A Thomistic Reflection on John Locke’s Theory of Natural Law

Peter P. Cvek, Associate Professor, Saint Peter’s University, Jersey City, New Jersey USA

pcvek@saintpeters.edu

ABSTRACT

This paper is a reflection on Locke’s theory of natural law from the perspective of contemporary
interpretations of Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of the relationship between natural law and natural
inclinations. At the heart of the natural law tradition is the belief that moral principles or basic human
goods are rooted in nature, or more precisely, that these principles can be discovered by rational reflection
on those natural inclinations which constitute the core of human nature. Every natural law theory assumes
that there is a necessary connection between Nature and Reason. Traditional theories will include God,
while modern versions may adopt a more secular approach. My concern is with Locke’s theory of the
natural law, more specifically, on how Locke understands the crucial relationship between natural law
and natural inclinations. Moreover, I intend to examine Locke’s comments on natural law from a
Thomistic perspective. First, I review three contemporary interpretations of the relationship between
natural law and natural inclinations based on Aquinas’ Treatise on Law. Second, I re-examine Locke’s
theory of natural law in light of the aforementioned interpretations of Aquinas. While Aquinas forges a
synthesis between nature, reason, and God, I will show that in his struggle to produce a “modern” version
of natural law Locke was compelled to adopt a theologically-based conception of natural law, which
subordinates both nature and reason to God and revelation.
 A Thomistic Reflection on John Locke’s Theory of Natural Law

At the heart of the natural law tradition in ethics is the belief that moral principles, or basic

human goods, are rooted in nature, or from an epistemic point of view, that these principles can

be discovered by rational reflection on natural inclinations, those inclinations which constitute

the core of human nature. Every natural law theory therefore assumes that there is a significant

connection between Nature and Reason. Traditional theories will also take for granted that there

is some relationship between natural law and God.

My primary concern in this paper is with John Locke’s theory of the natural law, more

specifically, on how Locke understands the relationship between natural law and natural

inclinations. This will, of course, also shed light on the role played by Reason and God. But

while it is common to interpret Locke’s thought from within the intellectual context of other 17th

century natural law theorists, in this paper, I intend to re-examine Locke’s often fragmented

comments on natural law from the perspective of contemporary readings of Thomas Aquinas’s

discourse on law.

In the first part of the paper, I will briefly review three recent interpretations of the

relationship between natural law and natural inclinations in Aquinas. I will also identify how

each interpretation construes the relationship between the Nature, Reason, and God. In the

second part, I will re-examine Locke’s theory of natural law in light of the aforementioned

interpretations of Aquinas. While the Thomistic theory of natural law represents a synthesis of

these three elements into a comprehensive unity, I will argue that in his struggle to produce a

“modern” theory of natural law Locke, perhaps ironically, was compelled to construct a

theologically-based conception of natural law, which subordinates both Nature and Reason to

God and revelation. Nevertheless, despite their differences, the natural law theories of Aquinas
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and Locke can be seen to be part of a broader Christian natural law tradition which views

morality as a function of the relationship between Nature, Reason, and God.

Thomas Aquinas on Natural Law and Natural Inclinations

One of the hallmarks of the natural law tradition is the attempt to ground morality in

human nature, or more precisely, natural law ethics is based on the belief that there is a necessary

connection between natural inclinations and the principles of natural law, a connection mediated

by human reason. This thesis is succinctly captured by Thomas Aquinas in the Question 94, art.

2 S.T. I-II. After distinguishing between theoretical and practical reasoning, Aquinas states that

the first principle of practical reasoning is founded on the nature of the good, since the good is

that which all things desire. Therefore, the first principle of natural law is that good is to be done

and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. All the other principles (or precepts) of the natural law

are based on this formal principle, for all those things which reason naturally apprehends as good

belong to the natural law. More importantly, this apprehension of the good, and therefore the

order of the natural law principles, is said to be based on the order of natural inclinations, for “all

those things to which man has a natural inclination are naturally apprehended by reason as being

good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of

avoidance” (I-II. 94, 2). By reflecting on the order of natural inclinations, Aquinas arrives at four

fundamental principles (or basic human goods) of the natural law, which can be listed as the

preservation of life, the care and education of children, knowledge, and the good of an ordered

social life. Each is these goods is said to be connected to, or inferred from, a specific natural

inclination.

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 The problems with the most obvious reading of this derivation, however, are well known.

Aquinas seems to suggest that the mere rational apprehension of an ‘inclination to x’ reveals to

reason that ‘x is good’. But why should that be the case? Does this apply to every inclination,

including those that appear to be aimed at evil, or only to those inclinations apprehended as

promoting some good? And if the latter, then of what use are the inclinations, assuming that the

inclinations themselves need to be evaluated by reason? In any case, the precise nature of the

relationship between natural inclinations and natural law is not explained here and has generated

considerable controversy among contemporary proponents of a Thomistic theory of natural law

(see Brock, 2005).

Fortunately, the natural law tradition itself provides a useful typography for

understanding this problem. Philosophical reflection on natural law has ultimately been a

function of attempting to understand the relationship between three fundamental realities:

Nature, Reason, and God. While all three elements play a role in any natural law theory,

significant differences in emphasis will distinguish one interpretation from another. As luck

would have it, we have contemporary examples of each approach.

Lisska: Nature

The interpretation grounded primarily in Nature maintains the very tight connection

between natural inclinations and natural law principles which is seemingly implied by Aquinas

in Question 94. Anthony Lisska’s Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic

Reconstruction (1996) is one of the best contemporary defenses of what might be called the

“traditional” reading. This Aristotelian inspired approach grounds reason’s apprehension of

natural law in a teleological understanding of human nature and inclinations (Lisska, 99). On

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this reading, the ends that identify the human telos are objectively good, not only because they

are the objects of inclinations, but because their achievement contributes to the optimal

functioning (or perfection) of any human being. Hence, the goods associated with the natural

law are essential to the full actualization of human potential and the achievement of the highest

good, described variously as well-being, human flourishing, perfection, or happiness.

Finnis: Reason

In contrast, other commentators have argued that our knowledge of the natural law lies

not in reflection on natural inclinations, but in reason’s own understanding of the good. What

has become known as the ‘new natural law theory’ has been developed most fully by John Finnis

in his Natural Law & Natural Rights (1980) and more recently in Aquinas (1998). Finnis insists

that the principles of natural law are grasped by reason as self-evident (per se nota) and

indemonstrable (Finnis, 1980, 33-34). On this reading, practical reason’s apprehension of the

good is logically prior to any theoretical understanding of human nature. For Finnis, the rational

apprehension that the object of this inclination is a good does not consist in simply observing that

such an inclination happens to exist. Rather, the role of reason is (to paraphrase Brock, 59) to

“make the inclination itself intelligible” by rationally demonstrating that the object of this

inclination is something valuable for its own sake. And, while it may seem strange to have a

theory of natural law sans nature, Finnis concedes that the experience of inclinations and their

objects might provide the raw material for reflection, but it is the task of reason alone to

apprehend what is good. He also assumes that these goods will as a matter of fact be the objects

of natural inclinations, although this appears to be more of a happy coincidence, or an

arrangement made possible by God, as Finnis (1998) later speculates.

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Porter: God

Much of the contemporary debate over natural inclinations and natural law has taken

place in the space between these two approaches, with different commentators finding different

levels of interplay between nature and reason. Most of these accounts have continued the modern

emphasis on constructing a philosophical conception of natural law which is independent of any

theological commitments. It is worth noting that metaphysically speaking, both Lisska and Finnis

agree that for Aquinas natural law is grounded in the eternal law in the mind of God, but they

also insist that appeals to God or divine revelation play no epistemic role in explaining our

apprehension of natural law. In this sense, both interpretations are naturalistic in their approach

to knowing the natural law. One exception is found in Jean Porter’s Natural Law and Divine

Law: Reclaiming the Tradition for Christian Ethics (1999) and Nature as Reason: A Thomistic

Theory of Natural Law (2005). Porter defends what she calls a “theological” conception of

natural law. According to Porter, the scholastic understanding of natural law was primarily based

on the study of various texts, with Scripture being authoritative (Porter 2005, 8). Within this

project, Nature was fundamentally understood through the theological categories of creation and

providence (Porter 2005, 65). So that even when human beings were grasped by reason in terms

of the inclinations inherent in their nature, they remained “creatures” in and through which God

manifested his creative power and wisdom (Porter 2005, 69).

In terms of the relationship between natural law and natural inclinations, Porter partially

agrees with the traditional interpretation: the scholastics did ground their accounts of natural law

in “a robust concept of nature,” but they also took for granted that “nature underdetermines

morality” (Porter 2005, 126). Hence, it was necessary to view human inclinations within a

broader theological context. It was this Scriptural-based understanding of human nature that
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provided “the necessary framework within which reason move(d) from reflection on human

inclinations to a developed account of natural law morality” (Porter 2005, 80). While Aquinas

assumed that reason and revelation will ultimately agree in revealing the natural law, it is

important to note that Porter’s thesis is stronger than that. According to Porter, Scripture has a

necessary epistemic role to play in facilitating our human knowledge of natural law that is not

found in the aforementioned naturalistic interpretations. On her reading, our apprehension of

natural law is not based on unaided reason alone (Finnis), nor on unaided reason reflecting on

natural inclinations (Lisska), but reason informed by revelation. In this sense, Porter’s

conception of natural law is decidedly theistic in character, as opposed to the naturalistic

interpretations advanced by Finnis and Lisska.

Each of these three interpretations provides a distinct way of understanding the

relationship between natural law and natural inclinations, as well as the interplay between

Nature, Reason, and God. While each of these approaches is reflected in Locke’s natural law

project, I will show that Porter’s theological and Scriptural account of natural law has much to

recommend it, not perhaps as the definitive reading of Thomas Aquinas, but as an illuminating

way of understanding the development of John Locke’s conception of natural law.

John Locke on Natural Law and Natural Inclinations

At first blush, Locke’s conception of natural law seems far removed from that advanced

by Thomas Aquinas. In the great debate between the intellectualist and voluntarist theories of

law, Aquinas is the quintessential intellectualist, while Locke is clearly committed to some form

of voluntarism. Upon closer examination, Locke most likely adopted a variation of the so-called

“middle course” between intellectualism and voluntarism associated with Francisco Suarez and

6
Nathaniel Culverwell (Tully 1980, 41). This conception of law is best illustrated in his early

Essays on the Law of Nature. In the Sixth Essay, Locke states that the formal cause of a law is

the will of a superior (185). God, or more precisely, God’s will, is the cause of the morally

obligatory character of the natural law. But, if God’s will is the formal cause, then human nature

is the material cause, for it is only by rational reflection on human nature that one is able to know

what God has commanded. For this reason, in the Seventh Essay, Locke describes the natural law

as “a fixed and permanent rule of morals, which reason itself pronounces, and which persists,

being a fact so firmly rooted in the soil of human nature” (199). Based on this distinction, Locke

describes the natural law as “the decree of the divine will discernible by the light of nature and

indicating what is and what is not in conformity with rational nature, and for this very reason

commanding or prohibiting” (111). In so far the content of the natural law is “discernible by the

light of nature,” i.e., reason, which is able to indicate “what is and what is not in conformity with

rational nature,” it would appear that, as with Aquinas, the key to understanding Locke’s theory

of natural law depends on determining how Locke construed the crucial relationship between

natural inclinations and natural law. This would also seem to commit Locke to a naturalistic

approach to natural law, despite his theistic and voluntarist account of moral obligation.

Samuel Zinaich has recently argued that, in his early Essays, Locke assumed the validity

of the Aristotelian world-view. If true, this would seemingly commit Locke to the traditional

understanding of the relationship between natural inclinations and natural law. On the one hand,

Zinaich’s defense of an Aristotelian reading of the Essays is certainly plausible given Locke’s

claim to ground natural law in human nature. While demonstrating the existence of the natural

law, Locke cites both Aristotle and Aquinas (Essays, 113, 117), and while defending the good of

social life, Locke claims that all human beings are “urged to enter into society by a certain propensity

7
of nature” (Essays, 157). Zinaich compares this favorably to Aquinas’ derivation of natural law

principles from natural inclinations (39). On the other hand, there is considerable evidence that

the aforementioned reference to a natural propensity is the exception to the rule. Locke

continuously warns that natural appetites, desires, or inclinations are more likely to run contrary

to the moral law than provide guides to right conduct, and that it would be a mistake to hold that

the “principles of moral action and a rule to live by” can be found “in men’s appetites and natural

instincts …just as if that was morally best which most people desired” (Essays, 213). So, while

Locke does believe that there are principles of action inherent in human nature, he seems to

believe that they cannot be the basis for our understanding of morality.

Moreover, when he has the opportunity to affirm that the natural law can be known by

rational reflection on natural inclinations, Locke explicitly denies it. This denial is all the more

intriguing in that it occurs only in the title of an unwritten essay, “Can the Law of Nature be

Known from Man’s Natural Inclinations? No. According to Zuckert, this title of an unwritten

essay is Locke’s definitive rejection of any relevant connection between natural inclinations and

natural law (201). There is no way of knowing why Locke never completed this essay. Zinaich’s

suggestion that the essay would be redundant, merely repeating the denial that the natural law is

inscribed (innate) in the minds of men contained in the Third Essay, is unconvincing, since a

natural inclination is not equivalent to an innate idea, and Locke certainly affirms the former,

while denying the latter (73). However, his explanatory note, to the effect that there is no way to

discriminate between inclinations which dispose us to do our duty from those that lead us astray

without “some sense of who God is,” is more telling (Zinaich 73, note 37).

It would seem that for Locke without some knowledge of God, rational reflection on

human nature alone is insufficient to reveal the principles of natural law. The exact nature of the

8
role played by God, however, is not fully explained here. Nevertheless, this appeal to God might

provide a response to the most decisive objection to Locke’s defense of natural law: his rejection

of natural teleology. There is no doubt that Locke eventually rejects the Aristotelian worldview,

in favor of the corpuscular theory of nature, according to which the real essences of things are

configurations of matter in motion, explainable in terms of efficient causes. It is likely that Locke

had his suspicions even while writing the Essays. On the traditional reading, Locke’s rejection of

Aristotelianism, especially the idea of final causality, is tantamount to a rejection of the natural

law doctrine itself (Feser 110).

Although Robert Boyle does provide a space for teleological explanations in an otherwise

mechanical understanding of nature, Locke appears reluctant to follow Boyle on this matter.

While Locke agrees that Nature exhibits purposive behaviors, and that these purposive behaviors

are the result of God’s intelligent design, his skepticism dissuades him from seeking teleological

explanations in nature alone. Locke doubts our ability to grasp the real essences of things. Some

understanding of the nominal essence might be provide a starting point for reflection on

purposes, but the goods of the natural law cannot be inferred from a simple examination of

natural inclinations alone. Locke cautions against placing too much trust in these pre-rational

inclinations and seems to agree with Finnis’ contention that reason would have to determine

which of our many inclinations and desires are worthy of pursuit. However, in contrast with

Finnis, and despite his own promise of a rational demonstration of morality, Locke is more

inclined to appeal to God as the ultimate source of this knowledge. So, if Locke’s theory of

natural law is to succeed, then it is not natural inclinations as such, but God’s will for his creation

that is expressed in and through these inclinations that is the ground of our knowledge of natural

9
law, for it is only by viewing these inclinations in the context of God’s reason and creative will

that they become fully intelligible.

The addition of this theological prerequisite to our understanding of natural law is

indicative of Porter’s interpretation of Aquinas. But it also raises the issue of the relationship

between Reason and Revelation. It is therefore not surprising that while this connection between

God and morality has been acknowledged by recent commentators, for example, Richard

Ashcraft (1987, 38) and Ian Harris (1994, 98), there is considerable disagreement over just how

much Locke is able to accomplish within this theological framework.

The problem is determining how one comes to know these divine purposes and how this

insight into the divine mind relates to our experience of natural inclinations. Locke rejects innate

knowledge, and he does not believe that we have any special access to the mind of God, what

Locke calls “enthusiasm” (Essay 4.19.6-13). He insists that the natural law can be known by a

combination of reason and experience. He also takes for granted that reason and revelation will

agree, but typically insists that reason is our best guide to understanding what has been revealed

in Scripture (4.18.8). Locke’s strategy appears assume that even if the real essence of human

nature is unknown to us, our knowledge of the nominal essence, in this case, our experience of

specific natural inclinations, in conjunction with our recognition of God’s intention in creating us

with these inclinations, is sufficient for our knowledge of the natural law. Given this approach,

however, it is not surprising that appeals to Scripture will increasingly play a role in Locke’s

understanding of natural law. What I hope to make clear is that Locke’s solution is eclectic at

best. God’s will may be revealed in multiple ways, including data provided by rational reflection

on natural inclinations, analysis of the idea of God as creator of the natural order, what reason

10
and experience tells us about the human condition, as well as significant clues provided by

Scripture.

Locke’s Derivation of the Principles of Natural Law

Throughout the Two Treatises, Locke repeatedly declares that the fundamental law of

nature commands the preservation of mankind, both individually and collectively. In a revealing

passage, Locke states that this law of preservation is based on the inclination for self-

preservation placed in human nature by God, such that “Reason, which was the voice of God in

him, could not but teach him and assure him, that pursuing that natural Inclination he had to

preserve his Being, he followed the will of his Maker. (1.86)

But, how does reason ascertain the connection between God’s will and the desire for self-

preservation? Locke’s strategy is two-fold. What might be called the a priori argument

expounds the logic of God’s creative act. That the inclination toward self-preservation is in

accordance with God’s will is evident from the idea of creation itself. Since we are all created

and preserved by God, it is obvious that God intends that we live. In other words, it would be

inconsistent for God to bring human beings into existence with a strong desire for self-

preservation and at the same time not wish that they continue to existence (see also Forde, 2001).

This a priori argument is combined with an a posteriori argument which reflects on the human

condition and the circumstances surrounding creation itself. For example, the divine intention

that humanity be preserved is further indicated by the fact that God “furnished the world with

things Fit for Food and Raiment and other Necessaries of Life, Subservient to His design, that

man should live and abide for some time upon the face of the Earth” (1.86). Both arguments

make the natural inclination for self-preservation intelligible as an indication of God’s rational

will.

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 But, If everyone has a duty to seek the preservation of their own life, what about the duty

to preserve mankind in general? Locke declares that “Everyone as he is bound to preserve

himself…so by the like reason when his Preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as

much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind” (2.6). Locke says “so by the like reason,” the

duty to preserve mankind follows from the duty to preserve oneself, but never elaborates on this

comparison. If the like reason is the existence of a natural inclination or desire, the problem is

that of ascertaining whether human beings are so inclined. If anything, Locke’s descriptions of

human nature emphasize our tendencies to pursue our own self-interest. If the like reason is that

it is willed by God then the duty is not so much grounded in human nature, but in divine fiat; in

which case Locke’s natural law collapses into divine law, knowable, if at all, by revelation.

One promising solution to this dilemma is suggested by Locke himself. After discussing

the freedom and equality of all men in the state of nature, Locke quotes a passage from Hooker,

who suggests that all of our moral duties can be derived from one’s duty to love one’s neighbor

as one’s self (Harris 219). This might be called “the golden rule” solution. According to Ian

Harris, Locke combined the desire for self-preservation with the golden rule, or its Biblical

equivalent, the commandment to love thy neighbor as thyself, in order to derive the duty to

preserve mankind in general. (Harris 219-222). It is worth noting that this strategy resembles

Aquinas’ own use of the golden rule (ST I-II, 100, 3). As Rhonheimer explains, the golden rule

transforms “what is ‘good for me’ into something that could be a good owed to others as well,

changing it into the fundamental structure of human fellowship” (2011, 285). For both Locke and

Aquinas, then it would seem that the golden rule is the foundation for the duties we owe to one

another.

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 But as one might expect, Locke’s endorsement of the golden rule is problematic. Arguing

against innate moral knowledge in the Essay, Locke insists that “there cannot any one moral rule

be proposed whereof a man may not justly demand a reason,” and cites the golden rule as a

prime example of a rule that requires justification. At the same time, he refers to it as “that most

unshaken rule of morality and foundation of all social virtue” (1.2.4). Colman concludes that

Locke never provided “a satisfactory reason” for accepting the golden rule and that this explains

his failure to produce a demonstrative system of morality (C 204). Harris suggests that Locke

simply took for granted the importance of this and other moral rules found in Scripture (H 219).

Both may be correct. Ideally, Locke sought to place morality on a rational foundation, but as he

concedes in the Reasonableness of Christianity, reason has not proven up to the task. The

acceptance of the golden rule therefore is a case of reason informed by revelation.

This convergence of reason and revelation is most evident in Locke’s discussion of the

natural law precept that commands the propagation of the species. Again Locke cites a natural

inclination as an indication of God’s will. So while “the first and strongest desire God Planted in

Men, and wrought into the very Principles of their Nature (is) that of Self-preservation,” next to

this “God planted in Men a strong desire also of propagating their kind, and continuing

themselves in their Posterity” (1.88). We are, of course, faced with the same difficulty, how do

we determine that this particular inclination is an indication of God’s will, especially when, as

Locke points out (1.54), this desire is so often pursued only for the sake of the immediate

pleasure associated with it.

It is, perhaps, here more than anywhere else, that revelation comes to the aid of reason.

While arguing against Filmer’s claim that the earth was given by God only to Adam, Locke

maintains that this alleged donation would be inconsistent with what he calls “the great Design

13
of God” (1.41). This great design is revealed in God’s command stated in Genesis: “And God

said unto them, be Fruitful and Multiply” (I Gen. 28). What God intends is obvious: “to promote

the great Design of God, Increase and Multiply” (1.41) [See also Harris, 215]. This divine

command makes intelligible not only the desire to procreate, but also the desire for self-

preservation and the duty to preserve mankind as whole, consistent with the logic of creation

itself. It also explains why the earth was given to humanity in common and not to a single

individual, since “it is reasonable to think, that God who bid Mankind increase and multiply,

should rather himself give them all a Right, to make use of the Food…and other Conveniences of

Life, the Materials whereof he had so plentifully provided for them” (2.6).

In order to further God’s great design, Locke also concludes that the preservation of

humanity requires the preservation of society (2.134). As Locke states in the Essay: “God having

designed Man for a sociable Creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a

necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind; but furnished him also with Language,

which was to be the great Instrument, and common Tye of Society” (3.1.1). And again, Locke

views this inclination, along with empirical evidence of necessity and natural sociability, as well

as the law of preservation, to be an indication of God’s rational will.

Conclusion

In seeking to develop a modern conception of natural law, Locke sought to defend a theory of

natural law that is compatible with the new science. By rejecting the Aristotelian worldview, the

traditional approach to grounding morality in Nature alone is unavailable to him. We have no

access to the real essence of humanity and even if we did, an understanding of the mechanics of

human nature would appear to be of little help in apprehending the purpose of human existence.

Of course, we could construct a conception of human nature based on our experience of

14
ourselves. This nominal essence would include a variety of inclinations and desires, along with

reason, which allows us to reflect on these non-rational aspects of our being. These inclinations

are experienced as end-directed, regardless of our inability to grasp our real essence. But, in so

far as “nature underdetermines morality,” Locke’s natural law theory depends upon our ability to

recognize that some of these inclinations are directed toward ends, or natural goods, that are not

only desirable, but rationally willed by God and as such morally obligatory. In keeping with the

modern call for a science of morality, Locke frequently appeals to Reason as that which reveals

the natural law and declares that morality should be capable of demonstration. Unfortunately,

this demonstration is never forth coming. Since he is confident that God would not create human

beings who are capable of self-understanding and at the same time frustrate that goal, he insists

that reason and experience are capable of apprehending God’s intentions for humanity. It is these

intentions that ultimately make natural inclinations morally intelligible, not the reverse. Of

course, this ‘theistic project’ would require a fully developed natural theology, which Locke

considers but never completes.

Although Locke sought a natural law based only on reason and experience, throughout

his discussions of natural law he increasingly appeals to revelation to fill in the gaps. This is

quite evident, as we have seen, in the Two Treatises. In The Reasonableness of Christianity,

Locke finally concedes that reason has failed in this task, only to be set on the right path by

Scripture (137). Only the introduction of revelation has allowed Christian philosophers to

advance beyond their classical compatriots. This admission returns Locke to the Christian natural

law tradition envisioned by Porter, within which appeals to Scripture fill in what reason is unable

to attain on its own.

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