EXERCISE 1.

1. It notes that the number of seats to be allocated to the party concerned should be
between the upper or lower rounding (called upper and lower quotas) of its
fractional proportion (called natural quota).

2. The Hamilton / Vinton method describes the divisor as the proportion of the total
population per building. When the population of each state is divided by the
divider, the total number of the quotient is retained and the fraction is reduced.
This will result in excess house seats

3. The Hamilton method consists of assigning a lower quota (with the exception of
0) to each state at first, and then assigning any remaining seats to states whose
regular quotas have the highest fractional share.;
1. Find a standard divisor   
2. Find the standard quota of each state 
3. Assign a lower quota for each territory, unless it is 0. In that case, allocate 1. 
4. If there are any seats left, find the nation with the largest fraction of the regular
quota (excluding countries with 0 as lower quotas). If there are still seats left,
delegate the next seat to the state with the next largest fraction. Continue this
way until all of them are allocated.

4. *Use the standard divisor to find the standard quota for each state
* Temporarily allocate to each state its lower quota of seats. At this point, there    
should be some seats that were not allocated
*Starting with the state that has the largest fractional part and working toward the
state with the smallest fractional part, allocate one additional seat to each state
until all the seats have been allocated.
Example;
Hamilton’s Method for Hamiltonia
Use Hamilton’s method to finish the allocation of seats in Hamiltonia.
Let’s use red numbers below in Table 9.1.4 to rank the fractional parts of the
standard quotas from each state in order from largest to smallest. For example,
Zeta’s standard quota, 4.958, has the largest fractional part, 0.958. Also find the
sum of the lower quotas to determine how many seats still need to be allocated.

5. You need to solve and make a way to solve and find the sum that suit to the
required value, for instance;Percentage of season’s results of a field hockey
team recorded androunded to whole numbers. The sum does not reach 100%,
and this becomes an apportionment problem. The coach may want to give the
extra percent to the games won—“to make it look good for the team.”  This would
be biased.

High School Field Hockey Team: 2004–2005 Season

                   Percentag Round
e

Games won
18 18/23 × 100% = 78.26% 78%

Games lost 4 18/23 × 100% = 17.39% 17%

Games tied 1 18/23 × 100% =   4.35% 4%

Games played 23      100.00% 99%

After the quotas are calculated, round them down to the lower quota  ⎣qi⎦. 
Simply truncate (chop off) the decimal portion.
Start with the state with the largest fraction (largest decimal portion), and round
up this state’s quota to its upper quota ⎡qi⎤.   Keep assigning the states their
upper quotas in order of largest fractions until the total seats in the house is
reached.

EXERCISE 1.2
A mother of four children plans to distribute 35 identical pieces of canbary
chocolate bars among her children based on the numbers of minutes they spent
doing chores.
If she uses the Hilton method, what will be the fair way to divide.

Child Child Child Child 4

Minutes work 1 2 3
90 145 180 320
Final pieces of chocolate bars 0.476 0.768 0.953 1.695
received.

How many minutes of chores its needed for each child to receive one pieces of
chocolate?

 Answer: 735

Child 1 Child 2 Child Child 4

Minutes 3
Work 2.571 4.142 5.142 9.142

Answer problem 1 using the Jefferson Method 

Solution 735
Standard Divisor:  4 = 183.75

Child Child Child Child 4

Minutes work 1 2 3
90 145 180 320
Final pieces of chocolate bars 2.041 0.789 0.979 1.741
received.

EXERCISE 1.3 
Answer:

1. Hilton’s Method
STATE A B C D E Total
P 23,403 33,87 28,677 12,90 42,90 118,356
0 0 9
SQ 6.32 9.15 7.75 3.48 11.60
LQ 6 9 7 3 11 36
FA 6 9 8 3 11 37
A 32
SD 3,698.625

2. Jefferson’s Method
STATE A B C D E Total
P 23,40 33,870 28,67 12,900 42,90 118,356
3 7 9
SQ 5.70 8.26 6.99 3.14 10.46
LQ 5 8 6 3 10 32
FA 5 8 6 3 10 32
A 32
SD 4,100

3. Webster Method
STATE A B C D E Total
P 23,403 33,870 28,677 12,900 42,909 118,356
SQ 5.200 7.526 6.372 2.866 9.535

LQ 5 8 6 3 10 32
FA 5 8 6 3 10 32
A 32
SD 4,500
 4.

STATE A B C D E Total
P 23,403 33,87 28,67 12,90 42,90 118,356
0 7 0 9
SQ 6.52 9.43 7.99 3.59 11.96
LQ 6 9 7 3 11 36
FA 7 9 8 4 12 40
A 33
SD 3,506.55

5. What causes an apportion paradox?

 The population paradox is the counter-intuitive consequence of such
distribution processes. When two nations have populations that at varying
speeds, a small, fast-growing state will lose its legislative seat to a huge,
slower-growing state.

6.

BUILDIN EB NB SB TOTAL
G
P 345 248 410 1,003
SQ 11.00 7.91 13.08
LQ 11 7 13 31
FA 11 8 13 32

A 32
SD 31.34

7.

BUILDIN EB NB SB TOTAL
G
P 345 248 410 1,003
SQ 11.1 8 13.22
2
 LQ 11 8 13 32
FA 11 8 13 32
A 32
SD 31

8. Use the Jefferson method for apportionment to answer problem 6.

BUILDING EAST NORTH SOUTH TOTAL

UNIT
MSQ=PMSD 11.5 8.27 13.67
LQ 11 8 13 32
FA 11 8 13 32
A 32
MSD 30

9. If one board of director is added which building will be entitled

for the additional director using the Huntington-Hill number in
problem 6?

h₁ = 345²
11(11+1)
= 119,025
132
= 901.70

h₂ = 248²
8(8+1)
= 61,504
72
= 854.22

h₃ = 410²
13(13+1)
= 168,100
182
= 923.63

The South building Ayala Prime Condominium has the greatest

Huntington-Hill number. Thus, the additional board of director
should be given to the South Building Ayala Prime Condominium.
EXERCISE 1.4 
1.
Chemical A B C D Total
Employers 120 95 48 28 291
MSQ=P/MS 7.54 5.97 3.01 1.76
D
LQ 7 5 3 1 16
FA 7 5 3 1 16
A 16
MSD 15.9
0

2.
Chemical A B C D Total
Employer 12 95 48 28 291
s 0

Chemical A B C D Total
Employer 120 95 48 28 291
s
SQ= GSD 6.60 5.22 2.64 1.87

LQ 6 5 2 1 14
Final A 7 5 3 1 16
A 16
SD 18.1
8

3. 
Chemical A B C D Total
Employers 120 95 4 28 291
8
SQ=PMSD 7.5 5.93 3 1.75
LQ 7 5 2 1 16
FA 7 5 3 1 16
A 16
 SD 16

4.
Chemical A B C D Total
Employers 120 95 48 28 291
SQ=PMSD 7.5 5.93 3 1.75
GQ 8 6 4 2
LQ 7 5 3 1
GM 7.25 5.98 3. 1.95 16
1
FA 7 5 3 1 16
A 16
MSD 16
Division A receive the representative.
5. k146 = 24 808 = 10
The absolute unfairness is 24-10 = 8. Thus, the delegates not well assigned to the two
groups.
 
6.The group of sectores is the poorly represented.

7.State B is the more poorly represented.

12,25015 = 6,150 83,20016= 5,200
The absolute unfairness is 6,150-5,200=950.

8. 

Grou Population
p
A 70
B 100
C 75
D 20
E 210
 F 450

 9.
School COE COA COE COAA Total
S
SP 10.065 408 2,350 7.180 20,503
SQ=PMSD 13.74 1.24 3.20 9.50
LQ 13 1 3 9
FA 14 1 3 10 28
A 28
SD 782.25
10.
School COE COA COE COAA Total
S
SP 10.065 408 2,350 7.180 20,503
SQ=PMSD 14.17 1.27 3.30 10.11
LQ 14 1 3 10 28
FA 14 1 3 10 28
A 28
SD 710

11.
School COE COA COE COAA Total
S
SP 10.065 408 2,350 7.180 20,503
SQ=PMSD 14.47 1.29 3.35 10.25
LQ 14 1 3 10 28
FA 14 1 3 10 28
A 28
SD 700

12.
School COE COA COE COAA Total
S
SP 10.065 408 2,350 7.180 20,503
SQ=PMSD 14.17 1.27 3.30 10.11
GQ 15 2 4 4
LQ 14 1 2 10 28
 GM 14.50 1.35 3.45 11.26
FA 14 1 3 11 28
A 28
SD 710
ASSIGNMENT

1. Explain the Alabama Paradox.

 The Alabama Paradox refers to the pathological scenario of the Hamilton
system in which an increase in the total number of seats in the legislature will
cause the electoral district or the political party to lose its seat. It is an
example of the failure of House monotony and can be interpreted by the
Balinski – Young Theorem. In general, the term Alabama paradox applies to
any distribution situation where an increase in the total number of products
will reduce one of the shares, this is because the rise in the number of seats
raises the fair share faster for the big states than for the small states.

2. Describe the Population Paradox.

 The population paradox is the counter-intuitive consequence of certain sorting
procedures. When two countries have populations that at different rates, a
small, fast-growing state will lose its legislative seat to a large, slower-growing
state.

3. Explain the New State Paradox.

 Given the set number of total representatives (as defined by the United States
House of Representatives), adding a new state would, in principle, decrease
the number of representatives for established states, as, under the United
States Constitution, each state has the right to have at least one
representative, irrespective of its population.
Often, even though the number of Members of the House of Representatives is i
ncreased by the number of Representatives in the new State, a pre-existing Stat
e may lose its seat due to the manner in which the special rules on the allocation 
of seats deal with rounding methods.
 
4. Create an apportionment problem any kinds and show that each of the
paradoxes above is possible.
 The Congress of Power Parador is a small republic located in central America
and consists of six states: Azcar, Bahia, Cafe, Diamante, Esmeralda,
Felicidad (A, B, C, D, E and F). There are 250 seat in the Congress which are
to be apportioned among the six states to their respective population. The
following table shows the populations based on the most recent census:

State A B C D E F TOTAL
Populatio 1,646,00 6,936,00 154,00 2,091,00 685,00 988,00 12,500,00
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EXERCISE 2.1
1. a. Plurality Method

Candidate 1st place voters

A 1 2 4 1 2 70
B 3 1 3 2 4 23
C 4 3 1 4 3 35
D 2 4 2 3 1 14
No. of 42 23 35 28 14 148
voters
Total 1ST place votes
A - 42 +28 = 70
B – 23
C – 35
D – 14
A row win’s the election

b. Plurality with elimination method

Candidate 1st place voters

A 1 2 3 1 1 70
B 2 1 2 2 3 23
C 3 3 1 3 2 35
No. of 24 23 35 28 14 128
voters
A. 42+28+14=84
B. 23
C. 35
C. Borda count
N=4 Arrow (4)
Rank Rank No. of Voters Total
Point
1 4 42 168
 2 3 23 69

4 1 35 35
1 4 28 112
2 3 14 42
Borda 426

N=4 BENNET (B)

Rank Rank Point No. of Voters Total

3 2 42 84

1 4 23 92

3 2 35 70
2 3 28 84
4 1 14 14
Borda 344

          D. Top the runoff method

Candidate 1st place voters

A 1 1 2 1 1 70
C 2 2 1 2 2 35
No. of 42 23 35 28 14 142
voters
Total 1ST place votes
A. 42+23+28+14=107
C-35

2. a. Plurality Method

Candidate 1st place voters

A 1 2 4 1 2 90
B 3 1 3 2 4 20
 C 4 3 1 4 3 18
D 2 4 2 3 1 7
No. of 72 20 25 19 7 135
voters
Total 1ST place votes
A – 71+18=90
B. 20
B. 18
B. 7

Since A had most 1ST place votes, A win’s the poll.

b. Plurality with elimination method

Candidate 1st place voters

A 1 2 3 1 1 90
B 2 1 2 2 3 20
C 3 3 1 3 2 18
No. of 71 20 25 18 7 128
voters
Since food chain has A most 1ST place votes, A win’s the poll.

Borda count
N=4 A
Rank Rank No. of Voters Total
Point
1 4 72 288

2 3 20 60

4 1 27 25
1 4 18 72
2 3 7 21
Borda 466

N=4 (B)
Ran Rank Point No. of Total
k Votes
3 2 72 144
1 4 20 80
3 2 25 50
2 3 18 54
4 1 7 7
Borda count 335

N=4 (C)
Ran Rank Point No. of Total
k Votes
4 1 72 72
3 2 20 40
1 4 25 100
4 1 18 18
3 2 7 14
Borda count 244

N=4 (D)
Ran Rank Point No. of Total
k Votes
2 3 72 216
4 1 20 20
2 3 25 75
 3 2 18 36
1 4 7 28
Borda count 375

Since A has the most Borda count, A wins the poll

3. Forty senior high school students form a math class were asked to pick
four vacancies of food that will be served for a dinner event. The students
were allowed to vote for more than one choice. The results are allowed to
vote for more than one choice. The results are shown in the table below.
Choices Number of students who voted
Korean fast and American food 7
American food and Filipino food 7
Chinese food and Filipino food 8
Korean food, American food, and Chinese 14
food
All four kinds of food 4
Which food will be served for the dinner event using the approval voting
method? 
 The American food will be served for the dinner event.

4. Shown below is the preference list for three candidates. Determine

the winner using the Borda count method
Candidate Ranking
A 3 2 1
B 1 3 3
C 2 1 2
Total 83 75 5
Votes

N=3 (A)
 Rank Rank Point No. of Total
Votes
3 1 83 83
2 2 75 150
1 3 5 15
Borda count 248

N=3 (B)
Rank Rank Point No. of Total
Votes
1 3 83 249
3 1 75 75
3 1 5 5
Borda count 329

N=3 (C)
Rank Rank Point No. of Votes Total
2 2 83 166
1 3 75 225
2 2 5 10
Borda count 401
Since C has the most Borda count, Candidate C wins the election.

Does this election violate the majority criterion using the Borda count method?
Yes, it is infringing. In a way, whether we consider the plurality criterion or the majority
voting method that includes at least half plus 1 of all the votes, the winning candidate
should be allowed to vote.
5. Given the customers’ preference list for three different choices of ice
cream flavors, determine the top choices of the customers using the Borda
count method. Re-evaluate the vote counting if the option cheese flavor is
removed from the choices and determine if the IIA criterion is violated.
Choices Ranking
Cheese 2 1 3
Chocolate 1 2 2
Mango 3 3 1
Total 6 81 90
Votes
N=3 CHEESE (A)
Rank Rank Point No. of Votes Total
2 2 6 12
1 3 81 241
3 1 90 90
Borda count 343

N=3 CHOCOLATE (B)

Rank Rank Point No. of Votes Total
1 3 6 18
2 2 81 162
2 2 90 180
Borda count 360

N=3 MANGO (C)

Rank Rank Point No. of Votes Total
3 1 6 6
3 1 81 81
1 3 90 270
Borda count 357
          Chocolate is the top choice of the customers.
There are 3 candidates and 50 voters in an election.
a.What is the maximum number of votes that a candidate can receive using the
Borda count method?
 The highest number of votes a candidate will obtain is at most 150 votes. There
are three contestants, each of which may be ranked as first, second or last. The
weight of these ranks is equal to 3 points, 2 points and 1 point respectively. In
order to win the Borda Count process, it is important to accumulate the most
votes in the highest rank in order to add more weight to that vote.
b.What is the minimum number of votes that a candidate can receive?
 At least 50 votes should be cast for a nominee. The weight of the position in the
rank is just one. This minimum vote will be taken by 50 electors who are not the
preferred candidate.

EXERCISE 2.2
Solve the following problems.
1.A group of 50 senior high school students were asked to rank their most
favorite sports to play. Determine the winning option using the plurality of voting.
Is there a majority option?
If so, which option?
Basketball 1 3 1 2 2
Volleyball 2 4 3 3 4
Badminton 4 1 4 1 3
 Swimming 3 2 2 4 1
No. of 15 8 12 10 5
votes

Solution:
Getting all the first-place votes, you will obtain the following:
Options Ranking Total first- place votes

Basketbal l 1 3 1 2 2 27
Volleyball 2 4 3 3 4 0
Badminto n 4 1 4 1 3 18
Swimmin g 3 2 2 4 1 5
No. of 15 8 12 10 5 50
votes

Basketball has the highest number of first-place votes according to the plurality process.
Basketball won the bulk of the votes at least 26 votes.

2. Answer Problem 1 using the Borda count method.

Solution:
Totaling the weights over 50 senior high school students, the Borda counts for the
following options are given below.
Basketball
Ran Rank No. of Total
k point votes

1 4 15 60
3 2 8 16
1 4 12 48
2 3 10 30
2 3 5 15
Borda count  169

Volleyball
Ran Rank No. of Total
k point votes

2 3 15 45
4 1 8 8
3 2 12 24
3 2 10 20
4 1 5 5
Borda count  102

Badminton
Ran Rank No. of votes Total
k point
4 1 15 15
1 4 8 32
4 1 12 12
1 4 10 40
3 2 5 10
Borda 109
count 
 Swimming
Ran Rank No. of votes Total
k point
3 2 15 30
2 3 8 24
2 3 12 36
4 1 10 10
1 4 5 20
Borda count  120

Basketball is the alternative with the highest Borda count. Thus, the basketball
alternative wins the most favored sport to play.

3.Answer Problem 1 using the plurality with elimination method. Solution:

Round 1: Option Volleyball should be eliminated
Options Ranking
Basketball 1 3 1 2 2
Volleyball 2 4 3 3 4
Badminton 4 1 4 1 3
Swimming 3 2 2 4 1
No. of 15 8 12 10 5
votes
Options Total First- place
Votes
Basketball 27
Volleyball 0
Badminton 18
Swimming 5
Round 2: Option swimming should be eliminated.
Options Ranking
Basketball 1 3 1 2 2
Badminton 3 1 3 1 3
Swimming 2 2 2 3 1
No. of 15 8 12 10 5
votes

Options Total First- place Votes

Basketball 27
Badminto 18
n
Swimming 5

Round 3: Option Badminton should be eliminated.

Options Ranking
Basketball 1 2 1 2 1
Badminton 2 1 2 1 2
 No. of 15 8 12 10 5
votes

Options Total First- place Votes

Basketball 32
Badminto 18
n

The winner for this method is Option Basketball.

4.Answer Problem 1 using the top two runoff method. Solution:

Computing the total first-place votes for each option, you will obtain the
following.

Options Total first- place votes

Ranking
Basketball 1 3 1 2   2 27
Volleyball 2 4 3 3   4 0
Badminton 4 1 4 1   3 18
Swimming 3 2 2 4     1   5
No. of 15 8 12 10   5
votes
The top two choices with the highest number of first-place votes are Basketball and
Badminton. Thus, exclude the Volleyball and Swimming options from the list. This
brings us the following set of interests.
Options Rankin Total
g first-
place
votes
Basketball 1 2 1 2 1 32
Badminton 2 1 2 1 2 18
 No. of 15 8 12 10 5
votes

The option Basketball wins this election.

5.There are 360 voters in an election using the plurality method.

1. What is the number of majority votes?

The majority requires at least 360/2 + 1 = 181 votes. Hence, no

one gets the majority vote.

b. What is the minimum number of votes for the winner with 5 candidates?

360/5 + 1 = 73 votes to win the election

6. There are 400 voters and 6 candidates in an election using the Borda
count method.

1. What is the total number of points on a ballot?

 There are 6 seats on the ballot, which are worth, from first to last, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1
points. There are then a total of 6 + 5 + 4 + 3 + 2 + 1=21 points on each vote. 
The nominee would receive the least points for being last on-ballot. 400 votes for
a rating of 1 point per means that the minimum number of points a candidate will
earn is 400.
b. What is the maximum number of points a candidate can receive?
 The nominee can gain the most points by being the first on-ballot. The first place
is worth 6 points and there are 400 ballots, so the maximum points a candidate
could win is 400 × 6 = 2400.
c. If points are given to the following candidates, which candidate wins the
election?

Candidat Points Candidat Points

e e
A 1635 D 2100
B 1325 E 1525
C 1800 F Unknown
Candidate D wins the election with a total of 2100 points. 
1635 + 1325 + 1800 + 2100 + 1525 = 8385 points
8400 - 8385 = 15 points for candidate F
ASSIGNMENT
 “Voting System and the Condorcet Paradox”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HoAnYQZrNrQ
1.Three things that I significantly learn from the video clip
- we have learned that the voting rates uses Condorcet paradox
- we learned the chain process of Condorcet paradox
- and lastly we learned about the methods of taking the rate and most chosen vote by
the voters
2.Three things that is still unclear to me
- rounding methods
- converting people choice to group choice
-properties of Condorcet paradox 
3.I used to think that
Within a strategic negotiation model with plurality voting, exogenous probabilities of acc
eptance and no discounting for the case of three actors and three alternatives, 
we analyze the Condorcet paradox.

4.Three things that I want to ask about the video

- Is there any other way to get the result of ranking?
- How to know if is bias vote?
-Is it required to use Condorcet paradox in having the ranking?

EXERCISE 3.1
For each of the given weighted system in Problem 1 to 6, do the following:

a. Identify the type of weighted voting system it represents

b. Find all the winning coalitions
c. Find the critical voters
d. Compute the Banzhaf Power Index for each of the voters
e. Identify any dictator or dummies in the system

1. {54: 45, 10, 2}

1. Veto power system
b. (A&B), (A,B,&C), (A,B,C,&D)
c. (A&B), (A&B), (A&B)
d.

VOTE Banzhaf power index

R
A 0.50
B 0.50
C 0.00
D 0.00
e. Voters C & D are dummies since their weight doesn’t affect any
voting outcome in the system.

2. {18: 9, 5,43}
a. Veto power system
b. (A,B,&C), (A,B,C,&D)
c. (A,B, & C), A,B, & C)
d.

VOTE Banzhaf power index

R
A 0.33
B 0.33
C 0.33
D 0.00
e. Voter D is a dummy.

3. {21:21,7,4,2,1}

1. Dictatorship
b. (A&B), (A&C), (A&D), (A&E),(A,B,&C), (A,B, &D), (A,B, &E), (A,C,
&D), (A,C, &E), (A,D, &E), (A,B,C,&D), (A,B,C,&E),
(A,B,D,&E), (A,C,D,&E), (A,B,C,D, & E)
b. (A&B),(A&C)(AX13)

VOTER Banzhaf power index

A 17/17 1.0
B 1/17 0.06
C 1/17 0.06
 D 0/17 0.0
E 0/17 0.0
d.

e. A is a dictator and the rest are dummies.

4. {38:24, 12,6,2}
a. Coalition
b. (A,B,&C), (A,B,&D), (A,B,C,& D)
c. (A,B,&C), (A,B,&D), (A&B)
d.

VOTE Banzhaf power Index

R
A 3/8 0.38
B 3/8 0.38
C 1/8 0.13
D 1/8 0.13

e. There is neither a dictator nor a dummy in the system.

5. {19:13,12,4,3,1}

a.Coalition
b. (A&B), (A,B,&C), (A,B,&D), (A,B,&E),(B,C&D),(A,C,& D)
(A,B,C,&D), (A,B,C,&E), (A,B,D,&E), (A,C,D,&E),
(B,C,D,&E), (A,B,C,D,&E)
c. (A&B)9, (B,C&D)3, (A,C&D)3
d.

VOTE Banzhaf power Index Identification

R
A 8/2 0.33
4
B 8/2 0.33
4
C 4/24 0.17
D 4/24 0.17
E 0/24 0.00 Dummy

e. There is at least one dummy in the system and that is voter E.

6. {160:100,90,60,50,10}
a. Veto Power system
b.  (A&B), (A&C), (A,B,&C), (A,B,&D), (A,B,&E),  (A,C,&D), (A,C,&E),
(A,D,&E), (B,C&D), (B,C&E),( (A,C,& D) (A,B,C,&D), (A,B,C,&E),
(A,B,D,&E), (A,C,D,&E), (B,C,D,&E), (A,B,C,D,&E)
c. (A&B), (A&C), (A,B,& C), (A,B,& D), (A,B,& E), (A,C,& D),
(A,C,&D), (A,C,& E), (A,D,& E), (B,C,& D), (B,C,& E),(A&B),(A)3,(B&C)
d.
VOTER Banzhaf power Index
A 12/34 0.3529
B 10/34 0.2941
C 7/34 0.2059
D 3/34 0.0882
E 2/34 0.0588

e. A has a veto power while B, C, D and E are dummies.

7.A weighted voting system consist of four voters A, B, C, and D whose vote
weights are 8,3,3 and 2 respectively. Find

a.The quota
W= {q: 8, 3, 3, 2}
q= 8+3+3+2+1
2
q= 9

b.The type of weighted voting system

c.he weight of coalition (A,D)
Coalition Total Winning Coalition Critical Voters

AD 10 Yes A

10>8, Winning Coalition

d.The winning coalitions

Coalitio Total Winning Critical voters
n Coalition
AB 11 Yes A&B
AC 11 Yes A&C
AD 10 Yes A&D
BC 6
BD 5
CD 5
ABC 14 Yes A
ABD 13 Yes A
BCD 8
ACD 13 Yes A
ABCD 16 Yes None
QUOTA= 9 >9
e.For what values of q is there a dummy in the system q≤ 8
f.For values of q that will make the system a veto power system q≤ 8, q=16
g.The minimum value of q that gives a null system q ≥8

8.A city council consist of a mayor, a vice mayor, and 8 councilors. The mayor
and the vice mayor must vote for the resolution to pass. It is also required that at
least 6 members vote for the resolution. What is the weighted voting system for
this council?
 Like the UN Security council, this is veto power system, since the total of
member votes probably will not reach the quota.
9.Four voters, A, B, C, and D make decisions according to a voting system
defined by {5, 4, 3, 2, 1}, excerpt when a tie exists. In the event that a tie exists, a
fifth voter, E, must vote to break the tie. Determine the Banzhaf Power Index,
including voter E.
 Based on the statistics above, we can infer that Voters A and B would be an
integral part of the winning coalitions and would thus have the highest Banzhaf
Strength Index. Next to that, is the second-highest-vote B. Voters C, D, and E are
predicted to have the same Banzhaf Power Index. Their 1-voting values (whether
to break a tie or not) should also be counted as the same value, but one would
 assume that the weight of Voter E must have been at least greater than that of
the last two electors, because the "fifth voter" is included.
10.Each of the senators in the Philippine Senate has one vote and at least a two-
thirds supermajority is required to impeach an official.
a.In this weighted voting system a one voter-one vote system?
Quota: 2x24=16 3
b.In this weighted voting system a veto power system?
No, this is not a veto power system since the sum of votes is greater than the quota.
c.What is the Banzhaf Power Index of each senator?
For each senator, their Banzhaf Power Index should be 1/24 each- equal power for
each senator.

EXERCISE 3.2 

1. Compute for the Banzhaf Power Index for each for each voter in the weighted
voting system given by W= (75:50, 45,30,15)

Answer:
CANDIDAT TOTAL
E
A 50
B 45
C 30
 D 15
QUATA = 75
 
Coalition Tota Winning Coalition Critical Voters
l
A 50
B 35
C 30
D 15
AB 95 YES A and B
AC 80 YES A and B
AD 65
BC 75 YES B and C
BD 60
CD 45
ABC 125 YES A and C
ABD 110 YES B and C
BCD 90 YES B and C
ACD 95 YES A and C
ABCD 140 YES None
Quota =      54 > 54
Therefore, the total number of critical voters in all winning coalition is 14.
CANDIDATE B
A 4/14 0.29
B 5/5 0.36
C 5/14 0.36
D 0/14 0
The table shows that the Candidate A has the power which is 50 and Candidate D Has
the least.
2. Four voters, A, B, C and D, decide to pass a motion by using the voting scheme
W = (5:4, 3, 1, 1) excerpt when there is a tie. In the event a tie to break a tie.
Determine the Banzhaf Power index, including voter E.

COALITIO TOTA WINNING COALITION

N L
A 4 AB
B 3 AC
C 1 AD
D 1 AE
E 1 ABC
 AB 7 ABC
AC 5 ABD
AD 5 ABE
AE 5 BCD
BC 4 BCE
BD 4 CDE
BE 4 ABCD
CD 2 BCDE
CE 2 ABCDE
DE 2
ABC 8
ABD 8
ABE 8
BCD 5
BCE 5
CDE 5
ABCD 9
ABCE 9
BCDE 6
ABCDE 9

BANZHAF POWER INDEX

A 0.3333333333
B 0.1904761904
C 0.1904761904
D 0.1928571428
E 0.1928571428
      1

ASSIGNMENT
“The United Nation’s Security Council”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JTEuWmABRD0
1.Three things that I significantly learn from the video clip
-we learned about the division of Un
-we learned the purpose of the rules and sanctions
- we learned how important the people choice is
2.Three things that is still unclear to me
- the connection of the video to the topic
-the purpose of categories
-role of mentioned nations
3.I used to think that
- if we don’t follow the rule implemented there will be having trouble in the community
where rule is being implemented.
4.Three things that I want to ask about the video
- what if there wasn’t rule implemented?
-how does the video affects the thinking of people?
-what does the video proposal?