Geopolitics in the Foreign Office: British Representations of Argentina 1945-1961

Author(s): Klaus-John Dodds

Source: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1994),
pp. 273-290
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Royal Geographical Society (with the
Institute of British Geographers)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/622323
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 273

Geopolitics in the Foreign Office:

British representations of Argentina
1945-1961
Klaus-John Dodds

Existing studies of Anglo-Argentine relations tend to neglect the period 1945-61.

The paper presents a critical geopolitical analysis of British representations of
Argentina within foreign policy discourse. Geopolitical and geoeconomic
representations, including those based on science, mapping and surveying, are
understood as crucial to the legitimation of foreign policies. Government records are
used to explore how a long-standing trading relationship was being replaced by
relations based increasingly on conflict and geopolitical competition in the Antarctic
and the South Atlantic.

key words Anglo-Argentine relations archival research cartography science

critical geopolitics representation

Lecturer in Geography, CEDAR, Department of Geography, Royal Holloway College, University of

London, Egham, Surrey TW20 OEX

revised manuscript received 21 December 1993

Introduction Argentine relations in the 1940s and 1950s were

characterized by a decisive shift away from a
There are many and varied accounts of Anglo- (declining) trading-based relationship to one based
Argentine relations tracing patterns of commercial on geopolitical competition in the South Atlantic. I
relationships,colonization and exploration, and geo- hope to illustrate how existing critical geopolitical
political conflict1. In this paper, it is suggested that studies of foreign policy imaginations and represen-
Anglo-Argentine relations in the 1950s have not tations may be utilized to investigate Anglo-
received the extensive study and investigation char- Argentine history (see, for example, Slater 1993). It
acteristic of previous (e.g. the immediate postwar) is suggested that, in spite of the significant changes
and subsequent (e.g. 1968-1982 and the Falklands/ to the Anglo-Argentine connection, official British
Malvinas War) periods. An important part of the geopolitical and geoeconomic representations of
Anglo-Argentine relationship has thereby been Argentina were surprisingly reactionary. Over a
neglected. The 1950s, for instance, was a time period of fifteen years, the paper charts in detail
when Anglo-Argentine trade had virtually collapsed how those representations were linked to changing
and a period when geopolitical competition over trading and geopolitical circumstances.Ultimately, I
the Falkland Islands and Antarctica was to change would argue that the stereotypical representations
from pressing legal claims to outbreaks of violence. of 'Argentina' led British officials on the one hand
These conflicts were later neutralized by the to exaggerate Argentina as a site of danger yet
emergence of the Antarctic Treaty System in paradoxically, on the other hand, to trivialize
1959-61. Argentina's counter-claims to disputed terri-
This paper attempts to link the research strategies tory such as the Falklands/Malvinas Islands or
of critical geopolitics to a detailed archival-based Antarctica. Tragically, the failure of British govern-
investigation of British government records. Anglo- ments to address those long standing territorial
Trans Inst Br Geogr NS 19 273-290 1994 ISSN: 0020-2754 Printed in Great Britain
274 K-J Dodds
claims ultimately contributed to the outbreak of the making sense of Anglo-Argentine relations. As
1982 Falklands/Mavlinas War (Beck 1988, Dodds such, there is no explicit claim to completeness; my
1993b). interpretation of a range of Foreign Office records
does not enable me to claim to be able to (re)present
the Foreign Office view. The complex webs of
Historical context and archival sources
interaction between civil servants, ministers and
The immediate postwar context for Anglo- other influential individuals can only be inferred.
Argentine affairswas shaped by several distinctive This reliance on inference reflects the restrictions
developments. First, the rapid disintegration of that exist on access under current legislation gov-
Anglo-Argentine trading relations (which had been erning public records. Most records of the Foreign
so decisive in shaping previous Anglo-Argentine Office, Colonial Office and the Dominions Office
history) fundamentally altered the dynamics of that which relate to the Falkland Islands or Antarctic
relationship (see Bulmer-Thomas 1989, Hennessy claims after 1940 are closed for 50 years, sometimes
and King 1992). The nationalization of the even 75 years. Indeed some of the most controver-
Argentine railways in 1947 by the Peron regime, for sial records on assessments of British sovereignty
example, confirmed that trend. Secondly, the rise of are closed indefinitely.
Colonel Peron in Argentine politics from the 1940s By using available archival records, the paper
onwards had a decisive impact on Anglo-Argentine attempts to highlight the existence of remarkably
relations. Peron's promotion of Argentine durable representations of 'Argentina', as a particu-
sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas and the lar type of place within the discourse of British
Antarctic increased the tension between Britainand foreign policy. It is argued that those (geopolitical)
Argentina. representations (and/or imaginations) were crucial
In a broader context, the period in question was to the enframing of the meanings and relations of
shaped by two developments. The first was the Anglo-Argentine relations. For our purposes, there-
consolidation of the United States as the major fore, archivalresearchhas the advantage of allowing
great power within Latin America in the immediate the possibility of reasonably detailed interpretations
postwar period (see Morris 1990, Parkinson 1990). of this period, 1954-1960. The paper is thus con-
The rise of pan-Americanism during the Second fined to elite representations of 'Argentina' and
World War and its consolidation with the 1947 Rio does not link these to popular sites of representation
Treaty (Inter-AmericanTreaty of ReciprocalAssist- (e.g. the media, but see Howells 1992 on the British
ance) on collective defence confirmed that trend press and the Perons). However, it is suggested that
(Dieguez 1989). Secondly, the impact of the second Argentina is represented by elites in a number of
World War on the British economy had a profound different ways: as a place with which Britain has
impact on British overseas investment and defence enjoyed a long trading history and which is now
commitments. British defence spending increased attempting to renegotiate that relationship; as a
significantly in the 1950s largely as a consequence place inscribed as a source of danger to British
of involvements in conflicts such as Korea and in an colonial possessions in the South Atlantic; and as
evolving nuclear weapons programme (Dockrill a place populated by hysterical and hyperbolic
1988). However, in terms of Britain's global pri- political leaders. These representations are signifi-
orities, Latin America continued to be ascribed a cant because they enabled British elites to pursue
low strategic or military importance. As Calvert policies which were remarkably reactionary and
(1990) notes, the promotion of trade in the region which, in turn, contributed little to renegotiating
was to be the central priority, notwithstanding the Anglo-Argentine relations in the second half of the
long-standing territorial disputes in British Guiana, twentieth century.
Belize and the Falklands/Malvinas. The remainderof the paper is organized into four
This paper is based on a reading of records of the sections. First, a brief discussion of critical geo-
Foreign Office (also Cabinet and Admiralty records) politics, cartography and representation aims to
and on interviews with officials attached to the situate the paper within contemporary debates in
American Department of the Foreign Office in the human geography; the subsequent historical narra-
1950s and 1960s.2 Secondary literatures were used tive will be used to illustrate such issues. Secondly,
to supplement this primary data base. The paper the period immediately after the Second World
explores how certain Foreign Office officials were War (1945-51) is explored because many of the
Geopoliticsin the ForeignOffice 275

processes and patterns that can be detected in the 1993) is crucial. Following writers such as Barnes
1950s have their origins in the 1940s (and earlier). and Duncan (1992), critical geopolitical scholars
The third section explores the period between 1950 have suggested that the academic practice of geo-
and 1959. In doing so it is suggested that two politics is not simply about recording the 'realities'
competing scripts of Argentina were used to of the earth (or international politics): the represen-
(re)present 'Argentina' as a place: on the one hand tation of earthly descriptions reveals as much about
as a potential economic partner (with an associated our theories and positionalities as it does about any
history of commercialand culturalrelationshipswith external realities. In an epistemological context,
Britain);on the other hand as a geopolitical rival therefore, critical geopolitics attempts to acknowl-
intent on threatening British sovereign claims in the edge the specificities of those representations.
Antarctic and the South Atlantic. The final section Cartography is an important element of represen-
focuses on the importance of the Antarctic Treaty tation. The map (whether it be, for instance, a
System in suspending possible conflict in Antarctica depiction of a region or the world under a
in the late 1950s and early 1960s at a time when Heartland-Rimland scheme) had been considered
trading relations had virtually disappeared. capable of faithfully representing geopolitical
I hope that this paper will be considered not only realities save for the impossibility posed by scale
in terms of its modest contribution to the existing (Natter and Jones 1993). Echoing the sentiments of
literature on Anglo-Argentine history. As a geo- the late Brian Harley, critical geopolitical writers
graphical study, it has been informed by ongoing such as O Tuathail (1989, 1994), have argued that
debates within political geography and it attempts cartography and geopolitics are far from 'innocent
to explore how places such as Argentina or tools' of representation and are heavily implicated
Antarctica are specified within the narratives of with author(ity)and power. The map and the survey
British foreign policy professionals (whether minis- have been important components in the contri-
ters or civil servants). The sorts of stories that are bution of geography and geopolitics to the consoli-
recounted about places and peoples are crucial to dation and legitimation of territorial sovereignty
the justification and legitimation of certain foreign (Harley 1992). Critical geopolitical writers have
policies. Furthermore,the paper attempts to high- tried to investigate how and with what effect the
light geographical practices such as mapping and representational practices employed more recently
surveying in the legitimation of sovereign claims to by geopoliticians have contributed to the legiti-
territory; in this context the case of the Falkland mation of territorialforms of reasoning and claims
Islands Dependency Survey is briefly considered. to territory and resources.
More specifically, the representation of 'foreign'
Critical geopolitics, cartography and places and people could be considered within the
wider debates on representation within human
representation
geography (e.g. Dalby 1990, O Tuathail and
The recent literature on 'critical geopolitics' has Agnew 1992, Duncan and Sharp 1993). In one
been a major source of inspiration for this paper. By respect, geopolitical writers have long recognized
drawing on theories of representation, cartography that the practices of foreign policy have obvious
and discourse, writers such as Dalby (1990, 1991), geographical connotations (e.g. Spykman 1944,
6 Tuathail (1992a, 1993) and 6 Tuathail and Cohen 1973, Gray 1988). However, an important
Agnew (1992) have attempted to reconstitute geo- distinguishing feature between earlier writers and
politics as an academic practice. Rather than con- critical geopolitical writers is that the geographical
ceptualizing 'geopolitics' as a seemingly self-evident depictions in the narratives of foreign policy are
academic preoccupation (which produces authori- investigated within a context that is also sensitive
tive readings of international politics), critical geo- to the material circumstances from which those
politics has sought to investigate how geopolitical depictions arose (see, for example, 6 Tuathail
discourse is constituted by a series of specialized 1992b). The depictions of place and the politics
languages, grammars and rhetorics. Academic geo- sustaining forms of territorial reasoning are influ-
politics has had a lengthy interest in (re)presenting enced by historical discourses on the nation-state,
other places and peoples within (often) grand geo- territorial politics and (often popular) represen-
political schemes but, for critical geopolitics, the tations (see O Tuathail 1992a, 1992b, 1993; Sharp
concept of representation (see Duncan and Sharp 1993).
276
Within those analyses of the geographical and
geopolitical components of the practices of foreign
policy lie the development of the concepts of the
script and story-telling. The former has been defined
as a 'set of representations, a collection of descrip-
tions, scenarios and attributes deemed to define a
place in foreign policy' within the utterances of
foreign policy professionals (see O Tuathail 1992a,
156). Critical geopolitical writers attempt to
investigate carefully how descriptions of places
and peoples are stitched together to narrate and
'explain' events. Foreign policy professionals are
understood as the 'master' story-tellers; their
interpretations and utterances are crucial to the
legitimation and justification of the practices of
foreign policy (see Slater 1993 on experts, represen-
tation and development theory). The public (and
private) stories of foreign policy professionals con-
tribute to the public expositions that effectively
constitute the practices of foreign policy (Dalby
1990, 0 Tuathail and Agnew 1992).3 In their
detailed investigations of US decision-making dur-
ing the Vietnam conflict, Sylvan and Majeski (1994),
for example, have explored practical forms of geo-
political reasoning employed in foreign-policy-
making. They suggest that a crucial component of
the problem-solving culture of US foreign policy are
the descriptions of specific places. Geographical
depictions of Indo-China (as a place, for example,
infiltrated by communists or anti-imperialists)
altered as the US expanded its involvement in the
region (Sylvan and Majeski 1994). The descriptions
and representations of places can be far more nested
(regions, states, sections), far more complex (people,
history, borders) and far more subtle (locations,
places, internal features) than descriptions of geo-
political circumstances investigated thus far by
critical geopolitical analyses.
As a consequence, this study focuses on a range
of geopolitical and geoeconomic representations
made by Foreign Office mandarins(in the main) and
by the subsequent actions of British governments.
The primary concern of this investigation is how
places such as Argentina or the South Atlantic are
represented (as particulartypes of places) within the
changing and evolving narratives of foreign policy
professionals based in London. Within those narra-
tives on Anglo-Argentine relations lay three major
components: first, British Officials faced a difficult
dilemma: how was Britain (an economically fragile
state in 1945) going to maintain relations with
Argentina, and, more generally, with LatinAmerica?
K-JDodds
In the heyday of Anglo-Argentine relations, trade
and commerce had been important and largely
mutually beneficial for political and economic elites
(see Thompson 1992). Faced with severe shortages
of meat in 1945, however, the British government
looked to Argentina for additional supplies. A new
economic relationship with Argentina had to be
developed within the existing historical discourses
on trade, commerce and resources. Secondly, with
the emergence of Colonel Peron from the 1940s
onwards, British officials were faced with an indi-
vidual able effectively to mobilize discourses of
territorial reasoning to justify support for national-
istic politics. Territorialpolitics between Britainand
Argentina entered its most important phase in the
1950s and 1960s. Thirdly, in terms of policy pre-
scription, British officials were attempting to juggle
the promotion of trade, the protection of the
colonies such as Belize, British Guyana and the
Falkland Islands on reduced defence budgets, and
the changing international politics of Antarctica
(explored later in the paper). Discourses of science
further complicated the contradictory relations
between geoeconomics and geopolitics and led to
the privileging of traditional territorial reasoning
which emphasized British 'sovereign' territory.
Cartographic agencies such as the Falkland Islands
Dependency Survey played an active role in
legitimating such claims.
In spite of the significant changes to Anglo-
Argentine relations in the 1940s and 1950s, British
elites perpetuated representations of Argentina
based on 'familiar'stereotypes of Latin personalities
and nation-states (Gooch 1990a, 1990b). As the
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancasterconcluded in
July 1960:
One has been warnedabout makinggeneralizations
aboutLatinAmerica... On the east side of the Andes
you will find all the vigour, speed and brashness
traditionally associated with North America . . . But on
the west side the tempo is more subdued, more
European,and the graciousarchitecture
of the Spanish
colonialera is not yet subdued.4
The durable representation of Argentina, as a place
dominated by Latin exaggeration and/or grandeur,
was an important component in the British elite
visualization of Anglo-Argentine relations. In con-
sequence Britishintransigence over territorialclaims
in the South Atlantic and Antarctica could be
justified as a reaction to the dangers posed by the
Argentine state.
Geopoliticsin the ForeignOffice
Anglo-Argentine relations between
1945-51
Geoeconomiccompetition
Anglo-Argentine relations during the period im-
mediately after the Second World War compare
unfavourably to the first decades of the twentieth
century (see Hennessy and King 1992). The decades
before the Great Depression of the 1930s repre-
sented the final chapter of a financial and commer-
cial relationship that had witnessed the creation of a
rail network, a banking system and trading relations
based on Argentine imports of manufacturedgoods
and British imports of primary products such as
beef. Furthermore,the existence of a large Anglo-
Argentine community (with, for example, its own
clubs and newspapers) ensured a British(elite) 'sense
of familiarity'for a place not formally incorporated
into the BritishEmpire(see Graham-Yooll 1981). As
Harry Ferns (1953) reminds us, Argentina was part
of Britain's 'informal empire' (although see the
criticalreview of Thompson 1992 on this concept of
'informal empire').
Sir Neville Henderson, a former British ambassa-
dor to Argentina in the 1930s, recalled a series of
meetings with the Minister of Agriculture (Senor
Carcano). The latter was described by Henderson
(1945) as 'one of the best types of landowners and
politicians'. On another occasion, he noted that
the Minister of Marine was 'a useful friend ...
especially when it was a question of contracts for
the Argentine navy .. .'.5 The familiarity with
which British officials described 'The Argentine' in
the 1930s was replaced by uneasiness in the
1940s. By 1945, Anglo-Argentine commerce and
trade had entered a phase of decline (Lewis 1975,
Rock 1987, MacDonald 1992). Argentina's declar-
ation of neutrality during the Second World
War disturbed American and British political elites
who, although suspicious of Peron's military
regime, had enjoyed relatively safe shipping lanes
in the South Atlantic. However, as the former
British Ambassador to Argentina, Sir David Kelly
noted,
Theirpolicy of liberalneutralityis an indicationthat
the people of Argentina,forgettingtheirpast glorious
history,have not fully appreciatedthe true natureof
the conflictnow being waged by the forcesof tyranny
... LatinAmericansare temperamentalcreatures,in
dealing with them, effects are often quite out of all
proportion ... they experience little hesitation in
actingcontraryto commonsense.6
277
British elite representations of Argentina in the
1940s were (consistently) hostile and based largely
on stereotypical representations of Latin 'person-
alities':unpredictable,hysterical and irrational.Such
dehistoricized and a-geographical representations of
Argentina were largely a product of frustration
within the British elite over declining trade per-
formance and of fears about Argentine involvement
in the Antarctic. The sources of that unease were
several-fold. First, foreign policy professionals were
concerned that a rather nostalgic 'sense of history'
between Argentina and Britain had been replaced
by more immediate and pragmatic priorities (like
Peron's interest in strengthening an 'independent'
Argentine economy). Secondly, and as a conse-
quence, British elites were aware that, for some
Argentines, the source of danger to their country
was not Nazi Germany but Britainand the unpopu-
lar Roca-Runciman trade pact of 1933 which had
shattered Argentina's export earning potential. As
Crawley (1984, 58) reminds us:
With Britainimposingprotectivemeasuresin favour
of the export trade of its Dominions, Argentina's
hard currencyrevenue was falling rapidly ... the
Roca-Runciman pact ... readlike little morethana list
of unilateralconcessionsby Argentina.
Thus Argentina's eventual policy of neutrality upset
sections of the British political elite who hoped that
Argentina would explicitly support the Allied forces
and the British war effort. At the same time,
however, the eventual overthrow of the Costas
presidency by a group of Army officers led by
Colonel Peron in June 1943 opened a new chapter
in Anglo-Argentine relations that was further to
alter Foreign Office representations. The immediate
reaction of the Foreign Office in London to the
Argentine military coup of 1943 was hostile. As one
official noted:
From our point of view the older generation are
definitelyan advantageat the head of affairs,the meat
growersof BuenosAires provinceespecially.So I see
no reasonto wish matterswere otherwise..7
A group of mysteriousarmy officerswho are led by
ColonelPeron(of whomwe knownnothing)has taken
politicalpower.8
The Argentinegovernmentis controlledby a gang of
Anti-USnationalisticandtotalitariancolonels... there
is no sign in Argentina of the emergence of any
political opposition capable of overthrowing the
presentgovernment.9
278 K-JDodds
These years, therefore, confirmed Argentina as a circumstances of Anglo-Argentine relations. The
source of tension for the British state. Familiar disputes over meat supplies were not just over
British elite stereotypes about 'Latin' personalities finance but were also about how British elites
permeated Foreign Office records as did a fasci- defined Britain and Argentina's place in a postwar
nation for the President's wife, Eva Peron. As one world. Having defeated Nazism in Europe, British
official noted: elites were having difficulty coping with the chal-
lenges (such as any attempt to take advantage of
Ministerstrailed through the corridorsof the Casa British economic weakness) that Peron's
Rosadaafterthe petticoatof the FirstLadyof the Land temporary
Argentina posed to the traditions which supposedly
transactingbusinesswith her on the principleof the characterized
Mad Hatter'sTea Party.10 Anglo-Argentine connections.
The first meeting on meat supplies in 1946, for
The tension between Britain and Argentina instance, proposed that the 1933 Roca-Runciman
increased over the following years as officials at the Treaty be updated and provide for more favourable
relations. At the same time, however, Sir
Foreign Office struggled to make sense of the Peron trading
regime. The subsequent electoral victory of Peron
Rex Leeper suggested in September 1946 that:
in 1946 and the initiation of a Five Year Plan It is importantthat these people shouldbe stoppedin
(1947-52) for the industrialization of Argentina their present course in order to put them in their
provoked angry and remarkably reactionary geo- properplace in the world and in our interestsas a
political and geoeconomic responses. As the British country considerablydependenton the purchaseof
Ambassador, Sir Rex Leeper, noted in December theirproductsduringthe next two years.l3
1947:
Nevertheless, in spite of The Economist'sreaction
There is no sign of dawning recognition that the that Peron's tactics were
'obviously not learnt at
traditionalcustomersfor Argentineprimaryproduce school' (a popular motif of British elite
public
may be estrangedor impoverishedby these selfish resentment of Peron's
government) a bulk buying
designs,or that the costs of these unsoundenterprises
must eventuallyimpedethe republic'sabilityto main- agreement was signed between the two states in
costs at competitivelevels.11
tain her agricultural September 1946 (Lewis 1975, MacDonald 1992)."4
The resentment of British political elites to these
British unhappiness over the Peron regime in the changing trading conditions was ironic (if predict-
the previous arrangements with the
period after the Second World War was revealed able) given
most clearly over two major issues: the supply of estancierosin the 1930s.15 Whilst Anglo-Argentine
meat from Argentina to Britain,and the question of trading relations were being renegotiated in this
British elite representations appeared unable
sovereignty claims in the Antarctic and South period,
Atlantic. As Lewis (1975, 121) reminds us, meat was to react in ways that were radically different from
one of Argentina's major exports to Britainbetween representations of earlier periods. As Sir John
1945-52 but rising domestic consumption and a Balfour noted in August 1949:
decline in slaughterings reduced exports to Britain
the Argentinesseem incapableof draftingan agree-
(from 1295 million pesos per year between 1940-44 ment themselves but they are finished experts at
to 1000 million pesos a year between 1945-49:
twistingcontractualtermsin sucha way as to deprive
figures adjusted for inflation). The Foreign Office in all,andmore,of theirown benefits,whiledeprivingthe
London was deeply concerned that: other side of their share of the advantageas far as
possible.16
Sincethe War,Anglo-Argentinerelationshave turned
upon the price of meat ... and that a hungryworld
couldbe forcedto pay whateverArgentinachoose to Geopolitical competition
demand.12 There were also fears that Antarctica and the South
Atlantic might emerge as a site of geopolitical and
Between 1946 and 1952 the British government territorialcompetition (see Beck 1984, Child 1985).
sent six trade missions to Argentina to discuss the Argentina was increasingly represented as a danger-
situation. Underlying these events, however, were ous place led by 'irrational'and 'unstable' military
elite representations of Argentina which display a leaders who were against US and British imperial
remarkablebitterness over the changing economic involvement in the region (unlike the estancierosof
Geopoliticsin the ForeignOffice 279
the 1930s who were empowered by their contacts and legitimation of territorial claims (see, for
with foreign capital investment and export earn- example, Harley 1992). As the FIDS base com-
ings). Thus, characterized by some as a place of mander in Antarctica was reminded,
grandeur and hyperbole, Argentina was also repre-
sented as a dangerous threat to British sovereign the primaryobjectof the Surveyis to strengthenHis
claims in the South Atlantic. As Beck (1986, 32) Majesty's title to the sector of Antarctica... The
secondary objective of the Survey is to continue
notes, British anxieties over legal, political and scientificwork in the Antarctic.20
strategic interests led to the British War Cabinet
approving that: In the summer season of 1947-48, the new Attlee
all possible steps should be taken to strengthenour government despatched HMS Sheffield from South
title over the AntarcticDependenciesof the Falkland Africa to the South Atlantic in response to the
Islandsagainstwhich the Argentinesare encroaching. provocative presence of Argentine naval 'exercises'
in the region (cited in Calvert 1992, 49). Ironically,
Operation Tabarin (1943-45) aimed to restore therefore, the scientific (and civilian) activities of the
British Antarctic interests in the region: by remov- FIDS were
having to be supported by a British
ing rival marks of sovereignty (e.g. plaques), by warship reacting against the 'self-evidently' threat-
deploying naval forces in the region and by the ening presence of Argentina.
funding of expeditions to the Antarctic.17 It was The importance of cartographic and surveying
funded by the Churchillgovernment on the basis of activities on behalf of the British
government
representations of Argentina as a dangerous place was considerable. The maintenance of the FIDS's
committed to overturning British sovereign claims activities was a
priority for those attached to the
to the region. In spite of the severe financial pres- American
Department in the Foreign Office. As
sures facing the British government during the
Figure 1 suggests, British claims to the Antarctic
Second World War, monies were found in order that
(formally dating from 1908) had been legally chal-
Operation Tabarincould establish permanent bases lenged by Argentina in 1943 (Chile had made an
on the continent during the 1943-44 season. After Antarctic claim in 1940). Within
Argentina, the
the end of the Second World War this operation was
Military Geographical Institute received financial
transformedinto a civilian organization, the Falkland
support from the Peron regime in order to promote
Islands Dependency Survey (FIDS), funded by the the
cartographic annexation of the 'Argentine
Colonial Office and dedicated to protecting the Antarctic' from 1947 onwards (see Peron 1947,
sovereign claims of the British state.l8 Aramayo 1949).21 In addition, the Argentine
British resentment over Argentine interest in Antarctic Institute
(formally created in 1951)
Antarctica and the South Atlantic led to a series of launched annual
expeditions to the Antarctic as well
protests, counter-protests and limited engagements. as publishing results of these 'scientific'activities in
British officials at the Foreign Office attempted to several
journals:Antartida,Boletinand Contribuciones
justify their militarized operations in the South Cientificas.As a consequence, officials at the Foreign
Atlantic by appealing to scientific research and to Office were concerned that
Argentine pretensions
legal pedantry. Such appeals also contributed to had to be countered by geographical activities that
Foreign Office representations of Britain as inher- supported British sovereign claims in the South
ently rational and orderly compared to the aggres- Atlantic.
sive and childishly ambitious Argentine state. In 1948, further fears were expressed inside the
Following the launch of the second expedition of Foreign Office and in other government depart-
Operation Tabarin, for instance, an official at the ments that conflict might erupt in the Antarctic.
Colonial Office noted that: Indeed in 1948 an agreement was signed in London
the Britishview is that the discovery of polar terri- by Britain, Argentina and Chile preventing the
tories,followed by periodicvisits and the exerciseof use of warships south of 60?S in response to fears
administrative functions,is a sufficientbasis for a title of naval clashes.22 As Vice Admiral Sir William
to such territories.19 Tennant noted in a remarkable letter to the First
Sea Lord, Sir John Cunningham, dated 5 May 1948:
The creation of FIDS in 1947 confirmed the impor-
tance of the 'scientific'activities of cartography and I would hold onto the Falklandsand SouthGeorgiaat
surveying as vital components in the confirmation all costs, even to the extent of going to war ... and
280 K-JDodds

Figure 1. Rival Antarctic claims. Source:Beck 1988

discussthe questionof internationalizing the Antarctic

the research publications of British and South
... if the Argentinesare too stupidto listen to any of
American scientists. This process was undoubtedly
this then I see no alternativeto continuethe rather aided by the very close co-operation that existed
childishperformancethat has gone on between our between the Polar regions office within the Foreign
ships.23 Office and scientists attached to the FalklandIslands
Dependency Survey. The partnership in the 1950s
This Naval Agreement was renewed each year between Dr Brian Roberts of the FO and Dr (later
(Beck 1990) until the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) Sir) Vivian Fuchs of the FIDS is a case in point.
took over the demilitarizationof the continent and The construction by British political elites of
surrounding water, so subsuming the Agreement. Argentina as a 'threat' or a 'danger' to British
The interplay between geopolitics, law and science sovereign claims was most intense at a time when
within Foreign Office discussions of Anglo- Anglo-Argentine trading links were declining in
Argentine relations in Antarctica has been remarked significance. The strategic importance of Antarctica
upon by other scholars (e.g. Beck 1989, 1990; for the British authorities in the 1950s was largely
Joyner 1985). However, neither the citing of science understood with reference to Argentine (and
by the British authorities as the raison d'etre for Chilean) activities that compromised British sover-
sending warships (such as HMS Nigeria in 1948) to eign claims in the region. However, as the decade
defend the imperial fantasies in the South Atlantic, unfolded Antarctica gradually became encoded as
nor the use of scienceby the Britishpolar authorities a place of potential conflict or tension within
to castigate (in private at least) the Argentines and the wider drama of the Cold War. This in turn
Chileans for their 'unscientific' activities in the was crucial to the eventual transformation of
region, has been fully appreciated.24 A popular the Antarctic continent by the creation of the
point of comparison employed by British polar Antarctic Treaty System in the final years of the
experts, for example, was to compare and contrast 1950s.
Geopoliticsin the ForeignOffice
Anglo-Argentine relations between
1950-59
The first decade after the Second World War was
characterized by further tensions within Anglo-
Argentine relations. In July 1951 the British
Embassy in Buenos Aires reminded officials at the
Foreign Office that:
Politically and culturallyArgentina aspires to the
leadershipof LatinAmericaand invariablylays stress
on her culturaland raciallinks,with the civilizationof
Spain and Italy ... the Argentine assumption of
superiorityis universallyresented.25
The characterization of Argentina as a place of
mainly Southern European heritage enabled further
stereotypical characterizations and representations
about assumed superiority and territorialaggrandise-
ment. In addition, at a time of continued commer-
cial and trading decline between the two states,
these representations intensified British fears that
Argentina was attempting to take over the Falkland
Islands (Islas Malvinas) and British Antarctic terri-
tories (Antartida Argentina).26 Reactionary geo-
political assessments of Anglo-Argentine relations
enabled further British financial and discursive
investment in scientific activities and general intran-
sigence over colonial possessions. However, as
we shall see, this did not deter British elites from
trying to sell arms to Argentina in the 1950s even
though they were concerned that such sales might
compromise British claims!
Geopolitical conflict
In 1951, for instance, the British Ambassador to
Argentina reported that Peron had despatched six
ships to the Antarctic region. In spite of the
assurance of the Ambassador that no offensive
action was contemplated, Churchill ordered the
despatch of a 'company of British infantry to the
Falkland Islands at once' (Hennessy 1984).27
Despite the advice of the Foreign Office, Churchill
felt that any challenge (however remote) to British
sovereignty had to be repulsed in order not to
compromise those claims.28
During the following year, the Argentine gov-
ernment of Peron initiated a major campaign in the
Antarctic region (Beck 1989). As Calvert (1992) has
argued, the Falklands/Malvinas and the Antarctic
had become central planks in Peron's 'Third
Position' approach (i.e. developing policies indepen-
dent of the interests of the Superpowers) to foreign
281
policy and international relations (see Milensky
1978). The outbreak of a number of incidents on the
continent served to confirm that Anglo-Argentine
relations were increasingly characterizedby conflict
and tension rather than cooperation. The most
celebrated incident was at Hope Bay in 1952. An
Argentine polar expedition established a base in the
region after the British had abandoned an earlier
base. The arrivalof the British ship JohnBiscoeon 30
January1952 provoked an immediate protest as the
British found Argentine personnel at their former
base. The following day, a British team led by
George Marsh and Frank Elliot proceeded to land
stores in order to re-establish a new base. However,
according to official records, the Argentine base
commander reportedly told the British that 'I am
instructed by my commander to prevent you from
building a base here, using force, if necessary' (Beck
1989, 36). Shortly afterwards,machine-gun fire was
directed over the heads of the Britishpersonnel who
were then forcefully escorted back to the JohnBiscoe.
On hearing the news, the then Governor of the
Falkland Islands, Sir Miles Clifford, sent a telegram
to the Colonial Office suggesting that 'this presum-
ably constitutes an act of war'. Without waiting for
a reply from the Colonial Office, the Governor
ordered the John Biscoe to wait at Hope Bay and
await the arrival of HMS BurgheadBay. Later in
February1952, the British were able to rebuild their
base at Hope Bay.
The reactions of officials at the Foreign Office to
such an incident were predictably filled with anger
and concern. As an official noted on 16 February
1952:
the ForeignOffice view is that the Argentineshave
overreached themselves in the recent Hope Bay
incident... Argentinaintendsto increasethe number
and permanencyof bases in Antarcticafor prestige
reasons.29
Indeed the 1950s was a period of unprecedented
activity in Argentina over the question of pursuing
Argentine Antarctic claims. As President Peron
argued in May 1952
We enteredinto agreementsunderwhich we cannot
occupy these regions militarily,but these scientific
expeditionswill step by step take possessionof them
... those who discuss our rights have thousandsof
yearsbehind,but perhapsa very few ahead.We have
a centurybehind,but many in'frontof us.30
As a consequence, Peron had encouraged official
surveys, commissioned reports on the polar
282 K-J Dodds

60?

RESEARCHDEPT., F.O., MAY,1951

Figure 2. Antarctic activity in the FID, 1951. Source:PRO (FO) 371/90440

continent (e.g. International Service of Argentine research department expressing concern over
Publications 1955) and increased funding to the Argentine activities. It is evident from Foreign
Argentine Antarctic Institute. Furthermore, the Office maps, for example, that there is concern for
expansion of geographical and geopolitical studies the number and location of Argentine and Chilean
in Argentina in the 1950s created academic and bases in the FalklandIslands Dependencies (see Fig.
public interest in the South Atlantic region (see Isola 2). For instance, Figure 2 purports to illustrate the
and Berra 1950). The increase in Argentine activity location of 'Bases in the Falkland Islands Depen-
in the Antarctic worried officials at the Foreign dencies, 1951'. There were also fears that Argentina
Office. In spite of attempts to resolve these over- might militarily (as opposed to cartographically)
lapping territorial claims at the International Court annexe British Antarctic possessions. In one case,
of Justice (which Argentina rejected), the foreign for instance, an official at the Colonial Office
Office was concerned that Argentina's surveying reported that an appeal had been made to the
and cartographic activities were compromising Admiralty for a batch of marines to be left at
British claims. As Brian Roberts noted: Deception Island because:
The hydrographer told me last week thathe thoughtit The Argentinesin some forcemay asserttheir'rights'
was most unsatisfactorythat the Admiraltyshould to DeceptionIsland... We mightnext yearhearof the
have to correct their charts of the FalklandIsland survivorsin an Argentineprison.32
DependenciesfromArgentineandChileansurveysand
have to acknowledgethis in print... We mustactnow However, the background to such fears was based
if thereis any hope of steppingup FIDSactivity.31 largely on the British authorities forcefully remov-
ing Argentine and Chilean personnel from Decep-
Within the records of the Foreign Office, there are tion Island earlier in the year. In a telegraph (10
many examples of BrianRoberts and his (influential) February1953) to the BritishHigh Commissioner in
Geopoliticsin the ForeignOffice 283
Ottawa, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Table I. Anglo-Argentine trade 1950-60
Relations, notes that
Imports Exports
after very careful considerationdecision has been Year From UK Total To UK Total
reachedthat the only possible course is to remove
latest Argentine and Chilean intruders from 1945 30 301 189 720
[Deception] Island and to dismantle their instal- 1950 113 965 211 1177
lations ... With object of avoiding resistance and 1951 111 1480 200 1169
possiblebloodshedour aim is to takeSouthAmerican 1952 70 1117 97 688
partiesby surprise.33 1953 49 795 218 1125
1954 72 979 188 1027
Britishconcern that Argentine and Chilean activities 1955 76 1173 201 929
in the Antarctic were compromising British sover- 1956 53 1128 212 944
1957 101 1310 237 975
eign claims surfaces later in the telegraph: 1958 102 1233 237 994
1959 90 993 235 1009
we are already outclassed by Argentina in the 1960 113 1249 221 1079
Antarctic . . . We have only one obsolescent vessel ...
We have no aircraftin the region ... To go on as we
in millions of dollars, adjusted)
are would merely encouragethe Argentinesto con- (Figures
Source:Lewis 1975 120
tinue their encroachmentsuntil they force us out
completely:thereafterthey would probablylauncha
heightened campaign against the FalklandIslands
themselves.34 tured items. As MacDonald (1992, 190) notes, the
then Head of the InstitutoArgentinode Promocionde
The Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Office InterCambio(IAPI) Miguel Miranda wanted 'coal
later proposed to the Foreign Office that HMS Snipe and raw materials such as caustic soda and soda ash.
should remain around Deception Island to deter any Argentina could not live on whisky or lipstick'.37
further incursions given that the Argentine Navy Peron's policy of import-substitution meant that
was responsible for all Antarctic expeditions. How- local industries were replacing the traditional
ever, there appears to have been some disagreement dependencies on British exports.
between government departments over these However, one growth area in British exports
Indeed the Office later seemed to be the arms trade. Foreign Office records
deployments.35 Foreign
indicated with government approval in 1954 that indicate that there was a concern that such sales
might have a detrimental impact on British terri-
it has been suggestedthat we mightmakesome show torial claims in the South Atlantic but few officials
of navalforceandwelcomethe Argentinepartyas our seemed able to detect the irony of their concern for
guests, thus demonstratingour claimto sovereignty. possible Argentine 'penetration' in the Antarctic
whilst at the same time trying to sell weapons and
The Attlee government later agreed to send a aircraft to
Argentina. As Sir Ian KirkPatrickat the
frigate to Deception Island to meet the Argentine Foreign Office noted:
Antarctic expedition of 1954.36
Sir Henry Mack (the then British Ambassadorto
Geoeconomic cooperation: the arms trade Argentina)might be instructedto tell the Argentines
that we should like to sell them the helicopters ... it
When 'Argentina' was not being encoded as a would be very awkwardif they were to be sub-
threat or source of danger to British territorial sequently used in Argentine adventures in the
claims, officials at the Foreign Office attempted to Antarctic.38
encourage Anglo-Argentine trade. The trade figures
for 1952-56 (see Lewis 1975) reveal the poor The fears over helicopters were replicated later
performance of British exports to Argentina (see when the subject of the possibility of the sale of a
Table I). This was due in part to increased compe- few Shackleton aircraftwas raised. As an official at
tition from the USA, Germany and other South the Foreign Office noted: 'The point for us is
American states but it was also due to the fact that whether Shackletons would, like the helicopters,
Argentina's economy needed raw materials and assist the Argentine penetration of our Antarctic
semi-finished goods rather than expensive manufac- sector'.39 In both cases, however, the sales were
284
eventually refused because there was no agreement
amongst departments as to whether these aircraft
constituted a threat to British sovereign interests
(even though the Treasury was anxious that such
trade deals should be completed).
Two years later, in 1956, the possibility of a sale
of arms and an aircraft carrier to Argentina domi-
nated cabinet business of the Churchillgovernment.
On the advice of his officials, the Foreign Secretary,
Selwyn Lloyd, recommended that:
No attemptshould be made to evict the Argentines
and Chileansfrom their bases in Antarctic.The new
governmentin Argentina(i.e.led by a militaryadmin-
istrationunderGeneralAramburu) werepursuinga less
aggressivepolicy in the Antarctic... it was doubtful
whetherpoliticaland strategicconsiderationsmade it
necessaryfor us to forgo the trade.40
The removal of the Peron government in 1955 by
the Argentine military had, therefore, significantly
altered perceptions of British officials. It was now
thought that the interim military regime was less
concerned with pressing sovereign claims in the
southern oceans. In spite of the protestations of the
Admiralty that 'the strategic issues involved were
perhaps more open to argument, for this carrier
might increase the power of the Argentines to
threaten our bases in Antarctica', the Churchill
government approved the sale.41
The return of a civilian government of Argentina
under the leadership of Arturo Frondizi in 1958
coincided with two major developments which
affected Anglo-Argentine relations. First, the
improvement in trade between the two states (in the
period between 195 7-60) meant that Britishofficials
reassessed their views on the new Argentine gov-
ernment, even if those representations of Argentina
as a place remained remarkablystable within foreign
policy discourse. As Sir Jack Ward noted in his
annual review of Argentina in 1958:
Despite some routine anti-Britishremarks... Dr
Frondiziwas at pains to reassureme that he wanted
good relations... Argentinaappearsto have played
an adultand constructiverole.42
British representations of Argentina, thus, remained
wedded to 'familiar' dualisms about personalities
(rational v. irrational)and maturity (adult v. child).
Regardless of the changing circumstancesof Anglo-
Argentine relations, British officials at the Foreign
Office felt justified in articulating British policies
K-JDodds
towards Argentina by drawing on such stereo-
typical representations.
Secondly and perhaps more importantly, the
decision to launch a global scientific programme
under the auspices of the InternationalGeophysical
Year (IGY 1957-58) created new possibilities
and tensions for British officials in London. The
participation of the British government in a major
Antarctic programme was considered vital to
counter Argentine and Chilean initiatives even
though the issue of sovereignty was officially sus-
pended (as a possible point of contention). The
IGY's Antarctic scientific programme (involving 12
countries, including the USA and USSR) was based
at over 60 stations (Mitchell 1981, Klotz 1990). The
Argentine and Britishexpeditions were restricted to
their respective sectors. Furthermore, the substan-
tive involvement of the two superpowers in the
Antarctic research programme raised fears that the
territorial claims of Britain might be caught up in
the geopolitical dramas of the Cold War. Fur-
thermore, as the last section of this paper briefly
notes, the changes in the international politics of
Antarctica provoked additional geopolitical fears
that Argentina would either wreck the Antarctic
Treaty negotiations or annexe British possessions.
Anglo-Argentine relations and the
Antarctic Treaty (1959-1961)
The final chapter of Anglo-Argentine relations in
the 1950s was undoubtedly dominated by the
Antarctic Treaty of 1959. The decision by President
Eisenhower to invite 'interested parties' for a con-
ference to 'internationalize'Antarctica was based on
fears that conflict could erupt over that continent
(Beck 1986). As a place within the strategic dramaof
the Cold War, Antarctica had become encoded as a
place of possible missile sitings, atomic bomb test-
ing and armed conflict. As the American delegate
Paul Daniels recalled:
It was generallyagreed to convene an international
conferencedealingwith such novel and controversial
questionswould be unwise, and possibly dangerous,
unless adequate preparations were made ... It was
talksin Washington:(cited
decidedto holdpreparatory
in Beck 1985, 654)
As a consequence, the American government
invited a total of twelve states to attend a meeting
in Washington DC in May 1958 (see Beck 1985).
Geopoliticsin the ForeignOffice
British elite representations of Argentina in this
period were increasingly paradoxical. On the one
hand, Argentina was consistently written and seen
as a place characterized as a source of danger.
Officials at the Foreign Office were convinced that
Argentine territorial militarism could derail the
Antarctic Treaty negotiations and threaten the
possibilities for a demilitarized Antarctic continent.
However, for the British, the proposed Antarctic
Treaty provided a possible mechanism for de-
fusing fears that overlapping territorial claims (in
Antarctica) could lead to conflict between Britain
and Argentina. Furthermore, the British were
concerned that the Falkland Islands could emerge
(once again) as a major source of tension. It was
feared that Argentina might take advantage of an
Antarctic agreement to pursue such claims rather
than encourage entirely peaceful negotiations. On
the other hand, however, Argentina was increas-
ingly being seen as a possible place which could
resist the 'spread' of communism in Latin America.
Whilst the military (and civilian) regimes of
Argentina (and Latin America) drew contempt and
despair from British elites, they had their uses.
The desire for an agreement to demilitarize the
Antarctic continent was widespread (Beck 1990,
Klotz 1990).43 Officials from the Foreign Office, for
instance, argued that the meeting should attempt to
'secure the non-militarization of Antarctica, the
promotion of scientific activities in the region . .44
The mini-conference in Washington held informal
(and secret) talks in June 1958. After 60 sessions the
participants agreed to hold a formal conference in
October 1959. By that time a formal treaty had
been drafted which was later signed by the twelve
states in December 1959. However, an important
element of these meetings was a series of private
meetings between Argentine, British and Chilean
delegates to discuss the pressing issue of over-
lapping sovereign claims.
The signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 (and
eventual ratificationin 1961 by those twelve states)
was an important moment in Antarctic affairs and
Anglo-Argentine relations. The territorial rivalry
over Antarctica, while not diffused entirely, had
been contained by Article IV of the Treaty which
prevented any state from changing or improving
upon its existing territorial claims. As a former
official at the American Department of the Foreign
Office noted, the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd,
was under great pressure to 'keep out of trouble'
and to seek to improve trade and commerce in
285
South America rather than worry about Argentine
claims to Antarctica.45
On the British side, however, there was a hope
that other disputes in Latin America could also be
solved with a mixture of diplomacy and goodwill.
The records of the Foreign Office for 1959 and
1960 reveal many references that confirm intense
Argentine interest in the Antarctic Treaty. The
BritishAmbassador, Sir JackWard, sent a number of
reports to officials in London detailing Argentine
pronouncements on the subject. Indeed, Sir Henry
Brainwarned Sir JackWard in January1960 that 'we
do not want to leave the Argentines any excuse for
misunderstanding our attitude.'46 The British gov-
ernment ordered the Embassy in Buenos Aires to
issue reminders to the Argentine government over
'erroneous' claims over the FalklandIslands and the
Antarctic. Furthermore, during the middle of the
negotiations of the Washington Treaty, the British
embassy in Buenos Aires had to report that there
were problems between Argentina and Chile over
the former's insistence on conducting artillery prac-
tice in and around the disputed waters of the Beagle
Channel. The records of the Foreign Office record
concern:
This is just the sort of incidentthat is likely to effect
any hopes of an agreement over Antarcticaeven
though the area in question would be beyond the
scope of such an agreement.47
The major territorial concern for Foreign Office
officials in the early 1960s, however, had shifted
from Antarctica to the Falkland Islands. At the
precise moment when Foreign Office officials were
trying to promote an increase in trade with
Argentina, Sir JackWard noted in January1960 that
fears over Argentine interests in the Falklandsmight
derail the Antarctic Treaty proceedings. As he
noted:
Thereis some evidencethat there are some people in
Argentineofficialdomwho may be trying to workup
a little campaignon this issue ... The Falklandswere
quitea separatematterfromAntarctica... in the light
of this I judge that with claims and counter claims
to Antarcticterritoryeffectively sealed up by the
WashingtonTreaty, the Argentinesare thinkingof
raisingthe issue with us ... More recentlya wild and
ratherspeculativepiece was publishedin our deplor-
ablelocalEnglishnewspaperthe BuenosAiresHerald.48
Yet at the time, officials in the Foreign Office were
acutely aware that Argentina might be an important
286
'stalwart' against. '[T]he dangers of Soviet subver-
sion ... We need powerful friends in all continents
and should not forget South America'.49As events
in Cuba in the early 1960s (the emergence of Castro
and the Cuban Missile Crisis) were to demonstrate,
this sentiment was genuinely felt within the Foreign
Office. Later events, however, showed that the
FalklandIslands did emerge as a major policy issue
in Anglo-Argentine relations in the 1960s (ulti-
mately leading to war in 1982: see Dodds 1993b).50
The fears of the Foreign Office were such that
they had been prepared to draw up an agreement
between Britain, Argentina and Chile creating a
special region dedicated to peaceful research and
exploration if the Antarctic Treaty could not resolve
the problems of territorialclaims and nuclearization
(Beck 1986).51 Commercial and trading links
between Britain and Argentina had been replaced
by territorial competition and conflict in the South
Atlantic.
Conclusions
This paper has charted the changing British elite
representations of Anglo-Argentine relations in the
1940s and 1950s. I have argued that a shift from
trade and commercial cooperation towards geo-
political competition to the South Atlantic and
Antarctica characterizedthe period. By employing a
mixture of stereotypical characterizations of Latin
American nations and by utilizing historical dis-
courses on territory, science and rationality, officials
at the Foreign Office were depicting Anglo-
Argentine relations in surprisingly reactionary
terms. At a moment of great change, therefore,
British elites seemed unable to represent that
relationship in a progressive way which recog-
nized changing political-economic and strategic
circumstances in Argentina and Latin America.
One of the (implicit) purposes of this paper has
been to demonstrate that foreign policy can be
interpreted through its representations of the
'Other'. I have not claimed to be able better to
represent 'Argentina'or 'Anglo-Argentine relations'
than British officials. Rather, the analysis has
attempted to provide an interpretation of a
neglected but particularlydifficultperiod of Anglo-
Argentine history and to illustrate how the
representational politics of British (foreign policy)
elites needs to be taken seriously and not dismissed
as mere 'rhetoric'.I would suggest that those types
of representations of 'Argentina' in the 1940s and
K-JDodds
1950s (with their earlier historical precedents) have
important ramifications for British intransigence
over the Falklandsissue in later decades.
The paper has also attempted to illustrate how
some of the researchstrategies of criticalgeopolitics
might have a wider relevance for more traditional
diplomatic historical studies and political geogra-
phy. Critical geopolitics offers new forms of
research strategies which attempt to highlight the
connections between geographical practices, knowl-
edges, identity formation and power. In a wide
range of studies, scholars such as Dalby (1990,
1991), 0 Tuathail (1992a, 1993), Sharp (1993) and
Slater (1993) have demonstrated that such 'critical
pathways' (Slater's phrase) have been exploited to
illustrate how foreign policy professionals employ
geographical reasoning in their (textual) (re)con-
struction and (re)presentations of world politics;
how those (re)presentations are themselves tied
to forms of 'popular' geopolitical understandings;
how Cold War militarism and postwar develop-
ment theory depended on (often simple) geographi-
cal depictions and representations of the Third
World; and, finally, how those forms of geographi-
cal reasoning are challenged and resisted by social
movements. If in this paper, I have concentrated
on Anglo-Argentine history during the 1940s
and 1950s, there is sufficient momentum within
the critical geopolitical literature to believe that
there are real possibilities for reconstituting the
research strategies of political geography more
generally.
Acknowledgements
I am very grateful for the comments of Paul
Glennie, Leslie Hepple and Nigel Thrift at the
Department of Geography, University of Bristol.
The ESRC supported this research through a post-
graduate studentship. Thanks are also due to Roger
Lee and the referees of this paper for their excellent
comments and advice. Jonathan Barton was kind
enough to provide trade figures for Anglo-
Argentine trade. In addition, a retired senior Foreign
Official also offered detailed comments on the text.
The usual disclaimers apply.
In addition, I owe thanks to the Librariansof the
Scott Polar Research Institute at Cambridge and at
the Public Records Office in Kew for helping me
with references and records. Peter Beck of Kingston
University was also kind enough to share his notes
on records of the Canadian archives on Antarctic
Geopolitics in the Foreign Office
affairs. Nicola Exley at the Department of Geogra-
phy, Edinburgh University redrew the maps for this
paper.
Notes
1. See, for example, Ferns 1973, 1992; Rock 1975;
Beck 1983, 1988; Child 1985; Danchev 1992;
Hennessy and King 1992; MacDonald 1992;
Thompson 1992.
2. The records cited in this paper are held at the Public
Record Office (PRO), Kew, Surrey. The following
series of records were examined: Admiralty (ADM),
Cabinet (CAB), Colonial Office (CO) and Foreign
Office (FO). The interview material cited in this
paper was granted on the condition that it should
remain anonymous and untaped.
3. Slater (1993), however, has cautioned critical geo-
politics over its collective assumptions on a centred
geopolitical subjectivity. His deployment of the
term 'geopolitical imagination' invokes a careful
distinction between different levels of geopolitical
analysis and deployment and, moreover, a distinc-
tion between geopolitics and the geopolitical. This
can be interpreted as a useful contribution to the
ongoing critiques made by critical geopolitical
writers of the often simplistic assumptions over
geopolitical reasoning within political discourse.
4. PRO (CAB) 129/102 July 1960.
5. Cited in Henderson 1945, 205-6. The familiarity
and uneasiness of such meetings stand in marked
contrast with a later posting to Germany (despite
Henderson's sympathies for Nazi Germany).
6. PRO (FO) 371 33518 February 1943.
7. PRO (FO) A3015/11/2 1943 Sir David Kelly to the
Foreign Office.
8. PRO (CAB) 66/21 July 1943.
9. See note 7.
10. See note 7.
11. PRO (FO) 371/51778 1947 Sir Rex Leeper letter to
the Foreign Office.
12. PRO (FO) 371/90475 1949.
13. PRO (FO) 371/51775 1947.
14. Cited in Howells 1992, 227-47.
15. One irony that might be borne in mind is that for
much of the nineteenth century British imperial-
ists, speculators and travellers complained that
Argentina was under-developed, that it wasted its
resources and was unprepared for the expansion of
the capitalist world-economy. As a consequence, it
was argued that British investment and endeavour
was needed to overcome such obstacles (see Pratt
1992).
16. PRO (FO) 371/74375 1949.
17. See Friedrich (1980) for details of the 1938-39
German Polar Expedition.
287
18. The records of the Admiralty provide some details
of expeditions to the Antarctic. HMS William
Scoresby,for instance, was despatched in 1944 to the
Antarctic in order to erect British flags and distrib-
ute boards marked 'British Crown Lands'. PRO
(ADM) 1/19509 1946.
19. PRO (CO) 78/198/2 1945.
20. Cited in Beck 1986, 23.
21. Escude (1987), however, has noted that, even in the
1920s, the concept of an 'Argentine Antarctic' had
been incorporated into Argentine geography text-
books for primary and secondary education.
22. The National Security Council Records of 1958
recall that the United States' government had
approached Argentina and Britain (as well as four
other claimant nations) about the possibility of
creating an international agreement for the
Antarctic. This agreement aimed to '... remove the
area from the field of present and potential future
contention, at the same time preserving to the
interested nations control over strategic use ...
The draft agreement was not enacted upon. US
government (NSC) 5804/1 8 March 1958.
23. PRO (ADM) 1/21126 1948. Sir William Tennant
identified several reasons for defending the South
Atlantic islands including the importance of mari-
time resources such as whaling and the possibility
for strategic bases in the south-west Atlantic.
24. I have used the provocative term 'imperialfantasies'
to highlight the significant expenditure on military
and civilian activities of the British state to 'defend'
South Atlantic and Antarctic claims against possible
annexation. However, the endeavours of polar
explorers held sway over an imperial imagination
which understood events such as the 1943 Trans-
Antarctic Expedition or the mapping of Antarctica
as the continuation of a glorious tradition of British
(white) masculinity, patriotism (never nationalism)
and science.
25. PRO (FO) 371/90475 1951.
26. Child (1988) has noted that in 1948, for instance,
Argentina and Chile began to articulate the concept
of a sector called the 'South American Antarctic'
(between 0 and 90 degrees) which had to be
defended from external presences (e.g. Britain).Geo-
political writers were important supporters of this
concept.
27. PRO (ADM) 1/25082 1951. See also Hennessy
1984.
28. An approach later adopted by the Callaghan
government in 1977 which despatched a nuclear
submarine to the Falkland Islands in response to
fears that the Argentines were interested in a
possible invasion.
29. PRO (FO) 371/97397 1952.
30. PRO (FO) 371/90440 1952.
31. See note 30.
288
32. PRO (ADM) 1 25082 1952.
33. Telegraph to the High Commissioner to the United
Kingdom from the Secretary for State for Common-
wealth Relations, 10 February 1953. Copy of this
previously secret telegraph was provided by
Professor Peter Beck of Kingston University.
34. Op. cit. (note 33).
35. PRO (ADM) 1/25082 1951. These records from the
Admiralty chart the difficulties between the Foreign
Office, the Colonial Office and the Admiralty. The
Admiralty was the most reluctant to commit ships
to the region because of costs and logistics.
36. PRO (CAB) 128/27 1954.
37. The IAPI was created by Peron in 1945. It was
designed to establish state monopolies in Argentina
and was specifically charged with purchasing the
entire grain harvest and selling it to Europe. The
IAPI paid domestic producers low prices so that
income generated from overseas sales could be
reinvested in capital machinery necessary for
Peron's industrialization plans.
38.
PRO (FO) 371/108815 1954. (See also The Times
1954).
39. See note 38.
40. PRO (CAB) 128/30 June 1956.
41. PRO (CAB) 128/30 September 1956.
42. PRO (FO) 371/147755 1958.
43. As Beck (1985) notes, the Geneva discussion on
nuclear weapons testing in 1958 and Krushchev's
visit to the USA in 1959 had helped to created a
favourable environment for the first meeting of the
Washington conference in October 1959.
44. See note 42.
45. Interview with retired Foreign Office official
attached to the Polar Regions Department 15
August 1992 Cambridge.
46. PRO (FO) 371/147713 1960.
47. PRO (FO) 371/139142 1959.
48. See note 46.
49. PRO (CAB) 129/102 1960.
50.
Shortly after the 1959 Antarctic Treaty had effec-
tively frozen territorial claims, the British govern-
ment created a new administrative territory called
British Antarctic Territory (BAT) under the direc-
tion of a High Commissioner. This was formed out
of the old Falkland Island Dependencies (FID)
region. In so doing, British territorial claims were
split into two groupings: BAT and the Falkland
Islands instead of being linked to one another.
51. PRO (FO) 371/147732 1960. Henry Hankey, the
Head of the American Department of Foreign
Office, noted 'We cannot exclude the possibility of
elements in Argentina opposed to the Treaty suc-
ceeding in deliberately trying to wreck the
ratification'.
K-J Dodds
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