpha droppe d threat developed to the east in the I Corps coasta l
out of Fremont on 9 September . region . Identified NVA and VC units were operating
One week later, on the 16th, BLT 1/3 lande d between the coast and Dong Ha on the northern sid e
again . Operation Ballistic Charge involved a of the Cua Viet River . To neutralize these Com-
simultaneous heliborne and surface assault of an ob- munist formations, III MAF planned to land SL F
jective area four miles southeast of Dai Loc . Th e Bravo in this by-now familiar operational area fo r
operation consisted of a rapid sweep to the north Operation Fortress Sentry . Previously, Operation s
followed by a detailed search and destroy sweep t o Beacon Hill and Beau Charger swept the sam e
the south along the track of the first northward locale .
move . Again, opposition consisted of Communis t A significant operational change occurred follow-
snipers, but during Ballistic Charge the battalion di d ing the untimely grounding of the CH-46s ; SLF
detain 55 suspects and three confirmed prisoners . Bravo had to land by surface means . III MAF
When Ballistic Charge ended on the 22nd, BL T directed the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion to sup-
1/3 shifted to the operational control of the 1s t plement the ARG landing craft .
Marines for Operation Shelbyville . BLT 1/3's in- Poor visibility, rough seas, and generally ba d
volvement started with a heliborne assault from the weather hampered BLT 2/3's 17 September landin g
Ballistic Charge AOA to a landing zone four mile s on the dunes bordering the "Street Without Joy ." A s
southeast of Dai Loc, close to the original Ballisti c usual, there was no resistance on the beach and onl y
Charge objective area . While the 2d Battalion, 1s t light contact as the battalion took its initial objec-
Marines occupied blocking positions to the east, an d tives . As the battalion moved north-northeas t
the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines blocked to the south , toward the DMZ, the 1st ARVN Division screened
Lieutenant Colonel Alfred I . Thomas' BLT 1/ 3 its left flank . Land mines damaged some amphibian
swept the operational area in an easterly direction . tractors as the BLT moved inland, but contact re-
Sniper fire was the only enemy response . mained light .
On 25 September, the BLT reversed its axis of ad- On 23 September about 100 NVA soldiers attack-
vance and, after a night movement, crossed th e ed the battalion, but it broke up the probe with th e
railroad tracks paralleling Route 1 on the morning of assistance of helicopter gunships . On the morning of
the 26th . The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines was on the the 24th, the Marines engaged another enemy forc e
BLT's left during the advance . Late that afternoon , near the village of An My, three miles east of Gi o
Company B had a brief firefight with an enemy com- Linh . Prisoners revealed that the Communists ha d
pany, but friendly artillery fire put a quick end t o expected an attack from the south or southwest an d
the engagement for SLF Bravo . Subsequent actio n the appearance of the BLT east of their position ha d
remained limited to sniper fire . On the 28th the BLT been a complete surprise .
172 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
any telling results, at least in the opinion of SL F area 11 kilometers east of Phu Loc . There, it bega n
Alpha . Two weeks in the field that accounted for on- sweep operations under the direction of the 7th
ly 9 confirmed enemy dead, 7 prisoners, and 1 1 Marines, and during the next 13 days the battalio n
suspects, while attrition gnawed at the battalion ' s experienced 12 enemy contacts, mostly mortar fire .
rolls during both operations . The casualties totale d The Marines killed two enemy soldiers, but Kno x
10 Marines dead and 50 others wounded, 38 of had a debilitating effect on BLT 2/3 . Two Marines
whom required evacuation . died in accidents and, of the 78 nonfatal casualties ,
only 15 were the result of enemy action . Fungus in-
Formation Leader/Liberty II/Knox
fections claimed 33 victims . Knox ended at 1000 o n
17 - 18 October, 18 - 24 October, 4 November ; however, bad weather prevented reem-
24 October - 4 November 196 7 barkation . Instead all elements of the BLT moved t o
Only two days after leaving Operation Kingfisher , the Da Nang Force Logistic Command facility .
Lieutenant Colonel Englisch's BLT 2/3 bega n
Granite/Kentucky II and II I
Operation Formation Leader in support of the 2 d
Battalion, 26th Marines . Envisioned as an area con- 26 October - 4 November, 6 - 16 November 196 7
trol operation, Formation Leader focused on the On 26 October, Operation Granite began for SL F
stabilization of coastal Thua Thien Province east o f Alpha with an early morning helicopterborne assaul t
Route 1, specifically Vin Loc and Phu Loc Districts . into the Hai Lang Forest . Granite was a two-
Because of the impending Vietnamese Nationa l battalion search and destroy operation in the regio n
Assembly elections, intelligence officers presume d of Communist Base Area 114 . The two assault bat-
that the Communists would concentrate disruptiv e talions, the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, and SL F
efforts against these populated districts . Alpha's BLT 1/3, conducted Granite under th e
The Communists did not respond . BLT 2/3 ' s operational control of the 4th Marines .
greatest problems during Formation Leader wer e The first day of Granite was uneventful for th e
nontactical . Because of the grounding of the Marines of BLT 1/3, but during the next nine day s
CH-46s, all troop lifts from the USS Tripoli relie d the enemy "continuously harassed the BLT . . . stay-
upon CH-53s from Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L . ing within a few hundred meters . . . ," and "nigh t
Sadowski's HMH-463, operating from Marble probes were made with a consistency not normall y
Mountain . The lifts were entirely satisfactory, bu t experienced . . . ." 1 5
realining the BLT's serial assignment tables for th e By the afternoon of the 30th some of the BL T
larger helicopters gave Major Douglas W . Lemon' s Marines began to believe that Granite was a jinxe d
battalion S-3 office a good prelanding workout . Ad- operation ; supporting arms mistakes were becomin g
ditionally, high seas and bad weather slowed th e costly . A friendly air strike, short of target, wounde d
landing of attached heavy vehicles at Hue . In fact , two Marines on the morning of the 29th . At dusk a
some remained on board for the duration of th e short 60mm mortar round wounded another Marine ,
operation . and just after midnight a short artillery roun d
There were no enemy contacts on the 17th and a t wounded still another BLT Marine . Fortunately, thi s
1000 on the 18th, BLT 2/3 shifted to the 3d Marin e was the last Granite casualty inflicted by friendl y
Division's operational control . Formation Leader ter- forces .
minated and a new operation, Liberty II, started , BLT 1/ 3 never did find the enemy base area in th e
but SLF Bravo's mission and operational area re- Hai Lang Forest, but it had no doubt of the presenc e
mained the same . The enemy still did not respond . of enemy troops there . When the battalion finishe d
The most significant incident was the sighting and its sweep of the rugged terrain on 4 November, it s
subsequent artillery attack on an enemy squad lat e journals revealed that it had called in 59 fixed-win g
on the 21st . Sadly, the next day five Marines on a sorties and 652 artillery fire missions during the las t
trash-burning detail suffered wounds from the ex - 10 days . The battalion captured five AK-47s an d
plosion of a grenade apparently dumped in th e killed 17 Communists . The tangled vegetation o f
trash . Liberty II ended at 0800 on the 24th an d the Hai Lang hid the rest of the story . All of the BLT
Operation Knox started . returned to Camp Evans before dark on 4
Shifted to the operational control of the 7t h November . Granite ended with three Marines dea d
Marines, the BLT moved by truck to a new assembly and 24 wounded .
The SLF Alpha battalion did not stay at Camp flew its UH-34Ds out to the USS Iwo Jima to becom e
Evans after Operation Granite . Just before noon on 6 the new SLF Alpha helicopter squadron . The reliabl e
November, the division shifted BLT 1/3 to the 9t h 34's were a welcome addition, especially since cir-
Marines' operational control . The BLT spent the res t cumstances forced the BLT to rely on other source s
of the day moving west to Cam Lo where it joined for helicopter support during all of Kentucky II an d
Operation Kentucky as the 3d Division reserve . Ken- III .
tucky began on 1 November, the day after Opera-
tion Kingfisher ended . The Kentucky area of respon- Badger Hunt/Foste r
sibility, including Con Thien and Cam Lo, was 13 - 29 November 196 7
nothing more than the eastern portion of the ol d
Kingfisher TAOR . Kentucky was the assigned In Quang Nam Province, north of the conclude d
TAOR of the 9th Marines while Lancaster, to th e Beaver Cage area of operation, enemy contact durin g
west, was the 3d Marines' responsibilty . the fall of 1967 had been relatively light . The 1s t
BLT 1/3 celebrated the 192nd birthday of th e Marine Division committed units of the 5th and 7th
Marine Corps with an early morning move from Ca m Marines to spoiling operations to prevent infiltration
Lo north to attack positions less than two kilometer s of the Da Nang rocket belt . In November SLF Brav o
east of Con Thien . With the 1st Battalion, 1s t participated in Operation Badger Hunt as a con-
Marines—comprised of only two companies and a tinuation of the spoiling tactics . The division con-
command group—on its right, BLT 1/3 jumped of f ceived Badger Hunt as an amphibious operation t o
on Phase II of Kentucky the next morning . Th e support the 7th Marines' Operation Foster which tw o
BLT's mission involved making a sweep from east t o spectacular VC raids triggered . On 2 November an d
west around the northern face of the Con Thie n again on the 8th, the Viet Cong raided the distric t
base . The 9th Marines conceived the operation as a headquarters and refugee settlements at Hieu Duc
spoiling attack to disrupt suspected Communist con- and Dai Loc, approximately 15 miles south of D a
centrations around Con Thien . Nang . The VC killed 22 civilians, wounded anothe r
The Kentucky planners were right . At 0830 on th e 42, and destroyed or damaged 559 houses .
11th, Company D hit an enemy platoon from th e To rid the area of the Communist raiders, bot h
east, the blind side of the well-dug-in and conceale d operations focused on the river complex of Dai Lo c
Communist position . The Marines forced the sur- District and the flat lands and foothills west of th e
prised NVA to fight ; seven died . That afternoo n Thu Bon River . SLF Bravo, under its new com-
Company D hit another dug-in enemy unit . Thi s mander, Colonel Maynard W . Schmidt, and con-
one suffered a similar fate ; six more NVA soldier s sisting of BLT 2/3, commanded by Lieutenant Col-
died . One survivor, a squad leader, told his captors onel Englisch, and a detachment of HMM-262 ,
that his battalion had been in the Con Thien area fo r started Badger Hunt by landing at An Hoa . The 3 d
about a month . Apparently, Kentucky, with ex- Battalion, 7th Marines, commanded by Lieutenan t
cellent timing, upset Communist plans for Co n Colonel Roger H . Barnard, began Operation Foster
Thien . west of Dai Loc and north of the Thu Bon River .
The SLF battalion's combat commitment to th e There was little contact during either operation ,
opening phases of Kentucky ended the morning o f with the exception of one company-sized engage-
12 November . The battalion marched back to Posi- ment on the 29th . The Communists evaded bot h
tion C-3, a base area in the strong point/obstacl e sweeps, heading for the hills to the west . The enem y
system, and then moved on to Dong Ha by truck . suffered some casualties as reconnaissance teams an d
BLT 1/3 remained at Dong Ha, again as 3d Marin e air observers called in air strikes and artillery fire o n
Division reserve, from 12 November until release d fleeing enemy groups . The final tally for Badger
by the 9th Marines at 0900 on the 16th, at which Hunt and Foster totaled 125 Communists killed an d
time the BLT started reembarkation . SLF Alpha , eight captured . Marines losses added up to 25 kille d
however, would see Kentucky again . and 136 wounded . The most significant accomplish-
While the BLT phased out of Kentucky, III MA F ment of both operations, other than driving the
provided some relief for the loss of mobility cause d enemy out of the area, was the destruction of most o f
by the grounding of CH-46s . On 15 November , the enemy's supporting installations in the region .
Lieutenant Colonel Daniel M . Wilson's HMM-361 The Marines destroyed over 6,000 bunkers, tunnels,
THE SPECIAL LANDING FORC E 17 5
counted 10 dead VC soldiers and observed enoug h Phouc Phu, 11 kilometers from 12 Finch . Initial fire sup -
enemy equipment on the battlefield to know the y port for the operation would be organic 81mm mortars ,
available on-call air support, and naval gunfire support .
had hurt the Communists . In his after action report ,
Once the BLT had closed on the first intermediate objec-
Lieutenant Colonel McQuown summarized the tive, Thon Phu Kinh, 105mm howitzers from a platoon o f
results of 21-24 December, writing, "Operation For - the 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines and a battery from the 1st
tress Ridge provided the confidence and experienc e Battalion, 11th Marines would provide artillery support .i 9
needed for a newly formed BLT to perform as a pro-
fessional combat unit . " Information relayed to the SLF by a U .S . Army
liaison officer with nearby ARVN units changed the
Badger Toot h Badger Tooth plan . After the seizure of LZ Finch ,
26 December 1967 - 2 January 1968 the SLF directed the BLT to search new objectives
Special Landing Force Bravo's last commitment i n consisting of the coastal villages of Thom Tham Kh e
1967 was Operation Badger Tooth . The original plan and Tho Trung An . Intelligence officers suspecte d
called for the BLT to land one company by LVT t o enemy forces hid there after evading ARVN opera-
seize Landing Zone Finch, slightly more than three tions to the north and west . Once the BLT cleare d
kilometers inland from the beach on the souther n the two villages, the SLF would continue with th e
Quang Tri Province border . The rest of the battalio n originally planned sweep to the southwest .
would follow by helicopter . The proposed objective Badger Tooth started as Company L in LVTs land-
area was on the extreme western side of the "Stree t ed over Green Beach at 1100 on 26 December an d
Without Joy," and this time intelligence estimate s proceeded to LZ Finch . The operation continued as
placed as many as 1,700 enemy troops in the area o f scheduled against very light opposition . Major Davi d
operation . 1 8 L . Althoffs "Poor Devils" from HMM-262 landed
The BLT commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ma x the last elements of the battalion at Finch by 1415 .
McQuown, described the plans for the operation : Two hours later Company K suffered the first casual-
ty of Badger Tooth when automatic weapons fir e
The scheme of maneuver called for a river crossing ove r west of the LZ wounded a Marine .
the Song 0 Lau River once all the BLT Task Organizatio n
The SLF commander, Colonel Schmidt, accom-
had landed from ARG shipping . After the river crossing
the BLT was to conduct search and destroy operations panied by the U .S . Army liaison officer to ARV N
through 14 towns and villages on a route running forces in the area, arrived at the battalion comman d
southwest from 12 Finch terminating at the town of Ap post with orders for the BLT to change direction and
0 200 400
meters I
1 3
sweep the coastal villages of Tham Khe and Trun g from machine guns, rifles, RPGs, and mortars . The
An . Company L received the mission of sweepin g company immediately suffered many casualties an d
Tham Khe, with Company M in support . After mov- Captain Thomas S . Hubbel decided to pull his com-
ing to the edge of the village in LVTs, Company L pany back and regroup for another attack . He re -
advanced northwest into the built-up area . By 182 2 quested supporting arms fires on Tham Ke while hi s
Company L had cleared the first village and was wel l company prepared for its new assault . After two ai r
into Trung An . Both towns were clean ; the Marine s strikes, followed by naval gunfire, Company L
killed only three Viet Cong and detained four . Th e assaulted the village . The enemy again met th e
infantrymen found no evidence of the presence o f Marines with withering defensive fires, killing Cap-
Communist formations . By 1940, both Companies L tain Hubbel and his battalion " tac-net" radi o
and M had tied in for the night north and west o f operator . Lieutenant Colonel McQuown lost com-
Tham Khe . The night was quiet . munications with the company for a short period un-
At 0700 on the 27th, both companies moved ou t til the acting company executive officer assume d
on another sweep of the two villages . Company M command of Company L .
moved north on a line parallel to Trung An so it During the period without radio contact wit h
could begin it' s sweep of the village from north t o Company L, Lieutenant Colonel McQuown ordere d
south . Company L, with the mission to sweep Tham Company M to move east and south and join the
Ke, initially moved out to the northeast . Leading fight on the left flank of Company L . Company M
elements of Company L were almost into the sout h reached its attack position and immediately came
of Trung An when Company L's commander realiz- under heavy enemy fire . Lieutenant Colonel Mc -
ed that his leading platoon had not turned sout h Quown realized at this time that the two companie s
toward Tham Ke . Company L reversed direction im- were up against a major enemy force in well -
mediately and started toward Tham Ke . prepared defensive positions . The search of Tha m
Just as the leading platoon of Company L ap- Ke the previous day had been inadequate .
proached the edge of the village, a concealed enem y Lieutenant Colonel McQuown ordered Company I
force opened up with a devastating volume of fire to move to the south of Tham Ke . He then re -
Marines of BLT 3/1 take cover as they fight to enter the village of Tham Khe on 2 7
December after their first search of the village the previous day failed to detect th e
presence of the elaborate but well-camouflaged positions of the 116th NVA Battalion .
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A190208
quested that the SLF land the tank platoon from th e stand up in, running the full length of the village . Con-
ARG ships . Next, he instructed Company K to tak e necting tunnels ran east and west . This tunnel system sup-
the pressure off Companies L and M by attacking th e ported ground level bunkers for machine guns, RPG's, an d
small arms around the entire perimeter of the village . Thus
south end of Tham Ke . After prepping the area wit h the NVA were able to defend, reinforce, or withdraw i n
81mm mortar fire, Company K attacked agains t any direction . All defensive preparation had been artfully
fierce resistance . camouflaged with growing vegetation . Residents of Tham
Company K made no progress until the arrival o f Ke, questioned after the fight, disclosed that the NVA had
been preparing the defense of this village for one year . 30
two Marine tanks at the company' s position . Unfor-
tunately, the two tanks had sustained water damag e The search turned up numerous machine guns ,
to their communications equipment during th e RPGs, AK-47 rifles, and thousands of rounds of am -
landing and could not communicate with the infan- munition which clearly indicated that a major NVA
trymen except by voice :* This reduced their effec- force had defended the village, not local Viet Cong .
tiveness ; however, the tankers did knock out som e A dying NVA soldier confirmed it ; the enemy forc e
enemy bunkers by direct fire from their 90mm guns . had been the 116th NVA Battalion . The Marines
The inability to coordinate the tanks' fire with it s also learned that ARVN forces operating northwes t
own assault kept the company from making mor e of Tham Ke had found over 100 bodies from th e
than a limited penetration into the village complex . 116th NVA Battalion abandoned in the sand dunes .
It did, however, gain a foothold in the village amid The enemy force apparently had evacuated its
the enemy defenses . casualties through the gap between L and K Com-
Companies K, L, and M continued their battle a s panies during the night .
night fell, Lieutenant Colonel McQuown expecte d At 1800 on the 31st, a New Year's truce went int o
the enemy would use the darkness to cover thei r effect and SLF Bravo prepared to return to its ships ;
escape . To counteract this, he moved Company I t o the New Year's stand-down cancelled any furthe r
the right flank of Company K where it could main- thoughts of attacking inland . Bad weather and
tain control over the eastern, or beach side, of Tha m rough seas slowed back-loading, but by 1130, 2
Ke . Company M, to the north, could cover part of January the BLT had left the " Street Without Joy . "
the beach side of the village by fire . Lieutenant Col- In the sharp fighting at Tham Khe, the Marines suf-
onel McQuown also moved elements of both Com- fered 48 killed and 86 wounded ; 31 enemy soldiers
panies L and K to the west of Tham Ke . Even though were known dead . Tham Khe was a bitter experienc e
the extent of the area involved precluded a link-u p for the Marines of BLT 3/1, but Badger Tooth was a
of these elements, McQuown anticipated that hi s poignant tactical lesson which would be re -
unit dispositions would block the enemy within th e membered in the clouded future of 1968 .
confines of the village . Such was not the case .
The following morning, the 28th, Company K , Ballistic Arch/Kentucky V/Osceola
already in the southern edges of Tham Ke, an d 24 - 27 November, 27 November - 29 December,
Company I renewed their assault on the village . 30 December—continuing 196 8
They quickly subdued the initial heavy enemy smal l
arms fire and secured the village by noon . Mc- Eight days after leaving Cam Lo, SLF Alpha land-
Quown's Marines spent the afternoon in a detaile d ed again . While at sea, BLT 1/3's commander s
search of Tham Ke . He recalled : changed, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas turned ove r
his command to recently promoted Lieutenant Col-
This search revealed a village that was literally a defen-
sive bastion . It was prepared for all-around defense i n onel Richard W . Goodale . The 24 Novembe r
depth with a network of underground tunnels you coul d landing, Ballistic Arch, was a helicopter and surfac e
assault of Viet Cong-dominated villages on the nor-
thern coast of Quang Tri Province, only seve n
*Of the five tanks assigned to the BLT, only these two par-
ticipated in this action . One tank was under repair at Da Nang ; a kilometers south of the southern DMZ boundary .
second would not start and had to be left aboard ship . None ap- Ballistic Arch aimed at Communist sympathizer s
pear to have been properly waterproofed for landing. The third reported in and around the hamlet of Mai Xa Thi .
tank reportedly " submerged" during the landing and the other
two, though operable, "received water damage on landing ." BLT The operation was a "walk through" for most of the
3/1 AAR, Operation Badger Tooth, dtd . 16Jan68, p . 15 (Ar- battalion, but the opening minutes were tense fo r
chives, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) . the crews of the LVTP-5s of the 4th Platoon, Conn-
Rice paddy mud provides the only resistance to BLT 1 /3 Marines after poor intelligenc e
caused Operation Ballistic Arch to take place in a thoroughly pacified area of Vietnam .
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189961
18 1
the time of the departure of BLT 1/3 on 2 9 rent to the Marines' engineering effort at A-3 . Fro m
December, the Marines had completed the defensive 2 December until the 29th, 578 rounds landed o n
wire and minefield and almost finished the bunker the position . Phase V of Kentucky concluded on 2 9
complex . December . BLT 1/3 made a combined tactical foo t
Enemy contact during the stay at A-3 was ver y and motor march back to Quang Tri Airfield com-
light . The battalion experienced small enemy probe s plex . The last two days of December passed as th e
until 11 December when supporting arms broke up a BLT prepared to relieve the 2d Battalion, 4t h
platoon-size Communist attack . Enemy ground ac- Marines, then involved in Operation Osceola . Th e
tion dropped off appreciably afterward . Enemy ar- end of the year brought no slowing of the planne d
tillery, mortar, and rocket fire were the main deter - tempo of SLF operations .
CHAPTER 1 2
Pacification
The Problem Defined— County Fai r
Marine Grass-Roots-Level Participation—Reporting and Evaluatio n
An infantryman from Company D, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines demonstrates the need fo r
a viable pacification program by holding up an empty bulgur wheat sack found in a
North Vietnamese Army unit's bunker destroyed by the battalion on 26 March 1967 .
3d MarDiv ComdC, March 1967
PACIFICATION 18 3
pacification, is the formalized Government of Vietna m ed many of the diverse American and Vietnames e
program, under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Revolu- opinions and actions . Top-level U .S . and Viet-
tionary Development, in specified hamlets generall y namese policy makers agreed to consider the civilia n
within RD campaign areas . It includes the local security for
these hamlets and the political, economic, and social ac- aspects of the war as important as the military effort .
tivities at that level . This summit changed the system of priorities an d
Nation building is the economic, political, and social ac- caused the initiation of additional programs an d
tivity having an impact nationwide and/or in urban provision of more of the requisites needed to wag e
centers . It is related to pacification in that it builds on th e what many called the "other war ." Perhaps the most
results of pacification and contributes to the establishmen t
of a viable economic and social community . , significant outcome of the conference was Presiden t
Johnson's decision that only one person would direc t
Since the beginning of United States involvemen t United States pacification efforts in Vietnam . Thi s
in Vietnam, security for the rural population re- led to the establishment of the Office of Civil Opera-
mained the basic requirement for pacification, an d tions (OCO) in late autumn 1966 . This new
how best to provide this security was the subject of organization brought the various U .S . civilian
continuing debate between American and Viet- pacification programs under the control of a senio r
namese officials . The military side contended that official who, in turn, reported directly to the deput y
the problem was a fundamental military issue, tha t ambassador .
physical security of the contested area must b e
The South Vietnamese Government assigned th e
established before starting any developmental pro -
overall responsibility for the Vietnamese side of th e
grams ; civil officials, on the other hand, viewed th e
national pacification plan, the Revolutionar y
problem as a political issue, stating that political ,
Development Program, to Major General Nguye n
economic, and social developmental projects woul d
Duc Thang, who headed the newly created Ministr y
make greater inroads on Communist influence an d
of Revolutionary Development . A reorganization o f
therefore should have greater priority . The con-
the Vietnamese war cabinet on 12 July 1966 gav e
trasting views led to the initiation of programs whic h
Thang direct supervision over the Ministries o f
often resulted in duplication, as well as confusion o n
Revolutionary Development, Agriculture, Publi c
the part of the Vietnamese offices charged with im-
Works, and Interior . At this juncture, Thang gaine d
plementing and administering them . To hel p
authority to direct coordination and integration o f
already overloaded local administrators, MAC V
civil/military Revolutionary Development activitie s
dispatched more American advisors to the provinces ,
at all echelons of the government .
but, unfortunately, in many cases their presence ac-
The main operational element for the civil aspect s
tually retarded pacification progress . Zealous ad -
of Revolutionary Development was the 59-ma n
visors often stifled local initiative .
Revolutionary Development cadre team . The
At the same time, MACV experienced equally government recruited these teams from within each
perplexing problems . While MACV perceived tha t district, trained them at the National Cadre Trainin g
security was the first prerequisite for a successful pro - School at Vung Tau, and returned them to their pro-
gram, it had difficulty implementing a sound , vinces for assignment to a district thief for work in
balanced management system . As in the civilian pro - one of his hamlets . Their first task involved th e
grams, military civic action concepts evolved by trial security and defense of their assigned hamlets . Onc e
and error . they established security they started working wit h
The Vietnamese had experimented with pacifica- the people to create a better way of life within th e
tion programs since 1954 . Based on past experience , hamlet .
a new program emerged late in 1965 . The Viet- In September, to ensure military assistance for th e
namese adopted the concept of the armed propagan- program, the South Vietnamese appointed Genera l
da cadre as the basis for the national program : Th e Thang to the position of assistant .for territorial af-
civil side of the program began slowly in 1966 , fairs and pacification to the Chief, Joint Genera l
primarily because of the shortage of trained cadre , Staff . Major functions of his position include d
but the Vietnamese Government provided en- development of policies and concepts for military ac-
thusiastic direction and the prospects for success wer e tivities in support of revolutionary development an d
optimistic . supervision of the employment, maneuver, an d
In February 1966, the Honolulu Conference align- training of regional and popular forces . The primary
Revolutionary Development role of the militar y dinating Council had performed a very similar func-
forces required achieving a level of security whic h tion for 20 months .
would permit the accomplishment of civil activitie s By early August 1965, Marine civic action had ex-
and subsequent nation building . The 1967 Combin- panded to the point that coordination with othe r
ed Campaign Plan assigned the primary mission o f United States agencies in I Corps became imperativ e
supporting the Revolutionary Development progra m for the effective support of the Vietnamese pacifica-
to ARVN forces, thus, by the end of 1966, the Sout h tion program . General Walt ordered the creation o f
Vietnamese Government had taken major steps to the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council . The counci l
consolidate its pacification programs . * drew its members from all major U .S . and Viet-
namese agencies in I CTZ, including representative s
As the Vietnamese reorganized, the American s
also continued to reform their own programs . The from both Marine and ARVN military staffs . Whe n
the council met on 30 August 1965, it was the firs t
Office of Civil Operations (OCO) confidently
working regional council of its kind in South Viet-
reported that it had integrated the pacification effor t
with military operations and was making significan t nam . This organizational step preceded the forma-
progress in implementing the various programs . On e tion of subcommittees for public health, education ,
roads, refugees, distribution, and police . Although
of the most important OCO contributions was th e
the Joint Coordinating Council had no directive -
appointment of four regional directors, one for eac h
corps area . These four men had full authority over all making authority or material resources of its own ,
American civilians in their respective regions an d the influence of its members made it the most effec-
tive group for carrying out the total pacification pro -
reported directly to the director of OCO ; previousl y
there had been no central management of th e gram in I Corps .* By the fall of 1966, she success o f
the council encouraged and assisted the formation o f
various pacification programs . During the spring o f
1967, the United States realized that it needed a other joint coordinating councils ()CC) . These JCC s
stronger organization and placed all of the variou s were independent of the corps-level council, but ha d
similar staffs and missions . As 1967 began, growin g
components of the American pacification effort ,
Vietnamese participation in council activities an d
both civilian and military, under a single manager ,
sponsored programs indicated the value of the JC C
ComUSMACV . The name of the new organizatio n
was Civil Operations and Revolutionary Develop- approach .
ment Support (CORDS) . During 1965 III MAF created a fifth general staff
On 23 May, MACV Directive 10-12 implemente d section, G-5, to coordinate all civic action programs .
CORDS . Ambassador Robert Komer becam e The Marines established G-5/S-5 sections in ever y
General Westmoreland's deputy for CORDS wit h Marine division, regiment, and battalion serving i n
full responsibility for the entire program . The direc- Vietnam . At the same time, to prevent overlap o f
tive specifically charged the ambassador with "super- projects, III MAF assigned responsibility for the
vising the formulation and execution of all plans , coordination of civic action in particula r
policies and programs, military and civilian, whic h geographical areas to specific units . This enable d
support the GVN's revolutionary development pro - them to coordinate all programs within their area s
gram and related programs ." In addition, the direc- with local government officials . By the end of 1966 ,
tive provided for the integration and consolidation these two steps formed a sound base for both the III
of all OCO and revolutionary development suppor t MAF and Vietnamese pacification programs .
activities at all levels : nation, corps, province, and Following the formation of CORDS, many of th e
district . The OCO regional director became th e functions of the III MAF G-5 section shifted to th e
deputy for CORDS to each corps commander, whil e
CORDS representatives at III MAF Headquarters .
the senior provincial and district advisors becam e
Such a shift inevitably caused some friction betwee n
CORDS representatives at those levels . Accommoda- the two offices . Among them was the tendency o f
tion of this extensive program proved to be a simpl e
matter in I Corps, chiefly because the I Corps Coor -
*Vice Admiral Thomas R . Weschler wrote that General Walt 's
*For a detailed description of the Revolutionary Developmen t leadership was the key element that molded the various agencie s
Program during 1966 and the development of the Combine d into a team dedicated to a successful pacification campaign . Vic e
Campaign for 1967, see Shulimson, U. S . Marines in Vietnam, Admiral Thomas R . Weschler, Comments on draft ms, 18Jun8 1
1966. (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)
PACIFICATION 18 5
the CORDS staff to report through their own chan- which all levels of legal government could functio n
nels directly to Saigon, bypassing III MAF . Despit e without enemy interference . To this end, th e
daily meetings, the G-5 section believed that muc h Marines' main objective was the isolation of the V C
information from the CORDS system was no t from the people, both physically and economically .
reaching the G-5 . "As CORDS took on more of th e Golden Fleece operations, in which Marines provid-
responsibility for pacification from the G-5, " wrot e ed security during rice harvests, had proven suc-
Colonel James L . Black, who served as III MAF G-5 , cessful in protecting the villagers' rice crops sinc e
"coordination among the [III MAF] G-3, G-2, an d September 1965 ; however, they occurred only dur-
G-5 became almost non-existent . " III MAF sharpl y ing the two or three yearly harvest seasons . On th e
reduced the size of the G-5 section and it almost in- other hand, the war on the VC infrastructure was a
tegrated into the CORDS staff. However, in spite o f daily affair .
being the smallest staff section in III MAF, G-5 re- The source of the enemy's strength was the loca l
mained charged with major requirements to suppor t guerilla organization which operated in 5- to 10-ma n
the pacification effort . 2 cells within each hamlet . Each cell acted as a
The G-5 officer found a number of obstacles in hi s clandestine de facto government which worked t o
path . Even though the Army's 29th Civil Affair s foster Communist influence, while simultaneousl y
Company supported III MAF, the growth of CORD S undermining the influence of local officials and th e
blurred the command relationship between III MA F central government . If the local population was no t
and the company . Further, Colonel Black did no t sympathetic to the Communist cause, the guerilla s
believe the company's task organization properl y resorted to intimidation and terror to control in -
reflected its mission . Another limiting factor was th e habitants . Each guerrilla acted as an agent betwee n
lack of understanding of civil affairs among Marine s the people and the VC main force units which need-
assigned to G-5/S-5 staffs at all command levels . ed food, recruits, and intelligence . Simply stated ,
Few had been school trained in their duties and ha d pacification involved eliminating the agents an d
to learn on-the-job . Those with formal school train- thus reducing the large Communist units to th e
ing had to learn to shift their thinking fro m status of conventional forces groping around i n
theoretical, classroom concepts to the practical situa- hostile territory . Furthermore, with the destructio n
tion at hand . The learning process slowed progress i n of the guerrilla infrastructure, the seeds of RVN in-
the III MAF civil affairs effort . fluence could fall on neutral, if not completely fer-
The importance placed upon civic action require d tile, ground .
the III MAF G-5 to submit a daily civic action repor t The Marines recognized these realities during th e
to FMFPac headquarters . The report included such early stages of the campaign and devised severa l
topics as the amount of lumber, clothing, garbage , techniques to combat the guerrillas . One of the most
and other material distributed to the Vietnamese successful, initiated in 1966, was the County Fai r
people during the last 24 hours . This classified concept . Basically, County Fairs involved elaborate
report could not be delayed, not even by heavy cordon and search operations conducted by combin-
message traffic during peak operational periods . "I f ed ARVN and Marine forces . Since the South Viet-
this report did not reach FMFPac within 24 hours, " namese government needed to know who belonged
wrote Colonel Black, "you would receive a 'nasty ' where, the ARVN handled the population contro l
phone call [from Hawaii] ." The reports proble m aspects, as well as the actual searching of the targete d
ended, according to Colonel Black, in the spring o f village, while the Marines usually remained in th e
1968 .3 background, providing tactical,"muscle . "
County Fair Once the combined commanders selected a n
Throughout 1967, the Marines concentrated o n operational area, Marine units moved in at night an d
the basics of pacification development . In accor- established a cordon around the designated villag e
dance with the Honolulu Declaration of 1966, th e to prevent the VC, if any, from escaping or gainin g
Marines directed much of their effort at the expan- reinforcements . At dawn, ARVN troops entered th e
sion and refinement of the pacification program the y village, rounded up the inhabitants, apologized fo r
had initiated earlier . For their programs to succeed , the inconvenience, and announced that they intend-
the Marines needed to provide secure conditions i n ed to search the hamlet . While district and villag e
which the Vietnamese people could live and in leaders mingled with the people explaining what was
happening, other officials checked identificatio n and ARVN units left the area, they took with the m
cards and took a census . the security essential to the survival of pro -
The allies tried to make the experience as pleasan t government villages . Even if the allies eradicated
as possible . They set up a temporary dispensary to the existing VC infrastructure, their departur e
provide the villagers with free medical and denta l created a vacuum into which other guerrilla cadre
care . They fed the people, including providing can- could filter . During a survey conducted by Marin e
dy and other delights for the children . Entertain- civil affairs personnel in the Chu Lai area, mos t
ment featured movies, live presentations, and ban d civilians interviewed stated that they appreciated the
concerts which helped to cover the serious busines s medical care, the clothing, the new schools, and al l
of uprooting the Communists . These organized of the other benefits, but what they really wante d
amusements provided the name "County Fair . " was protection from the Viet Cong . Revolutionar y
While the distractions continued in the assembly Development teams and Popular Forces could onl y
area, South Vietnamese troops systematically comb- partially remedy the situation because of thei r
ed the village . Often the guerrillas slipped into tun- limited training and armament . The Marines rea-
nels or spider holes at the first sign of approachin g lized these facts, but they also recognized the unex-
troops, but if the troops discovered the undergroun d ploited potential which the popular forces offered :
hiding place they literally smoked out the VC . O n total familiarity with local conditions, loyalties ,
some operations, the searchers used portable needs, and every physical characteristic of their hom e
blowers, called "Mighty Mites," to saturate the shafts villages . Marine recognition of this potential, and ef-
with tear gas and smoke .* If the guerrillas chose t o forts to develop it, produced one of the most pro-
run away, they encountered the Marine cordon ductive innovations in I Corps, the Combined Ac-
around the village . tion Program .
While these operations proved successful, Count y
Marine Grass-Roots-Level Participatio n
Fairs were not an end in themselves . When Marin e
The birth of the Combined Action Program occur -
*The term Mighty Mite should not be confused with the similar red in the summer of 1965 in Lieutenant Colonel
nickname for a light vehicle used as a jeep by Marine units in th e William W . Taylor's 3d Battalion, 4th Marines as a
1960s . means of controlling the population around the Phu
PACIFICATION 18 7
Bai combat base . The battalion civil affairs officer , be organized into Combined Action Companies .* In
discussions, stress the mutual benefits of the program i n
Captain John J . Mullen, Jr ., provided the origina l
that Marines can profit from Popular Forces knowledge o f
inspiration . Understanding the Vietnamese culture , area, language, and people while the Popular Force wil l
Mullen realized that the militia troops living in th e receive valuable training and will be provided additiona l
villages were the key to local security . Rural Vietna- security . Of primary importance is the fact that this rela-
mese had an orientation toward families, ancestors , tionship will provide a basis for better understanding an d
and hamlets ; they were not strong nationalists . Mos t building of mutual respect between our forces . In presen-
ting the program to RVN officials, avoid the use of the
farmers spent their entire lives within a 10-mil e
terms " operational control " by substituting "cooperatio n
radius of their hamlets . PFs usually performed poor- or coordination . "
ly if moved to another district, but in defense o f
their own homes they could be tough . In the war 3 . Insure a thorough indoctrination on the overall aims o f
with the VC, motivation alone could not overcome programs to all concerned . These are to improve the effec-
tiveness and prestige of the Popular Forces with a view to
superior firepower and experience . Mullen believe d
increasing recruitment to build up this critically
the Marines could add the necessary ingredients and , understrength force . The importance of the Popular Forces
given proper leadership and firepower, the PFs no t to provide security for rear areas, which will allo w
only could, but would stand up to the VC . Marine/ARVN combat forces to move forward, cannot be
Lieutenant Colonel Taylor agreed with Mullen' s overstressed . At every opportunity when dealing wit h
GVN officials, highlight the Popular Force problem an d
idea and, on 3 August 1965, he sent four squads o f assess the adequacy of the program at local levels to im-
Marines to work with six platoons of PFs in the thre e prove this force .
villages northwest of his perimeter . First Lieutenant
Paul R . Ek, who spoke Vietnamese, became th e 4 . Upon receipt of this letter, report :
company commander and a PF lieutenant worked a s a. Location of Popular Force units in area of operation .
b. Assigned mission of each unit .
his executive officer . Under this leadership, the pro - c. Commander .
gram got underway . d. Personnel present for duty .
Lieutenant Ek's success with combined actio n e. Amount and condition of equipment .
prompted III MAF to expand the program . General f. Uniform requirements .
Walt, a strong advocate of the pacification program , g. Plans for implementing program .
approved of the results at Phu Bai and, in Januar y
5 . After the initial report submit summary of operations
1966, decided to initiate similar programs at D a conducted and evaluation of the program on a weekl y
Nang and Chu Lai .* General Walt's initiating orde r basis . ,
stated :
By January 1966, there were seven combined ac-
1. . . . the Commanding General, .I Corps has concurred tion platoons in existence ; by July, 38 ; and by the
in III MAF proposal to expand the Marine-Popular Forc e
program throughout all Marine enclaves and has publishe d beginning of 1967 the number had risen to 57 . II I
instructions to subordinates throughout I Corps . MAF planned still more .
While it was important to have the support of II I
2. Action will be taken immediately to establish liaiso n MAF command levels for combined action, the suc-
through Province, District, and down to village/hamlet as cess or failure of the venture ultimately rested on th e
required to take operational control of Popular Force unit s
within a zone of action in accordance with reference (b) . I n shoulders of 19- and 20-year-old Marines . Combine d
each case ensure that local officials thoroughly understan d Action units needed a special Marine ; a man withou t
the program and have been apprised of General Thi's let - the necessary motivation, understanding, and com-
ter . Specifically, presentations will include that Marin e passion could do more harm than good . All Marine s
forces intend to establish communications to Popular Forc e in the original program were volunteers with at least
units, provide supporting arms, reserve forces, and plan t o
place Marines with selected Popular Force Platoons . Where four months' combat experience, a favorable recom-
possible Popular Force units in proximity to each other wil l mendation from their commanding officer, n o
record of disciplinary action, and, all important, n o
*Captain Mullen, who replaced Lieutenant Ek upon the latter' s discernible racial prejudices . These men were the
rotation in September 1965, and several members of the origina l
company assisted and advised in the establishment of the second *The name of these units soon changed to Combined Actio n
unit . Lieutenant Colonel John J . Mullen, Jr ., Comments on draft Platoons (CAPs) . The Marines found that the acronym "CAC "
ms, 21May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington , was, under certain pronunciations, a vulgarity in the Vietnames e
D .C .) language .
PACIFICATION 189
celerated enemy defections, but it also reinforced th e resident of either village . . . all the eligible resident males ,
permanency of the . CAP program in the minds of th e who should have been members of the PF platoons, wer e
gone! They had been drafted into the ARVN, joined th e
peasants . VC, or deserted the village to keep from [serving in eithe r
All of these activities contributed to the growth o f the ARVN or VC] . The strength of each PF platoon i n
the villagers' belief in their own government an d these villages never exceeded 20 men . . . .
their allies . Perhaps the most important factor in Marine [and PF] members of the CAP platoon . . . kep t
promoting confidence in the program was the fac t themselves aloof from the villagers they were supposed to
be helping . . . .
that the Viet Cong had not regained control of an y There was no record of either CAP unit capturing a VC ,
area in which a CAP had established security . Th e let alone destroying the VC infrastructure in these villages .
presence of a successful CAP in a village complex In fact, the VC operated with impunity around thes e
prohibited further use of that village by the VC . villages unless elements of 3/1 were in the area . . . .
Not all CAP units succeeded, especially durin g [The chiefs of the two villages], both many time s
wounded [and] ardent anti-communist leaders, chose to
the period of rapid expansion of the program . deal directly with [the battalion S-2 and S-5 sections] wit h
Lieutenant Colonel Max McQuown, the comman- respect to VC activity and civic action programs . Both
ding officer of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, was no t chiefs were instrumental in initiating 3/1 action agains t
favorably impressed with either of the two units i n VC operating in and around their villages . Neither chie f
had faith that the CAP units would accomplish anything . ,
his battalion TAOR . He described the problems o f
these units :
The existence of similar problems among a
Few of the Marines assigned to these two CAP units ha d number of CAP units, which were traceable to rapi d
prior ground combat experience . . . . [They] were an ad-
expansion of the program, was apparent to III MA F
mixture out of combat service support units . The leaders
and the Marines under them . . . lacked skills in scoutin g headquarters . To enhance the program's effec-
and patrolling, mines and booby traps, map reading , tiveness, General Cushman, the new III MAF com-
observed fire procedures, basic infantry tactics, and V C mander, established a provisional combined actio n
tactics and techniques . Further, they had scant knowledge group (CAG) headquarters at Da Nang . Th e
of the Vietnamese language and were unfamiliar with th e
primary purpose of this provisional CAG was t o
social and religious customs of the people they were livin g
with . oversee training and support of the combined actio n
With respect to their PF counterparts, not one PF was a units . A month later, III MAF formed two more
A large South Vietnamese flag flies over the bunkers and barbed wire protecting the
gate leading into the headquarters of Combined Action Platoon 3-1 in August 1967 .
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189537
PACIFICATION 19 1
tions of indigenous citizens are of the same importance a s ample, in two months' time one rallier identified
those of all other human beings . 9 more than 30 VC .
Despite the heavy language, the approach seemed Achieving the full potential of the rallier s
helpful . By the end of 1967, the Personal Response demanded rigid screening and orientation . Six par-
Project had become one of the anchors of III MAF's ticipated in combat operations on a trial basis in Oc-
civic action program . Lieutenant Colonel Donald L . tober 1966 . The hoi chanhs' intimate knowledge of
Evans, the III MAF assistant G-5 at the time the pro- the terrain, their familiarity with local people, an d
ject started, stated that he considered the Persona l their knowledge of the VC modus operandi prove d
Response Project as important as psychological invaluable to the tactical units . When Genera l
operations and the Combined Action Program ."' Nickerson, then commanding the 1st Marine Divi-
sion, learned of the success of the trial, he ordere d
The Marines realized that any effective pacifica- that all qualified returnees join field units as soon a s
tion plan must have both a political and a possible . General Nickerson also originated the ne w
psychological impact . They found that civic actio n collective name for the hoi chanhs; he called the m
and psychological operations had to be mutuall y Kit Carson Scouts, after the famous guide of th e
supporting and to obtain a maximum benefit, re- western frontier . At the end of 1966, 19 scout s
quired close coordination with Vietnamese officials . served in the 1st Marine Division program .
To this end, the County Fair and Combined Actio n In February 1967, General Walt ordered the pro -
Programs proved most effective . Other join t gram adopted throughout III MAF . A newl y
psychological operations involved relocation o f established Kit Carson Training Center standardize d
refugees from VC controlled areas and the support o f scout training, and by the end of December 13 2
tactical operations with armed propaganda teams' scouts served with Marine units in I Corps . During
presentations, leaflet drops, audio-visual produc- the year 1967, scouts killed 58 Viet Cong, capture d
tions, combat loudspeaker performances, and movi e 37, and seized 82 weapons . Equally important to th e
festivals . Vietnamese Cultural Drama Teams serve d Marines operating with them was the scouts '
in Marine operational areas to entertain local discovery of 145 mines and explosive devices .
peasants ; these teams presented short dramas an d Among other civic action programs employed b y
songs weaving in appropriate political points . the Marines during 1967, public health and educa-
The most significant psychological effort was the
Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program . This was the Pham Duoc, a veteran offive months as a Kit Carso n
government's campaign to win over the Viet Cong . Scout, points on a map to likely Viet Cong hidin g
The government provided them with assistance for a places to LCpI R . D . Kilmer and Cpl P . F. Collins,
new start by teaching them a trade to use whe n while fellow Scout Ho Quyet (center) watches.
returning to their homes . Ralliers (hoi chanhs) ofte n
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189519
provided valuable information, especially regardin g
the location of troops and equipment caches, bu t
more importantly, III MAF believed this progra m
provided still another avenue for achieving pacifica-
tion . Consequently, III MAF accelerated planning t o
support the Chieu Hoi Program . Planned suppor t
included the building of new Chieu Hoi centers t o
increase the handling capability of the returnees .
During 1967, the Chieu Hoi Program accom-
modated 2,539 ralliers in I Corps .
In July 1966, the Marines used hoi chanhs for th e
first time during a County Fair operation . The hoi
chanhs addressed small groups of villagers t o
describe the Viet Cong methods and intentions, as
well as the benefits of the Government's Revolu-
tionary Development Program . The success of hoi
chanh employment rapidly became apparent ; for ex -
PACIFICATION 193
tion continued to be keystones of the effort . Of the materials, technical advice, and heavy equipment .
two, medical assistance produced the most im- Each application required coordination with th e
mediate results . Almost every unit conducte d local government and CORDS officials to ensure
medical and dental civic action projects (MedCAP s compatibility with overall national school construc-
and DentCAPs) for their humanitarian value . As an tion plans .
adjunct to MedCAPs, Navy medical personne l Even more widespread than the school buildin g
distributed medical supplies to the Vietnamese an d programs were those of providing school supplies .
Vietnamese medical workers . Most of the refugee village schools needed every typ e
The Public Health Program bridged the gap bet- of school supply . Elementary school kits from the
ween pure medical assistance and self-help projects . Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE )
These efforts operated under the aegis of CORD S were the most popular item distributed to individual
and the supervision of the Public Health Committe e students . Classroom supply kits, also from CARE ,
of I Corps' JCC . A general sanitation campaign in- went to those students who needed onl y
cluded trash removal, innoculations, preventiv e replacements . By the end of 1967, almost ever y
medicine, pest control, and water purification . school-age child in I Corps had received, at one tim e
Just as good health was a prerequisite to the or another, one of the CARE kits .
villagers' general well being, education was man- These humanitarian programs were very difficul t
datory for economic and social growth . Medical to accomplish in actual practice . Committing a bat-
assistance, particularly the MedCAP efforts, produc- talion to an operation outside its TAOR or transfer -
ed immediate, tangible results ; conversely the II I ring it to another area could often disrupt the con-
MAF civil education program offered few short-ter m tinuity of the pacification effort within a village .
advantages, but the Marines could not ignore the re- Vietnamese teachers were understandably reluctan t
quirement for education and its long-range impact . to risk their lives by working in newly-built school s
During 1967, the Marines expanded the school in contested villages . In addition, as Lieutenant Col-
building project they started during the spring o f onel McQuown of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marine s
1966 . They coordinated this program through th e pointed out, some projects required a 48-hour day t o
Education Committee of I Corps JCC to determin e complete . "The Vietnamese people," he wrote ,
the hamlets that wanted to participate . Each par- "labored from dawn to darkness just to farm an d
ticipating hamlet provided an adequate school site , raise enough food to subsist . At the end of the work-
agreed to provide labor for its construction, arrange d ing day they were too tired to be interested in a lec-
for a teacher, and paid the teacher's salary . In return , ture on the necessity of screening or covering a toile t
the Marines agreed to provide construction that had been open for 3,000 years . . . ."" In spite of
PACIFICATION 19 5
Each component of the system depended on th e HES, like the Marine system, operated on a
others, thus the evaluation could not reflect a grea t monthly reporting cycle . The heart of the system wa s
achievement in the category "Establishment of Loca l the Hamlet Evaluation Worksheet (HEW), whic h
Government" until the village made large advance s each district advisor prepared for each of his district ' s
in the category " Destruction of Enemy Units . " A hamlets possessing some degree of Government con-
high score in " Completion of Initial New Life trol . The advisor analyzed each hamlet's pacificatio n
Hamlet Programs" was possible only if it represente d status in terms of six general categories :
gains in security and the establishment of local ap-
paratus in the village . A score of 60 points for a 1. VC military activitie s
village indicated that government had establishe d 2. VC political and subversive activities
3. Security (friendly capabilities )
firm influence . A "pacified" village was one whic h
4. Administrative and political activitie s
attained the grade of 80 points . The system prove d 5. Health, education, and welfar e
to be highly successful and, with minor refinements , 6. Economic development
became the basic technique used by the Marines to
assess pacification progress . At the end of 1967, it re- Each of the six categories received a rating in-
mained the standard system . dicator, from A (best) through E . The advisor als o
The Hamlet Evaluation System, devised by th e completed a multiple-choice list of 14 question s
Department of Defense in conjunction with the U .S . about the hamlet's problems during the month .
Mission Council, Vietnam, appeared in Decembe r Despite the basic differences between the Marines '
1966 . Patterned after the Marine evaluation system , System and the HES, the systems proved compatibl e
it differed in several important areas : as well as complementary .
Neither system was flawless, however . Both re-
The HES system focused on the hamlet level, while th e quired a great deal of work to compile statistics tha t
Marine system graded villages . were not always meaningful . As Colonel Black, th e
HES presented the results of its hamlet evaluation in let -
III MAF G-5 noted, the fact a village chief slept i n
ter form, while the Marine project rated the village b y
numerical percentage . his village was misleading . "If the chief did," wrote
Several HES elements required subjective evaluation , Black, "the usual assumption was made that
while the Marine system was basically objective . pacification was really in progress . [However, the ]
HES evaluated all areas in which Government authorit y chief could be VC and sleep in the village and th e
was present, while the Marines' system rated only those
villages in which III MAF influence was present . village or hamlet could be under VC control . "
HES utilized the advisory structure for its information Nevertheless, III MAF considered the village repor t
while the Marine system used the military structure .1 2 the better indicator of pacified areas .13
PART VI
SUPPORT AND CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 1 3
Supporting Arms
Marine Air Operations—Fixed-Wing Operations—Helicopter Operations—Artillery
Sunlight reflects from a .50 caliber machine gun sticking from the side of a CH-46 A
helicopter as it heads out on a late afternoon mission to a unit southwest of An Hoa .
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A42167 5
199
SUPPORTING ARMS 20 1
necessity of a unified air defense system in the even t (TOT), and a prescribed ordnance load ;* th e
of a North Vietnamese air attack on South Vietnam . squadron scheduling officer merely assigned pilots
The agreement gave the Air Force overall air defens e and aircraft .
responsibility, including naming an air defense com-
mander . The 1st MAW designated which of it s
forces would participate in air defense and grante d
the Air Force certain authority over those forces, in-
cluding the scrambling of alert aircraft, designatio n
of targets, declaration of Hawk missile control status ,
and firing orders .
Marine commanders were essentally satisfied wit h
the adequacy of these documents . In actual practice ,
1st MAW controlled all air operations in support of
ground units in I Corps while making available 25 to
30 sorties per day to the Seventh Air Force . 2 This
system remained in effect until the advent of "single
management" in early 1968 .
Fixed-Wing Operations
In the absence of enemy aircraft over South Viet-
nam, the day-to-day mission of the 1st MAW fighte r
and fighter attack squadrons became close air sup -
port (CAS) . 3 By long-established doctrinal defini-
tion, these air strikes were against targets so close t o Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A42181 5
friendly forces that each mission required integratio n A Marine forward air controller in a small 0-1 obser-
with the fire and maneuver plans of the ground com- vation aircraft checks a target after directing an air-
bat element . For better coordination and to reduc e strike on the position by fixed-wing attack aircraft .
the possibility of friendly casualties, a forward ai r
controller (FAC) with the supported unit or an air - At the appropriate time, the aircraft took off and
borne forward air controller (FAC[A]) controlle d headed for the target . Once airborne, the fligh t
these strikes . leader contacted TADC to confirm that his fligh t
There were two basic categories of CAS mission , was airborne and proceeding on schedule . Usuall y
preplanned and immediate . A preplanned strike was the TADC simply cleared the leader for his origina l
the culmination of a complex process . For example , mission, but if a target of higher priority developed ,
a Marine battalion commander with the mission o f the TADC could divert the flight . In this case ,
taking a specified objective normally would submit a before entering the new operating area, the leade r
request for strike aircraft through his air liaison of- contacted the responsible DASC, which cleared th e
ficer the day before the operation began . From th e flight to a local controller . Normally this was a divi-
battalion this request passed through the DASC a t sion air liaison officer (ALO) or a Marine or Air Forc e
division and eventually to the wing TADC at D a FAC(A) flying over the area of the infantry unit to
Nang . There, the TADC assimilated all requests and be supported .
assigned missions to one of the three fixed-win g FAC(A)s in either light observation planes or UH -
groups, depending on the nature of the target an d 1E helicopters controlled most CAS missions in I
aircraft type desired for the mission .
*Colonel John M . Verdi pointed out that this system did not
As soon as the TADC passed the mission to a relieve the squadron commander of his responsibilities . The
MAG, the group operations officers compared th e squadron commander had to carefully supervise the weight an d
balance of the prescribed load on the aircraft to avoid unnecessary
orders with aircraft availability within the group an d
danger to the crew and aircraft during takeoff and comba t
assigned a schedule to each squadron for the follow- maneuvering. Col John M . Verdi, Comments on draft ms, 4Jun8 1
ing day . Each mission passed by TADC throug h (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .), hereafte r
group received a mission number, a time on target Verdi Comments .
Corps . During these missions, the airborne con - resources . If a FAC(A) was available in the objective
troller monitored the ground unit's VHF radio ne t area, he controlled the strikes, but his services were
and directed the attacking aircraft over his UH F not mandatory because the distance from the targe t
radio . When a flight arrived on station, the FAC in - to friendly forces eliminated the chance of accidenta l
formed the pilots* of the target description, eleva- bombing . However, pilots of strike aircraft ofte n
tion, attack heading, direction of pull-out, number preferred to work with a FAC(A) on such mission s
of passes desired, and the number and type o f because of the latter's greater familiarity with target s
bombs to be dropped on each pass . He also relaye d and enemy defenses in the area . 4
the direction and distance to the nearest friendl y The aircraft most frequently selected for close sup -
units . The FAC then marked the target with a whit e port missions was the Douglas A-4E Skyhawk . Col-
phosphorous rocket or a smoke grenade . Once cer- onel Jay W . Hubbard's MAG-12 included four A- 4
tain that the pilots had identified the correct target , squadrons . The A-4E was a small, highl y
the controller cleared the jet for an approach wit h maneuverable, attack jet capable of extremely ac -
the phrase " cleared hot ." Thus instructed, the fligh t curate bombing . The Skyhawk could deliver a varie-
leader would make the first pass on the marke d ty of ordnance including bombs, rockets, napalm ,
target, followed closely by his wingman . smoke, and 20mm cannon fire . The most significan t
Throughout the strike, the ALO or FAC would rela y performance limitation of the A-4 was the size of it s
corrections to the attack planes, often directing the m payload, roughly 3,000 pounds . *
to new targets as the Communist troops maneuvere d The McDonnell F-4B Phantom II was a more ver-
or fled . satile aircraft . Four F-4 squadrons operated in Viet-
While preplanned missions required approx- nam during 1967, one assigned to Colonel Frankli n
imately 20 hours from time of request to time o f C . Thomas, Jr . 's MAG-11, at Da Nang and thre e
delivery, the wing could respond much more quickl y with Colonel Douglas D . Petty, Jr .'s MAG-13 .
if necessary . This response was an "immediate mis- Designed to perform the primary air-to-air missio n
sion ." If an emergency developed, the TADC o r and modified to perform a secondary air-to-groun d
DASCs diverted airborne flights to another target , mission, the F-4 was one of the fastest interceptors i n
and briefed them en route to the new target . Th e the world, yet it could carry as many as twenty-fou r
TADC also could launch aircraft from one of thre e 500-pound bombs for ground support . ,
"hot pads . " Each of the three fixed-wing group s Lieutenant Colonel John M . Verdi commented ,
maintained four planes on an around-the-clock aler t however, that this was a theoretical figure that di d
for this type of emergency . Two of the planes at eac h not reflect the realities of combat . He wrote recently :
group were on primary alert, and the other tw o . . . the F-4 could be loaded with as many as 24 Mk-8 2
served as a backup in case of another emergency . Th e bombs . . . But (1) not an F-4B (unless one elected to g o
time lapse between notification to launch and unti l with 2,000 pounds less than full internal fuel so as to com-
the on-call aircraft became airborne normally wa s ply with max gross weight), and (2) not if the target was
anywhere further away than the end of the runway . I
just under 10 minutes . As soon as a flight of alert air -
daresay somebody might have hauled such a load in com-
craft became airborne, another flight replaced it o n bat (to get his picture taken), but in the real tactical world
the pad . the choices came down to TANK-3-6-3-TANK ([as di d
Another important aspect of Marine fixed-win g VMFA-] 122 and most USAF units) and 3-3-TANK-3- 3
operations was deep air support . These strikes di d (most Navy units) . Of course, Brand X [squadrons] did i t
6-3-TANK-3-6, which (1) overloaded the airplane, (2 )
not take place in the immediate vicinity of friendly
cracked the wing spars, and (3) gave the crew an un-
forces and, therefore, did not require integration manageable rolling moment in event of failure of one of
with the ground maneuver plan . Deep air suppor t those outboard MElts (multiple ejection racks] to release or
missions helped isolate the battlefield by destroyin g jettison (something [the Air Force] found out when they
enemy reinforcements, support troops, and logisti c tried it, which is why they went back to TANK-3-6-3 -
TANK . ) 6
SUPPORTING ARMS 20 3
Two other types of Marine aircraft available fo r example of integrated employment of modern ,
ground support operations during 1967 were th e fixed-wing aviation in support of ground maneuve r
Ling-Temco-Vought F-8E Crusader and the Grum- elements . In the two weeks of bitter fighting fo r
man A6-A Intruder . One squadron of each typ e Hills 881 North and South, the 1st MAW flew more
served under MAG-11 at Da Nang . than 1,000 sorties for Marine infantry units . Th e
The Crusader carried internally mounted 20m m defeat of the enemy on this critical terrain was th e
cannon and was the only Marine aircraft in Vietna m product of skillful and closely coordinated air -
configured to carry more than one 2,000-poun d ground action .
bomb until the arrival of the A-6A . Because the As the enemy continued to focus on norther n
F-8Es were originally designed as a high performance Quang Tri Province, Marine aviation, from 2 Jun e
fighter, the Marines phased out these planes and under the command of Major General Norman J .
replaced them with F-4s . 7 Anderson, increased the tempo of attack operation s
The morning of 1 April, VMA(AW)-533, com- there . Primary targets were enemy artillery an d
manded by Lieutenant Colonel Williams P . Brown , rocket sites, a major threat to allied units and in-
arrived at Chu Lai to become MAG-12's first A- 6 stallations along the DMZ . By July, intelligence of-
squadron .* The A-6A was the only operational U .S . ficers had identified approximately 130 sites, in-
aircraft that had a self-contained all-weather bomb- cluding weapons as large as 152mm gun-howitzers .
ing capability using a moving target indicator .8 I t The heaviest raids against these positions occurre d
flew extensive interdiction missions during the mon- during and after the battle for Con Thien, whe n
soon season, not only in South Vietnam, but also i n Marine aircraft participated in joint operations calle d
Laos and North Vietnam . The Intruder could carry a Headshed, Neutralize, and Eradicate . These opera-
heavy bomb load to a target 400 miles away, drop it s tions received the acronym SLAM, for searching ,
ordnance, and return to base, even during sever e locating, annihilating, and monitoring . This con-
monsoon conditions . cept used the entire spectrum of supporting fire :
The increase in heavy ground action in northern I B-52s, tactical air, artillery, and naval gunfire .
Corps during the early months of 1967 brough t Elements of the Seventh Air Force, Strategic Ai r
demands for many more close and direct air suppor t Command, Seventh Fleet, Vietnamese Air Force ,
missions in that region . The heavy fighting at Khe Marine and Army artillery, and 1st MAW concen-
Sanh in late April and early May provided a classi c trated on destroying the enemy fire support posi-
tions . By the end of the year, the effort destroye d
*Lieutenant Colonel Howard Wolf's VMA(AW)-242, also fly- less than 40 of the NVA weapons .
ing the A-6A and part of MAG-11, had arrived in Vietnam on 1
November 1966 . While the majority of the 1st MAW's out-of-
204 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E
country missions were in the DMZ area, Marin e missions ; they carried no ordnance .12 During th e
pilots also participated in strikes against North Viet- raids, the EF-10Bs or EA-6s orbited beyond Nort h
nam . These strikes involved the six areas of North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile range and jamme d
Vietnam which planners called "route packages . " the enemy's fire control radar while the attacking In-
Route Package I was immediately north of the DMZ ; truders made their target runs . Because of .their
Route Package VI lay in the extreme north of the lighter equipment load, the EA-6As could remai n
country . Bombing of the southern portion of Rout e on station longer than the attack aircraft, an ideal
Package I, codenamed "Tally Ho"and under the con- situation for superior electronic countermeasure raid
trol of Seventh Air Force, began in July 1966 . By the protection . Prime targets for Rolling Thunder mis-
winter of 1967, Tally Ho missions ceased as a sions were bridges, fuel facilities, rolling stock, air -
separate entity ; strikes in the area thereafter fel l fields, missile sites, and supply lines . *
within the overall interdiction campaign . 9 In addition to close and deep air support missions ,
The Seventh Air Force's retaliatory Rollin g Marine fixed-wing squadrons conducted a variety o f
Thunder raids, initiated in March 1965, expanded t o less dramatic, but equally important, tasks such a s
include high intensity interdiction missions durin g landing zone (LZ) preparation . These operations il-
1967 . On 18 May 1967, VMA(AW)-242 participated lustrated the then prevalent Marine Corps concep t
in the first Rolling Thunder strike in Route Packag e that the helicopter was a mode of transportation, no t
VI (Hanoi/Haiphong) . 10 The other A-6A squadron , an attack aircraft . The 1st Wing provided fixed-wing
VMA(AW)-533, kept just as active . Th e support for helicopter assaults of contested landing
sophisticated electronic equipment and superb all - zones . Prior to and during these landings, Marine at -
weather capability of the Intruder made it an ideal tack aircraft would strike the objective area to clea r
aircraft for attacks against attractive, but heavily obstacles and neutralize possible antiaircraft threats .
defended, North Vietnamese targets . As the troop-carrying helicopters entered the zone ,
Because of the A-6's all-weather capability, 1s t the covering jet pilots would shift their attacks to ter -
MAW reduced the enemy's antiaircraft effectivenes s rain around the LZ from which the enemy could op -
by flying most Marine Rolling Thunder missions a t
night and as single-aircraft missions ." During th e
strikes, the attack pilots relied upon assistance fro m *After the NVA' s deployment of missiles in the DMZ area i n
April, electronic countermeasure EA-6As and older EF-10B Sky
their fellow Marines from VMCJ-1 . EF-10Bs and EA - Knights remained airborne over the area to. counter this threat .
6As of VMCJ-1, the same basic aircraft as the A-6As , Their effectiveness limited Marine aircraft losses to only tw o
carried equipment for electronic countermeasure missile kills during 1967 .
SUPPORTING ARMS 20 5
SUPPORTING ARMS 20 7
"birds" for airborne forward air controllers as well as 1 stLt Jack H. McCracken, a helicopter pilot with
senior ground commanders . Each division com- HMM-165, escaped serious injury during a resupply
mander had a permanently assigned helicopter ; mission in Quang Ngai province when th e
regimental and battalion commanders used other s .30-caliber round he holds smashed into his cockpit
on an "as available" basis . and lodged in the hard rubber heel of hir left boot .
In the FAC(A) mode, one rocket pack carrie d Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A423001
white phosphorous marking rockets, the other con-
tained high explosive missiles . In a clean, unarmed
configuration, appropriately referred to as a "slick, "
the aircraft could carry seven to nine fully equippe d
troops . "Slicks" also performed administrative an d
transport missions such as VIP flights .
An incident occurred in southern Quang Nga i
Province in late 1967 which demonstrated both th e
firepower of the armed UH-1E and the tenacity ,
skill, and courage of Marine gunship crews . On 1 9
August, Captain Stephen W . Pless, a VMO-6 gun -
ship pilot, was flying chase for an emergency
medevac mission when he heard over the radio net o f
another emergency situation . Pless learned that four
U .S . Army soldiers were stranded on a beach nort h
of Duc Pho and were about to be overwhelmed by a
large Viet Cong force . Breaking off from his origina l
mission, the Huey pilot flew to the scene . On arrival ,
Pless saw about 50 VC in the open ; some were
bayoneting and beating the Americans . He swept in
208 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E
received the Medal of Honor, the first awarded to a Vietnam armed with two .50-caliber machine guns . *
member of the 1st MAW for action in Vietnam . *
The arrival of another aircraft in 1967 further im-
While the armed helicopters participated in man y proved Marine helicopter capabilities . On 8 January ,
dramatic exploits, the yeoman 's share of th e a four-plane detachment of CH-53A Sea Stallion s
workload fell to the transport helicopters, th e from HMH-463 joined MAG-16 at Marble Moun-
UH-34s and the CH-46s . In March of 1966, the 1s t tain . They were the first increment of a phase d
Marine Aircraft Wing's tactical/logistical airlif t replacement of the obsolescent CH-37s . By the en d
capability significantly increased with the arrival o f of the year, 36 of the big CH-53s operated in I
the CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter . It could carry a Corps . These twin-turbine, single-rotor assault
four-man crew and 17-20 combat-loaded troops, o r transports could carry an impressive internal cargo o f
4,000 pounds of cargo, in contrast to the five t o 8,000 pounds, but more significantly the " 53A " ha d
seven troops, or 1,500-pound lift capacity of the ag- a six-ton external lift capability which permitted bat-
ing UH-34 . The twin-engined, tandem-roto r tlefield salvage of disabled UH-34Ds and CH-46s .
transport had a retractable tail ramp, a 115-mil e By the end of 1967, Marine Sea Stallions had retriev-
combat radius, and a top speed of about 145 knots . ed more than 120 damaged aircraft which avoide d
The Sea Knight was the only Marine helicopter i n
*Major General Norman J . Anderson has cautioned that ther e
was a greater complexity behind this simple statement about tw o
.50-caliber machine guns on helicopters . This became standard ,
*In addition to the Medal of Honor, Captain Pless, who flew replacing the .30-caliber," he wrote, "only after extensive ex-
over 700 combat missions in two tours in Vietnam, earned th e perience proved the need for the range and impact of the heavie r
Silver Star Medal, the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Bronze Star weapon . Issues such as this, and there were many in the ordnance
Medal, 32 Air Medals, the Navy Commendation Medal, the and engineering areas, were important and should not b e
Korean Order of Military Merit, and the Purple Heart . After [overlooked] or you create the impression that aviation saile d
returning to the U .S ., this colorful Marine aviator died in a tragic through the war without problems ." MajGen Norman) . Ander-
motorcycle crash at Pensacola, Florida, in 1969 . See Appendix D son, Comments on draft ms, 10Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file ,
for Captain Pless' Medal of Honor citation . MCHC, Washington, D .C .) .
210 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E
SUPPORTING ARMS 21 1
(pounds )
Q, D
105mm How Hel o Ti
11,000 4,980 3 20 30 33 200
Towe d 2'A-ton truck VT
M101A1 CP
155mm Ho w Hel o HE
14,600 12,950 1
Towe d 5-ton truck Q, D
HE
M114A1 Ilium Ti
30 50 wP VT 95 30 0
Smok e
CP
RA P
155mm Ho w Gas
(SP ) 14,600 53,060 1 SP
Nuclear
M109A1
Q, D
8" Ho w HE
(SP ) 16,800 58,500 0 .5 SP 30 80 spot Ti 200 N/A
Gas
VT
Nuclear
M110 CP
155mm Gu n Q
23,500 96,000 0 .5 SP 30 50 95 N/ A
(SP )
M53
Iliu m Q, D
107mm Mort Hel o
5,656 671 15-20 30 30 wp Ti 26 200
M30 '/.-ton truck Gas VT
214 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
artillery regiments provided increased range an d Marine units planned operations in coordinatio n
delivery capabilities .' ? Force artillery included th e with Vietnamese province and district chiefs, a
155mm M53 self-propelled gun and the 8-inch M5 5 liaison officer from the Marines or a Marine or Arm y
self-propelled howitzer . The Marine Corps replace d advisor stayed at the district headquarters to cool .-
the M55 during the year with the new M110 self-
propelled model . An unidentified Marine helicopter crewman smoke s
a cigarette beside his M-60 machine gun mount dur-
Although the basic techniques of artillery employ-
ing a quiet flight in a CH-53A in December 1967 .
ment in Vietnam differed little from those use d
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A370848
elsewhere, local circumstances required certai n
refinements . Probably the most difficult proble m
facing Marine artillerymen and the infantry the y
supported was the need to minimize civilia n
casualties and property destruction, while still fur-
nishing adequate fire support . Strongly worde d
MACV directives, further amplified by instruction s
from III MAF and the divisions, enjoined restraint
and careful fire planning . These required carefu l
selection of helicopter landing zones and schedulin g
artillery and air strikes with the goal of keeping bot h
Marine and civilian casualties at the lowest possibl e
level, especially in heavily populated areas such as
those around Da Nang . Firing into populated areas ,
using reconnaissance by fire, and planning harass-
ment and interdiction fires presented significan t
problems . The Marine artillerymen continuall y
balanced the possible tactical advantages against th e
danger to long-term pacification goals . When
38,703 round s
9,08 1
rounds
e
rK~~
LY,°, '~~ Ytr~i~T~
FF~~: iw t . -- =3+
?I, y
yam ,#~x~
l!
"
?4à .idl ii:' g it sal t:, fti t
216 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E
dinate fire support, as well as other aspects of th e Sav-a-plane was simply a radio procedure whic h
operations . ARVN liaison officers performed a told a pilot where and when artillery or naval gunfire
similar function at American headquarters . * was shooting . From that point on, it was the in-
These operational considerations, formalized a s dividual pilot's responsibility to stay clear of the fir-
rules of engagement, were necessary restrictions but ing area . When a battalion or regimental fire sup -
did not deprive any American unit of the right to de - port coordination center (FSCC) initiated a sav-a-
fend itself against hostile action . Though plannin g plane, the message went to the divisio n
helped to avoid the problem of noncombatan t FSCC/DASC for broadcast to all pilots in the area .
casualties, sound judgment during operations b y The elements of a sav-a-plane transmission include d
both field commanders and fire support centers re- target area, location of the firing unit, time of firing ,
mained the final determinant . and maximum trajectory ordinate . Though th e
Another technique of fire coordination, the "sav- system was not foolproof, artillery and naval gunfire
a-plane," appeared because of the crowded air space hit very few, if any, aircraft . *
over Vietnam, particularly over Route 1 along the Supplemental safeguards to the sav-a-plan e
coast of I Corps . Any artillery unit operating near the system included air sentries at battery positions and ,
road contended with innumerable aircraft flyin g whenever possible, collocation of the artillery liaiso n
through its zone of action . The competition for officers with infantry battalion forward air con-
space to shoot and space to fly was a constan t trollers . The latter technique ensured that al l
headache for both participants . The 1st MAW con-
sidered the established practice of restrictive fire
*"I don 't know that any aircraft has ever been hit by artillery
planning too burdensome because of the episodi c fire," commented Colonel Edwin S . Schick, a former commander
nature of artillery firing . As a result, III MAF in- of the 12th Marines . "There was some talk that an Army outfit di d
troduced the sav-a-plane system as a technique for hit a plane . . . . So long as the proper fusing is maintained . . .
keeping friendly aircraft safe from allied artillery [and the] coordination principle of the restrictive fire plan i s
while, at the same time, permitting liberal use o f adhered to, no harm will come to our air brethren ." Col Edwin S .
Schick, Jr ., Comments on draft ms, 11Jun81 (Vietnam Comment
both arms . file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) Current doctrine does not in-
clude the sav-a-plane concept . Statistical studies support the "bi g
.*Forty Marines augmented the U .S . Army advisory staff with sky-small bullet " principle by indicating very little probability o f
the ARVN in I Corps during 1967 . artillery hitting an aircraft in flight .
SUPPORTING ARMS 21 7
SUPPORTING ARMS 21 9
" almostinstant artillery," were particularly effectiv e armed and equipped teams usually landed b y
as a counter to meeting engagements and ambushes . helicopter at points near their operational areas an d
Other uses of artillery involved flushing th e then moved stealthily to a designated observatio n
enemy from concealed positions, denying his use o f post . Their primary mission was to gather in-
escape routes, and deceiving him as to the directio n telligence in areas of suspected heavy enemy move-
of attack . Night employment included illumination ment, but the Marines was soon learned the team s
of avenues of approach, harassing and interdictio n could call in artillery fire and air strikes and remain
fires, and navigational orientation for friendl y undetected by the enemy . This led to the evolution
elements . The Marines also used jungle application s of Sting Ray which caused substantial enemy
dating back to the island campaigns of World Wa r casualties at the risk of a very few Marines . Enem y
II . A lost patrol could reorient itself by requesting a troops, away from the main battle areas, relaxed ,
marking round on a nearby, grid line intersection . and feeling relatively safe, moved with less cautio n
Another common jungle technique was the use o f and often concentrated in large numbers . , Alert
artillery fire to guide units toward their objectives . Sting Ray teams exacted a heavy toll on unwar y
Following the advancing fire by only a few hundre d Communist units by hitting them with accurate ar-
meters, the infantry worked their way forward whil e tillery fire and precision air strikes .
the artillery forward observer adjusted the firing t o For the Sting Ray teams, artillery served both as a
suit the situation . defensive and an offensive weapon . If the enem y
The Sting Ray concept represented a novel innova- detected the team, artillery provided a ring of fir e
tion which blended maximum use of supportin g around its position while helicopters moved in fo r
arms and the talents of III MAF's reconnaissance per- the rescue . Though enemy units hotly conteste d
sonnel . As III MAF initiated large-unit operation s many extractions a surprisingly large number o f
beyond assigned TAORs, and as TAORs increased i n Sting Ray teams escaped with only minor casualties ,
size to accommodate the operational tempo, recon- while Communist losses multiplied greatly from th e
naissance teams operated at ever increasing range s heavy concentration of fire . To overrun a Sting Ray
from their battalion command posts . The lightl y position, the Communists had to concentrate thei r
forces ; as soon as helicopters extracted the team, th e
abandoned site became a killing zone .
The crew of a 105mm howitzer from Battery C, 4th When the North Vietnamese sent large unit s
Battalion, 12th Marines, prepares to respond to a fire across the DMZ during the fall of 1966, mor e
mission in support of infantrymen engaged i n American artillery units moved into the region, in-
Operation Chinook about 12 miles north of Hue . cluding the U .S . Army's 2d Battalion, 94th Artiller y
3d MarDiv ComdC, January 1967 with its 175mm self-propelled guns . These heav y
weapons, with a range of 32,700 meters, added a
new dimension to III MAF artillery support . B y
March of 1967 the 11th and 12th Marines provide d
artillery coverage from the Gulf of Tonkin to Lao s
and substantially reduced enemy freedom of move-
ment .
The U .S . Army's ist Battalion, 40th Artillery als o
arrived to reinforce Marine artillery during 1967 . It s
M108 self-propelled 105mm howitzers had a
360-degree traverse capability and could respon d
rapidly to calls for fire from any direction . I n
recognition of its quick response and rapid rate o f
fire, the 3d Division Marines called the 40th's Bat-
tery A "Automatic Alpha . "
Artillery strength further increased in I Corps dur-
ing 1967 following the arrival of the 1st Battalion ,
13th Marines ; the 1st Armored Amphibian Tracto r
Company (105mm howitzers) ; the 5th 155mm Gun
220 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
Battery ; a platoon from the 5th 8-inch Howitzer Bat- ments threatened not only the Marine forward posi-
tery ; and another battalion of Army 175mm guns , tions, but also lines of communication, command
the 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery . By the end of th e posts, airfields, and logistic installations .
year, 35 Marine artillery batteries from the 11th , There were many difficulties in countering the in -
12th, and 13th Marines, as well as four separat e creased enemy artillery acitivity, but the biggest pro-
Force Troops and 10 Army batteries supporte d blem involved determining the precise location of
Marine operations in I Corps . * the enemy weapons . The Marines had limited
Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the war , ground observation because of the political/military
from an artilleryman's point of view, was the massiv e probibition of operations in the DMZ, and NVA
supporting arms effort employed to counter enem y missile and antiaircraft fire challenged aerial obser-
artillery and rockets in the DMZ region . In th e vation . Intelligence and damage assessments remain-
spring of 1967, the NVA introduced rockets as wel l ed, at best, skimpy . The available assessments cam e
as medium and heavy artillery to support action s from diversified sources . The prolonged collecting
there . As the year progressed, the North Vietnames e and collating time, however, produced targeting
employed more and larger-caliber weapons . Accor- results which often were too old to be worthwhile .
ding to intelligence on the enemy order of battle , Conversely, the Communists knew the exact loca-
the North Vietnamese had approximately 130 ar- tions of Marine forces and installations . The fact tha t
tillery pieces in the area north of the Ben Hai River , the Marines occupied prominent terrain furthe r
including 152mm gun howitzers with a range in ex- simplified the enemy's observation task .
cess of 10 miles . Marine positions at Cua Viet, Gi o The Marines response to the expanded NVA ar-
Linh, Dong Ha, Con Thien, Cam Lo, and Cam p tillery and rocket threat involved a pronounced in -
Carroll suffered frequent attacks . These bombard- crease in counterbattery fire, augmented by naval
gunfire and aviation . III MAF increased Marine ar-
*K Battery, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines remained on Okinaw a tillery along the DMZ to 84 of the 180 piece s
awaiting gun repairs and equipment . available to the 3d Division . In August, USAF B-52s
SUPPORTING ARMS 221
C)
•1 q
"4"
-J
10
0
.
4-a
Ct
a)
..cQ)
cm
-J
ES
1
<0
>1—
z
222 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E
added their immense bomb loads to the battl e Headshed, both artillery and naval gunfire hi t
against the Communist artillery . The 3d Marine enemy positions, and air strikes followed to catch th e
Division staff initiated an intensive effort to improve survivors of the earlier bombardment .
the counterbattery program and installed new rada r
As a result of these measures, enemy fire decline d
and sound-flash ranging equipment at key locations .
steadily from a September peak, but the Com-
An Army unit, the Target Acquisition Battery fro m
munists retained their capability to disrupt militar y
the 2d Battalion, 26th Artillery worked to improv e
activity and cause significant allied casualties .
target information . The Dong Ha FSCC receive d
more personnel and communications equipment . The DMZ experience highlighted the necessity of
Because the Seventh Air Force controlled fir e relying on supporting arms to offset the disadvan-
clearances north of the DMZ, it sent an Air Forc e tage of operating next to an enemy sanctuary . The
liaison officer to the Marine FSCC to speed up fir e problem of neutralizing enemy artillery remaine d
mission clearances . On 28 September 1967, the Ma- one of the most frustrating dilemmas of the war .
rines established a fire support information cente r Though supporting arms eased the situation ,
(FSIC) that employed data processing equipment, t o political considerations ruled out the only satisfac-
speed collection and collation of target information tory solution, seizure of the enemy guns .
from all 3d Marine Division, III MAF, and Seventh
For the Marines not involved in the war along th e
Air Force sources . Additional observation aircraf t
DMZ, base defense remained one of the most wor-
were made available, nearly doubling the number o f
risome responsibilities . Beginning in February, th e
hours of aerial observation over the DMZ area .
threat of rocket attack menaced all I Corps bases . A t
The Marines initiated large-scale, joint counter - Da Nang the enemy could launch rockets from an y
battery and interdiction operations such a s point in a 200-square-mile belt surrounding the city .
Ropeyarn, Headshed, Neutralize, and Eradicate . Ar- Five thousand Marines participated in the defence o f
tillery, naval gunfire, and air strikes blanketed al l this TAOR, but the high mobility of the enem y
known and suspected firing and support position s rocket enabled the Communists to maintain the
north of the DMZ . For example, during Operation threat . To combat the rockets, the 11th Marines
SUPPORTING ARMS 223
H-
_____________________ I
—
..
.4— 1)
J—1II
Rocket Attack
DaNang
,1
DaNang Airbase
14 July 1967
1Q00 2000 3000 !H-I
rnnd:r 0
IMPACT -;-c\
CONCENTRATIONS
-
I I
ROCKET FIRING
POSITIONS
) N
CHAPTER 1 4
Logistics
Upgrading the Logistics System—Problems with the M-16 Rifl e
Navy Support—Marine Corps Engineer s
The headquarters of the Force Logistic Command (above) sits almost surrounded b y
water while (below) parts of the maintenance and storage area stretch toward Da Nang .
FLC ComdC, December 1967
LOGISTICS 22 5
LOGISTICS 22 7
Repair parts and similar expendable items, usuall y functioned until engineers completed another bul k
in the Class II supply category, continued to be a fuel farm at Dong Ha a week later . The ammunition
headache during 1967 . No matter how many of situation was better . Fortunately, two small, alter-
these items flowed into Vietnam through the suppl y nate supply points in the immediate Dong Ha area
system, the demand seemed insatiable . The explana- survived the attack . Quantities of artillery and other
tion rests with the wide variety of items required , ammunition remained limited, however, unti l
86,000 during 1967, as well as the high usage rate . emergency sea and airlifts replenished th e
The increased tempo of combat operations and hars h dangerously low stocks . Bad weather, heavy seas ,
weather conditions played a significant role in th e and flooding of the Dong Ha LCU ramp during th e
rapid expenditure of supplies and equipment . This period of 17-23 September complicated the resupply
increased the number of requisitions submitted eac h effort . The Marines circumvented this untimel y
month within III MAF . The number rose from onl y development by offloading munitions at Hue an d
2,500 in April 1965 to 70,959 in October 1967 . then moving them by truck to Dong Ha . Concur-
Enemy action also influenced supply levels an d
created sudden shortages . One of the most dramatic A forklift, mired to the axles in mud created b y
incidents of this nature occurred on 3 Septembe r monsoon rains in January, sits in the Force Logisti c
when enemy artillery hit Dong Ha combat base , Support Group Alpha open storage lot at Da Nang .
touching off one of the most spectacular series of ex - FLC ComdC, January 1967
plosions in the war . The initial blasts damage d
seventeen helicopters . Force Logistic Support Uni t
1's bulk fuel storage farm went up in flames . Th e
enemy fire destroyed the main ammunition storag e
area ; 15,000 short tons of vitally needed ammuni-
tion vanished . The explosions continued for mor e
than four hours and people as far south as Phu Bai ,
more than 40 miles away, could see the enormou s
column of smoke .
Replacing the destroyed ammunition and th e
bulk fuel system while continuing normal supply
operations plus providing building materials for con-
struction of the "McNamara Line" represente d
monumental tasks . 3 As an interim measure, the men
of Force Logistic Support Unit 1 established a drum
refueling point immediately after the attack . This
rently, they started construction of new dumps at back through Okinawa to El Toro and Cam p
Quang Tri City, well beyond enemy weapons ' range . Pendleton in California . In addition, all Marin e
Luckily, the Communists did not capitalize on th e posts and stations faced the tasks of filling outboun d
disaster . quotas and absorbing returnees .
Enemy artillery fire in October almost cause d At first, the main control center for the stream o f
another serious setback to these resupply efforts . For- Marines flowing through the western Pacific remain -
tunately, the immediate efforts of three Seabees an d ed at Camp McTureous, Okinawa. In mid-1966 thi s
four Marines, one of whom was a general officer , activity moved to Camp Hansen, Okinawa to accom-
prevented another disaster . "On 29 October ou r modate the increasing two-way personnel flow . B y
second and smaller ammunition dump in Dong H a early 1967, the Transient Battalion, commanded b y
was hit by enemy fire," recalled General Metzger . Lieutenant Colonel Donald K . Cliff, processed as
"Knowing we simply could not lose it, thre e many as 25,000 troops in a single month . This com-
Marines, three Seabees, and I put out the fire ."4 * plicated operation included accounting for al l
hospitalized casualties and expediting emergency
Another of FLC's inherited missions involved per-
leave personnel movement by arranging for these
sonnel management . By 1967, the task of processin g
Marines' transportation, clothing, and pay, as well a s
personnel to and from the western Pacific had grow n
many other services . Computerization sped such in-
to prodigious proportions . Over 191,000 Marines re-
volved operations as the modification of orders o f
quired processing during 1967 . Approximately
personnel still in transit . By 1967, the Transient Bat-
97,000 went .by aircraft to Vietnam and 7,872 arriv-
talion reduced the average holding time for tran-
ed in surface shipping ; 82,000 flew back to the
sients at Camp Hansen to about 40 hours . The tran-
United States and another 4,276 traveled home b y
sient program also involved the classification an d
ship . This complex evolution required the writing of
orders, rosters, and schedules ; and administerin g storage of excess baggage and clothing in 3d FSR' s
climate-controlled warehouse . The hard-working
physical examinations, baggage inspections, troo p
handling, and billeting at transient facilities an d troop handlers and administrators of the Transient
Battalion received little praise, but their long hour s
processing centers reaching from South Vietna m
of demanding work were as vital to the support o f
*Each of the seven received the Bronze Star Medal for their ef- the Marines in I Corps as food and ammunition .
forts in saving the ammunition dump . The Air Delivery Platoon of FLC was one of th e
Newly arrived Marine replacements await processing in front of a long line of tropica l
huts at the Force Logistic Command's transient facility in July at the Da Nang airfield.
FLC ComdC, July 1967
LOGISTICS 22 9
Feeding the thousands of Marines assigned to III MAF required facilities as large and ef-
ficient as many stateside commerical establishments . Some of the average of 2,592
loaves of bread provided each day by the bakery sit on cooling racks at Phu Bai . A Viet-
namese civilian (right), one of 53 employed in PLC's milk plant, analyzes a sample o f
the more than 40,000 pints of reconsituted milk produced each day in April 1967 .
more unusual Marine logistic units . The members o f moved from Chu Lai to Dong Ha, leaving Suppl y
this specially trained 33-man platoon were graduate s Company (-)(Reinforced) as the agency responsibl e
of the parachute school at Fort Benning, Georgia, a s for logistic support of Marine elements in the Ch u
well as the parachute rigger school at Fort Lee , Lai area .
Virginia . The platoon supported requests for aeria l Problems with the M-16 Rifle
delivery of supplies throughout I Corps . During Problems with the M-16 rifle posed a logistic s
September and October, the platoon rendere d burden of staggering proportions for III MAF . After
especially valuable service during the aerial resuppl y the heavy fighting at Khe Sanh in April and May a
of the 26th Marines at Khe Sanh . Because of subsur- furor developed over reported deficiencies in th e
face water damage, landing on Khe Sanh airstri p newly issued M-16 . Many Marines lost confidence i n
had become extremely hazardous for transpor t the weapon, creating a situation which had a
planes . Beginning in late August, the Air Deliver y definite impact on combat operations and morale . ,
Platoon helped airdrop large quantities of supplie s The issue generated considerable reaction in the
to the Marines at Khe Sanh during repairs to th e American press and Congress . Some Marines con-
runway . During the more than two months the stri p tributed to the furor by spreading exaggerated ac -
remained closed, the Air Delivery Platoon made air - counts of problems with the M-16, as described b y
drops on 40 days, handling an average of 51 shor t General Metzger :
tons per day, more than double its normal, rate d . . . a congressional investigating team of two con-
gressmen . . . arrived on the scene . It was my unhappy du-
capacity .
ty to escort them to units along the DMZ . If it weren't s o
At the end of 1967, to improve logistic support serious it would have been laughable . They insisted o n
and keep pace with the northward movement of II I questioning individual Marines with no officers and NCO s
MAF combat elements, FLC emphasis shifted to nor- present, I suppose to ensure they got the truth, without
thern I Corps . Force Logistic Support Group Bravo command influence . The result was that they were fed the
Security forces' aerial flares, photographed by a time exposure as they drift over Camp
Brooks, serve as a blunt reminder of the nearness of FLC's Marines to the dangers of war .
FLC ComdC, August 1967
LOGISTICS 23 1
Navy Support
(NSA), Da Nang, served as the focal point for Nav y lower I Corps, aided by the southernmost NS A
activities supporting the Marines in I Corps . The detachment at Sa Huynh . NSA built the Sa Huyn h
Navy established NSA in July 1965 to relieve th e
Marines of the administrative and logistic task s A sailor on the Navy's Swift Boat 80, operating ii ri
associated with an advanced naval base . During 196 6 the South China Sea in September, prepares to fir e
the command' s responsibilities grew to the poin t an 81 mm mortar at enemy coastal positions two
that a flag officer, Rear Admiral Thomas R . miles south of the Demilitarized Zone . The dual
Weschler, became the unit's commander . By the en d mount also includes a .50-caliber machine gun in -
of 1967, NSA developed into the largest U .S . Nav y stalled above the mortar and recoil mechanism .
overseas shore command with more than 10,000 of-
3d MarDiv ComdC, September 1967
ficers and men .* It provided III MAF with a n
average of 39,661 measurement tons of supplies pe r
month in 1967 .
Besides operating the Da Nang port facilities ,
sailors of NSA served throughout I Corps in several
separate detachments to accomplish some rather
diverse missions . Personnel of the comman d
operated small craft on the dangerous waters of th e
Cua Viet to supply the fighting forces along th e
DMZ . Detachments at Hue/Tan My performe d
similar duties . At Chu Lai another detachmen t
shared the burden of supplying all allied forces in
LOGISTICS 23 3
Admiral Robert R . Wooding, CEC . His force includ- spite of these obstacles, the first KC-130 landed a t
ed 7,000 officers and men . Quang Tri on 23 October, nine days ahead of th e
The Seabees in Vietnam demonstrated their scheduled completion date and only 38 days afte r
amazing capability and traditional versatility . On e the project started .
of the best examples of their ability to respond wit h
speed and determination took place during the fall Concentration shows on the faces of Cdr Ronald L .
of 1967 when they built an airfield and quarters fo r Bouterie and his assistants during surgery on the hip
500 men at Quang Tri . The field served as a backu p of a wounded Marine on board the USS Tripoli.
installation for the strip at Dong Ha, by the n Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A704398
vulnerable to NVA rocket and artillery fire . Seabee s
and equipment converged on the site within a day o f
General Westmoreland's order to complete the fiel d
before the monsoon season . NMCB-10, the Pacific
Fleet's Alert Construction Battalion on Okinawa ,
deployed immediately to take charge of the urgen t
project and relieve the composite force already a t
work . The specifications called for a 4,100-foot stri p
of sand cement covered with metal matting, plu s
15,000 square yards of parking aprons and taxiways .
Heavy rains hit the region in late September, ad -
ding to the problem of stabilizing shifting sand i n
the construction area . The Seabees also faced th e
delicate task of negotiating and supervising th e
removal of approximately 11,000 Vietnamese grave s
located in the middle of the proposed site . The latte r
problem occurred frequently in Vietnam and its
solution required subtle and skillful diplomacy . In
LOGISTICS 23 5
Navy Seabees use special mobile equipment in September to crush rock for repairing th e
damage caused by heavy monsoon rains to the runway at the Khe Sanh combat base .
3d MarDiv ComdC, September 1967
LOGISTICS 23 7
months, from 3 April to 2 September . Enemy sap- Tri . The deployment of a clearing platoon of "C " Com-
pers attacked the bridge during the early morning pany, 3d Medical Battalion to Khe Sanh during the figh t
hours of 6 September and knocked out two spans . A for Hills 861 and 881 was an extremely expeditious and ef-
ficient operation and provided excellent combat support . 9
scant 32 hours later, the Seabees had complete d
repairs and traffic moved once more on "Libert y
Road . " Dental Corps personnel could be found operatin g
with Marines under similar conditions . For example ,
For the majority of Marines in Vietnam, the mos t
to provide primary dental care to Marines at Du c
frequently encountered evidence of Navy suppor t
Pho, the 1st Dental Company rigged a dental chai r
were the naval personnel assigned to his unit . Eac h
and other equipment in a 3/4-ton trailer . A
battalion, aircraft group, and higher headquarter s
helicopter flew the trailer from Quang Ngai to Du c
had its own Navy chaplain . Each battalion an d
Pho . When dug in and sandbagged, it allowed th e
squadron, as well as higher headquarters, had it s
provision of excellent dental care throughout th e
own complement of Navy medical personnel, head-
Marine stay at the base, despite such occurrences as a
ed by a physician . The enlisted Navy medica l
near miss from a mortar during the enemy attack on
corpsmen provided immediate medical care at all
24 March . ro
levels, down to the individual rifle platoon . In addi-
tion, each Marine division included a medical bat-
talion and a dental company commanded by a Marine Corps Engineers
Medical Corps or Dental Corps officer .
Captain John T . Vincent, MC, USN, who com- No Marines in Vietnam faced more frustrations .in
manded the 3d Medical Battalion, described his the accomplishment of their mission than th e
unit's disposition in support of the 3d Marine Divi- engineers . Organized and equipped to accomplis h
sion : engineer support for short duration amphibiou s
operation, five Marine engineer battalions, the 1st ,
During 1967 there were two essentially complet e 3d, 7th, 9th, and 11th, found themselves commit-
hospitals, one at Phu Bai and the other at Dong Ha whic h ted to a protracted land war in an underdevelope d
we staffed and equipped for definitive surgical treatment .
country . The wide spectrum of urgent tasks, har d
In addition, two clearing platoons (essentially th e
equivalent of an Army MASH [Mobile Army Surgical equipment use, torrential rains, mud, heat, abrasive
Hospital] unit) were in the field : one at Khe Sanh and the dust, replacement shortages, lack of spares, and a
other at a fire support base between Phu Bai and Quang long supply pipeline were some of the more corn-
LOGISTICS 23 9
mon hindrances . Only forceful leadership, gruelin g volved 30 percent of all III MAF engineer forces . 1 2
work schedules, and considerable ingenuity kept th e U .S . Army motor transport and helicopter units
battalions abreast of mounting demands fo r were deployed from other Corps areas to help ;
engineering support . They met their military com- Seabees provided additional support, especially in
mitments while still managing to build dams , the construction of observation towers and bunkers ;
schools, dispensaries, bridges, and other facilities for and ARVN engineers contributed their share . By th e
the people of South Vietnam . 1 1 end of the year, the barrier construction effort an d
One of the most challenging tasks facing th e associated security tasks had absorbed 757,520 ma n
engineers in 1967 involved maintaining an d days . Casualties among the engineers mounted a s
upgrading more than 2,000 miles of I Corps roads . the enemy employed snipers, mines, mortars, an d
The opening of Route 9 connecting Dong Ha with artillery to discourage them .
Khe Sanh in March provided a prime example o f
The generator shortage caused headaches fo r
Marine engineering accomplishment . Flooding and Marines throughout 1967 . The engineers owned and
enemy damage closed the road to vehicular traffic operated the major share of III MAF's power -
west of Cam Lo in 1964 . This 42-mile road include d generating equipment, but they were purel y
49 bridges, 27 of which occupied the 15-mile stretc h expeditionary-type generators . The Marine Corps
between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh . Once open, the roa d possessed only a limited quantity of garrison equip-
required continuous maintenance to repair the con-
ment, including power generators . The rapid con -
stant ravages of flooding and enemy action . Addi- struction of many new installations in I Corps, all o f
tionally, the engineers reinforced all bridges to sup - which required electricity, quickly depleted existing
port 60-ton loads . The Route 9 project tied u p generator stocks . The engineers had the task of ser-
almost a full engineer battalion for all of 1967 .
vicing and exchanging generators to keep up wit h
Another project which tested the resolve of th e seemingly insatiable power demands . Clubs, messes ,
battalions was the construction of the DMZ barrie r air conditioners all demanded electricity, and the re .
system in northern Quang Tri Province . The 11th quirements often exceeded the means .
Engineer Battalion, under the sucessive command o f
Lieutenant Colonels Ross L . Mulford and Willard N . The generator situation in 1967 would have bee n
Christopher, comprised the initial project force, bu t even more acute save for actions taken in 1966 b y
by the end of the summer, the mammoth effort in - Colonel George C . Axtell, then the commander o f
Marines from the 3d Engineer Battalion use ropes and muscle power as they manhandl e
a dud 250 pound bomb in the mud of a farmer's paddy near Camp Evans in October.
3d MarDiv ComdC, October 1967
240 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
Father Nguyen Thanh Hoan, LtCol Ross L . Mulford of the 11th Engineer Battalion, an d
others stand in front of the school in Dong Ha partially supported by the battalion .
3d MarDiv ComdC . March 1967
CHAPTER 1 5
Marine BGen John R . Chaisson, the director of the MACV combat operations center in
Saigon, listens as Gen Creighton W . Abrams, the deputy MACV commander, confers
with III MAFs LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., and the 3d Marine Division's MajGe n
Bruno A . Hochmuth during Gen Abrams' visit to the division at Phu Bai on 13 July .
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A 18888 0
241
foreign representatives . From these associations, he a constant staff annoyance throughout the year .
gained considerable insight into the way the othe r General Westmoreland's continuing concern abou t
services viewed Marines . None ever criticized Communist use of the A Shau valley and the protec-
Marines' fighting characteristics, except for the belief tion of the remote cities of Kontum and Pleiku was
that Marines did not know how to dig in when occu- another worrisome matter . The enemy rocket attacks
pying a defensive position, such as Con Thien in against Da Nang posed still another dilemma . I f
1967 . Not all the remarks were so charitable, as h e enemy rockets could hit Da Nang, they also coul d
recounted some years later at the Basic School : hit Bien Hoa and, for that matter, Saigon . Anothe r
Sometimes they made disparaging remarks about ou r issue was the "barrier," or the "McNamara Line "
rather casual approach to logistics and communications along the DMZ . Even with the accelerated troo p
and these rather ancillary supporting activities . They buildup in I Corps, the number of troops required t o
weren't quite sure that we were up to speed in these man, much less build, the unpopular barrier serve d
regards . . . . I don't think they gave us credit for having to o
as a continuing source of irritation . Added to this ,
many smarts . They had a feeling that we liked to put ou r
head down and go up the middle rather than get the least the question arose of what to do with the left flan k
bit fancy . I can remember one day a senior officer of th e of the proposed barrier, an area comprising all o f
Army came back [after] he'd visited a Marine battalion . He western Quang Tri Province . In III Corps a new
said to me, ' John, you know, I met a real intelligent bat- threat developed . Even though Operations Cedar
talion commander up there . Real unusual guy . " Now, I Falls and Junction City had badly mauled Com-
wasn ' t sure that . . . [of the Marine's] tw o
characteristics—intelligent and unusual—whether the on e munist formations in the "Iron Triangle" northwes t
followed the other . ' of Saigon, at least three enemy divisions threatene d
Long Binh and Bien Hoa . To the south in IV Corps ,
Some of the other 1967 Marine MACV Staff U .S . riverine operations were expanding, but agai n
members were : Colonel James C . . Stanfield, chief of the I Corps troop drain reduced the effectiveness o f
the Plans and Requirements Division 0-4) ; Colone l this tactical innovation .
William L . Traynor, the COC air operations officer ; An entirely different and equally perplexing con-
and Colonel Joseph C . Fegan, Jr ., who served as flict was the dispute between Marine and Air Forc e
General Chaisson's deputy director of the COC . Col- fire restrictions in the DMZ . The Air Force contend-
onel Kirby B . Vick was the deputy director of the ed that it should be responsible for all territory nort h
Doctrine and Analysis Branch (J-34) until March , of the Ben Hai River, but Marine staffs demanded t o
when his relief, Colonel David D . Rickabaugh, ar- be allowed to fire to the maximum range of their at-
rived . tached 175mm guns in order to silence North Viet-
Many controversial issues confronted the Marines namese artillery . An interim decision limitin g
assigned to MACV . These involved doctrinal an d Marine fires to the northern boundary of the DM Z
policy matters of direct interest to other commands , and placing Air Force control north of the sam e
such as FMFPac, Seventh Fleet, and III MAF and its boundary, satisfied neither service, and the issue re-
subordinate units . Marine participation in MAC V mained in contention for the rest of the year .
functions helped in arriving at palatable solution s The year 1967 was filled with innumerabl e
for many of the problems which developed durin g perplexing situations for the MACV staff . America n
the year . troop strength increased from 385,000 to 486,000 ,
The MACV viewpoint, of necessity, covered a but Communist activity also intensified . In August ,
broader range than that of the respective corps com- the MACV Headquarters moved from downtow n
mands . MACV maintained a fine balance betwee n Saigon to a new complex at Tan Son Nhut Airbas e
the attitudes of the U .S . participants, as well as thos e on the outskirts of the city . The improved facilities
of Vietnamese and allied staffs . Typical of the issues did not diminish the number of problems, but they
which confronted MACV in 1967 was the structuring did improve the staffs' working conditions . The
of U .S . Army participation in I Corps . The provisio n coming year proved that the move occurred none to o
of Task Force Oregon represented only the begin- soon .
ning of the northward move of Army troops . Th e The Embassy Guard
fact that the displacement of each unit to I Corp s
meant that another corps area faced a force reduc- The year 1967 brought on expansion of th e
tion, or a postponement of force buildup, remained Marine Security Guard Detachment (MSGD) at the
OTHER MARINE crivrns 24
AIGON AREA
miles i
kilometers
American Embassy in Saigon . The detachment of accuracy, reliability, and light weight .* Backing up
Marines, one officer and 67 enlisted men at the the arsenal of hand guns, each internal post possess-
beginning of the year, came under the ad- ed 12-gauge Remington Shotguns, loaded with 0 0
ministrative control of Company C, Marine Security buckshot shells .
Guard Battalion, headquartered at the U .S . Em-
One major problem encountered by the officer in
bassy in Manila . The parent battalion, established in
charge during 1967 was that his command expanded
February 1967, was the Marine Security Guard Bat- so rapidly that he and his one staff NCO were har d
talion (State Department) located at Headquarters ,
put to exercise adequate control . As a result ,
Marine Corps . The Saigon detachment's chain o f
sergeants supervised watch sections of as many as 3 0
command consisted of one of the longest small uni t
Marines, located at different posts in a potentiall y
command links in the world, more than 650 miles
insecure city . This situation ceased only after Cap-
from Saigon to Manila and over 9,000 miles to bat-
tain Robert J . O'Brien became OIC of the detach-
talion headquarters in Washington . At the beginn-
ment in April and Gunnery Sergeant Alexande r
ing of the year, First Lieutenant Philip E . Tucke r
Morrison arrived in February .
commanded the Saigon detachment ; his deputy ,
The security guard faced an additional difficulty
and the only staff noncommissioned officer, wa s
during the construction of a new embassy facility .
Staff Sergeant Gary G . Stoces .
During the construction period, the Marines guard-
The Marines assigned to the Embassy protecte d ed the site on a 24-hour basis and, because of securi-
American lives and property within the Embassy an d ty considerations, monitored the workers on the job .
its associated U .S . Agency for Internationa l The Marine guard requirements constantly change d
Development (USAID) and U .S . Information Ser- at the new building site and the contractors did no t
vice (USIS) buildings . The guard consisted of an ad- finish the new complex until the fall .
ministrative section and a watch section . The watc h The year 1967 passed without any significant tes t
section broke down into three separate units : a of the Saigon MSG's mission capability . The events
Guard Section, charged with protection of the Em- of February 1968 justified the long and tedious
bassy, USAID, and USIS compounds ; an Am- hours devoted to drills, alerts, passive defens e
bassador's Residency Guard ; and the Ambassador' s measures, and tests of the security system .
Personal Security Unit, the bodyguard of th e
Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge and his wife . Th e The Advisors
Embassy Security Officer, Mr . Robert A . England , Major operations such as Cedar Falls and Junctio n
exercised operational control of the detachmen t City in III Corps, the Prairie series, the Hickor y
through First Lieutenant Tucker . The Embass y sweeps, and the protracted defenses of Con Thie n
Marines had no connection with Marines elsewher e and Khe Sanh in I Corps served as focal points fo r
in Vietnam . the year 1967 . Because of the tactful and ofte n
delicate nature of their missions, American advisor s
Weapons and radio equipment for the Marine s
came from the U .S . Department of State . Th e often found their activities in Vietnam overshadow-
detachment's highly sophisticated radio net con- ed by these more dramatic events . The advisors' role
sisted of extremely reliable fixed and portable unit s in Vietnam, however, included every aspect of th e
which linked guard posts, vehicles, the detachmen t conflict .
office, and the security offices . The standard weapo n Following the signature of the Geneva Accords o n
for the embassy guard was the Smith and Wesso n 20 July 1954, the South Vietnamese Government re -
.38-caliber, 4-inch barrel revolver . However, th e quested U .S . military aid . The United States grante d
Residency Guard carried the 2-inch barrel Smith an d the request and established the Military Assistanc e
Wesson .38, while the Personal Security Unit use d Advisory Group (MAAG), Vietnam . In February
the Colt "Python," a .357-caliber, magnum revolver . 1955, MAAG Vietnam's mission expanded to in-
Both the Residency and the Personal Security Unit s clude the organization and training of the Viet -
had 9mm Beretta sub-machine guns, which they car-
*The weapons tested included the Thompson SMG ( .4 5
ried in unobtrusive attache cases . A 1966 test o f caliber), the Swedish K, the Israeli Uzi, and the Beretta . LtCol
some of the world's available sub-machine gun s Philip E . Tucker, Comments on draft ms, n .d . (1981) (Vietnam
resulted in the selection of the Beretta because of its Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)
special tactical operational area, thus the designatio n helicopters after the VC gunners . The helicopters
Rung Sat Special Zone . As in all other arenas of con- could not land, which forced Dunning and his uni t
flict in Vietnam, American advisors served there . B y to jump into the swamp from the hovering
1967 the RSSZ Advisory Team consisted of tw o helicopters from a height of about 12 feet . About
Marine officers, one Navy officer, three enliste d 200 meters from the insert point, the reaction forc e
Marines, and two sailors . The team had its head - caught up with the Viet Cong . After a sharp
quarters at Nha Be, sevetl miles south of Saigon, on firefight, the enemy broke and ran, leaving behin d
the west bank of the Long Tau River . The base pro- two 75mm recoilless rifles . An air strike intercepted
vided an ideal operational site since it lay at the junc- the fleeing VC . One enemy charged out of the
tion of the Long Tau and the Soi Rap River, the lat- swamp toward Captain Dunning . Dunning sho t
ter forming the southern boundary of the RSSZ . him . Shortly thereafter, the air strike ended and th e
Boats from Nha Be could reach the entire perimete r surviving VC regrouped and counterattacked th e
of the swamp . Vietnamese commando party . Dunning ' s unit stop-
The RSSZ advisors faced multiple duties . As th e ped the VC charge . Another heavy firefight
resident experts, they coordinated all efforts to forc e developed, and once more the South Vietnamese at -
the Communists out of the swamp . Initially, the y tacked . While the South Vietnamese drove the V C
worked with a meager Vietnamese force consisting back, a smoke grenade dropped from a friendl y
only of local RF and PF units . As the year progresse d helicopter injured Dunning . Once more the Viet
the unit's advisory responsibilities increased as th e Cong withdrew and Dunning and his men establish-
South Vietnamese directed larger formations an d ed a night position . They counted 16 VC bodies on
more sophisticated equipment against the enemy i n the battlefield . In addition, the capture of the tw o
the zone . During the year, the United States im- recoilless rifles deprived the VC of their best an-
proved the Nha Be base to support U .S . Navy river tishipping weapons . *
patrol boats, minesweepers, landing craft, and th e Once inside the dank, smelly confines of th e
invaluable Navy Sea Wolf helicopter fire teams . On swamp, the rest of Viet Nam seemed as remote a s
28 February 1967, the U .S . Navy established the another world . The Rung Sat Advisors fought a very
Riverine Assault Force (TF 117), which represente d personal, almost private, war in the slime and heat
the Navy element of a new tactical organization, the of the Forest of Assassins .
Mekong Delta Mobile Assault Force . This force
made its combat debut in a joint operation with the The Marine Advisory Unit
9th U .S . Division in the Rung Sat during March .
Following this penetration, operations in the Run g The Marine Advisory Unit adapted its size accor-
Sat increased in tempo and scale through the sum- ding to the needs of the expanding Vietnames e
mer and fall . Marine Corps (VNMC) . Starting as a single battalio n
The Communists responded to the increased in 1955, by the spring of 1967 the Vietnamese
allied efforts . They shelled Nha Be twice durin g Marine Corps had grown to a strength of six infantr y
August, and during the first attack on 3 August, the battalions, an artillery battalion, and supportin g
Communists wounded 24 men . Enemy attacks elements . The advisory unit expanded from one of-
against shipping continued . On 16 March the Com- ficer in 1955 to 25 Marine officers, one Navy officer ,
munists hit the SS Conqueror with six 75mm and five enlisted Marines by January 1967 .
recoilless rifle rounds as it sailed up the Long Tau . At the beginning of the year, Colonel Nels E .
On 18 November they hit the SS Buchanan 1 9 Anderson served as the senior Marine advisor . He
times . On 22 December, a mine exploded under th e assigned teams of two officers, usually a major and a
SS Seatrain Texas while it lay at anchor near Nha Be . captain, to each battalion, while other members o f
the group served as technical advisors or performe d
The Buchanan shelling touched off a reaction
the diverse administrative functions of the MAG .
which is an excellent illustration of advisory activit y
When the Vietnamese Marines deployed in brigad e
in the Rung Sat . At the time of the incident, Marine or task force formations, normally two infantry bat -
Captain Clifford R . Dunning served as the RSSZ ad-
visor to a specially formed Vietnamese comman-
do/intelligence unit . The unit quickly planned an *For his actions on 18 November 1967, Captain Dunning
operation that sent a reaction force in three received the Silver Star Medal .
talions and an artillery battery, an additional pair o f The landing force of Vietnamese Marines cam e
advisors went with the force headquarters . from VNMC Brigade Force Bravo, consisting of th e
Both the Vietnamese Marine Brigade and the Air - 3d, 4th, and part of the 6th Battalion, reinforced b y
borne Brigade operated as the national strategic Battery C of the VNMC Artillery Battalion . Th e
reserve . This designation was, however, a misnomer ; American force came from the Special Landing Forc e
the so-called strategic reserve seldom sat uncommit- (SLF), then consisting of BLT 1/9 and HMM-362 .
ted . The units engaged in combat operations mor e Colonel Anderson recalled the problems he en -
than 80 percent of the year . The role of the Marines countered in coordinating the command relation -
resembled that of a theater reserve, but the emphasis ships of this operation :
was on rotational commitment, rather than reten-
When I learned that Deckhouse V was to be conducted
tion as a static reserve element . in Kien Hoa Province, I seized upon the opportunity to get
All but one of the VNMC battalions had thei r the Vietnamese Marines involved at last in an amphibiou s
operation, which, after all, was supposed to be thei r
home base on the outskirts of Saigon . The one ex-
primary mission . I knew this would involve certain risk s
ception was the 4th, which operated from Vun g because none of the Vietnamese Marines had had any
Tau, located on the sea 60 kilometers southeast o f training whatsoever in this, the most complex of al l
Saigon . For this reason, when a Marine battalio n military operations . One plus factor, however, was that th e
began a scheduled rehabilitation, it usually returne d field-rank officers that were to participate were graduate s
of Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico, and severa l
to Saigon and assumed duties in either the Capita l
junior officers and senior N .C .O .s had attended school at
Military District, the geographic area including and Landing Force Training Command, Pacific .
surrounding Saigon, or the Rung Sat Special Zone , The first thing I did was to discuss the operation with
(RSSZ), which also lay near the battalions ' base the Commandant, Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang,
camps . at his headquarters at Bien Hoa . (Bien Hoa was the head -
quarters of the III Corps of which General Khang was com-
The strategic role and high commitment rate mander at this time .) Khang, also a graduate of AWS wa s
caused the officers and men of the Marine Advisory very enthusiastic when told about the operation . Amon g
Group to see as much, if not more, of Vietnam dur- other things discussed were the command relations in am-
phibious operations as established by existing doctrine . He
ing their respective 12-month tours than any othe r
said he understood perfectly and that he would place the
group of Americans . The familiar Vietnamese verb , Vietnamese Marine units to be in Deckhouse V under th e
"Di!" (Go!), assumed a special meaning to the ad - command of the Amphibious Task Force Commander .
visors . Not only did it raise the immediate question This of course would be a departure from command rela-
of where, but experience soon taught the unwary tionships then existing between U .S . and South Viet-
that "Di!" could mean "We're going!" for weeks—o r namese Forces .
After embarkation, I learned that the Vietnamese Joint
possibly months . For example, during 1967, the 1s t General Staff had disapproved of the command relation -
Battalion remained in the field in Binh Dinh Pro- ships agreed to by General Khang and that the ol d
vince for 117 days, from 14 July until 8 November . "cooperation and coordination" system would be in effect .
I never could see the logic for such arrangement, and in m y
Vietnamese Marine operations during 1967 fell in - opinion the lack of unity of command between the U .S .
to three general categories : security operations in and Vietnamese forces was a glaring weakness in the entir e
both the Capital Military District and the Rung Sa t war ?
Special Zone, a year-long campaign against the well - Song Than/Deckhouse V got off to a bad start . A
entrenched Viet Cong in Binh Dinh Province in I I compromise of the operation occurred even befor e
CTZ, and search and destroy sweeps in III and I V the Vietnamese Marines embarked . Hurried plan-
Corps . ning, unclear command structures, faulty radio nets ,
One exception occurred with Operation Son g and poor liaison compounded operational problems .
Than/Deckhouse V, a joint U .S . Marine-Vietnamese Even the elements turned against the Marines .
Marine effort . The first large-scale USMC/VNMC Rough seas postponed the landing for one day, an d
amphibious operation, Song Than/Deckhouse V after returning to Vung Tau for ship-to-ship
went after VC elements reported active in the coasta l transfers, the Marines devised a new landing plan .
regions of Kien Hoa Province . Intelligence officers The new plan called for helilifting most of th e
reported the Communist units there included assault force . By this time, as many as 40 percent o f
elements of the 516th, 518th, and 261st VC Bat- the Vietnamese Marines had succumbed t o
talions . seasickness . The landing on- 7 January did not•
brighten their spirits . Major Donald E . Wood, th e 1st Battalion 2-8 Feburary
operations and training advisor, reported : 4th Battalion 11 March-12 April
1st Battalion 11 April-12 May
Following the assault across Red Beach . . . Brigade
6th Battalion 12 May-21 Jul y
Force Bravo was informed by local inhabitants in the area 3d Battalion 12 August-15 Septembe r
that VC elements had been alerted regarding the schedul-
ed date and location of the operation three weeks prior to 1 The 6th Battalion senior advisor's report of the 1 2
January . The result was that very light contact was gained
with VC by assault units . , May-21 July occupation provides an insight into th e
conditions in the Rung Sat . Major Robert L . Fische r
Song Than/Deckhouse V ended on 15-16 Januar y reported :
as Brigade Force Bravo went through the tediou s
process of reloading from the shallow beaches o f The tidal range in the TAOR is 12 feet . . . . At low tid e
many small streams are dry and larger rivers and stream s
Kien Hoa and unloading again at Vung Tau . Th e present high, steep banks . The rapid currents during fill-
week in the recently harvested rice fields and vexin g ing and receding tides make small streams dangerous for
mangrove swamps of the Mekong Delta resulted i n troop crossing and difficult for maneuverability of smal l
five dead VC and the capture of 25 suspects, 10 o f boats . At high tide it is virtually impossible to move rapid-
ly by foot . . . . Ambushers placed along streams ofte n
whom proved to be Viet Cong . These were lackluste r
found themselves waist deep in water for at least half o f
results for an operation conducted by 1,750 Viet- the ambush period .6
namese Marines . One 4th Battalion Marine drowne d
and seven other troops suffered accidental wounds . Another frustration of Rung Sat duty stemme d
The " lessons learned" were manifold ; however Son g from the Viet Cong's ability to recognize Marine in-
Than/Deckhouse V represented the last operation o f tentions, which made decisive engagements virtuall y
its type . MACV restricted the SLF to I CTZ and th e impossible . Major Fischer's report revealed some o f
Vietnamese Marines reverted to their previous land - the simple but effective VC measures :
locked role . * The Viet Cong utilize a simple system of early warning
During the year four Vietnamese Marine bat- and signal towers . Near each active camp located in th e
talions participated in forays into the forebodin g TAOR was a tree platform or tower . On ten occasions VC
swamps of the Rung Sat : were observed either in the tower or dropping from it an d
running into the nearest dense area . These towers are
located across the Rung Sat and undoubtedly serve t o
*See Chapter 11 for the SLF account of Deckhouse V . signal elements crossing the Rung Sat between adjacen t
A unit of Vietnamese wades ashore from a landing craft in a flooded part of the Mekon g
Delta during the joint Operation Deckhouse V in the Delta region in January .
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A 190966
provinces, as well as providing early warning and uni t centrated population made government contro l
massing capability . ? somewhat easier, but the local citizens remaine d
apathetic ; the Communists long dominance mad e
Simply stated, Rung Sat duty remained hot, wet , their influence strong .
filthy, frustrating, and dangerous . Myriad bugs , Operationally, the terrain proved suitable for a
gnats, mosquitoes, and ants added to the grim at- different type of guerrilla warfare, unlike that ex-
mosphere of the swamp . In spite of these obstacles , perienced in the swamps and delta region i n
the five VNMC Rung Sat battalion-size operations i n southern South Vietnam . In Binh Dinh Province th e
1967 cost the Viet Cong 30 killed at a price of fou r ground is hard, even during the rainy season . Cove r
Marines killed and 21 wounded . and concealment is excellent . Seasonal, dense morn-
ing fog neutralizes the effect of air superiority . Thes e
Action In Binh Dinh Province
factors provided the Communists with excellen t
An area of major VNMC action in 1967 was Binh mobility and they moved without fear of detection .
Dinh Province in northern II CTZ . After operatin g Consequently, their vast natural hiding place, th e
there since mid-1964, all Vietnamese Marine s inland forests, allowed the Viet Cong to operat e
became familiar with the beautiful Bong Son plai n more audaciously than elsewhere in the country .
and the seemingly endless ridge lines that exten d One commodity, food, remained in short suppl y
westward to Laos . In 1965, the first U .S . groun d in Binh Dinh Province . The main cultivated areas la y
forces moved into II Corps . The 1st U . S . Cavalry along Route 1 . In 1967, the government still con -
Division (Airmobile) went to An Khe with the mis- trolled the food producing areas and the Com-
sion of keeping Route 19 open between Pleiku an d munists wanted them . That brought the Vietnames e
Qui Nhon . Joint U .S . /RVN operations started short- Marines and 1st U .S . Cavalry Division to northern I I
ly after the arrival of the "1st Cay . " Corps .
For the Vietnamese Marines, operations in Bin h The first major VNMC action in II CTZ durin g
Dinh proved different from those in III and IV CTZ s
1967 was Operation Pershing/Song Than 9, a join t
to the south . The dense forest of the uncultivated operation with the 1st Cavalry Division near Bon g
areas, the concentration of the population in a nar-
Son . Song Than 9. was a satisfactory operation . Dur-
row coastal strip, cooler weather, long periods o f ing the period 14-22 February Brigade Force Bravo ,
morning fog, and much more solid land forms, all the 2d and 3d Battalions, killed 54 Viet Cong . I n
contributed to tactical variations . Generally, the Vie t return, the enemy killed three Marines and wounde d
Cong in Binh Dinh represented a different breed .
27 . Remaining in the Bong Son area, the brigad e
Dominated by the Viet Minh in the Fifties, the pro- force spent the rest of February, all of March, an d
vince remained notorious for its solid Communis t the first part of April conducting sweep operations .
base . The Binh Dinh Cong were "hard core" in ever y
They coordinated . these operations with the 1s t
sense of the term . Cavalry Division 's operations in adjacent areas, bu t
The terrain in Binh Dinh supports cultivation onl y the Marine sweeps remained separate operations .
in the coastal regions, hence the population center s On 18-19 April, Brigade Force Alpha flew t o
there . The rest of the province, all forested, served as English Airfield at Bong Son where it relieve d
an enormous VC sanctuary . Only woodcutters and Brigade Force Bravo . On the 22nd, Force Alpha
scattered Montagnards roamed the hinterlands ; th e began search and destroy/pacification of a TAOR in-
Communists moved at will under the vast fores t cluding Tam Quan on the north, Bong Son to th e
canopy . Operating from the spacious inland sanc- south, the portion of Route 1 connecting the tw o
tuary, the VC had the enviable position of operatin g towns, with the South China Sea serving as th e
on interior lines against the densely populate d eastern boundary . Elsewhere in II CTZ, Brigade
coastal region . Force Bravo, under the direction of the 22d ARV N
The GVN forces, on the other hand, sought to Division, conducted two major operations from 1 8
protect vulnerable Routes 1 and 19, as well as th e March through 18 April . Again, these actions paral-
railroad and the Bong Son Airfield, all in lowlan d leled but remained separate from 1st Cavalry Divi-
regions, except for the western end of Route 19 . sion operations . Brigade Force Alpha stayed in the
Similarly, most of the population requiring protec- Bong Son region until July . At the conclusion o f
tion concentrated in these same lowlands . The con - Operation Bac Thien 817 on 12 July, Brigade Force
Alpha resumed patrolling of its TAOR until relieve d Uyen village, 13 kilometers north of Bien Hoa in II I
by Brigade Force Bravo on the 26th . The latter uni t CTZ where it came under the direct control of II I
started Operation Song Than 14 the next day . Corps Headquarters . On 20 June the 1st Marine Bat-
Brigade Force Alpha left II Corps in late July ; Force talion left to participate with the 1st U .S . Infantry
Bravo remained until 6 November . The two units Division in Operation Billings, north of Tan Uyen .
again switched places and Force Alpha remaine d The net result of these actions for the Marines in-
there until well into 1968 . cluded the loss of nine killed, 34 wounded . Among
Vietnamese Marine operations in II CTZ during the wounded was the 1st Battalion's assistant ad -
1967 showed impressive results . Communist losses visor, Captain Manfred E . Schwarz . Communis t
totaled 202 killed and 282 captured . Marine losse s losses were 14 killed and one captured . Vietnamese
for the year's II CTZ campaign numbered 49 kille d Marine operations in III and IV Corps got off to a
and 215 wounded . slow start in 1967 .
Action in the Sout h When Operation Billings ended on 9 July ,
Other than periodic assignments to the Rung Sat , Brigade Force Bravo moved from Tan Uyen t o
security operations around Saigon in the Capital neighboring Phuoc Tuy Province . There, with th e
Military District, and rotations to II CTZ, the rest o f 9th U .S . Infantry Division, the 1st Australian Tas k
the Vietnamese Marines' 1967 operations took plac e Force, and the 43d ARVN Regiment, Force Bravo ,
in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones ; six occurred now consisting of the 2d and 3d Marine Battalions ,
in the former and five in the latter . joined Operation Paddington . The mission involve d
From 22 February through 11 March, Brigade locating and destroying the 274th VC Regiment .
Force Alpha, consisting of the reinforced 1st and 5th The Marines opened their phase of the operation a t
Battalions took part in Operation Junction City, a 0900 on 10 July with a helicopter landing in thei r
search and destroy operation with the 25th U .S . In- respective zones of action . Contact continued ligh t
fantry Division . Force Alpha became the only Viet- throughout the 10th and 11th, but at 0900 on 12 Ju-
namese unit to participate in the largest allied opera- ly, elements of the 3d Battalion made contact wit h
tion since the beginning of the war . Marine contac t what appeared to be an enemy battalion . Heav y
was very light, but the net results of the joint opera- fighting continued until 1600 when the VC brok e
tion included the seizure of more than 364 tons o f off the engagement . For the next three days th e
rice and significant damage to enemy installations i n Marines conducted search operations but made n o
the Communists' War Zone C, This zone lay in a contact . Finally, on the 15th, Brigade Force Brav o
triangular territory formed by Route 13, the Cambo- regrouped at Xuan Loc and motored back to its bas e
dian border, and a line connecting Ben Cat with Ta y camp at Thu Duc outside Saigon . Brigade Forc e
Ninh . Vietnamese Marine-U . S . relations improve d Bravo reported 43 Communists dead as the result o f
further when the brigade force commander, Colone l Paddington ; 11 Marines died and 31 suffered
Bui The Lan, requested that his force be granted a wounds during the operation .
more aggressive role in the 25th Division's scheme o f One of the most serious problems faced by ad -
operations . The Americans granted the request an d visors in the field revolved around establishing th e
Brigade Force Alpha avoided acting as a blockin g precise status of the advisor vis-a-vis his counterpart .
force . Often the Americans gave advice which their Viet-
In May, Brigade Force Bravo, then consisting o f namese counterparts ignored . Third parties often
the reinforced 1st and 5th Battalions moved fro m compounded this situation . Major Charles E . Parker ,
Saigon to Vi Tanh, 45 kilometers southwest of Ca n senior advisor with Brigade Force Bravo durin g
Tho in IV CTZ . There, under 21st ARVN Divisio n Operation Paddington, summed up the proble m
control, the Marine force participated in th e when he stated :
uneventful Operation Dan Chi 287/C . On 28 May ,
Force Bravo left its attached artillery behind an d On two occasions coordination with U .S . units consisted
undertook a riverine assault . This operation, Lon g of the [American] unit commanding officer simply statin g
Phi 999/N, proved unproductive and the Marin e his intentions to the nearest USMC advisor, then leaving
without waiting for a discussion with the Task Force Com -
elements became the 9th ARVN Division reserve a t mander . This abruptness, however, was probably more a
Vinh Long . result of late receipt of orders rather than any obstinacy on
On 7 June, Brigade Force Bravo moved to Tan the part of the U .S . command . As it turned out,
liaison/coordination problems were solved befor e arms fire continued to hold back the Marines' ad-
dangerous situations developed . vance . Suddenly, at 0500 on the 31st, a VC force o f
Major Parker continued : about two companies attempted a mass break-out .
Their path led them directly to the 3d Battalio n
The U .S . Army commanders and their staffs are no t command post located partly in a small hut . In the
aware of the organization and functions of U .S . Marine ad -
confused fighting which followed, the VC overra n
visors . They work on the assumption that we operate wit h
teams similar to U .S . Army advisory teams (which wer e the CP, but Captain Simpson and surviving Marines
larger) . They also seem to forget that USMC advisors ar e drove the VC back through the CP toward the VC 's
just what the term implies, advisors, not commanders . ' original positions . After that, the fighting stoppe d
abruptly . The remaining Viet Cong managed to sli p
During the last week in July, the 3d Battalion par-
away in the jungle . At 1300, helicopters extracte d
ticipated in Operation Concordia VII with the 2 d
the 3d Battalion and returned it to Dong Tam . Th e
Brigade, 9th U .S . Infantry Division . The operatio n
4th Battalion continued sweep operations until 150 0
produced no contacts or casualties, but the riverin e
the next day when it too withdrew to Dong Tam . O n
landing in Long An Province proved that the Viet-
1 August the 5th Battalion relieved the 3d and th e
namese Marines were prepared for this type o f
latter moved by transport aircraft to Thu Duc .
maneuver .
Intelligence sources reported a concentration of Phase II proved uneventful and Vietnamese par =
ticipation in Coronado II ended on 4-5 August . The
elements of it least four VC battalions in Din h
4th and 5th Battalions returned to their Thu Du c
Tuong Province during late July . Accordingly, a
quickly planned operation, Coronado II/Song Tha n bases . The sharp action of 30-31 July hurt the VC i n
63/67 began under the control of the 9th U .S . In- Dinh Tuong Province . The Marines killed 108 an d
captured six . Total South Vietnamese losses for th e
fantry Division . Other units assigned to Coronado I I
operation numbered 44 killed and 115 wounded . O f
included 1st Brigade, 25th U .S . Infantry Division ;
these, one of the dead and seven of the wounde d
11th Army Armored Cavalry Regiment ; and th e
were the result of friendly fires, an accident whic h
ARVN 44th and 52d Ranger Battalions . Marine par-
provided a bitter lesson in coordination .
ticipation consisted of Task Force Alpha made up o f
the 3d and 4th Marine Battalions and Battery B fro m Task force Alpha went to the field again on 1 1
the Marine Artillery Battalion . August . Operation Song Than 701-67, a three-phas e
The first phase of Coronado II started on 30 July . operation in Bien Hoa Province, dragged on until 2 1
Helicopters put the 3d Battalion into a landing zon e October . Various battalion combinations under Task
north of the Mekong River . It was a bad zone . Im- Force Alpha permitted the 2d, 4th, 5th, and 6t h
mediately upon landing the battalion found itself i n Battalions to participate, but the results prove d
trouble . The Viet Cong occupied the heavily for- disappointing . They killed one VC . Coordinatio n
tified area north of the LZ in force . The 3d Battalio n problems plagued the multibattalion, join t
could not move . To help, the 4th Battalion went by U .S ./Vietnamese sweep . The most tragic error hap-
helicopters into a second LZ north of the 3d Bat- pened on 16 September . A 155mm round, fire d
talion's position . The 4th Battalion moved to put from an improperly laid howitzer scored a direct hi t
pressure on the Viet Cong positions which now la y on the 6th Battalion's command post and kille d
between the two Marine' battalions . A prisoner three Marines and wounded 11 .
revealed that elements of the veteran 263d and Credit for the most successful operational series i n
514th VC Battalions faced the Marines . The battl e 1967 belongs to the 5th Battalion . During th e
raged all day in the jungle-canopied terrain as gun - period 9 November through 22 December, the 5t h
ships, air strikes, and artillery pounded the well - served as one of three maneuver battalions of th e
entrenched Communists . At dusk the VC tried t o U .S . Mobile Riverine Force . Their operations con-
break out, but the 3d and 4th Battalions held . Fir e centrated in Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, and Kien
fights continued all night . Phong Provinces . The 5th Battalion took part in nin e
Captain Jerry I . Simpson, senior advisor to the 3 d separate actions during this period . The 44 days of
Battalion, spent the entire day and most of the nigh t riverine operation netted the battalion the im-
directing supporting arms against the tough enem y pressive total of 186 dead Communists and 3 2
position . Enemy mortar rounds, rockets, and small prisoners, including one VC province chief .
While assigned to the Mobile Riverine Force, th e as it landed, while Headquarters Company and th e
battalion normally stayed in the field for three day s 4th Company met much lighter opposition . Neither
of operations, followed by a stand down period o f the 2d and 3d Companies, to the north, had any
the same duration . Missions generally started wit h contact . The 4th Company moved 250 meters in -
the battalion moving in boats of the River Assaul t land, stopped, and called in air and artillery . Majo r
Division to an area of operations . Once in the assign- Nam realized that his left flank units, the 1st an d
ed area, the battalion moved frequently, either b y 4th Companies, were engaging the northern portio n
boat or helicopter, depending on the tactical situa- of the VC formation, by then identified as the .502 d
tion . Local Force Battalion . Major Nam ordered the 2 d
A classic riverine operation, executed by Majo r and 3d Companies to retract and land again at Blu e
Huong Van Nam's 5th Marine Battalion, started a t Beach 2, move inland, seize objectives 114 and 213 ,
midnight on 3 December as the Marines embarke d and encircle the Communists . Both companies ac-
on assault ships at Sa Dec . Their mission : destructio n complished the mission ; the VC found themselve s
of the 267th Main Force and 502d Local Force VC surrounded . The riverine force boats blocked escap e
Battalions, then located in eastern Kien Phong an d to the east across the canal .
western Dinh Tuong Provinces . The force move d By this time the 4th Company had lost contact ,
down the northern bank of the Mekong and entere d so, on Major Nam's orders, it withdrew to the beach ,
the Rach Ruong Canal to make a landing on the wes t reembarked, and landed again just south of Blu e
bank of the canal at 0800 . The plan called for the Beach 1 . The VC greeted the company's landin g
Marines to land, move west, and then sweep sout h with intense rocket and automatic weapons fire . Th e
back toward the Mekong . Two U .S . Army bat- guns of the assault craft established fire superiority a s
talions, one embarked, supported the operation . the 4th Company Marines scrambled ashore an d
The sun came up as the river craft entered th e gained a foothold . The 1st Company closed the ring ,
canal . All remained quiet until 0740 when the rea r moving in from the northwest . Coordinated attacks
of the boat column came under light small arms fir e by both the 1st and 4th Companies slowly rolled u p
from the west bank . As the column moved up th e the VC position, as the other companies blocked th e
canal, heavier fire, including recoilless rifles an d rest of the perimeter . Contact was too close to use
B-40 rockets, opened up from positions furthe r supporting arms . The Marines destroyed the enem y
north on the west bank . All of the boats returne d bunkers systematically, but their progress continue d
fire and the South Vietnamese called in the suppor- slow because their 57mm recoilless rifle had little ef-
ting gunships . A Communist B-40 rocket hit one o f fect on the well-constructed Communist bunkers .
the ATCs (an armored troop carrying boat), an d The senior battalion advisor, Major Paul L .
wounded 18 Marines . The 5th Battalion continue d Carlson, reported final stages of the fight :
on toward its original landing beaches . Only the en d
of the column came under enemy attack . The boat By 1600 one major Viet Cong complex remained 60 0
formation carrying the 3d Battalion, 47th U .S . In- meters inland and withstood all assaults . Rocket gunships
fantry, which followed the 5th Battalion, heard th e peppered the bunker system . The assaulting units the n
stormed the bunkers using grenades to destroy the opposi-
enemy fire and took advantage of their warning . The
tion and physically tore the bunkers apart with entren-
3d Battalion promptly landed on the west bank , ching tools . ,
south of the first VC firing position .
At 0800 the Communists opened fire on the 5t h The battle ended by 1630 . Throughout the night
Battalion again, this time from another west ban k and the next morning, Viet Cong survivors con-
position about 2,500 meters north of the last firin g tinued to emerge from hiding places . Some had
site . Obviously, a large VC force occupied the wes t reverted to the classic VC trick of hiding unde r
bank of the Rach Ruong . Enemy B-40 rounds hit si x water, breathing through hollow reeds . The Marines
ATCs . Major Nam ordered his battalion to land o n knew the trick, also .
the west bank immediately . The 2d and 3d Com- Enemy casualties during the "Battle of Rac h
panies landed near Objective 18, while the 1st, 4th , Ruong" totaled 175 Viet Cong killed by the 5th
and Headquarters Companies landed at Blue Beac h Marine Battalion . They found the bodies of the chief
1. of staff of the 502d Battalion, one company com-
The 1st Company became heavily engaged as soon mander, two platoon commanders, one doctor, and
two newsmen among the dead . The Marines cap- post, controlling Song Than 809, shut down opera-
tured 12 more confirmed VC, including a provinc e tions in anticipation of the New Year ' s truce . Thi s
chief, and picked up an additional 12 suspect s left TF Bravo in the field and in contact . To make
before the 5th Battalion withdrew at 1400 on 5 matters worse, the 2d Battalion almost ran out of
December . Battalion losses amounted to 40 kille d ammunition and enemy fire drove off a pre-dar k
and 103 wounded, 34 of whom did not requir e helicopter ammunition resupply . As a last recourse ,
evacuation . the helicopter crewmen dropped the ammunitio n
Elsewhere in the AO, other units accounted for during a low pass . Unfortunately, it fell in an open ,
another 91 enemy killed, at the cost of nin e fire-swept area between the 2d Battalion and th e
American soldiers killed and 89 wounded . While th e Viet Cong . Senior battalion advisor, Major Jon A .
5th Marine Battalion was scoring its resounding vic- Rindfleisch, and a volunteer squad of Marines race d
tory, the 3d Battalion, 47th U .S . Infantry assaulte d out into the drop zone, gathered up the scattere d
the VC positions which had fired the openin g containers, and rushed them back to the battalion' s
rounds . The Army assault prevented the Com- lines . The supply kept the 2d Battalion goin g
munists from going to the aid of their besieged com- through the night . *
rades to the north . The Army action provided a Meanwhile, to add to the uncertainty of the situa-
valuable assist, but the Rach Ruong battle remains a s tion, the 7th ARVN Division released all of its avia-
one of the finer moments in the brief history of th e tion at 1800, again, in anticipation of the Ne w
Vietnamese Marine Corps . Year's truce . In spite of these disquietin g
While the 5th Battalion participated in Coronad o developments, contact continued throughout th e
IX, the 2d Marine Battalion, the major componen t night, finally ending at 0530, 1 January when th e
of Task Force Bravo, engaged in Operation Son g VC withdrew . First light disclosed 85 VC bodies .
Than 808/Buena Vista . Operating with the 199t h The Marines took eight prisoners during the figh t
U .S . Infantry Brigade, TF Bravo joined Buena Vista and picked up 71 enemy weapons . Task Force
on 7 December . The search and destroy operatio n Bravo's losses included 28 Marines killed and 8 3
covered portions of Binh Hoa and Binh Duon g wounded . This ended the last Vietnamese Marin e
Provinces . During the 11-day sweep, the Marines action of 1967 .
discovered the base camp of the VC Dong Nai Regi- During the year 1967, the Vietnamese Marines
ment and the Binh Duong Provincial Forces . Th e participated in 24 major combat operations, 15 of
Marines suffered light casualties . which were brigade- of task-force-scale maneuvers .
The last Vietnamese Marine Operation of 196 7 Total VNMC casualties included 201 killed and 70 7
was Task Force Bravo's Operation Song Than 809 . wounded . The Communists suffered 693 killed an d
Lasting only three days, 29-31 December, Son g 342 captured from Vietnamese Marine actions . Th e
Than 809 resulted in a 20-hour battle with the 261s t kill ratio of 3 .45 :1, though not as impressive as th e
and 263d VC Main Force Battalions in Dinh Tuon g U .S . Marine 1967 kill ratio of 5 .18 :1, was a tribut e
Province in IV CTZ . At this time TF Bravo consisted to the courage of the Vietnamese Marines, as well a s
of the 1st and 2d Marine Battalions, reinforced b y the dedication of their advisors . The Marine advisor s
Battery B of the Marine Artillery Battalion ; contro l were fortunate during 1967 ; three suffered wound s
of the operation rested with the 7th ARVN Division . but none died . From the advisory viewpoint, 196 7
Helicopters landed both battalions in separat e represented a year of investment . The dividends in-
zones during the morning of 29 December . There cluded positive results ; the immediate future woul d
was no contact . On the 31st the 2d Battalion ex- affirm the advisors' faith in the abilities of their Viet-
ecuted a second helicopter assault . This time the bat- namese contemporaries .
talion made contact immediately after landing .
Complications came from an unexpected quarter . *For this and other actions during Song Than 809, Major Rind-
At 1700 the 7th ARVN Division forward command fleisch received the Silver Star Medal .
CHAPTER 1 6
An Air Force C-123 "Provider" lands on the air strip at Khe Sanh with supplies afte r
Navy Seabees completed resurfacing the monsoon-damaged strip on 1 November 1967 .
3d MarDiv ComdC, December 196 7
255
Men of the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines stand in a loose formation beside the air strip a t
Khe Sanh just after arriving in transport aircraft to reinforce the base in December 1967 .
3d MarDiv ComdC, December 1967
THE SITUATION AT THE END OF THE YEA R 25 7
past year, plus the continued growth of the ARV N Enemy Dispositions
would permit phasing out U .S . units within abou t
The number of regular NVA soldiers in I Corps
two years . "I am absolutely certain, " he said, "that
numbered just over 21,000 at the end of the year .
whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is
Their distribution was follows :
certainly losing ." 4
Westmoreland's speech coincided with th e Quang Tri Province . The major units were th e
Johnson Adminstration's highly publicized " pro- 812th and 90th Regiments of the 324B NVA Divi-
gress" campaign in the fall of 1967 . That campaig n sion, the 29th and 95th Regiments of the 325C NVA
sought to show that the allies were winning the wa r Division, and the 2d Battalion and regimental head -
in South Vietnam . General Wallace M . Greene, Jr . , quarters of the 9th NVA Regiment . Other forces i n
the Commandant of the Marine Corps, was , the province included the 5th NVA Regiment, th e
however, one of the few officials who did speak ou t 27th NVA Independent Battalion, and four in-
on the problems still remaining . His statements , dependent companies . Total : 10,805 .
which received little media attention, reflected th e
concerns of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and II I Thua Thien Province . The Northern Front Head-
MAF over inadequate manpower, particularly in th e quarters, the 5th NVA Regiment, four independen t
I Corps area . At a speech in Chicago in September , NVA battalions, and four independent companie s
General Greene said : operated in the province . Total : 3,645 .
In the Marines' area of South Vietnam alone, we hav e
1,282,000 people inside our security screen . We must dou-
Quang Nam Province . This area contained th e
ble that number . This will take time—and fighting me n
on the ground . 368B NVA Artillery Regiment, four independen t
We have over 2,000 square miles of territory inside th e NVA battalions, and four independent NVA com-
same screen of security. But we need a total of 3,000 panies . Total : 2,940 .
square miles .
Again, it will take time—and fighting men on th e Quang Tin Province . Operating in this provinc e
ground to do this .
I cite these figures just to give you some idea of the pro- were the headquarters and other support units of th e
blems—in the Marines' area alone . , 2d NVA Division, the 1st Vietcong Main Force Regi-
ment, the 21st NVA Regiment, the 3d NVA Regi- operations in preparation for an offensive . Other
ment, three independent NVA battalions, and seve n sources reported the 325C NVA Division had move d
NVA independent companies . Total : 6,075 . back to positions near Hill 881 North, while th e
304th NVA Division, which listed Dien Bien Ph u
Quang Ngai Province . The major units were the among its battle honors, had moved from Laos t o
headquarters of Military Region 5, the 97th Bat- positions southwest of Khe Sanh .
talion of the 2d Vietcong Main Force Regiment, si x General Westmoreland analyzed these and simila r
independent NVA battalions, and nine indepen- reports and detected an alteration in enemy strategy .
dent NVA companies . Total : 3,645 . On 20 December, he explained the changed situa-
tion in a message to his superiors in Washington . H e
The Changed Situatio n emphasized the enemy might seek to gain a majo r
The bright element of the tactical situation pic- military victory somewhere in South Vietnam, or
ture quickly faded at year's end in the face of moun- perhaps even seek to gain an apparent position o f
ting evidence of an impending major enemy offen- strength before assenting to negotiations . "In short, "
sive . General Westmoreland ' s optimistic speech at wrote Westmoreland, "I believe the enemy has
the National Press Club in September had been bas- already made a crucial decision to make a maximu m
ed upon an analysis that indicated the allies wer e effort . "6
winning the war . Hanoi read the same signs an d General Westmoreland considered the base a t
changed its strategy . Khe Sanh an obvious target for an enemy offensiv e
Previously, Hanoi followed a strategy of pro- and ordered III MAF to conduct a buildup i n
tracted war ; however, late , in 1967 capture d preparation for a fight for the base .? In the last fe w
documents began containing exhortations for enem y days of 1967 he repeatedly advised reporters to ex-
units to make a maximum effort politically an d pect " an intensified campaign in the comin g
militarily to win the war quickly . During the sam e months ." The President echoed these expectation s
period, the number of enemy defectors decrease d when he told the Australian cabinet about th e
and captured prisoners began speaking of the com- enemy buildup . " We must try very hard to b e
ing "final victory ." Intelligence sources in I Corps in - ready," said President Johnson . "We face dark days
dicated the 2d NVA Division was shifting its area of ahead . "8
Amid the mud, barbed wire, sand-bagged positions, and welter of supplies at the Co n
Thien combat base, a young Marine stands radio watch as the year 1967 draws to a close .
3d MarDiv ComdC, December 1967
Note s
Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derive d Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section i s
from : Admiral Ulysses S . G . Sharp, USN, and Genera l derived from 3d MarDiv AAR, Opn Prairie II, 19May67 ; 3d Mar
Westmoreland, USA, Report on the War In Vietnam, hereafter ComdC, Feb-Mar67 ; 4th Mar ComdC, Feb-Mar67 ; 9th Mar Com-
Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War; FMFPac, U .S . dC, Feb-Mar67 ; 12th Mar ComdC, Feb-Mar67 ; 3d Recon B n
Marine Forces in Vietnam Mar65-Sep67 Historical Summary , ComdC, Feb-Mar67 ; 2/3 ComdC, Feb-Mar67 ; 3/3 ComdC, Feb -
Volume I : Narrative ; FMFPac monthly summaries, Operation o f Mar67 ; 3/4 ComdC, Feb-Mar67 ; 1/9 ComdC, Feb-Mar67 ; 2/ 9
U .S . Marine Forces, Vietnam, Jan Jun67 ; III MAF ComdCs, Jan- ComdC, Feb-Mar67 . All documentary material cited is in th e
Jun67 ; 3d Marine Division ComdCs, Jan-Jun67 ; 1st marine Air - MCHC, Washington, D .C .
craft Wing ComdCs, Jan Jun67 ; 3d Marine Division AAR, Opera- 1. LtCol Robert F . Sheridan, comments on draft MS, 11Jun8 1
tion Prairie I, 28 Apr67 ; Brigadier General Edwin H . Simmons , (Vietnam Comment File) .
"Marine Corps Operation in Vietnam, 1967, " USNI, Naval 2. Ibid .
Review 1969, hereafter Simmons "USMC Ops in RVN, 1967 . " 3. Ibid .
Unless otherwise noted all documentary material cited is located 4. Ibid .
in the Marine Corps Historical Center (MCHC), Washington , 5. Ibid .
D .C .
Operation Prairie III
1. Colonel John C . Studt, Comments on draft ms, 14May81 .
(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) .
2. Quoted in Sharp and Westmoreland, Report On The War, p . Additional material in this section is derived from 3d MarDi v
132 . AAR, Opn Prairie III, 13Jun67 ; 3d Mar ComdC, Mar-Apr67 ; 3 d
3. LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n ..d . (1981 ) Recon Bn ComdC, Mar-Apr67 ; 11th Engr Bn ComdC, Mar -
(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) . Apr67 ; 3/3 ComdC, Mar-Apr67 ; 1/4 ComdC, Mar-Apr67 ; 3/ 4
ComdC, Mar-Apr67 ; 1/9 ComdC, Mar-Apr67 ; 3/9 ComdC, Mar-
Apr67 . All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC ,
Washington, D .C.
CHAPTER 2
Operation Prairie IV Begins Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derive d
from : FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Jun67 ; 1st MAW ComdC, Apr -
Additional material in this section is derived from 9th Mar May67 ; 3d Mar AAR, Khe Sanh, dtd 9Jun67 ; 1/3 AAR, Op n
ComdC, May67 ; 3/3 ComdC, May67 ; 1/4 ComdC, May67 ; 1/ 9 Prairie I, 7Feb67 ; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War;
ComdC, May67 ; 3/9 ComdC, May67 ; 11th Engr Bn ComdC , Capt Moyers S. Shore, II, The Battle for Khe Saab (Washington :
May67 . HisBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1969), hereafter Shore, Khe Sanh ; Maj
Michael W . Sayers, Comments on draft ms, 18May81 (Vietna m
Attack on Con Thie n Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D .C .), hereafter Sayers
Comments, May81, Unless otherwise noted, all documentary
Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section i s material is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.
derived from 1/4 ComdC, May67 ; 11th Engr Bn ComdC, May67 ;
1st Amtrac Bn ComdC, May67 . The Early Day s
1. LtCol Rheaford C . Bell, Comments on draft ms, 25May8 1
(Vietnam Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D .C . ) Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section i s
derived from 3d Mar ComdC, Apr67 ; 1/3 ComdC, Sep66-Feb67 ;
1/9 ComdC, Feb-Apr67 ; 2/9 ComdC, Mar67 ; 2/ 12 ComdC, Feb -
Into the DMZ
Apr67 . Unless otherwise noted all documentary material is locate d
Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is in the MCHC, Washington, D .C .
derived from III MAF ComdC, May67 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC , 1. Sayers comments, May81 ; 2dLt John M . Kramer, intvw by 3 d
May67 ; 1st MAW ComdC, May67, 3d Mar ComdC, May67 ; 9t h MarDiv dtd 28Feb67, (No . 567, OralHist Coll, MCHC) .
Mar ComdC, May67' 1/4 ComdC, May67 ; 3/4 ComdC, May67 ; 2. III MAF ComdC, Mar67, p . 3 ; LtGen Louis Robertshaw, com-
1/9 ComdC, May67 ; 2/9 ComdC, May67 ; 3/9 ComdC, May67 ; ments on draft ms, 29May81 (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC) .
2/26 ComdC, May67 ; HMM-164 ComdC, May67 ; HMM-36 3 3. Capt William B . Terrill, et .al ., intvw by 3d MarDiv, dt d
ComdC, May67 . 24Mar67, (No . 1017, OralHistColl, MCHC) .
2. BGen Harvey E . Spielman, Comments on draft ms, 27May8 1 4. Sayers Comments, May81 .
(Vietnam Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) .
Opening Moves of the Battl e
Operation Beau Charger
Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section i s
Additional material in this section was derived from 1/ 3 derived from : 3d Mar ComdC, Apr-May67 ; MAG-11 ComdC ,
ComdC, May67 ; HMM-263 ComdC, May67 . Apr-May67 ; MAG-12 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; MAG-16 ComdC ,
Apr-May67 ; 1/3 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 3/3 ComdC, Apr-May67 ;
Operation Hickory 1/9 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 3/9 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 2/12 Com-
dC, Apr-May67 ; 3/ 13 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 3d AT Bn ComdC ,
Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section was Apr-May67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material i s
derived from 3d MarDiv ComdC, May67 ; 3d Mar ComdC , located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C .
May67 ; 2/3 ComdC, May67 ; 3/4 ComdC, May67 ; 2/9 ComdC , 5. SSgt Leon R . Burns intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 8May67, (No .
May67 ; 3/9 ComdC, May67 ; HMM-164 ComdC, May67 . 993, Oral Hist Coll, MCHC) ; 2dLt Thomas G . King, intvw by 3 d
3. Col Duncan D . Chaplin, III, Comments on draft ms, 31May8 1 MarDiv dtd 8May67, (No . 994, Oral Hist Coll, MCHC), hereafte r
(Vietnam Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D .C .), hereafter King Intvw .
Chaplin comments, May81 . 6. Sayers Comments, May81 .
4. Ibid . 7. King Intvw .
5. Col James R. Stockman, Comment on draft ms, 27Jun81 ;
Chaplin comments, May81 . Hill 86 1
Operation Prairie IV End s Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section i s
derived from : 3d Mar ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 3/3 ComdC, Apr-
Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is May67 ; 1/9 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 3/9 ComdC, Apr-May67 .
derived from 3d MarDiv ComdC, May67 ; 3/4 ComdC, May67 . 8. Sayers comments, May81 .
6. Maj Walter E . Deese, Comments on draft ms, 9Jul81 (Vietna m 9. Capt Bayliss L . Spivey, intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 13May67 ,
Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D .C .), hereafter Deese (No . 950, OralHistColl, MCHC) hereafter Spivey Intvw ; LtCol
comments, Jul81 . Bayliss L . Spivey, Comments on draft ms, 28May81 and 18Jun8 1
7. 3d MarDiv ComdC, May67 ; Deese comments, Jul81 . (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC) .
10. Sayers Comments, May81 .
11. Spivey Intvw, May67 .
12. Sayers Comments, May81 .
CHAPTER 4 13. Ibid .
14. Ibid .
THE FIRST BATTLE OF KHE SANH 15. Ibid .
NOTES 263
Reinforcing the Hill 861 Attac k 7Apr67 ; Task Force X-RAY, sit reps, Operation Desoto, 27Jan -
7Apr67 ; 3/7 AAR Operation Desoto, 1 Jun67 ; 3/7 ComdCs, Jan -
Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section i s Jun67 ; HMH 463 ComdCs, Jan Jun67 ; 3/ 12 ComdCs, Jan Jun67 ;
derived from 1st MAW ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 2/3 ComdC, Apr - 1st Engr Bn ComdCs, Jan-Jun67 ; Col Francis V . White, Com-
May67 ; 3/3 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 1/12 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; ments on draft ms, 22Nov82 . All documentary material cited i s
2/12 ComdC, Apr-May67 . located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C .
16. LtCol Rodney D . McKitrick, Comments on draft ms , 1. LtCol Edward J . Bronars intvw by 1st MarDiv, dtd 3Apr67 ,
15Jun81, (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC), hereafter, McKitric k (No . 808, Oral HistCollection, H&MDiv, HQMC) .
Comments . 2. Captain Kenneth W . Johnson, intvw by Combat Informatio n
Attacking Hill 881 S Bureau during Operation Desoto, (No . 0619, Oral HistCollec-
don, HMDiv, HQMC) .
Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is 3. Col Robert C . Rice, Comments on draft ms, 10Jun81, (Viet-
derived from : 2/3 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 3/3 ComdC, Apr- nam Comment files, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )
May67 ; 2/9 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 3/9 ComdC, Apr-May67 .
17. SSgt Ruben Santos, intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 12May67, (No . Deckhouse / Desoto
949, OralHistColl, MCHC) .
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s
The Final Objective : Hill 881 N derived from : SLF (TG 79 .5) AAR Operation Deckhouse VI ,
14Mar67 ; 1/4 AAR Operation Deckhouse VI, 9Mar67 ; HMM 36 3
Unless otherwise noted, additional r:+taterial in this section i s
AAR Operation Deckhouse VI, 12Mar67 . 1/5 AAR Operatio n
derived from : 2/3 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 3/3 ComdC, Apr-
Deckhouse VI/Desoto, 10Mar67, hereafter 1/5 AAR ,
May67 ; 1/26 ComdC, May67 . Deckhouse/Desoto . All documentary material cited is located i n
18. lstLt Frank M . Izenour, intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 12May67 , the MCHC, Washington, D .C .
(No . 2105, OralHistColl, MCHC) . 4. HMM-363 AAR, Operation Deckhouse VI, 12Mar67 .
19. McKitrick Comments, Jun81 . 4A . 1/5 AAR ; Desoto/Deckhouse, p . 14 .
20. 2dLt Terry M . Weber, intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 12May67 ,
(No . 996, OralHistColl, MCHC) . Desoto Continued
21. Sea Tiger, 19May67, p . 3 . PFC Lopez received the Navy Cros s
for this action . Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s
22. BGen Edwin H . Simmons, " Marine Corps Operations in Viet- derived from : III MAF Journal File, Operation Desoto, 27Jan -
nam, 1967, " USNI, Naval Review 1969, p . 136, records a 7Apr67 ; Task Force X-Ray, sit reps, Operation Desoto, 27 Jan -
favorable comment on the M-16 . For a negative view, see Col 7Apr67 ; 3/7 AAR Operation Desoto, 1Jun67 ; 3/7 ComdCs, Jan -
Peter L . Hilgartner, Comments on draft ms, 2Jun81, (Vietnam Jun67 : HMH 463 ComdCs, Jan Jun67 ; 3/ 12 ComdCs, Jan Jun67 :
Comment File, MCHC). 1st Engr Bn . ComdCs, Jan Jun67 . All documentary material cited
End of the Battl e is located in the MCHC, Washinghton, D .C .
5. Col Robert C . Rice, Comments on draft ms, 10Jun81, (Viet-
Additional material in this section is derived from : 26th Mar nam Comment files, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) .
ComdC, AprJul67 ; 1/26 ComdC, May-Ju167 ; 3/26 ComdC , 6. Captain Patrick J . Morgan intvw by 1st MarDiv, dtd 4Apr67 ,
May-Ju167 . (No . 811, OralHistColl, HMDiv, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )
7. LtCol Joseph T . Smith, Comments on draft ms, 30May81 ,
PART II (Vietnam Comment files, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )
8. Ibid .
Spring Fighting in Southern I Corp s
Operation Union
CHAPTER 5
Unless otherwise noted additional material in this section i s
derived from : 1st Mar ComdCs, Jan-Apr67 ; 5th Mar ComdCs ,
THE WAR IN SOUTHERN I CORP S Jan-Jun67 ; 5th Mar AAR Operation Union, 20Jun67 ; 1/5 AAR
Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derive d Operation Union, 29May67 ; 3/5 AAR Operation Union I, Jun67 ;
from : FMFPac, "U .S . Marine Corps Force in Vietnam Mar65 - 3/1 ComdC, Apr67 ; 1/1 ComdC, Apr-May67 . All documentar y
Sep67, Historical Summary, " v .I : Narrative, FMFPac Operations material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C .
of U .S . Marine Forces, Vietnam, monthly summaries, Jan Jun67 ; 9. Col Emil J . Radics, Comments on draft ms, 19May81, (Com-
III MAF ComdCs Jan Jun67 ; 1st Mar Div ComdCs, Jan Jun67 ; 1s t ments files, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )
MAW ComdCs Jan-Jun67 ; Task Force X-RAY ComdCs, Jan - 10. Ibid .
Apr67 . All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC , 11. LtCol Peter L . Hilgartner intvw by 1st MarDiv, dtd 4Apr67 ,
Washington, D .C . (No . I233, Oral HistCollHist MusDiv, MCHC, Washington ,
D .C . )
Operation Desoto 12. Col Peter L . Hilgartner, Comments on draft ms, 2Jun81 ,
(Comments files, MCHC, Washington, D .C .), hereafter Hilgart-
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s ner comments, 2Jun81 .
derived from : III MAF Journal File, Operation Desoto, 27Jan - 13. 5th Mar AAR, Operation Union, p .7 .
NOTES 26 5
19. III MAF Operation Plan 12-67, dtd 12Sep67 . 8. Maj Henry J . M . Radcliffe intvw by MCHC, dtd 14Dec73 .
20. MajGen Louis Metzger, ltr to CG, FMFPac, Subj : Debrief , 9. Maj Darrell C . Danielson, intvw by 3d MarDiv, 7Jul67, (No .
22Jan68 (Archives, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) ; LtCol Willard 1264, Oral Hist Collection, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) .
N . Christopher, Comments on draft ms, 31Jul81 (Vietnam Com- 10 . . LtCol Albert C . Slater, Comments on draft ms, 21May81 ,
ment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . ) (Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .), hereafte r
21. III MAF, Dye Marker msg file, dtd 22Oct67 . Slater comments .
22. III MAF, Dye Marker msg file, dtd 240ct67 . 11. Capt Burrell H . Landes, intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd (No . 1519 ,
23. FMFPac, USMC Ops in RVN, Dec67. Oral HistCollection, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )
24. Quoted in Simmons, "USMC Ops in RVN 1967," p . 134 . 12. Slater comments .
13. Ibid .
CHAPTER 8 14. Ibid . ; Navy Cross Citation, Cpl James L . Stuckey, Dec&Me d
Br, HQMC, Washington, D .C .
15. Col George E . Jerue, Comments on draft MS of " U.S . Marines
CON THIEN AND THE SUMMER BATTLE S in Vietnam ." pt V, 12Jan70 .
ALONG THE DM Z
1. Col Richard B . Smith, "Leatherneck Square," Marine Corp s 1. 2/5 ComdC, Jul67, p . 3 .
Gazette, Vol . 83, No . 8 (Aug 69), p . 35 . 2. West, The Enclave, pp . 42-45 .
2. Col George E . Jerue, Comments on draft ms, 25May81, (Viet- 3. Col Joseph T . Smith, Comments on draft ms, 30May81 (Viet-
nam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . ) nam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )
3. lstLt William F . Delany intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 7Jul67 (No .
1269, Oral Hist Collection, MCHC, Washington, D .C . ) Operation Cochis e
4. Maj Darrell C . Daniels on intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 7Jul67 ,
(No .1264, Oral Hist Collection, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) . Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s
5. SSgt Leon R . Burns intvw by 3dMarDiv, dtd 7Jul67 (No . 1265 , derived from : Task Force X-Ray Operations Order 1-67 (Opera-
Oral HistCollection MCHC, Washington, D .C .), hereafter Burn s tion Cochise), dtd 9Aug67 ; 5th Mar AAR, Operation Cochise ,
intvw . dtd 20Sep67 ; 1/5 AAR, Operation Cochise, dtd 3Sep67 ; 3/ 5
6. Col Richard J . Schening, Comments on draft ms, 26May81 , AAR, Operation Cochise, dtd 1Sep67 ; 1/3 AAR, Operatio n
(Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . ) Cochise, dtd 3Sep67 . All documentary material cited is located in
7. Burns intvw . the MCHC, Washington, D .C .
4 . MAG-36, ComdC, Sep67, Encl 1, p . 1 . derived from : 9th Mar AAR Operation Hickory II ; 9th Mar AAR
Operation Kingfisher ; 3d Mar AAR Operation Kingfisher ; 1/ 9
Operation Swift AAR Operation Kingfisher; 2/9 AAR Operation Kingfisher ; 2/ 3
AAR Operation Kingfisher ; 3/3 AAR Operation Kingfisher ; 2/ 4
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s
AAR Operation Kingfisher ; 3/4 AAR Operation Kingfisher ; 3/2 6
derived from : Task Force X-Ray AAR, Operation Swift, dt d
AAR Operation Kingfisher ; and 9th MT Bn ComdC, Jul-Aug67 .
20Oct67 ; 5th Mars AAR, Operation Swift, dtd 11Oct67 ; 1/ 5
AAR, Operation Swift, dtd 27Sep67 ; 3/5 AAR, Operation Swift ,
1. Major Walter E . Deese, Comments on draft ms, 9Jul81 (Viet-
dtd 22Sep67 ; 2/11 AAR, Operation Swift, dtd 29Sep67 ; LtCo l
nam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )
Gene W . Bowers, Comments on draft ms, 15Sep81 (Vietnam
2. Col Robert C . Needham, Comments on draft ms, 27Jun8 1
Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .), hereafter Bowers
(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .), hereafte r
comments . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary materia l
Needham comments.
cited in located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C .
3. Ibid .
5. Col Philip M . Crosswait, Comments on draft ms, 14Jul81 (Viet- 4. Ibid .
nam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) .
5. Needham comments and Col James Stockman, Comments o n
6. Col Peter L . Hilgartner, Comments on draft ms, 2Jun81 (Viet-
draft ms, 27Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington ,
nam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . ) D .C .) .
7. Ibid . 6. 9th MT Bn ComdCs, Jul-Aug67 .
8. Cpl Joseph E . Fuller, et . al . intvw by 1st MarDiv, dtd 19Sep6 7
7. Col Julian G . Bass, Jr ., Comments on draft ms, 28May81 ,
(No . 1612, Oral Hist Collection, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )
(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) .
9. Sgt James E . Dougherty, et al ., intvw by 1st MarDiv, dt d 8. LtCoI Horace A . Bruce, Comments on draft ms, 14Jul81, (Viet-
23Sep67 . LCpI Henshaw account in reel 3, side 2 and reel 4, sid e nam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) .
1 . (No . 1630, Oral Hist Collection, MCHC, Washington, D .C . ) 9. LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n .d . (1981 )
10. lstLt Donald R . Dunagan, intvw by 1stMarDiv dtd 20Sep6 7
(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Wasington, D .C .), hereafte r
(No . 1294, Oral Hist Collection, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )
Metzger comments .
11. Bowers comments .
10. Col Lee R . Bendell, Comments on draft ms, 25May81, (Viet-
12. Ibid .
nam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )
13. Col William R . Earney, Comments on draft ms, 2Jun81 (Viet- 11. Ibid .
nam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . ) 12. 3/26 ComdC, Sep67 .
14. Ibid .
13. Col James W . Hammond, Jr ., Comments on draft ms ,
A Busy Calm Before the Storm
18May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) ,
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s hereafter Hammond comments .
derived from : 7th Mar AAR, Operation Foster, dtd 14Jan68 ; 2/ 3 14. Col Richard B . Smith, Comments on draft ms, 21May8 1
AAR, Operation Badger Hunt/Foster, dtd 7Dec67 ; 2/5 AAR , (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .), hereafter
Operation Essex, dtd 29Nov67 ; and LtCol Gene W . Bowers , Smith comments .
Comments on draft ms, 15Sep81 (Vietnam Comment file , 15. Hammond comments .
MCHC, Washington, D .C .) hereafter Bowers Comments . . Unles s 16. Metzger comments .
otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in th e 17. Hammond comments .
MCHC, Washington, D .C . 18. Ibid .
15. LtGen Donn J . Robertson, Comments on draft ms, 4Jun8 1 19. LtCol James E . Murphy, Comments on draft ms, 6Aug81 ,
(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . ) (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .), hereafte r
16. 2/5 AAR, Operation Essex, p . 16-17 . Murphy comments .
17. Ibid ., p . 17 . 20. Ibid .
18. Bowers comments . 21. 9th Mar AA, Operation Kingfisher (2/4 )
22. Hammond comments .
CHAPTER 1 0 23. Needham comments .
24. Col John C . Studt, Comments on draft ms, 9Jul81 (Vietna m
Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .), hereafter Studt com-
FALL FIGHTING IN THE NORT H ments .
Unless otherwise noted, the material for this chapter was der- 25. Ibid .
vied from : III MAF ComdC, Jul-Dec67 ; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jul- 26. Ibid .
Dec67 ; 9th Mar ComdCs, Jul-Dec67 ; 3d Mar ComdCs, Jul- 27. Ibid .
Dec67 ; 4th Mar ComdCs, Jul-Dec67 ; 12th Mar ComdCs, Jul- 28. Murphy comments .
Dec67 ; 2/9 ComdC, Ju167 ; 2/4 ComdCs, Aug-Oct67 ; and 3/2 6 29. Studt comments .
ComdC, Sept67 . All documentary material cited is located in the 30. Ibid .
MCHC, Washington, D .C . 31. Ibid .
32. Ibid .
33. Ibid .
Operation Kingfishe r
34. Ibid .
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is 35. 2/4 AAR, Operation Kingfisher .
NOTES 26 7
Beacon Sta r
CHAPTER 1 1
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s
THE SPECIAL LANDING FORC E derived from : 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, Apr-May67 ; HMM-16 4
ComdCs, Apr-May67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary
Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derive d material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C .
from : COMUSMACV Comd Hist, 1967 ; COMUSMACV Monthl y
Evaluation Report, Jan-Dec67 ; FMFPac "U .S . Marine Forces, Viet -
nam," monthly summaries, Jan-Dec67 ; III MAF ComdCs, Jan - Beaver Cage/Union I
Dec67 ; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-DEc67 ; LtCol Ralph F . Moody
and Mr . Benis M . Frank, "The Special Landing Force" (ms , Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s
MCHC, Washington, D .C ., 1972) . Unless otherwise noted all derived from : 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, Apr-May67 ; HMM-26 3
documentary material cited is located in the Marine Corp s ComdCs, Apr-May67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary
Historical Center, Washington, D .C . material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C .
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s
derived from : III MAF ComdCs, Aug66-Feb67 ; 1st MAW Com- derived from : 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, May-Jun67 ; 2d Bn, 3 d
Mar ComdCs, May-Jun67 ; HMM-164 ComdCs, May-Jun67 ;
dCs, Jan-Dec67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary
material cited is located in the Marine Corps Historical Center , HMM-263 ComdCs, May-Jun67 . Unless otherwise noted all
Washington, D .C . documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington ,
D .C .
1. Col James R . Stockman, Comments on draft ms, 27Jun8 1
(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . ) 10. LtCol Edward K . Kirby, Comments on draft ms of Moody, et
2. LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n .d . (1981 ) a!, "Marines in Vietnam," 18Jan70 (Vietnam Comment file ,
(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) hereafter MCHC, Washington, D .C . )
Metzger comments .
Day On, Stay O n
Operation Deckhouse V
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s
dervied from : 1stBn, 9th Marines ComdC, Jan67 ; HMM-36 2 derived from : 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, Jan Jun67 ; 2d Bn, 3d Ma r
ComdC, Jan67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary materia l ComdCs, Jan-Jun67 ; HMM-164 ComdCs, Jan-Jun67 ; HMM-26 3
cited is located in the Marine Corps Historical Center , ComdCs, Jan-Jun67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentar y
Washington, D .C . material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C .
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s
derived from : 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Jun67 ; HMM-263 ComdC , derived from : 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Aug-Sep67 ; HMM-26 2
Jun67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited i s ComdC, Aug-Sep67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentar y
located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C . material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C .
11. 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Jun67 . 14. 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Sep67 .
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s
derived from : 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, Jun Ju167 ; HMM-16 4 derived from : III MAF ComdC, Aug67 ; 1st MAW ComdC ,
ComdCs, Jun Ju167 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentar y Aug67 ; MAG-16 ComdC, Aug67 ; HMM-262 ComdC, Aug-
material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C . Dec67 ; HMM-163 ComdC, Aug67 ; HMM-463 ComdC, Aug67 .
Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located
in the MCHC, Washington, D .C .
Bear Claw/Buffalo/Hickory II
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s Beacon Point/Fremont/Ballistic Charge/Shelbyvill e
derived from : 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, JuI67 ; HMM-263 ComdC ,
JuI67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited i s Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s
located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C . derived from : 1st Bn, 3d Mat ComdC, Sep67 ; HMM-362 ComdC ,
12. Col John A . Conway, Comments on draft ms, 8Jun81 (Viet- Sep67 ; 4th Mar ComdC, Sep67 ; 1st Mar ComdC, Sep67, 2d Bn ,
nam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . ) 1st Mar ComdC, Sep67 ; 3d Bn, 5th Mar ComdC, Sep67 . Unless
otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in th e
Beaver Track/Buffalo/Hickory I I MCHC, Washington, D .C .
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s Fortress Sentry/Kingfishe r
derived from : 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Ju167 ; HMM-164 ComdC , Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s
Ju167 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is derived from : 9th Mar ComdCs, Sep-Oct67 ; 2d Bn, 3d Mar Com-
located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C . dCs, Sep-Oct67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentar y
material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C .
Bear Chain/Fremont
Bastion Hill/Medina/Liberty II/Fremon t
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s
derived from 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Ju167 ; HMM-164, ComdC , derived from : 1st Mar ComdC, Oct67 ; 4th Mar ComdC, Oct67 ;
Ju167 ; HMM-265 ComdC, Ju167 . Unless otherwise noted, al l 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Oct67 . Unless otherwise noted al l
documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington , documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington ,
D .C . D .C .
Formation Leader/Liberty II/Kno x
Beacon Guide
Unless otherwise noted additional material for this section is
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s derived from : 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Oct-Nov67 ; 7th Mar ComdCs ,
derived from : 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, JuI67 ; HMM-263 ComdC , Oct-Nov67 ; 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, Oct-Nov67 ; 2d Bn, 26t h
Ju167 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is Mar ComdCs, Oct-Nov67 . Unless otherwise noted, all docume n
located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C. tary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C .
NOTES 269
Fortress Ridg e Corps Civic Action Efforts in Vietnam, March 1965 - March 1966 ,
(Washington D .C . : Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Head -
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s quarters, U .S . Marine Corps, 1968) ; Captain William D . Parker ,
derived from : 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Nov-Dec67 ; 3d Bn, 1st Ma r USMCR, U.S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs in I Corps Republic of
ComdCs, Dec67-Jan68 ; HMM-262 ComdCs, Dec67-Jan68 . South Vietnam, April 1966 to April 1967, (Washington D .C . :
Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located Historical Division, Headquarters, U .S . Marine Corps, 1970) .
in the MCHC, Washington, D .C . Documentary material cited is located in the MCHC ,
16. Col Max McQuown, Comments on draft ms, 20May81 (Com- Washington, D .C .
ments files, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) hereafter McQuown
comments . Marine Grass-Roots-Level Participatio n
17. Ibid .
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s
Badger Toot h derived from : Captain William D . Parker, USMCR, U.S. Marin e
Corps Civil Affairs in I Corps Republic of South Vietnam, Apri l
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s
1966 to April 1967, (Washington D .C . : Historical Division ,
derived from : 3d Bn, 1st Mar ComdCs, Dec67-Jan68 ; HMM-26 2 Headquarters, U .S . Marine Corps) . Documentary material cited i s
ComdCs, Dec67-Jan68 . located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C .
18. McQuown comments . 5. III MAF ComdC, February 1967 .
19. Ibid . 6. V . Keith Fleming, Jr ., personal recollection, 9Nov82 .
20. Ibid .
7. Col Max McQuown, Comments on draft ms, 20May81 (Viet-
Ballistic Arch/Kentucky V /Osceola nam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .), hereafter Mc -
Quown Comments . '
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s 8. lstLt Robert E . Mattingly, intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 23Oct6 7
derived from : 9th Mar ComdCs, Nov67-Jan68 ; 1st Bn, 3d Ma r (No . 1602, Oral Hist Collection, MCHC, Washington, D .C .
ComdCs, Nov67-Jan68 ; 2d Bn, 4th Mar, ComdC, Dec67 . Unless 9. AO3E-cem, " Personal Response Project," June 1968 .
otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in th e 10. Col Donald L . Evans intvw by HistDiv, HQMC, dtd 15Feb72 ,
MCHC, Washington, D .C . (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) .
21. 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Nov67 . 11. McQuown comments .
Marine Air Operation s derived from : 11th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 ; 12th Mar ComdCs ,
Jan-Dec67 . Unless otherwise noted all documentary material cite d
Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section i s is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C .
derived from LtGen Keith B . McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation i n
Vietnam, 1962-1970," United States Naval Institute Proceedings , 17. Col Ernest W . Payne, Comments on draft ms, 4Jun81, (Viet-
May71, p . 122-155, hereafter McCutcheon "Marine Aviation i n nam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) hereafter Payn e
Vietnam," and Gen William W . Momyer Air Power in Three comments .
Wars (GPO, Washington, D .C . : 1978), hereafter Momyer, Air 18. Col Edwin S . Schick, Jr ., Comments on draft ms, 11Jun8l ,
Power. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material i s (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) hereafte r
Schick comments .
located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C .
1. Col Kenneth T . Dykes, Comments on draft ms, 23Jul81 (Viet- 19. Schick comments and Col Clayton V . Hendricks, Comments
nam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) . on draft ms, 31May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC ,
2. BGen Edward J . Doyle, Comments on draft ms, 14Jun81 (Viet- Washington, D .C . )
20. Payne Comments .
nam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )
Fixed-Wing Operation s
CHAPTER 1 4
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s
derived from : MAG-11 ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 ; MAG-12 ComdCs , LOGISTIC S
Jan-Dec67 ; MAG-13 ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 ; McCutcheon, " Marine
Aviation in Vietnam ." Unless otherwise noted, all documentar y Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derive d
material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C . from : FMFPac, U .S . Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam, Mar65 -
Sep67, Historical Summary, Vols I and II ; FMFPac, Operations o f
3. Colonel John M . Verdi, Comments on draft ms, 4Jun81 (Viet- U .S . Marine Forces, Vietnam, monthly summaries, Jan-Dec67 ; II I
nam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) hereafter Verdi MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 ; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 ; 3 d
comments . MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 ; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 .
4. Ibid . Unless otherwise noted, all cited material is located in the MCHC ,
5. Ibid . Washington, D .C .
6. Ibid .
7. Ibid . Upgrading the Logistics System
8. Verdi comments and Col Edgar J . Love, Comments on draft
Unless otherise noted, additional material in this section i s
ms, 30May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington ,
derived from : FLC ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 ; Col G . C . Axtell, intv w
D .C .) hereafter Love Comments .
by FMFPac, 5Oct66 (No . 219, Oral History Coll, MCHC) ; Col W .
9. Momyer, Air Power, p . 199 and LtCol Earl E . Jacobson, Jr . ,
H . Cowper, intvw by FLC, 29Jan67 (No . 377, Oral Hist Coll ,
Comments on draft ms, 8Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC ,
MCHC) . Unless otherwise noted, all cited material is located i n
Washington, D .C .) hereafter Jacobson comments .
the MCHC, Washington, D .C .
10. Jacobson comments .
1. LtGen Louis M . Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n .d . (1981) ,
11. Ibid .
(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C ., hereafte r
12. Love comments .
Metzger comments .
13. LtGen Louis B . Robertshaw, Comments on draft ms ,
2. FMFPac Hist Summ, pp . 6-8 .
22May81, (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )
3. Metzger comments .
14. Love comments .
4. Ibid .
5. Ibid .
Helicopter Operation s 6. Ibid .
7. Col James C . Short, Comments on draft ms, 29May81 (Viet-
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s nam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )
derived from : MAG-16 ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 ; MAG-36 ComdCs , 8. Metzger comments .
Jan-Dec67 ; MajGen Keith B . McCutcheon, USMC . "Air Suppor t
for III MAF," Marine Corps Gazette, v .51, no .8 (Aug 1967), pp . Navy Support
19-23 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is
located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C . Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s
derived from : Cdr W . D . Middleton, "Seabees in Vietnam," U .S.
15. Cdr F .O . McClendon, Jr ., MSC, USN . "Doctors and Dentists ,
Naval Institute Proceedings, Aug67, v . 93, No . 8, pp . 54-64 ; U S
Nurses and Corpsmen in Vietnam," Naval Review 1970, An-
napolis ; U .S . Naval Institute, 1970, p .283 . NavSupAct Da Nang, Naval Support in I Corps 1968 . Unless
16. LtCol William R . Fails, Ms, "Development of Marine Corps other noted, all material cited is located in MCHC, Washington ,
D .C .
Helicopters, 1962-1972," Chapter 6 .
9. Capt John T . Vincent, (MC), USN, Comments on draft ms ,
Artillery 7Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )
10. Col Robert C . Rice, Comments on draft ms, 10Jun81 (Viet-
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is nam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)
NOTES 27 1
Marine Corps Engineers 5. SMA AA Rept, Song Thanh/Deckhouse V, dtd 1Mar67, Enc l
(10) .
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s 6. SMA AA Rept, RSSZ Ops (unnamed), dtd 28JuI67 .
derived from : 1st, 3d, 7th, 9th, 11th Eng Bns ComdCs, Jan - 7. Ibid .
Dec67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is 8. SMA AA Rept, Operation Paddington, dtd 28Nov67 .
located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C . 9. SMA AA Rept, Operation Coronado IX, dtd 12Feb68 .
11 . Col James L . Black, Comments on draft ms, 23May81 (Viet-
nam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . ) CHAPTER 1 6
12 .- Col Ross L . Mulford, Comments on draft ms, 1Jun81 (Viet-
nam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . ) THE SITUATION AT THE END OF THE YEA R
13. Col Richard D . Taber, Comments on draft ms, 7Jun81 (Viet-
nam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . ) Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derive d
14. LtCol Willard N . Christopher, Comments on draft ms , from FMFPac ComdC, Jul-Dec67 ; III MAF ComdC, Dec67 ; Ge n
31Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . ) William C . Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports . (Garden City :
Doubleday, 1976), hereafter Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports ;
and Peter Braestrup, Big Story, (Boulder : Westview Press, 1977) ,
CHAPTER 1 5 hereafter Braestrup, Big Story . All documentary material cited i s
located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C .
OTHER MARINE ACTIVITIE S
Operational Aspects
Unless otherwise noted, material for this chapter is derive d
from : HQMC Comd Status of Forces reps, Jan-Dec67 ; Adm U . S . Additional material in this section is derived from 1st MarDi v
Grant Sharp, USN, and Gen William C . Westmoreland, USA , ComdC, Dec67 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67 ; 1st MAW ComdC ,
Report on the War in Vietnam (Washington, GPO, 1968) . Al l Dec67 ; and FLC ComdC, Dec67 . All documentary material cite d
documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington , is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C .
D .C . 1. Douglas Pike, conference remarks, quoted in A Conference
Report: Some Lessons and Non-Lessons of Vietnam Ten Year s
Marines with MAC V
After the Paris Peace Accords . (Washington : Woodrow Wilson
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s Center for Scholars, 1983) .
derived from MACV Strength Reports, 1967 ; BGen John R . 2. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 204 ; Gen William C .
Chaisson debrief, HQMC, 1Aug67 (No . 6172, Oral Hist Col l Westmoreland, Oral History Interview, 4Apr83 (Oral History Col-
HQMC) . All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC , lection, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) .
Washington, D .C . 3. BGen Edwin H . Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations in Viet-
1. LtGen John R . Chaisson, Transcript of Remarks at a Basi c nam, 1967," Naval Review, 1969 ; FMFPac ComdC, Jul-Dec67 ;
School Mess Night, 17Nov70 (Oral Hist Coll, MCHC , and III MAF ComdC, Dec67 .
Washington, D .C .) .
Personnel and Logistics
The Embassy Guard
Material in this section is derived from : HQMC Comd Cente r Additional material for this section is derived from III MA F
Status of Forces rept, Jan-Dec67 ; MSG Bn Comd ComdCs, Feb - ComdC, Dec67 . All documentary material cited is located in th e
Dec67 ; MACV Strength Reports, 1967 ; Maj Philip E . Tucker int- MCHC, Washington, D .C .
vw by HistBr, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 6Jun75 (No . 6019, Oral
The Outlook for Victory
Hist Coll, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) . Unless noted otherwise al l
documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington ,
D .C . . Additional material for this section is derived from III MAF
2. LtCol Philip E . Tucker, Comments on draft ms, n .d . (1981 ) ComdC, Dec67 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec67 ; and 3d MarDi v
(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) . ComdC, Dec67 . All documentary material cited is located in th e
MCHC, Washington, D .C .
I Corps Advisors
5. Quoted in Braestrup, Big Story, p . 53 and 59 .
Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s
derived from : HQMC Comd Cntr Status of Forces rept, Jan - Enemy Dispositions
Dec67 ; SMA, AA rpts, Jan-Dec67 ; MajGen W . B . Fulton, USA ,
Vietnam Studies, Riverine Operations, 1966-1969 (Washington , Additional material for this section is derived from III MA F
GPO, 1973) ; VAdm E . B . Hooper, USN (Ret .), Mobility, Sup - ComdC, Dec67 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec67 ; and 3d MarDi v
port, Endurance, (Washington, GPO, 1972) . Unless otherwis e ComdC, Dec67 . All documentary material cited is located in th e
noted, all documentary material is located in the MCHC , MCHC, Washington, D .C.
Washington, D .C . 6. Gen William C . Westmoreland, quoted in Braestrup, Big
3. LtCol James R . Davis, Comments on draft ms, 21May81 (Viet- Story, Vol . 1, p . 61 .
nam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) . 7. LtGen Keith B . McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam ,
4. Col Nels E . Anderson, Comments on draft ms, 17May81 (Viet- 1962-1970," Naval Review, 1969 .
nam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) 8. Quoted in Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 239 .
Appendix A
*Unless otherwise indicated, dates refer to the period when a 1st Marine Division Headquarters lJan-31Dec6 7
unit was in Vietnam . Only permanent Marine organization of CG MajGen Herman Nickerson, Jr . lJan-31May6 7
battalion/squadron-size or larger are listed; exceptions are 3 d MajGen Donn J . Robertson* 1Jun-31Dec6 7
Marine Division (Fwd), Task Force X-Ray, and the Force Logistic ADC BGen William A . Stiles 1Jan-23Mar6 7
Command and its components . The following listing reflects ad- BGen Foster C . LaHue* 24Mar-31Dec6 7
ministrative rather than operational organization . (For a complete *BGen LaHue was Acting 1st Marine Division Commande r
listing of locations and strength of Marine units in the wester n during the period 27Oct-28Nov67 .
Pacific, see Appendix F.) C/S Col Sidney J . Altman lJan-31May6 7
Col Edward L . Bale, Jr . 1-12Jun67
Col Henry J . Woessner, II 13Jun-31Dec67
III MM Headquarters 1Jan-31Dec6 7 G-1 Col Charles C . Crossfield, II 1-18Jan67
CG LtGen Lewis W . Walt lJan-31May67 Col Arnold L. Emils 19Jan-lOMay6 7
LtGen Robert E . Cushman, Jr . lJun-31Dec67 Col William R . Earney llMay-31Dec6 7
DepCG MajGen Herman Nickerson, Jr . lJan-31Mar67 G-2 Col John J . O'Donnell 1-14Jan6 7
MajGen Robert E . Cushman, Jr . lApr-31May6 7 Col Stanley Davis 15Jan-30Jun6 7
MajGen Herman Nickerson, Jr . 1Jun-17Oct6 7 LtCol Emmett B . Sigmon, Jr . 1-7Ju16 7
MajGen Raymond L . Murray 18Oct-31Dec6 7 Col James C . Short 8-11Jul6 7
C/.S BGen Hugh M . Elwood lJan-31Mar6 7 LtCol Emmett B . Sigmon, Jr . 12Ju1-30Sep6 7
BGen Robert C . Owens, Jr . lApr-20Dec6 7 Col Russell E . Corey 1Oct-31Dec6 7
BGen Earl E . Anderson 21Dec-31Dec6 7 G-3 Col Herman Poggemeyer, Jr . lJan-31May6 7
G-1 Col John L . Mahon 1Jan-3Jun6 7 Col Herbert E . Ing, Jr . 1Jun-8Ju16 7
Col James H . Berge, Jr . 4Jun-15Jul6 7 Col Robert D . Bohn 9-11Jul67
Col Poul F . Pedersen 16Ju1-31Dec6 7 Col James C . Short 12Jul-31Dec67
G-2 Col Roy H . Thompson 1Jan-13Feb6 7 G-4 Col Edward L . Bale, Jr . 1Jan-27Jun6 7
Col Benjamin S . Read 14Feb-9Ju167 LtCol Earl K . Vickers, Jr . 28Jun-31Dec6 7
Col Kenneth J . Houghton 10Jul-31Dec6 7 G-5 Col Walter Moore 1Jan-2Feb6 7
G-3 Col Drew J . Barrett, Jr . lJan-2Ju16 7 Col Donald L. Mallory 3Feb-31May6 7
Col Fred E . Haynes, Jr . 3Ju1-13Nov6 7 LtCol Richard F . Peterson 1Jun-11Jul6 7
Col Thomas L . Randall 14Nov-31Dec6 7 Col Emil J . Radics 12Jul-30Sep6 7
G-4 Col Joseph F . Quilty, Jr . 1Jan-2Jun6 7 LtCol Richard F . Peterson 1-4Oct6 7
Col Rex O . Dillow 3Jun-31Dec6 7 Col Herbert L . Beckington 5Oct-31Dec6 7
G-5 Col Eric S . Holmgrain 1Jan-31Jan67 Headquarters Battalio n
Col John T . Hill lFeb-26Apr67 CO Col Warren A . Leitner 1Jan-31Jul6 7
Col George 0 . Ross 27Apr-17May67 Col Joseph F . Donahoe, Jr . lAug-31Dec6 7
Col Robert F . Warren 18-31May67
Col George 0 . Ross 1Jun-1Jul6 7
Col James A . Gallo, Jr . 2Ju1-5Sep6 7 Task Force X-Ray lJan-26Apr67 '
LtCol James L . Black, Jr . 6-14Sep67 *TF X-Ray activated at Chu Lai on 10 October 1966 an d
27 3
operated from there until 26 April 1967, at which time i t 3d Battalion, 5th Marines
deactivated when Task Force Oregon assumed its mission . CO LtCol Dean E . Esslinger 1Jan-27May6 7
Col Charles B . Webste r 28May-6Sep6 7
CO BGen William A . Stiles 1Jan-24Mar6 7 Col William K . Rockey 7Sep-31Dec6 7
BGen Foster C . LaHue 25Mar-26Apr6 7
C/S Col Fred E . Haynes, Jr . 1Jan-26Apr6 7 7th Marines
G-1 LtCol Roland L . McDaniel lJan-3Mar67 CO Col Lawrence F . Snoddy, Jr .* 1-20Jan67
Maj John C . Hergert, Jr . 4Mar-26Apr6 7 *Surname changed to Snowden 19Apr72
G-2 Maj Glenn K . Maxwell 1-4Jan67 Col Charles C . Crossfield, II 21Jan-14Aug6 7
Maj Daniel Z . Boyd 5Jan-26Apr67 LtCol Russell E . Johnson 15-21Aug6 7
G-3 LtCol Edward J . Bronars 1Jan-2Feb67 Col Ross R . Miner 22Aug-31Dec6 7
LtCol Robert E . Hunter, Jr . 3Feb-26Apr6 7 1st Battalion, 7th Marine s
G-4 LtCol Louis A . Bonin lJan-3Mar67 CO LtCol Basile Lubka 1Jan-27Feb67
LtCol Basile Lubka 4Mar-26Apr67 LtCol Jack D . Rowley 28Feb-14Sep67
G-5 Maj Joseph T . Smith 1Jan-26Apr67 LtCol William) . Davis 15Sep-31Dec6 7
2d Battalion, 7th Marines
1st Marines CO LtCol Warren P. Kitterman 1Jan-16Aug6 7
CO Col Donald L. Mallory 1Jan-28Jan67 LtCol John R . Love 17Aug-31Dec6 7
Col Emil J . Radics 29Jan-11Ju16 7 3d Battalion, 7th Marines
Col Herbert E . Ing, Jr . 12Ju1-31Dec67 CO LtCol Raymorid J . O' Leary 1Jan-1 Feb6 7
LtCol Edward J . Bronars 2Feb-4Apr6 7
1st Battalion, 1st Marines LtCol John D . Counselman 5Apr-18Oct6 7
CO LtCol Van D . Bell, Jr. lJan-4Jun67 LtCol Roger H . Barnard 19Oct-31Dec6 7
LtCol George E . Petro 5Jun-27Aug67
LtCol Albert F . Belbusti 28Aug-16Nov67 11th Marines
LtCol Marcus J . Gravel 17Nov-31Dec67 CO Col Glenn E . Norris 1Jan-28Jun6 7
2d Battalion, 1st Marines LtCol Clayton V . Hendricks 29Jun-18Jul6 7
CO LtCol Haig Donabedian 1-31Jan67 Col Ernest W . Payne 19Jul-27Dec67
LtCol Marvin M . Hewlett lFeb-5Aug67 LtCol Clayton V . Hendricks 28-31Dec6 7
LtCol Archie VanWinkle 6Aug-14Nov6 7 1st Battalion, 11th Marines
LtCol Evan L . Parker, Jr . 15Nov-31Dec67 CO LtCol Mark P. Fennessy 1Jan-18May6 7
Maj Joseph J . Marron 19May-31Jul6 7
3d Battalion, 1st Marines '
*The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines became part of SLF BRAVO o n LtCol David A . Rap p lAug-60ct6 7
1 Dec67 . LtCol Robert C . V . Hughes 7Oct-31Dec6 7
2d Battalion, 11th Marines
CO LtCol Hillmer E . DeAtley 1Jan-26Apr6 7 CO Maj Ivil L . Carver lJan-21Feb6 7
LtCol Robert C . Rice 27Apr-28Aug67 Maj Joseph H . Marron 22Feb-11May6 7
LtCol Max McQuown 29Aug-30Nov67 LtCol Robert E . Hunter, Jr . 12May-28Sep6 7
LtCol David A . Clark 29Sep-31Dec6 7
5th Marines 3d Battalion, 11th Marines
CO Col Fred E . Haynes, Jr . 1Jan-27Feb67 CO LtCol Alexander S . Ruggiero 1Jan-28Jun6 7
Col Kenneth J . Houghton 28Feb-30Jun67 LtCol George T . Balzer 29Jun-31Dec67
Col Stanley Davis 1Jul-16Oct6 7 4th Battalion, 11th Marines
Col Robert D . Bohn 17Oct-31Dec67 CO LtCol George R . Lamb Ilan-lFeb67
1st Battalion, 5th Marines LtCol Joseph M . Laney, Jr . 2Feb-18Apr67
CO LtCol Peter L . Hilgartner 1Jan-19Sep67 LtCol Gordon M . B . Livingston 19Apr-31Ju16 7
LtCol Oliver W . Vandenberg 2OSep-31Dec67 Maj John S . Hollingshead lAug-31Dec6 7
4th Marine s
12th Marines
CO Col Alexander D . Cereghino IJan-14Feb6 7
CO Col Benjamin S . Read 1-22Jan6 7
Col Roy H . Thompson 15Feb-9Ju16 7
Col William R . Morrison 23Jan-20Jul6 7
Col William L . Dick 10Jul-31Dec67
Col Edwin S . Schick, Jr . 21Ju1-31Dec6 7
1st Battalion, 4th Marines '
1st Battalion, 12th Marines
*The 1st Battalion, 4th Marines served with the SLF during the
CO LtCol Lavern W . Larson 1Jan-15Feb6 7
period IJan-1Apr67.
LtCol Wayne H . Rice 16Feb-6Sep6 7
CO LtCol Theodore J . Willis 2Apr-12May67 *
LtCol Charles H . Opfar 7Sep-31Dec6 7
Maj Rheaford C . Bell 13May-29Ju16 7
2d Battalion, 12th Marines
LtCol Edwin A . Deptula 30Jul-31Dec6 7 CO LtCol Willis L . Gore IJan-27Apr6 7
2d Battalion, 4th Marines '
LtCol Jack L. Norman 28Apr-8Sep6 7
*The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines arrived in Vietnam on 6Jan67 .
Maj George C . Harris, Jr . 9-10Sep6 7
CO LtCol Arnold E . Bench 6Jan-15Jul6 7
LtCol Robert Schueler 1lSep-2Dec6 7
Maj Wells L . Field, III 16-18JuI6 7 LtCol Ronald P . Dunwell 3-31Dec6 7
LtCol James W . Hammond, Jr . 19Jul-270ct6 7 3d Battalion, 12th Marines
LtCol William Weise 28Oct-31Dec6 7
CO LtCol Charles) . Kirchmann IJan-28Feb6 7
3d Battalion, 4th Marines
LtCol Jack L . Miles 1Mar-12JuI6 7
CO LtCol William J . Masterpool IJan-3Mar6 7
LtCol David B . Barker 13Ju1-8Nov6 7
LtCol Wendell N . Vest 4Mar-21JuI6 7
Maj Robert W . Green 9Nov-31Dec6 7
LtCol Lee R . Bendell 22Ju1-31Dec6 7
4th Battalion, 12th Marines
CO LtCol David G . Jones IJan-6Apr6 7
9th Marines Maj Louis G . Snyder 7Apr-23Ju16 7
CO Col Robert M . Richards lJan-20Mar67 LtCol Joseph K . Gastrock, III 24Jul-31Oct6 7
Col Robert M . Jenkins 21Mar-17May67 Maj Rudolph W . Bolves 1Nov-31Dec67
3d Antitank Battalion
26th Marines *
CO LtCol Charles R . Case y lJan-29Aug6 7
*The regimental headquarters arrived 26Apr67.
LtCol Gene M . McCain 30Aug-20Nov6 7
CO Col John J . Padley 26Apr-12Aug6 7
Maj Robert M . Jordan 21Nov-31Dec6 7
Col David E . Lownds 13Aug-31Dec6 7
1st Battalion, 26th Marine s
3d Tank Battalion
CO LtCol Donald E . Newton 1Jan-3Ju16 7
CO LtCol William R . Corson 1Jan-14Feb6 7
LtCol James B . Wilkinson 4Jul-31Dec6 7
LtCol Robert J . Norto n 15Feb-23Mar6 7
2d Battalion, 26th Marines
Maj Eddis R. Larson 24-26Mar6 7
CO LtCol John M . Cummings lJan-lOApr6 7
Maj Vernon L . Sylveste r 27Mar-28Jun6 7
LtCol Charles R . Figard llApr-18May6 7
LtCol Duncan D . Chaplin, II I 29Jun-31Dec6 7
LtCol William) . Masterpool 19May-26May6 7
LtCol Duncan D . Chaplin, III 27May-3Dec6 7
3d Motor Transport Battalion
LtCol Francis J . Heath, Jr . 4-31Dec6 7
CO Maj Richard F . Armstrong 1Jan-6Sep6 7
3d Battalion, 26th Marines
Maj William O . Day 7Sep-6Oct6 7
CO LtCol Garland T . Beyerle 1-17Jan6 7
Maj William H . Stewart, Jr . 7Oct-31Dec6 7
LtCol Kurt L . Hoch 18Jan-20Aug6 7
LtCol Harry L . Alderman 21Aug-31Dec6 7
3d Engineer Battalion
CO Maj Joseph A . Shearman, Jr . 1-31Jan67 1st Battalion, 13th Marines *
LtCol Garry M . Pearce, Jr . 1-17Feb67 *The battalion arrived in Vietnam on 23Jul67 .
LtCol James H . Reid, Jr . 18Feb-20Oct67 CO Maj Thomas J . Coyle 23Ju1-9Dec6 7
LtCol Robert C . McCutchan 21Oct-6Nov67 LtCol John A . Hennelly 10-31Dec67
LtCol Jack W . Perrin 7Nov-31Dec67
Headquarters, Force Logistic Command *
*(Redesignated Headquarters, 1st Force Service Regiment/Forc e
3d Shore Party Battalion
Logistic Command on 16Feb67 . The staff for both units was th e
CO LtCol Donald E. Marchett e lJan-9May6 7
same.
Maj Willard T . Layton, III 10May-31Jul6 7
CG BGen James E . Herbold, Jr . 1Jan-5Oct6 7
LtCol James W . Quinn lAug-31Dec6 7
BGen Harry C . Olson 6Oct-31Dec6 7
C/S Col William H . Cowper 1Jan-23May6 7
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalio n Col Lyle S . Stephenson 24May-lAug6 7
CO LtCol Albert R . Bowman, II 1Jan-15Ju16 7 Col Roy I . Wood, Jr . 2Aug-31Dec6 7
Maj Austin C . Rishel 16-25Ju16 7 G-1 Maj Joe B . Noble 1-2Jan6 7
LtCol Edward R . Toner 26Jul-31Dec6 7 Maj Leonard E . Fuchs 3Jan-4May6 7
LtCol Stanley H . Rauh SMay-30Jun6 7
Capt Harold B . Jensen, Jr . 1-29Ju167
3d Medical Battalion LtCol Minard P . Newton, Jr . 30Jul-31Dec67
CO Cdr John T . Vincent (MC) US N 1Jan-22Aug6 7 G-2 LtCol Richard M . Taylor 1-30Jan67
Cdr Robert A. Brown (MC) USN 23Aug-31Dec67
LtCol Arthur R . Mooney 31Jan-11Jun67
Capt Joseph G . Vindich 12-28Jun67
9th Motor Transport Battalion Maj Clarence E . Watson, Jr . 29Jun-31Dec67
CO Maj Donald R . Tyer 1Jan-20Jun67 G-3 Col Lyle S . Stephenson 1Jan-23May67
Maj David J . Maysille s 21Jun-3Sep67 LtCol Nolan J . Beat 24May-21Dec67
Maj John R. Stanley 4Sep-31Dec67 Col George K . Reid 22-31Dec67
Marine Air Support Squadron 3 (MASS-3) ' MASS-3, MACS-4, 1st LRAM Bn, and 2d LAAM Bn under
*MASS-3 transferred to MACG-18, effective 1Sep67 . MWHG 1 .
CO LtCol Donald L . Fenton 1Jan-29Mar6 7 CO Col Lyle V. Tope lSep-31Dec6 7
LtCol Gordon D . McPherson 30Mar-14Sep6 7
LtCol Hugh R . Bumpas, Jr . 15Sep-31Dec6 7 Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 18 (H&HS-18) '
*H&HS-18 activated with the formation of MACG-18 o n
Marine Air Control Squadron 4 (MACS-4) ' 1Sep67 .
*MACS-4 arrived in Vietnam from CONUS on 4Jun67 an d CO LtCol John M . Johnson, Jr . lSep-5Nov67
transferred to MACG-18 on 1Sep67 . LtCol Paul B . Montague 6Nov-31Dec6 7
CO LtCol Conrad P . Buschmann 4Jun-20Dec67
LtCol William A . Cohn 21-31Dec67
Marine Aircraft Group 1 1
CO Col Franklin C . Thomas, Jr . 1Jan-3Feb6 7
Marine Air Control Squadron 7 (MACS-7) '
Col William F . Guss 4Feb-30Jun6 7
*The squadron returned to CONUS on 15Jul67 .
Col Arthur O . Schmagel lJul-29Dec6 7
CO Maj Thomas K . Burk, Jr . 1Jan-15Ju16 7
Col LeRoy T . Frey 30-31Dec6 7
Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 11 (H&MS-11 )
1st Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion (1st LAAM Bn) '
CO LtCol Raymond A. Cameron lJan-30Apr6 7
*The battalion transferred to MACG-18, effective 1 Sep67 .
LtCol Charles E . Dove IMay-31Aug6 7
CO LtCol Merton P . Ives 1Jan-4Aug6 7
LtCol Earl E . Jacobson lSep-3Nov6 7
LtCol Marshall) . Treado 5Aug-31Dec6 7
LtCoI Anthony L . Blair 4Nov-31Dec6 7
Marine Air Base Squadron 11 (MABS-11 )
2d Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion (2d LAAM Bn) *
CO Maj Guy R . Campo 1-23Jan67
*The battalion transferred to MACG-18, effective 1 Sep67 .
Maj Edgar J . Love 24Jan-30Apr6 7
CO LtCol Thomas I . Gunning 1Jan-12Jun6 7
LtCol Lonnie P . Baites IMay-11Jun6 7
LtCol Stanley A . Herman 13Jun-31Dec67
Maj Stanley D . Cox 12Jun-90ct6 7
LtCol John W. Irion, Jr . 130ct-31Dec6 7
Marine Wing Communications Squadron 1 (MWCS-1) '
*The squadron activated on 1Sep67 with the reorganization o f
Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron 1 (VMCJ-1)
MWHG-1 .
CO LtCol William B . Fleming lJan-30Apr6 7
CO Maj David H . Tinius 1Sep-31Dec6 7
Maj Edgar J . Love lMay-150ct6 7
LtCol Robert W . Lewis 160ct-31Dec6 7
Marine Wing Facilities Squadron 1 (MWFS-1) '
*The squadron activated on 1Sep67 with the reorganization of
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115 (VMFA-115) '
MWHG-1 .
The squadron left Vietnam for Iwakuni, Japan on 15Feb67 .
CO Maj Edward A . Laning 1Sep-31Dec6 7
CO Maj Larry Vandeusen 1-23Jan6 7
Maj Guy R. Campo 24-15Feb6 7
Marine Wing Support Group 17 (MWSG-17 )
CO Col Orlando S . Tosdal 1Jan-28Mar6 7
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122 (VMFA-122) '
Col Victor A . Armstrong 29Mar-30Jun6 7
*The squadron joined MAG-11 from CONUS on 1Sep67 .
Col John E . Hansen 1JuI-31Dec6 7
CO LtCol John M . Verdi 1Sep-31Dec67
Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 17 (H&MS-17 )
CO LtCol John J . Leogue 1Jan-9Aug6 7
Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 242 (VMA (AW)-242 )
LtCol Eugene V . Goldston 10Aug-31Dec6 7
CO LtCol Howard Wolf 1Jan-30Apr6 7
LtCol Earl E . Jacobson, Jr . lMay-17Aug6 7
Wing Equipment and Repair Squadron 17 (WERS-17)
LtCol Lewis H . Abrams 18Aug-26Nov6 7
CO LtCol Lawrence P . Hart 1Jan-11Apr6 7
Maj Arthur W . D . Lavigne 27Nov-31Dec6 7
LtCol John R . Hansford 12Apr-31Dec6 7
Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron 235 (VMF (AW)-235) ' Marine Attack Squadron 311 (VMA-311) '
*The squadron arrived in Vietnam on 1SFeb67 . *During the period 1Mar-3Jun67 the squadron was at MCAS,
CO LtCol Edward R . Rogal 15Feb-31May6 7 Iwakuni, Japan for rehabilitation .
LtCol Wallace Wessel 1Jun-150ct6 7 CO LtCol Roger A. Morris 1Jan-17Jun6 7
LtCol Lee E . Blanchard 160ct-28Dec6 7 LtCol Eugene Lichtenwalter 8Jun-25Aug6 7
LtCol Carl R . Lundquist 29-31Dec67 LtCol Edgar K . Jacks 26Aug-21Sep6 7
LtCol Richard B . Taber 22Sep-31Dec6 7
Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12 )
CO Col Jay W . Hubbard 1Jan-15Feb67 Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 533 (VMA [AW]-533 )
Col Baylor P . Gibson, Jr . 16Feb-31Aug6 7 *VMA (AW)-533 arrived from CONUS on 1Apr67 .
Col Dean Wilker 1Sep-31Dec67 CO LtCol William P . Brown lApr-1Oct67
LtCol William H . Fitch 20ct-31Dec67
Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 12 (H&MS-12 )
CO LtCol Paul G . McMahon 1Jan-31Mar67 Marine Air Group 13 (MAG-13 )
Maj Eugene Lichtenwalte r lApr-28May67 CO Col Douglas D . Petty, Jr . lJan-5Feb67
LtCol Robert E . Miller 29May-9Nov67 Col Dan H . Johnson 6Feb-7Aug6 7
LtCoI Dan C . Alexander lONov-31Dec67 Col Edward F . LeFaivre 8Aug-31Dec6 7
Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS-12) Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 13 (H&MS-13 )
CO LtCol Ralph D . Wallace 1Jan-2May67 CO LtCoI Walter E . Domina 1Jan-30Mar6 7
Maj Forest G . Dawson 3May-2Sep67 LtCol Lynn F . Williams lApr-19Jul67
LtCol Leo J . Leblanc, Jr . 3Sep-31Dec67 LtCol James E . Miller 20Ju1-22Sep67
LtCol Paul Sigmund 23Sep-31Dec67
Marine Attack Squadron 121 (VMA-121) '
Marine Air Base Squadron 13 (MABS-13 )
*During the period 3Jun-SSep67, the squadron was at Iwakuni,
CO LtCoI Owen L . Owens 1-25Jan6 7
Japan undergoing rehabilitation.
LtCol David W . Morrill 26Jan-23Mar67
LtCol Kenny C . Palmer 24Mar-27Ju16 7
CO LtCol Donald R . Stiver 1Jan-16Mar6 7
LtCol Richard E . Carey 28Jul-50ct6 7
Maj Forest G . Dawson 17-30Mar67
LtCol Leroy A . Madera 60ct-31Dec6 7
LtCol James H . McGee 31Mar-24Sep6 7
Maj Richard J . Kern 25Sep-31Dec67
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115 (VMFA-115) '
*The squadron arrived in Vietnam from MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan
Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA-211) '
on 1SMay67.
*The squadron departed from Vietnam on 3Sep67 for
CO LtCol Guy R. Campo 15May-27Jul6 7
rehabilitation at MCAF Iwakuni, Japan and returned to Vietnam
LtCol Kenny C . Palmer 28Jul-50ct6 7
LtCol Richard E . Carey 60ct-31Dec67
on 1 Dec67.
CO LtCol William G . McCool 1Jan-25Feb6 7 Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 (VMFA-314) '
LtCol Knowlton P . Rice 26Feb-30Jun6 7 *During the period 16Aug-16Nov67 the squadron was at
Maj Gerit L . Fenenga lJul-25Aug6 7 MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan for rehabilitation .
LtCol Francis H . Thurston 26Aug-31Dec6 7 CO Maj William H . Heintz lJan-31May67
LtCol Frank D . Topley lJun-31Dec67
Marine Attack Squadron 214 (VMA-214) '
The squadron departed for CONUS 3Apr67 .
CO Maj Richard E . Hemingway 1Jan-3Apr6 7 Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323 (VMFA-323) '
*The squadron departed from Vietnam on 13May67 for MCAS ,
Marine Attack Squadron 223 (VMA-223) ' Iwakuni, Japan for a rehabilitation period; it returned to Vietnam
*The squadron arrived from Iwakuni, Japan on 2Mar67 an d on 15Aug67 .
returned to Iwakuni for rehabilitation on 3Dec67 . CO LtCol Aubrey W . Talbert 1-29Jan6 7
CO LtCol Leonard C . Taft 2-25Mar67 LtCol Gordon H . Keller, Jr . 30Jun-14Ju16 7
LtCol Claude E . Deering, Jr . 26Mar-26Sep6 7 LtCol Edison W . Miller 15Ju1-130ct67
LtCol Arthur W . Anthony 27Sep-31Dec67 LtCoI Harry T . Hagaman 140ct-31Dec67
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 542 (VMFA=542) CO LtCol McDonald D . Tweed 16-28Feb6 7
CO LtCol Donald L . May 1Jan-2Feb67 LtCol Earl W . Traut lMar-23May6 7
LtCol Frederick L . Farrell, Jr . 3Feb-18Ju167 Maj Homer A . Bruce 24May-170ct6 7
LtCol John Hubner 19Ju1-14Sep67 LtCol Daniel M . Wilson 18Oct-15Nov6 7
LtCol Richard C . Marsh 15Sep-31Dec67
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM-362) '
Marine Aircraft Group 16 (MAG-16) *The squadron joined MAG-16 from the SLF on 8Sep67 and o n
CO Col Frank M . Hepler iJan-21Apr67 15Oct67 it transferred to MAG-36 .
Col Samuel F . Marti n 22Apr-4Sep6 7 CO LtCol Nick J . Kapetan 8-13Sep67
Col Edwin O . Reed 5Sep-31Dec67 LtCol Richard W . Cline 14Sep-150ct6 7
Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 16 (H&MS 16)
CO LtCol Lucius O . Davis 1-31Jan6 7 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363 (HMM-363) '
LtCol Walter C . Kell y 1Feb-21Apr6 7 *The squadron joined MAG-13 from the SLF on 4Apr67.
LtCol William E . Deeds 22Apr-20Ju16 7 CO Maj Marvin E . Day 4Apr-10Jul6 7
Maj Glenn A . Stephens 21Jul-30Sep6 7 LtCol Robert Lewis, Jr . 1 lJul-2Dec6 7
LtCol Lawrence J . Flanagan IOct-31Dec67 LtCol Frankie E . Allgood 3-31Dec6 7
Marine Air Base Squadron 16 (MABS-16 )
CO LtCol Rodney D . McKitrick 1-4Jan67 Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 (HMH-463) '
LtCol Charles E . Wydner, Jr . ' 5Jan-30Sep6 7 *The major portion of the squadron arrived in Vietnam fro m
LtCol Frederick M . Kleppsattel, Jr . 1-250ct6 7 CONUS on 23May67, but a detachment had served with MAG-1 6
LtCol Samuel J . Fulton 26Oct-31Dec67 since 26Dec66.
CO LtCol Samuel G . Beal 23May-50ct6 7
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (HMM-163) ' LtCol Joseph L . Sadowski 6Oct-31Dec67
*The squadron tranferred to the SLF on 9Sep67 .
CO LtCol Rocco D . Bianchi 1Jan-26Apr6 7 Marine Observation Squadron 2 (VMO-2)
LtCol Walter C . Kelly 27Apr-8Sep67 CO LtCol William F . Harrell iJan-14Jul6 7
Maj Morris G . Robbins 14-23Ju16 7
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 (HMM-164) ' LtCol Philip M . Crosswait 24Jul-10Dec6 7
*During the period 3Apr-13Ju167 the squadron served with th e LtCol Morris G . Robbins 11-31Dec6 7
SLF; it transferred to MAG-36 effective 160ct67 .
CO LTCoI Warren C . Watson Ilan-14Feb6 7 Marine Observation Squadron 3 (VMO-3) '
LtCol Rodney D . McKitrick 15Feb-24Jul6 7 *The squadron transferred effective 160ct67.
LtCol Manning T . Jannell 25Jul-16Sep6 7 CO Maj Kyle W . Townsend 1Jan-17Aug6 7
LtCol Robert F . Rick 17Sep-150ct67 LtCol Glenn R . Hunter 18Aug-150ct6 7
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (HMM-263) ' Marine Air Group 36 (MAG-36)
On 1SFeb67 the squadron returned to MCAS, Futema,
CO Col Victor A . Armstrong 1Jan-28Mar6 7
Okinawa to assist in the CH-46 repair program . Col Orlando S . Tosdal 29Mar-1JuI6 7
CO LtCol Leslie L . Darbyshire iJan-15Feb67
Col Frank E . Wilson 2Jul-31Dec6 7
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (HMM-265) '
*During the period 12Ju1-23Aug67 the squadron served with Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 36 (H&HS-36 )
the SLF; on 23Aug67 it returned to MAG-36 and on 160ct67 CO LtCol William C . Carlso n lJan-14Aug6 7
transferred back to MAG-16 . Maj Harold E . Roth 15Aug-130ct6 7
CO Maj Frank B . Ellis LtCol Richard G . Courtney 140ct-31Dec6 7
1-31Jan6 7
LtCol Clifford D . Corn lFeb-2Apr67 Marine Air Base Squadron 36 (MABS-36 )
LtCol Robert L . Gover, Jr . 3Apr-18Jun67 CO LtCol Joseph A . Nelson lJan-26Mar67
LtCol William R . Beeler 29Jun-31Dec67 LtCol Thomas E . Fish 27Mar67-30Apr6 7
LtCol William L . Walke r lMay-3Sep6 7
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMM-361) ' Maj Claude E . Hendrix 4Sep-50ct6 7
*The squadron arrived from Okinawa on 16Feb67 ; on 16Nov67 LtCol Melvin J. Sternberg 6Oct-15Dec6 7
it transferred to the SLF. Maj James C . Robinson 16-31Dec6 7
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (HMM-163) ' Marine Observation Squadron 3 (VMO-3) '
The squadron joined MAG-36 from the SLF on 300ct67 . *The squadron joined MAG-36 from MAG-16 on 160ct67 .
CO Maj Frederick A: Rueckel 300ct-19Nov67 CO LtCol Glenn R . Hunter 160ct-31Dec6 7
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM-362)' G-3 LtCol James G . Dionisopoulos lJan-25Jun6 7
*The squadron joined MAG-36 from the SLF on 19Jan67. On LtCol William L . Smith 26Jun-12Jul6 7
Col David E . Lownds 13-24Ju16 7
8Sep67 it transferred to MAG-16, but on 160ct67 it rejoined
LtCol Bruce F. Meyers 25Ju1-31Dec6 7
MAG-36.
CO LtCol Marshall B . Armstrong 19Jan-15Mar67 G-4 Col Elton Mueller 1Jan-8Sep6 7
Col Warren A . Butcher 9Sep-31D&6 7
LtCol Nick J . Kapetan 16Mar-13Sep6 7
LtCol Richard W . Cline 14Sep-23Dec67
Maj Walter H . Shaver 24-31Dec67 Regimental Landing Team 26 (RLT-26)/Task Force 79 .2 '
*On 26Apr67, RLT-26 Headquarters became RLT-26 (Forward)
when it deployed to Vietnam, leaving RLT-26 (Rear) on Okinawa.
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363 (HMM-363) ' CO Col John J . Padley 1Jan- l lAug6 7
*The squadron transfered to the SLF on 19Jan67 as a replace- Col David E . Lownds 12Aug-31Dec6 7
ment for HMM-362 .
CO LtCol Kenneth E . Huntington 1-19Jan6 7
Regimental Landing Team 26 (Rear) (RLT-26 [Rear]) '
*During the year 1967, RLT-26 and later RLT-26 (Rear) acted a s
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 364 (HMM-364) ' the command headquarters for battalion and battalion landin g
*The advance party of HMM-364 arrived in Vietnam o n teams as they arrived in Vietnam for training, rehabilitation, an d
290ct67; the rest of the squadron arrived during November . deployment. All of the regiment's integral battalions ha d
CO LtCol Louis A . Gulling 290ct-31Dec67 deployed in Vietnam, consequently the listing of battalions whic h
follows presents only the periods when the individual battalions dent and transient, appears in order of arrival during the year
came under 26th Marines' control. They appear in the sequence of 1967.
their arrival during the year, rather than in any numerical se- CO Col Charles Kimak 1Jan-31Aug67
quence. LtCol David O . Takala 1-27Sep67
CO LtCol Joseph K . Gastrock, III 26Apr-15Ju16 7 Col Wilbur C . Kellogg, Jr . 28-30Sep67
LtCol Richard D . Alexander 16Ju1-31Dec67 LtCol David O . Takala 1-31Oct6 7
Col Wilbur C . Kellogg 1Nov-31Dec67
1st Battalion, 13th Marines *
*The battalion arrived on Okinawa on 20Aug66. Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 15 (H&MS-15 )
CO Maj Robert L . Christian, Jr . 1Jan-12May67 CO LtCol James McDaniel 1Jan-22Aug67
Maj Alva F . Thompson, Jr . 13May-15Jun67 LtCol Herman L . Mixon 23Aug-31Dec6 7
Maj Thomas J . Coyle 16Jun-14Dec6 7
Marine Air Base Squadron 15 (MABS-15)
LtCol John A . Hennelly 15-31Dec67
CO LtCol George H . Albers lJan-6Sep67
LtCol Clement C . J . Chamberlain 7Sep-31Dec6 7
1st Battalion, 4th Marine?
*The battalion became BLT 1/4 for planning on 13Jan67,
Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152)
transferred to the SLF on 27Jan67 and departedfrom Okinawa on
CO LtCol John Urell 1Jan-15May6 7
28Jan67.
LtCol Royce M . Williams 16May-31Dec6 7
CO LtCol Jack Westerman 1-26Jan67
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323 (VMA-323) ' Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (HMM-163
*The squadron arrived from MAG-13 on 16May67 and return- CO LtCol Walter C . Kelly 8-22Sep67
ed to MAG-13 on 17Aug67 . Maj Fredrick A . Rueckel 23Sep-300ct6 7
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM-362 ) Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (HMM-265 )
28Jul-7Sep67 CO LtCol William R . Beeler 12Jul-22Aug67
CO LtCol Nick J . Kapetan
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262 (HMM-262) CO Maj John W . Alber 12Oct-23Nov6 7
CO Maj Gregory A . Corliss 23Aug-11Oct67 Maj David L. Althoff 24Nov-31Dec6 7
County Fair—A sophisticated cordon and search operation in a tamed rate of aimed fire of five-seven rounds per minute an d
particular hamlet or village by South Vietnamese troops , an effective range of 375 meters .
police, local officials, and U.S . Marines in an attempt to scree n Gun, 175mm, M107—U .S .-built, self-propelled gun whic h
and register the local inhabitants . weighs 62,000 pounds and fires a 147-pound projectile to a
CP— Command post . maximum range of 32,800 meters . Maximum rate of fire is
CRC—Control and reporting center, an element of the U .S . Air one round every two minutes .
Force tactical air control system, subordinate to the Tactical Gun, 155mm, M53—U .S .-built, medium, self-propelled gun ,
Air Control Center, which conducted radar and warnin g with a 23,300 meter range, and weighing 96,000 pounds . It
operations . has a sustained rate of fire of one round every two minutes .
CTZ—Corps Tactical Zone . GVN—Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam) .
GLOSSARY 28 9
KANZUS—A proposed international brigade to man defenses ground facilities for the detection and interception of hostil e
along the DMZ ; the acronym stands for Korean, Australian , aircraft and for the navigational direction of friendly aircraft i n
New Zealand, and United States . the conduct of support operations .
KC-130—The in-flight refueling tanker configuration of th e MACV—Military Assistance Command, Vietnam .
C-130 Lockheed Hercules . MAF—Marine amphibious force .
KIA — Killed-in-action . MAG—Marine aircraft group .
Kit Carson Scout—Viet Cong defectors recruited by Marines t o Main Force—Refers to organized Viet Cong battalions an d
serve as scouts, interpreters, and intelligence agents . regiments as opposed to local VC guerrilla groups .
Maj—Major .
L-Hour—In planned helicopter operations, it is the specific hour MajGen—Major general .
the helicopters land in the landing zone . MaDiv—Marine division .
LAAM Bn—Light antiaircraft missile battalion . —Marines—Designates a Marine regiment, e .g . 3d Marines .
LCM—Landing craft mechanized, designed to land tanks, trucks , MASS—Marine air support squadron, provides and operate s
and trailers directly onto the beach . facilties for the control of support aircraft operating in direc t
LCVP—Landing craft, vehicle, personnel, a small craft with a bo w support of ground forces .
ramp used to transport assault troops and light vehicles to th e MAW—Marine aircraft wing .
beach . MCAF—Marine Corps air facility .
LOI—Letter of Instruction . MCAS—Marine Corps air station .
LPD—Amphibious transport, dock, a ship designed to transpor t MCCC—Marine Corps Command Center .
and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means of em - MCOAG—Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group .
barked landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and helicopters . I t MedCap—Medical civilian assistance program .
has both a submersible well deck and a helicopter landing MIA—Missing-in-action .
deck . MilHistBr—Military History Branch .
LPH—Amphibious assault ship, a ship designed or modified t o Mortar, 4 .2-inch, M30—U .S . built, rifled, muzzle-loaded, drop -
transport and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means fired weapon consisting of tube, base-plate and standard ;
of embarked helicopters . weapon weighs 330 pounds and has a maximum range of
LSA—Logistic support area . 4,020 meters . Rate of fire is 20 rounds per minute .
LSD—Landing ship, dock, a landing ship designed to comba t Mortar, 60mm, M19—U .S . built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded ,
load, transport, and launch amphibious crafts or vehicle s weapon, which weighs 45 .2 pounds when assembled; it has a
together with crews and embarked personnel, and to provid e maximum rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and sustained
limited docking and repair services to small ships and crafts . I t rate of fire of 18 rounds per minute ; the effective range i s
lacks the helicopter landing deck of the LPD . 2,000 meters .
LST—Landing ship, tank, landing ship designed to transport Mortar, 81mm, M29—U .S . built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded ,
heavy vehicles and to land them on a beach . which weighs approximately 115 pounds when assembled ; i t
Lt—Lieutenant . has a sustained rate of fire of two rounds per minute and an ef-
LtCol—Lieutenant colonel . fective range of 2,300-3,650 meters, depending upon am -
LtGen—Lieutenant general . munition used .
Ltr—letter . Mortar, 82mm, Soviet-built, smooth-bore, mortar ,
LVTE—Amphibian vehicle, tracked, engineer ; a lightly armored single-shot, high angle of fire weapon which weighs approx-
amphibious vehicle designed for minefield and obstacl e imately 123 pounds ; it has a maximum rate of fire of 2 5
clearance . rounds per minute and a maximum range of 3,040 meters .
LVTH—Amphibian vehicle, tracked, howitzer ; a lightly armored , Mortar, 120mm—Soviet or Chinese Communist built, smoot h
self-propelled, amphibious 105mm howitzer . It resembles a n bore, drop or trigger fired, mortar which weighs approximate-
LVTP with a turret for the howitzer . ly 600 pounds ; it has a maximum rate of fire of 15 rounds per
LVTP—Landing vehicle, tracked, personnel ; an amphibian vehi- minute and a maximum range of 5,700 meters .
cle used to land and or transport personnel . MR-5 —Military Region 5, a Communist political and military sec -
II—Landing zone . tor in northern South Vietnam, including all of I Corps . NVA
units in MR-5 did not report to COSVN .
MAB— Marine Amphibious Brigade . MS—Manuscript .
Machine gun, .50 caliber—U .S . built, belt-fed, recoil-operated , Msg — Message .
air-cooled automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 8 0
pounds without mount or ammunition ; it has a sustained rate NAG—Naval Advisory Group .
of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range o f NCC—Naval component commander .
1,450 meters . NCO—Non-commissioned officer .
Machine gun, M60—U .S . built, belt-fed, gas-operated, air- NLF—National Liberation Front, the political arm of the
cooled, 7 .62mm automatic weapon, which weighs approx- Communist-led insurgency against the South Vietnames e
imately 20 pounds without mount or ammunition ; it has a Government .
sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effec- NMCB—Naval mobile construction battalion (Seabees) .
tive range of 1,000 meters . NMCC—National Military Command Center .
MACS—Marine air control squadron, provides and operates NPA—National priority area, designated targeted area for
GLOSSARY 29 1
airplane, who coordinates close air support . USAF—United States Air Force .
TACC—Tactical air control center, the principal air operations in- USAID —United States Agency for International Development .
stallation for controlling all aircraft and air-warning function s USMC—United States Marine Corps .
of tactical air operations . U .S . Mission Council—Council, chaired by the U .S . Ambassador
TADC —Tactical air direction center, an air operations installatio n to South Vietnam and included ComUSMACV, which
under the tactical air control center, which direct aircraft an d developed and coordinated U .S . policy within South Viet-
aircraft warning functions of the tactical air center . nam .
TAOC—Tactical air operations center, a subordinate componen t USN—United States Navy .
of the air command and control system which controls al l USOM—United States Operations Mission, the United States
enroute air traffic and air defense operations . civilian organization in RVN including the U .S . Embassy ,
TAFDS—Tactical airfield fuel dispensing system, the expedi- AID, etc.
tionary storage and dispensing system of aviation fuel at tac-
tical airfields . It uses 10,000 gallon fabric tanks to store the VC—Viet Cong, a term used to refer to the Communist guerrill a
fuel . in South Vietnam ; a derogatory contraction of the Vietnames e
Tally Ho—Bombing campaign under ComUSMACV begun inJu- phrase meaning "Vietnamese Communists . "
ly 1966 of Route Package I in North Vietnam . Viet Minh—The Vietnamese contraction for Viet Nam Doc Lap
Tank, M48—U .S . built 50 .7-ton tank with a crew of four ; primary Nong Minh Hoi, a Communist-led coalition of nationalis t
armament is turret-mounted 90mm gun with one .30 caliber groups, which actively opposed the Japanese in World War I I
and one .50 caliber machine gun . Maximum road speed of 3 2 and the French in the first Indochina War .
miles per hour and an average range of 195 miles . VMA—Marine attack squadron . In naval aviation, the "V"
TAOR—Tactical area of responsibility, a defined area of land fo r designates "heavier than air" as opposed to craft that were
which responsibility is specifically assigned to the commande r "lighter than air . "
of the area as a measure for control of assigned forces and coor-
dination of support . VMF (AW)—Marine fighter squadron (all-weather) .
TE—Task element . VMFA—Marine fighter attack squadron .
TG—Task Group . VMCJ— Marine composite reconnaissance squadron .
Tiger Hound—Airstrikes in Laos directed by U .S . Air Force small VMGR—Marine refueller transport squadron .
fixed-wing observation aircraft, flying up to 12 miles in VMO —Marine observation squadron .
southeastern Laos . VNAF—Vietnamese Air Force .
TU—Task unit . VNMB—Vietnamese Marine Brigade .
VNMC—Vietnamese Marine Corps .
UH-1E-Bell "Huey"—A single-engine, light attack/obseration VNN— Vietnamese Navy.
helicopter noted for its maneuverability and firepower ; carrie s VT—Variable timed electronic fuze for an artillery shell whic h
a crew of three ; it can be armed with air-to-ground rocke t causes airburst over the target area .
packs and fuselage-mounted, electrically-fired machine guns .
UH-34D—Sikorsky Sea Horse, a single-engine medium transpor t
helicopter with a crew of three, carries 8-12 combat soldiers , WestPac—Western Pacific .
depending upon weather conditions . WIA—Wounded-in-action .
USA—United States Army . WFRC—Washngton Federal Records Center .
Appendix C
Chronology of Significant Events
6-DO April The 1st Marines conducted Operation Canyon with South Vietnames e
ranger battalions participating .
20 April Operation Prairie IV began in Quang Tri Province . It ended on 1 7
May .
20 April Task Force Oregon arrived at Chu Lai .
24 April The First Battle of Khe Sanh began . Units of the 3d Marine Divisio n
subsequently fought bitter battles with regular NVA forces for contro l
of Hills 8815, 881N, and 861 . This battle continued into May .
2 May 11th Engineer Battalion completed clearing a 200-meter wide trac e
between Con Thien and Gio Linh and began clearing a 500-mete r
perimeter around each position .
13 May The 26th Marines began Operation Crockett in the Khe Sanh area .
18 May Units of the 3d Marine Division, augmented by the SLF and ARV N
forces, began Operation Hickory by moving into the southern portion
of the DMZ in a three-pronged attack against North Vietnamese unit s
using the area as a sanctuary .
26 May The 5th Marines began Operation Union II, which continued until 5
June .
31 May LtGen Robert E . Cushman, Jr ., succeeded LtGen Lewis W . Walt a s
CG, III MAF .
7 June A company-size force from the 26th Marines engaged an NVA forc e
on Hill 881 during Operation Crockett and reported killing 59 NV A
soldiers .
14-22 June The 7th Marines conducted Operation Arizona with a multi-battalio n
force . The operation moved 1,650 refugees to camps at Duc Duc, th e
headquarters of the An Hoa industrial complex 15 miles south of D a
Nang .
18 June III MAF published its OpPlan 11-67 outling the SPOS concept .
25 June LtGen Cushman and MajGen Hoang Xuan Lam, the Vietnamese Ar-
my I Corps commander, opened the new 1,680 foot prefabricate d
bridge across the Da Nang River .
3 July North Vietnamese artillery fired supply dumps at the Marines' base a t
Dong Ha .
14 July The name "Dye Marker" became effective as the title of the efforts t o
construct an SPOS south of the DMZ .
15 July An early morning enemy rocket attack heavily damaged aircraft an d
the southern end of the Da Nang Air Base .
28-29 July The 3d Marine Division sent the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, reinforce d
with armored vehicles, into the DMZ north of Con Thien on a searc h
and destroy mission . The battalion had to fight its way out on th e
DMZ on the second day .
7-11 August BLT 1/3 of the SLF conducted Operation Beacon Gate southeast o f
Hoi An .
10-28 August The 1st Marine Division's Task Force X-Ray conducted Operatio n
Cochise in Quang Tin Province in conjuction with the ARVN Opera-
tion Lien Ket-122 .
27 August The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines began Operation Yazoo in Happ y
Valley near Da Nang . There was little contact and the operation ende d
on 5 September .
CHRONOLOGY 29 5
3 September North Vietnamese artillery fire destroyed the large ammunition dum p
at Dong Ha .
4 September Navy Chaplain Vincent R . Capodanno died earning the Medal of
Honor while serving with the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines .
4-15 September Task Force X-Ray's Operation Swift pitted elements of two Marine bat-
talions against a large and well-equipped force of NVA soldiers nor-
thwest of Tam Ky . ARVN forces and elements of Task Force Orego n
fought simultaneous operations in conjunction with Swift .
6 October BGen Harry C . Olson relieved BGen James E . Herbold, Jr ., as com-
mander of the Force Logistics Command .
11-20 October The 1st Marines conducted Operation Medina near Quang Tri .
20 October The 1st Marines began Operation Osceola .
24 October The 7th Marines began Operation Knox, which ended 4 November, i n
the Phu Loc-Hai Van area .
31 October Operation Ardmore, Fremont, and Kingfisher, which began in mid -
July, ended in northern I Corps .
1 November Vice President Hubert H . Humphrey, on a visit to South Vietnam ,
presented the Presidential Unit Citation to the 3d Marine Division an d
the 7th ARVN Airborne .
14 November MajGen Bruno A . Hochmuth died in a helicopter crash near Hue .
BGen Metzger assumed command of the 3d Marine Division pendin g
the arrival of MajGen Tompkins .
6-17 November The 5th Marines conducted Operation Essex in Quang Nam Province .
13-30 November The 7th Marines conducted Operation Foster northwest of An Hoa .
1-31 December The 3d Marine Division continued Operation Scotland, Lancaster ,
Kentucky, Napoleon, Neosho, and Osceola .
23 December The 7th Marines terminated Operation Citrus .
31 December As of this date, III MAF units had expended 757,520 man days an d
114,519 equipment hours on the construction of the strong poin t
obstacle system, which many Marines referred to as the "McNamar a
Line ." Enemy action had destroyed $1,622,348 worth of Marine equip-
ment being used on the project .
Appendix D
The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F
HONOR posthumously to
CITATIO N
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as a
rifleman, Second Platoon, Company F, Second Battalion, Third Marines, Third Marine Division in Vietna m
on 28 February 1967 . Company F was advancing in dense jungle northwest of Cam Lo in an effort to extract a
heavily besieged reconnaissance patrol . Private First Class Anderson's platoon was the lead element and ha d
advanced only about 200 meters when they were brought under extremely intense enemy small arms an d
automatic weapons fire . The platoon reacted swiftly, getting on line as best they could in the thick terrain, an d
began returning fire . Private First Class Anderson found himself tightly bunched together with the othe r
members of the platoon only 20 meters from the enemy positions . As the fire fight continued several of the
men were wounded by the deadly enemy assault . Suddenly, an enemy grenade landed in the midst of th e
Marines and rolled along side Private First Class Anderson's head . Unhesitatingly and with complete disregar d
for his own personal safety, he reached out, grasped the grenade, pulled it to his chest and curled around it a s
it went off. Although several Marines received shrapnel from the grenade, his body absorbed the major forc e
of the explosion . In this singularly heroic act, Private First Class Anderson saved his comrades from serious in -
jury and possible death . His personal heroism, extraordinary valor, and inspirational supreme self-sacrifice
reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps and upheld the highest traditions of the Unite d
States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life for his country .
297
The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F
HONOR posthumously to
CITATIO N
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serv-
ing as a machine gunner with Company F, Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, Third Marine Division, in th e
Republic of Vietnam on 21 September 1967 . During a reconnaissance operation near Con Thien, Corpora l
Barker's squad was suddenly hit by enemy sniper fire . The squad immediately deployed to a combat formatio n
and advanced to a strongly fortified enemy position, when it was again struck by small arms and automati c
weapons fire, sustaining numerous casualties . Although wounded by the initial burst of fire, Corporal Barke r
boldly remained in the open, delivering a devastating volume of accurate fire on the numerically superio r
force . The enemy was intent upon annihilating the small Marine force and, realizing that Corporal Barker wa s
a threat to their position directed the preponderance of their fire on his position . He was again wounded, thi s
time in the right hand, which prevented him from operating his vitally needed machine gun . Suddenly, an d
without warning, an enemy grenade landed in the midst of the few surviving Marines . Unhesitatingly an d
with complete disregard for his own personal safety, Corporal Barker threw himself upon the deadly grenade ,
absorbing with his own body the full and tremendous force of the explosion . In a final act of bravery, he crawl-
ed to the side of a wounded comrade and administered first aid before succumbing to his grievous wounds .
His bold initiative, intrepid fighting spirit, and unwavering devotion to duty in the face of almost certai n
death undoubtedly saved his comrades from further injury or possible death and reflected great credit upo n
himself, the Marine Corps, and the United States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life for his country .
MEDALS OF HONOR 29 9
The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F
HONOR posthumously to
CITATIO N
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Weapon s
Platoon Commander, Company I, Third Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division, in Quang Tri Pro-
vince, Republic of Vietnam, on 30 March 1967 . Company I was establishing night ambush sites when the
command group was attacked by a reinforced North Vietnamese company supported by heavy automati c
weapons and mortar fire . Lieutenant Bobo immediately organized a hasty defense and moved from position t o
position encouraging the outnumbered Marines despite the murderous enemy fire . Recovering a rocket laun-
cher from among the friendly casualties, he organized a new launcher team and directed its fire into the enem y
machine gun positions . When an exploding enemy mortar round severed Lieutenant Bobo's right leg belo w
the knee, he refused to be evacuated and insisted upon being placed in a firing position to cover the move-
ment of the command group to better location . With a web belt around his leg serving as a tourniquet an d
with his leg jammed into the dirt to curtail the bleeding, he remained in this position and delivere d
devastating fire into the ranks of the enemy attempting to overrun the Marines . Lieutenant Bobo was mortall y
wounded while firing his weapon into the mainpoint of the enemy attack but his valiant spirit inspired hi s
men to heroic efforts, and his tenacious stand enabled the command group to gain a protective position wher e
it repulsed the enemy onslaught . Lieutenant Bobo's superb leadership, dauntless courage, and bold initiativ e
reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the Unite d
States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life for his country .
The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F
HONOR posthumously to
CITATIO N
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepedity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty a s
Chaplain of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division (Reinforced), FMF, in connection with opera-
tions against enemy forces in Quang Tin Province, Republic of Vietnam, on 4 September 1967 . In respnse t o
reports that the 2d Platoon of M Company was in danger of being overrun by a massed enemy assaulting force ,
Lieutenant Capodanno left the relative safety of the Company Command Post and ran through an open are a
raked with fire, directly to the beleaguered platoon . Disregarding the intense enemy small-arms, automatic -
weapons, and mortar fire, he moved about the battlefield administering last rites to the dying and givin g
medical aid to the wounded . When an exploding mortar round inflicted painful multiple wounds to his arm s
and legs, and severed a portion of his right hand, he steadfastly refused all medical aid . Instead, he directe d
the corpsmen to help their wounded comrades and, with calm vigor, continued to move about the battlefiel d
as he provided encouragement by voice and example to the valiant Marines . Upon encountering a wounde d
corpsman in the direct line of fire of an enemy machine gunner positioned approximately fifteen yards away ,
Lieutenant Capodanno rushed forward in a daring attempt to aid and assist the mortally wounded corpsman .
At that instant, only inches from his goal, he was struck down by a burst of machine gun fire . By his heroi c
conduct on the battlefield, and his inspiring example, Lieutenant Capodanno upheld the finest traditions o f
the United States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life in the cause of freedom .
MEDALS OF HONOR 30 1
The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F
HONOR posthumously to
CITATIO N
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serv -
ing as the right guide of the Second Platoon, Company B, First Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division ,
in action against enemy forces in Quang Nam Province-, Republic of Vietnam, on 6 September 1967 . Elements
of the Second Platoon were pinned down by a numerically superior force of attacking North Vietnamese Arm y
Regulars . Remnants of the platoon were located in a trench line where Sergeant Davis was directing the fire of
his men in an attempt to repel the enemy attack . Disregarding the enemy hand grenades and high volume o f
small arms and mortar fire, Sergeant Davis moved from man to man shouting words of encouragement to eac h
of them while firing and throwing grenades at the onrushing enemy . When an enemy grenade landed in th e
trench in the midst of his men, Sergeant Davis, realizing the gravity of the situation, and in a final valiant ac t
of complete self-sacrifice, instantly threw himself upon the grenade, absorbing with his own body the full an d
terrific force of the explosion . Through his extraordinary initiative and inspiring valor in the face of almost cer -
tain death, Sergeant Davis saved his comrades from injury and possible loss of life, enabled his platoon to hol d
its vital position, and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service .
He gallantry gave his life for his country .
The President of the Uniied States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F
HONOR posthumously to
CITATIO N
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serv-
ing with the Second Platoon, Company C, First Battalion, Fourth Marines, Third Marine Division in th e
Republic of Vietnam on 26 March 1967 . While participating in Operation Beacon Hill 1, the Second Platoo n
was engaged in a fierce battle with the Viet Cong at close range in dense jungle foliage Private First Clas s
Dickey had come forward to replace a radio operator who had been wounded in this intense action and was be-
ing treated by a medical corpsman . Suddenly an enemy grenade landed in the midst of a group of Marines ,
which included the wounded radio operator who was immobilized . Fully realizing the inevitable result of his
actions, Private First Class Dickey, in a final valiant act, guickly and unhesitatingly threw himself upon th e
deadly grenade, absorbing with his own body the full and complete force of the explosion . Private First Class
Dickey's personal heroism, extraordinary valor and selfless courage saved a number of his comrades from cer-
tain injury and possible death at the cost of his own life . His actions reflected great credit upon himself, th e
Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life for his country .
MEDALS OF HONOR 30 3
The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F
HONOR posthumously to
CITATION
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serv -
ing as an Artillery Liaison Operations Chief with the Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, Third Marine Divi-
sion, near Con Thien in the Republic of Vietnam . In the early morning hours of 14 October 1967, the Secon d
Battalion was occupying a defensive position which protected a bridge on the road leading from Con Thien t o
Cam Lo . Suddenly, the Marines' position came under a heavy volume of mortar and artillery fire, followed b y
an aggressive enemy ground assault . In the ensuing engagement, the hostile force penetrated the perimete r
and brought a heavy concentration of small arms, automatic weapons, and rocket fire to bear on the Battalio n
Command Post . Although his position in the Fire Support Coordination Center was dangerously exposed t o
enemy fire and he was wounded when an enemy hand grenade exploded near his position, Sergeant Foste r
resolutely continued to direct accurate mortar and artillery fire on the advancing North Vietnamese troops . A s
the attack continued, a hand grenade landed in the midst of Sergeant Foster and his five companions . Realiz-
ing the danger, he shouted a warning, threw his armored vest over the grenade, and unhesitatingly placed hi s
own body over the armored vest . When the grenade exploded, Sergeant Foster absorbed the entire blast wit h
his own body and was mortally wounded . His heroic actions undoubtedly saved his comrades from further in -
jury or possible death . Sergeant Foster's courage, extraordinary heroism, and unfaltering devotion to dut y
reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps and upheld the highest traditions of the Unite d
States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life for his country .
The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F
HONOR posthumously to
CITATION
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Com-
manding Officer, Company F, Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division, in the Republic of Viet -
nam on 2 June 1967 . During Operation Union II, the First Battalion, Fifth Marines, consisting of Companie s
A and D, with Captain Graham's company attached, launched an attack against an enemy occupied position ,
with two companies assaulting and one in reserve . Company F, a leading company, was proceeding across a
clear paddy area one thousand meters wide, attacking toward the assigned objective, when it came unde r
heavy fire from mortars and small arms which immediately inflicted a large number of casualties . Hardest hit
by fire was the second platoon of Company F, which was pinned down in the open paddy area by intense fir e
from two concealed machine guns . Forming an assault unit from members of his small company headquarters ,
Captain Graham bodly led a fierce assault through the second platoon's position, forcing the enemy to aban-
don the first machine gun position, thereby relieving some of the pressure on his second platoon, and enabl-
ing evacuation of the wounded to a more secure area . Resolute to silence the second machine gun, which con-
tinued its devastating fire, Captain Graham's small force stood steadfast in its hard won enclave . Subsequent-
ly, during the afternoon's fierce fighting, he suffered two minor wounds while personally accounting for a
estimated fifteen enemy killed . With the enemy position remaining invincible upon each attempt to withdra w
to friendly lines, and although knowing that he had no chance of survival, he chose to remain with one ma n
who could not be moved due to the seriousness of his wounds . The last radio transmission from Captai n
Graham reported that he was being assaulted by a force of twenty-five enemy ; he died while protectin g
himself and the wounded man he chose not to abandon . Captain Graham's actions throughout the day were a
series of heroic achievements . He outstanding courage, superb leadership and indomitable fighting spirit un-
doubtedly saved the second platoon from annihilation and reflected great credit upon himself, the Marin e
Corps, and the United States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life for his country .
MEDALS OF HONOR 30 5
The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F
HONOR posthumously to
CITATION
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty . On April
21, 1967, during Operation Union, elements of Company F, conducting offensive operations at Binh Son, en -
countered a firmly entrenched enemy force and immediately deployed to engage them . The Marines in Privat e
Martini's platoon assaulted across an open rice paddy to within twenty meters of the enemy trench line wher e
they were suddenly struck by hand grenades, intense small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire . Th e
enemy onslaught killed 14 and wounded 18 Marines, pinning the remainder of the platoon down behind a
low paddy dike . In the face of imminent danger, Private Martini immediately crawled over the dike to a for -
ward open area within 15 meters of the enemy position where, continuously exposed to the hostile fire, he
hurled hand grenades, killing several of the enemy . Crawling , back through the intense fire, he rejoined his
platoon which had moved to the relative safety of a trench line . From this position he observed several of hi s
wounded comrades laying helpless in the fire-swept paddy . Although he knew that one man had been kille d
attempting to assist the wounded, Private Martini raced through the open area and dragged a comrade back t o
a friendly position . In spite of a serious wound received during this first daring rescue, he again braved th e
unrelenting fury of the enemy fire to aid another companion lying wounded only 20 meters in front of th e
enemy trench line . As he reached the fallen Marine, he received a mortal wound, but disregarding his ow n
condition, he began to drag the Marine toward his platoon's position . Observing men from his unit attemp-
ting to leave the security of their position to aid him, concerned only for their safety, he called to them to re -
main under cover, and through a final supreme effort, moved his injured comrade to where he could be pulle d
to safety, before he fell, succumbing to his wounds . Stouthearted and indomitable, Private Martin i
unhesitatingly yielded his life to save two of his comrades and insure the safety of the remainder of his pla-
toon . His outstanding courage, valiant fighting spirit and selfless devotion to duty reflected the highest credi t
upon himself, the Marine Corps, and the United States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life for his coun-
try .
The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F
HONOR posthumously to
CITATION
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serv-
ing as a machine gunner attached to the First Platoon, Company F, Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, Firs t
Marine Division, in the Republic of Vietnam on 3 and 4 July 1967 . Private Newlin, with four other Marines ,
was manning a key position on the perimeter of the Nong Son outpost when the enemy launched a savage an d
well coordinated mortar and infantry assault, seriously wounding him and killing his four comrades . Propping
himself against his machine gun, he poured a deadly accurate stream of fire into the charging ranks of Vie t
Cong . Though repeatedly hit by small arms fire, he twice repelled enemy attempts to overrun his position .
During the third attempt, a grenade explosion wounded him again and knocked him to the ground un-
conscious . The Viet Cong guerrillas, believing him dead, bypassed him and continued their assault on th e
main force . Meanwhile, Private Newlin regained consciousness, crawled back to his weapon, and brought it t o
bear on the rear of the enemy causing havoc and confusion among them . Spotting the enemy attempting to
bring a captured 106 recoilless weapon to bear on other marine positions, he shifted his fire, inflicting heav y
casualties on the enemy and preventing them from firing the captured weapon . He then shifted his fire bac k
the primary enemy force, causing the enemy to stop their assaults on the marine bunkers and to once again at -
tack his machine gun position . Valiantly fighting off two more enemy assaults, he firmly held his ground unti l
mortally wounded . Private Newlin had singlehandedly broken up and disorganized the entire enemy assaul t
force, causing them to lose momentum and delaying them long enough for his fellow marines to organize a
defense and beat off their secondary attack . His indomitable courage, fortitude, and unwavering devotion t o
duty in the face of almost certain death reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps and uphel d
the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service .
MEDALS OF HONOR 30 7
The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F
HONOR posthumously to
CITATION
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serv -
ing as a combat photographer attached to Company C, First Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division, i n
the Republic of Vietnam on 12 October 1967 . During Operation Medina, a major reconnaissance in forc e
southwest of Quang Tri, Company C made heavy combat contact with a numerically superior North Viet-
namese Army Force estimated at from two to three companies . The focal point of the intense fighting was a
helicopter landing zone which also serving as the Command Post of Company C . In the course of strong hotil e
attack, an enemy grenade landed in the immediate area occupied by Corporal Perkins and three othe r
Marines . Realizing the inherent danger, he shouted the warning, "Incoming Grenade" to his fellow Marines ,
and in a valiant act of heroism, hurled himself upon the grenade absorbing the impact of the explosion wit h
his own body, thereby saving the lives of his comrades at the cost of his own . Through his exceptional courag e
and inspiring valor in the face of certain death, Corporal Perkins reflected great credit upon himself and th e
Marine Corps and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life
for his country .
The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F
HONOR posthumously to
CITATIO N
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serv -
ing as a squad leader with Company M, Third Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division in the Republi c
of Vietnam on 4 September 1967 . During Operation Swift, in the province of Quang Tin, the Marines of the
second platoon of Company M were struck by intense mortar, machine gun, and small arms fire from an en -
trenched enemy force . As the company rallied its forces, Sergeant Peters maneuvered his squad in an assaul t
on an enemy defended knoll . Disregarding his own saftey, as enemy rounds hit all about him, he stood in th e
open, pointing out enemy positions until he was painfully wounded in the leg . Disregarding his wound he
moved forward and continued to lead his men . As the enemy fire increased in accuracy and volume, his squa d
lost its momentum and was temporarily pinned down . Exposing himself to devastating enemy fire, he con-
solidated his position to render more effective fire . While directing the base of fire, he was wounded a second
time in the face and neck from an exploding mortar round . As the enemy attempted to infiltrate the positio n
of an adjacent platoon, Sergeant Peters stood erect in the full view of the enemy firing burst after burst forcin g
them to disclose their camouflaged positions . Sergeant Peters continued firing until he was critically wounde d
by a gunshot wound in his chest . Although unable to walk or stand, Sergeant Peters steadfastly continued t o
direct his squad in spite of two additional wounds, persisted in his efforts to encourage and supervise his me n
until he lost consciousness and succumbed . Inspired by his selfless actions, the squad regained fire superiorit y
and once again carried the assault to the enemy . By his outstanding valor, indomitable fighting spirit an d
tenacious determination in the face of overwhelming odds, Sergeant Peters upheld the highest traditions o f
the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life for his country .
The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pleasure in presenting the MEDA L
OF HONOR to
CITATION :
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serv-
ing as a helicopter gunship pilot attached to Marine Observation Squadron Six in action against enemy force s
near Quang Ngai, Republic of Vietnam, on 19 August 1967 . During an escort mission Major (then Captain )
Pless monitored an emergency call that four American soldiers, stranded on a nearby beach, were being over-
whelmed by a large Viet Cong force . Major Pless flew to the scene and found 30 to 50 enemy soldiers in th e
open . Some of the enemy were bayoneting and beating the downed Americans . Major Pless displayed excep-
tional airmanship as he launched a devastating attack against the enemy force, killing or wounding many of
the enemy and driving the remainder back into a treeline . His rocket and machine gun attacks were made a t
such low levels that the aircraft flew through debris created by explosions from its rockets . Seeing one of the
wounded soldiers gesture for assistance, he maneuvered his helicopter into a position between the wounde d
men and the enemy, providing a shield which permitted his crew to retrieve the wounded . During the rescu e
the enemy directed intense fire at the helicopter and rushed the aircraft again and again, closing to within a
few feet before being beaten back . When the wounded men were aboard, Major Pless maneuvered th e
helicopter out to sea . Before it became safely airborne, the overloaded aircraft settled four times into th e
water . Displaying superb airmanship, he finally got the helicopter aloft . Major Pless' extraordinary herois m
coupled with his outstanding flying skill prevented the annihilation of the tiny force . His courageous actions
reflect great credit upon himself and uphold the greatest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States .
Naval Service .
The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F
HONOR posthumously to
CITATION
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the rick of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serv -
ing as Supply Sergeant, Company A, First Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division, on 24 Marc h
1967 . Sergeant Singleton's company was conducting combat operations in Gio Linh District, Quang Tri Pro-
vince, Republic of Vietnam, when the lead platoon received intense small arms, automatic weapons, rocket ,
and mortar fire from a well entrenched enemy force . As the company fought its way forward, the extremel y
heavy enemy fire caused numerous friendly casualties . Sensing the need for early treatment of the wounded ,
Sergeant Singleton quickly moved from his relatively safe position in the reat to the foremost point of the ad-
vance and made numerous trips through the enemy killing zone to move the injured men out of the dange r
area . Noting that a large part of the enemy fire was coming from a hedgerow, he seized a machine gun an d
assaulted the key enemy location, delivering devastating fire as he advanced . He forced his way through the
hedgerow directly into the enemy strong point . Although he was mortally wounded, his fearless attack kille d
eight of the enemy and drove the remainder from the hedgerow . Sergeant Singleton's bold actions completel y
disorganized the enemy defense and saved the lives of many of his comrades . His daring initiative, selfless
devotion to duty and indomitable fighting spirit reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps ,
and his performance upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service .
MEDALS OF HONOR 31 1
The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F
HONOR posthumously to
CITATIO N
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serv -
ing as a squad leader with Company D, First Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division, in connectio n
with operations against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam . On the evening of 20-21 December 1967, Cor-
poral Smedley led his six-man squad to an ambush site at the mouth of Happy Valley, near Phouc Ninh (2) in
Quang Nam Province . Later that night, an estimated 100 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army Regulars ,
carrying 122mm rocket launchers and mortars, were observed moving toward Hill 41 . Realizing this was a
significant enemy move to launch an attack on the vital Da Nang complex, Corporal Smedley immediatel y
took sound and courageous action to stop the enemy threat . After he radioed for a reaction force, he skillfull y
maneuvered his men to a more advantageous position and led an attack on the numerically superior enem y
force . A heavy volume of fire from an enemy machine gun positioned on the left flank of the squad inflicte d
several casualties on Corporal Smedley's unit . Simultaneously, an enemy rifle grenade exploded nearby ,
wounding him in the right foot and knocking him to the ground . Corporal Smedley disregarded this seriou s
injury and valiantly struggled to his feet, shouting words of encouragement to his men . He fearlessly led a
charge against the enemy machine gun emplacement, firing his rifle and throwing grenades, until he wa s
again struck by enemy fire and knocked to the ground . Gravely wounded and weak from loss of blood, he rose
and commenced a one-man assault against the enemy position . Although his aggressive and singlehanded at-
tack resulted in the destruction of the machine gun, he was struck in the chest by enemy fire and fell mortall y
wounded . Corporal Smedley's inspiring and courageous actions, bold initiative, and selfless devotion to dut y
in the face of certain death were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the Unite d
States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life for his country .
The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F
HONOR posthumously to
CITATIO N
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life, above and beyond the call of duty, while ser-
ving as a fire team leader with the First Platoon, Company K, Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marin e
Division, in the Republic of Vietnam . On 11 August 1967, Corporal Wheat and two other Marines wer e
assigned the mission of providing security for a Navy construction battalion crane and crew operating alon g
Liberty Road in the vicinity of the Dien Ban District, Quang Nam Province . After the Marines had set up
security positions in a tree line adjacent to the work site, Corporal Wheat reconnoitered the area to the rear o f
their location for the possible presence of guerrillas . He then returned to within ten feet of the friendly posi-
tion, and here unintentionally triggered a well concealed, bounding type, antipersonnel mine . Immediately, a
hissing sound was heard which was identified by the three Marines as that of a buring time fuse . Shouting a
warning to his comrades, Corporal Wheat in a valiant act of heroism hurled himself upon the mine, absorbin g
the tremendous impact of the explosion with his own body . The inspirational personal heroism and extraor-
dinary valor of his unselfish action saved his fellow Marines from certain injury and possible death, reflected
great credit upon himself, and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Nava l
Service . He gallantly gave his life for his country .
Appendix E
List of Reviewers
REVIEWERS 31 5
Appendix F
Distribution of Aircraft
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
December 196 7
UNIT DA NANG CHU LAI PHU BAI OKINAWA JAPAN HAWAII EASTPAC OTHER*
MAG-1 1
H&MS-11 3/TA-4 F
1/C-1 17 D
VMCJ- 1 8/ EF- IO B
9/RF-4 B
4/EA-6 A
VMFA-122 14/F-4 B
VM F
(AW)-235 16/F-8 E
VM A
(AW)-242 11/A-6 A
MAG-1 2
H&MS-12 1/C-1I 7
3/TA-4 F
VMA-121 16/A-4 E
VMA-211 21/A-4 E
VMA-311 15/A-4 E
(AW)-533 I2/A-6A
MAG-1 3
H&MS-13 3/TF-9J
1/C-117 D
VMFA-115 14/F-4 B
VMFA-323 12/F-4 B
VMFA-314 10/F-4 B
MAG-1 5
H&MS-15 5/UH-34D 3/C-54
4 / TF-9J
1/C-117 D
VMGR-152 12/KC-130F
VMA-223 19/A-4 C
VMFA-542 6/F-4 B
HMM-262 12/CH-46A 9/CH-46 A
HMM-361 23/UH-34D *
MAG-1 6
H&MS-16 1/C-117 D
14/0-1 C
4/UH-34 D
VMO-2 29/UH-1 E
HMM-265 6/CH-46A 15/CH-46A* *
HMM-363 29/UH-34 D
HMM-463 36/CH-53A
UNIT DA NANG CHU LAI PHU BAI OKINAWA JAPAN HAWAII EASTPAC OTHE R
MWSG-1 7
H&MS- 17 5/UH-34 D
3/C-117 D
2/US-2 B
MAG-3 6
H&MS-36 3/UH-34D
1/C-117 D
VMO- 3 20/UH- E
VMO- 6 2I /UH-1 E
HMM-163 26/UH-34D
HMM-164 3/CH-46A 12/CH-46A* *
HMM-165 3/CH-46A 16/CH-46A* *
HMM-362 25/UH-34D
HMM-364 6/UH-34 D
MAG-3 3
H&MS-33 2/T-1 A
VMCJ-3 1I/RF-4 B
7/EF-10 B
VMF-214 17/A-4C
VMFA-232 17/A-4C
VMFA-334 15/f-4J
MWSG-3 7
H&MS-37 4/T-1 A
4/C-117 D
3/C-54Q
VMGR-352 4/KC-130F 11/KC-130 F
MHTG-3 0
H&MS-30 3/UH-34 D
HMMT-301 24/UH-34D
HMMT-302 23/UH-I E
1ST MA R
BRI G
H&MS 3/UH-34 D
l/VH-34 D
3/T-LA
VM F
(AW)-21 2 16/F-8D/B
MAG-56
H&MS-5 6 6/CH-46 D
VMO- 5 23/UH-1 E
HMM-26 3 24/CH-46A
HMH-462 19/CH-53 A
TOTAL PA C
AIRCRAFT
Fixed Wing
(338) 72 129 16 34 15 72
Helicopters
(364) 108 94 24 23 5 68 42
Appendix G
Distribution of Personne l
Fleet Marine Force, Pacifi c
31 December 1967
STRINGED STR RPT
UNIT NOTE STRENGTH DATE DANANG CHU LAX . PHU BAI DONO HA OKINAWA JAPAN HAWAII EASTPAC OTHE R
USIC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN URIC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN URIC USN URIC USN
HEADDUARTERS .6
HQ . FM', PAC _ •
FM F, PAC (FWD) ~1T 27IAUG 75
H&S BN, FMF, PAC 1065 30 23NOV 1065 30 _
CAMP S . M . BUTLER 1241 109 6NOV X241 109
_
CASUAL/TRANSIENT W87 6NOV 1287 _
HQ, V MEF 82 2 23NOV 82 2
1ST CIV AFF GIP 80 7 23NOV - - 80 7
HQ, 9TH MA B
HQ CO, 9TH MAB 422 12 23NOV 422 12 _
HQ . III MAF _
H&S CO, III MAF
1ST 6 7D CAG 4 76R 62 2NOV 7AR 67
HQ, 1ST MAR DI V
HOBN, 1ST MAR DIV 1588 32 16NO V 1588 32
INFANTRY
1ST MARINES
HQ CO 255 6 16NOV 255 6 _
1ST BATTALION 1132 49 16NOV 1132 49
2D BATTALION 1081 54 16NOV uj8,1 54
3D BATTALION 1 1498 94 1650V 1498 94
3D MARINES
HO CO 218 5 16NOV 218 5
1ST BATTALION 1 1533 83 1750V 1533 83
20 BATTALION 1123 54 120CT 1173 54
3D BATTALION 1081 50 1680V 1081 50
4TH MARINES
HQ CO 218 3 16NOV 218 3
1ST BATTALION 1082 48 16NOV I 1082 4B _
__2D BATTALION 1051 49 16404 1051 49
3D BATTALION 1062 53 16140V 1062 5 3
5TH MARINE S
HQ CO 214 4 16NOV 234 4
1ST BATTALION 905 51 16NOV 995 S5
20 BATTALION 11601 45 1650V 1001 45
3D BATTALION 982 51 1650V 982 51
7TH MARINES
HQ CO 223' 7 16NOV 1223 7
1ST BATTALION 1050' 54 1680V 1050 54
20 BATTALION 1030 53 1650V 1030 53
3D BATTALION 1039 51 1680V 1039 51
9TH MARINES
HQ CO 219 3 16NOV 219 3
1ST BATTALION 1052 52 1650V 1052 52 _
20 BATTALION 1079 51 1650V 1079 51
3D BATTALION 1040 49 1650V 1040 49
26TH MARINES
HQ CO 503 17 2350V 220 2 283 15
1ST BATTALION 1012 50 1680V 1012 50
20 BATTALION 1058 49 1650V 1058 49
3D BATTALION 1079 40 1f,NOV 1079 49
27TH MARINES
HQ CO 216 3 23NOV 216 1
1ST BATTALION 3 1491 65 2380V 1491 65
20 BATTALION 1017 33 23N0V 1017 33
3D BATTALION 1012 32 2350V 1012 32
31 9
28TH MARINES
HO CO 113 5 23NOV 942
11 3
BATTALION oe7 35 23NOV 11
2D BATTALION y45 i y 945
9.1 5 95
3D BATTALION 91/ irNO' 916 11
ARTILLERY
11TH MARINE S
HQ BTRY 262 7 16NOV 262 7
1ST BATTALION 431 14 16N0V 431 14
2D 'BATTALION 638 11 16NOV 638 11
3D BATTALION 577 15 16N0V 577 15
4TH BATTALION 427 11 16NOV 427 11
12TH MARINE S
HQ .BTRY v . 4 NOV
1ST BATTALION 703 13 16N0V 703 13
2D BATTALION 541 8 16NOV 541 8
3D BATTALION 516 9 16N 516 9
4TH BATTALION 646 12 _ 16NOV _ 646, 12 ,
_
• UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, STRENGTHS AND LOCATION ARE THOSE REPORTED BY UNIT PERSONNEL STATUS REPORTS AND DO NOT REFLEC T
DAY_TO_DAY ADJUSTMENTS BETWEEN REPORTING PERIODS .
USMC USN USMC USN USI USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USPC USN USMC US N
13TH MARINES
HQ BTRY 255 5 23NOV 255 5
1ST BATTALION SRR R ISNCV 388 R
2D BATTALION 4n1 R 23NOV
3D BATTALION 401 8
627 14 23N0V 627 14
4TH BATTALION 366 8 23NOV 366 8
HQ BTRY, 1ST FAG 91 2 16NOV 91 2
HQ BTRY, 5THFAG 156 5 23NOV 156 5
1ST 155MM GUN BTRY 115 1 16NOV 118 3
3D ISSMM GUN BTRY 140 3 16NOV - 140 3
5TH I55MM GUN BTRY 150 3 16NOV , 150 3
7TH 155MM GUN BTRY 167 3 21NOV _162
1ST 8" HOW BTRY 0
3D B. HOW BTRY 197 3 16NOV 197 1
5TH B . HOW BTRY 203 2 23NOV 203 2
1ST SEARCH LIGHT BTRY 111 2 16NOV 111 2
RECONNAISSANC E
1ST RECON BN 441 , 74 16N2V 441 24
3D RECON BN 500 16NOV
14 500 34
5TH RECON BN 334 15 23NOV 31 1 304 14
1ST FORCE RECON CO 146, 4 16NOV 4
146
3D FORCE RECON CO 151 7 1SNOV 161 7
5TH FORCE RECON CO 116 1 21NOV _ 116 3
ANTI-TANK
1ST AT BN 303 7 16NOV 303 7
3D AT BN 348 7 16NOV 348 7
5TH AT UN 269 7 23N0V 20 1 249 6
TAN K
1ST TANK BN 591 15 16NOV 593 15
3D TANK BN 611 A 1 NnI
5TH TANK BN 611 8
604 17 23NOV 77 1 527 11
AMTRA C
1ST AMTRAC BN 631 15 16NOV 631 15
3D AMTRAC BN 656 15 16N0V 656 15
5TH AMTRAC BN 705 17 23NOV 110 1 595 16
1ST ARM AMPHIB CO 244 3 16NOV 244 3
ENGINEE R
1ST ENGR BN 665 14 I6NOV 668 1 4
3D ENGR BN 672, 11 16NOV
5TH ENGR BN 672 11
491 12 23NOV 37 1 456 11
7TH ENGR BN 947 22 16NOV 947 22
9TH ENGR BN 946 14 16NOV 946 14
11TH ENGR BN 1165 21 16NOV 1165 21
13TH ENGR BN 869 17 71NOV
1ST BRIDGE CO 869 17
140 16NOV 140
3D BRIDGE CO 15 6 16NOV 156
5TH BRIDGE CO 118 2 23NOV 118 2
MOTOR TRANSPORT
1ST MT 9N 246 5 16NOV 246 5
3D MT B N 39 5 8 16NOV 395 8
5TH MT BN 193 B 23NOV 12 1
7TH MT B N 181 7
357 3 16NOV 387 3
9TH MT BN 366 9 16NOV 366 9
11TH MT BN 151 9 13NOV 381 9
13TH MT BN 358 9 23 NOV 358 9
COMMUNICATION .
1ST RADIO BN 475 7 23NOV 247
5TH COMM B N 228 2
71 7 7 16NOV 71 7 7
7TH COMM BN 669 13 16NOV 669
9TH COMM BN 13
670 4 24NOV 190
90 3 113
ANGLICO 2 110 2 4Rn 1
In 71NOV
19 7 8
SHORE PARTY
1ST SP BN . 37 1 1 5 1RNO V 373 15
3D SP BN 496 15 16NOV
5TH SP BN 496 35
79R 21 21NOV 21
_ 4 277 17
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL 32 1
MILITARY POLICE
1ST MP BN 614 6 16NOV 614 6
3D MP BN 688 9 16NOV 688 9
5TH MP BN 249 6 23NOV 7,9 6
SERVICE/SUPPOR T
FLC, III MA F
HQ, FLC/1ST FSR
H&S BN 1480 37 16NOV 1480 37
SUPPLY BN 1536 13 16NOV 1536 13
7TH SEP BK FUEL CO 145 9 16NOV 145 9
MAINT BN 1075 1 16NOV 1075 1
FLSG_A/3D SERV BN 1998 27 16NOV 1998 27
FLSG-B 1ST SER(rBN 752 12 16NOV 752 12
3D FSR
H&S BN 1067 41 2390V 1067 41
SUPPLY BN 1318 12 23N0V 1318 12
MAINT BN 1017 23NOV 101 7
5TH FS R
1365 BN 474 35 24N0V 474 1 5
SUPPLY BN 554 25 24NOV 562 2 5
MAINT BN 567 7dNOV 56 7 '
5TH SERVICE BN 612 20 23NOV 6.12 20
PROV SERVICE BN, 91H MAB 922 13 24NOV 922 13
9TH SEP BULK FUEL CO 256, _ 23NOV _ 256
MEDICALL USlC USN USIC USN USMC USN USPC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN
lftl NOV
' n~~WN®®~~ n~_~~~~~ n
1ST MED BN `ii7
MED BN®Q1I'~ET'
_~~ ® ©0~ nn
5TH MED BN
ST HOSP C . ~ ]RLID.D:UMMO_•MML' =ts!lL~ n
-_-_ -
5TH HOSP CO
1ST DENTAL CO
~1jJ1~t
__f(i_{~-,~
~~nn1~n~~~1nnn~~mn
3D DENTAL CO
TH DENTAL CO
_~.11_ .~
1n ~~IN .•O_M
rM
lM-Ri
n~~T•1_~ n
11TH DENTAL CO -_~~_~
13TH DENTAL CO
1 DENTAL CO 1n ©ET:_ •IIIM~ n ~n ~M~~~~ n ~ n EEM1EF> ~
17TH DENTAL CO _R~RI~RRaRa=RaR' n~~~ n1~'©m n
usw 85 790 25,463 1 737 12 186 15 134 Mr. 3 131 Mg 8
USN 3,855 1,154 100 668 575 222 125 826 18 5
GROUND TOTAL
/1
89,645 26,617 1,837 12,854 15,709 8,355 3,256 17,604 3,41 3
AVIATION UNITS
MAG-1 2
HEMS-12 501 16NOV 50 1
MABS_12 565 35 I6NOV 565 35
MATCU-67 88 16NOV 88
VMA-121 192 1 16NOV 192 1
VMA-211 721 1 1690V 271 1
VMA_311 1A5 1 16NOV IRS 1
VMA(AW)_533 261 1 9NOV 261 1
MAG-1 3
H&MS-13 134 16NOV 33 4
MABS-13 510 7A 16NOV 510 JA
VMFA-115 317 1 16NOV 317 1
VMFA-314 322 1 16NOV 322 1
VMFA_323 339 '1 16NOV 339 1
MAG_ 1 6
HSMS_16-
MABS_16
~~~
~ T:1ERIICM7i
49 6
MATCU_ . _ E M n _71~
MATCU_68
VNO_2
HMH-463
'F l - 265
~~~
i[] n ~
mel[~ 163
306
1
1
73
~ 179 4
HMM_ ~~J~ 187 1
--
MAG_36 - n_ '
HEMS- 6
MARS _
n R'4
JJRJ7IMi[1T~
''9411 ma
VMO
il-1 ir_,li
JBMMI19 2
~
. 225 4
HMM_©~ 176 1
HMM_ 65 UE1EL•~ 185 1
HMM-362 MIMS •
HMM-364 R TINNFI .i1! '
H AG 1s ..-
M _
H&MS-1 97 47 1
MASS- 383 2 9
H6H3 IWAKUNI
HAHS FUTEMA
MACS_ .
~m~
~~®
244
208
61
2
394 29 3
MATCU_60 ]~I 69
MATCU
VMGR_ IM1t~l_~ •1 6
VMA-223
VMFA-542
]1~ 20 9
®i © . 303 2
HMM-262 ~0 .® 163 1
HMM_361 1 ~Ippp!i~ 192 4
USMC USN USMC USN USFC USN USMC USN US1•C USN USMC USN USDC USN USMC USN USPC USN USMC US N
TA BRIG
HAMS 1ST BRIGADE 93 23NOV 93
MACS-2
VMF A -212 233 1 9NOV 1
233
3D MAW
MWHG- 3
H&HS-3 676 6 23NOV _ 676 6
MWFS_3 170 23NOV _ 17 0
MWCS_3 149 23NOV 14 9
MHTG_3 0
H&MS-30 457 1 23NOV 457 1
HMMT-301 261 1 23N0V 261 1
HMMT_302 307 1 23N0V 307 1
MAG_3 3
H&MS-33 75R 23NOV 75 8
MABS_33 145 2 23NOV 145 7
MATCU-65 79 23NOV 79
VMCJ_3 419 2 23NOV 419 2 J
VMA-214 251 1 16NOV 25 1
VMFA-232 238 1 16NOV 23 8
VMFA_334 305 2 23NOV 30 5
MWSG_1 7
H&MS_37 694 3 23NOV 69 4
WERS_37 251 23NOV 25 1
VMGR-352 449 1 23NOV 449
MACG-3 8
H&HS-38 221 23NOV 221
MASS-5 186 23NOV 186
MACS-1 301 23NOV 301
MACS-3 226 23NOV 2 26
MACS-7 194 4 2 OCT 19,
5TH LAAM BN 489 4 21NOV 489 9
MAG_5 6
H&MS_56 327 1 260CT 327 1
MABS_56
VMO-5 368 4 23NOV 36B 4
HMH-462 205 1 23NOV ,n 5 1
HMM-263 229 3 190CT 9 3
USPC 27 280 . 2
USN 717 143 85 41 4 70 326 1 43 4
AVIATION TOTAL 27,997 _ 7,807 _ 4,790 2,575 _ 229 1,211 _ 2,155 636 8,398 196
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL 32 3
ASSIGNED
STRENGTH DANANG CHU LAI PHU MI DONG HA OKINAWA JAPAN HAWAII EASTPAC OTHER
USMC
85,790 25,463 1,737 12,186 15,134 8,133 3 .131 16,778 3 .228
GROUND TOTAL
USN 3,855 1,154 100 668 575 222 125 826 185
USMC 27,280 7,664 4,705 2,534 225 1,141 1,829 635 8,355 19 2
AVIATION IOTA
USN 717 143 85 41 4 70 326 1 43 4
USMC 113,070 33,127 6,442 14,720 15,359 9,274 1,829 3,766 25,133 3,420
GRAND TOTAL
USN 4,572 1,297 185 209 579 292 326 126 869 189
INDEX 32 7
INDEX 32 9
Joint Coordinating Council UGC), 184, 19 3 Lanigan, Col John P ., 9-11, 37, 4 6
Laos, 10, 31, 44, 21 9
Lawendowski, Maj John J ., 137
Kane, Capt Richard R ., 20 5 "Leatherneck Square " , 22, 28, 30, 9 5
Kapetan, LtCol Nick S ., 162-163, 17 0 Lemon, Maj Douglass W ., 17 3
Kelley, Col Joseph J ., 104 Lewis, LtCol Robert Jr ., 11 4
Kelly, LtCol Walter C ., 17 1 Liberty Bridge, 17 1
Keneipp, Capt Warren O ., Jr ., 9 6 Liberty Road, 236, 23 8
Kent, LtCol William D ., 125-128, 13 3 Little, LCpI Thomas L ., 124
Khang, LtGen Le Nguyen, 248 Logistical Support Installations, 103-10 4
Khe Sanh Logistics in Operation DeSoto, 6 3
Khe Sanh Combat Base, 9-10, 16, 21, 33-39, 41, 44, 46-47, 93 , Logistics Support Area (LSA), 60-6 1
128-130, 142, 147, 151, 157-158, 203, 205, 229, 235, 239 , Long An Province, 25 2
244, 255-25 6 Long Binh, 24 2
Khe Sanh Fire Support Control Center, 4 5 Long Tau River, 246-24 7
First Battle of Khe Sanh, 35, 15 7 Lopez, PFC Steve D ., 4 5
"The Khe Sanh Hill Fights" (See also Khe Sanh, First Battle of) , LoPrete, Col Joseph E ., 142
15 7 Lord, Sgt Donald, 3 4
"Siege of Khe Sanh", 12 9 Love, Maj Edgar J ., 205
Khe Sanh Village, 3 5 Lownds, Col David E ., 14 2
Kien Hoa Province, 151, 248-249 Ly Ly River, 11 3
Kim, BGen Yun Sang (KMC), 5, illus ., 5 Lyons, Capt Alfred E ., 43
King, 2dtLt Thomas G ., 35-3 6
Kirby, LtCol Edward K ., 158-16 0
Kit Carson Scout, 52, 7 2 McCarter, Capt James W ., 136
Knapper, Capt Roger E ., illus ., 24 6 McCormick, Ens John W ., USN, 160
Knowles, BGen Richard T ., USA, 79, 107, 11 9 McCracken, Capt Jack H ., 110, 20 7
Koehler, lstLt Richard D ., Jr ., 12, 103 McCutcheon, LtGen Keith B ., 197
Komer, Amb Robert, 18 4 McKay, Capt Gerald L ., 67
Kontum, 8, 184, 192, 24 2 McKenna, Col James D ., 120
Korea, Army of the Republic of, 7 7 McKitrick, LtCol Rodney D ., 28, 156, 164
Korean Marine Brigade, 5, 107, 10 9 McNamara, Secretary of Defense Robert S ., 86-87, 89, 9 1
Koster, MajGen Samuel W ., USA, 120, 25 8 "McNamara Line", 95, 145, 227, 242, (See also Strong Obstacle
Krulak, LtGen Victor H ., 4-5, 150, 15 7 System)
Ky, Vice President Nguyen Cau, 258 McNaughton, LtCol George C ., 12 0
Ky Ha, 62, 199, 205, 211-21 2 McQuown, LtCol Max, 175-179, 190, 193
Kyle, MajGen Wood B ., 4, 19, illus ., 4 MACV (See " Military Assistance Command, Vietnam )
Magnificant Bastards, 136n (See also "Bastard's Bridge" )
Mai Loc, 16, 2 0
LaHue, BGen Foster C ., 81, 110, 117, 15 7 Mai Xa Thi, 17 9
Lam, LtGen Hoang Xuan, 89, 258 ; illus ., 6, 8 Manila, 244
Lam Binh, 6 2 Marble Mountain Air Facility, 130, 132, 170, 173, 199, 209-21 1
Lan, Col Bui Thi, 25 1 Marine Air Command and Control System, 19 9
Landers, Maj James H ., 2 9 Marine Bases, illus ., 7
Landes, Capt Burrell H ., Jr ., 102 Marine Corps Commands and Unit s
Landing Zones (LZ) Headquarters Marine Corps, 191, 244, 25 7
Landing Zones, 5 8 Landing Force Training Command, Pacific, 24 8
Landing Zone Bat, 58-59, 15 4 Marine Corps Supply Center, Barstow, California, 26 6
Landing Zone Canary, 100 Marine Corps Air Facility, Futema, 205, 21 1
Landing Zone Cardinal, 16 2 Marine Security Guard Battalion, 24 4
Landing Zone Dove, 13 9 Marine Security Guard Detachment (MSGD), 24 2
Landing Zone Finch, 176 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), 3
Landing Zone Goose, 29 Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac), 4-5, 150-151, 185, 242 ,
Landing Zone Mockingbird, 160 25 7
Landing Zone Owl, 16 0 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB), 8, 150-151, 153, 22 4
Landing Zone Parrot, 16 0 Special Landing Force (SLF), 3, 5, 17, 19n, 23, 57, 119, 135 ,
Landing Zone Wren, 16 2 142, 150-151, 153-155, 160, 175, 179, 206-207, 218 ,
Lang Rui Ou, 9 3 248-249
Lang Son, 10 0 SLF Alpha, 23, 66, 100, 110, 125, 139, 156-159, 161, 161n ,
Lang Vei Special Forces Camp, 31, 33, 36-37, 44, 46, 93, 129 163-164, 167-174
SLF Bravo, 24, 28, 82, 100, 123, 125, 135, 156-158, 161 , 1st Hospital Company, 208, 23 3
167-170, 175-17 6 3d Marine Division, 3-5, 8-9, 16, 20-28, 34, 39, 44, 75, 79 ,
5th Marine Division, 5 n 87-88, 91, 95, 120, 125, 135, 139, 142-145, 155, 157 ,
III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), 3-8, 16, 20, 23, 31, 33 , 159-161, 164-165, 173, 191, 210-211, 222, 224, 238, illus . ,
37, 51, 63, 68, 74-75, 78, 83, 86, 89, 91, 93-95, 104, 111 , 144
119-120, 124, 125, 128, 130, 132, 135, 139, 150-151, 155 , 3d Marine Division, (Fwd), 9, 200
163, 170, 174, 185, 187-192, 199, 205, 210, 214, 216 , 3d Marines, 9, 16, 18, 29, 35, 37, 46, 125, 128, 142, 155, 157 ,
219-222, 224, 226, 241-242, 255, 258 164, 17 4
Task Force X-Ray, 5, 53, 55, 58, 79, 81, 109-111, 169, 21 8 1st Battalion, 3, 26, 33, 66-67, 100-104, 110, 139, 139n ,
1st Marine Division, 3-5, 51-52, 64, 79, 107, 109, 119-120, 123 , 156-164, 167-175, 179-18 3
150, 169, 191, 210, 216, 23 6 H&S Company, 15 8
1st Marines, 64-65, 107, 119-120, 139-142, 166, 172, illus ., 4 1 Company A, 67, 160, 164
1st Battalion, 52, 65, 57, 139, 141, 174, illus ., 142 Company B, 67, 102, 159-160
Company D, 67, 11 4 Company C, 67, 103, 139, 158-159, 164, 17 2
2d Battalion, 51, 64, 139, 17 1 Company D, 160, 174, illus ., 170
3d Battalion, 64, 175, 178, 19 0 2d Battalion, 10-13, 28, 41-44, 100, 125, 135, 135n158-174 ,
Company I, 175-176, 178, 180 illus ., 1 3
Company K, 125, 179-180 Company E, 39, 42-45, 160-163
Company L, 175, 178-179 Company F, 11-12, 41-45, 103, 160, 167
Company M, 175, 178-17 9 Company G, 11-13, 39-44, 103, 160-16 6
5th Marines, 66n, 67, 72-73, 79, 93, 107, 110, 114, 119-120 , Company H, 39-44, 160-16 9
123, 159, 159n, 165, 169, 17 4 3d Battalion, 10, 14, 17, 18, 20, 37-44, 128-129, 136-138 ,
1st Battalion, 58, 61, 68, 74, 107, 110, 113-114, 117, 119, 159 illus ., 1 8
Company A, 6 7 Company I, 18, 20
Company B, 113-11 5 Company K, 38-39, 12 9
Company C, 67 Company L, 129-13 0
Company D, 61, 66-67, 72, 111, 114-11 5 Company M, 41, 129-13 0
2d Battalion, 72-73, 79, 107, 120-12 2 4th Marines, 5, 142-143, 155, 162, 167-17 3
Company E, 10 8 1st Battalion, 17, 19, 19n, 20-21, 23-24, 58-59, 61, 126 ,
Company F, 72, 108, 120-122 153-155, 161, 17 3
Company H, 51, 117, 118-122 Company A, 21, 58-59, 153-154
3d Battalion, 65, 70n, 72, 107, 110, 113-115, 117-119, 171, 194 Company C, 59, 15 3
Company I, 68, 114-115, 11 8 Company D, 21-22, 6 1
Company K, 113-115, 11 8 BLT, 6 1
Company L, 57, 68 2d Battalion, 133-139, 168, 181, 23 6
Company M, 57, 67-68, 113, 115, 11 8 Company E, 133-136, 138-16 8
7th Marines, 3, 5, 79, 107, 122, 154, 174 Company F, 67, 73, 133-137, 145-14 6
1st Battalion, 7 2 Company G, 133-13 7
Company D, 7 2 Company H, 133, 135-136
2d Battalion, 6 2 12th Marines
Company E, 7 2 Battery E, 100
Company F, 6 0 Battery F, 3 5
Company G, 6 2 Battery I, 5 3
3d Battalion, 53, 55-58, 61-63, 78, 153, 17 4 3d Battalion
Company I, 55-5 7 Battery I, 33, 35, 53, 60
Company K, 6 2 3d Battalion, 9, 12, 17, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30, 82, 92, 132, 156 ,
Company L, 53, 5 7 186 ; illus ., 27, 12 8
Company M, 55-5 7 Company I, 17, 30 ; 13 2
11th Marines, 218-220, 22 2 Company K, 29, 29n
1st Battalion, 64-6 5 Company L, 10-11, 12, 13, 30 ; illus ., 1 1
Battery B, 6 5 Company M, 12, 13, 30, 127-128, 132 ; illus ., 1 2
2d Battalion, 11 5 9th Marines, 20-21, 24, 29, 132-133, 136-139, 142-143 ,
Battery E, 10 8 161-164, 171, 174
3d Battalio n 1st Battalion, 14, 17-24, 33, 96-103,136, 151-153, 163, 248 ; il-
Battery G, 21 7 lus., 14, 15, 1 6
4th Battalion, 21 6 H&S Company, 96
7th Engineer Battalion, 236, 238, 240 Company A, 18n 96, 99, 102, 129 ; illus ., 13, 1 4
1st Medical Battalion, 23 3 Company B, 33-39, 96, 98-100, 10 3
Company B, 6 2 Company C, 96, 98-100, 102, 129 ; illus ., 1 6
1st Dental Company, 238 Company D, 96, 98-100
INDEX 33 1
2d Battalion, 24, 26-27, 125, 126-128, 128n, 133, 133n, 16 1 79, 104, 109, 135, 151, 155, 170, 191, 199-21 2
H&S Company, 125, 12 7 Marine Wing Headquarters Group (MWHG) 1, 20 0
Company E, 34-35, 41, 125, 12 7 Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 11, 199-20 3
Company F, 12, 26, 125, 127-128, 14 3 Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 12, 199-20 3
Company G, 125, 127, 129 Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 13, 199, 202
Company H, 27, 125, 12 7 Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 15, 15 1
3d Battalion, 3, 18, 20, 24, 28, 40, 100, 102-103, 134, 16 3 Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 16, 170, 199, 206, 210-212
H&S Company, 10 1 Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 36, 199, 206, 211-21 2
Company I, 18-1 9 Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron (H&MS) 36, 20 6
Company K, 28, 37-42, 98, 10 1 Marine Air Control Group 18, 200
Company L, 28 ; illus ., 28 Marine Air Control Squadron (MACS) 4, 20 0
Company M, 28, 40, 42, 13 4 Marine Air Control Squadron (MACS) 7, 20 0
12th Marines, 9-10, 142-143, 216-22 0 Marine Attack Squadron (VMA) 311, 104
1st Battalion, 15 9 Marine Attack Squadron (All Weather) (VMA[AW]) 242, 203 -
4 .2-inch Mortar Battery, 15 9 204
2d Battalion, 33, 38, 13 2 Marine Attack Squadron (All Weather) (VMA[AW]) 533, 20 3
Battery I, 130 Marine Attack Squadron (All Weather) (VMA[AW]) 542, 20 4
3d Battalion, 17 6 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 163, 170-171 ,
Composite Artillery Battalion, 17, 21-2 2 212 ; illus ., 20
13th Marines, 22 0 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadrom (HMM) 164, 28, 39, 44 ,
1st Battalion, 33, 39, 219 156, 163-166
Battery B, 31, 33, 3 9 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 165, 110, 207 ,
26th Marines, 5, 46, 84, 128-129, 142, 229, 25 6 212, 214
26th Marines (Fwd), 46-4 7 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 262, 57, 170, 174 ,
1st Battalion, 44, 4 6 175, 176, 21 1
Company A, 4 7 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 263, 158-15 9
Company B, 46, 12 9 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 265, 167, 169 ,
Company C, 44 21 1
2d Battalion, 20, 24, 26-29, 29n, 17 3 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 361, 70, 130-132 ,
Company E, 2 9 174
Company F, 2 9 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 362, 151, 153 ,
Company H, 2 9 156, 162-163, 170, 211, 24 8
3d Battalion, 47, 132n, 132-13 3 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 363, 58-59, 113 -
Company I, 47, 13 3 114, 137-138, 153-15 5
Company K, 13 3 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 463, 130, 170 ,
Company L, 47, 13 3 173, 209-210
Company M, 13 3 Marine Observation Squadron (VMO) 2, 58, 113, 11 5
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 125, 142, 145-146, 177 ; Marine Observation Squadron (VMO) 6, 110, 207, 21 1
illus ., 14 2 Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron (VMGR) 152, 20 5
Company A, 146-14 7 Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS) 2, 200
Company B, 14 6 Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS) 3, 200
5th Amphibian Tractor Battalio n Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron (VMCJ) 1, 204-20 5
Company A, 18 0 Force Logistic Command, 151, 173, 224-225, 229, 240, 25 7
3d Medical Battalion, 233, 236, 23 8 3d Force Service Regiment (FSR), 225, 228
Company C, 23 8 Force Logistic Support Group (FLSG) Alpha, 225, 22 7
3d Reconnaissance Battalion, 33, 100, 25 7 Force Logistic Support Group (FLSG) Bravo, 79, 225, 22 9
Company A, 46 Force Logistic Support Unit (FLSU) 1, 225, 22 7
3d Tank Battalion, 101, 12 6 Supply Battalion, 22 5
Company A, 162, 16 4 Supply Company (-) Reinforced, 22 9
9th Motor Transport Battalion, illus ., 1 6 Transient Battalion, 22 8
3d Engineer Battalion, 236-23 9 Transient Facility, 23 0
9th Engineer Battalion, 236-23 8 Air Delivery Platoon, 22 8
11th Engineer Battalion, 17, 19-20, 30, 89, 92-93, 237-239 ; Mangrove Swamp, 24 6
illus ., 16, 23 8 Marshall, Capt Albert R ., CEC, USN, 24 0
Company C, 23 7 MASH (Mobile Army Surgical Hospital), 238
Company D, 23 7 Masterpool, LtCol William J ., 26, 29
1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Company, 21 9 Matheson, BGen Salve H ., 8 1
5th 8-inch Howitzer Battery, 22 0 "Meatgrinder" the, 139
5th 155mm Gun Battery, 21 9 Medal of Honor, 12, 19, 72, 108, 113-115, 141, 20 9
1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW), 3-4, 6, 23, 33, 39, 45, 65, Medical Civic Action Patrol (MedCap), 194
Medical evacuation (Medevac), 39, 40, 59, 62, 138, 170, 20 6 Swift Boat, illus ., 80
Mekong River, 151, 249, 25 2 Navy, U .S ., 25, 152, 231-232, 24 5
Mellon, 2dLt Richard C., Jr ., 1 2 Navy Commands and Units
Merchant Ship Naval Air Systems Command, 21 0
SS Buchanan, 247 Naval Support Activity, Da Nang (NSA) 231-233 ; illus ., 23 1
SS Conqueror, 24 7 Seventh Fleet, 3, 5, 17, 26, 104, 135, 150, 153, 203, 24 2
SS Seatrain Texas, 247 Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), 5, 17, 82, 150-152, 156, 158 ,
Metzger, BGen Louis, 8, 75, 132, 144, 150, 153, 224, 228-229 ; 17 9
LtGen ., 23n, 82n, 135n, 164n, 210n Task Group 79 .4, 156 (See also SLF Alpha)
Mielke, Cpl William H ., 206 Task Group 79 .5, 156-157 (See also SLF Bravo)
"Mighty Mite", 186 USS Canberra (CAG 2), 15 2
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), 4, 6, 8, 17, 20 , USS Clarion River (LSMR 409), 5 8
23, 75, 79, 88, 94-95, 145, 150, 153, 164, 182-184, 194 , USS Henrico (APA 45), 15 2
214, 241-242, 245, 249, 255, 25 7 USS Iwo Jima, 58, 151, 153-154, 17 4
MACV Aviation Directive 95-4, 20 0 USS Ozbourne (DD 843), 60
MACV Contingency Plans, 7 7 USS Repose (AH 16), 23 3
MACV Combat Operation Center, 87 USS Sanctuary (AH 17), 23 3
MACV Directive 10-12, 184 USS Thomaston (LSD 28), 15 2
MACV I Corps Field Advisory Element, 24 5 USS Tripoli (LPH 10), 164, 166, 169-170, 173, 23 4
Office of Civil Operations (OCO), 183-18 4 USS Okinawa (LPH-3), 159, 171, 207, 21 2
Miller 2dLt Robert W., Jr ., 12 1 USS Vancouver (LPD 2), 15 2
Mobile Riverine Force, 252-25 3 USS White River (LSMR 536), 5 8
Mo Duc, 5 2 3d Naval Construction Brigade, 233, 240
Morrison, GySgt Alexander, 244 Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 4, 23 6
Momyer, MajGen William W ., USAF, 15 2 Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 10, 31, 23 4
Monkey Mountain, 200 Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 301, illus ., 23 5
Monsoon, 91, 93, 202, 234-235, 25 5 Needham, LtCol Robert, 128, 130, 13 6
Montagnards, 35, 25 0 Nelson, LtCol Joseph A ., 11 0
Moran, Capt Lawrence R ., 17 5 Neuropsychiauic ("Shell chock") casualties, 13 9
Morgan, Capt Robert F ., 11 1 New Life Hamlet Program, 195
Morley, Maj William F ., 3 3 Newlin, PFC Melvin E ., 108, 108n
Mortar Fire, 3 4 Newton, LtCol Donald E ., 4 6
Mulford, LtCol Ross L ., 17,33 9 Nha Be, 24 7
Mullen, Capt John J ., Jr ., 187 Nhung River, 169
Murray, lstLt John J ., 113, 11 5 Nickerson, MajGen Herman, Jr ., 51, 52, 65, 191-192 ; illus ., 4- 5
Murray, MajGen Raymond L., 9 4 Nong Son Coal Mine, 107-10 8
My Chanh, 16 8 North Vietnam, 8, 44, 63, 83, 87
North Vietnamese, 114, 130, 141, 156, 159, 25 5
Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), 7
Nam, Huong Van, 25 3 North Vietnamese Army (NVA), 3, 6-7, 9-10, 12-14, 17, 31 ,
Nation Building, 18 2 33-34, 37-38, 40, 51, 75, 93, 103, 110, 115, 127, 129 ,
National Cadre Training School, 18 3 132-133, 136-137, 146, 153, 161, 165, 174, 201, 207, 219 ,
National Press Club, 257-25 9 245-24 6
Naval Component Commander, 4 Artillery, use of, 77, 95-96, 99-100, 102-103, 132, 138, 137 n
Naval gunfire, 56, 58, 146, 153, 203, 22 2 Mortars, use of, 134, 138, 14 6
Naval Liaison officer, 16 0 Base Areas
Naval Vessels (General) Base Area C-3, 9 3
Amphibious Assault Ship (LPH), 150-152, 17 0 Base Area 606, 7 8
Amphibious Transport, Dbck (LPD), 150, 15 2 Dry Season Offensive, 1967, 11 9
Fire Support ships, 2 5 Regional Commands
Hospital Ship, 23 3 B-3 Front, 8
Landing craft, 247 Military Region 4 (MR-4), 8, 7 7
Landing craft, medium, 17, 17, 152, 17 5 Military REgion 5 (MR-5), 8, 25 9
Landing craft, utility (LCU), 17, 61, 6 3 Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region, 8
Landing ship, Dock (LSD), 15 2 NVA Divisions
Landing ship, Medium (Rocket), 15 3 2d NVA Division, 63-64, 68, 77, 107, 110-111, 117, 119-121 ,
Landing ship, Tank (LST), 17, 63, 150, 15 2 258-25 9
'Logistical Support Ship, 6 3 3d NVA Division, 8, 11 9
Minesweeper, 247 304th NVA Division, 8, 147, 25 9
River patrolboats, 247 320th NVA Division, 8
INDEX 33 3
INDEX 33 5
INDEX 33 7
"Bouncing Betty" mine, 165, 165n Weschler, RAdm, Thomas R ., USN., 231-232 ; VAdm, 184n
Claymore mine, 44, 9 6 Westerman, LtCol Jack, 5 8
"Surprise Firing Devices", 17 0 Western Pacific, 15 1
Mortars Westervelt, Capt John D ., USN ., 151, 15 3
60mm, 36-37, 45, 121, 127, 133, 13 7 Westman, LtCol Jack ., 153, 15 5
81mm, 21, 35, 45, 57, 64, 108, 122, 144, 176, 179, 23 2 Westmoreland, Gen William C ., USA ., 4, 7-8, 75, 77-78, 87-89 ,
82mm, 11, 30, 33, 36, 38, 47, 103, 121, 125, 127, 129, 13 5 92-93, 120, 139, 153, 159, 184, 234, 241-242, 245, 257 ,
107mm, M30, 21 2 259, illus ., 8, 17n
107mm, M-98 " Howtar" , 21 8 White, Col Francis V ., 5 6
4 .2-inch, 10, 33, 39, 64, 108, 121, 212, 22 3 Whitlow, lstLt, Robert H ., 11 4
120mm, 31, 4 6 Wickwire, LtCol Peter A ., 31, 33, 66-67, 100, 102-103, 158, 164 ,
Recoilles Rifles 167
57mm, 57, 25 3 Wilder, LtCol Gary, 14, 18, 37-4 1
75mm, 61, 117, 24 7 Willis, LtCol Theodore J ., 19, 2 1
106mm, 35, 41-42, 44-45, 56, 145 (See also below "Ontos" ) Wilson, LtCol Daniel M ., 17 4
Rifles Wilson, Col Frank E ., 21 1
AK-47, 173, 179 Wilson, LtCol James S ., 18, 20
M-16A1, 45, 52, 118, 229, 231, 245, 25 7 Wilson, Capt Robert B ., 62
Rocket, Aerial (White Phosphorous), 20 2 Wolf, LtCol Howard, 20 3
Rocket, Artillery Wolfe, LCpI C .M ., 12 2
Rocket (General), 122, 137, 22 2 Wood, Maj Donald E ., 24 9
102mm, 14, 46-4 7 Wooding, RAdm Robert T ., (CEC) USN., 234
122mm rocket, 10 9 Woodring, Maj Willard J ., 100-10 3
140mm, 21, 24, 77, 13 3 World War II, 91, 136
Smoke Grenade, 202 Wortman, Col Harry D ., 57, 153, 154, 156, 167
Tear Gas, 113, 11 5
Tracked Vehicle s
Ontos, 26, 35, 63, 125-127, 26n, 35 n Xuan Hai, 16 1
Tanks, (See also Tanks, use of) Xuan Loc, 25 1
Weber, 2dLt Terrence M ., 4 5
Webster, LtCol Charles B ., 70, 110-115, 11 9
Weise, LtCol William, 139 Young, Capt Robert K., 132