PROPERTY

Pre-final Reviewer

Art. 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of
an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.
In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-
ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this
Title. (392)
Sanchez Roman [the greatest Spanish Civil Law commentator] -
right of common dominion which two or more persons have in a
spiritual part of thing, not materially or physically divided.
2) Without prejudice to the interest of the co-ownership
3) Without preventing the other co-owners from making use
thereof according to their own rights.
Purpose – to be determined by the agreement, express/implied,
by the parties [may be changed].
In default – purpose is that to which the property is ordinarily
adapted according to its nature or use to which it has been
previously devoted.

Characteristics of Co-ownership Prescription of Use – mere tolerance on the part of co-owners

A. Plurality of Subjects – Co-owners cannot legalize the change in the use of a thing from that
B. Unity of or Material Indivision – there is a single obj. which intended by the parties. Mere tolerance cannot be a basis of
is not materially divided and which is the element which prescription [Manresa].
binds the subjects.
C. Recognition of Ideal Shares – determines the rights and Co-owner cannot devote community property to his exclusive use
obligations of the co-owners. to the prejudice of the co-ownership.
*Relationship of Co-owners is fiduciary in character such that *if lease is agreed – cannot retain property for his use without
each co-owner becomes trustee for the benefit of his co-owners. rent.
*if occupied exclusively for exploitation of an industry – other co-
Causes of Co-ownership owners become co-participants in the accessions of the property
1. Law and should share in the net profits thereof.
2. Contracts
3. Succession Co-owners may establish rules in the in their use of the thing
4. Fortuitous Event or Chance owned in common. In default thereof, there should be a just and
5. Occupancy equitable distribution of its uses among all co-owners.

*Co-ownership may exist as to rights and is not limited to The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar
corporeal things. right of the others. Hence, if the thing is a dwelling, all co-owner
may live therein.
CO-OWNERSHIP PARTNERSHIP
May arise from various causes Created only by agreement or If one occupies without opposition of the others and there is no
[see above] contract agreement to lease the property, no rentals can be demanded.
Purpose is merely collective Usually to obtain profit.
enjoyment and to maintain Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in
unity and preservation of the ejectment. (n)
thing owned in common.
Covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession,
No separate juridical There is juridical personality
including FE and UD, the accion publiciana and reivindicatoria
personality. separate and distinct from the
[suit is deemed instituted for all].
members.
Special authorization is There is generally mutual
Favorable Decision – bind all co-owners
required for mutual representation by the partners.
Adverse Decision – will not be binding on all
representation.
*if a co-owner knows action is being instituted alone by a co-
There is freedom of disposition Cannot transfer rights to 3rd
owner, he shall be bound by the decision – Tolentino
of a co-owner’s share. persons without the consent of
the others.
If action is for the benefit of a co-owner alone [i.e. claims the
Death of co-owner does not Death or incapacity of a partner possession himself and not the co-ownership] action will not
extinguish the co-ownership. can lead to the extinguishment prosper.
of the partnership.
Distribution of profits governed Profits may be distributed in Ejectment Against Another Co-owner – i.e. if co-owner takes
by Art. 485. accordance with stipulations. exclusive possession of the property and asserts ownership – the
only effect will be the recognition of the co-ownership [defendant
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well cannot be excluded and plaintiff cannot recover any material or
as in the charges, shall be proportional to their respective determinate part of the property].
interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall
be void. Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to
proved. (393a) the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this
obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest
Accretion added to a land owned in common becomes part of the as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes.
property in co-ownership. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-
ownership. (395a)
Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in
common, provided he does so in accordance with the Refers to taxes and expenses for preservation [does not cover
purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to those merely produce benefits, mere luxury, embellishment,
injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other pleasure].
co-owners from using it according to their rights. The
purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by agreement, Expenses for Preservation – those w/c if not made would
express or implied. (394a) endanger the existence of the thing or reduce its value or
Limitations on Co-owner’s Rights productivity.
1) To the purpose for which it is intended
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Expenses advanced by (1) co-owner should be borne by all.
If co-owner does not pay his share – bring an action to compel
him to contribute – but you cannot compel him to renounce
[renunciation is a voluntary and free act].
Renunciation – must be of an amount EQUIVALENT to his share in
the expenses and taxes; must be EXPRESSLY made.
*NOT allowed if PREJUDICIAL to the co-owneship.
*actually dacion en pago; valuation – at the time renunciation is
made.
Art. 489. Repairs for preservation may be made at the will of
one of the co-owners, but he must, if practicable, first notify
his co-owners of the necessity for such repairs. Expenses to
improve or embellish the thing shall be decided upon by a
majority as determined in Article 492. (n)
Related to the previous article.
Authorizes any co-owner to advance the expenses for
preservation.
If practicable, he is required to give notice to his co-owners of the
necessity of the repairs but he is not required to obtain their
consent.
*those who oppose thereby impeding the repair of the property
are liable for the damage caused.
Failure to give notice when practicable – still entitled to recover
but is burdened to prove necessity of repairs and reasonableness
of costs.
Art. 490. Whenever the different stories of a house belong to
different owners, if the titles of ownership do not specify the
terms under which they should contribute to the necessary
expenses and there exists no agreement on the subject, the
following rules shall be observed:
(1) The main and party walls, the roof and the other things
used in common, shall be preserved at the expense of all the
owners in proportion to the value of the story belonging to
each;
(2) Each owner shall bear the cost of maintaining the floor of
his story; the floor of the entrance, front door, common yard
and sanitary works common to all, shall be maintained at the
expense of all the owners pro rata;
(3) The stairs from the entrance to the first story shall be
maintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata, with the
exception of the owner of the ground floor; the stairs from
the first to the second story shall be preserved at the expense
of all, except the owner of the ground floor and the owner of
the first story; and so on successively. (396)
Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of
the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common,
even though benefits for all would result therefrom.
However, if the withholding of the consent by one or more of
the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest,
the courts may afford adequate relief. (397a)
Alteration – change in the thing from the state in w/c the others
believe it should remain, or withdrawing it from the use to w/c
they desire it to be intended [not limited to material changes, but
includes changes in the use from that expressly or tacitly agreed
upon].
Article refers to alterations/transformations w/c change the
essence and nature of the thing – requiring the UNANIMOUS
consent of all the co-owners [if merely affects the better
enjoyment of the thing – MAJORITY is required].
Consent may either be EXPRESS or TACIT [knowledge w/out
objection].
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Co-owner who caused alteration without consent is liable to
remove/demolish the alteration at his own cost [if still possible]
with damages. Whatever is useful to the co-ownership should
belong to it.
*UNANIMOUS consent is required for all acts of ownership.[i.e.
impose easement].
Art. 492. For the administration and better enjoyment of the
thing owned in common, the resolutions of the majority of
the co-owners shall be binding.
There shall be no majority unless the resolution is approved
by the co-owners who represent the controlling interest in
the object of the co-ownership.
Should there be no majority, or should the resolution of the
majority be seriously prejudicial to those interested in the
property owned in common, the court, at the instance of an
interested party, shall order such measures as it may deem
proper, including the appointment of an administrator.
Whenever a part of the thing belongs exclusively to one of the
co-owners, and the remainder is owned in common, the
preceding provision shall apply only to the part owned in
common. (398)
Acts of Administration [Characteristics]
1. Refer to the enjoyment and preservation of the thing.
2. They have transitory effects.
ADMINISTRATION ALTERATION
Refer to enjoyment of a thing. Relate to the substance or form
of the thing.
Transitory in character. More permanent in nature.
Leases of Immovable Property
If lease is to be recorded in the Registry of Property – acts of
alteration.
Special Power of Atty Required for Leases of Real Property
a. When lease is to be recorded in the Registry
b. Lease is more than 1 year
*in these two cases mere majority cannot constitute lease.
Majority – in interest [not in number].
Management of the Property
1. Co-owners themselves
2. May be delegated to other persons [governed by the rules
on agency].
3. If no majority, or when seriously prejudicial, court may
appoint [powers and duties defined by appointment].
Instances When Minority may Complain Against Resolution of the
Majority
1. Substantial change or alteration of the property/use to
which it has been dedicated by its nature and agreement
2. Goes beyond the limits of mere administration or invades
proprietary rights of co-owners
3. Majority authorizes leases, loans, or other contracts
without security, exposing the thing to serious danger
4. Majority refuses to dismiss administrator who is guilty of
fraud or negligence or is unqualified.
5. Resolution if carried out would cause serious injury to the
thing itself.
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he
may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation
or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
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 PROPERTY
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limited to the portion which may be alloted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (399)
Co-owner can validly sell and dispose of or lease his undivided
interest.
The sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share, and
the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in
the partition of the co-owned property.
With EXPRESS consent from other co-owners, 1 co-owner can
alienate or encumber any definite or specific portion, without
segregating it as independent property [in the event of poartition,
the delimited portion shall form part of what may finally be
allotted to such co-owner].
Co-owner cannot alienate his rights which are purely personal [his
share in a right to use and habitation].
Neither can he make a disposition which would give the thing a
different use from that agreed upon.
RIGHT OF LEGAL REDEMPTION [Requisites] *Rabuya
1. There must be co-ownership
2. One of the co-owners sold his right to a stranger
3. Sale was made before partition
4. Exercised within 30 days from notice [or actual knowledge]
5. Vendee reimbursed for price of the sale
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share
is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a
certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid.
This term may be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which
shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by
law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a)
TERMINATION OF CO-OWNERSHIP
1. Consolidation in only one of the owners of all other shares
2. Destruction of the thing/loss of the right
3. Prescription IFO 3rd person
4. Partition
*mere agreement to subdivide is not enough [there must be
subdivision plan drawn and co-owners actually occupying
respective portions, and titles issued accordingly].
Mere fact that the partition may affect usefulness/value of the
whole is not an excuse for refusal to partition.
WHEN PARTITION IS NOT ALLOWED
1. When co-owners agreed to continue with co-ownership for
period allowed by law [10 yrs., always renewable].
- If more than ten years the stipulation is void as
to the excess
2. Co-ownership is imposed as a condition [in a
donation/will].
3. By its nature the property cannot be legally divided [party
walls, conjugal partnership].
4. Partition will make thing unserviceable for use and purpose
for w/c it is intended.
IN ORDER THAT POSSESSION CONSIDERED ADVERSE
[REPUDIATION]
1. That he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to an ouster of the others
2. Positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the
other co-owners
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3. Evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
Art. 495. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding
article, the co-owners cannot demand a physical division of
the thing owned in common, when to do so would render it
unserviceable for the use for which it is intended. But the co-
ownership may be terminated in accordance with Article
498. (401a)
Art. 496. Partition may be made by agreement between the
parties or by judicial proceedings. Partition shall be
governed by the Rules of Court insofar as they are consistent
with this Code. (402)
Partition may be made ORALLY or IN WRITING.
Oral Partition is valid and enforcement upon the parties [Statute
of Frauds has no operation].
Principal Issues in Partition
1. W.O.N. plaintiff is co-owner.
2. How property is to be divided.
Art. 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners may
take part in the division of the thing owned in common and
object to its being effected without their concurrence. But
they cannot impugn any partition already executed, unless
there has been fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding
a formal opposition presented to prevent it, without
prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor to maintain
its validity. (403)
All types of creditors included [the law does not distinguish].
*must be creditors DURING the co-ownership and not before or
after.
Althoug not expressly provided, NOTIFICATION must be made to
creditors for partition to be binding on them [once notified, they
are bound to intervene].
Art. 498. Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and
the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them
who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its
proceeds distributed.(404)
a.k.a. Juridical Dissolution
Thing is essentially INDIISIBLE.
First, adjudication to one of the o-owners [who pays the others
the amount adjudged equitable].
Second, by the sale of the thing to 3rd persons [private/public
sale].
Art. 499. The partition of a thing owned in common shall not
prejudice third persons, who shall retain the rights of
mortgage, servitude or any other real rights belonging to
them before the division was made. Personal rights
pertaining to third persons against the co-ownership shall
also remain in force, notwithstanding the partition. (405)
3RD PERSONS - all those who do not intervene in the partition.
Art. 500. Upon partition, there shall be a mutual accounting
for benefits received and reimbursements for expenses
made. Likewise, each co-owner shall pay for damages caused
by reason of his negligence or fraud. (n)
DE GUIA V CA
DE GUIA contends that a co-owner cannot claim a definite portion
from the property owned in common until there is a partition. DE
GUIA argues that ABEJO should have filed an action for partition
instead of recovery of possession since the court cannot
implement any decision in the latter case without first a partition.
DE GUIA contends that an action for recovery of possession
cannot prosper when the property subject of the action is part of
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 PROPERTY
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an undivided, co-owned property. The procedural mode adopted
by ABEJO, which is recovery of possession, makes enforcement
difficult if not impossible since there is still no partition of the
subject property.
Under Article 484 of the Civil Code, "there is co-ownership
whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to
different persons." A co-owner of an undivided parcel of land is an
"owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of
dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which
15
is truly abstract." On the other hand, there is no co-ownership
when the different portions owned by different people are already
concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet
16
technically described.
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides, "[a]ny one of the co-owners
may bring an action in ejectment." This article covers all kinds of
actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes
forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery
of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership
(accion de reivindicacion). The summary actions of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer seek the recovery of physical possession
only. These actions are brought before municipal trial courts
within one year from dispossession. However,accion
publiciana, which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to
possess, falls under the jurisdiction of the proper regional trial
court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one
year. Accion de reivindicacion, which seeks the recovery of
ownership, also falls under the jurisdiction of the proper regional
17
trial court. 1awphi1.nét
Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only
against a third person, but also against another co-owner who
takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the
18
property. In the latter case, however, the only purpose of the
action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff
cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because
as co-owner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff cannot
19
recover any material or determinate part of the property.
In Hermogena G. Engreso with Spouse Jose Engreso v. Nestoria
20
De La Cruz and Herminio De La Cruz, we reiterated the rule that
a co-owner cannot recover a material or determinate part of a
common property prior to partition as follows:
It is a basic principle in civil law that before a property owned in
common is actually partitioned, all that the co-owner has is an
ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire
property. A co-owner has no right to demand a concrete, specific
or determinate part of the thing owned in common because until
division is effected his right over the thing is represented only by
an ideal portion.
As such, the only effect of an action brought by a co-owner
against a co-owner will be to obtain recognition of the co-
ownership; the defendant cannot be excluded from a specific
portion of the property because as a co-owner he has a right to
possess and the plaintiff cannot recover any material or
determinate part of the property. Thus, the courts a quo erred
when they ordered the delivery of one-half (½) of the building in
favor of private respondent.
Indisputably, DE GUIA has been in exclusive possession of the
entire FISHPOND since July 1974. Initially, DE GUIA disputed
ABEJO’s claim of ownership over the ½ undivided portion of the
FISHPOND. Subsequently, he implicitly recognized ABEJO’s ½
undivided share by offering to settle the case for P300,000 and to
vacate the property. During the trial proper, neither DE GUIA nor
ABEJO asserted or manifested a claim of absolute and exclusive
ownership over the entire FISHPOND. Before this Court, DE
1a\^/phi1.net
GUIA limits the issues to the propriety of bringing an action for
recovery of possession and the recovery of compensatory
damages.
Following the inherent and peculiar features of co-ownership,
while ABEJO and DE GUIA have equal shares in the FISHPOND
quantitatively speaking, they have the same right in a qualitative
sense as co-owners. Simply stated, ABEJO and DE GUIA are
owners of the whole and over the whole, they exercise the right of
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dominion. However, they are at the same time individual owners
of a ½ portion, which is truly abstract because until there is
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partition, such portion remains indeterminate or unidentified. As
co-owners, ABEJO and DE GUIA may jointly exercise the right of
dominion over the entire FISHPOND until they partition the
FISHPOND by identifying or segregating their respective portions.
Since a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA,
judicial or extra-judicial partition is the proper recourse. An action
to demand partition is imprescriptible and not subject to
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laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-
23
ownership under certain conditions. Neither ABEJO nor DE GUIA
has repudiated the co-ownership under the conditions set by law.
To recapitulate, we rule that a co-owner may file an action for
recovery of possession against a co-owner who takes exclusive
possession of the entire co-owned property. However, the only
effect of such action is a recognition of the co-ownership. The
courts cannot proceed with the actual partitioning of the co-
owned property. Thus, judicial or extra-judicial partition is
necessary to effect physical division of the FISHPOND between
ABEJO and DE GUIA. An action for partition is also the proper
forum for accounting the profits received by DE GUIA from the
FISHPOND. However, as a necessary consequence of such
recognition, ABEJO shall exercise an equal right to possess, use
and enjoy the entire FISHPOND.
DE GUIA further claims that the trial and appellate courts erred
when they ordered the recovery of rent when the exact identity of
the portion in question had not yet been clearly defined and
delineated. According to DE GUIA, an order to pay damages in the
form of rent is premature before partition.
We disagree.
The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar
right of the other co-owners. A co-owner cannot devote common
property to his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-
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ownership. Hence, if the subject is a residential house, all the
co-owners may live there with their respective families to the
extent possible. However, if one co-owner alone occupies the
entire house without opposition from the other co-owners, and
there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand
the payment of rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement to lease
the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-owner
who dwells in the house.
The co-owners can either exercise an equal right to live in the
house, or agree to lease it. If they fail to exercise any of these
options, they must bear the consequences. It would be unjust to
require the co-owner to pay rent after the co-owners by their
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silence have allowed him to use the property.
In case the co-owners agree to lease a building owned in
common, a co-owner cannot retain it for his use without paying
26
the proper rent. Moreover, where part of the property is
occupied exclusively by some co-owners for the exploitation of an
industry, the other co-owners become co-participants in the
27
accessions of the property and should share in its net profits.
The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to lease the entire
FISHPOND to DE GUIA. After DE GUIA’s lease expired in 1979, he
could no longer use the entire FISHPOND without paying rent. To
allow DE GUIA to continue using the entire FISHPOND without
paying rent would prejudice ABEJO’s right to receive rent, which
would have accrued to his ½ share in the FISHPOND had it been
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leased to others. Since ABEJO acquired his ½ undivided share in
the FISHPOND on 22 November 1983, DE GUIA should pay ABEJO
reasonable rent for his possession and use of ABEJO’s portion
beginning from that date. The compensatory damages of P25,000
per year awarded to ABEJO is the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased
29
property, considering the circumstances at that time. DE GUIA
shall continue to pay ABEJO a yearly rent of P25,000
corresponding to ABEJO’s ½ undivided share in the FISHPOND.
However, ABEJO has the option either to exercise an equal right
to occupy the FISHPOND, or to file a new petition before the trial
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court to fix a new rental rate in view of changed circumstances in
the last 20 years. 1a\^/phi1.net
ABEJO made an extrajudicial demand on DE GUIA by sending the
27 November 1983 demand letter. Thus, the rent in arrears
should earn interest at 6% per annum from 27 November 1983
30
until finality of this decision pursuant to Article 2209 of the Civil
Code. Thereafter, the interest rate is 12% per annum from finality
of this decision until full payment.
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ADLAWAN V ADLAWAN
The renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino, explained –
A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for
the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims
possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the
28
action will not prosper. (Emphasis added)
29
In Baloloy v. Hular, respondent filed a complaint for quieting of
title claiming exclusive ownership of the property, but the
evidence showed that respondent has co-owners over the
property. In dismissing the complaint for want of respondent’s
authority to file the case, the Court held that –
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners
may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of
actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion
publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-owner may bring such
an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners
as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the
benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner
will benefit the others but if such judgment is adverse, the same
cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners. If the
action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the
sole owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will
not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are
indispensable parties.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming
sole ownership over the subject property and praying that he be
declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other
co-owners had waived their rights over the subject property or
conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were
aware of the case in the trial court. The trial court rendered
judgment declaring the respondent as the sole owner of the
property and entitled to its possession, to the prejudice of the
latter’s siblings. Patently then, the decision of the trial court is
erroneous.
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was
mandated to implead his siblings, being co-owners of the
property, as parties. The respondent failed to comply with the
rule. It must, likewise, be stressed that the Republic of the
Philippines is also an indispensable party as defendant because
the respondent sought the nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which
was issued based on Free Patent No. 384019. Unless the State is
impleaded as party-defendant, any decision of the Court would
not be binding on it. It has been held that the absence of an
indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the
proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including
the judgment. The absence of the respondent’s siblings, as
parties, rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing thereof,
including the judgment of the court, ineffective for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to
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those present.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought the
suit for unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own
benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even
executed an affidavit of self- adjudication over the disputed
property. It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly
maintain the instant action considering that he does not recognize
the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of
succession to the property of his father, Dominador.
In the same vein, there is no merit in petitioner’s claim that he
has the legal personality to file the present unlawful detainer suit
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because the ejectment of respondents would benefit not only him
but also his alleged co-owners. However, petitioner forgets that
he filed the instant case to acquire possession of the property and
to recover damages. If granted, he alone will gain possession of
the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages to
the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana. Hence, petitioner cannot
successfully capitalize on the alleged benefit to his co-owners.
Incidentally, it should be pointed out that in default of the said
heirs of Graciana, whom petitioner labeled as "fictitious heirs," the
31
State will inherit her share and will thus be petitioner’s co-
owner entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property.
The present controversy should be differentiated from the cases
where the Court upheld the right of a co-owner to file a suit
pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code. In Resuena v. Court of
32 33
Appeals, and Sering v. Plazo, the co-owners who filed the
ejectment case did not represent themselves as the exclusive
owner of the property. In Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa
34
Santiago, the complaint for quieting of title was brought in
behalf of the co-owners precisely to recover lots owned in
35 36
common. Similarly in Vencilao v. Camarenta, the amended
complaint specified that the plaintiff is one of the heirs who co-
owns the controverted properties.
In the foregoing cases, the plaintiff never disputed the existence
of a co-ownership nor claimed to be the sole or exclusive owner of
the litigated lot. A favorable decision therein would of course inure
to the benefit not only of the plaintiff but to his co-owners as well.
The instant case, however, presents an entirely different backdrop
as petitioner vigorously asserted absolute and sole ownership of
the questioned lot. In his complaint, petitioner made the following
allegations, to wit:
3. The plaintiff was the only son (illegitimate) and sole heir of
the late DOMINADOR ADLAWAN who died intestate on 28 May
1987 without any other descendant nor ascendant x x x.
xxxx
5. Being the only child/descendant and, therefore, sole heir of
the deceased Dominador Adlawan, the plaintiff became the
absolute owner, and automatically took POSSESSION, of the
37
aforementioned house and lot x x x. (Emphasis added)
Clearly, the said cases find no application here because
petitioner’s action operates as a complete repudiation of the
existence of co-ownership and not in representation or recognition
thereof. Dismissal of the complaint is therefore proper. As noted
by Former Supreme Court Associate Justice Edgrado L. Paras "[i]t
is understood, of course, that the action [under Article 487 of the
Civil Code] is being instituted for all. Hence, if the co-owner
expressly states that he is bringing the case only for himself, the
action should not be allowed to prosper."
38
Indeed, respondents’ not less than four decade actual physical
possession of the questioned ancestral house and lot deserves to
be respected especially so that petitioner failed to show that he
has the requisite personality and authority as co-owner to file the
instant case. Justice dictates that respondents who are now in the
twilight years of their life be granted possession of their ancestral
property where their parents and siblings lived during their
lifetime, and where they, will probably spend the remaining days
of their life.
CRUZ V CATAPANG
In her memorandum,[16] petitioner contends that the consent and
knowledge of co-owner Norma Maligaya cannot defeat the action
for forcible entry since it is a basic principle in the law of co-
ownership that no individual co-owner can claim title to any
definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until
partition.
On the other hand, respondent in her memorandum[17] counters
that the complaint for forcible entry cannot prosper because her
entry into the property was not through strategy or stealth due to
the consent of one of the co-owners. She further argues that
since Norma Maligaya is residing in the house she built, the issue
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is not just possession de facto but also one of possession de
jure since it involves rights of co-owners to enjoy the property.
As to the issue of whether or not the consent of one co-owner will
warrant the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-
owner against the person who was given the consent to construct
a house on the co-owned property, we have held that a co-owner
cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to the
prejudice of the co-ownership.[18] In our view, a co-owner cannot
give valid consent to another to build a house on the co-owned
property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to
his or her exclusive use.
xxx xxx xxx
Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the
consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in
common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can,
without the consent of the other co-owners, validly consent to the
making of an alteration by another person, such as respondent, in
the thing owned in common. Alterations include any act of strict
dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or disposition has
been held implicitly to be an act of alteration.[19] The construction
of a house on the co-owned property is an act of dominion.
Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil
Code. There being no consent from all co-owners, respondent had
no right to construct her house on the co-owned property.
Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the
complaint for forcible entry filed against the builder. The consent
given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of
petitioner and Luz Cruz did not vest upon respondent any right to
enter into the co-owned property. Her entry into the property still
falls under the classification “through strategy or stealth.â€
xxx Respondent’s entry into the property without the
permission of petitioner could appear to be a secret and
clandestine act done in connivance with co-owner Norma Maligaya
whom respondent allowed to stay in her house. Entry into the
land effected clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-
owners could be categorized as possession by
stealth.[20] Moreover, respondent’s act of getting only the
consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing
the latter to stay in the constructed house, can in fact be
considered as a strategy which she utilized in order to enter into
the co-owned property. As such, respondent’s acts constitute
forcible entry.
Petitioner’s filing of a complaint for forcible entry, in our view,
was within the one-year period for filing the complaint. The one-
year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is
generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land.
However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year
period is counted from the time the petitioner learned about
it.[21] Although respondent constructed her house in 1992, it was
only in September 1995 that petitioner learned of it when she
visited the property. Accordingly, she then made demands on
respondent to vacate the premises. Failing to get a favorable
response, petitioner filed the complaint on January 25, 1996,
which is within the one-year period from the time petitioner
learned of the construction.
SANCHEZ V CA
This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of civil law:
co-ownership. Throughout the proceedings from the MeTC to the
[11]
Court of Appeals, the notion of co-ownership was not
sufficiently dealt with. We attempt to address this controversy in
the interest of substantial justice. Certiorari should therefore be
granted to cure this grave abuse of discretion.
xxx xxx xxx
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other
co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute. Whether
established by law or by agreement of the co-owners, the
property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed with a fiducial
nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of
his co-owners and he may not do any act prejudicial to the
[15]
interest of his co-owners.
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Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties
in co-ownership is to create an express trust among the heirs as
co-owners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and
[16]
every co-owner is a trustee for the others.
Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no
individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion
thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or
[17]
proportionate share in the entire land or thing.
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided
interest in the property the right to freely sell and dispose of it,
i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly lease his undivided
interest to a third party independently of the other co-
[18]
owners. But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete,
specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common
because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal
[19]
portion without any physical adjudication.
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property,
the metes and bounds of petitioner’s lot has not been
designated. As she was not a party to the Deed of Absolute
Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners, her right to
1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition needs to be
effected to protect her right to her definite share and determine
the boundaries of her property. Such partition must be done
without prejudice to the rights of private respondent Virginia Teria
as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.
PAULMITAN V CA
The redemption of the land made by Fanesa did not terminate the
co-ownership nor give her title to the entire land subject of the
co-ownership. Speaking on the same issue, the Court, in Adille v.
Court of Appeals, resolved the same by holding that the right of
repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his
share alone (CIVIL CODE, art. 1612; CIVIL CODE (1889), art.
1514.). While the records show that the property was redeemed
in its entirety, the plaintiff shouldering the expenses therefor, that
did not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not
put to end the existing state of co-ownership (Supra, art. 489).
There is no doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary
expense.
XXX XXX XXX
Article 488 of the Civil Code provides that “each co-owner shall
have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the
expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common
and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from
this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as
may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No
such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.”
Thus, although Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the entire
lot by virtue of the redemption she made, nevertheless, she did
acquire the right to be reimbursed for half of the redemption price
she paid to the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental on
behalf of her co-owners. Until reimbursed, Fanesa holds a lien
upon the subject property for the amount due her.
MARIATEGUI V CA [citing Adille v CA]
Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership
when they executed the extrajudicial partition excluding the
private respondents and registered the properties in their own
names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid
repudiation was made by petitioners to the prejudice of private
respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of the subject lot
in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership,
prescription had not yet set in when private respondents filed in
1973 the present action for partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA
552 [1990]).
In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of
their demands, petitioners, except the unwilling defendants in the
lower court, failed and refused to acknowledge and convey their
lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record on Appeal, p.
6). This allegation, though denied by the petitioners in their
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answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never successfully refuted by them. Put
differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge of their
relationship to private respondents who are therefore their co-
heirs, petitioners fraudulently withheld private respondent's share
in the estate of Lupo Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto,
since 1962, he had been inquiring from petitioner Maria del
Rosario about their (respondents) share in the property left by
their deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria
del Rosario) not to worry because they will get some shares. As a
matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto constructed a house
where he now resides on Lot No. 163 without any complaint from
petitioners.
Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971
did not operate as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership.
In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]),
the Court held:
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership,
must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership).
The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1)
a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of
repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the
evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in
possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the property for the period required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is
constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been our holding
that the Torrens title does not furnish shield for fraud. It is
therefore no argument to say that the act of registration is
equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one,
notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates
as a universal notice of title.
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names
in fraud of their co-heirs prescription can only be deemed to have
commenced from the time private respondents discovered the
petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription definitely may not be
invoked by petitioners because private respondents commenced
the instant action barely two months after learning that
petitioners had registered in their names the lots involved.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Art. 523. Possession is the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right. (430a)
2 REQUISITES TO COMPLETE POSSESSION
1. Occupancy, apprehension, or taking
Possession cannot exist without occupation EXCEPT in
cases provided for in Art. 537.
2. Intent to Possess [Animus Possidendi]
Possession involves a state of mind whereby the
possessor intends to exercise and does exercise a right
of possession, whether legal or otherwise.
Constructive Possession – possession in the eyes of the law does
not mean that a man has to have his feet in every square meter
of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
DEGREES OF POSSESSION
1. Mere Holding or Possession w/out Title and in Violation of
the Right of the Ower [thief/usurper]
2. Possession with Juridical Title but not that of Ownership
[tenant, pledge]
3. Possession with a Just Title, or a Title Sufficient to Transfer
Ownership, but not from the True Owner [buying from one
who pretends to be owner]
4. Possession with a Just Title from the True Owner
CLASSES OF POSSESSION
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II – LLB, University of San Carlos – College of Law
1. Possession in the Concept of Owner and in the Concept of
Holder
2. Possession by Oneself and Possession in the Name of
Another
3. Possession in Good Faith and Possession in bad Faith
Art. 524. Possession may be exercised in one's own name or
in that of another. (413a)
Rights of possession may be exercised by agents.
Possession by another may either be:
1. Necessary – i.e. exercised on behalf of the conceived child,
of juridical persons.
2. Voluntary – i.e. agents or administrators appointed by the
owner or possessor.
[3rd person who voluntary exercises possession in the
name of another is not effective unless ratified by the
person in whose name it is exercised].
Art. 525. The possession of things or rights may be had in one
of two concepts: either in the concept of owner, or in that of
the holder of the thing or right to keep or enjoy it, the
ownership pertaining to another person. (432)
POSSESSION IN CONCEPT OF OWNER – maybe the owner himself
or one who claims to be so. *it is not important whether the
owner believes to be the owner or not, what matters is in the
performance of acts of ownership, he is or may be considered by
as the owner by those who witness his exercise of propriety
rights.
EFFECTS:
a. Converted into ownership by lapse of time
b. Possessor can bring all actions necessary to protect his
possession [except accion reinvindicatoria]
c. Can ask for the inscription of his possession in the registry
of property
d. Upon recovering possession from one unlawfully depriving
him of it, he can recover fruits and damages
e. He can exercise right of pre-emption and entitled to
indemnity in case of expropriation
POSSESSION IN CONCEPT OF HOLDER – possessor acknowledges
that there is in another a superior right which he believes to be
ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong. [while tenant
possess land as holder, he possess the lease right as owner].
Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not
aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any
flaw which invalidates it.
He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any
case contrary to the foregoing.
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be
the basis of good faith. (433a)
POSSESSOR IN GF – one who is unaware that there exists a flaw
which invalidates his acquisition of the thing. [i.e. possessor’s
belief that person from whom he received a thing was the owner
of the same and could convey title].
*can be determined by outward [overt] acts and proven conduct.
*belief of the possessor that he is the legal owner, to be well-
grounded, must be based upon some title or mode of acquisition
[sale, donation, inheritance or other means of transmitting
ownership].
Gross inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of
GF but possible excusable ignorance may be [i.e. re: doubtful or
difficult questions of law].
*must hold under a title valid in form or deed sufficient to
transfer property [from sale, inheritance].
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POSSESSION IN BF – one in possession knowing his title thereto
is defective.
Art. 527. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who
alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden
of proof. (434)
Art. 528. Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this
character except in the case and from the moment facts exist
which show that the possessor is not unaware that he
possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. (435a)
Possession in GF ceases from the moment defects in the title are
made known to the possessor.
Art. 529. It is presumed that possession continues to be
enjoyed in the same character in which it was acquired, until
the contrary is proved. (436)
Art. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of
being appropriated may be the object of possession. (437)
Art. 531. Possession is acquired by the material occupation of
a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is
subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and
legal formalities established for acquiring such right. (438a)
ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION
1. Corpus – material holding of a thing.
2. Animus - intent to possess.
Occupation – used in the general and real sense.
Art. 532. Possession may be acquired by the same person
who is to enjoy it, by his legal representative, by his agent, or
by any person without any power whatever: but in the last
case, the possession shall not be considered as acquired until
the person in whose name the act of possession was executed
has ratified the same, without prejudice to the juridical
consequences of negotiorum gestio in a proper case. (439a)
Personal Acquisition
1. Must have capacity to acquire possession
2. Must have intent to possess
3. Possibility to acquire possession must be present
Acquisition Thru Another
1. Representative/agent has the intention to acquire thing or
exercise the right for another
2. The person for whom the thins has been
Art. 533. The possession of hereditary property is deemed
transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the
moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance
is accepted.
One who validly renounces an inheritance is deemed never to
have possessed the same. (440)
Art. 534. On who succeeds by hereditary title shall not suffer
the consequences of the wrongful possession of the decedent,
if it is not shown that he was aware of the flaws affecting it;
but the effects of possession in good faith shall not benefit
him except from the date of the death of the decedent. (442)
BF is personal and intransmissible [GF can benefit only the person
who has it and GF of heir cannot erase the effects of BF of
predecessor].
Art. 535. Minors and incapacitated persons may acquire the
possession of things; but they need the assistance of their
legal representatives in order to exercise the rights which
from the possession arise in their favor. (443)
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Property of RJ Martinez
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Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through
force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who
objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a
right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must
invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should
refuse to deliver the thing. (441a)
If a person believes he is entitled to possession of a thing which is
in the possession of another he may ask the latter to deliver
possession. If he refuses, recourse must be with the courts.
*otherwise may be liable for forcible entry.
Art. 537. Acts merely tolerated, and those executed
clandestinely and without the knowledge of the possessor of
a thing, or by violence, do not affect possession. (444)
ACTS MERELY TOLERATED – by reason of neighborliness or
familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or another
person to do on the property.
*although continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by
prescription.
*question of deciding whether it is tolerance/abandonment is for
courts to decide
CLANDESTINE & UNKNOWN – possession must be public to be
basis for prescription.
ACTS OF VIOLENCE – may either be actual or threatened; by the
possessor himself or one acting on his behalf.
Acts referred to herein do not constitute true possession and do
not prejudice the rights of real possessor.
Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the
same time in two different personalities except in the cases
of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact
of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if
there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the
dates of the possession are the same, the one who presents a
title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be
placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its
possession or ownership through proper proceedings. (445)
Except in co-ownership, ownership as a fact can only be
recognized in 1 person.
Should a question arise as to fact of possession:
Present possessor is preferred.
If there are 2 Possessors
1. One longer in possession
2. One who presents a title
3. Placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its
possession or ownership
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his
possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be
protected in or restored to said possession by the means
established by the laws and the Rules of Court.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible
entry may within ten days from the filing of the complaint
present a motion to secure from the competent court, in the
action for forcible entry, a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall
decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing
thereof. (446a)
i.e. A landlord cannot summarily enter and dispossess his tenant,
even for non-payment of rent, and until the lease is legally
terminated the tenant has a right to the possession.
Within 10 days from the filing of complaint for F.E., plaintiff may
be restored in possession during pendency of the action by a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction.
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*writ of preliminary injunction itself cannot be used as substitute
for an action of F.E. and U.D.
Art. 540. Only the possession acquired and enjoyed in the
concept of owner can serve as a title for acquiring
dominion. (447)
It is only the conviction of ownership externally manifested, which
generates ownership [adverse possession of property is not an
encumbrance in law].
Occupation and use, however long continued, will not confer title
by prescription or adverse possession, unless coupled with the
element of hostility toward the right of the true owner.
Art. 541. A possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor
the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and
he cannot be obliged to show or prove it. (448a)
Possession is presumed ownership, unless the contrary is proved.
Just title – means that which is legally sufficient to transfer the
ownership or the real right to which it relates.
Art. 542. The possession of real property presumes that of
the movables therein, so long as it is not shown or proved
that they should be excluded. (449)
Art. 543. Each one of the participants of a thing possessed in
common shall be deemed to have exclusively possessed the
part which may be allotted to him upon the division thereof,
for the entire period during which the co-possession lasted.
Interruption in the possession of the whole or a part of a
thing possessed in common shall be to the prejudice of all the
possessors. However, in case of civil interruption, the Rules
of Court shall apply. (450a)
Art. 544. A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits
received before the possession is legally interrupted.
Natural and industrial fruits are considered received from
the time they are gathered or severed.
Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily and belong to the
possessor in good faith in that proportion.(451)
Art. 545. If at the time the good faith ceases, there should be
any natural or industrial fruits, the possessor shall have a
right to a part of the expenses of cultivation, and to a part of
the net harvest, both in proportion to the time of the
possession.
The charges shall be divided on the same basis by the two
possessors.
The owner of the thing may, should he so desire, give the
possessor in good faith the right to finish the cultivation and
gathering of the growing fruits, as an indemnity for his part
of the expenses of cultivation and the net proceeds; the
possessor in good faith who for any reason whatever should
refuse to accept this concession, shall lose the right to be
indemnified in any other manner. (452a)
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every
possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain
the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in
good faith with the same right of retention, the person who
has defeated him in the possession having the option of
refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the
increase in value which the thing may have acquired by
reason thereof. (453a)
Necessary Expenses – for the preservation of the thing; “cost of
living” for the thing and must be returned to the one who paid
them, irrespective of his GF or BF.
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Property of RJ Martinez
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*to be paid to every possessor irrespective of GF or BF but only
GF possessor can retain thing until reimbursed.
Useful Expenses – incurred to give greater utility or productivity
to the thing.
*only reimbursed to possessor in GF [compensation/reward for
him].
Option Available for One who Defeats a Possessor in GF
1. Refunding amount of expenses
2. Paying the increase in value which the thing acquires by
virtue of his possession
Art. 547. If the useful improvements can be removed without
damage to the principal thing, the possessor in good faith
may remove them, unless the person who recovers the
possession exercises the option under paragraph 2 of the
preceding article. (n)
If useful improvement can be removed without injury to the
principal thing, the possessor in GF may remove it, instead o
asking for reimbursement
Art. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not
be refunded to the possessor in good faith; but he may
remove the ornaments with which he has embellished the
principal thing if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his
successor in the possession does not prefer to refund the
amount expended. (454)
These expenses do not affect the essence or substance of the
thing itself, but only the comfort, convenience or enjoyment of
the possessor.
The law does not compensate personal whims or caprices.
Possessor in GF/BF have the same rights when it comes to
expenses for pure luxury: to remove the improvements upon w/c
they were made if the principal thing will suffer no injury and the
owner does not prefer to retain them upon payment of the proper
indemnity.
Art. 549. The possessor in bad faith shall reimburse the
fruits received and those which the legitimate possessor
could have received, and shall have a right only to the
expenses mentioned in paragraph 1 of Article 546 and in
Article 443. The expenses incurred in improvements for pure
luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the
possessor in bad faith, but he may remove the objects for
which such expenses have been incurred, provided that the
thing suffers no injury thereby, and that the lawful possessor
does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they may
have at the time he enters into possession. (445a)
Possessor in BF – no right to receive any fruits.
Fruits already gathered and existing will have to be returned.
Fruits consumed, lost, or could have been received will have to be
paid.
Fruits ungathered will have to go to lawful possessor/owner.
*he is liable only for the period of his possession [not liable for
those who preceded him].
*possessor in BF is entitled to production expenses and the
charges on property w/c lawful owner would have himself paid.
*Necessary expenses may also be recovered, w/out right of
retention.
*Improvements made for pure luxury may be removed if the
principal thing does not suffer injury.
Art. 550. The costs of litigation over the property shall be
borne by every possessor. (n)
Art. 551. Improvements caused by nature or time shall
always insure to the benefit of the person who has succeeded
in recovering possession. (456)
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Art. 552. A possessor in good faith shall not be liable for the
deterioration or loss of the thing possessed, except in cases
in which it is proved that he has acted with fraudulent intent
or negligence, after the judicial summons.
A possessor in bad faith shall be liable for deterioration or
loss in every case, even if caused by a fortuitous event. (457a)
GF – no liability.
GF then BF – liable for deterioration or loss in cases of fraud and
negligence after judicial summons.
BF – absolutely liable for deterioration or loss [even in case of
F.E.].
Art. 553. One who recovers possession shall not be obliged to
pay for improvements which have ceased to exist at the time
he takes possession of the thing. (458)
Art. 554. A present possessor who shows his possession at
some previous time, is presumed to have held possession
also during the intermediate period, in the absence of proof
to the contrary. (459)
Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:
(1) By the abandonment of the thing;
(2) By an assignment made to another either by onerous or
gratuitous title;
(3) By the destruction or total loss of the thing, or because it
goes out of commerce;
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of
Article 537, if the new possession has lasted longer than one
year. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the
lapse of ten years. (460a)
Abandonment – voluntary renunciation of all the rights w/c a
person may have in a thing, with the intent to lose such thing;
includes giving up of possession, not necessarily of ownership, by
every possessor.
*necessary that the person making the “abandonment” is a
possessor in the concept of an owner.
*spes recuperandi is gone and animus revertendi is finally given
up.
Possession by another is subject to the provisions of Art. 537 [by
mere tolerance]
Art. 556. The possession of movables is not deemed lost so
long as they remain under the control of the possessor, even
though for the time being he may not know their
whereabouts. (461)
Control in this article means juridical control or right.
*control is present even if you do not actually have the thing or
do not know its whereabouts for the time being as long as you
can get their physical or natural possession by diligent search.
Art. 557. The possession of immovables and of real rights is
not deemed lost, or transferred for purposes of prescription
to the prejudice of third persons, except in accordance with
the provisions of the Mortgage Law and the Land
Registration laws. (462a)
Art. 558. Acts relating to possession, executed or agreed to by
one who possesses a thing belonging to another as a mere
holder to enjoy or keep it, in any character, do not bind or
prejudice the owner, unless he gave said holder express
authority to do such acts, or ratifies them
subsequently. (463)
Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in
good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has
lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof
may recover it from the person in possession of the same.
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Property of RJ Martinez
II – LLB, University of San Carlos – College of Law
If the possessor of a movable lost or which the owner has
been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a
public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor. (464a)
When a movable is in the possession of one who has acquired and
holds it in GF, the true owner cannot recover it, except when the
latter has lost it or he has been unlawfully deprived of it.
3 Requisites
1. Possession is in GF
2. Owner has voluntarily parted with the possession of the
thing
3. Possessor is in the concept of owner
The owner can recover even from 3rd person if
1. He lost the thing
2. He was unlawfully deprived thereof
*except if 3rd person bought thing in a public sale. [public sale –
there is public notice of sale, everybody has right to bid and offer
to buy].
Art. 560. Wild animals are possessed only while they are
under one's control; domesticated or tamed animals are
considered domestic or tame if they retain the habit of
returning to the premises of the possessor. (465)
Art. 561. One who recovers, according to law, possession
unjustly lost, shall be deemed for all purposes which may
redound to his benefit, to have enjoyed it without
interruption. (466)
Possessor in GR will be deemed in continuous possession for the
purpose of prescription.
A possessor in BF will not be obliged to return fruits which might
have been received during the time that he was not in possession.
MEDINA V GREENFIELD DEV’T.
Petitioners also claim that they are in actual possession of the
property. As alleged in their complaint, they instituted Santos
26
Arevalo, a co-petitioner, as caretaker. They also alleged in their
petition filed before this Court that Balbino and Yolanda Medina
and their respective families are still residing on a portion of the
27
property. Respondent belies their claim, declaring that it
employed Arevalo as caretaker. Respondent presented a notarized
Receipt and Quitclaim dated April 26, 1994, signed by Arevalo,
who attested that he was employed by respondent as caretaker
and that his stay on the property was a mere privilege granted by
respondent.
Possession and ownership are two different legal concepts. Just as
possession is not a definite proof of ownership, neither is non-
possession inconsistent with ownership. Even assuming that
petitioners' allegations are true, it bears no legal consequence in
the case at hand because the execution of the deeds of
conveyances is already deemed equivalent to delivery of the
property to respondent, and prior physical delivery or possession
28
is not legally required. Under Article 1498 of the Civil Code,
"when the sale is made through a public instrument, the
execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object
of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or
cannot be inferred." Possession is also transferred, along with
ownership thereof, to respondent by virtue of the notarized deeds
29
of conveyances.
VILLA V HEIRS OF ALTAVAS
As to respondents' ownership and right of possession of the
subject properties, records show that the MCTC based its Decision
not only on the Position Paper of respondents but also on the
pieces of evidence submitted by them. Respondents attached, as
annexes to their Complaint, the Original Certificates of Title Nos.
RO-4326 and RO-4327 in the name of Enrique, covering Lot Nos.
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2816 and 2817, respectively, as evidence of their ownership and
right to possess the disputed properties.
Moreover, being a mere lessee, petitioner steps into the shoes of
her lessor, Virginia. However, Virginia's claim of ownership was
not sustained by the MCTC, which instead found that she was not
the owner of and had no right to possess the disputed property or
to transfer possession of the same, through lease, in favor of
another person. Virginia later withdrew her appeal filed with the
RTC. By reason of such withdrawal, she is bound by the findings
of the MCTC.
BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO. V CA
Petitioner’s claim of ownership through extraordinary acquisitive
prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code cannot be
sustained.
There is no dispute that the controversial strip of land has been in
the continuous possession of petitioner since 1929. But
possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right,
must be possession under a claim of title, that is, it must be
adverse.[21] Unless coupled with the element of hostility towards
the true owner, possession, however long, will not confer title by
prescription.[22]
Xxx xxx xxx
While it is true that, together with a person’s actual and adverse
possession of the land, tax declarations constitute strong evidence
of ownership of the land occupied by him,[25] this legal precept
does not apply in cases where the property is declared to be a
mere easement of right of way.
An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the
corporeal immovable property of another, by virtue of which the
owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do,
something on his property, for the benefit of another thing or
person. It exists only when the servient and dominant estates
belong to two different owners. It gives the holder of the
easement an incorporeal interest on the land but grants no title
thereto. Therefore, an acknowledgment of the easement is an
admission that the property belongs to another.[26]
Having held the property by virtue of an easement, petitioner
cannot now assert that its occupancy since 1929 was in the
concept of an owner. Neither can it declare that the 30-year
period of extraordinary acquisitive prescription started from that
year.
Petitioner, however, maintains that even if a servitude was merely
imposed on the property in its favor, its possession immediately
became adverse to the owner in the late 1950’s when the grant
was alleged by respondent heirs to have expired. It stresses that,
counting from the late 1950’s (1959 as found by the trial court),
the 30-year extraordinary acquisitive prescription had already set
in by the time respondent heirs made a claim against it in their
letters dated March 1 and April 6, 1989.
We do not think so. The mere expiration of the period of
easement in 1959 did not convert petitioner’s possession into an
adverse one. Mere material possession of land is not adverse
possession as against the owner and is insufficient to vest title,
unless such possession is accompanied by the intent to possess as
an owner.[27] There should be a hostile use of such a nature and
exercised under such circumstances as to manifest and give
notice that the possession is under a claim of right.
In the absence of an express grant by the owner, or conduct by
petitioner sugar mill from which an adverse claim can be implied,
its possession of the lot can only be presumed to have continued
in the same character as when it was acquired (that is, it
possessed the land only by virtue of the original grant of the
easement of right of way),[28] or was by mere license or
tolerance of the owners (respondent heirs).[29] It is a
fundamental principle of law in this jurisdiction that acts of
possessory character executed by virtue of license or tolerance of
the owner, no matter how long, do not start the running of the
period of prescription.[30]
After the grant of easement expired in 1959, petitioner never
performed any act incompatible with the ownership of respondent
heirs over Cadastral Lot No. 954. On the contrary, until 1963,
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Property of RJ Martinez
II – LLB, University of San Carlos – College of Law
petitioner continued to declare the “sugar central railroad right of
way” in its realty tax receipts, thereby doubtlessly conceding the
ownership of respondent heirs. Respondents themselves were
emphatic that they simply tolerated petitioner’s continued use of
Cadastral Lot No. 954 so as not to jeopardize the employment of
one of their co-heirs in the sugar mill of petitioner.[31]
The only time petitioner assumed a legal position adverse to
respondents’ was when it filed a claim over the property in 1965
during the cadastral survey of Medellin. Since then (1965) and
until the filing of the complaint for the recovery of the subject
land before the RTC of Cebu in 1989, only 24 years had lapsed.
Since the required 30-year extraordinary prescriptive period had
not yet been complied with in 1989, petitioner never acquired
ownership of the subject land.
MANOTOK REALTY V CA
A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there exists
in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
(Caram v. Laureta, 103 SCRA 7, Art. 526, Civil Code). One who
acquires real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in
his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good
faith as against the true owner of the land or of an interest
therein; and the same rule must be applied to one who has
knowledge of facts which should put a reasonable man upon his
guard, and then claims that he acted in good faith under the
belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. (See
Leung Yee v. FL Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil. 644).
The records show that when Dayrit executed the deed of'
assignment in favor of the respondent, the disputed lot was
already registered and titled in the name of the petitioner. Such
an act of registration served as a constructive notice to the whole
world and the title issued in favor of petitioner made his
ownership conclusive upon and against all persons including
Dayrit and. herein respondent, although no personal notice was
served on either of the latter. (See Garcia v. Bello, 13 SCRA 769;
Demontano v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 286). Therefore, the
presumption of good faith in favor of the respondent cannot apply
because as far as the law is concerned, he had notice of the
ownership by the petitioner over said lot. It is also unthinkable
that in the big Tambunting Estate beset with one of the most
serious squatter problems in Metro Manila, any tenant or
prospective buyer would be unaware that the petitioner acquired
the estate as highest bidder at the sale ordered by the probate
court. Furthermore, the respondent did not even bother to inquire
about the certificate of title covering the lot in question to verify
who was the real owner thereof, despite the fact that his
transferor, Dayrit, never showed him any title thereto; a
circumstance which should have put him upon such inquiry or
investigation. His failure to exercise that measure of precaution
which was reasonably required of a prudent man in order to
acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor precludes
him from claiming possession in good faith.
VILLAMIL V VILLAROSA
The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith lies
upon one who asserts that status.[26]
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of
another without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest in that same property, and who pays a full and fair price
at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of
another person’s claim.[27]
The honesty of intention that constitutes good faith implies
freedom from knowledge of circumstances that ought to put a
prudent person on inquiry. Good faith consists in the belief of the
possessors that the persons from whom they received the thing
are its rightful owners who could convey their title. Good faith,
while always presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary,
requires this well-founded belief.[28]
Indeed, we found that Villarosa had successfully discharged this
burden. In the instant case, there were no traces of bad faith on
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Villarosa’s part in acquiring the subject property by
purchase. Villarosa merely responded to a newspaper
advertisement for the sale of a parcel of land with an unfinished
structure located in Tierra Pura, Tandang Sora, Quezon
City.[29] He contacted the number specified in the advertisement
and was able to talk to a certain lady named Annabelle[30]who
introduced him to the owner, Mateo Tolentino.[31] When he
visited the site, he inquired from Mateo Tolentino about the
unfinished structure and was informed that the latter allegedly
ran out of money and eventually lost interest in pursuing the
construction because of his old age.[32] Villarosa was then given a
copy of the title.[33] He went to the Register of Deeds and was
able to verify the authenticity of the title.[34] He also found out
that the property was mortgaged under the name of Mario
Villamor, who turned out to be the employer of Tolentino. Upon
reaching an agreement on the price of P276,000.00, Villarosa
redeemed the title from Express Financing
Company.[35] Thereafter, the property was released from
[36]
mortgage and a deed of sale was executed. Villarosa then
secured the transfer of title in his name.[37]
Well-settled is the rule that every person dealing with a registered
land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of
title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go
beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
Where there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any
cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any
encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore
further than what the Torrens Title upon its face indicates in quest
for any hidden defects or inchoate right that may subsequently
defeat his right thereto.[38]
This principle does not apply when the party has actual knowledge
of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious
man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge
of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to
induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the
title of the property in litigation. One who falls within the
exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for
value nor a purchaser in good faith.[39]
XXX XXX XXX XXX
A forged or fraudulent document may become the root of a valid
title if the property has already been transferred from the name of
the owner to that of the forger.[42] This doctrine serves to
emphasize that a person who deals with registered property in
good faith will acquire good title from a forger and be absolutely
protected by a Torrens title.[43]
Having made the necessary inquiries and having found the title to
be authentic, Villarosa need not go beyond the certificate of
title. When dealing with land that is registered and titled, as in
this case, buyers are not required by the law to inquire further
than what the Torrens certificate of title indicates on its
face.[44] He examined the transferor’s title, which was then under
the name of Spouses Tolentino. He did not have to scrutinize
each and every title and previous owners of the property
preceding Tolentino.
In sum, Villarosa was able to establish good faith when he bought
the subject property. Therefore, TCT No. 354675 issued in his
name is declared valid.
CEBU WINLAND DEVT. V ONG SIAO HUA
In the case at bar, it appears that respondent was already placed
in possession of the subject properties. However, it is crystal clear
that the deeds of absolute sale were still to be executed by the
parties upon payment of the last installment. This fact shows that
ownership of the said properties was withheld by petitioner.
Following case law, it is evident that the parties did not intend to
immediately transfer ownership of the subject properties until full
payment and the execution of the deeds of absolute
28
sale. Consequently, there is no "delivery" to speak of in this
case since what was transferred was possession only and not
ownership of the subject properties.
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Property of RJ Martinez
II – LLB, University of San Carlos – College of Law
We, therefore, hold that the transfer of possession of the subject
properties on October 10, 1996 to respondent cannot be
considered as "delivery" within the purview of Article 1543 of the
Civil Code. It follows that since there has been no transfer of
ownership of the subject properties since the deeds of absolute
sale have not yet been executed by the parties, the action filed by
respondent has not prescribed.
BARTOLOME ORTIZ V HON. KAYANAN
The issue decisive of the controvery is—after the rendition by the
trial court of its judgment in Civil Case No. C-90 on March 22,
1966 confirming the award of one-half of the property to Quirino
Comintan—whether or not petitioner is still entitled to retain for
his own exclusive benefit all the fruits of the property, such as the
tolls collected by him from March 1967 to December 1968, and
September 1969 to March 31, 1970, amounting to about
P25,000.00. In other words, petitioner contends that so long as
the aforesaid amount of P13,632,00 decreed in the judgment
representing the expenses for clearing the land and the value of
the coconuts and fruit trees planted by him remains unpaid, he
can appropriate for his exclusive benefit all the fruits which he
may derive from the property, without any obligation to apply any
portion thereof to the payment of the interest and the principal of
the debt.
We find this contention untenable.
There is no question that a possessor in good faith is entitled to
the fruits received before the possession is legally
11
interrupted. Possession in good faith ceases or is legally
interrupted from the moment defects in the title are made known
to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by the filing of an
action in court by the true owner for the recovery of the
12
property. Hence, all the fruits that the possessor may receive
from the time he is summoned in court, or when he answers the
complaint, must be delivered and paid by him to the owner or
13
lawful possessor.
However, even after his good faith ceases, the possessor in fact
can still retain the property, pursuant to Article 546 of the New
Civil Code, until he has been fully reimbursed for all the necessary
and useful expenses made by him on the property. This right of
retention has been considered as one of the conglomerate of
measures devised by the law for the protection of the possessor
in good faith. Its object is to guarantee the reimbursement of the
expenses, such as those for the preservation of the
14
property, or for the enhancement of its utility or
15
productivity. It permits the actual possessor to remain in
possession while he has not been reimbursed by the person who
defeated him in the possession for those necessary expenses and
useful improvements made by him on the thing possessed. The
principal characteristic of the right of retention is its accessory
character. It is accessory to a principal obligation. Considering
that the right of the possessor to receive the fruits terminates
when his good faith ceases, it is necessary, in order that this right
to retain may be useful, to concede to the creditor the right to
secure reimbursement from the fruits of the property by utilizing
its proceeds for the payment of the interest as well as the
principal of the debt while he remains in possession. This right of
retention of the property by the creditor, according to Scaevola, in
the light of the provisions of Article 502 of the Spanish Civil
16
Code, is considered not a coercive measure to oblige the
debtor to pay, depriving him temporarily of the enjoyment of the
fruits of his property, but as a means of obtainitig compensation
for the debt. The right of retention in this case is analogous to a
contract of antichresis and it cati be considered as a means of
extinguishing the obligation, inasmuch as the right to retain the
thing lasts only for the period necessary to enable the creditor to
be reimbursed from the fruits for the necessary and useful
17
expenses.
According to Manresa, the right of retention is, therefore,
analogous to that of a pledge, if the property retained is a
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movable, and to that of antichresis, if the property held is
18
immovable. This construction appears to be in harmony with
similar provisions of the civil law which employs the right of
retention as a means or device by which a creditor is able to
obtain the payment of a debt. Thus, under Article 1731 of the
New Civil Code, any person who has performed work upon a
movable has a right to retain it by way of pledge until he is paid.
Similarly, under Article 1914 of the same Code, the agent may
retain in pledge the things which are the object of the agency
until the principal effects reimbursement of the funds advanced by
the former for the execution of the agency, or he is indemnified
for all damages which he may have suffered as a consequence of
the execution of the agency, provided he is free from fault. To the
same effect, the depositary, under Article 1994 of the same Code,
may retain the thing in pledge until the full payment of what may
be due him by reason of the deposit. The usufructuary, pursuant
to Article 612 of the same Code, may retain the property until he
is reimbursed for the amount paid for taxes levied on the capital
(Article 597) and tor extraordinary repairs (Article 594).
XXX XXX XXX
Applying the afore-cited principles to the case at bar, petitioner
cannot appropriate for his own exclusive benefit the tolls which he
collected from the property retained by him. It was his duty under
the law, after deducting the necessary expenses for his
administration, to apply such amount collected to the payment of
the interest, and the balance to the payment of the obligation.
We hold, therefore, that the disputed tolls, after deducting
petitioner's expenses for administration, belong to Quirino
Comintan, owner of the land through which the toll road passed,
further considering that the same was on portions of the property
on which petitioner had not introduced any improvement. The
trial court itself clarified this matter when it placed the toll road
under receivership. The omission of any mention of the tolls in the
decision itself may be attributed to the fact that the tolls appear
to have been collected after the rendition of the judgment of the
trial court.
CARBONELL V CA
17. Poncio did not remain owner by possessing the lot
Being a valid consensual contract, the document effectively
transferred the possession of the lot to the vendee Carbonell by
constitutum possessorium (Article 1500, New Civil Code); because
thereunder the vendor Poncio continued to retain physical
possession of the lot as tenant of the vendee and no longer as
owner thereof. More than just the signing of the document by
Poncio and Carbonell with Constancio Meonada as witness to
perfect the contract of sale, the transaction was further confirmed
when Poncio agreed to the actual payment by Carbonell of his
mortgage arrearages to the bank on 27 January 1955 and by his
consequent delivery of his own mortgage passbook to Carbonell.
If he remained owner and mortgagor, Poncio would not have
surrendered his mortgage passbook to Carbonell.
18. Poncio does not own another parcel of land with the
same area adjacent to Carbonell
It is not shown that Poncio owns another parcel with the same
area, adjacent to the lot of his cousin Carbonell and likewise
mortgaged by him to the Republic Savings Bank. The transaction
therefore between Poncio and Carbonell can only refer and does
refer to the lot involved. If Poncio had another lot to remove his
house, the document would not have stipulated to allow him to
stay in the sold lot without paying any rent for one year and
thereafter to pay rental in case he cannot find another place to
transfer his house.
19. Carbonell liable to efund amount Infante paid the
bank to redeem the mortgage
While Carbonell has the superior title to the lot, she must however
refund to Infante the amount of P1,500, which Infante
paid to the Republic Savings Bank to redeem the mortgage.
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II – LLB, University of San Carlos – College of Law
20. Article 546 and 547, NCC
The Infante spouses being possessors in bad faith, their rights to
the improvements they introduced on the disputed lot are
governed by Articles 546 and 547 of the New Civil Code.
21. Infante’s expenses
Their expenses consisting of P1,500 for draining the property,
filling it with 500 cubic meters of garden soil, building a wall
around it and installing a gate and P11,929for erecting a
bungalow thereon, are useful expenditures; for they add to the
value of the property (Aringo vs. Arenas, 14 Phil. 263; Alburo vs.
Villanueva, 7 Phil. 277; Valencia vs. Ayala de Roxas, 13 Phil. 45).
22. Article 546 and 547; Possessor in good faith entitled
to right of retention of useful improvement and right to a
refund for useful expenses; Implies contrary to possessor
in bad faith
Under the second paragraph of Article 546, the possessor in good
faith can retain the useful improvements unless the person who
defeated him in his possession refunds him the amount of such
useful expenses or pay him the increased value the land may
have acquired by reason thereof. Under Article 547, the possessor
in good faith has also the right to remove the useful
improvements if such removal can be done without damage to the
land, unless the person with the superior right elects to pay for
the useful improvements or reimburse the expenses therefor
under paragraph 2 of Article 546. These provisions seem to imply
that the possessor in bad faith has neither the right of retention of
useful improvements nor the right to a refund for useful
expenses.
MWSS V CA
3. Possessor in bad faith does not have the right to remove
useful improvements
Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that "he
who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another,
loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity."
As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful
improvements it had made without right to indemnity (Santos vs.
Mojica, Jan. 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 703).
4. Only possessor in good faith has right to be refunded for
useful expenses with right of retention until reimbursed; or
removal of useful improvements without damage to the
principal thing
Under Article 546 of said code, only a possessor in good faith shall
be refunded for useful expenses with the right of retention until
reimbursed; and under Article 547 thereof, only a possessor in
good faith may remove useful improvements if the can be done
without damage to the principal thing and if the person who
recovers the possession does not exercise the option of
reimbursing the useful expenses.
5. Possessor in bad faith has right to remove
improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided
such suffers no injury thereby
The right given a possessor in bad faith is to remove
improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or
mere pleasure, provided the thing suffers no injury thereby and
the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the
value they have at the time he enters into possession (Article
549, Id.).
6. Mindanao Academy v. Yap
In Mindanao Academy, Inc. vs. Yap (13 SCRA 190), it was held
that "if the defendant constructed a new building, as he alleges,
he cannot recover its value because the construction was done
after the filing of the action for annulment, thus rendering him a
builder in bad faith who is denied by law any right of
reimbursement." What this Court allowed appellant Yap to remove
were the equipment, books, furniture and fixtures brought in by
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him, because they were outside of the scope of the judgment and
may be retained by him.
7. Carbonell v. CA cannot invoke to modify the provisions
of the Code; Case is not a precedent
The decision in the case of Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals (69
SCRA 99) cannot be invoked to modify the clear provisions of the
Civil Code of the Philippines that a possessor in bad faith is not
entitled to reimbursement of useful expenses or to removal of
useful improvements. In said case, the lower courts found that
respondents Infantes were possessors in good faith. On appeal,
the First Division of this Court reversed the decision of the Court
of Appeals and declared petitioner Carbonell to have the superior
right to the land in question. On the question of whether or not
respondents Infantes were possessors in good faith, four
Members ruled that they were not, but as a matter of equity
allowed them to remove the useful improvements they had
introduced on the land. Justice Teehankee (now Chief Justice)
concurred on the same premise as the dissenting opinion of
Justice Muñoz Palma that both the conflicting buyers of the real
property in question, namely petitioner Carbonell as the first
buyer and respondents Infantes as the second buyer, may be
deemed purchasers in good faith at the respective dates of their
purchase. Justice Muñoz Palma dissented on the ground that since
both purchasers were undoubtedly in good faith, respondents
Infantes' prior registration of the sale in good faith entitled them
to the ownership of the land. Inasmuch as only four Members
concurred in ruling that respondents Infantes were possessors in
bad faith and two Members ruled that they were possessors in
good faith, said decision does not establish a precedent.
ROMEO EDU V HON.GOMEZ
There is no merit in the petition considering that the acquirer or
the purchaser in good faith of a chattel of movable property is
entitled to be respected and protected in his possession as if he
were the true owner thereof until a competent court rules
otherwise. In the meantime, as the true owner, the possessor in
good faith cannot be compelled to surrender possession nor to be
required to institute an action for the recovery of the chattel,
whether or not an indemnity bond is issued in his favor. The filing
of an information charging that the chattel was illegally obtained
through estafa from its true owner by the transferor of the bona
fide possessor does not warrant disturbing the possession of the
chattel against the will of the possessor.
Finally, the claim of petitioners that the Commission has the right
to seize and impound the car under Section 60 of Republic Act
4136 which reads:
Sec. 60. The lien upon motor vehicles. Any balance of fees for
registration, re-registration or delinquent registration of a motor
vehicle, remaining unpaid and all fines imposed upon any vehicle
owner, shall constitute a first lien upon the motor vehicle
concerned.
is untenable. it is clear from the provision of said Section 60 of
Republic Act 4136 that the Commissioner's right to seize and
impound subject property is only good for the proper enforcement
of lien upon motor vehicles. The Land Transportation Commission
may issue a warrant of constructive or actual distraint against
motor vehicle for collection of unpaid fees for registration, re-
registration or delinquent registration of vehicles.
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Art. 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of
another with the obligation of preserving its form and
substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise
provides. (467)
USUFRUCT - Real right of a temporary nature which authorizes its
holder to enjoy all the benefits which results from the normal
enjoyment of another’s property with the obligation to return at
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the designated time, either the same thing or, in special cases, its
equivalent.
*includes both jus utendi and jus fruendi.
*there can be usufruct of rights and unproductive things.
*usufruct on consumable things – not on the thing itself but on its
value, if appraised, or on an equal quantity or quality,if not
appraised.
Art. 563. Usufruct is constituted by law, by the will of private
persons expressed in acts inter vivos or in a last will and
testament, and by prescription. (468)
1. Legal – provided by law [parents over properties of
children].
2. Voluntary – created by will f persons.
3. Mixed/By Prescription
Art. 564. Usufruct may be constituted on the whole or a part
of the fruits of the thing, in favor of one more persons,
simultaneously or successively, and in every case from or to
a certain day, purely or conditionally. It may also be
constituted on a right, provided it is not strictly personal or
intransmissible. (469)
1. TOTAL/PARTIAL
2. SIMPLE/MULTIPLE
3. SIMULTANEOUS/SUCCESSIVE
4. PURE/CONDITIONAL/WITH A TERM
5. OVER THINGS/RIGHTS
Usufruct Over Right – of same nature as the right which is
burdened [i.e. usufruct of real right is also a real right].
Art. 565. The rights and obligations of the usufructuary shall
be those provided in the title constituting the usufruct; in
default of such title, or in case it is deficient, the provisions
contained in the two following Chapters shall be
observed. (470)
Rights and duties of the usufructuary provided by law may be
modified or eliminated by the parties.
*naked owner y authorize the usufructuary to alienate the thing.
Art. 566. The usufructuary shall be entitled to all the natural,
industrial and civil fruits of the property in usufruct. With
respect to hidden treasure which may be found on the land
or tenement, he shall be considered a stranger. (471)
Usufructuary has the same rights as the owner but only with
respect to its use and receipt of its fruits.
*he has right to administer the property.
*usufructuary rights may be transferred, assigned, or otherwise
disposed of by the usufructuary. They are also not exempt from
execution and can be sold at public auction.
Products of a thing which when taken from it diminishes its
substance, such as minerals from mines and stones from quarries
form part of the capital and do not pertain to the usufructuary
[unless the owner, before constitution of the usufruct, has
dedicated the property to the exploitation of such products].
*with respect to hidden treasure, the parties may also freely
stipulate, and even agree that hidden treasure found on the
property shall belong wholly to the usufructuary.
Rights of Naked Owner
He can exercise all the rights of ownership consistent with the
enjoyment of the thing by the usufructuary [i.e. sell or
encumber].
He is entitled to products w/c do not constitute fruits [i.e. ½ of
hidden treasure].
Art. 567. Natural or industrial fruits growing at the time the
usufruct begins, belong to the usufructuary.
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Those growing at the time the usufruct terminates, belong to
the owner.
In the preceding cases, the usufructuary, at the beginning of
the usufruct, has no obligation to refund to the owner any
expenses incurred; but the owner shall be obliged to
reimburse at the termination of the usufruct, from the
proceeds of the growing fruits, the ordinary expenses of
cultivation, for seed, and other similar expenses incurred by
the usufructuary.
The provisions of this article shall not prejudice the rights of
third persons, acquired either at the beginning or at the
termination of the usufruct. (472)
Fruits which would have already been gathered, because they are
ripe and mature, but which remained ungathered due to acts
imputable to the naked owner or 3rd person or even force majeure
or F.E., remain with the usufructuary.
Usufructuary is not bound to pay production expenses to naked
owner for fruits pending at the birth of the usufruct [but if 3rd
person, he is bound].
Art. 568. If the usufructuary has leased the lands or
tenements given in usufruct, and the usufruct should expire
before the termination of the lease, he or his heirs and
successors shall receive only the proportionate share of the
rent that must be paid by the lessee. (473)
A lease executed by the owner before the creation of the usufruct
is not extinguished by such usufruct.
Rents are civil fruits – usufructuary is entitled thereto.
Art. 569. Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily, and belong
to the usufructuary in proportion to the time the usufruct
may last. (474)
Art. 570. Whenever a usufruct is constituted on the right to
receive a rent or periodical pension, whether in money or in
fruits, or in the interest on bonds or securities payable to
bearer, each payment due shall be considered as the
proceeds or fruits of such right.
Whenever it consists in the enjoyment of benefits accruing
from a participation in any industrial or commercial
enterprise, the date of the distribution of which is not fixed,
such benefits shall have the same character.
In either case they shall be distributed as civil fruits, and
shall be applied in the manner prescribed in the preceding
article. (475)
Art. 571. The usufructuary shall have the right to enjoy any
increase which the thing in usufruct may acquire through
accession, the servitudes established in its favor, and, in
general, all the benefits inherent therein. (479)
Art. 572. The usufructuary may personally enjoy the thing in
usufruct, lease it to another, or alienate his right of usufruct,
even by a gratuitous title; but all the contracts he may enter
into as such usufructuary shall terminate upon the
expiration of the usufruct, saving leases of rural lands, which
shall be considered as subsisting during the agricultural
year. (480)
Transfer or lease of the usufruct does not terminate the relation
of the usufructuary with the owner. The usufructuary will be liable
to the owner for damages caused by the fault or negligence of the
transferee or the lessee.
*usufruct does not terminate upon death of the transferee but it
terminates upon the death of the usufructuary.
Usufructuary cannot alienate or dispose of objects included in the
usufruct.
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Usufructuary may dispose of the thing in the following cases:
1. Things are consumable
2. Things are by their nature, intended for sale.
3. Things are delivered under appraisal s equivalent to their
sale.
Usufructuary may sell future crops.
*if usufruct is terminated before harvest:
Sale is valid [and price not yet paid] – owner is entitled to
receive from vendee.
If price already paid – usufructuary is obliged to reimburse.
If sale is void as to the owner – vendee can recover price from
usufructuary.
*validity depends upon the ratification by the naked owner of the
sale
*Only voluntary usufructs can be alienated.
Art. 573. Whenever the usufruct includes things which,
without being consumed, gradually deteriorate through wear
and tear, the usufructuary shall have the right to make use
thereof in accordance with the purpose for which they are
intended, and shall not be obliged to return them at the
termination of the usufruct except in their condition at that
time; but he shall be obliged to indemnify the owner for any
deterioration they may have suffered by reason of his fraud
or negligence. (481)
Usufructuary is to return the thing in the condition in which it may
be found at the time of expiration of the usufruct.
The law renders the usufructuary not liable for deterioration due
to normal wear and tear.
He is only liable for deterioration only when it is caused by his
frau or negligence.
Art. 574. Whenever the usufruct includes things which
cannot be used without being consumed, the usufructuary
shall have the right to make use of them under the obligation
of paying their appraised value at the termination of the
usufruct, if they were appraised when delivered. In case they
were not appraised, he shall have the right to return at the
same quantity and quality, or pay their current price at the
time the usufruct ceases. (482)
The usufruct in this particular case is not upon the consumable
things themselves but upon the sum representing their value or
upon a quantity of tings of the same kind and quality.
*usufructuary becomes the owner of the thing while the grantor
becomes the creditor entitled to the value or to a thing of the
same kind and quantity.
Art. 575. The usufructuary of fruit-bearing trees and shrubs
may make use of the dead trunks, and even of those cut off or
uprooted by accident, under the obligation to replace them
with new plants.(483a)
Art. 576. If in consequence of a calamity or extraordinary
event, the trees or shrubs shall have disappeared in such
considerable number that it would not be possible or it
would be too burdensome to replace them, the usufructuary
may leave the dead, fallen or uprooted trunks at the disposal
of the owner, and demand that the latter remove them and
clear the land. (484a)
Art. 577. The usufructuary of woodland may enjoy all the
benefits which it may produce according to its nature.
If the woodland is a copse or consists of timber for building,
the usufructuary may do such ordinary cutting or felling as
the owner was in the habit of doing, and in default of this, he
may do so in accordance with the custom of the place, as to
the manner, amount and season.
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In any case the felling or cutting of trees shall be made in
such manner as not to prejudice the preservation of the land.
In nurseries, the usufructuary may make the necessary
thinnings in order that the remaining trees may properly
grow.
With the exception of the provisions of the preceding
paragraphs, the usufructuary cannot cut down trees unless it
be to restore or improve some of the things in usufruct, and
in such case shall first inform the owner of the necessity for
the work. (485)
Art. 578. The usufructuary of an action to recover real
property or a real right, or any movable property, has the
right to bring the action and to oblige the owner thereof to
give him the authority for this purpose and to furnish him
whatever proof he may have. If in consequence of the
enforcement of the action he acquires the thing claimed, the
usufruct shall be limited to the fruits, the dominion
remaining with the owner. (486)
Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in
usufruct such useful improvements or expenses for mere
pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does not alter
its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be
indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such
improvements, should it be possible to do so without damage
to the property. (487)
Whenever the usufructuary can remove the improvements
without injury to the property in usufruct, he has a right to do so,
and the owner cannot prevent him from doing so even upon
payment of their value.
*he may demolish/destroy the improvements provided he leaves
the land as it was before construction of such improvement.
Art. 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements he
may have made on the property against any damage to the
same. (488)
It is necessary that the improvements should have increased the
value of the property, and that the damages are imputable to the
usufructuary.
Art. 581. The owner of property the usufruct of which is held
by another, may alienate it, but he cannot alter its form or
substance, or do anything thereon which may be prejudicial
to the usufructuary. (489)
Art. 582. The usufructuary of a part of a thing held in
common shall exercise all the rights pertaining to the owner
thereof with respect to the administration and the collection
of fruits or interest. Should the co-ownership cease by
reason of the division of the thing held in common, the
usufruct of the part allotted to the co-owner shall belong to
the usufructuary. (490)
Right of the usufructuary is not affected by the division of the
property in usufruct among the co-owners.
Art. 583. The usufructuary, before entering upon the
enjoyment of the property, is obliged:
(1) To make, after notice to the owner or his legitimate
representative, an inventory of all the property, which shall
contain an appraisal of the movables and a description of the
condition of the immovables;
(2) To give security, binding himself to fulfill the obligations
imposed upon him in accordance with this Chapter. (491)
These requirements are not conditions precedent to the
commencement of the right of the usufructuary, but merely to the
entry upon the possession and enjoyment of the property.
The law does not require the concurrence of the owner in the
making of the inventory. It is sufficient for the usufructuary to
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notify him, and he may attend or not, personally or through an
authorized representative.
*expenses for the inventory – borne by the usufructuary.
The security may be a personal bond, a pledge, or a mortgage.
Art. 584. The provisions of No. 2 of the preceding article shall
not apply to the donor who has reserved the usufruct of the
property donated, or to the parents who are usufructuaries
of their children's property, except when the parents
contract a second marriage. (492a)
Art. 585. The usufructuary, whatever may be the title of the
usufruct, may be excused from the obligation of making an
inventory or of giving security, when no one will be injured
thereby. (493)
WHERE INVENTORY OR GIVING SECURITY IS NOT REQUIRED
1. Where owner waives the giving of a security or the making
of an inventory
2. Where the title constituting the usufruct exempts the
usufructuary from any or both these obligations
3. Where the usufructuary asks to be relieved from the
obligations, and no one will be injured by such exemption
[such as usufruct over a periodic income/pension].
*if owner refuses exemption, resort may be had to the courts
for judicial declaration thereof taking into account the special
circumstances.
The code does not provide for the effect of the failure to make an
inventory when the usufructuary is not exempt from making it.
Art. 586. Should the usufructuary fail to give security in the
cases in which he is bound to give it, the owner may demand
that the immovables be placed under administration, that
the movables be sold, that the public bonds, instruments of
credit payable to order or to bearer be converted into
registered certificates or deposited in a bank or public
institution, and that the capital or sums in cash and the
proceeds of the sale of the movable property be invested in
safe securities.
The interest on the proceeds of the sale of the movables and
that on public securities and bonds, and the proceeds of the
property placed under administration, shall belong to the
usufructuary.
Furthermore, the owner may, if he so prefers, until the
usufructuary gives security or is excused from so doing,
retain in his possession the property in usufruct as
administrator, subject to the obligation to deliver to the
usufructuary the net proceeds thereof, after deducting the
sums which may be agreed upon or judicially allowed him for
such administration. (494)
Potestative right granted to the naked owner, if he does not wish
to exercise it, he may deliver the property to the usufructuary
[delivery cannot be interpreted as renunciation of right to demand
security].
Usufructuary who does not possess the property, by virtue of the
provisions of this article, may alienate his right in the same form
that he holds it, w/out prejudice to the right of the transferee to
give the required security [but lease cannot be executed by the
usufructuary].
Art. 587. If the usufructuary who has not given security
claims, by virtue of a promise under oath, the delivery of the
furniture necessary for his use, and that he and his family be
allowed to live in a house included in the usufruct, the court
may grant this petition, after due consideration of the facts of
the case.
The same rule shall be observed with respect to implements,
tools and other movable property necessary for an industry
or vocation in which he is engaged.
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 PROPERTY
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If the owner does not wish that certain articles be sold
because of their artistic worth or because they have a
sentimental value, he may demand their delivery to him
upon his giving security for the payment of the legal interest
on their appraised value. (495)
It is only by way of exception that caucion juratoria is allowed,
and only under the special circumstances mentioned in this
article, upon petition of the usufructuary, and according to judicial
order.
*usufructuary who holds property under CJ can neither alienate
his right nor lease the property, for that would mean that he does
not need the dwelling or the implements and furniture.
Art. 588. After the security has been given by the
usufructuary, he shall have a right to all the proceeds and
benefits from the day on which, in accordance with the title
constituting the usufruct, he should have commenced to
receive them. (496)
Upon giving the security, the usufructuary will be entitled to all
the benefits accruing since the time when he should have begun
to receive them [thus retroactive].
Art. 589. The usufructuary shall take care of the things given
in usufruct as a good father of a family. (497)
It is not necessary for the naked owner to wait for the termination
of the usufruct before bringing an action to recover the proper
indemnity.
Art. 590. A usufructuary who alienates or leases his right of
usufruct shall answer for any damage which the things in
usufruct may suffer through the fault or negligence of the
person who substitutes him. (498)
Art. 591. If the usufruct be constituted on a flock or herd of
livestock, the usufructuary shall be obliged to replace with
the young thereof the animals that die each year from
natural causes, or are lost due to the rapacity of beasts of
prey.
If the animals on which the usufruct is constituted should all
perish, without the fault of the usufructuary, on account of
some contagious disease or any other uncommon event, the
usufructuary shall fulfill his obligation by delivering to the
owner the remains which may have been saved from the
misfortune.
Should the herd or flock perish in part, also by accident and
without the fault of the usufructuary, the usufruct shall
continue on the part saved.
Should the usufruct be on sterile animals, it shall be
considered, with respect to its effects, as though constituted
on fungible things. (499a)
Art. 592. The usufructuary is obliged to make the ordinary
repairs needed by the thing given in usufruct.
By ordinary repairs are understood such as are required by
the wear and tear due to the natural use of the thing and are
indispensable for its preservation. Should the usufructuary
fail to make them after demand by the owner, the latter may
make them at the expense of the usufructuary. (500)
Requisites for ordinary repair
1. That the deteriorations or defects arise from the natural
use of the thing
2. The repairs are necessary for the preservation of the thing.
*deteriorations caused by time or age and the
destruction/consumption of the thing by use do not fall within the
concept of ordinary repairs.
*not obliged to pay for repairs prior to usufruct; if defects already
present before usufruct, he is not obliged to make repairs
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Usufructuary cannot excuse himself from liability by renouncing
the usufruct [defects due to his fault].
If defects are existing before the renunciation are occasioned by
the ordinary use of the thing, the usufructuary may exempt
himself from making the repairs by returning to the owner the
fruits received during the time that the defects took place.
Art. 593. Extraordinary repairs shall be at the expense of the
owner. The usufructuary is obliged to notify the owner when
the need for such repairs is urgent. (501)
Art. 594. If the owner should make the extraordinary
repairs, he shall have a right to demand of the usufructuary
the legal interest on the amount expended for the time that
the usufruct lasts.
Should he not make them when they are indispensable for
the preservation of the thing, the usufructuary may make
them; but he shall have a right to demand of the owner, at the
termination of the usufruct, the increase in value which the
immovable may have acquired by reason of the
repairs. (502a)
DEFECTS OF DETERIORATIONS REQUIRING EXTRAORDINARY
REPAIRS ARE OF TWO KINDS
1. Caused by exceptional circumstances, whether or not they
are necessary for the preservation of the thing
2. Those caused by the natural use of the thing, but are
necessary for its preservation.
Expenses for extraordinary repairs are borne by the owner but
the usufructuary cannot compel him to make such repairs.
If need for repairs is urgent [required for preservation] -
usufructuary is required to give notice thereof.
If not urgent – there is no obligation to give notice.
Whether notice was given or not, the owner may make the
repairs, and collect from the usufructuary the legal interest on the
amount invested, as long as usufruct lasts.
If owner does not make them, the usufructuary may make them,
but only when they are necessary for preservation, and he shall
be entitled to indemnity.
If owner pays for repairs, the usufructuary should pay legal
interest on the amount invested, until the usufruct expires.
Usufructuary who has made the extraordinary repairs necessary
for preservation, is entitled to recover from the owner the
increase in value which the tenement acquired by reason of such
works.
Art. 595. The owner may construct any works and make any
improvements of which the immovable in usufruct is
susceptible, or make new plantings thereon if it be rural,
provided that such acts do not cause a diminution in the
value of the usufruct or prejudice the right of the
usufructuary. (503)
Any advantage or increase in the use or enjoyment of the thing
due to the improvements or plantings introduced by the owner
will inure to the benefit of the usufructuary [no interest due to the
owner because he voluntarily made them].
*Rabuya from here on
Art. 596. The payment of annual charges and taxes and of
those considered as a lien on the fruits, shall be at the
expense of the usufructuary for all the time that the usufruct
lasts. (504)
Art. 597. The taxes which, during the usufruct, may be
imposed directly on the capital, shall be at the expense of the
owner.
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 PROPERTY
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If the latter has paid them, the usufructuary shall pay him
the proper interest on the sums which may have been paid in
that character; and, if the said sums have been advanced by
the usufructuary, he shall recover the amount thereof at the
termination of the usufruct. (505)
Art. 598. If the usufruct be constituted on the whole of a
patrimony, and if at the time of its constitution the owner
has debts, the provisions of Articles 758 and 759 relating to
donations shall be applied, both with respect to the
maintenance of the usufruct and to the obligation of the
usufructuary to pay such debts.
The same rule shall be applied in case the owner is obliged, at
the time the usufruct is constituted, to make periodical
payments, even if there should be no known capital. (506)
Art. 599. The usufructuary may claim any matured credits
which form a part of the usufruct if he has given or gives the
proper security. If he has been excused from giving security
or has been able to give it, or if that given is not sufficient, he
shall need the authorization of the owner, or of the court in
default thereof, to collect such credits.
The usufructuary who has given security may use the capital
he has collected in any manner he may deem proper. The
usufructuary who has not given security shall invest the said
capital at interest upon agreement with the owner; in default
of such agreement, with judicial authorization; and, in every
case, with security sufficient to preserve the integrity of the
capital in usufruct. (507)
Art. 600. The usufructuary of a mortgaged immovable shall
not be obliged to pay the debt for the security of which the
mortgage was constituted.
Should the immovable be attached or sold judicially for the
payment of the debt, the owner shall be liable to the
usufructuary for whatever the latter may lose by reason
thereof. (509)
Art. 601. The usufructuary shall be obliged to notify the
owner of any act of a third person, of which he may have
knowledge, that may be prejudicial to the rights of
ownership, and he shall be liable should he not do so, for
damages, as if they had been caused through his own
fault. (511)
Art. 602. The expenses, costs and liabilities in suits brought
with regard to the usufruct shall be borne by the
usufructuary. (512)
Payment of Annual Charges and Taxes
- Shall be borne by the usufructuary for all the time the
usufruct lasts.
- Taxes imposed directly on the capital shall be borne by
the owner [usufructuary is obliged to pay interest on the
sums which may have been paid in that character].
Land taxes – directly burdens the capital and should be paid by
the owner.
Usufructuary is obliged to notify the owner of any act of a 3rd
person w/c may be prejudicial to the “rights of ownership.”
*otherwise he shall be liable for damages as if he himself caused
the same.
*usufructuary is not obliged to notify the owner when acts of the
3rd person does not affect ownership but only his rights.
Art. 603. Usufruct is extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary
intention clearly appears;
(2) By the expiration of the period for which it was
constituted, or by the fulfillment of any resolutory condition
provided in the title creating the usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same
person;
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(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting
the usufruct;
(7) By prescription. (513a)
Art. 604. If the thing given in usufruct should be lost only in
part, the right shall continue on the remaining part. (514)
Art. 605. Usufruct cannot be constituted in favor of a town,
corporation, or association for more than fifty years. If it has
been constituted, and before the expiration of such period
the town is abandoned, or the corporation or association is
dissolved, the usufruct shall be extinguished by reason
thereof. (515a)
Art. 606. A usufruct granted for the time that may elapse
before a third person attains a certain age, shall subsist for
the number of years specified, even if the third person
should die before the period expires, unless such usufruct
has been expressly granted only in consideration of the
existence of such person. (516)
Art. 607. If the usufruct is constituted on immovable
property of which a building forms part, and the latter
should be destroyed in any manner whatsoever, the
usufructuary shall have a right to make use of the land and
the materials.
The same rule shall be applied if the usufruct is constituted
on a building only and the same should be destroyed. But in
such a case, if the owner should wish to construct another
building, he shall have a right to occupy the land and to make
use of the materials, being obliged to pay to the usufructuary,
during the continuance of the usufruct, the interest upon the
sum equivalent to the value of the land and of the
materials. (517)
Art. 608. If the usufructuary shares with the owner the
insurance of the tenement given in usufruct, the former
shall, in case of loss, continue in the enjoyment of the new
building, should one be constructed, or shall receive the
interest on the insurance indemnity if the owner does not
wish to rebuild.
Should the usufructuary have refused to contribute to the
insurance, the owner insuring the tenement alone, the latter
shall receive the full amount of the insurance indemnity in
case of loss, saving always the right granted to the
usufructuary in the preceding article. (518a)
Art. 609. Should the thing in usufruct be expropriated for
public use, the owner shall be obliged either to replace it with
another thing of the same value and of similar conditions, or
to pay the usufructuary the legal interest on the amount of
the indemnity for the whole period of the usufruct. If the
owner chooses the latter alternative, he shall give security
for the payment of the interest. (519)
Art. 610. A usufruct is not extinguished by bad use of the
thing in usufruct; but if the abuse should cause considerable
injury to the owner, the latter may demand that the thing be
delivered to him, binding himself to pay annually to the
usufructuary the net proceeds of the same, after deducting
the expenses and the compensation which may be allowed
him for its administration. (520)
Art. 611. A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons
living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished
until death of the last survivor. (521)
Art. 612. Upon the termination of the usufruct, the thing in
usufruct shall be delivered to the owner, without prejudice to
the right of retention pertaining to the usufructuary or his
heirs for taxes and extraordinary expenses which should be
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 PROPERTY
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reimbursed. After the delivery has been made, the security or
mortgage shall be cancelled. (522a)
CAUSES FOR EXTINGUISHMENT
1. Death of usufructuary
a. unless contrary intention clearly appears
b. in case of multiple usufruct [only upon death of
last surviving usufructuary]
2. Expiration of the period for which it was
constituted/fulfillment of any Resolutory condition provided
in the title creating usufruct
3. Merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person
4. Renunciation of the usufruct
5. Total loss of the thing in usufruct
When it perishes, goes out of commerce, or
disappears in such a manner that its existence is
unknown or it cannot be recovered.
6. Termination of the right of person constituting the usufruct
7. By prescription
Usufruct is limited to 50 years if IFO a corporation, town, or
association.
Death of the naked owner does not extinguish the usufruct unless
the contrary is stipulated.
Upon termination
Usufructuary is obliged to return the property to the naked owner
unless he is entitled to exercise right of retention:
1. Payment of sums advanced by the usufructuary for taxes
directly imposed on principal.
2. Increase in value w/c the immovable property acquired by
reason of the extraordinary repairs paid by for by the
usufructuary.
RAMIREZ V VDA. DE RAMIREZ
The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the
estate in favor of Wanda is void because it violates the
constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by
aliens.
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to
Wanda on the ground that the Constitution covers not only
succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession.
We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which
enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to
testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for
naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent
the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in
exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of
Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title
to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land
in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
FABIE V CA
It is admitted by the parties that the petitioner Josefa Fabie is the
usufructuary of the income of the property in question and that
the respondent Juan Grey is the owner thereof. It is likewise
admitted that by virtue of a final judgment entered in civil case
No. 1659 of the Court of First Instance of Manila between the
usufructuary and the owner, the former has the right to collect all
the rents of said property for herself with the obligation on her
part to pay all the real estate taxes, special assessments, and
insurance premiums, and make all necessary repairs thereon, and
in case default on her part the owner shall have the right to do all
those things, in which event he shall be entitled to collect all
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Property of RJ Martinez
II – LLB, University of San Carlos – College of Law
subsequent rents of the property concerned until the amount paid
by him and the expenses of collection are fully satisfied, after
which the usufructuary shall again collect the rents. There is
therefore no dispute as to the title to or the respective interests of
the parties in the property in question. The naked title to the
property is to admittedly in the respondent Juan Grey, but the
right to all the rents thereof, with the obligation to pay the taxes
and insurance premiums and make the necessary repairs, is, also
admittedly, vested in the usufructuary, the petitioner Josefa
Fabie, during her lifetime. The only question between the plaintiff
and the intervenor is: Who has the right to manage or administer
the property — to select the tenant and to fix the amount of the
rent? Whoever has that right has the right to the control and
possession of the property in question, regardless of the title
thereto. Therefore, the action is purely possessory and not one in
any way involving the title to the property. Indeed, the averments
and the prayer of the complaint filed in the municipal court so
indicate, and as a matter of fact the defendant Ngo Soo does not
pretend to be the owner of the property, but on the contrary
admits to be a mere tenant thereof. We have repeatedly held that
in determining whether an action of this kind is within the original
jurisdiction of the municipal court or of the Court of First Instance,
the averments of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought are primarily to be consulted; that the defendant in such
an action cannot defeat the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace
or municipal court by setting up title in himself; and that the
factor which defeats the jurisdiction of said court is the necessity
to adjudicate the question of title. (Mediranvs. Villanueva, 37
Phil., 752, 759; Medel vs. Militante, 41 Phil., 526, 529;
Sevilla vs. Tolentino, 51 Phil., 333; Supia and
Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil., 312; Lizo vs. Carandang,
G.R. No. 47833, 2 Off. Gaz., 302; Aguilarvs. Cabrera and
Flameño, G.R. No. 49129.)
MORALIDAD V SPS. PERNES
Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to
enjoy another’s property.[9] It is also defined as the right to enjoy
the property of another temporarily, including both the jus
utendi and the jus fruendi,[10] with the owner retaining the jus
disponendi or the power to alienate the same.[11]
It is undisputed that petitioner, in a document dated July 21,
1986, supra, made known her intention to give respondents and
her other kins the right to use and to enjoy the fruits of her
property. There can also be no quibbling about the respondents
being given the right “to build their own house” on the property
and to stay thereat “as long as they like.” Paragraph #5 of the
same document earmarks “proceeds or income derived from the
aforementioned properties” for the petitioner’s “nearest kins who
have less in life in greater percentage and lesser percentage to
those who are better of (sic) in standing.” The established facts
undoubtedly gave respondents not only the right to use the
property but also granted them, among the petitioner’s other
kins, the right to enjoy the fruits thereof. We have no
quarrel, therefore, with the CA’s
ruling that usufruct was constituted between petitioner and
respondents. It is thus pointless to discuss why there was no
lease contract between the parties.
However, determinative of the outcome of the ejectment case is
the resolution of the next issue, i.e., whether the existing usufruct
may be deemed to have been extinguished or terminated. If the
question is resolved in the affirmative, then the respondents’ right
to possession, proceeding as it did from their right of
usufruct, likewise ceased. In that case, petitioner’s action for
ejectment in the unlawful detainer case could proceed and should
prosper.
XXX XXX XXX
We disagree with the CA’s conclusion of law on the matter. The
term or period of the usufruct originally specified provides only
one of the bases for the right of a usufructuary to hold and retain
possession of the thing given in usufruct. There are other modes
Cases based on PROPERTY Syllabus for AY2010-2011 & Comments on Tolentino, NCC Book II
 PROPERTY
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or instances whereby the usufruct shall be considered terminated reimbursement. If the rule on reimbursement or indemnity were
or extinguished. For sure, the Civil Code enumerates such other otherwise, then the usufructuary might, as an author pointed out,
modes of extinguishment: improve the owner out of his property.[15] The respondents may,
however, remove or destroy the improvements they may have
XXX XXX XXX introduced thereon without damaging the petitioner’s property.
Out of the generosity of her heart, the petitioner has allowed the
The document executed by the petitioner dated July 21, respondent spouses to use and enjoy the fruits of her property for
1986 constitutes the title creating, and sets forth the conditions quite a long period of time. They opted, however, to repay a
of, the usufruct. Paragraph #3 thereof states “[T]hat anyone of noble gesture with unkindness. At the end of the day, therefore,
my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail they really cannot begrudge their aunt for putting an end to their
the use thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not right of usufruct. The disposition herein arrived is not only legal
inimical to the purpose thereof” (Emphasis supplied). What and called for by the law and facts of the case. It is also right.
may be inimical to the purpose constituting the usufruct may be
gleaned from the preceding paragraph wherein petitioner made it
abundantly clear “that anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on
the aforementioned property should maintain an atmosphere
of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering
with one another.” That the maintenance of a peaceful and
harmonious relations between and among kin constitutes an
indispensable condition for the continuance of the usufruct is
clearly deduced from the succeeding Paragraph #4 where
petitioner stated “[T]hat anyone of my kins who cannot
conform with the wishes of the undersigned may exercise
the freedom to look for his own.” In fine, the occurrence of any
of the following: the loss of the atmosphere of cooperation, the
bickering or the cessation of harmonious relationship
between/among kin constitutes a resolutory condition which,
by express wish of the petitioner,extinguishes the
usufruct.
From the pleadings submitted by the parties, it is
indubitable that there were indeed facts and circumstances
whereby the subject usufruct may be deemed terminated or
extinguished by the occurrence of the resolutory conditions
provided for in the title creating the usufruct, namely, the
document adverted to which the petitioner executed on July 21,
1986.
As aptly pointed out by the petitioner in her Memorandum,
respondents’ own evidence before the MTCC indicated that the
relations between the parties “have deteriorated to almost an
irretrievable level.”[13] There is no doubt then that what impelled
petitioner to file complaints before the local barangay lupon, the
Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, and this instant complaint
for unlawful detainer before the MTCC is that she could not live
peacefully and harmoniously with the Pernes family and vice
versa.
Thus, the Court rules that the continuing animosity between the
petitioner and the Pernes family and the violence and humiliation
she was made to endure, despite her advanced age and frail
condition, are enough factual bases to consider the usufruct as
having been terminated.
To reiterate, the relationship between the petitioner and
respondents respecting the property in question is one of owner
and usufructuary. Accordingly, respondents’ claim for
reimbursement of the improvements they introduced on the
property during the effectivity of the usufruct should be governed
by applicable statutory provisions and principles on usufruct. In
this regard, we cite with approval what Justice Edgardo Paras
wrote on the matter:
If the builder is a usufructuary, his rights will be
governed by Arts. 579 and 580. In case like this, the terms of
the contract and the pertinent provisions of law should govern
(3 Manresa 215-216; se also Montinola vs. Bantug, 71 Phil.
449).[14] (Emphasis ours.)

By express provision of law, respondents, as usufructuary, do not

have the right to reimbursement for the improvements they may
have introduced on the property. We quote Articles 579 and 580
of the Civil Code:

XXX XXX XXX

Given the foregoing perspective, respondents will have to be

ordered to vacate the premises without any right of
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Property of RJ Martinez
II – LLB, University of San Carlos – College of Law Cases based on PROPERTY Syllabus for AY2010-2011 & Comments on Tolentino, NCC Book II