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U N IV ER S I T Y O F NEW S O UT H WAL E S
AT THE
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE ACADEMY
AN ASSESSMENT OF
SELECTED MARITIME
REGIMES IN THE
INDIAN OCEAN
REGION
BY
MANOJ GUPTA
In fulfillment of the requirements

For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
THESIS COMMITTEE:
Supervisor:
Professor Carlyle A. Thayer
University of New South Wales at the
Australian Defence Force Academy
Co-supervisors:
Dr Anthony Bergin
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Professor Clive Schofield

University of Wollongong
APRIL 2009
SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE ACADEMY
NORTHCOTT DRIVE, CANBERRA ACT 2600
i
COPYRIGHT STATEMENT
‘I hereby grant the University of New South Wales or its agents the right to archive and
to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or part in the University libraries in
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use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation.
I also authorise University Microfilms to use the 350 word abstract of my thesis in
Dissertation Abstract International (this is applicable to doctoral theses only).
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dissertation.'
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Date ……………………………………………...........................
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Signed ……………………………………………...........................
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ii
ORIGINALITY STATEMENT
‘I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it
contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial
proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or
diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due
acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others,
with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the
thesis.
I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work,
except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in
style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.’
Signed ……………………………………………..............
Date ……………………………………………..............
iii
Abstract
The Indian Ocean is one of the world’s least understood region. The purpose of this
research is to assess regime effectiveness of select maritime regimes in the Indian
Ocean as a region.
The central focus is to examine why regional order in the Indian Ocean is so difficult to
achieve and why common maritime interests have not formed the basis of broader
regional cooperation to date.
The thesis uses a ‘rubric model of effectiveness’ constructed from a synthesis of

‘regime theory’ and ‘structuration theory’ to test the effectiveness of two different
maritime regimes in the Indian Ocean Region. The model avoids both overemphasising
the role of structure and underestimating the power of actors in regime building and
regime effectiveness.
The marine scientific research and maritime safety regime of port state control,
considered to be the most important maritime regimes, were investigated for
cooperation in areas of common interests to assess the prospects for broader regional
cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region.
The study is an interdisciplinary one drawing on international maritime law, political

science, international relations and international regimes.
This thesis addresses the analytical niche of the gap in our understanding about the
strategic importance of the Indian Ocean as a region in contemporary world geopolitics
and international relations. This places the thesis in the genre of area studies that
emphasise regions, regional orders and regional cooperation.
The case studies show that the ground work for regional cooperation in the maritime
realm has been laid by Indian Ocean countries. At present though, there is insufficient
political leadership for the Indian Ocean to be considered as ‘one-ocean, one-region’ for
maritime regimes to be effective.
The research finds there is definite value in looking at the Indian Ocean as a region for
future analysis of maritime regimes. The thesis argues that international maritime
regimes can expand regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean for a new geopolitical
region to emerge in the geostrategic maritime realm.
iv
Acknowledgements
Arguably, this thesis is my own work but the effort would not have been possible
without the contributions of numerous individuals who have coalesced around its
creation.
My deep gratitude to Carlyle A. Thayer for this thesis grew in strength under his
supervision. His comments on chapter drafts enabled me to grasp the rich complexity
and his capacity to combine constructive critique with immediate empathy and
commitment helped me get over the line. I thank Anthony Bergin for introducing me to
the research and this wonderful country, and for his friendship. I thank Clive Schofield
for his critical insights and helping me come to grips with the Law of the Sea issues.
My especial thanks go to the librarians at the Australian Defence Force Academy.

Christopher Dawkins brought the Indian Ocean to my doorstep, placing every possible
resource at my disposal. I am grateful to Patsy Sheather and Hayward Maberley, always
at hand, with new resources waiting without even having to ask for them. I am indebted
to Edith Hackworthy for tirelessly responding to requests for inter-library loans. The
research would have gotten nowhere without the administrative team’s support and
patience, in particular, Bernadette McDermott, Shirley Ramsay, Marilyn Anderson-
Smith, Tatiana Romanovsky and Christa Cordes.
I am very grateful for my years at the University of New South Wales campus at the
Australian Defence Force Academy, made possible by the University College
Postgraduate Research Scholarship. I would also like to thank the two faculty research
committees for supporting my travel to Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. I thank
David Lovell for his support to the research in difficult times for hardly any research
project is ever completed without some setback. I would like to thank all the faculty
members for their ideas, learning, and making the stay very congenial for research.
Particular thanks to Eleanor Hancock, Fiona Cotton, Ida Nurhayati, James Cotton, John
McFarlane, Linda Bowman, Nikki Baker and Susan Cowan.
A big thank you to all my colleagues for keeping me sane through the experience. I
have had an exceptional opportunity to follow alongside my colleagues Derrill De Heer
and Christopher Roberts whom I found to be of pure hearts and shall always cherish
their friendship.
v
I would like to thank whole-heartedly the numerous people I interacted with over these
four years and who helped sharpen my thinking on the Indian Ocean and other matters
of regions, regime theory and maritime affairs. My thanks to Sam Bateman who showed
me the path to making this research a reality. My particular thanks to Professor Dr
Hasjim Djalal with whom I had the opportunity to co-author a paper on maritime
cooperation and Rear Adm (Retd) Robert Mangindaan for the fieldwork in Indonesia.
I also take this opportunity to thank the Centre for Strategic and International Studies
for making the field trip possible by accepting me as a research fellow at the centre and
the exceptional support during my stay. I am grateful to the GARNET network of
excellence and the European Commission for supporting my participation at the Fourth
PhD School workshop in Belgium during 11-17 June 2007. I would like to thank
Lieutenant Desmond Woods RAN for inviting me to HMAS Creswell and present to the
Junior Officer’s Management & Strategic Studies Course.
When I left the Indian Navy in February 2005, I knew I would miss traversing the
depths of the world’s oceans. The transition to research on ocean governance started
with Admiral Madhevendra Singh, Chief of Naval Staff, when the navy supported my
Masters degree in Exclusive Economic Zone Management in the United Kingdom.
My sincere thanks to the Australian Government Department of Infrastructure,

Transport, Regional Development and Local Government for their support and flexible
arrangements.
I want to thank the numerous good friends I made ever since starting here in Australia
for their indulgence and thoughtfulness in so many different ways. I warmly thank
Pratibha Nagabhushan and Robyn Bergin for the quiet encouragement, support and
friendship.
This transition into academic life was eased by the love, support and endless patience of
my family, Neelima, Mihir and Tanya – for whom “thanks” will never suffice. I
especially wish to thank Mihir for his tireless efforts in assisting me with pulling the
statistical data and references together.
I dedicate this thesis to my parents, Kumud and Chandra Mohan, for inspiring me to
follow my dreams and without whom none of this would ever have been possible.
And to God, who made all things possible.
vi
Table of Contents
COPYRIGHT STATEMENT ....................................................................................... ii

AUTHENTICITY STATEMENT ................................................................................ ii
ORIGINALITY STATEMENT ...................................................................................iii
Abstract ........................................................................................................................ iv
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... v
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................ vii
List of Tables.............................................................................................................. xiv
List of Figures ........................................................................................................... xvii
Glossary...................................................................................................................... xix
Introduction
Chapter 1 Researching the Indian Ocean Region ........................................................ 1
Indian Ocean Region ................................................................................................. 1
Maritime regime building for regional cooperation .................................................. 2
Importance of the Indian Ocean ................................................................................ 3
Regional cooperation for ocean governance ............................................................. 4
Centrality of the thesis .............................................................................................. 6
Methodology ............................................................................................................. 7
Contribution of the thesis to IR and IO studies ....................................................... 10
Structure of thesis.................................................................................................... 11
A note on sources and methods............................................................................... 13
Part I
Chapter 2 The new regime for ocean governance ..................................................... 17
Emergence of the new legal regime for the oceans ................................................ 17
Regime change in the oceans .................................................................................. 18
Importance of oceans .............................................................................................. 20
Changing maritime dimension ................................................................................ 24
vii
Regime for ocean governance ‘history in the making’ ........................................... 28
Defining ocean governance ..................................................................................... 31
Pressures of ocean governance ............................................................................... 33
Indicators of ocean governance............................................................................... 34
Objectives and principles of ocean governance ...................................................... 36
Initiatives for ocean governance ............................................................................. 39
Strategy for ocean governance ................................................................................ 42
Regulation and control at sea .................................................................................. 46
Attributes of the power to govern the sea ............................................................... 49
Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 54
Chapter 3 Indian Ocean Region ................................................................................. 55
Indian Ocean Region as a concept .......................................................................... 55
Regions and regional orders .................................................................................... 56
New concept of security .......................................................................................... 59
Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) .......................................................... 60
Indian Ocean RSCs ................................................................................................. 61
Regions and the Indian Ocean ................................................................................ 63
Understanding the geostrategic maritime realm ..................................................... 64
Indian Ocean political geography ........................................................................... 68
Indian Ocean regional initiatives ............................................................................ 72
Indian Ocean regionalism ....................................................................................... 73
Indian Ocean Region defined .................................................................................. 78
Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 80
Chapter 4 Regime theory and application of structuration theory ............................. 81
Regime effectiveness an agenda for research ......................................................... 81
Structurational approach to regimes ....................................................................... 82
viii
Regimes do matter .................................................................................................. 83
Conceptual clarification of regimes ........................................................................ 84
Regime definitions .................................................................................................. 84
Attributes and classification of regimes .................................................................. 86
Norm for ocean governance and maritime regimes ................................................ 90
Driving social forces of regime formation .............................................................. 92
Process of regime formation ................................................................................... 95
Actor-structure interplay ......................................................................................... 95
Actors and leadership .............................................................................................. 97
Structure in regime analysis .................................................................................... 98
Elements of structuration theory ............................................................................. 99
Application of structuration theory to regime theory............................................ 105
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 109
Chapter 5 Methodological considerations for case study analysis .......................... 111
Integrating the literature on ocean governance, regions, and regimes .................. 111
Meaning of regime effectiveness .......................................................................... 115
Objects of assessment ........................................................................................... 116
Importance of time and space ............................................................................... 118
Level of collaboration as a measure of effectiveness ........................................... 119
Behavioural change and institutional effectiveness .............................................. 120
Broader consequences of regime effectiveness across space................................ 120
Variables for measurement of regime effectiveness ............................................. 123
Constructing the measurement scale ..................................................................... 126
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 133
ix
Part II
Chapter 6 Regime for marine scientific research in the Indian Ocean Region........ 136
Importance of marine scientific research .............................................................. 136
Maritime zones and marine scientific research ..................................................... 137
International legal regime for marine scientific research...................................... 138
International cooperation in marine scientific research ........................................ 144
Process of regime formation: Global Ocean Observing System (GOOS) ............ 146
Indian Ocean Global Ocean Observing System (IOGOOS) regional alliance ..... 149
Actor behaviour and leadership ............................................................................ 152
Structure over time ................................................................................................ 155
Broader consequences across space ...................................................................... 159
Stages of regime formation ................................................................................... 169
IOGOOS projects .................................................................................................. 174
Analysis of regime effectiveness .......................................................................... 187
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 194
Chapter 7 Intra-Indian Ocean trade ......................................................................... 197
Indian Ocean commerce........................................................................................ 197
Intra-Indian Ocean trade overview ....................................................................... 198
Country specific intra-Indian Ocean trade performance ....................................... 200
IOR regional exports ............................................................................................. 203
Top performing IOR countries .............................................................................. 205
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 215
Chapter 8 Shipping and port state control in the Indian Ocean ............................... 217
Shipping a globalised industry .............................................................................. 217
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) framework ....................................... 221
World shipping ...................................................................................................... 223
x
IOR shipping fleet ................................................................................................. 225
Indian Ocean port state control ............................................................................. 229
Actor behaviour and leadership ............................................................................ 231
Structure over time ................................................................................................ 251
Broader consequences across space ...................................................................... 256
Stages of regime formation ................................................................................... 260
Analysis of regime effectiveness .......................................................................... 265
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 272
Conclusion
Chapter 9 Prospects for regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region ............. 276
Open maritime space or a region .......................................................................... 276
International regimes and ocean governance ........................................................ 277
Effectiveness of maritime regimes in the Indian Ocean Region ........................... 280
Challenge to building good order at sea and prospects for regional cooperation . 284
Indian Ocean as a regional framework in international relations ......................... 286
Appendices and Bibliography
Appendix 1 List of Persons ........................................................................................... 288
Interviews/formal/informal discussions in Australia ............................................ 288
Interviews/formal/informal discussions in Indonesia ........................................... 288
Other interviews/formal/informal discussions ...................................................... 289
Appendix 2 Coding and Classification of IOGOOS annual reports ............................. 290
Actor Behaviour/Leadership (ACBEL) ................................................................ 290
Power based/Structured (POBAS) ........................................................................ 293
Interest based/Entrepreneurial (INBAE) ............................................................... 295
Knowledge based/Intellectual (KNBAI) ............................................................... 300
Structure over time (STROT) ............................................................................... 300
xi
Signification/Level of Concern (SIGLOC) ........................................................... 302
Legitimisation/Contractual Environment (LEGCOE) .......................................... 309
Domination/Capacity of Governments (DOMCOG) ............................................ 310
Broader consequences across space (BREAS) ..................................................... 320
State Learning/Unit Level (SLUL) ....................................................................... 324
Regional Cooperation/Sub-system level (RCSSL) ............................................... 328
International Cooperation/System Level (ICSL) .................................................. 330
Stages of Regime Formation (STAREGFOR) ...................................................... 334
Agenda Formation (AGFOR) ............................................................................... 335
Institutional Choice (INCHO) ............................................................................... 344
Operationalisation (OPSTA) ................................................................................. 350
Process of Regime Formation (PROREGFOR) .................................................... 361
Imposition (IMPOS) ............................................................................................. 362
Negotiation (NEGOT)........................................................................................... 364
Self-Generation (SELFG) ..................................................................................... 365
Appendix 3 Value of Intra-Indian Ocean trade (in USD millions) 2001 to 2007 ......... 366
Value of exports to the world (in USD millions) 2001 to 2007 ................................ 367
Value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as percentage of world exports 2001 to 2007..... 368
Value of exports to developing countries (in USD millions) 2001 to 2007.............. 369
Value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as percentage of exports to developing countries
2001 to 2007 .............................................................................................................. 370
Value of exports to industrialised countries (in USD millions) 2001 to 2007 .......... 371
Value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as percentage of exports to industrialised countries
2001 to 2007 .............................................................................................................. 372
Appendix 4 Intra- Indian Ocean exports by value (in USD m) by country 2001 ......... 373
xii
Appendix 10 Intra- Indian Ocean exports by value (in USD m) by country 2007 ....... 379
Appendix 11 Shipping fleets by country of registration 31 December 2007 ................ 380
Shipping fleets by nationality of owner 1000 GT and above 31 December 2007 ... 381
Indian Ocean Region principal merchant fleets 31 December 2007......................... 382
Appendix 12 Indian Ocean countries Port State Control inspection data 2001 to 2006
....................................................................................................................................... 383
Appendix 13 Indian Ocean port state control inspection data for classification societies
....................................................................................................................................... 389
Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 390
xiii
List of Tables
Table 2.1: Indian Ocean states membership in interest groups ....................................... 30
Table 2.2: Porters 5 Ps and strategy for ocean governance............................................. 45
Table 2.3: Time line of key events in the maritime realm .............................................. 48
Table 3.1: Relative influence of different levels on Indian Ocean RSCs ....................... 63
Table 3.2: List of Indian Ocean countries ....................................................................... 70
Table 4.1: Definitions of regimes.................................................................................... 85
Table 4.2: Schools of thought in international regimes .................................................. 94
Table 5.1: Components of regime effectiveness and variables for measurement ......... 124
Table 5.2: Typology of effective and ineffective regimes ............................................ 127
Table 5.3: Level 4 measurement of actor-structure interplay ....................................... 128
Table 5.4: Rubric for measuring regime effectiveness ................................................. 129
Table 5.5: Measurement of level 4 regime collaboration ............................................. 130
Table 5.6: Level of collaboration ordinal scale ............................................................. 132
Table 5.7: Recoded scores of variable sets ................................................................... 132
Table 6.1: Conduct of marine scientific research in the maritime zones ...................... 138
Table 6.2: Indian Ocean countries IOC membership .................................................... 165
Table 6.3: GOOS and IODE marine scientific research programmes .......................... 168
Table 6.4: Indian Ocean countries remote sensing capability....................................... 182
Table 6.5: IOGOOS Data and information management timeline ................................ 186
Table 6.6: Numerical score of variable sets and level of collaboration ........................ 189
Table 6.7: Level of collaboration marine scientific research in the Indian Ocean Region
....................................................................................................................................... 193
Table 6.8: Marine scientific research regime effectiveness .......................................... 193
Table 7.1: Indian Ocean rim countries total exports in USD (millions) 2001-2007 ..... 198
Table 7.2: Intra-IOR exports by region in USD (millions) 2001-2007......................... 199
xiv
Table 7.3: Intra-IOR exports as a percentage share of total exports 2001 to 2007 ....... 199
Table 7.4: Value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as a % of world exports in 2007............ 200
Table 7.5: Value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as a percentage of exports to developing

countries in 2007 ........................................................................................................... 201
Table 7.6: Value of intra-Ocean trade as a percentage of exports to industrialised

countries in 2007 ........................................................................................................... 203
Table 7.7: Value of IOR regional exports as a percentage of world exports ................ 204
Table 7.8: Value of IOR regional exports as a percentage of exports to developing

countries ........................................................................................................................ 204
Table 7.9: Value of IOR regional exports as a percentage of exports to industrialised

countries ........................................................................................................................ 204
Table 7.10 IOR country exports by value (> USD 10,000 millions) to IOR country of
destination ..................................................................................................................... 205
Table 7.11: Intra-IOR exports by value (> USD 10,000 millions) to IOR country of
destination ..................................................................................................................... 206
Table 8.1: Principal merchant fleets by Indian Ocean country of registration ............. 225
Table 8.2 Tonnage of principal merchant fleets by Indian Ocean country of registration
....................................................................................................................................... 226
Table 8.3: Number of ships of principal merchant fleets by nationality of owner ....... 227
Table 8.4: Gross tonnage of principal merchant fleets by nationality of owner ........... 228
Table 8.5: Port state control regimes............................................................................. 230
Table 8.6: Flag state performance of Indian Ocean PSC countries .............................. 232
Table 8.7: 3-Year average detention percentage of Indian Ocean PSC countries ........ 233
Table 8.8: Black-Grey-White list performance of Indian Ocean PSC countries .......... 233
Table 8.9: Indian Ocean intellectual leadership in port state control ............................ 235
Table 8.10: Keyword search in identified maritime journals........................................ 236
Table 8.11: IACS classed cargo-carrying ships from IOR countries on record............ 243
xv
Table 8.12: Black-Grey-White list IOMOU performance of classification societies ... 244
Table 8.13: Flag state performance as on June 2007 .................................................... 249
Table 8.14: Tokyo MoU port state inspection contribution from IOR countries.......... 253
Table 8.15: IOMOU port state inspection contribution ................................................ 254
Table 8.16: Indian Ocean port state inspection contribution ........................................ 255
Table 8.17: IOMOU status of port state control relevant IMO instruments ................. 261
Table 8.18: Inspection contributions by IOMOU member states ................................. 263
Table 8.19: Inspection effort of IOMOU member states .............................................. 265
Table 8.20: Numerical score of variable sets and level of collaboration ...................... 267
Table 8.21: Level of collaboration port state control in the Indian Ocean Region ....... 271
Table 8.22: Port state control regime effectiveness ...................................................... 271
xvi
List of Figures
Figure 2.1: Possible boundary limits for ocean governance ........................................... 22
Figure 2.2: Activity in the coastal and open ocean ......................................................... 23
Figure 2.3: Ocean governance concept to practice ......................................................... 44
Figure 2.4: Cyclic process in the ‘use of the sea’ and ‘use of power’ at sea .................. 50
Figure 3.1: Map of the Indian Ocean .............................................................................. 69
Figure 4.1: From norms to rules...................................................................................... 89
Figure 4.2: Ocean governance norm and attributes of maritime regimes ....................... 90
Figure 4.3: Regime formation multivariate model .......................................................... 96
Figure 4.4: Giddens stratification model....................................................................... 101
Figure 4.5: Dimensions of the duality of structure ....................................................... 102
Figure 4.6: Giddens ‘duality of structure’ in regimes .................................................. 106
Figure 5.1: Process of measuring regime effectiveness ................................................ 125
Figure 5.2: Measure of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness variable sets
....................................................................................................................................... 131
Figure 5.3: Measure of level of collaboration ............................................................... 131
Figure 5.4: Regime effectiveness .................................................................................. 133
Figure 6.1: GOOS international institutional structure ................................................. 149
Figure 6.2: IOC regional committees ............................................................................ 166
Figure 6.3: GOOS regional alliances ............................................................................ 167
Figure 6.4: Integrated Indian Ocean Observing System (IndOOS) .............................. 176
Figure 6.5: Regional committee for Central Indian Ocean (IOCINDIO) member states
....................................................................................................................................... 185
Figure 6.6 Measure of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness .................. 190
Figure 6.7: Measure of level of collaboration ............................................................... 192
Figure 6.8: Marine scientific research regime effectiveness ......................................... 194
xvii
Figure 7.1: Intra-IOR exports by region in USD (millions) 2001-2007 ....................... 198
Figure 7.2: Australia’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001-2007 .................................... 207
Figure 7.3: Singapore’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001-2007 ................................... 208
Figure 7.4: Malaysia’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001-2007 .................................... 209
Figure 7.5: Indonesia’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001-2007 ................................... 210
Figure 7.6: Thailand’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001-2007 ..................................... 211
Figure 7.7: India’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001-2007 ........................................... 212
Figure 7.8: Saudi Arabia’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001-2007 .............................. 214
Figure 7.9: United Arab Emirates intra-IOR exports by value 2001-2007 ................... 215
Figure 8.1: Principal merchant fleets by Indian Ocean country of registration ............ 225
Figure 8.2: Tonnage of principal merchant fleets by Indian Ocean country of

registration .................................................................................................................... 226
Figure 8.3: Number of ships of principal merchant fleets by nationality of owner ...... 227
Figure 8.4: Gross tonnage of principal merchant fleets by nationality of owner.......... 229
Figure 8.5: Overview of the port state control regime .................................................. 231
Figure 8.6: Effect of PSC inspection - serious and less serious casualty...................... 241
Figure 8.7: Working of International Chamber of Shipping ......................................... 246
Figure 8.8: Organisational structure of IOMOU ........................................................... 264
Figure 8.9: Measure of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness ................. 268
Figure 8.10: Measure of level of collaboration ............................................................. 270
Figure 8.11: Port state control regime effectiveness ..................................................... 272
xviii
Glossary
AAMP Asian Australian Monsoon Panel

ABS American Bureau of Shipping
ADCP Acoustic Doppler Current Profiling
AMSA Australian Maritime Safety Authority
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
APN Asia-Pacific Network for Global Change Research
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare
BIMCO Baltic and International Maritime Council
BV Bureau Veritas
CCS China Classification Society
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CLCS Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
CLIVAR Climate Variability and Predictability
COLREG Collision Regulations
COM Council of Ministers
COOP Coastal Ocean Observations Panel
CORDIO Coastal Oceans Research and Development in the Indian Ocean
CS Continental Shelf
CSC International Convention for Safe Containers
CSO Committee of Senior Officials
CZ Contiguous Zone
DIM Data and Information Management
DIOZP Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace
DNA Designated National Agency
DNV Det Norske Veritas
DWT Dead Weight Tonnage
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
EU European Union
EURO-GOOS Euro-Global Ocean Observing System
FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation
FoC Flags of Convenience
FPDA Five Power Defence Arrangement
FSI Flag State Implementation
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GCOS Global Climate Observing System
GCRMN Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network
GDP Gross Domestic Prodcut
GDS Geographically Disadvantaged States
GL Germanischer Lloyd
GLOSS Global Sea Level Observing System
GOOS Global Ocean Observing System
GOOS-Africa Global Ocean Observing System for Africa
GRAs GOOS Regional Alliances
xix
GRC GOOS Regional Council
GSC GOOS Steering Committee
GSO GOOS support office
GSSC GOOS Scientific Steering Committee
GT Gross Tonnage
HOTO Health of the Ocean
IACS International Association of Classification Societies
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAM Integrated Coastal Area Management
ICES International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICM Integrated Coastal Management
ICS International Chamber of Shipping
ICSU International Council for Science
ICZM Integrated Coastal Zone Management
IGO Inter-Governmental Organisation
I-GOOS Intergovernmental Committee for GOOS
IHO International Hydrographic Organization
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMCAM Integrated Marine and Coastal Area Management
INCIOS Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services
IndOOS Indian Ocean Observing System
INTERCARGO International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners
INTERTANKO International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
IOC International Oceanographic Commission
IOCINDIO IOC regional committee for the Central Indian Ocean
IOCIS Indian Ocean Computerised Information System
IOCWIO IOC regional committee for the Western Indian Ocean
IOD Indian Ocean Dipole
IODE International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange
IOGOOS Indian Ocean Global Ocean Observing System
IOMAC Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation
IOMOU Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding
IOP Indian Ocean Panel
IOR Indian Ocean Rim
IORAG Indian Ocean Academic Group
IOR-ARC Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
IORBF Indian Ocean Business Forum
IOTWS Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System
IR International Relations
IRS Indian Register of Shipping
ISF International Shipping Federation
ISPS International Ship and Port Facility
ITCP Integrated Technical Cooperation Programme
ITF International Transport Federation
International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural
IUCN
Resources
IW Internal Waters
xx
Joint WMO-IOC technical Commission for Oceanography and
JCOMM
Marine Meteorology
JCR Journal Citation Reports
Joint Scientific and Technical Committee for Global Ocean
J-GOOS
Observing System
KR Korean Register of Shipping
LLS Land Locked States
LMR Living Marine Resources
LOSC Law of the Sea Convention
LR Lloyd’s Register
MARPOL Prevention of Pollution from Ships
MIM Marine Information Management
MLC Maritime Labour Convention
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MSC Maritime Safety Committee
MSR Marine Scientific Research
NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations
NK Nippon Kaiji Kyokai
NODC National Oceanographic Data Centre
OCIMF Oil Companies International Marine Forum
ODIN Oceanographic Data and Information Network
Ocean Data and Information Network for the Central Indian Ocean
ODIN-CINDIO
Region
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OOPC Ocean Observations Panel for Climate
OOSDP Ocean Observing System Development Panel
OSF Ocean State Forecast
P&I Protection and Indemnity
PEBLDS Pan-European Biological and Landscape Diversity Strategy
PFZ Potential Fishing Zone
PICO Panel for Integrated Coastal Observations
PI-GOOS Pacific Islands Global Ocean Observing System
POGO Partnership for Observation of the Global Oceans
PSC Port State Control
PSCO Port State Control Officer
QDA Qualitative Data Analysis
RINA Registro Italiano Navale
ROOFS-Africa Regional Ocean Observing and Forecasting System for Africa
RS Russian Maritime Register of Shipping
RSC Regional Security Complex
RSCT Regional Security Complex Theory
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SADC Southern African Development Community
SADCC South African Development Coordination Conference
SCOR Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research
SEACAMP South-East Asia Centre for Atmospheric and Marine Prediction
SEA-GOOS South East Asia Global Ocean Observing System
SIA Strategic Impact Assessment
xxi
SIDS Small Island Developing States
SIRE Ship Inspection Report
SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea
SSC Strategy Sub-Committee
SST Sea Surface Temperature
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
STCW
Seafarers
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Fishing
STCW-F
Vessel Personnel
TC/OPC Technical Committee for Ocean Processes and Climate
TS Territorial Sea
UAE United Arab Emirates
UN United Nations
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNDOALOS United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea
UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
USCG United States Coast Guard
WAGOOS Western Australia GOOS
WCED World Commission on Environment and Development
WCRP World Climate Research Programme
WESTPAC IOC regional sub-commission for the Western Pacific
WGTI Working Group on Trade and Investment
WIOMAP Western Indian Ocean Marine Applications Programme
WIOMSA Western Indian Ocean Marine Science Association
WMO World Meteorological Organization
XBT Expendable Bathythermograph
xxii
Introduction
Charting Our
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1
Chapter 1
Researching the Indian Ocean Region
This chapter sets the stage for a concerted detailed analysis of maritime regimes for
regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean. The main emphasis of research lies in efforts
to assess the behavioural change and institutional effectiveness of individual maritime
regimes in the Indian Ocean as a region.
Indian Ocean Region

The Indian Ocean as a region is arguably one of the least understood.1 It is only in the
last few decades that the scholarship has begun to appreciate the importance of the
Indian Ocean in integrating trade extending across the ocean from East Coast of Africa
and the Arab world to South East Asia and beyond to Japan and Korea, long before the
arrival of Europeans.2
The geography of the Indian Ocean may be described simply as the medium connecting
the continents of Africa, Asia, and Australia. What is not easily realised is that the
region with one third of the world population becomes the world’s largest market for
buying consumer goods. The region has enormous resources: contains 2/3rd of the
world’s proven oil reserves, a third of the world’s natural gas, 90 per cent of the world’s
diamonds, 60 per cent of the world’s uranium and 40 per cent of the world’s gold,
making it potentially the single largest area of exploitable wealth in the world.3 Its
1
Take for example the BBC News website at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/> that has Americas, Europe, Asia
Pacific and then Africa, Middle East and South Asia as its regional groupings for reporting world news in
international relations.
2
See Ashin Das Gupta, Malabar in Asian trade, 1740-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1967); Ashin Das Gupta and Michael Pearson, India and the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800 (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1999); Abu-Lughod, Janet. Before European hegemony: The world system A.D. 1250-
1350 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Kenneth McPherson, The Indian Ocean: A history of the
People and the Sea (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993); K.N. Chaudhuri, The trading world of
Asia and the English East India company, 1660-1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978);
K.N. Chaudhuri, Trade and civilisation in the Indian Ocean: an economic history from the rise of Islam
to 1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); K.N. Chaudhuri, Asia before Europe: economy
and civilisation of the Indian Ocean from the rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990); Philip Curtin, Cross-cultural trade in world history (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1984).
3
Peter Lynn Sinai, ‘Indian Ocean area: political, strategic and economic aspects, background note:
summary and recommendations,’ Asia centre (paper held by author).
1
waterways account for transportation of the highest tonnage of goods globally – half the
world’s crude oil, container shipments and a third of the bulk cargo.4
The Cold War divided the Indian Ocean Region in countless ways – border wars,
suspicions and tensions with widespread emphasis on sovereignty. Even after the Cold
War ended, it took six years for some countries in the region to come together in 1997
and establish the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC).5
The IOR-ARC focus is to promote greater economic interaction and human resource
development across the region. Unfortunately, the organization does not seem to have
delivered, prompting one of the principal participants at that time to write about the ‘sad
history of the good ship IOR-ARC.’6
Maritime regime building for regional cooperation

In global ocean politics, the process of ocean governance as a way for better managing
the oceans is becoming a priority across stakeholders and sectors. In the governance of
oceans economic development, environmental protection, and maritime safety and
security are now considered to be interdependent and indivisible. There are also
questions on the legal status of oceans from one of ‘freedoms of the seas’ to that of
‘control and regulation.’7 Consequently, Indian Ocean Rim states must adapt to the
emerging maritime environment to coordinate, collaborate and cooperate in matters of
ocean governance not just at the national level but also at the regional level.8
In a world, which has become interdependent, virtually every country is engaged in

cross-border region building. Cooperation in marine issues which are of common
4
Report by the UNCTAD secretariat, ‘Review of maritime transport, 2004,’ UNCTAD/RMT/2004.
5
Indian Ocean Rim Association of Regional Cooperation document, IOR-ARC, (New Delhi, L.B.
Associates, 2004).
6
Kenneth McPherson, ‘There was once an ugly duckling..., or, the sad history of the good ship IOR-
ARC,’ in Dennis Rumley and Sanjay Chaturvedi, Geopolitical orientations, regionalism and security in
the Indian Ocean (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 2004).
7
The author has published a series of publications addressing both issues. See Manoj Gupta, ‘Indian
Ocean sea lane security and freedom of navigation: legal regimes and geopolitical imperatives’ in Dennis
Rumley, Sanjay Chaturvedi and Mat Taib Yasin, The security of sea lanes of communication in the Indian
Ocean region (Malaysia: MIMA, 2007); with Hasjim Djalal, ‘The key to maritime cooperation,’
Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. 1 No. 35, 2007; ‘Sea power: defining the ocean future,’ Headmark, Spring
2006; ‘Integrated management of maritime affairs,’ Maritime Studies Journal, No. 142, May/June 2005;
and Maritime affairs: Integrated management for India (New Delhi, Manas Publishers, 2005).
8
‘Sharing and cooperation are now a necessity, not just an idealistic vision’ see Van Dyke, Jon M,
‘Sharing Ocean Resources – In a time of scarcity and selfishness,’ viewed 03 August 2008,
<http://www.hawaii.edu/elp/publications/faculty/JVD/Sharing_Ocean_Resources.pdf>.
2
interest to all Indian Ocean states is seen as a ‘building block’ for wider maritime
security of the Indian Ocean Region.9 Valencia is the first to have explored in great
detail the concept of maritime regime building for North-East Asia. The focus was on
the marine issues of pollution and environment protection and fisheries in identifying
the role maritime regimes can play in regional confidence building.10
In this thesis in the study of Indian Ocean maritime affairs, all three concepts – regimes,
regions and ocean governance – are central to regime effectiveness and regional
cooperation. Normally, in international relations there are the system level of analysis
then the regional, nation-state and decision making levels with a focus on land regions
rather than ocean regions. By introducing maritime regime analysis, the research
introduces a new dimension in the way we look at regions in international relations.11
Importance of the Indian Ocean

The literature review in chapter 3 reveals a limited body of pre-1991 work on the Indian
Ocean as a region. Post 1991, the International Relations (IR) and geopolitical sub-
disciplines, broadly characterise the pattern of relationships in the Indian Ocean into
four sub-regions – Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East, South Asia and East Asia/Asia
Pacific. The simultaneous works in 2003 by Buzan and Weaver12 and Cohen13 reflect a
marked similarity in the delimitation of regions. Both works exclude the existence or
emergence of an Indian Ocean Region in international relations and world geopolitics.
Pearson’s best sums up the existing scholarship: ‘the Indian Ocean has been known and
ignored, dismissed and described.’14 In other words, the Indian Ocean as a region in
international relations is a neglected area. What then makes an analysis of the Indian
Ocean as a region relevant? It is Pearson’s astute observation: ‘the Indian Ocean is
embedded in a truly global economy… it is now impossible to write a history of the
9
Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin, ‘Building blocks for maritime security in the Indian Ocean,’ Ocean
Development and International Law, Vol 27, 1996, pp. 235-254.
10
Mark J. Valencia, A Maritime Regime For North-East Asia (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press,
1996).
11
Carlyle A. Thayer, Interview 17 Apr 2009.
12
For an authoritative survey of regions in international relations see Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver,
Regions and Powers: the structure of international security (Cambridge: University Press, 2003).
13
For an authoritative survey of regions in geopolitics see Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics of the world
system (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
14
Michael Pearson, The Indian Ocean (London: Routledge, 2003).
3
Indian Ocean. All Indian Ocean history is now a history in the ocean…’15 that provides
a compelling insight into the relevance of the otherwise neglected ocean proper, in
geopolitics and international relations.
The expansion of land activities into the 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and
potentially beyond the 200 nautical mile limit in the context of outer continental shelf
claims, as well as the prospect of seabed exploitation through the International Seabed
Authority by nation-states including land-locked could potentially abuse the oceans.
Pearson concludes forebodingly, that ‘at present people ignore the sea: soon they may
destroy it. The Indian Ocean cannot expect to be spared from this catastrophic event.’ 16
Kaplan points out that ‘politics is still at the mercy of geography’ as the Indian Ocean
assumes centre stage for the challenges of the 21st century.17 The research in the thesis
draws its inspiration from the set of policy ideas to consider Kearney’s notion that ‘the
Indian Ocean Region continues to form, as always, the hub of the wheel’ in world
history.18
Regional cooperation for ocean governance

This section draws on the work of Borgese19 that shows how the new ocean regime has
achieved many firsts in international law thereby creating the framework by which
implementation of international maritime regimes could potentially further cooperation
in the Indian Ocean as a region. Borgese argues that the new ocean regime enshrined in
the 1982 UN Convention on Law of the Sea actually fosters the concept of regional
cooperation, which in number of instances, it makes mandatory.
For Borgese, the new ocean regime discussed in detail in chapter 2 includes a
comprehensive, binding, enforceable international environmental law framework. It
provisions for the development of marine resources, human resources, and marine
scientific research and technology. It advances peace and security by reserving all seas
15
Michael Pearson, The Indian Ocean, p.12.
16
Michael Pearson, The Indian Ocean.
17
Robert D. Kaplan, ‘Centre stage for the twenty-first century: power plays in the Indian Ocean,’ Foreign
Affairs Vol. 88 No. 2, Mar-Apr 2009.
18
Milo Kearney, The Indian Ocean in world history (New York: Routledge, 2004).
19
Elisabeth Mann Borgese, ‘The process of creating an international ocean regime to protect the ocean’s
resources’ in Jon M. Van Dyke, Durwood Zaelke and Grant Hewison (eds.), Freedom for the Seas in the
21st Century: Ocean governance and environmental harmony (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1993), pp.
23-37.
4
outside the territorial waters and the seabed exclusively for peaceful purposes including
the conduct of marine scientific research.
In the most creative and original way the new ocean regime combines development,
environment and peace-enhancing aspects into the concept of the common heritage of
humankind – a new relationship amongst people and between people and nature. It
favours a universally acceptable international institutional framework for exploration,
development of human resources and development of technology. Further, the new
ocean regime is the most important peaceful redistribution and reorganisation of ocean
space ever attained in history. It is a system of management through a combination and
interaction of national, regional and international institutions. It recognises that ‘the
problems of ocean space are closely interlinked and need to be considered as whole.’
Finally, it provides for a comprehensive and flexible but binding system for peaceful
settlement of disputes.
Borgese further suggests that comprehensive security and common heritage are
complementary, where common heritage, like comprehensive security, has a
developmental, environmental and peace enhancing dimension. Under such conditions,
there is a need for institutional innovation at the national, regional and global levels.
More specifically, Borgese calls for the creation of a regional seas institutional
framework to implement comprehensive security and with its environmental,
developmental and disarmament dimensions, declaring the regional seas as a zone of
peace. She foresees the oceans as ‘our great laboratory for the making of a new world
order, foreshadowed in the process of implementing, interpreting, and progressively
developing the new law of the sea and the principle of the common heritage of
humankind as the basis of a system of common and comprehensive security.’
Writing on the prospects of ocean governance as a catalyst for regional cooperation

Bateman takes the view that there is a need for: inter-sectoral orientation in national
ocean governance policy; regional cooperation amongst not just governments of States
but local and epistemic communities; common understanding of the principles of the
Law of the Sea; innovative solutions to resolve problems of competing sovereignty
5
claims; enhancing comprehensive security through cooperation amongst navies and
coast guards; and promoting maritime confidence and security building measures.20
Keohane and Nye make an important and distinctive contribution in bringing together
regime theory, regional cooperation and ocean governance that informs power and
interdependence in international relations theory.21 Keohane in advancing the most
elaborate theory of international regimes argues that in terms of contractualist or
functional theory regimes can act as catalysts for cooperation.22
Centrality of the thesis

Case studies that form the empirical backbone of this thesis depart from regime analysis
literature by measuring precisely this very aspect. The thesis measures the potential for
regional cooperation from implementation of international maritime regimes in
furtherance of ocean governance, something that has not been attempted before for the
Indian Ocean Region.
The focus of the research is to determine and critically assess the effectiveness of
selected international maritime regimes for the Indian Ocean Region. The research
focus raises three issues: What are international regimes? What are the issue areas in
ocean governance to which international regime theory can apply? What is a measure of
effectiveness? The emphasis is on the regional level of analysis to determine the
prospects for greater regional cooperation. Regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean in
the post cold war era has not been extensively studied and this thesis does this from a
maritime perspective and therefore offers an original contribution.
The theoretical framework of international regimes in the context of the regime for
ocean governance frames the objective of this research, which is to test the hypothesis:
Can international maritime regime building improve prospects for regional cooperation
in the Indian Ocean, for a new geopolitical region to emerge within the geostrategic
maritime realm?
20
Sam Bateman, ‘Oceans management: Catalyst for cooperation’ in Sam Bateman and Dick Sherwood
(eds.) Oceans management policy: the strategic dimension (Wollongong: University of Wollongong,
1994), p. 96.
21
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World politics in transition
(Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1977).
22
On how regimes make a difference see Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger,
Theories of international regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 33-36.
6
The thesis tests the effectiveness of two different maritime regimes in the Indian Ocean
Region. First, is the regime for marine scientific research and second is the maritime
safety regime of port state control. These regimes, considered as the most important
regimes for the Indian Ocean Region, are investigated to establish common interests
that hold prospects for regional cooperation.
The effectiveness of the marine scientific research legal regime is vital to the successful
implementation of the other international maritime regimes in fisheries, environment,
disaster management and climate change. Each of these regimes is dependent on the
regime for marine scientific research for effective policy making at the national level.
Ill-informed national policies are only likely to impede regional cooperation. Therefore,
an examination of the regime for marine scientific research is essential as the basis for
regional cooperation in the areas of fisheries, environmental and disaster management,
and climate change.
The examination of the maritime safety regime is similarly significant. All countries in
the region are dependent on the sea for trade and the safety of ships is critical to
carrying that trade. The successful implementation of the port state control regime is
key to the effectiveness of international maritime safety standards. If implemented by
all Indian Ocean countries the port state control regime would increase the effectiveness
of maritime safety and security measures under international law.
The interdisciplinary approach draws on historical analysis, international maritime law,

political science, international relations and the literature on regime theory.
In so doing the research attempts to answer three questions: What challenges need to be
overcome for building good order at sea in the Indian Ocean Region, the least
developed and yet the most strategic of the world’s oceans? What are the prospects for
cooperation amongst Indian Ocean states for effective implementation of international
maritime regimes? Does the Indian Ocean have value as a regional framework for future
analysis in international relations?
Methodology
The effectiveness of international maritime regimes in ocean governance for the future
is important. The unresolved issue in the literature is a measure of different international
maritime regimes for ocean governance as a whole. This can be attributed to a number
of factors.
7
Foremost is the tension between increasing national control and the demand for regional
cooperation in the oceans. The singular factor responsible in coastal States wanting to
extend national jurisdiction over the oceans is the creation of the 200 nm Exclusive
Economic Zone under the new ocean regime.
The second factor is the limited analysis on the effects of international maritime regimes
on regional orders. The focus has been more on the political effects of international
institutions on member states in terms of increasing national concern, contractual
environment and capacity and less on the institutionalised possibilities of regional
cooperation.
The third factor is that ocean governance has not received the attention it deserves in the
discourse on regions, regionalism and regionalisation in international relations. The
need for increased regional cooperation stems from the fact that governance of oceans is
beyond the individual capacity of States. More so, many of the ocean uses despite
national overtones retain a transnational character for governance.
These factors are dealt with in greater detail in chapter 4 on regime and structuration
theory when developing the theoretical model for measuring effectiveness of
international maritime regimes.
There are several methods for determining what norms are shared in a community. One
way is to look for evidence of the norm in codified laws. Another strategy is to examine
patterns of behaviour and to argue these patterns reveal certain norms. This process of
attaching meaning to observed behaviour, of course, can be controversial. A third
strategy is to examine the discourse in a community by some form of content analysis,
discourse analysis, survey or in-depth interviews.23 Regardless of the method employed,
one must guard against over-generalising and evoking essentialist stereotypes.
A mix of strategies is adopted. The evidence in Memorandum of Understandings is

examined and through content analysis, attaches meaning to behaviour. The
methodology for modelling regime effectiveness, involves data correlation from
published documents using qualitative content analysis and undertaking statistical
23
Richard K. Herrmann, ‘Linking theory and evidence in International Relations’ in Walter Carlsnaes,
Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, Handbook of international relations (London: Sage Publications,
2002).
8
analysis. The procedure, in an effort to understand the nature and effectiveness of
international maritime regimes, involves supplementing conventional contractarian
thinking in ‘regime theory’ with ‘structuration theory.’24
The focus of contractarian thinking is on the processes through which groups of actors
endeavour, successfully or unsuccessfully, to arrive at social contracts establishing the
constitutive rules of regimes.25 Structuration theory originating in the writings of
Giddens presupposes a ‘de-centering’ of the actor-agent and provides ‘ontology of
potentials’ emphasising both actors and structures.26 Giddens captures this emphasis in
his conception of the ‘duality of structure’ in terms of the:
‘Essential recursiveness of social life as constituted in social practices:

structure is both medium and outcome of the reproduction of
practices. Structure enters simultaneously into the constitution of the
agent and social practices, and ‘exists in the generating moments of
this constitution.’27 (my emphasis)
This thesis will undertake a regime effectiveness audit of the regimes for marine
scientific research and the port state control in the Indian Ocean Region using a ‘rubric
model of effectiveness’ constructed from a synthesis of ‘regime theory’ and
‘structuration theory.’
The model avoids both overemphasising the role of structure and underestimating the
power of actors in regime building. Applied to the study of International Relations (IR),
the model advances Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger’s theoretical synthesis of the
three schools – knowledge (cognitivism), interests (neoliberalism) and power
(realism).28
For purposes of this investigation, each of the regimes will be analysed using five broad
concepts with each concept examined for three sub concepts. These conceptual
components include: process of regime formation (imposition, negotiation, self
24
Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Zurn, ‘The study of international regimes,’ European
Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1 (3), 1995, pp. 267-330.
25
Marc A. Levy, The study of international regimes.
26
Ira J. Cohen, Anthony Giddens and the constitution of social life (London: Macmillan, 1989).
27
Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social
Analysis (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 5.
28
Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, ‘Integrating theories of international
regimes,’ Review of International Studies, Vol. 26, 2000, pp. 3-33.
9
generation); actor behaviour and leadership (knowledge-based actors and intellectual
leadership, interest-based actors and entrepreneurial leadership, power-based actors and
structural leadership); structure over time (signification, legitimisation, domination);
broader consequences across space (state learning, regional cooperation, international
cooperation); and stages of regime formation (agenda formation, institutional choice,
operationalisation).29 The approach taken is to stress on the regional level and is not
intended to provide a detailed unit level analysis of each Indian Ocean state policy.
Contribution of the thesis to IR and IO studies

The rich body of literature on history of the Indian Ocean emphasises its significance in
world history. At the same time, in geopolitics and international relations the Indian
Ocean has not been studied as a region.
This thesis addresses the analytical niche of the gap in our understanding about the
strategic importance of the Indian Ocean as a region in contemporary world geopolitics
and international relations. This places the thesis in the genre of area studies that
emphasise regions, regional orders and regional cooperation.
Even here, the thesis departs from existing work. First, it brings forwards the theory of
international regimes to treat maritime regimes as the instrument for regional
cooperation, not attempted in previous analyses of the Indian Ocean as a region.
Second, it integrates regime and structuration theory in analysing the effectiveness of
international regimes. Third, it undertakes a cross-sectoral, cross-national and cross-
regional study of ocean policy departing from existing work. Fourth, none of the
previous studies has examined the regime for marine scientific research and the regime
for port state control in the Indian Ocean, for both of which there exists a Memorandum
of Understanding amongst Indian Ocean rim countries.
The central focus is to examine why regional order in the Indian Ocean is so difficult to
achieve and why common maritime interests have not formed the basis of broader
regional cooperation to date.
In this context, the thesis contributes to the literature in four ways. First, it takes a view
of the land from the ocean to present a post 1991 comparative study of the four sub-
29
See Marc A. Levy, The study of international regimes; and Anthony Giddens, The constitution of
society: outline of the theory of structuration (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984).
10
regions; Southern Africa and island states east of it; Middle East; South Asia; and South
East Asia including Australia that frame the Indian Ocean Region in international
relations and geopolitics. Second, in the application of ocean governance the thesis
advances the understanding of maritime regimes through the lens of international
regime theory. Third, focussed comparative case studies assess the concept of an Indian
Ocean Region in the maritime realm at the system level in international relations.
Fourth, the thesis adds to the explanatory utility of regime theory within the context of
regionalism in international relations applied to specific maritime issues in ocean
governance.
In so doing, the thesis breaks new ground to advance our knowledge across a number of
different areas of social sciences in Indian Ocean studies, regionalism, international
regime theory, maritime regimes and ocean governance policy.
The thesis will be of interest to a plurality of scholars: Indian Ocean area specialists;
ocean governance analysts with an interest in the effectiveness of different maritime
regimes; regime theory specialists that are interested in the potential development and
application of the ‘rubric model of effectiveness’ in determining the effectiveness of
regimes in sectors outside the maritime sector; and foreign policy scholars that study
mechanisms to build regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean. The thesis also has a
broader interest to the Indian Ocean policy community that may be seeking practical
ideas on how to apply maritime regimes in the Indian Ocean in order to improve
prospects for regional cooperation.
Structure of thesis
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part I informs the research through a
comprehensive discussion on ocean governance in Chapter 2, Indian Ocean Region in
chapter 3, regime and structuration theory in chapter 4 and methodological
considerations for case study analysis in Chapter 5. Part II undertakes an empirical
analysis, opening with the case study on marine scientific research in chapter 6,
discussion on Indian Ocean trade in chapter 7 and case study on Port state control in
chapter 8.
Chapter 2 opens with a discussion on regime change in the ocean before drawing on the
literature to define the regime for ocean governance. The chapter then reflects on the
changing maritime dimension and its implications for control and regulation. The
11
chapter examines the literature on approaches to ocean governance in the context of
investigating maritime regimes for their effectiveness in the Indian Ocean Region
before identifying the attributes of the power to govern the sea. By so doing, the
literature establishes the plausibility of ‘oceanic’ regional cooperation beyond the
territorialised Indian Ocean shoreline.
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on regions and regional orders with a focus on Regional
Security Complex (RSC) theory put forward by Buzan and Weaver in the context of
Indian Ocean RSCs. The chapter outlines the work of prominent historians to establish
intra-ocean patterns of relationship in conceptualising the Indian Ocean as a region. The
chapter then explores the geostrategic maritime realm to examine the geography and
political geography of the Indian Ocean before discussing the literature on Indian Ocean
regionalism. The chapter attempts to bridge the study of regions and regional orders in
international relations to define the Indian Ocean Region.
Chapter 4 continues with the conceptual clarification of regimes to develop the

attributes of regimes and their classification. The chapter explains the processes and
driving social forces of regime formation that underpins the multivariate model guiding
the empirical analysis presented in the two case studies related to marine scientific
research and maritime safety. This leads to a discussion on structuration theory to
develop the ‘duality of structure’ at the heart of the synthesis with regime theory. In
Chapter 5, by integrating structuration theory with regime theory, the chapter develops
the key components of actor, structure, time and space used to measure behavioural
change and institutional effectiveness and establishing the level of collaboration to
assess the effectiveness of a regime.
Chapter 6 in the first case study examines the regime for marine scientific research,
critical to addressing marine related problems of coastal communities, environmental
degradation, food security and resource exploitation. Using the ‘rubric model of
effectiveness’ the chapter analyses implementation of the marine scientific regime and
assesses its effectiveness using the Global Ocean Observing System as a case study for
the Indian Ocean.
Chapter 7 explores the extent of intra-Indian Ocean trade to emphasise the importance
of shipping to countries in the region. Chapter 8 then examines the framework for
international shipping standards and analyses the shipping fleet of Indian Ocean
12
countries. Using the ‘rubric model of effectiveness’ this chapter analyses the
implementation of the port state control regime in the Indian Ocean to assess its
effectiveness in furthering quality shipping.
In chapter 9, a synthesis of the findings of the empirical analysis is used to draw

conclusions about the challenges that need to be overcome for building good order at
sea in the Indian Ocean Region and the prospects for cooperation amongst Indian Ocean
countries. The chapter ends the research with the rationale for why Indian Ocean as a
regional framework has value in international relations.
A note on sources and methods

The research has relied extensively on archival/library resources with more than 550
bibliographical references. The Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) library,
National Library of Australia and the Australian National University were accessed and
librarians at ADFA sourced a number of publications on inter-library loans. The annual
reports for the case studies were downloaded from the internet as was other information
related to marine scientific research and port state control available on the websites of
agencies of the United Nations.
The ideas for the thesis were first tested at the research proposal stage with subject
experts and informally through interviews with officials in the Australian Government.
The ideas were similarly tested informally through interviews with subject experts and
officials in the Indonesian Government including the Deputy Minister for Environment.
The ideas were also tested and improved upon at international conferences and
workshops at three different stages of research. These discussions provided background
information only.
The first conference attended was in July 2005, at the research proposal stage, organised
by the Maritime Institute of Malaysia and the Indian Ocean Research Group. The ideas
on maritime cooperation were further tested in 2006 at the IndoDefence conference
when attending the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) as a research
fellow. The ideas on maritime safety and security in the Indian Ocean Region and
regional maritime affairs were further probed in two separate workshops one with a
group of Indonesian Navy officers and experts from the Forum for Defense and
Maritime Studies in Indonesia and with industry members through a non-governmental
organisation, the Forum Masyarakat Maritim Indonesia (FMMI). The ideas on regime
13
theory and its application to regional cooperation were tested in 2007 at a PhD
workshop in Brussels on global governance and regionalism. The initial formulations on
the model for measuring effectiveness were informed by discussion with eminent
scholars including Professors Mario Telo, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium,
Professor Bjorn Hettne from University of Gothenburg, Sweden and Professor Vinod K.
Agarwal, University of California, Berkley. In Brussels, availed an opportunity to talk
to Mr John B. Richardson, Head of the EU Maritime Policy task force at the European
Commission. Finally, in 2008 I had an opportunity to be a discussant at the Rajaratnam
School of International Studies roundtable on Asian security in Singapore. A complete
list of persons interviewed formally or had informal discussions related to the research
is at Appendix 1.
The case studies are based on published reports on the Memorandum of Understanding
for the Indian Ocean Global Ocean Observing System (IOGOOS) and the Indian Ocean
Memorandum of Understanding (IOMOU) for Port State Control (PSC). Email
correspondence with the secretariats of the two memoranda helped clarify those issues
that were not clear from a reading of the annual reports.
Case study on IOGOOS

In the case study on marine scientific research in chapter 6, there are numerous
acronyms that have been used within a sentence. As a style guide the first use of
acronyms has not been expanded to maintain flow in readability. The thesis has a
comprehensive glossary of acronyms at the start to assist the reader.
The marine scientific research case study utilises ‘Weft QDA’ a freely available
software tool for Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) of the written texts. The software
assists in character level coding using categories to organise the data; retrieval of coded
text; fast free-text search; and combining coding and searches using Boolean queries.
The use of software with examples has been elucidated in Appendix 2 along with the
data collated from the IOGOOS I-IV reports.
Since completion of the marine scientific research case study, the IOGOOS-V report on
the meeting held from 30 November to 3 December 2007 has been published on the
web, late in 2008. This report could not be coded by the software tool. The reference to
the document is limited but from a reading of the document there is no change in the
findings.
14
Case study on IOMOU for PSC
In the analysis of intra-Indian Ocean trade in chapter 7 the International Monetary Fund
database on Direction of Trade has been used to establish the extent of Indian Ocean
trade by exports. The focus is on exports rather than the total intra-Indian Ocean trade.
The complete data is listed in appendices. From the 36 Indian Ocean rim countries in
the case study, Timor-Leste has not been included in the analysis due to insufficient
data while landlocked Ethiopia has been included on the basis that it has a shipping fleet
registered under its flag.
The analysis of shipping fleets utilises Lloyds Register Fairplay on world fleet statistics
to determine the strength of the Indian Ocean shipping fleets made available from the
Australian Government Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development
and Local Government.
In the case study on port state control in chapter 8, the IOMOU PSC regime has been
considered for the period from 2001-2007, for which annual reports were available. The
reports utilise 3-year averages to demonstrate the effectiveness of the regimes. Hence
the analysis aggregates data on the 3-year averages for 2001-2003 and 2004-2006 and
where needed makes reference to the 2007 data. In March 2009 the annual report for
2008 has been posted on the website. Brief references have been made to the report and
from a reading of the document there is no change in the findings. The data does
suggest improved inspection rate in the region.
The annual reports 2001-2006 of the IOMOU, Tokyo MoU and Paris MoU on PSC are
aggregated to determine the flag state performance of Indian Ocean countries. The
Australian Maritime Safety Authority annual reports are utilised to correct for data
under the IOMOU and Tokyo MoU as Australia provides the same data to both PSC
regimes.
The author corresponded with the secretariats in Paris and Tokyo MoUs on PSC to
understand the formulae for establishing the black-grey-white lists. The methodology
has been applied to the data on IOMOU for PSC.
15
Part I
(Erythraen Sea)Region hand drawn by Abraham Ortelius in 1597
Source: Columbia University, Middle East and Asian Languages and Cultures, viewed 18 April 2009,
<http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00maplinks/mughal/orteliusmaps/arrian1592.jpg >
Chapter 2
The new regime for ocean governance
This chapter discusses the framework for ocean governance that emphasises
coordination, cooperation and collaboration at the national, regional and international
levels. This chapter underscores the importance of regional cooperation and maritime
regimes for ocean governance in the Indian Ocean as a region.
Emergence of the new legal regime for the oceans

The oceans, in the 21st century, remain significant to humanity and increasingly require
separate consideration in international relations. The dramatic change over time of
ocean usage has, however, altered the highly permissive ‘freedom of the high seas’
regime to a new form of ocean governance centred on ‘control and regulation.’ In a
world, which has become more interdependent this new regime for the oceans is
embodied in the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) adopted by the third United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982 and entered into force in
1994, possibly the most significant but least recognised legal instrument of the 20th
century.
The new legal regime for the oceans assumes that the problems of the ocean space are
closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole, where all nations will
cooperate in the management of the oceans. LOSC in one stroke evolved into hard law
from soft law.1 It consolidated all past treaties, codified customary law and put in place
new law for new issues.2 It was a global agreement as for the first time even land locked
states were addressed in maritime affairs.3
Traditionally, in international relations nation-states act in pursuit of national interests

and seldom from collective international good. Territoriality reigns supreme. Looking
through the national security lens, it is about what serves the essentially territorial
nation-state best.
Primarily, national interest is to do with gaining political leadership, military supremacy

and/or economic advantage in the international arena. Nation-states in pursuing their
1
Edward D. Brown, The international law of the sea (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1994).
2
Brown, The international Law of the Sea Volume I.
3
17
national interests act alone - national identity or in concert – group identity in relation to
one another or in relation to another group. To achieve ascendancy in their relations
with one another nation-states have even established societal boundaries that separate
race, nations and regions.4
In the last two decades, the significant change in perception about the abundance and
resilience of the environment introduced a new dimension, in the study and practice of
international relations. In stark contrast to any other dimension of international
relations, the environment seeks nation-states to act at the international level for the
collective good of all mankind.
Yet, in the oceans for instance, nation-states have acted more out of protecting
individual interests than from protecting the marine environment as the common
heritage of mankind.
Regime change in the oceans

This section draws on Keohane and Nye’s work on the international regime change in
the oceans. 5 To explain changes in the oceans, Keohane and Nye discount using only
traditional theories in international relations. Interdependent relationships to deal with
non-military dimensions of security now characterise international relations alongside
the traditional maxim that nation-states interact in pursuit of their national interests.6 It
is worth noting that interdependence does not automatically spell mutual benefits.
Invariably it will also involve costs and the terms of mutual dependence need not be
evenly balanced.7
The reciprocal effects of interdependence revolves around the question of ‘who gets
what’ even in situations where nation-states recognise that they cannot act alone.8 The
individual nation-states power to affect outcomes in interdependent relationships
depends on their own sensitivity and even more on their own vulnerability in the event
4
John A. Agnew, David N. Livingstone and Alisdair Rogers, Human Geography: an essential anthology
(Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), p. 25.
5
Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence.
6
Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. 8.
7
For benefits and costs, see Robert O. Keohane, Power and Interdependence, p. 10.
8
For effects of interdependence see Robert O. Keohane, Power and Interdependence, p. 8-10.
18
of policy change.9 In essence, there exists a web of complex interdependence, which
depends on what get securitized as the referent object, who is the securitizing actor and
who are the functional actors.10
Contemporary ocean policy is illustrative of the three aspects that characterise complex
interdependence.11 First, multiple channels connect nation-states. Second, there exist
multiple issues. These are closely interrelated at multiple levels across a multiplicity of
stakeholders and lack coordination with no clear hierarchy amongst issues. Third,
nation-states in a region are less inclined to use naval force against one another and are
more willing to use collective naval force to deal with issues that affect the
interdependent relationship.
Over the past two decades, ocean politics has moved even closer to complex
interdependence than when it was first studied by Keohane and Nye in the 1970’s. True
to Keohane and Nye’s assessment, the different conditions in international relations
have increased the range of foreign policy choices available to nation-states.
More specifically, multiple channels of contact could provide effective policy

coordination overcoming some inherent pitfalls of non-governmental influence on
policy makers. On a more general level, policy coordination for the future requires
nation-states to act from ‘long foresight and a prescribed system’ than from seeking
short-term goals. On this last point, if major nation-states are willing to exercise
‘multiple leadership’ and assume special obligations it could pave the way for regional
orders.
A necessary condition for a successful international regime in the oceans is that it must
relate to the interests of domestic interest groups within the major nation-states as also
the make-up of power amongst those nation-states.
9
For an explanation on sensitivity and vulnerability, see Robert O. Keohane, Power and
Interdependence, pp. 12-18.
10
Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jap De Wilde, Security: A new framework for analysis (London: Lynne
Rienner, 1998), p. 36.
11
For ocean policy as an example and characteristics of complex interdependence, see Robert O.
Keohane, 1977, p. 24 and p. 36.
19
Importance of oceans
Oceans, regarded as the ‘last frontier’ on earth, shall decisively influence world geo-
politics, globalisation, socio-economic balance and life of earth. The importance of the
oceans has evolved, from a historical perspective, over the last 500 years.
Today 82% of all nations border the world's oceans or seas. Of these, some 40 nations
(30%) are islands.12 The world’s oceans have afforded the human populace freedom to
explore and acquire natural resources and wealth distributed over 29% of the land. With
70.92% of the earth’s surface covered by water, the oceans encompass not only 2/3rd of
the world surface but could well impact on the lives of three quarters of the world
population by 2030.13
The ocean of ‘all’ life on earth (oceans as the cornerstones of life) has remained a vast
frontier whose mysterious depths, abundant life, and influence on earth are yet to be
fully explored and understood.14 The ocean space represents a neighbourhood with a
unique socio-cultural entity that offers fresh air, natural light and breath taking long-
range views of landscapes and seascapes that provide a distinct culture and way of life
over centuries. Nearly 60% of the world population lives within 60 kilometres of the
coast at a density twice the global average.15
An insight into the traditional expanse of the high seas is useful in understanding the
impact of the new legal regime in the use of ocean space. It is well established that the
world’s largest expanse of common international spaces the high seas traditionally
nearly encompassed the vast majority of the world ocean with the exception of a
narrow coastal band of territorial sea (generally 3nm). History of the law of the sea,
however, is a narration of the struggles for and against the doctrine of the freedom of
the seas. Verzijl states, ‘historical research clearly proves that freedom has no static
content a priori, but is subject to continuous, at times even violent, changes.’16 Spain
12
Elisabeth M. Borgese, Ocean Yearbook 13 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
13
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), ‘A Sea of Troubles,’
Press Release No 2001-129, viewed 2 Aug 2008, <http://www.unesco.org/bpi/eng/unescopress/2001/01-
129e.shtml>.
14
For ‘oceans as the cornerstones of life’ see Ellen J. Prager with Sylvia A. Earle, The Oceans (New
York: McGraw hill, 2000).
15
Jan C. Post and Carl G. Ludin (eds.), ‘Guide to Integrated Coastal Zone Management,’
Environmentally Sustainable Development Studies and Monographs Series No 9, World Bank, 1996.
16
J. H. W. Verzijl, ‘International Law in historical perspective, Part IV’ cited in Anand, Origin and
Development of the Law of the Sea, p. 225.
20
and Portugal through a series of papal bulls and Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 went on
to divide all of the oceans in the Southern Hemisphere.17
Until 1958, the high seas were viewed as all parts of the sea not included in the
territorial sea or the internal waters of a state.18 In 1782, the Italian jurist Galiani
suggested for the purposes of neutrality the breadth of territorial waters as a maritime
belt coterminous with a ‘cannon shot.’19 It was in 1793 during the war between England
and France that US Secretary of State Jefferson equated the range of a cannon ball to
one sea league or 3nm.20 England in their Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act of 1878
recognised this as a result of three decisions of Lord Stowell between 1800 and 1805.21
Ever since, various states have submitted proposals which have varied from 3 to 200
nm.22
LOSC marked a historically important shift in the balance between 'control and
regulation' and ‘freedom of the high seas.’ Under article 86 of LOSC, the high seas
came to be defined as ‘all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive
economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state, or in the
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state.’ The 200 nm EEZ now spatially under
national jurisdiction of the coastal states amounts to nearly 41 per cent of the world
ocean space.23
The freedoms making up the ‘freedom of the high seas’ which by the end of nineteenth
century had come to be established as a fundamental principle of international law,
where now subjected to varying control and regulation.24 Although, the fundamental
high seas freedoms, especially the crucial navigational/communications related rights
were retained within EEZs and this was crucial to the balancing act achieved through
LOSC. The new legal regime for the oceans had established zones of maritime
jurisdiction and specified rights and responsibilities for all states including landlocked
states.
17
Luc Cuyvers, Ocean uses and their regulations (New York, John Wiley & Sons Inc, 1984)
18
19
Anand, Origin and development of the Law of the Sea.
20
21
D. P. O’Connell, The international Law of the Sea: Volume I (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1982).
22
Vogler, The global commons: A regime analysis.
23
Vivian L. Forbes, The maritime boundaries of the Indian Ocean region (Singapore: Singapore
University Press, 1995).
24
R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988).
21
The maritime zones that define the oceanic realm cover a geographic area where both
the land and water interact through the dynamics of natural processes. The boundary of
these maritime zones encloses a space, which extends from the ocean across the land-
water interface to an inland limit. It is difficult to define such an all-embracing area in
terms of physical or administrative boundaries. Figure 2.1 is illustrative of the possible
limits to define the geographic extent of the maritime zones. Ideally, the inland limit
must encompass all activities that have a direct impact on the oceans. The concept of
Exclusive Economic Zone has transformed the status of the coastal waters out to the
200 nautical mile limit and ideally the seaward limit of national jurisdiction must extend
up to 200 nautical miles.25
Figure 2.1: Possible boundary limits for ocean governance
Exclusive
Economic Zone
limit
Continental Shelf
limit SEAWARD BOUNDARY
Contiguous Zone DEFINITION
limit
Territorial Sea
limit
State/local limit
Arbitary distance from

tide mark
MLW
MHW
Extent of salt water

influence
Arbitary distance
from tide mark
State/local limit
effects of an
LANDWARD activity limit
BOUNDARY
DEFINITION Watershed limit
Climatic
influence limit
Source: Developed by author
The economic use of ocean space can be classified into a number of basic categories
that reflect the fundamental human activities involved (Figure 2.2). The ocean space is a
region of simultaneous and continually increasing land and sea based economic activity.
25
Job Dronkers and Ies de Vries, ‘Integrated coastal management: the challenge of transdisciplinarity,’
Journal of Coastal Conservation, Vol. 5 Issue 2, 1999.
22
With each activity, competing for the same space a typical conflict of interests exists
between different economic user groups.26
Figure 2.2: Activity in the coastal and open ocean

Conservation Coastal Engineering Resources
1. Heritage sites 1. Sediment cell formation 1. Mineral and Aggregates
~
2. Biological diversity 2. Accretion 2. Hydrocarbons
~
3. Wetlands 3. Beach erosion 3. Living resources
I 4. Critical habitats 4. Man made structures 4. Renewable energy
IL N--- -·1'- -L,
Economic Use
~
Education and 1. Gross National Product Transport and
- 2. Efficiency and
-
Research
- - Communication
~
1. Training stakeholder value 1. Shipping
2. Data collection ---= 3. Potential for conflict 2. Ship Design and Building
3. Data analysis
- between sectors
- 3. Ship maintenance
- -
I 4. Data dissemination 4. Need for systems 4. Undersea optic cables
IL perspective
L
Waste Disposal
L, - +-
Recreation
r,....J
Strategic
1. Industrial 1. Marine leisure 1. Military
2. Domestic 2. Coastal tourism 2. Crime at sea
- -
~
r
3. Pollution at sea
4. Agricultural run off
3. Water sports
4. Underwater recreation
~
3. Regional co-operation
4. International co-operation
The range of international agreements dealing with different aspects in the ocean realm
have contributed to international norm-setting for ocean governance but implementation
at the national and regional levels continues to be a challenge. The problems include:
legislation and policy have been sectorally based and uncoordinated; inappropriate and
isolated sectoral planning decisions have often worked against long term interests; rigid
bureaucratic systems have limited local creativity and adaptability; local initiatives have
lacked adequate resources and support from higher administrative levels; management
has lacked vision and has been based on a very limited understanding of ocean
processes; and scientific research and data have been isolated from end-users.27
Many of the marine scientific research and maritime safety and maritime security issues
are beyond the capacity of individual states to tackle alone. Growing dependency on
ocean use for food security has the potential for conflict between and within nation-
states. In addition, growth in the intensity of ocean use is impinging on the carrying
capacity of the marine environment.
26
Dronkers and de Vries, ‘Integrated coastal management: the challenge of transdisciplinarity.’
27
EU Demonstration Programme on Integrated Management in Coastal Zones 1997-1999, Lessons from
European Commission’s demonstration programme on Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM),
updated 08 May 2008, viewed 15 Mar 2009, <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/iczm/pdf/vol2.pdf>.
23
Changing maritime dimension
In this new ‘ocean regime’ of interdependence the centre of political gravity has
unendingly shifted from land to oceans, but knowledge and understanding of the oceans
is fragmented and specialised. The triads of factors in Geopolitics: end of the Cold War,
globalisation and governance standards;28 security: beyond individual states,
empowerment of transnational actors, interdependence of security;29 development:
trade, aid, security;30 maritime environment: new law of the sea, growing dependence
on oceans, growth in sea denial capabilities;31 balance: growth, efficiency,
sustainability;32 and Agenda 21: economic, social and environmental sustainable
development, together provide an understanding of the need to look at issues from the
ocean towards land rather than take a land centric view of things.
Firstly, from a security perspective the end of the Cold War has seen non-traditional
maritime security challenges – environmental degradation, resource scarcity,
transnational crime, piracy, drug trafficking, illegal immigration and terrorism – begin
to gain greater prominence. It also eroded the bipolar model of international relations
bringing an increased opportunity to address global problems with a growing
acceptance of a wider conception of peace and security.
Many of the issues are beyond the capacity of individual states to tackle alone even
though tough, independent measures can be taken to reduce their vulnerability to certain
threats. From 1984 to June 2002, 2,678 incidents of piracy and armed attack were
reported to the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Two hundred and seventy
six incidents of migrant smuggling, involving 12,426 migrants, were reported to IMO
from the end of 2000 to 30 April 2002.33
28
Ramesh Thakur and Edward Newman, New millennium, new perspectives: The UN, security and
governance (Japan: UN Press, 2000).
29
Paul Kennedy, The rise and fall of the great powers: Economic change and military conflict from 1500
to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1987).
30
Mark Halle, Jason Switzer, and Sebastian Winkler, Trade, Aid and Security: Elements of a Positive
Paradigm (Washington DC: IUCN, 2002).
31
Alvin J. Cottrell and associates, Sea power and strategy in the Indian Ocean (California: Sage
Publications, 1981).
32
Karl-Erik Sveiby, ‘Measuring Intangibles and Intellectual Capital - An Emerging First Standard,’ 05
Aug 1998, viewed 17 Feb 2009, <http://www.sveiby.com/portals/0/articles/emergingstandard.html>.
33
United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (UN/DOALOS), ‘Oceans: The
source of life,’ United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, 20th Anniversary 1982-2002, viewed 15
Mar 2009,
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_20years/oceanssourceoflife.pdf>.
24
The empowerment of transnational non-state actors necessitates international
cooperation to deny them access to sanctuaries, weaponry, finances and other resources.
Consequently, despite the growth in sea denial capability of a number of nations there is
increasing interdependence for maritime security.
Secondly, from an economic perspective the breaking down of economic boundaries,

globalisation and aid for eliminating poverty has had a significant impact on governance
and security. Trade, aid and security are mutually supportive in theory. Trade leading to
growth in economic and social exchange between groups, combined with international
standards of governance to preserve peace and balanced by transfer of payments should
lead to more harmonious and equitable societies.
The reality is that globalisation of weakly governed markets coupled with misuse of
international development assistance and aggressive promotion of unbalanced trade is
straining traditional international and national mechanisms for preserving peace.
Thirdly, from a social perspective there is growing dependency on ocean use for
resource and transit of goods by all nations leading to unplanned development and
decline of traditional sectors. Uncontrolled development in the port and tourism or other
sectors destroys the cultural heritage and dilutes the social fabric of the coastal
population.
The carrying capacity of the coastal zone is increasingly being exceeded thereby
polluting and degrading the natural resources, destroying the landscapes, and reducing
the quality of life for the coastal populace.34 Ocean pollution is estimated to cause some
250 million cases of gastroenteritis and upper respiratory disease every year, costing
societies worldwide about $1.6 billion a year.35 The consumption of uncooked sewage-
contaminated shellfish causes some 2.5 million cases of infectious hepatitis each year,
at a cost of approximately $10 billion annually.36 Added to that the decline of traditional
sectors like inland fisheries, struggling to remain competitive, is leading to
unemployment, emigration and social instability. The capacity to accommodate has
steadily eroded and conflicts among competing uses have become common place.
34
Report of the post International Decade for Ocean Exploration (IDOE) planning steering committee,
The continuing quest: large-scale ocean science for the future (Washington D.C.: National Academy of
Sciences, 1979).
35
UN/DOALOS, ‘Oceans: The source of life.’
36
25
Fourthly, from a technological perspective accelerated growth in science and
technology has led to the discovery of new uses and the potential to exploit them. For
instance, new advances in technology have allowed humankind to go further offshore
and deeper into the oceans. Life on the seabed, which was once thought of as existing
only in the shallow waters of the continental shelf, has now been found at depths of
more than 4,000 feet.37 At the same time advances in science and technology has also
added to the vulnerability of the oceans. For instance, increasing trade is making
demands for a more efficient cargo transport. The development of faster and larger ships
with zero tolerance for the negative environment impacts such as emissions, discharges
of bilge water and tank washings, and introduction of harmful alien species into new
environments through ship ballast water is placing enormous pressure on the marine
environment.
Fifthly, from a legal perspective the new law of the sea has not only increased the
demand for uses of the oceans but promises to alter radically the traditional freedom of
access enjoyed by maritime powers in the past. Now, more than one-third of the world's
oceans fall within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of coastal states. The 200 nm
EEZ gives coastal states exclusive rights with respect to natural resources and other
economic activities and the right to exercise jurisdiction over marine scientific research
and environmental protection. The economic significance of EEZs is evident from the
fact that 90% of the world fish stocks were within national jurisdictions.38 Further, the
high seas, representing nearly 60 per cent of the earth's surface are beyond national
jurisdiction and the International Seabed Authority has come to be vested with the
control of its seabed and resources.
Sixthly, from an environmental perspective the balance between human life and the
environment which assumed international dimensions since the 1970’s has come to be
recognised as the one of the pillars of sustainable development. Growth in the intensity
of ocean use is impinging on the carrying capacity and levels of sustainable use of the
marine environment.
The ocean has served as humanity’s preferred dustbin. This has involved the dumping
of waste; disposal of industrial, space, and military debris; flow of runoffs laden with
37
38
26
toxic pollutants; and the pumping out of dirty oil bilges.39 The ocean is now in a state of
crisis and can no longer be considered to exist in isolation from activities on land. Land-
based sources are responsible for 80 percent of the pollution while dumping of wastes
and other matter accounts for 10 percent of pollutants in the ocean affecting most of the
productive areas in the marine environment.40
Added to the problems of large-scale urbanisation and over use of pristine natural
habitats there are other negative impacts on coastal communities from climate change
and global warming. Changes in climatic conditions are perceived to be the reason
behind the frequent devastating storms, cyclones and hurricanes besides causing erratic
hot and cold weather conditions, and variations in monsoons.
The United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea (UN/DOALOS)
2002 report estimates that approximately 27 percent of coral reefs are at a high risk of
degradation due to direct human impact and the effects of climate change.41 Scientific
studies predict that a further 50 to 60 percent of the world’s coral reefs may be
destroyed within the next 30 years unless urgent measures are taken.42
Another impact of climate change is sea-level rise, which threatens the very survival of
some countries, such as some Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and low-lying
coastal states. It is estimated that the global average sea level has risen by 10 to 25
centimeters over the past 100 years. Different projections indicate that sea levels will
rise another 15 to 95 cm by 2100 or at the minimum 18 to 59 cm.43
Seventhly, from a resource perspective as if what humanity put into the ocean was not
enough, the taking out of millions of tons of wildlife has led to the collapse of the stocks
of dozens of species once thought of as inexhaustible populations of ocean life with
implications for food security.44 Every year, almost 90 million tons of fish are captured
39
Prager and Earle, The Oceans, p. 296.
40
41
42
43
UN/DOALOS, ‘Oceans: The source of life’; and IPCC, 2007: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate
Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen,
M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M.Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds.)], (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007).
44
Prager and Earle, The Oceans, pp. 276-277.
27
globally, providing by far the largest source of wild protein for human consumption.45
According to the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) projections for 2010 world
fisheries production is likely to range between 107 and 144 million tons.46
Finally, from a political perspective effective forms of ocean governance have been
rendered more complex by the increased number of nation states and their differing
interpretations of the Law of the sea. The major maritime powers benefit from the
current arrangements or from the absence of them. This is even more so when
traditional negotiating blocks – like for disarmament, development, trade and
investment – are much less in evidence in the case of the oceans.
Further, the economic ideology of nations is placing heavy reliance on the market and
role of private enterprise and therefore some nations are not receptive to regulatory
mechanisms for the oceans. The absence of regulatory mechanisms has led to the abuse
of oceans. Growing awareness of the problems of the oceans has not yet permeated to
individual behaviour. Nations left to their own devices are unable to dispense answers
to questions relating to peace, security, equity and the environment. As a consequence,
the decision making imposed by the complexity of the issue and the realisation that our
‘Knowledge’ to effectively take account of the multidisciplinary and interdependent
issues is still inadequate.
These changes in maritime dimension point towards increasing interdependence for

addressing maritime issues where traditional international and national mechanisms are
strained in implementing maritime regimes. The law of the sea promises to alter
radically the traditional freedom of access, as individual nations are unable to cope with
matters of ocean governance.
Regime for ocean governance ‘history in the making’

By the 1970s, just when the world was beginning to fathom the significance of the
ocean for survival of life on earth, the very nature of the ocean, which barely half a
century ago was the ‘Sea of Eden,’ began to dramatically change. It became evident that
there was a need to overcome the plethora of claims by coastal states, preserve the
freedom of navigation, conserve and optimally utilise the resources at sea, protect and
45
46
28
preserve the marine environment and use the sea on a basis of 'equitable apportionment'
so as to take into account the interests of mankind as a whole.47 Table 2.1 summarises
membership of the Indian Ocean states in various special interest groups and their
common interests during negotiations on the new ocean governance regime.
The emergence of ocean governance had several catalysts. In 1967, Arvid Pardo,
President of Malta, coined the phrase ‘Common Heritage of Mankind’ in highlighting
the inadequacies of the current international law on the oceans. There was growing
recognition in developed nations of coastal degradation due to inappropriate
development and poor planning. Globally, it had become evident that there was a need
to conserve and optimally utilise the resources, protect and preserve the marine
environment and co-ordinate activities within the United Nation (UN) system.48 The
1972 UN Stockholm conference on the human environment represented the first effort
by the international community to deal with environmental problems on a
comprehensive basis by creating the United Nations Environmental Programme
(UNEP).49
The 1982 third UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provided a

comprehensive framework for governance of the oceans. The 200 nautical mile limit
EEZ placed 41% of the oceans under national jurisdiction for conservation of the
marine ecosystem and optimum utilisation of resources.50 This is consistent with the
goals formulated in Hardin’s ‘Tragedy of Commons’ because UNCLOS has been able
to resolve some important jurisdictional questions creating forms of enclosure as
recommended by Hardin.51 The 1987 World Commission on Environment and
Development (WCED) report 'Our Common Future' states ‘looking into the next
century, the commission is convinced that sustainable development if not survival itself
depends upon significant advances in the management of the oceans.’52 The 1992 UN
Conference on Environment and Development by underlying the need for
interdependence and integration developed the basis for ocean governance.
47
48
Biliana Cicin-Sain and Robert W. Knecht, Integrated coastal and ocean management: concepts and
practice (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1998).
49
Cicin-Sain and Knecht, Integrated coastal and ocean management.
50
Comment on draft by Clive Schofield 31 March 2009.
51
Garret Hardin, ‘The tragedy of the commons,’ Science, Vol. 162 No. 3859, 1968.
52
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our common future (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1987), p. 264.
29
Table 2.1: Indian Ocean states membership in interest groups
Special Interest Group Indian Ocean member states Common Interests of the group
Coastal States Australia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Strong EEZ; counter and opposed
India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, LL/GDS claim for rights to living
Madagascar, Mauritius, resources in the EEZ; and opposed
Mozambique, Myanmar, Oman, position of LL/GDS and major
Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, powers on the legal status of the
Sudan, Thailand, United Arab EEZ.
Emirates, Yemen
Land Locked States Afghanistan, Bhutan, Botswana, Resources in the EEZ and rights of
Burundi, Lesotho, Malawi, Nepal, LL/GDS therein; status of the EEZ;
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, definition of continental shelf;
Zimbabwe revenue sharing respecting
Geographically Bahrain, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, nonliving resources; and transit
Disadvantaged States Kuwait, Qatar, Sudan, UAE rights for land locked states.
Territorialist States Madagascar, Mozambique Somalia, Retain rights for a territorial sea of
Yemen more than 12 nm under national
legislation. Proposed 200nm EEZ
conformed as close as possible to
their territorialist concept.
Margineers or Broad Australia, India, Madagascar, Sri Exercise continental shelf rights
shelf States Lanka beyond 200 nm; and opposing
revenue sharing beyond 200 nm.
Straits States Indonesia, Malaysia, Oman, Yemen Oppose transit passage concept;
(Djibouti, Iran and Singapore and seek amendments to
although strait states could not be accommodate concerns over
identified as part of this group) prevention of pollution.
Archipelagic States Indonesia, Mauritius Drawing archipelagic straight
baselines connecting outermost
points of the outermost islands to
create a sense of political unity.
equidistance principle Bangladesh, Bhutan, Iraq, Kenya, Represented splits among coastal
delimitation (EPD) Madagascar, Pakistan, Somalia states, big powers, GDS and some
Median Line or EPD Kuwait, United Arab Emirates Arab states on the delimitation of
the EEZ and the Continental shelf
Special Interest Group Other states Common Interests of the group
Maritime States France, Germany, Greece, Japan, Shipping and navigation interests
Liberia, Norway, Panama, United
Kingdom, USA, USSR
Great Maritime Powers France, Japan, United Kingdom,
USA, USSR
Coordinating Group of France, Germany, Japan, United
Five Kingdom, USA
Group of 12 Australia, Austria, Canada, Tried to bridge the gap between the
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, United States and the developing
New Zealand, Netherlands, countries (Group of 77)
Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland
Australia, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Yemen all
were members of more than one special interest group
Source: Compiled by author from Edward L. Miles53
53
Edward L. Miles, Global ocean politics: the decision process at the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea 1973-1982 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998).
30
The 1990’s saw the emergence of international guidelines on the concepts through
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCED) in 1991, World
Bank and International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
(IUCN) in 1993, World Coast Conference report in 1994 and United Nation
Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1995.
Defining ocean governance

Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 identifies ocean governance - sustainable development and
integrated management - as one of the essential components of the global life-support
system.
Cicin-Sain and Knecht summarise sustainable development to mean: economic

development to improve the quality of life of people; environmentally appropriate
development; and equitable development in terms of inter-societal, intergenerational
and international equity.54 Integrated Management combines the land and adjoining
water in a single unified framework.55 According to Cicin-Sain and Knecht the variety
of terms used internationally like Integrated Coastal Management (ICM), Integrated
Coastal Area Management (ICAM), Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) or
even Integrated Marine and Coastal Area Management (IMCAM) all refer to the same
concept.
The modern day ocean space has been segregated into two realms, namely, coastal
ocean subject to a variety national jurisdictional levels and open ocean subject to
international jurisdiction. Moreover, the open ocean has been vertically subdivided into
the water column having the status of ‘freedom of the high seas’ and the seabed claimed
as the common heritage of mankind.
In the management of coastal and open oceans, recent political science literature has
tended to replace the word ‘management’ with that of ‘governance’ to focus on the
ocean as a system that needs to be considered as a whole.56 Keohane and Nye define
54
55
John R. Clark, Coastal seas: The conservation challenge (Oxford: Blackwell Science, 1998).
56
Adalberto Vallega, ‘The Regional Scale of Ocean Management,’ Ocean & Coastal Management, Vol.
39 No. 3, 1998.
31
governance as ‘the processes and institutions, both formal and informal that guide and
restrain the collective activities of a group.’57
In this thesis, ocean governance embodies the call made by Brundtland in Our common
future: ‘we live in an era in the history of nations where there is greater need than ever
for coordinated political action and responsibility.’58
A review of 142 case studies determined that nations have generally followed a similar
process from concept to practice, beginning with an initial awareness stage and
culminating in program implementation and evaluation.59 However, the initiatives to
manage human activities in this area show weaknesses: jurisdictional gaps and overlaps,
lack of interagency communication and co-ordination, competition for scarce
management resources, and inter-agency and intergovernmental conflicts.60 The priority
should be to create a framework that has the mandate, human and financial resources
and the political will to put into practice the concept of integrated management.61
There appears to be growing consensus on the outlines of a general model for ocean
governance. Contributions in this regard all stress the dynamic nature of the ocean realm
with an emphasis on integration.62 The EC Demonstration Programme summarises these
works to define ocean governance as a dynamic, continuous and iterative process
designed to promote sustainable development of the maritime zone. Sustainable
development as seen over the long term is based on the inherent interdependent
principle of economic well being, social justice, and environmental quality.
57
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, ‘Introduction’ in Joseph S. Nye Jr. and John D. Donahue (eds.),
Governance in a Globalizing World (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 12.
58
WCED, Our common future. The world commission included Indian Ocean region members from
Sudan (Vice Chair), India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Zimbabwe.
59
Jens Sorensen, ‘The international proliferation of integrated coastal zone management efforts,’ Ocean &
Coastal Management, Vol. 21 No. 1-3, 1993.
60
Kem Lowry, ‘Federal-State coordination in coastal management: An assessment of the Federal
consistency provision of the CZMA,’ Ocean & Coastal Management, Vol. 19 No 2, 1993.
61
Stephen Olsen, James Tobey and Meg Kerr, ‘A common framework for learning from ICM
experience,’ Ocean & Coastal Management, Vol. 37 No. 2, 1997.
62
See Robert Kay and Jacqueline Alder, Coastal planning and management (New York: E & FN Spon,
1999); Cicin-Sain and Knecht, Integrated coastal and ocean management; John R. Clark, Coastal seas:
The conservation challenge; R. Kenchington, ‘Tourism in coastal and marine environment: A
recreational perspective,’ Ocean & Coastal Management, Vol. 19 No. 1, 1993; Kem Lowry, ‘Federal-
State coordination in coastal management’; Edward L. Miles, ‘The concept of ocean governance:
Evolution toward the 21st century and the principle of sustainable ocean use,’ Ocean & Coastal
Management, Vol. 27 No 1, 1999; Hance D. Smith, ‘The industrialisation of the world ocean,’ Ocean &
Coastal Management, Vol. 43 No. 1, 2000; and C. Thia-Eng, Y. Humming and C. Guoqiang, ‘From
sectoral to integrated coastal management: A case in Xiamen, China,’ Ocean & Coastal Management,
Vol. 37 No. 2, 1997.
32
Based on these works, ocean governance can be said to take into account: spatial
integration or the need to consider the challenges of the ocean space as a whole;
temporal integration or coherence between long term vision, medium term targets, and
short term action; stakeholder integration or promoting genuine collaboration amongst
stakeholders at the national, regional, interregional, and international levels so that there
is a cooperative approach to problem solving as the problems are too complex to be
resolved by an one group acting alone; sectoral integration or developing horizontal
linkages across sectors so that there is a coordinated approach to economic
development; and institutional integration or hierarchical linkages so that there is a
convergence in policy, development efforts, and governance at national, regional,
interregional, and international levels.
Pressures of ocean governance

To achieve sustainability in the new millennium, the first step is to bring all users and
uses in the ocean realm under some type of management.63 The management of the
ocean realm is multidisciplinary in nature, balancing economic activity, social equity,
environmental quality and maritime safety and security.
Among the pressures are expanding economic activities such as renewable energy,
coastal tourism, marine leisure, aquaculture, transportation, communication, and
fishing. This has resulted in pressures of social instability due to growing coastal
population and loss of traditional employment alongside environmental concerns of
increased pollution and habitat degradation. There are added pressures of disturbances
in the sediment transport mechanisms causing coastal erosion and climate change
causing natural disasters and sea level rise. These pressures make the ocean realm a
dynamic and complex system for management.64
The issues need to be resolved by concerted action of all stakeholders with an interest in
maritime activities. Over the last two decades a body of work has emerged on the
63
Robert L Friedheim, ‘Ocean governance at the millennium: where we have been - where we should go,’
Ocean & Coastal Management, Vol. 42 No. 9, 1999.
64
Olsen et al., ‘A common framework for learning from ICM experience.’
33
lessons learned and best practice guidelines. The challenges faced were similar in
developed and developing nations.65
To begin with, the fundamental goals were similar in that they addressed the need to
balance intensifying human activities with the changes that the activities bring in the
quality of the maritime zone.66 Resource degradation, nature destruction and multiple
use conflicts were invariably the precondition for consideration of ocean governance in
the United States, United Kingdom, France, Greece, Australia, Sweden, Ecuador, Sri
Lanka, Philippines and Thailand.67 Management programmes emphasised integration
across scales of time and space, active participation of stakeholders and an incremental
iterative approach to problem solving. There appeared widespread inability to
implement the strategy as an integrated whole.
Indicators of ocean governance

A case study of 22 nations by Cicin-Sain and Knecht suggests that the difference
between developed and developing nations lies only in the prevailing economy and the
resultant pace of system change.68
Based on the findings amongst the cross-section of developed and developing nations
by Cicin-Sain and Knecht and Olsen and Christie69, the lessons learned from the EU
Demonstration Programme 1997-1999 serve as good indicators for ocean governance
initiatives at the national and regional level. Each of the indicators builds on the other
indicators to repeatedly stress the importance for all levels to be involved in their own
capacity and sphere of competence. A case in point is that local level ocean governance
activity will not be effective where there is a policy vacuum at higher national, regional
and international levels.70 The EC programme based around 35 projects suggests that all
successful initiatives require seven components:
 Taking a wide-ranging perspective. Both human and physical processes link

the land and water components. At the same time, the administrative
65
Stephen Olsen and Patrick Christie, ‘What are we learning from tropical coastal management
experience?’ Ocean & Coastal Management, Vol. 28 No. 1, 2000.
66
Olsen and Christie, ‘What we are learning from tropical coastal management experience?.’
67
Sorensen, ‘The international proliferation of integrated coastal zone management efforts.’
68
69
Olsen and Christie, ‘What are we learning from tropical coastal management experience?.’
70
EU Demonstration Programme, ‘Lessons from European Commission demonstration programme.’
34
boundaries do not generally coincide with the natural and social system
boundaries. Together, with the geographic scale and extent, the maritime zone
represents a complex zone for governance. Significant interrelated influences
necessitate concurrently considering the hydrological, geomorphological,
socio-economic, administrative, institutional and cultural systems in their
entirety.
 Building on an understanding of specific conditions in the area of interest.
The initiative must be rooted in a thorough understanding of the local
circumstances. Diverse conditions in the physical, social, cultural, economic
and institutional characteristics of the area require adopting a site-specific
context. Although, a generic institutional framework can be developed at the
regional and national levels, the characteristics outlined require developing an
understanding of the area in question. This allows an appreciation of the
pressures and driving forces that are influencing the dynamics of the maritime
zone.
 Working with natural processes. Ocean governance initiatives should be
based on an understanding of the natural processes and dynamics of coastal
systems. By working with the processes, maritime activities can become more
environmentally sustainable and more economically profitable thereby
increasing long-term options.
 Ensuring decisions taken today do not foreclose options for the future.
Ocean governance must explicitly acknowledge the uncertainty of future
conditions that may arise from sea level rise, climate change, or coastal
erosion and promote sufficiently flexible management. It is particularly
important not to forget future generations and those who are not physically
present in the target maritime zone.
 Using participatory planning to develop consensus. Participatory planning
may be seen as the involvement and collaboration of the private sector, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), citizens groups and other non-
institutional organisations or individuals interested in or affected by the
process of ocean governance. It works to build the opinions and perspectives
of all relevant stakeholders into the planning process through collaborative
involvement reducing conflict and developing consensus.
35
 Ensuring the support and involvement of all administrative bodies. It is
essential to engage local authorities from the start. Ocean governance is not
effective if it is not supported by all levels and by all relevant sectors.
 Using a combination of instruments. Ocean governance can only succeed
using multiple instruments that include a mix of law and economic
instruments, voluntary agreements, information provision, technological
solutions, research and education.
Objectives and principles of ocean governance

A review of recent key initiatives diagnose the need to facilitate universal logic or
‘reason’ in the way of decision taking, by government officials, scientific experts and by
the community.71
Effective governance is really a question of proper institutional design, finding the right
balance between the different vertical levels of control in order to achieve the collective
and sometimes conflicting goals of different programmes.72
The first priority should be to create a formalised institutional framework that has the
mandate, the human and financial resources and the political will to put into practice the
concept of ocean governance.73 In the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) initiative ‘institutional and organisational arrangements were imperative in
carrying out the projects and programmes.’74 Lessons learned from the Netherlands
experience ‘demonstrates the need for building an organisational structure for the
relevant participants to communicate about problems and solutions.’75 The challenge
lies in ‘developing practices and institutions that are consistent with the principles we
recognise as right, but whose implementation is difficult.’76 Limitations in institutional
capacities are the main barrier to improved resource planning and management.77
71
Leontine Visser, ‘The socio-institutional dynamics of coastal zone management,’ Journal of Coastal
Conservation, Vol. 5 Issue 2, 1999.
72
M. T. Imperial, ‘Analysing institutional arrangements for ecosystem based management: Lessons from
the Rhode Island salt ponds plan,’ Ocean & Coastal Management, Vol. 27 No 1, 1999.
73
74
C. Thia-Eng, ‘Essential elements of integrated coastal zone management,’ Ocean & Coastal
Management, Vol. 21 No 1-3, 1993.
75
Jos van Alphen, ‘The Voordelta integrated policy plan: administrative aspects of coastal zone
management in the Netherlands,’ Ocean & Coastal Management, Vol. 26 No 2, 1995.
76
Friedheim, ‘Ocean governance at the millennium.’
77
Bram F. Noble, ‘Institutional criteria for co-management,’ Marine Policy, Vol. 24 No 1, 2000.
36
To summarise the works of Cicin-Sain and Knecht and the EC Demonstration
Programme, the three core objectives of ocean governance are: economically efficient
development to improve the quality of life; environmentally sustainable development
that preserves the quality of the environment; and socially equitable development that
provides inter-society and inter-generation equity. Using the indicators from the EC
Demonstration Programme and the Pan-European Biological and Landscape Diversity
Strategy (PEBLDS)78 the eight core principles can be derived as:
 Principle of careful decision-making. Decisions as far as possible need to be

made on the basis of the best available information adopting economically,
environmentally and socially sound measures that act as incentives for the
conservation and sustainable use of the maritime zone.
 Precautionary principle. Ocean governance needs to move from a standard
procedure in which a science arrangement provides advice to a management
body to a system where management options are based on the precautionary
principle. Using Hey’s definition this principle dictates that comprehensive
methods of environmental, social, cultural and economic assessment must be
used in deciding upon measures to enhance the quality of the maritime zone.79
The principle stresses the need to simulate further research, particularly,
scientific and economic research that contributes to a better understanding of
the long-term options available.
 User pays principle. Part costs of measures to prevent, control, and reduce
damage to the biological diversity and coastal landscapes and seascapes must
be borne by the user. Prices charged for access to or use of ocean resources
should reflect all short-term and long-term economic, environmental and
social costs associated with the use of those resources.
 Principle of public participation. Increasingly, it is becoming necessary to
develop private-public partnerships to fully accomplish the development goals
within the maritime zone. The users and the public must be involved at the
78
Committee for the activities of the council of Europe in the field of Biological and Landscape Diversity
(CO-DBP), ‘European Code of Conduct for Coastal Zones’ 19 Apr 1999, viewed on 15 Mar 2009,
<http://www.coastalguide.org/code/cc.pdf>.
79
Owen McIntyre and Thomas Mosedale, ‘The precautionary principle as a norm of customary
international law,’ Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 9 No. 2, 1997.
37
earliest possible stage of an ocean governance strategy. The users have
valuable insights regarding both the management needs and the economic
opportunities that must be addressed. The support of the users for
development and implementation of the ocean governance strategy is seen as
crucial to its success.
 Principle of public access to information. An informed public allows two-
way communications among government agencies, users groups, and local
communities to ensure the social acceptability that will enhance the successful
implementation and enforcement of ocean governance decisions. There is a
need to make available accurate, timely and documented official information
on proposed ocean governance activities through media coverage and public
fora, meetings and discussions, and information education campaigns in the
local language.
 Principle of best available technology. Access to and transfer of technology is
essential for attainment of the strategy. Scarcity of water demands that water
saving technologies be incorporated in all development designs. In addition,
material used for coastal infrastructure should not include contaminants,
which might enter the marine ecosystem.
 Principle of best environmental practice. Environmental Impact Assessment
of a project needs to be strengthened by Strategic Impact Assessment (SIA) to
take account of the cumulative impacts of a development. This will allow
promulgating non-development zones and protected areas with a view to
control the scale of activities in relation to the natural, cultural and physical
characteristics of the surrounding area. It will enable the preservation of the
local cultural heritage by relocating development not dependent on the coastal
and marine area, phasing out ongoing harmful activities and reserving
potential development sites for future developments.
 Principle of ecological integrity. Outstanding natural features as well as
important flora and fauna habitats should be afforded strict conservation
status. The maintenance and enhancement of natural processes can increase
the resilience of the coastline against coastal erosion and accelerated sea level
rise. Mitigation of adverse effects of developments that cannot be avoided, by
38
restoration of the habitat is a compensatory mechanism that is to be used as a
last resort.
Initiatives for ocean governance

Together with the three core objectives and the eight core principles, thirteen core
initiatives are drawn from the 22 nation case study by Cicin-Sain and Knecht and the
lessons learned from the 35 projects of the EC Demonstration Programme. These are:
 Taking a long-term view. Unfortunately, in most nation-states the ocean

governance strategy is in the form of disjointed projects with time frames of
five years or a decade at most rather than distinct elements of a coherent,
overarching strategy. The ocean governance cycle is a process needing
continual updating and amendments that requires 8-15 years for completion.80
 Adopting a process of adaptive management. Given the geographic scale the
process of achieving effective ocean governance will have to be an
incremental process. Further, ocean governance decisions are often made in
the face of important unknowns and conflicting opinions on the right course of
action. This requires a sustained effort of learning by doing that could extend
over decades, for sustainable development of the maritime zone to become
visible. At its most fundamental level adaptive management means a cyclic
process that is based on: a sound governance process rooted in the principles
of participatory democracy; and reliable knowledge that applies the best
available science to the issues that the governance initiative is working to
address.81
 Organising around an integrated approach. There is a need to ensure the
vertical and horizontal co-operation and co-ordination in policy development
and those local individuals and organisations have a voice in any higher level
decisions that will have a significant impact on them. Given the significant
number of perceived conflicts ‘first, last and always, horizontal and vertical
80
81
Olsen and Christie, ‘What are we learning from tropical coastal management experience?.’
39
integrated planning and management are necessary if practitioners are to
effectively and efficiently plan and manage coastal systems.’82
 Promoting participation and a collaborative culture. It is important that the
different and often conflicting sectors are able to collaborate with each other.
Ensuring the involvement of all stakeholders in an ocean governance initiative
is essential. Effective participation can help achieve commitment, ownership
and shared responsibility. Stakeholder ownership of the policies and projects
will lead to commitment to the governance process. Input of local knowledge
into the process is vital to ensure identification of the real issues and
resolution of the issues by those who are actually affected. Further, better
awareness of the project will lead to greater understanding of the issues, which
in turn will lead to governance that is more effective. Finally, working
together can achieve more than working singularly.
 Establishing coastal forums. This provides a mechanism to empower people
to take decisions essential to achieving the objectives. Public participation is
particularly important to ensure that the ocean governance initiative addresses
issues related to quality of life, cultural and social heritage, and leisure time
pursuits. It also helps ensure implementation of any recommendations or plans
that the governance initiative produces.
 Develop understanding through multi-disciplinary training. Most planners
and managers are single discipline specialists while ocean governance requires
multi-disciplinary understanding of the activities in the maritime zone.
Developing human capacity at all levels is as important as the need to
demonstrate that effective resource management is possible and sustainable.
While a short-term solution is to undertake capacity building of existing
planners and managers a long-term approach is to build multi-disciplinary
perspective into the education system.
 Highlight best practice guidelines. Mahatma Gandhi once said ‘We must be
the change we wish to see in the world.’ For stakeholders to change, in how
they relate to the maritime zone there is a need to highlight best practice
82
Jens Sorensen, ‘National and International efforts at integrated coastal management: definitions,
achievements and lessons’ Coastal Management, No. 25, 1997.
40
guidelines covering every possible area of economic, environmental and social
activity. This encourages the change we wish to see in every possible
individual, interest group, community group, local authority, national
authority and regional community and international body.
 Determine indicators to measure the objectives. The Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defined indicators as ‘a
parameter, or a value derived from parameters, which points to, provides
information about, describes the state of a phenomenon/environment/area,
with a significance extending beyond that directly associated with a parameter
value.’83 In relation to the economic, environmental and social objectives
indicators measure the extent to which any action is sustainable and
consequently, the effect of any change in that action. It is essential to identify
the indicators that objectively tell the progress towards sustainable
development in the maritime zone. Such an assessment will help to learn how
to improve the ocean governance process.
 Establish conflict resolution mechanisms. The economic and ecological
interests of the different stakeholders create conflict between development and
environment in terms of short-term private economic interests and long-term
public interest of sustainable resource use.84 Effective conflict resolution
requires a conception of public policy making in which all stakeholders have
an opportunity to negotiate.
 Undertake Strategic Impact Assessment (SIA). There is a need for a better
understanding of the interactions and interdependencies between the land and
water components. To overcome the procedural, planning, policy and
institutional weaknesses of ocean governance will require a formalised
systematic and comprehensive assessment that includes the environmental,
social, cultural and economic impacts of a policy, plan or programme and its
alternatives. A policy is defined as an inspiration and guidance for action; a
83
Myriam Linster, ‘OECD work on environmental indicators,’ viewed 18 Apr 2009, <
http://inece.org/indicators/proceedings/04_oecd.pdf>.
84
Visser, ‘The socio-institutional dynamics of coastal zone management.’
41
plan as a set of co-ordinated and timed objectives for the implementation of
the policy; and a programme as a set of projects in a particular area.85
 Conduct interdisciplinary research. The justifications for interdisciplinary
research lie in the nature of coastal and open ocean systems, which are
complex, interrelated and influenced by humans. The problem faced is that
each discipline has its own objectives and scientific language to communicate
within the discipline.86 Yet, interdisciplinary research is essential to evaluate
the environment in its entirety. This is the foundation on which cross-sectoral
planning and management is possible.
 Establish a Geographic Information System. A need assessment is
imperative to organise and integrate data with reference to spatial location.
Useful information not only depends upon raw data but also on its correct
analysis and transformation into something that planners and decision-makers
can understand and use. This requires the use of Geographic Information
System for data management and analysis.
 Provide an information technology network. A failure in knowledge
diffusion is one of the key reasons for continuing destruction of coastal
landscapes, seascapes and resources. Many of the problems of the coastal and
marine area can be traced to the fact that the required information or
understanding has never reached the correct audience. The diffusion of
information, knowledge and understanding of the natural processes can help
planners, decision makers and the general public to realise the consequences
of any particular action, and provide the basis for developing more sustainable
policy and management actions in the coastal and marine area.
Strategy for ocean governance

Undoubtedly, national prosperity requires sustained economic growth and resource
development to increase productivity and national income. However, alongside national
economic growth the higher regional level issues: social – intersociety and
intergenerational equity; environmental – resource conservation and protection; and
85
John Glasson, Riki Therivel and Andrew Chadwick, Introduction to environmental impact assessment:
principles and procedures, process, practice, and prospects (London: UCL Press, 1999)
86
Dronkers and de Vries, ‘Integrated coastal management: the challenge of transdisciplinarity.’
42
safety and security –good order at sea, also require consideration in ocean governance.
These issues when not addressed accumulate over time and have consequences that do
not show up in the shorter time-horizon typical of economic policy making. To quote
Van Dyke:
“The precautionary principles, the polluter-pays principle, the duties

to notify, consult, and cooperate, and the duty to assess the
environmental consequences of new initiatives are not mere idealistic
mantras, but are important and practical principles that the world must
embrace if its people are to have enough food to eat.”87
Despite the 30-year history, there are few examples of a successful ocean governance
practice beyond a local level or problem specific scale. The challenge lies in developing
the political will to improve the process of planning for and implementing ocean
governance. According to Underdal to integrate in ocean governance would mean to
unify - to put parts together into a whole. To qualify as integrated the ocean governance
strategy must achieve concept comprehensiveness, process aggregation, and consistent
practice.88The process as visualised by the author is depicted in Figure2.3.
Concept comprehensiveness is measured along four dimensions viz. time, space, actors
and issues. In time, sustainable development means taking a long-term view. From a
spatial perspective, the concept refers to inter-governmental, inter-agency, inter-sector,
inter-discipline, and the land-sea interface. Along the actor dimension the level ranges
from international to site within a given activity system. Finally, along the issue
dimension the guidelines reflect the interdependency between an international
declaration and a site-specific project.
Process aggregation is reflected in the strategy being evaluated from an overall

perspective. It necessitates weighing interests and setting priorities at each level. For
example, failure to do so at the national level may be attributed as the cause of failure of
the strategy in practice.
87
See Van Dyke, ‘Sharing Ocean Resources – In a time of scarcity and selfishness.’
88
Arild Underdal, ‘Integrated marine policy: what? why? how?,’ Marine Policy, Vol. 4 No. 3, 1980.
43
Figure 2.3: Ocean governance concept to practice
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Consistent practice can be said to have a vertical and horizontal dimension. The vertical
aspect refers to the accord between the different strategy levels international-regional-
national-local. Along the horizontal dimension for any given issue, only one strategy is
being pursued at a time by all the agencies involved provided vertical consistency is
achieved. In consistent practice, specific types of implementation measures conform to
the more general guidelines, whereas, the techniques and resultant activation conform to
the strategic goal for each vertical level and horizontal dimension.
The ocean governance strategy is integrated to the extent that the concept recognises its
consequences as decision premises, the process aggregates them into an overall
evaluation and in practice penetrates all levels and all agencies involved in its
execution.89 Underdal outlines two generic ways of achieving integration, direct method
or 'top-down' approach and indirect method or a 'top-down and bottom-up' approach or
co-management approach.90
The direct method seeks to achieve integration by defining national policy goals derived
from global principles that are to be followed by all government agencies involved in
the management of the coastal and marine area. However, the direct method will often
89
Cicin Sain and Knecht, Integrated coastal and ocean management.
90
Underdal, ‘Integrated marine policy: what? why? how?.’
44
have to be supported by the indirect method to find sufficiently precise integrating goals
and to secure their participation given the different patterns of participation, interaction
and influence.91 The indirect method involves an intellectual strategy and an
institutional strategy.92 The intellectual strategy seeks integration through initiating
research, training, and socialisation aimed at developing a more comprehensive and
holistic perspective on the part of decision-makers.
The institutional strategy involves some type of organisational change that facilitates
moving issues upwards from the site to the national level and transferring issues from a
narrow single sector to a broader multiple sector perspective. In fact, the institutional
strategy will encompass the intellectual strategy to be truly representative of all the
stakeholders.
What then do we mean by strategy? Porter’s seminal work pioneers strategy to be a

plan, a ploy, a pattern, a position and a perspective that have been described by
Mintzberg as the 5Ps of strategy.93 It can be argued that ocean governance is a question
of strategic management that broadly encompasses the areas of strategy formulation,
implementation and control.94
In essence, ocean governance integrates various functions, is oriented towards

organisation-wide goals, considers a broad range of stakeholders, entails multiple time
horizons and is concerned with both efficiency and effectiveness. An attempt has been
made in relating ocean governance to principles of strategic management in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Porters 5 Ps and strategy for ocean governance

5 Ps Porters Definition Strategy for ocean governance
PLAN Some sort of consciously intended Integrate all relevant policy areas, sectors
course of action – establish and levels of administration.
direction for the organisation. Land-water interface.
Take a short-term and long-term view.
PLOY A specific manoeuvre to gain An imposed ocean governance strategy
advantage placing the process of works as a ploy for overcoming inertia to
strategy formation in its most change and tunnel vision in sectoral
dynamic setting organisations.
91
92
93
Henry Mintzberg and James Brian Quinn, The strategy process: concepts, contexts, cases (New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, 1996).
94
Alex Miller, Strategic management (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1998).
45
5 Ps Porters Definition Strategy for ocean governance
PATTERN A notion of convergence in a Taking a wide-ranging view of inter related
stream of actions - achievement of problems.
consistency in organisation Making knowledgeable decisions based on
behaviour. data and information.
Working with natural forces.
Allowing for unforeseen future
developments.
Make use of a range of instruments.
POSITION A match between organisation and Concept comprehensiveness – measured
the environment – locating the along the dimensions of time, space, actors
organisation within the and issue.
environment. Process aggregation – Evaluating the
A match between the internal and strategy from an overall perspective
external environment – locating necessitating weighing interests and setting
the organisation in the external priorities at each level of management.
environment. Consistent practice – Vertical and horizontal
dimension where vertical aspect refers to the
accord between the different strategy levels
and only one strategy for a given issue is
being pursued along the horizontal
dimension.
PERSPECTIVE Strategy is a concept, perspective Taking a long term view.
is shared – intention and behaviour Adopting a process of adaptive management.
in a collective context – looks Organising around an integrated approach.
inside the organisation – not just a Promoting participation and a collaborative
chosen position but an ingrained culture.
way of perceiving the world. Developing understanding through
interdisciplinary training.
Source: Compiled by author
Regulation and control at sea

Although the international law of the sea has evolved over five centuries, the present
body of rules, agreements, treaties, law and institutions have developed in the last five
decades, in a global attempt to provide a system of ocean governance. The increased
focus on the oceans is due to the strategic, political, legal, environmental, economic,
social, and technological changes in the maritime realm.
The change in the maritime environment, indicative of increasing coastal state

influence, began to evolve in early 20th century with discovery of offshore oil and a
growing realisation of the potential to exploit ocean resources, such as minerals and
fish. The speed of change accelerated over the past three decades due to a perceptible
shift in mindset from one of ‘apparent abundance’ to ‘growing scarcity’ of ocean
resources and due to the increasing ocean uses from ‘accommodation’ to ‘conflict.’
These changes in the basic condition of ocean use have been responsible for raising
46
questions on the legal status of oceans from one of ‘freedom of high seas’ to that of
‘control and regulation.’95
This is even more evident after the September 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade
Centre. The perceived threat of maritime terrorism has brought swift and unprecedented
legislation by the international community for security of shipping and ports. A number
of incidents in the Indian Ocean suggest that the threat is longer perceived and could
become even deadlier.96 The timeline of events that lays emphasis on ‘regulation and
control’ is shown in Table 2.4.
Broadly, fished and navigated for millennia, the ‘use of the sea’ now involves free
passage of trade and access to the ocean wealth, protecting the marine ecosystem from
environmental damage, and safeguarding the sovereign and territorial integrity of the
nation.
Principle 25 of the Rio Declaration upholds that security, economic development, and
environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible. Thus, ocean governance
can be conceived as a trinity of ocean policy spheres: economic development,
environmental protection, and maritime security. And these derive their growing
integration from the new ocean regime of the under the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea, 1982.
The new ocean regime has altered nation’s ‘use of power’ at sea from Mahan’s97 purely
military concept of ‘command of the sea’ to having the ‘power to govern the sea.’98 The
focus is now on nations’ ‘use of power’ to safeguard national and in turn international
‘use of the sea’ within the coastal ocean and beyond on the open high seas.
95
Van Dyke makes the case where nations have a duty to protect and preserve the marine environment
embodied in the Law of the Sea Convention. See Van Dyke, ‘Sharing Ocean Resources – In a time of
scarcity and selfishness.’
96
On USS Cole bombing in 2000 see Robert Ratnesar, Times Magazine CNN, ‘Sneak Attack,’ 15
October 2000, viewed 16 Apr 2009, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,57755-
1,00.html>; On Limburg tanker blast in 2002 see BBC News, ‘Yemen says tanker blast was terrorism,’ 16
October 2002, viewed 16 Apr 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2334865.stm>; Terrorist
enter Mumbai from the sea in 2008 see Praveen Swami, The Hindu online edition, ‘Pointed intelligence
warnings preceded attacks,’ 30 November 2008, viewed on 16 Apr 2009,
<http://www.hinduonnet.com/2008/11/30/stories/2008113055981500.htm>;
97
Alfred T. Mahan, The influence of sea power upon history 1660-1783, (London: Sampson Low,
Marston, 1890).
98
Manoj Gupta, ‘Maritime Affairs: Integrated Management for India’ (New Delhi: Manas Publishers,
2005).
47
Table 2.3: Time line of key events in the maritime realm
Year Event
1945 President Truman of the United States on 28 September 1945 makes twin declarations relating
to fisheries and continental shelf extending the coastal jurisdiction to 200nm in areas of the
high seas contiguous to the coasts of the United States.
1958 The first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) I is convened.
1960 The second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) II is convened.
1967 Arvid Pardo, President of Malta, coins the phrase 'Common Heritage of Mankind' in
highlighting the inadequacies of the current international law on the oceans.
1968 The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction is established.
1972 UN Stockholm conference on the human environment represents the first effort by the
international community to deal with environmental problems on a comprehensive basis by
creating the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP)
1973 The third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) III opens.
1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) is adopted by the third United Nations Conference
1987 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) report ‘Our Common Future’
1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(SUA Convention) adopted by the International Maritime Organization
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located
on the Continental Shelf (SUA Protocol) adopted by the International Maritime Organization
1991 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Guidelines
1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) at Rio. Agreements reached on
Agenda 21 underlying Integrated Management and Sustainable Development.
1993 Commission on Sustainable Development established to oversee implementation of Agenda 21
1993 World Bank Guidelines
1993 International Union for Conservation of Natural Resources (IUCN) Guidelines
1994 The Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) enters into force.
1995 The International Seabed Authority becomes operational.
1995 United Nations Environmental Programme Guidelines
1996 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea becomes operational.
1997 The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf holds its first session.
1998 International Year of the Oceans.
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development
2002 IMO adopts the International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code
2002 Container Security Initiative launched by the United States of America
2003 Proliferation Security Initiative announced by the United States of America
2004 ISPS code comes into force on 01 July 2004
2005 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention and 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA Protocol
This means two things. First, the military concept of sea power and the high seas regime
of ‘freedom of the seas’ has to be balanced with ‘control and regulation’ in performing
of good order tasks. Second, all maritime nations, including great powers and medium
powers, need to individually and/or in concert possess the capacity to exert the power to
govern the sea within the coastal ocean and the maritime commons of the open ocean
48
beyond. The new ocean regime is one of a ‘shared ocean, shared future’99 that calls for
global ocean governance.
Attributes of the power to govern the sea

Geoffrey Till describes sea power, in the 21st century, as the use of both military and
civil maritime capabilities by a nation in the conduct of naval and commercial
operations.100 Therefore, sea power depends on a nation’s outlook towards ‘use of the
sea (ocean)’ and the ‘use of (military) power’ at sea.
For the future, it is the individual nation’s power to govern the sea as opposed to the
military concept of sea power that holds the key to sustaining economic growth,
providing protective security, and ensuring clean oceans for the benefit of not just their
own people but all mankind. If nations do not develop the power to govern the sea they
not only undermine their own national interests but also global security, and nations will
be unable to position themselves as partners in global ocean governance.
There are four attributes that a nation must possess to develop their power to govern the
sea. The first attribute is having the political will to be able to act or function at sea in a
manner of governing or control. The second attribute is having to constitute a law, rule,
standard or principle for the nation at sea. This requires articulating a national maritime
vision. The third attribute is being able to constitutionally conduct the maritime policy,
actions, and affairs of the nation at sea. To do this a nation must build on its financial
resources, technological capability, and industrial capacity. The fourth attribute is being
in military command of the sea and regulating proceedings at sea when required by
national interests. This requires commitment to developing military strength for combat
and good order tasks.
The power to govern the sea flows from a nation’s concept of ‘maritime power.’
Maritime power for the future is defined as the ‘maritime resource of a nation’s power’
or the nation’s use of the sea.101 In other words the ‘maritime resource of a nation’s
power’ depends on the political outlook; level of international and regional cooperation;
naval power; strength of mercantile marine; level of port infrastructure, presence of
coastal communities; management of living and non-living resources, ship design,
99
US Department of State, ‘Shared Oceans, Shared Issues,’ Global Issues, Vol. 9 No. 1, April 2004.
100
Geoffrey Till, Sea Power: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (London: Frank Cass, 2004).
101
Manoj Gupta, Maritime Affairs: Integrated Management for India.
49
building, repair and maintenance capacity; extent of coastal shipping and inland;
waterways, oceanographic science and technological capacity, sustainability of marine
biodiversity governed by a national legal regime for oceans would arguably constitute a
nation’s maritime power. Figure 2.4 summarises the cyclic process in the ‘use of the
sea’ and ‘use of power’ at sea across six constituents that follow on from the attributes
of the power to govern the sea.
Figure 2.4: Cyclic process in the ‘use of the sea’ and ‘use of power’ at sea
r-----------------------------------------------~------------------------------------------------~
MARITIME MARITIME
r
'
~:r ~
RESOURCES CAPABILITIES
MARITIME
OUTLOOK
I NATIONAL
VISION
I ECONOMIC
STRENGTH
I FINANCIAL
RESOURCES
I MARITIME
ENVIRONMENT
L MARITIME ~ L MARITIME ~
r CHALLENGES
~ r
Good order tasks
STRATEGY
LD_J LD_
USE OF MARITIME NEW OCEAN MILITARY MARITIME USE OF
THE SEA POWER REGIME
SEA POWER STRENGTH FORCES POWER
Ready for combat
MARITIME MARITIME
r INTERESTS
~ r OPERATIONS
~
MARITIME
POLICY
I INDUSTRIAL
CAPACITY
I INNOVATIVE
TECHNOLOGY
I
TECHNOLOGICAL
CAPABILITY
I MARITIME
DOCTRINE
L MARITIME ~ L MARITIME _j
INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY
Source: ManojCGupta,
i ht M jG t
Headmark, Spring 2006
The use of the sea for free passage of trade and also regulated by the EEZ regime
characterises a nation’s right to sustainable development of its ocean wealth: from oil to
gas, diamonds to gravel, metals to fish, and nodules to sulphur.
The new ocean regime loop explains that growing maritime interests in the use of the
sea have altered the scope of a nation’s maritime power with new maritime challenges
that are ‘closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole’102 at the national,
regional, and international levels.
The national vision loop envisions maritime resources needed in meeting emerging
maritime challenges. The actual extent of a maritime resource would depend on the
maritime outlook and economic strength of a nation.
102
UN/DOALOS, Preamble to the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea.
50
The industrial capacity loop visualises the nature of maritime interests that determine
the size of a nation’s maritime industry. What is needed is a robust national maritime
policy that acts as a stimulus for innovative technology in developing the industrial
capacity of the nation.
The use of power in protecting the national and international use of the sea would
depend upon the political will and foreign policy of a nation to build maritime forces to
secure the maritime domain.
The military strength loop explains that the type of maritime strategy, when acting
alone and in concert, would determine maritime force structures for the conduct of
maritime operations.
The financial resources loop envisions adopting a maritime strategy based on both the
military and civil maritime capabilities of a nation. The financial resources available to
build maritime capabilities that shape the operating environment of maritime forces will
depend upon the economic strength of the nation.
The technological capability loop visualises a maritime doctrine that promotes

innovative technology to sharpen the technological capability needed for the conduct of
maritime operations. The advancements made by a nation in maritime technology
determine the conduct of maritime operations in support of national interests and global
security.
In determining the power to govern the sea, there has to be recognition that every
maritime nation has rights and responsibilities in conduct of maritime activities
occurring within legitimately claimed maritime zones. All nations require a range of
potential responses - diplomatic, operational, political, legal and non-governmental - to
manage the multiple activities and must at the very least exert power to govern the sea
within their maritime zones by maintaining or having access to capabilities for
surveillance, monitoring, and control.
Through improved coordination, cooperation, and collaboration at the national,

regional, and international levels, nations could better secure national interests within
their delimited maritime zones and achieve greater global security.
The power to govern the sea is clearly more complex than a simple ‘command of the
sea.’ It is no longer concerned with winning the war against a would-be adversary and
51
deterring future aggression. The old image of sea power – war fighting, deterrence, and
power projection – increasingly has to adapt to the power to govern the sea in the
execution of good order tasks that require interdependence and integration.
The matrix of cause and consequence between economic development, environmental

protection and maritime security is, however, a complex one. For instance economic
development driving environmental degradation can result in actual or possible conflict
between and within countries over the resultant scarcity of resources. Even, inequitable
distribution of resources and environmental degradation due to infrastructure
development can create a space for sub-state actors to further their cause by increasing
social tensions and political instabilities through the propagation of conflict.
The access to marine resources, particularly where sovereignty claims overlap or are in
doubt, and declining fish stocks can also lead to conflict. Moreover, growing energy
demands and uncertainty over energy supplies can be motive for controlling the sources
of energy leading to conflict.
Interdependence between nation-states is vital to enhancing management of ocean

resources, maritime safety and security, protecting the marine environment and disaster
management.
The example of maritime safety and security may serve to illustrate the importance of
interdependence between nation- states. The Proliferation Security Initiative, Container
Security Initiative, port state control, Suppression of Unlawful Acts Convention, and the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code are some disparate arrangements that
reflect the interdependence in strengthening the maritime safety and security regime at
national, regional and international levels.
In the implementation of these arrangements, integration of maritime resources within

nation-states is fundamental to the development of an integrated air, surface and
subsurface picture, optimising of resources to maintain 24/7 forces, and the speed of
execution in the conduct of maritime operations. The United States concept of a
52
‘national fleet’ commits to a shared purpose and common effort focussed on tailored
operation integration of platforms, infrastructure and personnel.103
Such is the complexity of transnational threats to global security that no individual

nation can do all in protecting its maritime borders. Maintaining security of the
maritime commons is inherent to protecting national maritime borders. It will take
interdependence between international navies and integration of national maritime
forces to build a ‘1000-ship navy to secures the seas.’104
A 1000-ship navy as the cornerstone of a global maritime network is a Pax Americana

vision to increase security of its maritime domain. Nevertheless, it is in national interest
to integrate maritime forces and in a regional context for like-minded nations to work
interdependently in dealing with global threats to national and regional maritime safety
and security.
Maritime safety as the first step towards broader maritime security is one area of ocean
governance with regional connotations that is considered as vital to the development
and prosperity of the Indian Ocean Region. The second area of significance with
regional connotations is marine scientific research vital to informing fisheries
management, environmental and disaster management and climate change. Both these
areas are the focus of this thesis.
Haward and Vince make the case on how the scope of ocean law in the development of
regimes governing oceans has broadened over the last three decades.105 In their
discussion the authors point out that governance is a matter for government, market and
community where government remains an important actor even if governance occurs
without government.106 According to the authors, the developments of ecosystem
management approaches as opposed to sovereign rights in the treatment of ocean space
remain controversial. This is not to say that regional initiatives are not important. On the
103
United States Navy, ‘Navy-Coast Guard National Fleet Policy Updated,’ Navy Newsstand, 03 March
2006, viewed 21 Mar 2006, <http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=22645> and
‘National Fleet: A joint Navy/Coast Guard Policy Statement,’ viewed 21 Mar 2006,
<http://www.navy.mil/palib/cno/2006_national_fleet_policy.pdf>.
104
Vice Admiral John G. Morgan Jr. and Rear Admiral Charles W. Martoglio, ‘The 1,000 ship navy:
global maritime network,’ United States Naval Institute, Proceedings, November 2005.
105
Marcus Haward and Joanna Vince, Oceans Governance in the twenty-first century: Managing the blue
planet (Massachusetts: Edward Elgar, 2008).
106
The thesis later in chapter 4 when exploring regime theory links the three elements to power-based,
interest-based and knowledge-based actors.
53
contrary, the authors point to the scale, scope and diversity of regional management
initiatives as a tool for effective ocean governance.
Conclusion
The modern day ocean usage has grown manifold. There exists potential for conflict
amongst competing uses while our knowledge and understanding of the oceans remains
fragmented and specialised. A new form of ocean governance centred on ‘control and
regulation’ assumes that the problems of the ocean space are closely interrelated and
need to be considered as a whole, where all nations will cooperate in the management of
the oceans.
The management of the ocean realm is multidisciplinary in nature, balancing economic

activity, social equity, environmental quality and maritime safety and security. Ocean
governance conceived as a trinity of economic development, environmental protection,
and maritime security has altered the nation’s ‘use of power’ at sea from purely a
military concept of ‘command of the sea’ to having the ‘power to govern the sea.’
What is more is that interdependent relationships to deal with issue of ocean governance
now characterise international relations. Despite a range of international agreements that
have contributed to international norm-setting for ocean governance, implementation at
both national and regional levels continues to remain a challenge. Many of the marine
scientific research and maritime safety and maritime security issues are beyond the
capacity of individual states to tackle alone.
As a result, nations in pursuit of ocean governance can ill afford a policy vacuum at the
regional level between the national and international levels. The higher regional level
issues: social – intersociety and intergenerational equity; environmental – resource
conservation and protection; and safety and security –good order at sea, all require
consideration in ocean governance.
The next chapter will consider what constitutes the regional dimension for Indian Ocean
countries in pursuit of ocean governance.
54
Chapter 3
Indian Ocean Region
This chapter discusses the Indian Ocean as a region drawing on international relations
literature on regions interwoven with historical and geographic references. The
purpose is to draw on the importance of the regional level in international relations to
frame the Indian Ocean as a regional unit of analysis for maritime regimes.
Indian Ocean Region as a concept

The Indian Ocean Region within world affairs is of utmost strategic importance in the
21st century. This is because as Kaplan point that the Indian Ocean is the jugular of
world energy and commerce.1 In history, Chaudhuri points out Indian Ocean countries
have not shared a common destiny but the ocean had its own distinct sphere of influence
where means of travel, movement of peoples, economic exchange, climate and historic
forces all created elements of cohesion.2
McPherson’s contribution in this regard best sums up the body of literature where he
argues that the peoples, culture and economies of the Indian Ocean Region formed a
distinctive ‘world’ in which the essential unity of the Indian Ocean ‘world’ was
determined by the long distance maritime trade.3
Europe, the Americas, and Asia-Pacific are robust examples of regional groupings
influencing developments within their own areas and over time, contributing to the
creation of norms, rules and procedures.4 The scholarly analysis of the Indian Ocean as
a region mainly concentrates on the ancient history of contact, trade and distant voyages
done by the people from its coasts and from distant lands.5 Moreover, the Indian Ocean
Region as a priori concept does not take shape in the study of geopolitics and
international relations (IR).6 In Cohen’s geopolitical structure and theory – analysis of
1
Kaplan, ‘Centre stage for the twenty-first century: power plays in the Indian Ocean.’
2
Chaudhuri, Trade and civilisation in the Indian Ocean: an economic history from the rise of Islam to
1750.
3
McPherson, The Indian Ocean: A history of the People and the Sea.
4
Louise Fawcett, ‘Exploring regional domains: a comparative history of regionalism,’ International
Affairs, Vol. 80 No. 3, 2004; see also note 1 for emphasis.
5
See e.g. Pearson, The Indian Ocean; Kearney, The Indian Ocean in world history; M. L. Bhargava,
Indian Ocean strategies through the ages (New Delhi: Reliance publishing, 1990).
6
See Cohen, Geopolitics of the world system; Buzan and Weaver, Regions and Powers: the structure of
international security.
55
the interaction between geographical settings and political processes – South Asia when
linked with the Middle East forms an ‘arc of instability,’ Sub-Saharan Africa forms a
part of the quarter-sphere of marginality, and South East Asia and Australia being
firmly aligned eastwards to the Asia-Pacific regional groupings.7 According to Buzan
and Weaver, the future structure of international security is to be determined by the
interplay of regions and powers.8
Such interplay is evident in the three macro regions – Americas, Europe and Asia-
Pacific – all have an institutionalised role by the US as the sole superpower
within/outside the region, and one or more great powers within the region –
Britain/France/Germany-EU, Japan, Russia and China – as an interplay of mutual
dependence and the balance of power.9 A plausible explanation then for the near
absence of an Indian Ocean Region in IR studies could be that it consists of only
regional powers and there are no great powers within the region. As a result, there is no
interplay of mutual dependence and the balance of power like that between the US as a
super power and other regional great powers in the other regions. US engagement in the
Indian Ocean Region is limited to instrumental concerns of oil, nuclear proliferation,
and international terrorism while engaging India as an ally to balance the rise of China
as a super power.10 Lehr concludes that there is nothing like an Indian Ocean Region
beyond mere geography and the prospects for cooperation are bleak, more so given the
perceived absence of a region at the end of the Cold War.11
Are we then to conclude that the world will witness a move towards a tri-polar structure
centred on Americas, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific,12 and there is going to be no Indian
Ocean Region at the system level in international relations?
Regions and regional orders

The structure of international relations as Buzan and Weaver point out has changed
from Empires to nation-states to regions. This change in world affairs is captured in the
7
Cohen, Geopolitics of the world system.
8
Buzan and Weaver, Regions and Powers: the structure of international security, p. 460.
9
10
11
Peter Lehr, ‘Prospects for multilateral security cooperation in the Indian Ocean: A sceptical view,’
Indian Ocean Survey, Vol. 1 No. 1, 2005.
12
Michael Schulz, Fredrik Soderbaum and Joakim Ojendal, Regionalisation in a Globalising world: A
comparative perspective on Forms, actors and process (London: Zed Books, 2001), p. 3.
56
three stages of their study of international relations: the modern era from 1500 to 1945;
the Cold War and decolonisation from 1945 to 1989; and the post-Cold War period
since 1990.13
The end of the Cold War transformed the international structure with the emergence of
an intermediate strong regional level between the national and global levels.14 Buzan
and Weaver write, ‘the regional level stands more clearly on its own as the locus of
conflict and cooperation for states and as the level of analysis for scholars seeking to
explore contemporary security affairs’ in the post-Cold War structure of international
security.15 Such is the importance of the regional level in international relations that the
costs of underrating them could be even higher’ than the disasters of the Cold War.16
There has been a renewed focus on the study of regions, regionalism, and
regionalisation in international relations, as scholars attempt to theorise the present and
possible future global power structures for building security in a new world, which is
seen as a combination of superpowers and/or great powers and/or regional powers.17
Regional orders in contemporary international relations have come to be viewed as an

important strategy for achieving security, peace, development, and welfare.18
Katzenstein, for example, argues that a ‘world of regions’ – nation-states grouped into
one or more different regions – could shape the international order in the 21st century.19
This is not to say that debates on sub-national levels, sub-state nationalism and fourth
13
Buzan and Weaver, Regions and powers: the structure of international security, p. 14.
14
Buzan and Weaver, Regions and Powers: the structure of international security, pp. 3, 20; and Peter J.
Katzenstein, ‘Regionalism and Asia,’ New Political Economy, Vol. 5 No. 3, 2000, p. 354.
15
Buzan and Weaver, Regions and Powers: the structure of international security, p. 10; and David A.
Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, Regional Orders: Building security in a new world (Pennsylvania: State
University Press, 1997).
16
17
For two useful surveys see Buzan and Weaver, Regions and powers: the structure of international
security; Lake and Morgan, Regional orders: Building security in a new world. For post-Cold War books
on regions, regionalism and regionalization see e.g. Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, Regionalism in
world politics: Regional organization and international order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995);
Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, Regionalism and world order (New York: St Martin’s press, 1996);
Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, Security communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998); Bjorn Hettne, Andras Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel (eds.), Globalism and the new regionalism (New
York: St Martin’s press, 1999); National perspectives on the new regionalism in the third world (New
York: St Martin’s press, 2000); The new regionalism and the future of security and development (New
York: St Martin’s press, 2000); Schulz et al., Regionalisation in a globalising world: A comparative
perspective on Forms, actors and process; Douglas Lemke, Regions of war and peace (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002); Fredrik Soderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw, Theories of new
regionalism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
18
Michael, Soderbaum and Ojendal, Regionalisation in a globalising world.
19
Katzenstein, ‘Regionalism and Asia,’ p. 354.
57
world nations do not exist.20 Although, globalisation and internationalisation of
standards of political morality and governance21 fundamentally altered the thinking
about regional orders from the ‘old’ to the ‘new,’22 the definitions, explanations, and
surveys continue to remain contested and fuzzy concepts.23
The concept of ‘region’ is open to manipulation and interpretation in accordance with

the interest of pivotal political players.24 Regional grouping can be deliberately
inclusive and exclusive – keeping welcome states in, and unwelcome ones out –
depending on the terms and scope of regional action.25 Building regional orders is a
continually evolving phenomenon. Regions are ‘dynamic’ in changing their
compositions, ‘complex’ by varying their aspirations and in ‘conflict’ for determining
capabilities to suit emerging agendas.26 No two regions are analogous. There is no
‘ideal’ region nor is there a common agenda for all regions.27 Yet, there is a
fundamental understanding of what is a region.
As the referent object regions, regionalism, and regionalisation all identify with the
geographic clustering of nation-states that institutionalises an intermediate or regional
level in the interplay between the national and global levels in the different sectors.28
20
See Joshua B. Forest, Subnationalism in Africa: Ethnicity, Alliances, and Politics (Boulder, Colorado:
Lynne Rienner, 2004); and George Manuel, The fourth world: An Indian reality (Canada: Collier-
Macmillan, 1974)
21
See Thakur and Newman, New millennium, new perspectives: The UN, security and governance;
Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, Security: A new framework for analysis.
22
See e.g. Shaun Breslin and Richard Higgott, ‘Studying regions: learning from the old, constructing the
new,’ New Political Economy, Vol. 5 No. 3, 2000; Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, Security: A new
framework for analysis.
23
Fawcett, ‘Exploring regional domains: a comparative history of regionalism’; Fawcett and Hurrell,
Regionalism in world politics: Regional organization and international order.
24
Anthony Bergin, Defining the ‘Asia Pacific Region’ in Hadi Soesastro and Anthony Bergin, The role of
security and economic cooperation structures in the Asia Pacific Region: Indonesian and Australian
views (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996).
25
See further Thakur and Newman, New millennium, new perspectives; and Buzan, Weaver and de
Wilde, Security: A new framework for analysis.
26
For varying compositions, capabilities and aspirations see Fawcett, ‘Exploring regional domains: a
comparative history of regionalism,’ p. 434.
27
Fawcett, ‘Exploring regional domains: a comparative history of regionalism.’
28
For region, see e.g. Bjorn Hettne and Fredrik Soderbaum, ‘Theorising the rise of regionness,’ New
Political Economy Vol. 5 No. 3, 2000, p. 457. For regionalism see e.g. Andrew Hurrell, ‘Explaining
regionalism in world politics,’ Review of International Studies, Vol. 21:4, 1995, p. For Regionalisation
see e.g. Michael, Soderbaum and Ojendal, Regionalisation in a globalising world. For regional security
complexes terminology see Buzan and Weaver, Regions and powers: the structure of international
security.
58
New concept of security
Post-Cold War, adding to the interest in regions, international security entered a new
phase that reflects: the growing acceptance of a wider conception of peace and security;
empowerment of transnational non-state actors; increasing interdependence of security;
emergence of new categories of security challenges beyond the capacity of individual
nation-states to tackle alone; and deeper interdependence of the present global political
economy.29
Challenges such as international terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal immigration,

transnational crime, environmental degradation, and resource scarcity reflect on new
threats to national security as it becomes increasingly inseparable from international
security. The non military dimension increasingly coexists with the traditional military
dimension to ‘security’ taking their place alongside the ‘old’ threats of nuclear warfare
and large scale conventional war. Security in the 21st century has assumed a much
broader definition in place of the narrow military concept. A threat to national security
could be defined as anything which challenges people’s health, economic well-being,
social stability and political peace.
Consequently, the old military and state centred security focus was questioned and
widened in terms of military, political, economic, societal and environmental sectors.30
As a new framework for analysis, the extended concept of security lays the foundations
for thinking about regional security.31
In the face of a wider security agenda at the national level, which has become
inseparable from the international level and the renewed impetus towards regional
orders, IR studies is witnessing attempts to establish regional levels as the interface
between the global level of the strong international system and the micro-level of the
sovereign territorial nation-states.
Regional entities are increasingly being viewed by IR scholars as the solution for
nation-states to fill the void created by the lifting of the bipolar super power overlay
from the world. Nation-states concerned with preserving the traditional conceptions of
29
See Thakur and Newman, New Millennium, New Perspectives; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of
Great Powers (New York: Random house, 1987); and Michael, Soderbaum and Ojendal, Regionalisation
in a Globalising world.
30
Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, Security: A new framework for analysis.
31
Buzan and Weaver, Regions and powers: the structure of international security, p. xvi.
59
national sovereignty and national autonomy see regional entities as a means to
overcome the risk of being marginalised in the globalised economy, pool resources in
dealing with global security challenges to national interests, and develop the framework
for a sustainable future.
Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)

This section focuses on Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) propagated by
Buzan and Weaver in their seminal work on regions and powers.32
Even as the number of nation-states has grown from 51 in 1945 to 192 today, the
process of geopolitical restructuring in the context of the wider security agenda has
entered an era of interdependence – sovereign entities clustered into Regional Security
Complexes (RSCs), set of states united by common security problems constituting a
region.33
Buzan and Weaver frame nation-states into eight RSCs – South Asia, East Asia, Middle
East, Southern Africa, Central Africa, post-Soviet, Europe, South America and North
America; and two proto-complexes – West Africa and Horn of Africa; that in the post-
Cold War are located in five principal regions – Asia, Middle East, Africa, Americas,
and Europe.
RSCT based on a wider security agenda provides a conceptual framework for

comparative studies in regional security to capture the emerging structure of
international security: ‘regions and powers.’ Originally propounded by Buzan, RSCT
can be used to analyse threats that can arise in different spheres or sectors and at
different locations or levels.
RSCT specifies what to look for at four levels of analysis: Domestically is the state
strong or weak; state-to-state relations; the region’s interaction with neighbouring
regions; and the role of global powers in the region. Taken together these four levels
constitute the security constellation.
RSCT enables a systemic approach to the study of intra-state conditions, inter-state

relations, inter-regional dynamics, and the inter-play between regions and powers. What
32
See Buzan and Weaver, Regions and powers: the structure of international security, pp. 40-83 and 463-
477.
33
See Cohen, Geopolitics of the world system, p. 29.
60
RSCT does in international relations is to identify the regional level as being always
operative that is even when it is not the dominant level.
Indian Ocean RSCs

Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) characterised by actual patterns of security
practices are made up of the fears and aspirations of separate nation-states within the
geographic proximity of one another. Buzan and Weaver define an RSC as: ‘a set of
units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked
that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one
another.’34
The units are actors, such as, nation-states, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs),
transnational firms, and international bodies.35 It has been argued that the nation-state is
the ideal standard unit of security in the international system.36 Buzan and Weaver argue
that South Asia, Middle East and South-East Asia within East Asia all remain strongly
state-based regions even though some states themselves are not always strong.
As the starting point of the inquiry, using nation-states as units for defining an RSC
allows easier correlation with the familiar geopolitical definition of a region. This also
allows determining the kind of relations states and/or others form among themselves.
RSCs are very specific functionally defined type of regions that are mutually exclusive.
The essential structure of an RSC embodies four variables: boundary; anarchic
structure; polarity; and social construction.
In the Indian Ocean Region South Asia is a good example of an RSC that naturally
fulfils all four attributes. The boundaries of an RSC may not coincide with the
commonly understood geopolitical boundary of the region. The processes of
securitisation in Southern Africa and the neighbouring island states are equally
interlinked to form an RSC. Similarly, in the Indian Ocean context South East Asia and
Australia form the Australasian37 sub-complex within the larger East Asian RSC.
34
35
Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, Security: A new framework for Analysis, p. 6.
36
Barry Buzan, People, states, and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-Cold
War era (New York : Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 19.
37
For a discussion on the term Australasia see Dennis Rumley, The geopolitics of Australia’s regional
relations (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), pp. 242-256.
61
A sub-complex has the same definition as RSCs. It is also possible for an RSC to
contain one or more sub-complexes. The Gulf and the Horn of Africa-Red Sea area are
two sub-complexes within the larger Middle East RSC. The Gulf Cooperation Council
in the Gulf sub-complex is the only Indian Ocean centric regional organisation in the
Middle East RSC.
The four RSCs in the Indian Ocean – South Asia, Southern Africa, Gulf sub-complex,
and Australasia sub-complex – are all standard RSCs with an anarchic structure of two
or more regional powers and no global level powers. The polarity in the RSCs is
defined by regional powers – Unipolar (South Africa) in Southern Africa, Bipolar (India
and Pakistan) in South Asia, and Multipolar in the Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq)
and Australasia (Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand).
The social construction, which covers the patterns of amity and enmity, is one of
conflict formation in Southern Africa, South Asia and the Gulf, and that of a security
regime in Australasia.
The standard RSCs of the Indian Ocean stand apart from the centred/great power RSCs
in the rest of the world. North America forms a unipolar superpower (US) centred RSC.
While the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) forms a unipolar great power
(Russia) centred RSC. Europe acquires regional actor quality as an institution
(European Union) centred RSC. Finally, East Asia forms a bipolar great power RSC
with China and Japan as the regional poles.
So, what distinguishes the standard and centred or great power RSCs? First, the lowest
common denominator of the centred and great power RSCs is the actor quality of a
global level power as compared to that of a regional power in standard RSCs. Second,
standard RSCs have a predominant military-political security agenda. Finally, standard
RSCs are open to penetration by superpowers and great powers.
As a consequence, all four levels are in play in the RSCs of the Indian Ocean. The
domestic level exerts medium influence in three RSCs and is very influential within the
Southern Africa RSC. The regional level has significant influence in all the four RSCs.
It takes the top spot in South Asia, shares the top spot with the global level in the Gulf
and Australasia and takes the number two spot alongside the global level in Southern
Africa. The global level in South Asia exerts the same influence as the domestic level.
The interregional level, in the context of the Indian Ocean Region, is low in Southern
62
Africa and the Gulf and of medium influence in South Asia and Australasia. Table 3.1
gives the relative influence of the different levels in the international system on the
security dynamics of the Indian Ocean RSCs.
Table 3.1: Relative influence of different levels on Indian Ocean RSCs

Levels/RSCs Southern Africa Gulf South Asia Australasia
Domestic High Medium Medium Medium
Regional Medium High High High
Interregional Low Low Medium Medium
Global Medium High Medium High
Source: Adapted from Buzan and Weaver – Regions and Powers, 2003
What and how do the centred and great power RSCs portend for the Indian Ocean
Region? Centred RSCs can be more stable connecting the regional and global levels,
while great power RSCs, ‘generate a sustained and substantial level of interregional
security dynamics.’
In the Indian Ocean Region as a concept, some internal or external transformation is

evident. There is internal transformation in South Asia that could elevate India to
becoming a global level great power. India close to achieving unipolarity is pursuing a
model of great power centred RSC. Southern Africa is also showing signs of internal
transformation moving away from conflict formation towards a security regime. Even
though South Africa is unlikely to be a global level player it is likely to create a unipolar
centred RSC. External transformation in Australasia merged South East Asia and
Australia with North East Asia to form the larger East Asian great power RSC. On the
other hand, a centred or great power RSC seems unlikely in the Middle East, which
includes the Horn of Africa-Red Sea area and the Gulf sub-complex of the Indian Ocean
Region.
Regions and the Indian Ocean

One of the fundamental problems of research in regional studies has been to answer the
important question of what constitutes a region. At the same time, in order to limit the
scope of scholarly work it becomes necessary to establish the boundaries of the region
for study even before the existence can be justified. In so doing, regions cannot be taken
for granted and research must develop concepts that make the common constituents of
the defined region visible.
63
In the various interpretations of what constitutes a region Braudel was the first to
conceptualise the notion of oceanic regions to study the problems and consequences that
shaped the destiny of people on the opposite shores of the Mediterranean.38 Few
historians have followed suit in conceptualising the Indian Ocean as a region. Prominent
in their exposition are Abu-Lugbhad, Chaudhuri, McPherson, Milo Kearney and
Pearson.39 However, the Indian Ocean Region in international relations remains largely
a ‘mental map’ created by scholars in classifying their research.
The reasons appear to be two fold. Firstly, in comparison to the Atlantic and the Pacific
there is difficulty in defining the geographic boundaries of the Indian Ocean Region.
Secondly, in the field of area studies the focus has rarely shifted from land centric
margins to ocean centred maritime connections that could potentially bind the littorals
on opposite shores of the ocean into a single geopolitical region. Such reasoning,
although true, defies logic, when distant shores of the Indian Ocean have long been
linked through maritime trade, conquests, and migration.
Understanding the geostrategic maritime realm

The earth’s maritime and continental settings define the geostrategic realms within
which geopolitical regions emerge as power frameworks that should enhance global
stability by strengthening the balance of power system.40
It was not until 1498, when Portuguese sea power changed the face of world geopolitics
into the modern oceanic circle in which all states including land-locked states are now
enmeshed.41 Until then, the centres of world civilisation –the Ottoman Empire, India
under the Moguls, China under the Ming dynasty and the European State System – were
roughly at the same level of economic and technological development and far superior
to other scattered societies of Africa, Oceania and America.42
38
Ned Alpers, ‘The Newest Old World,’ Africa Studies Centre, UCLA International Institute, viewed 23
May 2008, < http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=1299>.
39
See Chaudhuri, Trade and civilisation in the Indian Ocean: an economic history from the rise of Islam
to 1750; Abu-Lughod, Before European hegemony: The world system A.D. 1250-1350; Michael Pearson,
The Indian Ocean; Kenneth McPherson, The Indian Ocean: A history of the People and the Sea; and Milo
Kearney, The Indian Ocean in world history.
40
For settings, realms and regions see Cohen, Geopolitics of the world system.
41
See Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of great powers; and Eric Grove, The future of sea power (London:
Routledge, 1990).
42
See Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of great powers.
64
Ever since, the geostrategic maritime realm comprising primarily of the Americas,
Europe and Asia-Pacific geopolitical regions, has dominated the past century and a
half.43 The nation-states of these geopolitical regions border the Atlantic and Pacific
oceans, not the Indian Ocean.
The most basic divisions of the world into continents and oceans are constructs based
on easily visualised land features of mountains and coastlines. The seven continents are
possibly more of intellectual constructs conveniently identifiable by prominent land
features of the world map.
The ocean world, on the other hand, can be and has been divided in different ways. For
instance, it is traditional to say that the Indian Ocean washes on to the coastline of
Western Australia. It could well be that the Indian Ocean eastern limit stops short of
reaching Western Australia just as the southern limit does not reach the continent of
Antarctica. It can also be that the Pacific Ocean western limit stops short of reaching the
eastern coast of Australia. Neither construct is practical for statecraft and is unlikely to
be applied in the future.
The same holds true for the determination of limits between the Indian and Atlantic
Oceans south of Africa. Entertaining alternative views of the oceanic divisions – whole
of Australia part of the Indian or Pacific Oceans - allows us to see the world afresh, that
could reveal patterns of connections otherwise obscured by our standard worldview.
Although discrepancies in the sizes, boundaries, and number of oceans remain, as will
become apparent from the next section there is remarkable global consensus on the
nomenclature of oceanic divisions within the geostrategic maritime realm.
Indian Ocean nomenclature

This section draws on the work of Lewis on dividing the Ocean Sea.44 Unlike as on
land, historic and local names of different bodies of water have yielded to global
conventions. For instance, waters to the west of the Indonesian archipelago are no
longer referred to as the ‘Indonesian Ocean.’
43
Saul Cohen, Geopolitics of the world system, p. 37.
44
Martin W. Lewis, ‘Dividing the ocean sea,’ Geographical Review, Vol. 89 No. 2, April 1999, pp. 188-
214.
65
The current accepted maritime spatial classifications emerged in broad outlines in the
1800s, but did not fully-develop until the 20th century. The global consensus in
geographic names is strongly indicative of nations tacitly accepting the norm of
international regimes for governance in the geostrategic maritime realm.
On the other hand, epistemic thinking over time does reveal differences on the number
of oceans from one to seven. In medieval times, for example, the classical
Mediterranean world predicated a single sea encircling a limited body of land or held a
continental view of two earth-spanning oceans separated by four continental
landmasses. The oceanic model emerged only after Ferdinand Magellan’s voyage in the
early 1500s. In 1570, Abraham Ortelius, accredited as the inventor of the modern atlas,
divided the oceanic world into four oceans by dividing the Atlantic into the northern
one as ‘Mar Del Nort’ (North Sea) and the southern one as ‘Ethiopian Ocean’ and
designated the Pacific as the “Mar Del Sur” and identifying the Indian Ocean as the
‘Sea of India.’
However, it was to be Phillipe Bauche’s 1758 global model of interconnected mountain

ranges both terrestrial and submarine that first inspired the current perspective of three
distinct basins: Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian. Then in 1878 Black’s atlas of the world
mapped a five-ocean scheme - Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, Arctic, and Antarctica. It is only
when Peter Freuchen in 1957 argued that the North and South of the Atlantic and the
Pacific exhibited their own individuality did the ‘seven oceans’ come to figuratively
represent the ancient ‘seven seas’ schema and divided the earth’s surface uniformly into
seven continents and oceans a piece.45
The phrase ‘seven seas’ from time immemorial has represented different bodies of water
and has appealed to those poetically and numerologically inclined. The ‘seven seas’
came to be popularised by Rudyard Kipling in 1897 when he published a book of poetry
entitled ‘the Seven Seas.’46 In India, the Hindi idiom “Saath Samundar Paar” (across
the seven seas) has come to symbolise the Indian Diaspora living across the seven
oceans. Kipling never enumerated the seven seas but hydrographers in 2000 created a
45
Peter Freuchen and David Loth, Book of the Seven Seas (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), p. 35.
46
Freuchen and Loth, Book of the Seven Seas, p. 33.
66
system of five oceans or seven divisions, as we now know them - North Atlantic, South
Atlantic, North Pacific, South Pacific, Indian, Arctic, and Southern Oceans.47
One other notable variation in the conceptualisation of the geostrategic maritime realm
has been the synonym use of the terms ‘Ocean’ and ‘Sea’ to describe the same body of
water. The debate amongst geographers on whether or not the Arctic Ocean should be
known as the Arctic Sea shows that the two terms - Ocean and Sea - remain intertwined.
The term ‘Ocean’ has come to represent the largest seven bodies of water and seas are
generally considered as constituents of the larger oceans. However, the entire maritime
realm is encased in the term ‘Sea’ by the United Nations Convention on ‘Law of the
Sea’ as the internationally accepted legal regime as also the customary ‘freedom of the
high seas.’ What becomes irrefutable is that the earth’s maritime realm cannot really be
divided into pools of water and the use of different terms, names, and boundary lines are
conceptual constructs created by political and ideological thinking of its time.
The Indian Ocean has not been insulated from variations in the terminology and
consequentially size. By tracing the different names assigned to the modern Indian
Ocean it is clear that geographers were keen to link different bodies of water to the
cultural and political outlooks of neighbouring landmasses.
In 1544, Roman Geographer Sebastian Cabot labelled the northern waters as the “Indian
Ocean” and the modern central Indian Ocean was named as the ‘Green Sea’ (Mare
Prasodum). Ortelius in 1570 identified the Indian Ocean as a single basin simply called
the ‘Sea of India.’ Continuing with the basin concept, John Senex in 1725 had similar
divisions as Cabot but with different names calling the body of water north of the
equator as the ‘Indian Sea’ and the rest of the basin as the ‘Eastern Ocean.’ It can be
assessed that there is a striking similarity over time amongst different geographers to
link the waters north of the equator chiefly to India.
There is a brief reference in history to the modern north-western Indian Ocean as the
Red or ‘Erythraean Sea.’ To the Greeks the Erythraean Sea encompassed the modern
day Red Sea or the ‘Arabian Gulf’ (Sinus Arabicus), Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and the
waters off the Somali coast. Historic explorations are indicative that states did exert
47
See the International Hydrographic Organization draft 4th edition of S-23 ‘Limits of Oceans and Seas’
that remains a working document only.
67
some political and cultural influence across the waters from their coastline, providing
some clarity to the imagination of geographers.
According to some geographers, the ‘Eastern Indian Ocean’ extended from the Arabian
Sea through the Malay Archipelago to include the South China Sea. Abu-Lughod and
Chaudhuri demonstrate that the ocean-arc linking the Swahili coast to the South China
Sea did constitute closely linked trading circuits leading to the spread of different
religions and their associated culture.48
The precise geographic boundaries of the Indian Ocean have remained open to debate
through the 20th century. The boundaries between the three Ocean basins - Pacific,
Indian, and Atlantic - and the southern limits of the three basins have been revisited
from time to time.49 Forbes, and Prescot and Schofield provide an authoritative and
comprehensive discussion on the Indian Ocean boundaries as we know it today.50 The
20th century Indian Ocean includes the historic waters of the Persian Gulf, Erythraean
Sea (Red Sea), Indian Sea/Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal, Mare Barbaricus (Barbarian
Sea), Mare Prasodum (Green Sea) and the Eastern Indian Ocean without the South
China Sea.
Indian Ocean political geography

The political geography that describes the Indian Ocean Region is more complex. The
concept of coastal states and landlocked states established by the United Nations Law of
the Sea identifies 149 coastal (maritime) states and 43 landlocked (continental) member
countries.51 The Indian Ocean Region in Bouchard’s typology52 (Figure 3.1) accounts
for 20.7 per cent of the total earth’s surface.53
48
1750; Abu-Lughod, Before European hegemony: The world system A.D. 1250-1350.
49
The International Hydrographic Organization developed the draft 4th edition of S-23 ‘Limits of Oceans
and Seas’ from 1998 to 2002 that remains a working document only. The document defines the limits of
the Southern Ocean as the parallel of 60S to the north and the coast of Antarctica, including the
Antarctic Peninsula, to the south.
50
Vivian Louis Forbes, Maritime Boundaries of the Indian Ocean Region (Singapore: Singapore
University Press, 1995); Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, The maritime political boundaries of the
world (Boston: Martinus Nijoff Publishers, 2005).
51
United Nations, ‘List of member states,’ viewed 7 Mar 2009, <http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml>;
Nationmaster Encyclopaedia, ‘List of landlocked countries,’ viewed 7 Mar 2009,
<http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Landlocked-country>.
68
Figure 3.1: Map of the Indian Ocean
Source: Christian Bouchard
The geostrategic maritime realm of the Indian Ocean geopolitical region describes the
position of Southern Africa and adjacent island states, Middle East, South Asia, South-
East Asia, and Australia. The ocean forms the logical link between the people of these
lands. The Indian Ocean also acts as a communications link between the Atlantic and
Pacific oceans. Open access through choke points to the wide, expansive Indian Ocean
is of prime geostrategic importance to all nation-states. In this thesis, the Indian Ocean,
as a geopolitical entity consists of 36 of the 149 coastal states, 13 of the 43 landlocked
52
Christian Bouchard, ‘Emergence of a new geopolitical era in the Indian Ocean, characteristics, issues
and limitations of the Indianoceanic Order,’ in Rumley and Chaturvedi, Geopolitical orientations,
regionalism and security in the Indian Ocean. Bouchard makes the case to also include the Central Asian
countries as Indian Ocean landlocked countries.
53
Christian Bouchard, ‘Geographical setting of Indian Ocean Region,’ Journal of Indian Ocean Studies,
Vol.11 No. 2, 2003, pp. 214-233.
69
countries and 11 other island territories under the control of the UK and France (Table
3.2).54
Table 3.2: List of Indian Ocean countries

S No Country I UN Member S No I Country I UN Member
Coastal States Landlocked States
1 Australia 01 Nov 1945 1 Afghanistan 19 Nov 1946
2 Bahrain 21 Sep 1971 2 Bhutan 21 Sep 1971
3 Bangladesh 17 Sep 1974 3 Botswana 17 Oct 1966
4 Comoros 12 Nov 1975 4 Burundi 18 Sep 1962
5 Djibouti 20 Sep 1977 5 Ethiopia 13 Nov 1945
6 Egypt 24 Oct 1945 6 Lesotho 17 Oct 1966
7 Eritrea 28 May 1993 7 Malawi 01 Dec 1964
8 India 30 Oct 1945 8 Nepal 14 Dec 1955
9 Indonesia 28 Sep 1950 9 Rwanda 18 Sep 1962
10 Iran 24 Oct 1945 10 Swaziland 24 Sep 1968
11 Iraq 21 Dec 1945 11 Uganda 25 Oct 1962
12 Israel 11 May 1949 12 Zambia 01 Dec 1964
13 Jordan 14 Dec 1955 13 Zimbabwe 25 Aug 1980
14 Kenya 16 Dec 1963 Other Island territories
15 Kuwait 14 May 1963 1 British Indian Ocean Territory Chagos(UK)
16 Madagascar 20 Sep 1960 2 La Réunion (FR)
17 Malaysia 17 Sep 1957 3 Bassas da India (FR)
18 Maldives 21 Sep 1965 4 Europa Island (FR)
19 Mauritius 07 Oct 1964 5 Glorioso Islands (FR)
20 Mozambique 16 Sep 1975 6 Juan de Nova Island (FR)
21 Myanmar 19 Apr 1948 7 Tromelin Island (FR)
22 Oman 07 Oct 1971 8 Crozet (FR)
23 Pakistan 30 Sep 1947 9 Kerguelen (FR)
24 Qatar 21 Sep 1971 10 Saint-Paul and Amsterdam (FR)
25 Saudi Arabia 24 Oct 1945 11 Mayotte (FR)
26 Seychelles 21 Sep 1976
27 Singapore 21 Sep 1965 Note: Together Bassas da India, Europa Island,
28 Somalia 20 Sep 1960 Glorioso Islands, Juan de Nova Island and Tromelin
29 South Africa 07 Nov 1945 Island form a unique administrative territory, named
the Scattered Islands in the Indian Ocean. According
30 Sri Lanka 14 Dec 1955
to French law 2007-22 of February 21, 2007, the
31 Sudan 12 Nov 1956
Scattered Islands constitute the fifth district of
32 Tanzania 14 Dec 1961
French Southern and Antarctic Lands (TAAF).
33 Thailand 16 Dec 1946 Crozet, Kerguelen, and Saint-Paul Amsterdam have
34 Timor-Leste 27 Sep 2002 the same administrative status (one of the five
35 United Arab Emirates 09 Dec 1971 districts of the TAAF).
36 Yemen 30 Sep 1947
54
Based on discussions with Christian Bouchard, Department of Geography, Laurentian University,
Canada in July 2005. The number of Indian Ocean countries and the island territories under control of UK
and France differ from Dr P. Nag (ed.), Geography of the Indian Ocean (Kolkata: Government of India
Publication, 2007) – this publication does not include Sudan amongst Indian Ocean countries. The 13
landlocked countries have been identified from the transhipment port of access to the Indian Ocean
indicated by Export 911, ‘Shipping department,’ viewed 7 Mar 2009
<http://www.export911.com/e911/ship/landlock.htm>; and see Gupta, Maritime Affairs: Integrated
Management for India.
70
This political geography of the Indian Ocean Region, under constant change from
violent conflict, has now more or less stabilised. The geographic contiguity of an ocean
and documented historic connections notwithstanding, the question remains: Is it
justifiable in continuing to study and analyse the Indian Ocean as a region in
international relations?
Prior to 1498, in ancient times the Indian Ocean flourished as a ‘region’ of trade and
contact open to all.55 At the beginning of the modern era between 1500 and 1945 the
great power rivalry embroiled the Indian Ocean into politics even as it was consolidated
into a region of the British Empire.56 After 1945, as the British withdrew from the
Indian Ocean, the political process of the region became increasingly fragmented into
the Westphalian system of nation-states with varying degrees of instabilities due to
conflicts and tensions.57
The Cold War divided the Indian Ocean Region in myriad ways that witnessed civil
wars, border wars, suspicions and tensions, insurgencies and terrorism, arms race and
nuclear build up. It became standard to argue that there exist multitudes of divergence in
economic strength, political system, social development, and cultural and religious
traditions.58 And those nation-states in the region appear too hostile and too
geographically separated ever to come together as a coherent regional force. There was
widespread emphasis on secrecy and sovereignty. Nation-states believed that
multilateral dialogue would somehow undermine national sovereignty. All this
obstructed the formation of an Indian Ocean regional order.
It is perceived that the superpower rivalry during the Cold War helped support local
balances, preventing the Indian Ocean Region from turning into chaos.59 Post Cold War
the external factors that clouded and vitiated local and regional tensions and conflicts
have largely receded. They have assumed their true dimension unclouded by the politico
- ideological and military factors of the bipolar struggles. The US as the sole super
power and the other great powers – Russia, China, Japan, Britain, France and Germany,
55
1750; and Pearson, The Indian Ocean, 2003, p. 123.
56
Ferenc A. Vali, Politics of the Indian Ocean region (New York: The Free Press, 1976), pp. 14-16.
57
Vali, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region, pp. 20-21.
58
Harry Harding, ‘Prospects for Co-operative Security Arrangements in the Asia Pacific Region,’ Journal
of North East Asian Studies, Fall 1994, p. 33.
59
Vali, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region, p. 45.
71
are more inclined towards regional solutions to regional problems than direct
intervention by an outside power.
The realisation that long term security in the Indian Ocean Region cannot be guaranteed
by the United States or any other single power has placed a sobering responsibility on
regional powers to strengthen mutual relationships.60 The one factor that had an
important bearing on the security environment of the region then and remains relevant
even today is the absence of an Indian Ocean regional order. Post Cold War, with the
geographic settings unchanged and the political process seeking a greater role for
regional powers, the Indian Ocean as a geopolitical entity is more relevant than ever
before.61
Indian Ocean regional initiatives

Regional initiatives in the Indian Ocean remain in a state of flux. In an effort to address
strategic and security issues, the 1971 United Nations initiative on Declaration of the
Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (DIOZP), hereinafter referred to as the DIOZP,
continues to languish, despite the Cold War having ended.62 Ironically, opposition to the
DIOZP comes from external maritime powers. The Indian Ocean countries currently
have the support of more than two-thirds of the UN member states including Russia and
China to progress work on implementation of the DIOZP, but from the very beginning
have been thwarted in their attempts by the three other permanent members of the UN
Security Council – United States of America, United Kingdom and France.63
A non-military initiative emerged in 1985 from the UN Convention on Law of Sea to

focus on ocean management. The Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation (IOMAC),
initiative started in 1985, focused on cooperation and coordination amongst Indian
Ocean States in tapping the ocean resource potential for economic benefit and national
development.64 The IOMAC initiative has largely remained embryonic despite efforts to
60
Damon Bristow, ‘Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea,’ RUSI Journal Aug 1996, p. 33.
61
Vali, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region, pp. 22.
62
UN General Assembly 56th session, ‘Report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean,’ UN
Document A/56/29 dated 05 Jul 2001.
63
UN General Assembly 62nd session, Report of the First Committee, ‘Implementation of the Declaration
of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,’ UN Document A/62/382 dated 8 Nov 2007.
64
Hiran W. Jayewardene, ‘The Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation (IOMAC),’ in Peter Bautista
Payoyo (ed.), Ocean Governance: Sustainable development of the seas (Tokyo: The United Nations
University, 1994), viewed 29 May 2008,
<http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu15oe/uu15oe0n.htm>.
72
breathe new life through the 1990 Arusha Agreement in Tanzania.65 An International
Forum on the Indian Ocean Region in 1995 identified a number of other
intergovernmental, non-governmental and other Indian Ocean organisations with
mandates for cooperation.66
A second non-military initiative was started in 1997, to foster regional economic

integration and economic cooperation amongst Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) countries. The
Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) had four main
components as its pillars for regional cooperation, namely, trade liberalisation, trade and
investment facilitation, economic and technical cooperation and trade and investment
dialogue. An elaborate institutional mechanism - Council of Ministers (COM),
Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), Indian Ocean Business Forum (IORBF), Indian
Ocean Academic Group (IORAG) and the Working Group on Trade and Investment
(WGTI) - was devised to deliver on the objectives of regional cooperation with the
secretariat situated in Mauritius.67 A decade after its inception, the IOR-ARC appears to
be dying a natural death.68
Of interest is the belief of a group of scholars, internationally and from the Indian Ocean
states, in the concept of an Indian Ocean Region. The Indian Ocean Research Group
(IORG) envisions itself as a research umbrella organisation providing social science
policy-oriented research towards realizing ‘a shared, peaceful, stable and prosperous
future for the Indian Ocean region.’69 Bouchard provides a comprehensive discussion of
the various regional associations prevalent in the Indian Ocean Region.70
Indian Ocean regionalism

The scant literature in international politics on the Indian Ocean has divided the nation-
states on the three continents in different ways. Dowdy identifies five core sectors: a
65
On Arusha Agreement, see Hiran W. Jayewardene, ‘The Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation.’
66
International Forum on the Indian Ocean Region, ‘Indian Ocean frameworks for Cooperation: other
areas of possible cooperation: non-economic issues,’ Working paper no. 5, 1995.
67
Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation 2004 document, IOR-ARC, pp. 11-16.
68
See statement by Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad, South Africa, at the 7th meeting of the IOR-ARC
Council of Ministers, 7 March 2007, viewed 29 May 2008,
<http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2007/07031511451003.htm> .
69
Indian Ocean Research Group (IORG) Vision and Preamble, viewed 18 Apr 2009,
<http://www.iorgroup.org/index.php>.
70
Bouchard, ‘New geopolitical era in the Indian Ocean.’
73
Persian Gulf core; a South Asia core; a Red Sea core; a Southern Africa core; and an
Australasia core within the Indian Ocean Region during the Cold War period.71
In the post-Cold War period, the Indian Ocean Rim have been categorised into four
regional systems: Arabian/Persian Gulf; South Asia; Horn of Africa; and South-East
Asia.72 The sub-divisions of the Indian Ocean Region are similar in Cohen’s
examination of the world system at the beginning of the 21st century and Buzan and
Weaver examination of the post-Cold War structure of international security.73 Cohen
writes about the Middle East, South Asia, Asia-Pacific Rim and Sub-Saharan Africa
that includes Southern Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, and the Horn of Africa.
Similarly, Buzan and Weaver write about Middle East, South Asia, East Asia including
Australia (on the lines of Cohen’s Asia-Pacific Rim) and Sub-Saharan Africa (same as
Cohen).
Vali’s work in 1976 stands apart in the literature on Indian Ocean politics.74 Vali takes
an oceanic approach to write about the African countries and island territories in
Southwest Indian Ocean, Horn of Africa and Red Sea, Persian Gulf, India and its
neighbours, South East Asia including Australia and the residual colonials.
According to Chaturvedi, what is needed is to articulate and develop a new

sustainability based geopolitical orientation for the Indian Ocean, which lies outside the
neo-imperialist legacy defining current international maritime relations in the region and
moves away from the traditional geopolitical theorising by the strategic community and
military planners.75
By taking a view of the land from the ocean it is possible to focus on four sub-regions:
Southern Africa and the island states east of it, Middle East, South Asia, and
Australasia. The sub-regions differ from other divisions in literature in two ways: the
71
William L. Dowdy, ‘The Indian Ocean Region as concept and reality,’ in William L. Dowdy and
Russell B. Trood (eds.), The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a strategic arena (Durham: Duke University
Press, 1985), p. 5.
72
W. Howard Wriggins with F. Gregory Gause III, Terrence P. Lyons, and Evelyn Colbert, Dynamics of
Regional Politics: Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992),
p. 5; for a discussion on sub-regionalism in the Indian Ocean also see Bouchard, ‘New geopolitical era in
the Indian Ocean.’
73
Cohen, Geopolitics of the world system; and Buzan and Weaver, Regions and powers: the structure of
international security.
74
Vali, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region.
75
Sanjay Chaturvedi, ‘Common security? Geopolitics, development, South Asia and the Indian Ocean,’
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 19 No. 4, 1998, pp. 701-724.
74
Middle East includes the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea area; Australasia as a term
defines Australia and South-East Asia as a single sub-region.
One of the advantages is that study of the majority of coastal and island States can be
organised around four prominent sub-regional organisations: Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC); Southern African Development Community (SADC); South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC); and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) although
much broader than South East Asia and Australia.
Together, the four organisations represent 20 of the 31 coastal states and 2 of the 5
island states in the Indian Ocean Region. The island states outside the four organisations
are Comoros, Madagascar, and Seychelles and the coastal states include Iran and Iraq in
the Gulf complex, Kenya in Southern Africa, and Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Israel,
Jordan, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen in the Horn of Africa-Red Sea area.
The difficulty is that the Middle East sub-region, from an RSCT perspective, involves a
joint discussion of the Horn of Africa-Red Sea proto-complex and the Gulf sub-
complex. The absence of a sub-regional organisation for the Horn of Africa-Red Sea
proto complex precludes a regional discussion of these 8 coastal states in the area.
The most complex of the four sub-regions the Middle East includes the Arab States of
West Asia, North African members of the Arab league, Iran, Turkey and Israel76 or the
Middle East RSC and the Horn of Africa proto-complex.77 The Middle East sub-region
consists of two of the three geostrategic choke points in the Indian Ocean - the Red Sea-
Bab el Mandeb strait and the Strait of Hormuz. There is no regional institution
corresponding to a Middle East Region to address common interests and prospects of
cooperation.78
It is the Gulf sub-complex formed around the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that has
emerged as one of the most successful organisation in a fragmented Middle East.79 The
nation-states comprising the GCC best represent the geographic setting of the oil
strategic Strait of Hormuz with Oman bordering the Indian Ocean situated at the mouth
76
Louise Fawcett, International relations of the Middle East (New York: oxford University Press, 2005),
p. 2.
77
78
Fawcett, International relations of the Middle East, p. 191.
79
Fawcett, International relations of the Middle East, p. 185; and Fawcett and Hurrell, , Regionalism in
world politics: Regional organization and international order, p. 307.
75
of the strait. Oman as a GCC member is interesting. During the Cold War, in its fight
against Soviet supported guerrillas in Dhofar, it received support from Iran on the other
side of the Strait of Hormuz. Now, in the post-Cold War period Iran has become a
security concern for the GCC.80
South Asia centred on India is the simplest sub-region to define in the Indian Ocean. It
stands apart as a geopolitical region independent of the Atlantic and Pacific trade
dependent maritime realm, the Eurasian continental Russian heartland, and the mixed
continental-maritime East Asian realm.81 The South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC) established in 1985 continues to focus on areas of cooperation
other than regional security (SAARC charter).
SAARC has made little impact as a regional institution with nation-states still
suspicious of each other and preferring bilateral arrangements to regional solutions.82
During the Cold War, India with more than half of the total population in the Indian
Ocean Region, adopted a policy of non-alignment and became the leader of the Afro-
Asian bloc of nation-states seeking a third-way in world affairs.83
The end of the Cold War crushed the nonalignment movement and left Indian foreign
policy groping for direction. India’s 1992 ‘Look East’ policy had its genesis in the end
of the Cold War. By 1996, India had become a dialogue partner of the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF). In the Middle East, India abandoned its anti-Israeli policy. In
2004, India announced a ‘Focus Africa Policy.’ Unshackled from its position of non-
alignment with a Soviet tilt and fixation with its immediate neighbourhood, India has
begun to give greater importance to its relationship with the United States and Europe.
Overall, India’s is being more proactive with its foreign policy for the security
environment of the Indian Ocean Region.
Southern Africa and the adjacent island nation-states with South Africa as the core form
the third sub-region in the Indian Ocean. The transformation from conflict to
cooperation in the region between the period before and after the Cold War is most
apparent in the restructuring of the regional framework.
80
Vali, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region, p. 51; and Fawcett, International relations of the Middle
East, p. 188.
81
Cohen, Geopolitics of the world system, p. 4.
82
83
Vali, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region, p. 50; and Cohen, Geopolitics of the world system, p. 42.
76
In 1980, to lessen economic dependence on South Africa nation-states in the region
established, the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) that in
1992, transformed itself into the South African Development Community (SADC) and
South Africa joined as a member in 1994.84 The SADC initiative to formulate a regional
security regime with South Africa assuming a leadership role has been troubled by
South Africa’s own internal challenges.85
Australasia comprising nation-states of South East Asia and Australia represents the
final sub-region of the Indian Ocean. Although aligned to the Asia-Pacific region,
Australasia is also the most stable of the four sub-regions within the Indian Ocean. The
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) founded in 1994 after the Cold War is the principal
forum for security dialogue that in the Indian Ocean regional context includes Australia
and India as dialogue partners and Pakistan joining in 2004.
The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) of 1971 involving, Australia, Malaysia,
Singapore, New Zealand and UK is the only operational regional defence arrangement
of its kind involving coastal states from the Indian Ocean Region. Australia in 1995,
signed a defence accord with Indonesia, thereby establishing defence arrangements with
the three principal coastal states bordering the Strait of Malacca, the busiest strategic
waterway of the Indian Ocean. Thus, Australia geopolitically seen as a unit of the Asia-
Pacific rim is strategically crucial to the Indian Ocean as a region.86
The Indian Ocean Region is a geopolitical entity of newly independent nation-states.87

Bounded by territoriality, all four corners of the Indian Ocean were formed as regions of
conflict and tensions. Post-Cold War only the Australasia sub-region has had some
success towards attaining a durable security architecture. Regional institutions of the
other three sub-regions had their origins in the 1980’s at almost the same time, and have
survived to the present.
Security affairs continue to plague these regions. Unlike the GCC, which continues to
exclude Iraq and Iran, SADC emerged from the Cold War transformed into accepting
South Africa as a regional power with a leadership role. SADC unlike ARF could not
84
85
Buzan and Weaver, Regions and powers: the structure of international security, p. 236-238; and
86
87
Vali, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region, p. 230.
77
deliver as a security regime. Both SADC and ARF formed after the Cold War differ in
approach to regional security. ARF unlike SADC engaged key nation states as dialogue
partners. SAARC continues to remain in the shadow of the India-Pakistan rivalry.
Regional security was unthinkable during the Cold War period. In the post-Cold War,
regional geopolitical unity could give nation-states in the Indian Ocean the power or the
potential to affect outcomes when acting in concert in identified areas of common
interests within the geostrategic maritime realm. In his exposition on the strategic
rivalry in the Indian Ocean Berlin concludes, ‘the Indian Ocean, often characterised in
the past as “the neglected ocean” will be so no longer.’88
Rumley, one of the leading strategic analysts on Indian Ocean geopolitics,

conceptualises the significance of regionalism and argues that for ‘reasons of identity,
security and long-term stability’ it is in the interests of ‘peoples and states’ to construct
their own brand of regional cooperation.89
Two prominent reorientations are evident in the post-Cold War that could shape the
geopolitical landscape of the Indian Ocean in the future. First, India has moved away
from its traditional position of nonalignment and is building cooperative partnerships
within the Indian Ocean Region and with external powers – US, Russia, UK, France,
Germany, China, and Japan. And second, since the mid 1990’s by increasing its security
linkages with Asia, Australia has carved for itself a major role in the Indian Ocean
Region should it choose to fulfil that role. These and other changes in the sub-regional
organisations have the potential to foster a new wave of regional cooperation in the
Indian Ocean as a region.
Indian Ocean Region defined

Allowing for modern day nomenclature and conventions, for the purposes of this
research the Indian Ocean is deemed to be bounded by the east coasts of the African
continent and Arabian Peninsula to the west; the south coast of the Asian continent to
the north extending from the Strait of Hormuz to the Singapore Strait; the south coasts
of the Indonesian Archipelagos, and the north and west coast of the Australian continent
88
Donald L. Berlin, ‘Neglected No Longer: Strategic Rivalry in the Indian Ocean,’ Harvard International
Review, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2002, p. 31.
89
Dennis Rumley, ‘The geopolitics of Asia-Pacific Regionalism in the 21st Century,’ The Otemon
Journal of Australian Studies, Vol. 31, 2005, pp. 5-27.
78
in the east; and in the south imaginary lines at sea and not land borders separate the
Indian Ocean from the Atlantic, Pacific, and Southern Oceans, namely, the 20 degree
meridian from Cape Agulhas at the southern tip of Africa, the 147 degree meridian from
southern most point of Tasmania (Australia) and the 60 degree latitude to the an
irregular line joining the Southern tips of Africa, South African Prince Edward islands,
French Kerguelen, Australian Heard’s and Macdonald islands, and Tasmania.90
Simply stated, the Indian Ocean is the smallest of the three oceans in the world that
touches the continental shores of Africa, Asia, and Australia and is separated from the
continent of Antarctica by the Southern Ocean.
The modern-day nomenclature that further characterise the waters of the Indian Ocean
include the Mozambique channel, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf,
Gulf of Oman, Laccadive Sea, Bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea and the Strait of Malacca.
Historic connections apart the waters of the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden, Persian Gulf-Strait
of Hormuz-Gulf of Oman, and the Malacca Straits linked to the expansive Arabian Sea
and Bay of Bengal are of significant strategic and economic importance in international
relations.
It can possibly be deduced that the political and cultural influence of the Arab Peninsula
was to prevail in the north-western Indian Ocean known as the Arabian Sea, and India’s
influence extended eastwards coming into contact with Chinese influence in Southeast
Asia. Clearly, political processes on land have influenced the geographic settings of the
Indian Ocean to the North of the equator. Here, the waters of the Indian Ocean are
named in relation to the historic influence of the proximate land mass.
Geographers question the extent to which Australia is part of the Indian Ocean
Region.91 Historically too, McPherson documents Australia’s marginal contact in the
Indian Ocean.92 In the absences of any meaningful interaction up until the 1800s across
the vast stretches of water from Durban to Perth, geographers possibly relied on the
single basin concept to label the waters south of the equator as the Indian Ocean.93
90
Prescott and Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, p. 461.
91
Martin W. Lewis and Karen Wigen, ‘A maritime response to the crisis in area studies,’ Geographical
Review, Vol. 89 No. 2, 1999, p. 168.
92
McPherson, The Indian Ocean: A history of the People and the Sea, p. 7.
93
Lewis, ‘Dividing the ocean sea,’ p. 204.
79
The label intensive politically and culturally influential waters north of the equator
together with the southern Indian Ocean waters create a mental map of a single region
referred to as the Indian Ocean Region.
Conclusion
The Indian Ocean Region has always existed historically and geographically although it
is barely recognised as such in modern day international relations. In an era of
interdependence, the land centric system of the modern state has for Indian Ocean states
made regional cooperation more complex and difficult. In the oceanic realm, this has
left many Indian Ocean states without the ‘power to govern the sea.’
In understanding the geostrategic maritime realm, the ocean space can hardly be divided
by imaginary lines at sea and this is true for the Indian Ocean as a body of water that
connects the shores of Africa, Asia and Australia. The geographic setting remains
unchanged and in history, this oceanic region had flourished as a region of trade and
contact open to all.
The modern day single basin regional initiatives are in a state of flux. The political
landscape of this oceanic region has emerged from a period of conflict and has now
more or less stabilised into four different sub-regional groupings – SADC, GCC,
SAARC and ARF. Some tensions still exist but none that in the oceanic realm threaten
to undermine regional cooperation. The oceanic region of the Indian Ocean remains
intact and open to regional cooperation, as an intermediate level between the national
and international levels, should Indian Ocean states choose to benefit from such
cooperation in the implementation of internationally agreed to maritime regimes.
The next chapter will draw on regime and structuration theory to describe the elements
of a regime that need to be considered in assessing the effectiveness of maritime
regimes in the Indian Ocean.
80
Chapter 4
Regime theory and application of structuration theory
This chapter reviews the literature on regime theory to inform the analysis on
effectiveness of maritime regimes in the Indian Ocean as a regional unit of analysis.
The chapter integrates the different schools of thought on regime theory and applies
structuration theory to emphasise the actor-structure interplay across space and time.
Regime effectiveness an agenda for research

When Strange, approximately twenty-five years ago, commented on the concept of
regimes as a state-centric value-biased imprecise and woolly passing fad, she or anyone
else was far from postulating that regimes matter.1 Within international relations, the
debate has since transcended from regime formation to regime effectiveness and is now
strongly becoming a top research agenda for scholars.2
Mostly, the study of regimes has focussed mainly on international environmental

regimes,3 but the principles are not exclusive to environmentalists. For example, the
Rene Dubos maxim ‘Think globally, act locally’ exhorted by the Brundtland
Commission or the World Commission on Environment and Development has
implications in other ocean regime arenas besides protection of the marine environment,
such as, shared fisheries resources, conduct of marine scientific research, safety of
shipping, and maritime security. More specifically, the aim of international regimes is to
regulate national actions when dealing with collective issues.
Empirical observations have shown that the success of international environmental

regimes varies greatly. The question arises can international regimes conceived globally
effectively perform locally in the way they are currently configured? To answer the
question, research emphasis in recent years has shifted to assessing the effectiveness of
regimes within the broader study of regime consequences.
1
See Susan Strange, ‘Cave! Hic Dragones: A critique of regime analysis,’ International Organization
Vol. 36. No. 2, 1982, pp. 479-496.
2
See comments by Oran R. Young in Arild Underdal and Oran R. Young (ed.), Regime consequences:
Methodological challenges and research strategies, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004).
3
Oran R. Young (ed.), The effectiveness of international environmental regimes: causal connections and
behavioural mechanisms (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999), p. 29.
81
Structurational approach to regimes
Regimes affect state behaviour by altering the institutional environment and/or actors
interests or preferences so that cooperation is more likely.4 It is argued that the concept
of regimes needs to submit itself to a ‘structurational’ approach put forward by Anthony
Giddens in order to build on the theory that like actors institutions do matter in the
international system.5
A number of authors have applied structuration theory to international relations for

different objectives with telling effect. Wendt making use of structuration theory makes
a notable attempt to theorise about behaviour of states as agents given the structure
constraints in the international system.6 Cerny has applied it to the process of
globalisation.7 Carlsnaes describes structuration theory as a resolute strategy for
overcoming the core of the agency-structure problem in foreign policy analysis.8
Dessler seeks to link theory to specific empirical analysis and builds on Giddens work
to outline a structural model of international politics.9 Arts focused on the role of non-
state actors in regimes attempts to enrich regime analysis with insights from
structuration theory.10
This chapter draws inspiration from these notable works in an attempt to use Giddens
work in expanding the application of regime theory to analyse the effectiveness of
maritime regimes in the Indian Ocean Region. Later in the chapter, the discussion
particularly tries to adapt Giddens ‘duality of structure,’ the core of structuration theory,
into a cyclical model that opens a four-way actor-structure interaction in the analysis of
4
See context and functions of international regimes in Robert O. Keohane, ‘The demand for regimes,’
International Organization Vol. 36 No. 2, 1982, pp. 325-355; Robert O. Keohane, After hegemony:
Cooperation and discord in the world political economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984);
and Bertram I. Spector and I. William Zartman, Getting it done: Post- agreement negotiation and
international regimes (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2003).
5
Anthony Giddens, The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration (Oxford: Polity
Press: 1984).
6
Alexander E. Wendt, ‘The agent-structure problem in international relations theory,’ International
Organization, Vol. 41 No. 3, 1987.
7
Philip G. Cerny, ‘Political agency in a globalizing world: toward a structurational approach,’ European
journal of International Relations, Vol. 6 (4), 2000.
8
Walter Carlsnaes, ‘The agency-structure problem in foreign policy analysis,’ International Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 36 No. 3, 1992.
9
David Dessler, ‘What’s at stake in the agent-structure debate?,’ International Organization, Vol. 43. No.
3, 1989.
10
Bas Arts, ‘Regimes, Non-state actors and the state system: a ‘structurational’ regime model,’ European
Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6 (4), 2000.
82
Regimes do matter
Where anarchy11 may be the rule in world politics12, the study of international regimes
seeking ‘cooperation under anarchy’13 and ‘governance without government’14 becomes
important for understanding ‘order’ in international relations.15 In a range of
international issue-areas, mutual interests exist, whereby, through mutual agreement
self-interested state actors establish international regimes for mutual benefits that
outweigh the costs of participation or of going alone.16
In other words, international regimes make expectations of governments consistent with

one another, facilitating agreement in an anarchic world of politics by providing a
framework of rules, norms, principles and procedures that govern State behaviour for
international cooperation in areas of common concern.17
Over the last three decades, having weathered a number of challenges, international
regimes can be pictorially described as widely dispersed small islands of cooperation in
the oceanic expanse of anarchy18 that have come to be the mainstay of peace,
development and sustainability in a globalised world. Not without its criticism,19 there
is now consensus amongst scholars that international regimes do matter in international
relations.20
11
For an excellent discussion on Anarchy see Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it: The
social construction of power politics,’ International organization, Vol. 46 No. 2, 1992, pp. 391-425.
12
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of international politics (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
13
Kenneth Oye, Cooperation under anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
14
James N. Rosenau and Ernest O. Czempiel, Governance without government: Order and change in
world Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
15
See Robert O. Keohane, ‘The demand for international regimes,’ International Organization, Vol. 36
No. 2, 1982, p. 325. For a discussion on Anarchy vs Order see Andreas Behnke, ‘Ten years after: The
state of the art of regime theory,’ Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 30(2), 1995, p. 187.
16
See especially Keohane, ‘The demand for international regimes,’ pp. 325-355.
17
See Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, ‘Integrating theories of international
regimes,’ Review of International Studies, Vol. 26, 2000, pp. 3-33.
18
Behnke, ‘Ten years after: The state of the art of regime theory,’ p. 187.
19
See Strange, ‘Cave! Hic Dragons: A critique of regime analysis’; Also see Vinod K. Agarwal, Liberal
protectionism: the international politics of organized textile trade (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1985); Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules ,norms and decisions: on the conditions of practical and
legal reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989); and Friedrich V. Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie, ‘International Organisation: A state of the art on
an art of the State,’ International Organization, Vol. 40 No. 4, 1986, pp. 753-775.
20
See John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International responses to technology: concepts and trends,’ International
Organization, Vol. 29, 1975, pp. 557-83; Robert O. Keohane, ‘The analysis of international regimes:
Toward a European-American research programme,’ in Volker Rittberger with the assistance of Peter
Mayer (ed.), Regime theory and international relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 23-
45.
83
Conceptual clarification of regimes
What regimes do is further cooperation to provide international governance.21 From the
various valuable functions served by international regimes,22 Keohane outlines three
key functions in depth.23 Foremost, regimes establish a clear legal framework that
specifies legitimate and illegitimate behaviour. Essentially, a regime alters the operating
environment by stressing on cooperation amongst States and making it more conducive
to achieving such cooperation.
Secondly, regimes create mutual trust by improving the quality and quantity of
information exchanged between states. In so doing, a regime creates a formal
mechanism that binds actors by a uniform code of conduct. Over the long run, a
successful regime favourably enhances interaction amongst actors, which in turn
encourages other actors to join.
Finally, even though not cost-free, regimes reduce transaction costs associated with the
negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of agreements. By joining a regime, there is
willingness amongst states to offset transaction costs against the likely mutual benefits
in an issue-area. Thus, by helping make government’s expectations consistent with one
another, regimes seek to structure their relationships in stable and mutually beneficial
ways, which in the long term could bring order to an otherwise anarchic world.24
In sum, international regimes are instruments of institutionalised or regularised

behaviour, which alleviates cooperation between states for a given issue or problem.
Regime definitions
At the most basic level, the main challenge concerns the definition of what constitutes a
regime. Leading authors such as Keohane, Levy, Young, Zurn and Breitmeier have
21
Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger and Michael Zurn, ‘State of the art and perspectives’ in Volker
Rittberger (ed.) Regime theory and international relations,(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp.
392-430.
22
For increasing governmental concern, enhancing contractual environment and for increasing national
political and administrative capacity see Marc A. Levy, Robert O. Keohane and Peter M. Haas,
‘Improving the effectiveness of international environmental institutions,’ in Peter M. Haas, Robert O.
Keohane and Marc A. Levy (eds.), Institutions for the Earth: Sources of effective international
environmental protection (London: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 397-406. For reducing transaction costs and
facilitating decentralised rule-making see Keohane, After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the
world political economy; and Agarwal, Liberal protectionism: The international politics of organized
textile trade.
23
Keohane, After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy.
24
Keohane, ‘The demand for international regimes,’ pp. 325-355.
84
made important contributions in attempting to improve upon Krasner’s 1983-consensus
definition of international regimes (Table 4.1). The word ‘regime’ stems from the Latin
words regimen, which means ‘a rule’ and regere, which denotes ‘to rule.’25 The
Krasnerian consensus definition on regimes is universally accepted as the foundation of
regime-studies, regardless of the debate on the vagueness and indistinguishable
components of the definition. In an effort to better understand the means and conditions
under which state cooperate, a solid working definition of regimes continues to be
sought.26
Table 4.1: Definitions of regimes

Author Year Definition
Stephen D. Krasner27 1983 Regimes are implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations
converge in a given area of international relations.
Robert O. Keohane28 1989 Regimes are institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by
governments that pertain to particular set of issues in international
relations.
Marc A. Levy, 1995 Regimes are social institutions consisting of agreed upon
Oran R. Young, and principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the
Michael Zurn29 interactions of actors in specific issue areas.
Helmut Breitmeier, 2006 Regimes are social institutions created to respond to the demand
Oran R. Young, and for governance relating to specific issues arising in a social setting
Michael Zurn30 that is anarchical in the sense that it lacks a centralised public
authority or a government in the ordinary meaning of the term.
What is generally acknowledged is that regimes treated as social institutions are

characterised by a specific problem and a problem-solving capacity that relies on
coordination and cooperation amongst actors. The criticism of the definition points to
the difficulty in differentiating the four components – principles, norms, rules and
decision-making procedures –and its vagueness of ‘around which actors expectations
converge’ in operationalising a regime.31
25
Agarwal, Liberal protectionism: The international politics of organized textile trade.
26
See discussion on the meaning of the term regime in Helmut Breitmeier, Oran Young and Michael
Zurn, Analysing international environmental regimes: From case study to database (Massachusetts: The
MIT Press, 2006).
27
Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 2.
28
Robert O. Keohane, ‘Neoliberal institutionalism: A perspective on world politics’ in Robert O.
Keohane (ed.), International institutions and State power: Essays in international relations theory
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 4.
29
Marc A. Levy, Oran Young and Michael Zurn, ‘The study of international regimes,’ European Journal
of International Relations Vol. 1 No. 3, 1995.
30
Helmut Breitmeier, Analyzing international environmental regimes: From case study to database, .p. 3.
31
Levy et al., ‘The study of international regimes.’
85
Keohane simplifies regimes as ‘institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by
governments that pertain to particular set of issues in international relations.’32 Levy,
Young and Zurn suggest defining international regimes ‘as social institutions consisting
of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the
interactions of actors in specific issue areas.’33
Although vast in range, the definitions seem to vary little in scope. Moreover, the
definitions do not capture the dynamic nature of regimes. Spector and Zartman
convincingly argue regime building as an ongoing negotiation.34 Rather than examine
regimes to determine their effectiveness in terms of compliance, regimes need to be
studied for their own evolution and the effects on the ground. This characterisation
introduces the elements of time and space in any attempt to arrive at a working
definition of a regime.
Implicit in every definition is that regimes define actor behaviour in international issues.
In effect, a regime institutionalises35 cooperation amongst actors to better-manage that
particular international issue for the collective good of humanity. Regimes are required
where there is an inability on the part of actors to overcome problems in an issue-area
without collective action.36 Under such conditions, the problems stem from low levels
of concern and the lack of individual capacity.37
Attributes and classification of regimes

The first main task is classification of regimes in formulating the methodology to
measure regime consequences and regime effectiveness. Levy, Young and Zurn make
the point that regime classification is a blank spot in the literature on international
regimes.38 Further complication arises from the difficulty in differentiating between the
attributes explicitly used in defining regimes. A good starting point is to draw
distinctions between the different regime attributes and use the variations in the
classification of regimes.
32
Keohane, ‘Neoliberal institutionalism: A perspective on world politics.’
33
34
See Spector and Zartman, Getting it Done: Post- agreement Negotiation and International Regimes.
35
For typology of international institutions, see Keohane, ‘Neoliberal institutionalism: A perspective on
world politics,’ pp. 3-4.
36
Levy et al., ‘Improving the effectiveness of international environmental institutions,’ p. 398.
37
38
86
According to Parson, norms are ‘generalised formulations more or less explicit of
expectations of proper action by differentiated units in relatively specific situations.’39
Norms are problem-solving devices for dealing with the recurrent issues of social life:
conflict and cooperation.40 Norms are ‘collective understandings of the proper
behaviour of actors.’41
Norms frame international cooperation in three ways - Norms help to constitute the
actors in international cooperation by both identifying who the actors are and conferring
rights and responsibilities upon them; Norms make international cooperation ‘rule-
governed’ in constraining the activities of social actors where legitimacy within that
society is obtained by acting in accordance with the rules; and Norms create a
meaningful language of communication between actors in international cooperation
based upon established patterns of social interaction.42
Clark makes a compelling argument that the practice of legitimacy in international

relations and observable actor behaviour in international cooperation is closely linked to
the three international norms of legality, morality and constitutionality.43 The norm of
legality elucidates the formal idea of international legal rules, while the norm of
morality alludes to the notion of shared moral values. The norm of constitutionality lies
independent of the norms of legality and morality in the political realm of conventions,
informal understandings and mutual expectations.44 A good example is constitutional
orders, which are characterised by shared agreement about the principles and rules of
order; authoritative limits on the exercise of power; and the entrenchment of these rules
in a wider political system.45
Norms most often are in conflict. As Krasner observes, the international environment
has been characterised by competing and often logically contradictory norms, not some
39
Talcott Parsons, Theories of society: Foundations of modern sociological theory (New York: Free Press
of Glencoe, 1961), p. 120.
40
Kratochwil, Rules, norms, and decisions: on the conditions of practical and legal reasoning in
international relations and domestic affairs, p. 69.
41
Jeffrey W. Legro, ‘Which norms matter? Revisiting the “failure” of internationalism,’ International
Organization, Vol. 51 No. 1, 1997, p. 33.
42
Alex J. Bellamy, Security communities and their neighbours: regional fortresses or global integrators
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
43
Ian Clark, Legitimacy in international society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 207-226.
44
Clark, Legitimacy in international society, p. 220.
45
See John G. Ikenberry, After victory: institutions, strategic restraint and the rebuilding of order after
major wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
87
single coherent set of rules.46 Inadvertently, the legitimacy in international cooperation
of an actor’s behaviour is derived from the consensual quality of that behaviour reached
through political accommodation amongst competing pulls of the three norms of
legality, morality and constitutionality.47
What it means is that norms describe the social phenomena of shared understandings,
arrived at by actors in international cooperation by overcoming conflicts with self-
interest, to prescribe or proscribe actor behaviour with a deontological content.48 This is
not to say that actors do not disregard norms or the degree of consensus about them
never changes or even that norms remain constant.49
The theoretical argument is that norms affect behaviour by changing an actor’s motives
and beliefs, that is there understanding of their interests. Norms produce, therefore, not
only a logic that spells out the consequences of what will happen if they are violated but
also logic of what behaviour is appropriate.50 Norms have therefore been defined as ‘a
broad class of prescriptive statements – rules, standards, principles, and so forth - both
procedural and substantive’ that are ‘prescriptions for action in situations of choice,
carrying a sense of obligation, a sense that they ought to be followed.’51
Norms defined in terms of rights and obligations are standards of behaviour.52 Against
this backdrop, the methodology assembles the attributes of norms – principles, rules,
standards and guidelines (Figure 4.1) – into a hierarchical relationship, as set out by
Braithwaite and Drahos in their seminal work on ‘Global Business Regulation.’53
46
Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: organized hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p.
52.
47
Clark, Legitimacy in international society, p. 226.
48
See Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond, Exorcising the ghost of Westphalia: Building world
order in the new millennium (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002); and Gary Goertz, Contexts of
International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
49
See Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond, Multipolar Peace?: Great power politics in the
twenty-first Century (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), p. 124; and Charles W. Kegley and Gregory
A. Raymond, Exorcising the ghost of Westphalia: Building world order in the new millennium, pp. 192-
194.
50
Herrmann in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, Handbook of International
Relations (London: Sage, 2002), p. 128.
51
Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with international
regulatory agreements (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 65.
52
John Volger, The global commons: A regime analysis (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1995), p. 31.
53
John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global business regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000).
88
Figure 4.1: From norms to rules
Nonns
Principles Standards Guidelines
Legal Non-Legal Legal Non-Legal
Rules Rules
Source: Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000
A principle may apply to more than one action while a rule relates to a particular action.
Ostrom in her ground-breaking work ‘Governing the Commons’54 argues that one of the
operatives ‘forbid,’ ‘require’ or ‘permit’ must be contained in a statement to be
considered as a rule. In this way, rules prescribe relatively specific acts. Volger provides
the following classification of regime rules:55
 Standards setting rules involves promoting desirable actions and prohibiting

others.
 Distribution rules involve procedures for allocation of shared resources that

specify user rights and obligations.
 Information rules specify sharing of information, reporting and monitoring

arrangements.
 Enforcement/compliance rules adopt a self-regulatory character placing reliance

on upon governments to enforce compliance within their jurisdiction.
 Knowledge rules are designed to increase the body of consensual knowledge

significant to the operational level in the relevant issue-area.
54
Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
55
Volger, The global commons: A regime analysis, pp. 40-41; Ernst B. Haas, ‘Why Collaborate? Issue-
Linkage and International Regimes,’ World Politics, Vol. XXXII (3), 1980, pp. 357-405 sighted in Oran
R. Young (ed.), The international political economy and international institutions, p. 227.
89
Principles are at a higher-order level than rules and remain as the focus of the research
inquiry. As Braithwaite and Drahos point out, principles stand behind rules informing
their application. Principles are settled agreements on conduct that bring about mutual
orientation between actors in a group. Principles function to secure objectives and goals,
which are important to the actor. Actors seek through principles changes that are
consistent with their general values, goals and desires. Volger defines principles as
‘beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude.’56
Standards denote a point of reference in the conduct of actors that can be applied to
measure their performance and act as a benchmark for compliance. Standards, unlike
principles, can have a high degree of specificity. To quote from Braithwaite and Drahos
‘Guidelines are used to suggest a direction for conduct in conditions of uncertainty.
Guidelines do not have the degree of ‘settledness’ which principles possess and are very
often issued as a provisional measure until more is known about the relevant problem.’
Norm for ocean governance and maritime regimes

The methodology treats ocean governance as the overarching norm for research. The
core attributes of norms – principles, standards and guidelines – further frames the
classification of maritime regimes (Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2: Ocean governance norm and attributes of maritime regimes

/
"'
Norm Attribute Regime
Allocat ion r 1 1nternational Seabed

Exclusive Economic Zone
Hig h Seas
J
Marine Scie nt ific Research

~ Principles Cooperat ion }
Sust aina ble Fishe ries
Protect io n and Preservation of
k/
t he Marine Environment
[ Ocean
Govern ance
Funct ional }
l
Ma rit ime Safety
Marit ime Security l
~
Safety of Life a nd Property at Sea
H St andards I
St a nda rds of Tra ining, Cert ificatio n
a nd Watchkee ping for Seafa re rs
Preve ntion of Pollution from Ships
N" Gu ide lin es

__J Deve lopme nt a nd Transfer )
of Marine Technology
~
'
56
Volger, The global commons: A regime analysis, p. 31.
90
Principle based maritime regimes can be classified in a number of ways. The norm for
ocean governance mainly utilises the principle of allocating ocean space for specific
uses. The ‘common heritage of mankind’ principle allocates seabed resources for shared
use defined by the international seabed regime. The nationalisation principle of coastal
states rights and responsibilities over allocating adjoining ocean resources led to the
creation of the Exclusive Economic Zone regime. The principle of ‘freedom of the high
seas’ maintains the regime character of the high seas open to all states for navigation,
fishing and scientific research besides overflight, laying of submarine cables and
pipelines, and constructing artificial islands and other installations. These freedoms are
exercised by all States with due regard to the interests of other states in their exercise of
the freedom of the high seas, which are reserved for peaceful purposes. Ocean
governance across the different ocean spaces – the Area, Exclusive Economic Zone and
the High Seas – is further guided by principles of cooperation. This has led to the
emergence of cooperative regimes for marine scientific research, protection and
preservation of the marine environment and sustainable fisheries.
Another method is to differentiate in terms of roles amongst participants of a regime. A

good example is the role of flag states and port states in maritime safety exercised
through the regime for port state control. An emerging role based regime is the maritime
security regime led by the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code and
includes other initiatives such as the Container Security Initiative, Proliferation Security
Initiative and the Suppression of Unlawful Acts convention. According to Levy, Young
and Zurn such functionally differentiated regimes are difficult to create and come into
existence only as part of larger institutional networks, but once created are expected to
be more influential in terms of consequences and display greater robustness.57
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has established a number of standards-

based regimes for international shipping. Amongst the prominent ones are the
International Conventions for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), and Prevention of Pollution
from Ships (MARPOL). Finally, a guidelines-based regime for ocean governance
includes the regime for the development and transfer of marine technology.
57
91
Drawing on the normative power of principles and rules, standards and guidelines actors
use different mechanisms as devices to achieve their goals. 58 As such, mechanisms are
causal chains, which cannot be generalised as laws.59 In the employment of different
mechanisms to achieve goals, States establish regimes, in the knowledge that it is in
their long-term interest to cooperate. The underlying assumption being that compliance
with international commitments is possible, even likely. Therefore, mechanisms help
prevent short-term defection by some states at the expense of other states.60
The generally accepted notion is that regimes once established would serve the long-
term interests of states. Yet, at the same time, there exists unease over non-compliance
by some states. In a way, for the duration of the regime mechanisms designed to achieve
cooperation amongst states must apply across a defined (geographic) space and should
be extended over time. Using Gidden’s Structuration theory, the thesis takes this
approach having developed the Indian Ocean space as a region for analysis in chapter 3.
Driving social forces of regime formation

Contributions on driving social forces essentially cluster around three schools of
thought, interest-based neoliberalism; power-based realism; and knowledge-based
cognitivism.61 Scholars point out that the three schools are not mutually exclusive and
none offers a complete explanation for regime formation. To begin with, the
neoliberalist view is that sharing of common interests is the motive for cooperation.
Although, commonality of interests in a particular international issue is necessary it is
not a sufficient condition to get cooperation amongst actors.
Taking a realist view, consideration of relative power amongst actors encourages or

entices cooperation and characterises effectiveness of the regime. What cognitivists are
quick to point out is that perceptions of shared interests and relative power capabilities
are dependent on the causal and social knowledge of the actors.62
58
For a discussion on the meaning of mechanisms, see Jon Hovi, ‘Causal mechanisms and the study of
international environmental regimes’ in Underdal and Young, Regime consequences: Methodological
challenges and research strategies.
59
Braithwaite and Drahos, Global business regulation, p. 15.
60
Raustiala and Slaughter in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas, Risse-Kappen, Beth A. Simmons, Handbook of
international relations (London: Sage, 2002).
61
Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, Theories of international regimes
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
62
Hasenclever et. al., Theories of international regimes.
92
Even though within the mainstream interest-based approach, the widely discussed
contractualist or functional theory by Keohane is considered the most elaborate theory
in the analysis of international regimes, no one school is a clear winner.63 Regardless of
the divergent theoretical considerations, regimes prompt a change in actor behaviour at
the international and national levels.
In their review of international regimes, Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger compare

and contrast the three schools of thought to show how they may complement one
another.64 The scholars argue that the variables – interests, power and knowledge –
somehow interact. According to the authors, a synthesis of the three schools of thought
holds considerable promise in studying the effectiveness of international regimes. The
three schools of thought have been crystallised in Table 4.2. Hasenclever, Mayer and
Rittberger in exploring a synthesis of these otherwise comprehensible and plausible
theories of international regimes defend three propositions:
 Neoliberalism and realism not only share a commitment to rationalism as a

meta-theoretical stance, but may fruitfully work together when it comes to
explaining international regimes, thus offering the prospect of a more unified
rationalist theory of international institutions;
 There is a distinct strand within the cognitivist school, [also known as] ‘weak
cognitivism,’ which can serve as an analytically necessary supplement to, and,
as such, can be incorporated into, the rationalist account of international
regimes; and
 ‘grand synthesis’ – i.e. one that includes the more radical, or ‘strong,’ forms of
cognitvism as well – is not on the cards. Strong cognitivists have ontological
and epistemological commitments that are strictly opposed to those of
neoliberals or realists. In this case, continued intellectual competition is both
more likely and more desirable than ill-fated attempts to merge to mutually
exclusive paradigms of inquiry. 65
63
Hasenclever et al., Theories of international regimes.
64
Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, ‘Interests, power, knowledge: The study of
international regimes,’ Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 40 No. 2, October 1996, pp. 177-228.
65
Hasenclever et al., ‘Interests, power, knowledge: The study of international regimes,’ pp. 177-228.
93
Table 4.2: Schools of thought in international regimes
Rationalist Sociologist
Attributes
Realism Neoliberalism Cognitivism
Meta-theoretical Self-interested goal Self-interested goal Shared normative and causal
orientation seeking actors seeking actors social beliefs
Epistemology Envious states acting to Unenvious states acting to States utility depends on shared
maximise their own maximise their own regulative and constitutive
utility function utility function social knowledge
Ontology Actor priority over norms Actor priority over norms Institutionalised norms and
and rules and rules rules empower actor
Central variable Relative power Shared common interests Distribution of knowledge
capabilities
Main actor Atomistic states Atomistic states Social institutions
State behaviour Relative gains seeker Absolute gains maximiser Role player
Political play Domestic level politics is Domestic level politics is Two level games – national and
almost negligible almost negligible international
Regime-conducive foreign
policy
Veil of States fear from lack of States fear from lack of Decision makers fear from
uncertainty reliable information reliable information about their inability to assess the
about the behaviour and the behaviour and likely consequences of their
intentions of other states intentions of other states own decisions or non-decisions
Knowledge Assumed knowledge Assumed knowledge Constitutes identities; shapes
preferences and options
Interests International public good Constellation of interests International cooperation
Power Hegemonic state power Distribution of power Epistemic community backed
amongst states international institutions
Institutionalism Minimum Bounded Maximum
Operating Set of sufficiently clear Must share common Minimum of collective
precondition and constraining rules interests; can be attained understanding concerning the
and their reliable only through cooperation issues at stake
enforcement
Operational Sensitivity to rule-based Rule-based cooperation Rule-based cooperation
outcome cooperation amongst under anarchy amongst states
states. Collective good
supplied by independent
action.
Viewing regimes Alternatives to unilateral Problem-solving devices Web of meaning
leadership
Regime resilience Presence of a strong Embodied sunk costs Institutionalised cooperation
leader
Regime effects Rationalist approach Sociologist approach
 Reduce mutual uncertainty.  Mutual adjustment.
 Reduce information costs.  Process of policy coordination.
 Reduce transaction costs associated  Shape reputations of members.
with negotiation, monitoring and  Strategy of reciprocity.
enforcement.  Sense of obligation in international
 Enable linkages between issues. cooperation.
 Continuity in political relationships or
ongoing negotiation.
Source: Deduced by author from Andreas Hasenclever et. al. (1996, 1997, 2000)
94
Process of regime formation
The process involved in identifying the problem for collective response and setting the
agenda could be one of self-generation, negotiation or imposition.66 An imposed
regime, preferred by one or few powerful actors, succeeds in inducing other actors to
accede to the institutional preference of the regime. On the other hand, a negotiated
regime emerges from a conscious process of give and take amongst actors to arrive at
mutually agreeable provisions incorporated into a formal treaty or agreement. While a
self-generating regime forms when there is a convergence in expectations without any
conscious efforts on the part of actors.67
Even after an agenda has been set, regimes do not remain static but continue to evolve.
Under such conditions, the process can be substituted for one another depending on the
varying needs of coordination and problem solving over time, and need for adaptability
to the shifting constellation of power and interests amongst the members of the
regime.68
Actor-structure interplay
The theoretical core of driving social forces underscores the significance of the
multivariate model69 in regime formation (Figure 4.3). This model places strong
emphasis on substitution effects and interaction effects. In the model, actors display
leadership and engage in the process of agenda setting leading to institutional choice
towards operationalisation of the regime in an issue-area.70
Keohane argues that ‘all efforts at international cooperation take place with an
institutional context of some kind, which may or may not facilitate cooperative
66
Oran R. Young, ‘Regime dynamics: The rise and fall of International Regimes,’ in Stephen D. Krasner
(ed.), International Regimes, pp. 93-113.
67
Levy et al., ‘The study of international regimes,’ pp. 267-330.
68
Bertram I. Spector and I. William Zartman, Getting it done: Post agreement negotiation and
international regimes.
69
Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko, ‘Testing theories of regime formation: Findings from a large
collaborative research project,’ in Volker Ritterberger (ed.), Regime theory and international relations
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) cited in Oran R. Young, The international political economy
and international institutions and also Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko, Polar politics: Creating
international environmental regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
70
For a discussion on the substitution and interaction effects see Young and Osherenko, ‘Testing theories
of regime formation: Findings from a large collaborative research project’ and Young and Osherenko,
Polar politics: Creating international environmental regimes.
95
endeavours.’71 The right institutional choice can provide governments with the
necessary arrangements to respond collectively to the set agenda.72 Effective institutions
can affect the political process at three key points in the sequence from agenda setting to
operationalisation. They can achieve political and technical consensus about the
problem contributing to agendas that are more appropriate to the specific issue-area.
Through the core political process of intergovernmental bargaining, they can contribute
to more comprehensive and specific international policies. Finally, they can contribute
to national policy responses.73
Figure 4.3: Regime formation multivariate model

Actor Behaviour
and
Leadership
Process
Structure
Consequences
Interaction
and
Substitution
cross cutting effects
Source: Adapted from Oran R. Young, and Gail Osherenko, 1993
Institutions frame the structure by which actors operationalise the regime. Later in the
chapter, the elements of structure are developed using Gidden’s structuration theory.
According to Jacobson and Weiss, ‘operationalisation covers all those activities
required to transform an agreement on paper into a functioning social practice.’74 Once
71
Robert O. Keohane, ‘International institutions: Two approaches’ International Studies Quarterly Vol.
32 (4), 1988, pp. 379-396 cited in Oran R. Young (ed.), The international political economy and
international institutions, p. 380.
72
73
Robert O. Keohane, Peter M. Haas and Marc A. Levy, ‘The effectiveness of international
environmental institutions’ in Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane and Marc A. Levy, Institutions for the
Earth: Sources of effective international environmental protection (London: MIT Press, 1993), p. 8.
74
Harold K. Jacobson and Edith Brown Weiss, ‘Implementing and complying with international
environmental Accords: A framework for research’ cited in Levy et al., ‘The study of international
regimes.’
96
a regime has been operationalised, institutions can intensify the ability to make and
keep agreements thereby enhancing the contractual environment; promote concern
among governments thereby increasing governmental concern; and build national and
administrative capacity thereby increasing national capacity over time.75 Spector and
Zartman visualise regimes as ‘watercourses flowing through time and space’76 again
something that has been conceptualised by Giddens in his theory of structuration.
Actors and leadership

A number of efforts have each made important contributions from investigation of the
cluster of driving social forces – power, interests and knowledge – in the formation of
regimes. Oran R. Young distinguishes three types of leadership – structural,
entrepreneurial and intellectual – that parallel these driving social forces. The driving
social forces and leadership are applied in a slightly modified form in the measurement
of regime effectiveness. More specifically, not only has a synthesis of the driving social
forces been used to explain actor behaviour in regime formation but also leadership is
blended into the discussion for treatment of actor behaviour and leadership as a single
component in the methodology.
Knowledge-based actors chiefly construed as epistemic communities77 but also as non-

state actors, scientific networks and international nongovernmental organisations, focus
on the role of ideas about international problems and their solutions. Such intellectual
leadership is crucial in developing consensual knowledge to shape the way issues are
framed at the agenda formation stage. Knowledge-based actors energise the occurrence
of social learning about the nature of problem and availability of policy options.
Interest-based actors display entrepreneurial leadership in search for solutions to

problems requiring collective action. For their part, the focus is on institutional
bargaining to produce consensus on the institutional arrangements needed for regime
implementation. The role of interest-based actors becomes important at the stage of
institutional choice in regime formation.
75
Levy et al., ‘Improving the effectiveness of international environmental institutions.’
76
Spector and Zartman, Getting it done: Post-Agreement negotiation and international regimes, p. 18.
77
Network of scientific, technical, legal and policy experts, see Breitmeier et al., Analyzing international
environmental regimes: From case study to database, p. 201.
97
The research takes the accepted view that the dominant power-based actors are states
displaying structural leadership.78 This is not to align with the theory of hegemonic
stability but it is to say that power does play a role in regime formation. The research
acknowledges that ultimately it is behavioural change in states that is needed to get
commitment for increasing the national capacity, a key element of institutional
effectiveness. According to Young, structural leaders represent states bringing power in
the resource or structural sense to bear on the process of regime formation. Structural
leadership becomes prominent at the operationalisation stage of regime formation.
Structure in regime analysis

Beginning with the position of ‘structuration theory’ per se, it was Giddens, one of the
foremost sociological theorists, who developed the theory to explain and integrate agent
(actors) and structure (rules and resources), by making time and space the two major
aspects of his theoretical perspective. In Giddens words:
‘The basic domain of study of the social sciences, according to the theory of
structuration, is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the
existence of any form of social totality, but social practices ordered across
space and time. Human social activities, like some self-reproducing items in
nature are recursive. That is to say, they are not brought into being by social
actors but continually recreated by them via the very means whereby they
express themselves as actors. In and through their activities agents
reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible.’79
A number of inclusive and instructional texts already exist on the theory of

structuration. The research treats the call in structuration theory for de-centring of the
agent (actors) basic to the analysis of international maritime regimes in the Indian
Ocean Region. By doing so, the thesis ascribes an ontological priority to the study of
social practices (influences of agency and structure) in maritime regimes ordered across
time and space. By ‘ontology’ Gidden’s means a conceptual investigation of the nature
of human action, social institutions, and the inter-relations between actions and
78
Haas et al., Institutions for the Earth: Sources of effective international environmental protection.
79
Giddens, The constitution of society, p. 2.
98
institutions.80 In simple terms, Giddens explains his ontology as social practices ordered
across space and time.81 Dessler explains a theory’s ontology as a structured set of
entities or things (real world structures) that not only consist of designated things but
also of connections or relations (processes) posited by the theory and invoked in the
theory’s explanations.82
Wendt in championing the agent-structure debate in international relations has argued

that agent and structure are not only both relevant but equally influence social behaviour
in the real world. According to Wendt, while structuration theory by itself cannot
substantively contribute to the understanding of international relations per se, it does
provide the meta-theoretical framework for solving agency and structure problems in
existing substantive theories.83 The research uses the ‘structurational’ approach to
ground and inform the theoretical and empirical research into international maritime
regimes in the Indian Ocean Region and therefore makes an original contribution to the
study of regimes in international relations.
Elements of structuration theory

Structuration theory provides the conceptual framework to analyse the agent-structure
entities in any real world social system but does not inform on the type of agents or
structures within that system.84 While agent means actor, agency implies power and in
structuration theory is concerned with the basic aspect of all human conduct, which is,
having the power to act and make a difference or having the capacity to transform a pre-
existing state of affairs or course of events. Structure is regarded as rules and resources
recursively implicated in social behaviour across time and space.
The understanding of the agency-structure relationship is made possible by the ‘duality

of structure,’85 the core element in Gidden’s structuration theory. The ‘duality of
structure’ is the most promising formulation existing, which is to treat the ‘structural
properties of social systems as both the medium and outcome of the practices they
80
Christopher G.A. Bryant and David Jary, Giddens' theory of structuration: a critical appreciation
(London: Routledge, 1991), p. 201.
81
82
Dessler, ‘What’s at stake in the agent structure debate?.’
83
Wendt, ‘The agent-structure problem in international relations theory.’
84
Wendt, ‘The agent-structure problem in international relations theory,’ p. 355.
85
In Giddens terminology the structural properties of social systems do not exist outside of action but are
chronically implicated in its production and reproduction.
99
recursively organise.’86 In other words, structures shape human conduct or practices, but
also the conduct or practices of human’s constitute and transform structures.
According to Giddens, actors are “knowledgeable” as people who know what they are
doing and how to do it. Actors show three forms of social behaviour. Firstly, actors
ordinarily show only their knowledge by describing in words what they do and their
reasons for doing it.87 Secondly, their knowledgeability88 as actors is more than just
what they can say about what they do.89 Finally, the unconscious motivational
components of social behaviour includes ‘those forms of cognition or impulsion which
are either wholly repressed from consciousness or appear in consciousness only in
distorted form.’90
There are strong similarities in Giddens discursive and practical consciousness to

Krasner’s dimensions of ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ rules, principles, norms and decision-
making procedures. The line between the discursive and practical consciousness can
easily be altered by the actor’s socialisation and learning experiences. However, there is
a distinct barrier, centred on repression, between what actors do and their reasons for
doing it (discursive) and unconscious social behaviour. The challenge here in to be able
to distinguish between: what is said and what gets done; what is known and what is said
about whatever gets done; and what is said or gets done and what were or are the
(unconscious) motives.
Giddens refers to doing or action as the continuous flow of conduct intentionally or

unintentionally, which constitutes the day-to-day activity of any actor. A key feature is
that at any phase in any given sequence of conduct, any given actor could have acted
differently.91 Action as a continuous process of social behaviour is explained by
86
87
Giddens references such social behaviour as discursive consciousness, a terminology used to explain
what actors are able to say, or to give verbal expression to, about social conditions, including especially
the conditions of their own action; awareness which has a discursive form.
88
In Giddens terminology everything which actors know (believe) about the circumstances of their action
and that of others, drawn upon in the production and reproduction of that action, including tacit as well as
discursively available knowledge.
89
Giddens references such social behaviour as practical consciousness, a terminology used to explain
what actors know (believe) about social conditions, including especially the conditions of their own
action, but cannot express discursively.
90
91
100
Giddens using the three components of social behaviour in what he terms as
stratification model (Figure 4.4).92
Figure 4.4: Giddens stratification model
Unacknowledged Reflexive monitoring of action Unintended

conditions of consequences of
action action
Rationalisation of action
Motivation of action
Source: Giddens, 1984
Temporally, the subjective processes sustained by an actor include, purposive or

intentional character of everyday human behaviour involving the conduct of not just the
actor but also of other actors;93 routinely without fuss ‘keeping in touch’ with the
grounds of what they do, as they do it, such that if asked by lay actors, they can give
reasons for their conduct;94 and the potential for action95 where by motives supply the
overall plans or programmes within which a range of conduct can then be or is
enacted.96 The flow of intentional action in the duree of day-to-day conduct can have
unintended consequences that can feed back to be the unacknowledged conditions of
further action.97
Giddens theorises structure as rules and resources, or sets of transformation relations,

organised as properties of social systems.98 Rules are regarded as techniques or
generalisable procedures applied in the enactment and reproduction of social practices.
Rules have two aspects to them: interpretative and normative. Interpretative rules relate
to the constitution of meaning. Normative rules relate to the sanctioning of modes of
92
In Giddens terminology an interpretation of the human agent, stressing three layers of
cognition/motivation: discursive consciousness, practical consciousness and the unconsciousness.
93
Giddens uses the term reflexive monitoring, a terminology that means action is not a string of discrete
acts, involving an aggregate of intentions, but a continuous process.
94
For Giddens this means rationalisation of action.
95
For Giddens it means motivation different from reflexive monitoring and rationalisation of actions in
that much of day-to-day conduct is not directly motivated.
96
Ira J. Cohen, Structuration theory: Anthony Giddens and the constitution of social life (Hampshire:
Macmillan Education Ltd, 1989), pp. 49-51.
97
98
In Giddens terminology structure exists only as memory traces, the organic basis of human
knowledgeability, and instantiated in action; rules and resources recursively implicated in the production
and reproduction of social systems.
101
social conduct.99 The main characteristics of these rules are described as intensive
versus shallow, tacit versus discursive, informal versus formalised, and weakly
sanctioned versus strongly sanctioned.100
Giddens distinguishes three dimensions of the ‘duality of structure,’ sustaining of

communication, normative regulation and resource allocation and authorisation.
Giddens explains the three dimensions (Figure 4.5) as the communication of meaning
through interpretative schemes (signification); effective mobilisation of sanctions to
make norms count (legitimation); and exercising power through the mobilisation of
resources (domination).
These structural dimensions are separable only analytically, as they tend to occur
simultaneously and in an integrated fashion in social practices. Domination depends
upon the mobilisation or allocative101 and authoritative102 resources focussed via
signification and legitimation, which has the transformative capacity for actors to ‘make
their own geography’ and ‘make their own history.’103 This is critical to the research
consideration of the Indian Ocean as a region.
Figure 4.5: Dimensions of the duality of structure
Structure Signification Domination Legitimation

...
I I I
I I I
,-----------y ___________ _ ~------------v------------~ ,-----------':!(___________ ,
Modality
i
'
Interpretive i' Facility
'
'
: Norm
''
i
i scheme i
;_ __ ----- --...- ----------' ~- --------~-------- __j
I
I
v
Interaction Sanction
Source: Giddens, 1984
99
100
101
In Giddens terminology allocative resources are material resources involved in the generation of
power, including the natural environment and physical artifacts; allocative resources derive from human
dominion over nature.
102
In Giddens terminology authoritative resources are non-material resources involved in the generation
of power, deriving from the capability of harnessing activities of human beings; authoritative resources
result from the dominion of some actors over others.
103
See Giddens, The constitution of society, pp. 33, 377; and Cohen, Structuration theory: Anthony
Giddens and the constitution of social life, p. 91.
102
In the mobilisation of resources, it is important to take into account the two-way
character of power (power as control) whereby the less powerful manage resources in
such a way as to exert control over the more powerful in established power
relationships.104
In expressing the situated character of social practices, Giddens binds the temporal,
spatial and structural moments of difference to highlight the conceptual distinction
between systems and structure.105 Systems is the concrete patterning of interaction
across time and space (temporal and spatial moments of difference) while structure
refers to the rules and resources (structural moment of difference) which enable
knowledgeable actors to produce and reproduce practices they recognise as
appropriate.106
Giddens argues that while existing rules and resources make human action possible,
human action is equally constrained by existing structures. Structures are therefore both
enabling and constraining. Giddens reformulated the notion of actor and structure by
emphasising that ‘Structure has no existence independent of the knowledge that actors
have about what they do in the day-to-day activity. Humans as actors always know what
they are doing on the level of discursive consciousness under some description….But
human knowledgeability is always bounded. The flow of action continually produces
consequences which are unintended by actors, and these unintended consequences also
may form unacknowledged conditions of action in a feedback fashion.’107
The concept of duality of structure at the core of structuration theory enables

reconceptualising the dualism of actor and structure in that they are considered
inseparable, meeting each other in recurring social practices.
In addition to the dualism of actor and structure, stretching of social systems across time
and space is equally central to the theory of structuration, based on mechanisms of
104
Giddens means ‘dialectic of control,’ a terminology that explains the two-way character of the
distributive aspect of power (power as control).
105
See Giddens, The constitution of society, p. 23; and Cohen, Structuration theory: Anthony Giddens and
the constitution of social life, p. 87.
106
See Giddens, The constitution of society, p. 377; and Ira J. Cohen, Structuration theory: Anthony
Giddens and the constitution of social life, p. 87.
107
Giddens, The constitution of society, pp. 26-27.
103
social and system integration.108 Social integration means systemness on the level of
face-to-face interaction. System integration refers to connections with those who are
physically absent in time or space.109
In explaining the relation between social and system integration Giddens introduces the
concepts of locale110 to do with space and presence-availability to do with time.111 The
locale as physical region in structuration theory carries the connotation of the
structuration of social conduct across space and over time.112 According to Giddens,
regionalisation then ‘should be understood not merely as localisation in space but as
referring to the zoning of time and space in relation to routinised social practices.’113
Giddens offers four modes of regionalisation: form, span, duration and character. In
Cohen’s words:
 Form refers to the boundaries separating one region from another;

 Span refers to the time-space extension of the actions with which it is
associated. For example, in modern times the span of regions may be
considerably larger owing to the revolution in means of transportation and
communication;
 Duration refers to the extent to which it is institutionalised in the longue durée.
The duration of regions in modern systems often is shorter than in their
traditional counterparts where clusters of interactions often were regionalised
with the same form, span and character for many hundreds of years; and
 Character of a region refers to its time-space ordering within a single region, a
region that itself may comprise one of several zones within a larger system. It
is particularly important to resist the urge to treat regions within regions as if
the boundaries of the larger system circumscribe all of the activities in its
more localised settings.114
108
Giddens use the term time-space distanciation to mean the stretching of social systems across time-
space, on the basis of mechanisms of social and system integration. System integration is the reciprocity
between actors or collectiveness across extended time-space, outside conditions of co-presence.
109
110
In Giddens terminology a physical region involved as part of the setting of interaction, having definite
boundaries which help concentrate interaction in one way or another.
111
112
113
114
Cohen, Structuration theory: Anthony Giddens and the constitution of social life, p. 111.
104
The temporal dimension in structuration theory, is represented by Giddens as a ‘series
of episodes,’ both at the micro and macro level. At the micro level lies ‘routinization’ or
the ‘habitual, taken-for-granted character of the vast bulk of activities of day-to-day
social life. At the macro level is ‘world time,’ which ‘concerns watershed events in
history that may affect the conditions and outcomes of seemingly similar episodes.115
According to Giddens, the fundamental question is to explicate how the ‘stretching’ of

social relations across time and space transcends the limitations of individual
‘presence.’116 Amongst the different temporalities, Giddens characterises both the duree
of day-to-day experience and the longue duree of institutions by reversible time, and the
life span of an individual by irreversible time.
Giddens explains the duree of day-to-day life as having duration, a flow, and not
leading anywhere, indicating that time here is constituted only in repetition. ‘The terms
‘social reproduction,’ ‘recursiveness’ and so on indicate the repetitive character of day-
to-day life, the routines of which are formed in terms of the intersection of the passing
(but continually returning) days and seasons.’117
By contrast, the life of an individual is not only finite but also irreversible, ‘being
towards death.’118 Even here, there are elements of repetition, given the fact that we
speak of the ‘life cycle.’ However, for Giddens ‘life cycle’ is a concept that belongs to
the succession of generations or the supra-individual’ duree of the long-term existence
of institutions, the longue duree of institutional time.119
In short, actors are ‘knowledgeable’ people and structure refers to rules and resources.
Structure has no existence independent of the knowledge that actors have but
knowledgeability of actors is always bounded giving rise the duality of structure. The
actor structure interaction occurs across space and over time.
Application of structuration theory to regime theory

As a first step, international regimes may be defined as the ‘structurational’ manner,
method or system of governance across a geographic space and over time, on the
115
Giddens, The constitution of society, p. xxix.
116
117
118
119
105
coming into force of an international convention, agreement and/or treaty to deal with a
specific area of common concern.
In the context of international regimes, the structuralist conception of signification,

legitimation and domination (mobilising of allocative and authoritative resources) is
formed into a cyclic process of institutional orders (Figure 4.6) compared to the vertical
and horizontal explanation provided by Giddens (see Figure 4.5). The cyclic process
builds on Giddens point that these structural dimensions tend to occur simultaneously
and in an integrated fashion.
Figure 4.6: Giddens ‘duality of structure’ in regimes
The three cognate concepts frame the structure over time and across space: for the
beginning of signification (communication) amongst actor’s leads to legitimation
(sanction) of a framework for action across a defined space, that facilitates the
mobilisation of allocative (economic) and authoritative (political) resources towards
institutionalised cooperation in the implementation of a regime. Moreover the cyclic
process opens a four-way interaction between signification, legitimation, economic
domination (allocative power) and political domination (authoritative power). In the
adapted ‘duality of structure,’ the modalities of interpretive scheme in communication
by actors and norm in sanctioning action set the rules while the facilities of allocative
106
power and authoritative power establish the resources committed by actors. The cyclic
process continues over time as rules are altered or modified and resources are
augmented for effectiveness of the regime across a defined space.
Due to ‘duality of structure,’ actors cannot be divorced from structure. Actors shape
structure as much as structures shape actor behaviour. Here, the discussion returns to the
interaction between knowledge, interests and power as the driving social forces of actor
behaviour. It takes us to the heart of the debate between sociologists and rationalists in
regime theory. Social institutions in cognitivism or agency in structuration theory is
equated with transformative capacity. This is because social institutions or agency
depends solely upon the capabilities actors maintain and exercise ‘to make a difference’
in the production of definite outcomes, regardless of whether or not they intend (or are
aware) that these outcomes occur.120
Thus, for Giddens knowledgeability is everything which actors know (believe) about
the circumstances of their action and that of others, drawn upon in the production and
reproduction of that action, including tacit as well as discursively available knowledge.
Moreover, Giddens insists that at any phase in any given sequence of conduct any given
actor could have acted otherwise – in a manner somewhat different than he did.
In integrating schools of international regimes, Giddens arguments lend credence to

combining interests and ideas where cognitive variables of knowledge can causally
precede or follow rationalist ones of common interests. Hence, knowledge can certainly
help explain preferences and perceived options to explain outcomes. Alternatively,
knowledge can also intervene between interests and outcomes to provide salient
solutions to negotiating problems, helping parties coordinate their behaviour in a
mutually beneficial way.
Either way actors are knowledgeable people and so emphasised by Giddens where
mutual knowledge is creating an awareness of the procedures of action i.e. a knowledge
of ‘how to do something’ or ‘how to go on’ shared by lay actors and sociological
observers. Thus, using the structuration concept of bounded human knowledgeability
that produces a continuous flow of intentional and unintentional consequences it is
120
107
possible to integrate the weak cognitivists theories of ideas, learning and epistemic
communities with rationalist interest-based explanations.
Second, outside the debate between rationalists and sociologists an intense dispute over
the power variable has been raging within the rationalist school. Going by the
neoliberalist argument, the Indian Ocean Region, which has a preponderance of
distributed power amongst states, is ideally suited for implementing international
regimes. Yet, in areas of common concern the Indian Ocean as a region remains devoid
of a strong international regime. So does that mean that the realist theory of the need for
the presence of a strong power exercising unilateral leadership is central to having a
strong regime? What becomes clear is that either way power plays a role in explaining
state behaviour.
To understand state (actor) behaviour better in seeking relative and/or absolute gains
expounded by realists and neoliberalists requires a prior grasp of Giddens innovative
approach to generic issues regarding the common denominator of power at large.
All actors posses the capacity to exert power, once it is understood that the power to
‘make a difference’ is prior to any regard for the subjectivity of the actor.121 It is only
because of the asymmetrical distribution of resources that actors exhibit some degree of
political inequality. Thus, power in a relational sense is the capability of actors to secure
outcomes where the realisation of these outcomes depends upon the doing of others.122
The crucial insight provided here by Giddens is the ubiquitous presence of the ‘dialectic
of control,’ which is the two-way character of the distributive aspect of power in all
circumstances of power relations. Giddens stresses on a complementarity of relations
between superordinates and subordinates by taking into account how the less powerful
manage resources in a way as to exert control over the more powerful in established
power relationships. In other words, the dialectic of control intrinsically refers to the
universal presence of imbalanced degrees of autonomy and dependence that constitute
all kinds of power relations.
One can now contextualise rationalist approaches to international regimes by

understanding state motivation or the specific conditions under which absolute gains
121
122
108
dominate relative gains or vice versa. For Giddens, motivation refers to potential for
action whereby motives supply the overall plans or programs within which a range of
conduct is enacted.123 Even in much of our ordinary day-to-day routine and predictable
social life, actors unconsciously have a motivated interest in reproducing conditions of
confidence or trust. It is within this ‘ontological security,’ where the natural and social
worlds are, as they appear to be, that actors are able to canalise and manage tensions
that are more primal.124
Using the present discussion it is now possible to juxtapose the substantive two
propositions of Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger that integrate theories of
international regimes, by using the knowledge, interests and power variables to explain
behaviour. Unilateral or distributed, the ‘power’ to intervene and thereby ‘make a
difference’ in a course of events or state of affairs is the basic aspect of all human
conduct. Giddens introduces the notion of allocative and authoritative resources in
exercising power as an aspect of social practice that refers to how interventions are
exercised to contribute towards transforming or altering an event.125
It is manipulation of resources by which actors influence one another’s behaviour.

Moreover, the mobilisation of resources invariably involves both semantic and
normative aspects of mutual knowledge. Conversely, resources provide the means by
which these semantic and normative rules are actualised.126 Simply stated,
knowledgeable actors (human action driven state or institutional behaviour) open
communications to arrive at shared common interests that shape the legal framework for
exercising of power to mobilise allocative and authoritative resources in the formation,
institutional choice and operationalisation of an international regime.
Conclusion
International regimes align expectations of governments in an issue area by providing a
framework of rules, norms, principles and procedures for cooperation in which just like
actors, institutions do matter.
123
124
Cohen, Structuration theory: Anthony Giddens and the constitution of social life, p. 52-54.
125
126
109
The norm of ocean governance populated by collective issues has witnessed the
emergence of a number of maritime regimes that rely on coordination and cooperation
amongst actors. Characterised by a problem-solving capacity the international maritime
regimes seek to institutionalise cooperation amongst actors and better coordinate
national actions in dealing with a specific problem and its consequences for governance
of the oceanic region as a whole.
The application of structuration theory to regime theory shows that actor and structure
cannot be divorced in operationalisation of the regime and stretching the actor-structure
interplay across space and over time is integral to assessing the effectiveness of the
regime.
The next chapter applies these methodological considerations in developing a rubric

model to measure effectiveness of maritime regimes in the Indian Ocean Region.
110
Chapter 5
Methodological considerations for case study analysis
This chapter brings forward the earlier discussion on ocean governance, regions and
regime theory to develop an empirical model of regime effectiveness. The emphasis is
on measuring behavioural change, institutional effectiveness and level of collaboration
across space and over time in analysing regime effectiveness.
Integrating the literature on ocean governance, regions, and regimes

The 1982 UN Convention on Law of the Sea is the nucleus of the new ocean regime
around which a web of international maritime law for ocean governance has evolved in
the last three decades and genuine commitment from national governments will be
needed for this new ocean regime to work.1
In 1996, Valencia published a seminal piece of only work so far on maritime regime
building. His work centred on multilateral regime building in North-East Asia focused
on incipient regionalism, particularly, on the role of both maritime issues and regimes in
regional confidence building.2 Five year later, in deriving lessons learned Valencia is
quick to point out that no maritime regime has yet been initiated in North-East Asia.3
While the case studies that form the empirical backbone of these lessons learned all
favour the development of international regimes to promote regional cooperation.
The 200 nm EEZ under the new ocean regime has created boundary conflicts and
conflict of interests in ocean use because as Valencia elucidates there is ‘insufficient
understanding and consideration [by States bordering the oceans] of the transnational
and interdependent character of the ocean environment and resources and activities that
it harbours and supports.’4
Not just this but the 200 nm EEZ has created political tension between the traditional
notion of ‘freedom of the high seas’ and the new form of ‘control and regulation’ in
pursuit of national interests in the oceans. Valencia points out that a ‘major impediment
1
Christopher C. Joyner, ‘The international ocean regime at the new millennium: a survey of the
contemporary legal order,’ Ocean & Coastal Management, Vol. 43, 2000, pp. 200-201.
2
Valencia, A maritime regime for Northeast Asia.
3
Mark J. Valencia (ed.), Maritime regime building: lessons learned and their relevance for Northeast
Asia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001).
4
Mark J. Valencia, ‘Regional maritime regime building: prospects in Northeast and Southeast Asia,’
Ocean Development & International Law, Vol. 31, 2000, p. 236.
111
is widespread inability to formulate and implement [national] ocean policy as an
integrated whole, balancing the overall interests of the nation and the region in the
short- and long-term.’5
This is despite international maritime regimes encouraging increased regional

cooperation amongst states bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed body of water, a
policy idea inspired by Valencia in arguing for a maritime regime for North-East Asia.6
The establishing of regional governing bodies is one of the six principles emphasised by
Dyke for a comprehensive regime of ocean governance.7 Even the other five principles
of ecological vitality; due regard; polluter pays; common heritage; and shared resources,
all stress the need for a coordinated, cooperative and collaborative perspective of ocean
governance.
Valencia sets out the conceptual basis and framework of a system for ocean
governance.8 For a specified marine geographic region, the approach focuses on getting
a defined group of actors to reach agreement on: distribution of power and authority;
system of rights and obligations; body of rules and regulations that govern individual
behaviour of members.9 Such an agreement would give effect to the institutional
character, jurisdictional boundaries, and conditions of operation and consequences of
operation of the maritime regime.10 Valencia identifies several key features of an ideal
maritime regime:
 Define structure, objectives and functions supported by a significant political

constituency;
 Focus on sector specific issue of concern, identified at the outset, to
geographically fit the natural system;
 Concentrate on policy functions maintaining a decentralised decision making
process;
5
Valencia, ‘Regional maritime regime building: prospects in Northeast and Southeast Asia,’ p. 236.
6
Valencia, A maritime regime for Northeast Asia.
7
Jon M. Van Dyke, ‘International governance and stewardship of the high seas and its resources’ in Van
Dyke et. al., Freedom for the Seas in the 21st Century: ocean governance and environmental harmony,
pp. 18-19.
8
Valencia, ‘Regional maritime regime building: prospects in Northeast and Southeast Asia,’ pp. 223-247.
9
10
Valencia, A maritime regime for Northeast Asia, p. 31.
112
 Avoid distributive issues to focus on mutually beneficial solutions where
benefits of participation outweigh the costs;
 Build institutionalised capacity with clear distribution of power and authority
conducive to negotiating rules and/or agreements;
 Commit to cooperative marine environment monitoring and scientific
research.
 Seize ‘window of opportunity’ in crisis situations to enhance speed of regime
formation; and
 Strong leadership by one or more members coupled with willingness by other
members to effectively participate would give impetus and direction for the
regime.11
According to Valencia, a level of complexity with regard to maritime regime building in

a non-homogenous region like Asia-Pacific (as also the Indian Ocean) is that consensus
is pre-requisite. Asians generally distrust outside solutions, favour principle of non-
interference and prefer informal structures, placing great emphasis on personal
relationships.12
In looking at the interdependent ocean world, Borgese provides a powerful

interpretation of the Law of the sea convention arguing it limits, transforms and
transcends the concept of sovereignty.13 It limits sovereignty by:
 Creating a comprehensive dispute settlement system making peaceful

settlement of disputes mandatory;
 Subjecting ‘sovereign rights’ over resources to duties of conservation and
protection of the environment, and even sharing of resources;
 Imposing the duty to cooperate – states ‘shall’ cooperate – in protecting the
marine environment, resource management, marine scientific research, and
transfer and development of technology; and
 Imposing international taxation on resource exploitation in international areas
and the national continental shelf claims beyond 200 nm. 14
11
Valencia, A maritime regime for Northeast Asia, pp. 58-61.
12
13
Elizabeth Mann Borgese, ‘Global civil society: lessons from ocean governance,’ Futures, Vol. 31,
1999, p. 985.
113
It transforms sovereignty by disaggregating rights into sovereign rights, exclusive
rights, jurisdiction and control and shared jurisdiction, all the time placing near equal
emphasis on States and non-state entities.15 It transcends sovereignty by setting aside
State claim or sovereignty over resources in the Area in favour of mankind as a whole.16
The answer then for effective ocean governance lies in regional organisations belonging
to member states of a region.17
Reflecting on 45 years of cumulative Canadian experience with regional ocean

initiatives, Hinds contends regional organisations are in a unique position to fill the
implementation gap between the international and national levels and satisfy both global
and national ocean governance and development needs.18
Maritime regime analysis in the Indian Ocean Region

In the realm of international maritime regimes to fathom the Indian Ocean as ‘one
ocean’ is like sailing on calm seas in fair weather fishing at leisure. To determine the
effectiveness of different maritime regimes in the Indian Ocean as ‘one region’ is like
sinking into the depths of the ocean destined to be laid to rest on the ocean floor. The
sharp contrast in the oceanic experience lies in the differing perceptions of the sailor and
the landlubber.
Defining the geographic area of regime influence is akin to the view of a lookout from
the crow’s nest of the sailing vessel that gives the feeling of one vast ocean. For the
landlubber looking out from the different shorelines of the many sovereign lands, the
ocean beyond gives the sinking feeling of the unknown. Like the landlubber, what
nation-states fail to do is look deep within oceanic realm to discover a completely new
world in which the goal is one – a sustainable, safe, secure and clean Indian Ocean.
Nations effortlessly focus on what they can see on the surface – vast geographic
distances, diverse cultures, varied capacities, different interests and dissimilar laws – to
justify individual actions creating suspicions and mistrust, which only leads to a
breakdown of maritime regimes.
14
Borgese, ‘Global civil society: lessons from ocean governance,’ p. 985.
15
16
17
Lennox Hinds, ‘Ocean governance and the implementation gap,’ Marine Policy, Vol. 27, 2003, 349-
356.
18
Hinds, ‘Ocean governance and the implementation gap,’ pp. 355-356.
114
The heart of the research on ocean governance in the Indian Ocean Region lies in efforts
to assess the broader consequences of issue-specific maritime regimes embedded within
the much more far-reaching Law of the Sea umbrella-regime.
With research on the broader consequences of international regimes in general still in its
infancy, a standard taxonomy for defining and measuring broader consequences has yet
to become available.19
According to Underdal and Young, the suggested strategy for research then is to devise
a methodological model that integrates the works of many scholars, while the research
still exercises individual creativity and develops a personal niche.20 The logic being that
a serious research endeavour is only going to add to the existing stock of knowledge
about broader consequences.21 A set of ideas inspired by Underdal and Young and
Miles project22 are used in designing a methodological model for measuring regime
effectiveness.
Meaning of regime effectiveness

The discussion to flow directs attention primarily to the conceptual definition of regime
effectiveness considered a sub-field of the study of regime consequences.23 Young and
Underdal have each made important contributions in this regard.
Young adopts five approaches in explaining the meaning of effectiveness. First, the
problem-solving approach centres on the degree to which a regime eliminates or
alleviates the problem that prompted the creation of a regime.
Second, the legal approach provides a measure of the degree to which contractual
obligations are met, where rules are complied with, policies changed and programs
initiated.
19
Underdal and Young, Regime consequences: Methodological challenges and research strategies, p. 7,
371.
20
Underdal and Young, Regime consequences: Methodological challenges and research strategies, p.
376.
21
Underdal and Young, Regime consequences: Methodological challenges and research strategies, p.
371.
22
For Miles project see Underdal and Young, Regime consequences: Methodological challenges and
research strategies, p. 63.
23
Underdal and Young, Regime consequences: Methodological challenges and research strategies, p. 27.
115
Third, an economic approach measures efficiency in addition to incorporating
contractual obligations by assessing not only whether a regime generates the right
outcome but also whether it does so at least cost.
Fourth, a normative approach equates effectiveness with the achievement of values such
as, fairness or justice, stewardship, participation and so forth.
Finally, a political approach treats regimes as being responsible for changes in the
behaviour of actors, in the interest of actors or in the policies and performance of
institutions in ways that contributes to the positive management of the targeted
problem.24
Underdal cautions against confusing effectiveness with efficiency and for effectiveness to
imply fairness.25 Using a common-sense approach, Underdal considers a regime as
effective should it achieve success in performing a certain (set of) function(s) or solve
the problem(s) that motivated its establishment.26
Objects of assessment
From a methodological perspective, the design of the conceptual framework using
regime effectiveness as the dependant variable must state precisely the object to be
evaluated; the standard against which the object is to be evaluated; and the measurement
operations to be performed in comparing the object to this standard.27
Underdal uses the three elements to construct two principal alternatives. The first
alternative argues that ‘regimes matter’ by comparing actual performance under the
regime with the hypothetical state of affairs under a no-regime counterfactual. The
second alternative is to compare achievements of the regime against the idea of what
constitutes a ‘good’ or ‘optimal’ solution or some notion of the ‘best’ solution.28
24
Young (ed.), The effectiveness of international environmental regimes: Causal connections and
behavioural mechanisms.
25
For a explanation on effectiveness see Underdal and Young, Regime consequences: Methodological
challenges and research strategies, p. 27.
26
Arild Underdal, ‘One Question, Two Answers’ in Edward L. Miles, Arild Underdal, Steinar Andresen,
Jorgen Wettestad, Jon Birger Skjaerseth and Elaine M. Carlin (eds.), Environmental regime effectiveness:
Confronting theory with evidence (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002).
27
Underdal, ‘One Question, Two Answers,’ pp. 4-5.
28
Arild Underdal, ‘Methodological Challenges’ in Underdal and Young, Regime consequences:
Methodological challenges and research strategies, p. 35.
116
Helm and Sprinz combine the two alternatives into a single formula29 (see below) or the
Oslo-Potsdam solution that conceptualises the effectiveness of a regime in terms of the
extent to which it in fact accomplishes all that can be accomplished.30
-
-
A healthy debate ensued in the Global Environmental Politics journal on the Oslo-
Potsdam solution to measure regime effectiveness.31
Analytically, this thesis brings into play Underdal’s treatment of output, outcome and
impact as three distinctive objects of assessment.32 In short, output is setting out the
norms, principles and rules constituting the regime; outcome is the behavioural change
in actors as the first product of implementing the regime; and impact is change in the
issue-area as result of implementation and adaptation of that regime.33
What this distinction does is to frame the causal chain of events from start to finish –
regime formation (output), regime implementation (outcome) and regime consequences
(impact) – over time and across space.
An important goal in this connection is that effectiveness can be measured at different

points in the causal chain.34 The starting point in time being the political construct of
agenda setting (output) where an international agreement is signed for states to then take
measures for implementing the agreement.
The political construct of the regime differs from the political processes that are then set
into motion in institutionalisation of the regime.35 This generates its own consequences
29
For a detailed discussion, see Carsten Helm and Detlef Sprinz, ‘Measuring the effectiveness of
international environmental regimes,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44 No. 5, 2000.
30
Underdal, ‘Methodological Challenges,’ p. 35.
31
See Oran R. Young, ‘Inferences and Indices: Evaluating the effectiveness of international
environmental regimes,’ Global Environmental Politics, 1:1, 2001; Oran R. Young, ‘Determining regime
effectiveness: a commentary on the Oslo Potsdam Solution,’ Global Environmental Politics, 3:3, 2003;
Jon Hovi, Detlef F. Sprinz and Arild Underdal, ‘Regime effectiveness and the Oslo-Potsdam solution: a
rejoinder to Oran Young,’ Global Environmental Politics, 3:3, 2003; and Jon Hovi, Detlef F. Sprinz and
Arild Underdal, ‘The Oslo-Potsdam solution to measuring regime effectiveness: Critique, response and
the road ahead,’ Global Environmental Politics, 3:3, 2003; for more on the Oslo-Potsdam solution see
Detlef Sprinz, ‘Regime Effectiveness: the next wave of research’ paper prepared for the 2005 Berlin
conference on the Human dimensions of global environmental change, 02-03 December 2005.
32
33
34
35
117
in the behaviour of actors (outcome). State actors, for instance, may act unilaterally or
collectively through bilateral and multilateral arrangements in implementation of the
regime.36
Finally, long after the regime has been established in an issue-area, the effects of
behavioural change on the particular problem (impact) across a defined space can
actually be measured.37
The objective of this discussion was to differentiate between the effects attributable to
establishing the regime itself and those that can be attributed to the problem-solving
efforts or processes in implementation of the regime.
Importance of time and space

It is worth noting as well the importance of time and space in the measure of
effectiveness. It is important not to confine the analysis to just measuring the effects
from establishment of the regime but to also analyse the change in behaviour. Underdal
provides good reasons for doing so.38
First, change in human behaviour is a necessary condition for problem solving,

whatever the ultimate purpose of the regime. In terms of governance, success in
achieving behavioural change is a reasonable notion of effectiveness, even if the change
in behaviour does not bring about an improvement in the situation. For political
scientists, the issue is one of diagnostic error rather than of ineffective governance.
Second, attempts at determining the impact on complex social and biophysical systems
not only requires substantial expertise in other disciplines outside the social sciences but
it is extremely difficult to distinguish between the effects caused by the regime itself
and effects caused by other external factors.
Third, influence exerted by a regime differs from actor to actor. Focusing on such
differentials can be interesting in studying regime effects at the micro level as well as
important in aggregating levels of change.
36
37
38
See discussion by Underdal, ‘Methodological Challenges,’ pp. 34-35.
118
Fourth, by focusing on the immediate behavioural change needed rather than on the
ultimate purpose can allow assessment of regime effects at an early stage, well before
impact on the problem itself can be determined.
Finally, relationship between effectiveness and level of collaboration measured in terms

of behavioural change is of significant interest. Underdal assumes that level of
collaboration is affected by problem malignancy and problem-solving capacity but also
that it makes a positive, albeit modest, contribution to effectiveness.39
A measure of the level of collaboration as the intervening variable not only provides a
standard against which the object (regime effectiveness) can be evaluated but also
allows an assessment of whether greater regional cooperation can lead to better
substantive results in the issue-area.
Level of collaboration as a measure of effectiveness

This leads to conceiving effectiveness in terms of relative improvement caused by the
level of collaboration and at the same time evaluating regime effectiveness against the
concept of a good or optimal solution concerned with satisficing and maximising,
respectively.40 The notion of relative improvement calls for establishing a baseline as
the point of reference from which improvement can be measured. One option is using
the counterfactual position of a no-regime condition that measures effectiveness in
absolute terms, an elusive notion virtually impossible to measure. The alternative
practical option is to take as the baseline the previous order or rules of the game and
measure change from one order to another in terms of effectiveness differentials.
The notion of a good or ideal solution refers to the collective optimum or the optimal
solution that can be accomplished collectively for the group of members, given the state
of knowledge at the time. This raises the question of what technically and politically
constitutes as the maximum that a particular group of actors can accomplish. Under the
Pareto frontier, the political optimum is reached when no further increase in benefits to
one party can be accomplished without one or more members of the group being worse
off.41 In the absence of a reliable method to determine the distance from the Pareto
39
Underdal, ‘One Question, Two Answers,’ p. 7.
40
41
For a detailed explanation on relative improvement, collective optimum and Pareto frontier, see
119
frontier42, the research uses level of collaboration, a political process of behavioural
change, to determine the political optimum.
In international relations, there is a complete absence of an Indian Ocean Region. It is

possible then to consider the maxim of regional cooperation as the political optimum or
ideal solution, even though there is no guarantee that such cooperation will maximise
technical benefits in the issue-area of the regime for members of the group.
Behavioural change and institutional effectiveness

A measure of behavioural change in terms of the level of collaboration can provide a
good indicator of the distance actually accomplished and the distance remaining to
reach the political optimum. Given that technically perfect solutions are politically not
necessarily feasible43, institutional effectiveness stressed by Keohane, Haas and Levy
and described earlier in chapter 4 assumes significance. This is supported by Underdal
who takes the view that what is politically feasible depends on the institutional setting.44
Thus, a considered measure of the three Cs – concern, contractual environment and

capacity – to do with structure over time is a good indicator for the political process
along the technical optimum. Such an approach moves away from the narrow analysis
of whether the regime solved the problem in the issue area, to a broader analysis of
whether the regime increased concern, contractual environment and capacity, which
would also be reflected in the level of collaboration over time and across space.
So far, the research methodology has taken Underdal’s simple common-sense notion of
effectiveness, saying that the regime is effective should it successfully perform certain
(set of) functions or solve the problem that motivated its establishment. The immediate
target is behavioural change (actor) and institutional effectiveness (structure).
Broader consequences of regime effectiveness across space

Measurements have been integrated into a single intervening variable of the level of
collaboration. Using level of collaboration not only allows determining how a regime
42
43
44
Institutional setting encapsulates two notions of institutions – institutions as arenas or the framework
within which politics takes place and institutions as actors that provide independent inputs into the
problem solving process or somehow amplify outputs of these processes. See Underdal, ‘One Question,
Two Answers.’
120
influences behaviour but also allows assessing impact on the basic problem itself. The
question posed is does greater regional cooperation lead to better substantive results in
the issue area.
The methodology has attempted to sharpen the dependant variables by constructing an

actor-structure continuum but stopped short of including normative assessments.45 The
discussion makes no pretence of using the assessment of effectiveness as a tool for
broader normative evaluation, such as, whether a regime produces outcomes that are
efficient or fair in terms of who deals with what, how, when, and where; determining
costs incurred in establishing and operating the regime; and determining internal
distribution of costs and benefits.46
The approach taken is about determining the broader consequences of regime

effectiveness. What this approach cannot provide is simultaneously determining the
effectiveness of regime building as a problem-solving strategy.47 If this is done, there is
a significant risk of bias in favour of findings inflating the importance of regimes for
solving collective problems.48
It is important to stress again that the basic question is does greater regional cooperation
lead to better substantive results in the issue area i.e. ongoing governing regional efforts
to improve the situation but it is not necessary that the problem be solved.
So, before launching into defining and coding the independent variables a discussion on
broader consequences is in order. Here again, in the discussion on broader
consequences, no attempt has been made to cast the net wide to capture all the
consequences of international maritime regimes, what is otherwise an impossible task.
45
See discussion by Arild Underdal and Oran R. Young, ‘Research strategies for the Future’ in Regime
Consequences, p. 367.
46
See Underdal and Young, ‘Research strategies for the Future,’ p. 368; and Underdal, ‘One Question,
Two Answers.’
47
Miles et al., Environmental regime effectiveness: confronting theory with evidence, p. 473.
48
Miles et al., Environmental regime effectiveness: confronting theory with evidence, p. 474.
121
The approach taken is to focus attention on behavioural pathways or mechanisms.
Mapping behavioural pathways as determinants of broader consequences across space is
essential in understanding the effect institutions have over time.49
Analytic construct of broader consequences across space

The analytic construct for this is drawn from the six behavioural pathways, developed
by Young and Levy and put to test in the effectiveness of international environmental
regimes project on causal connections and behavioural mechanisms.50
Regimes as utility modifiers underscore actors as self-interested utility maximisers in

that actors alter their behaviour, when social practices within institutional arrangements
make it worth their while to do so, in the costs and benefits they attach to well-defined
options. The essential logic is one of linkage in which regimes can threaten penalties for
non-compliance or promise rewards for compliance.
Regimes as learning facilitators highlight the institutional processes that give rise to
individual and collective learning. The essential point is that regimes do play a role in
changing information, prevailing discourses and even values. In the process, they alter
the motive forces that give rise to the behaviour of individuals and collective entities
active in the issue area.
Regimes as enhancers of cooperation heighten alleviating problems of trust and

motivation and allowing participants to achieve collective outcomes that lie closer to the
Pareto frontier. The basic point is regimes affect behaviour by mitigating the collective-
action problems.
Regimes as bestowers of authority emphasise authoritativeness of regime rules and

activities that triggers the behavioural response rather than some calculation of the
anticipated benefits and costs of the different options available to decision makers. The
basic premise is one of respect for authority.
49
Young and Levy, ‘The effectiveness of international environmental regimes’ in Young (ed.), The
effectiveness of international environmental regimes: causal connections and behavioural mechanisms, p.
19.
50
Young and Levy, ‘The effectiveness of international environmental regimes,’ pp. 22-25.
122
Regimes as role definers underline the fact that regimes can at times operate at the
constitutive level shaping identities and therefore interests of actors. In the process,
regimes can influence the way actors behave in the roles assigned to them.
Regimes as agents of internal realignments accentuate the proposition that members of

regimes and others active in the relevant behavioural complex need not be treated as
unitary actors. The focus here is on internal dynamics of states or other collective
entities to explain when and to what extent regimes are likely to prove effective.
No attempt is made to impose order by isolating a single behavioural pathway as being

adequate in explaining the causal links in the complex institutional processes. Rather,
by treating behavioural pathways in a comprehensive manner at least three broader
consequences across space are identified in the context of regional cooperation.51
First, the behavioural pathways of regimes as utility modifiers and regimes as learning
facilitators can provide insights into the level of state learning at the unit level.
Second, the behavioural pathways of regimes as enhancers of cooperation and regimes

as bestowers of authority can inform the extent of regional cooperation at the sub-
system level.
Finally, the behavioural pathways of regimes as role definers and regimes as agents of
internal realignments can explain the potential for emergence of international
cooperation at the system level.
Taken together, the six behavioural pathways to broader consequences across space
complement the three Cs of structure over time to create a time and space dimensional
behavioural map of institutional effectiveness.52
Variables for measurement of regime effectiveness

The discussion so far describes behavioural change and institutional effectiveness as the
two main independent variables in the analysis of the core actor-structure interaction for
regime effectiveness. Both these independent variables are a further function of two sets
of variables each. Behavioural change is a function of the stages of regime formation,
51
Young and Levy have made the point not to examine single behavioural pathways but to take a
comprehensive approach, ‘The effectiveness of international environmental regimes.’
52
For a discussion on the three Cs and the six behavioural pathways as complementary models, see Levy
et al., ‘The study of international regimes.’
123
and actor behaviour and leadership discussed in chapter 4. Institutional effectiveness is
a function of structure over time dealt through use of structuration theory discussed in
chapter 4 and the broader consequence across space. Drawing on the discussion on in
chapter 4, these independent variables in the measurement of regime effectiveness as
the dependant variable are summarised in Table 5.1.
To refresh the discussion in chapter 4, the process of regime formation can result in a
self-generated regime, negotiated regime or an imposed regime. Even after regime
formation, the regime does not remain static but continues to evolve in which the one
process can be substituted for the other.
Table 5.1: Components of regime effectiveness and variables for measurement

Key components of regime effectiveness as the dependant variable
Processes of regime Self-generation Negotiation Imposition
formation
Independent variable: Behavioural change – level of collaboration as the intervening variable
Stages of regime Agenda formation Institutional choice Operationalisation
formation
Actor behaviour and Power based actors Knowledge based Interest based actors
leadership and structural actors and intellectual and entrepreneurial
leadership leadership leadership
Independent variable: Institutional effectiveness – level of collaboration as the intervening variable
Structure over time Signification/ Legitimisation/ Domination/
increasing concern improving contractual increasing capacity of
environment governments
Broader consequences Improved state Greater regional Emergence of
across space learning cooperation international
cooperation
The multivariate model in chapter 4 (see Figure 4.3) highlights the different stages of
regime formation that include agenda formation, institutional choice and
operationalisation. The discussion evolves into actor behaviour by power-based,
interest-based and knowledge based actors through structural, entrepreneurial and
intellectual leadership. Taken together, the two variables of stages of regime formation,
and actor behaviour and leadership measure behavioural change in determining the
effectiveness of a regime.
The discussion in chapter 4 on structuration theory highlights the three dimensions of

structure over time: signification or increasing concern; legitimisation or improving the
contractual environment; and domination or increasing capacity of governments in
improving the effectiveness of regimes. The broader consequences across space of
improved state learning, greater regional cooperation and emergence of international
124
cooperation combined with the structure over time provide a measure of institutional
effectiveness in determining the overall effectiveness of a regime.
The combined measure of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness provides a

measure of the level of collaboration in assessing regime effectiveness. The process of
measurement is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Process of measuring regime effectiveness
.. SicnifiutiorJLev.!of
Concern
• leJ:it imiutlo,YContractulll!
En¥ironmen1
• DominiltiorJQp:acityof
Govemmef'll5
.. Power BaMd k t orund
Structl.lrllle.cll'!'sN'p
• Interest BaMd KtOn .nd
enueprl'l'leurill lelden.hip
• Knowled&e bas.dactof1
.nd intell.a1.11l l eadenhip
• ReJionll Coopemion ilt lha

SutHystem Level
• International Cooperation
It the System Lwei
Level of Collaboration
~act-----,
L • Reeime
Cons~nces
125
Constructing the measurement scale
The research does not attempt to go beyond the ordinal level of measurement
(distinguishing more from less), considered sufficient to understanding what changes, if
any, in the level of collaboration have been brought about by the maritime regime.
What a numerical score does is it requires making an unambiguous choice and is more
transparent. Moreover, the freedom of a purely verbal mode of analysis is largely
illusory and the freedom from the constraints of fixed format may come at cost. In
measuring single variables, Underdal argues that measurements of behavioural change
and institutional effectiveness call for a judgemental assessment rather than some form
of straightforward observation of simple counting.53 Therefore, each numerical score is
at the same level of measurement as the corresponding verbal description in the rubric.
The guidelines used for assigning a verbal description to each numerical score of the
rubric is based on the Miles project on confronting theory with evidence and the coding
data used by the International Regime Database (IRD).54
The IRD architecture is built on four pillars – regime formation, regime attributes,
regime consequences and regime dynamics. The data protocol specifically interrogates
the roles of power, interests and knowledge; the activities of states, non-state actors and
individuals; the stages of agenda formation, negotiation and operationalisation; outputs,
outcomes and impacts; the effectiveness of regimes in solving specific problems, and
the broader consequences of regimes.
Table 5.2 summarises the typology for effective and ineffective regimes. The Miles
project based on the scores of the dependant variables categorises regimes as effective,
mixed or ineffective regimes. Mixed performance regimes have either a combination of
positive and negative scores or an intermediate score that lies between effective and
ineffective regimes.
In confronting theory with evidence, the analysis deals with the three components –
regime effectiveness, problem type and problem-solving capacity – as the core model of
the project.
53
Underdal, ‘Method of Analysis’ in Miles et al., Environmental regime effectiveness.
54
See Brietmeier et al., Analyzing International Environmental Regimes; and Miles et al., Environmental
Regime Effectiveness.
126
Table 5.2: Typology of effective and ineffective regimes
Independent Effective Regime Ineffective Regime
Variable
Type of  Predominantly benign or at least mixed.  Predominantly malignant
Problem  Good state of knowledge  Poor state of knowledge
Problem- High as indicated by Low as indicated by
solving  Decision rules providing for adoption of  Decision rules requiring unanimity
capacity rules by majority or consensus
 An IGO with significant actor capacity  Weak IGO serving the regime
serving the regime  No epistemic community present
 A well integrated epistemic community  Distribution of power in favour of
 Distribution of power in favour of laggards or
pushers or laggards + bystanders
pushers + intermediaries  Scant instrumental leadership
 Instrumental leadership by one or a few provided by delegates or coalitions
parties or by individual delegates or of delegates
coalitions of delegates
Political Favourable, as indicated by Unfavourable, as indicated by
context  Linkages to other, benign problems  Linkages to other malign problems
 Ulterior motives or selective incentives  No ulterior motives or selective
for cooperation incentives for cooperation
Source: Miles et. al. Environmental regime effectiveness
Rubric for measuring regime effectiveness

In developing the rubric, the focus is directly on the theory-based model of actor-
structure interaction over time and across space. The rubric uses a five-point ordinal
scale and a corresponding verbal description for measurement of variables. In using a
scale of 1 to 5, what can be inferred is that 1<2<3<4<5. The verbal description serves as
a guideline for assessing each of the variables.
Taking a level 4 measurement as an example, the rubric describes the actor-structure

interplay from which the level of collaboration can be measured. A level 4 measurement
shows that leadership on part of actors is reasonably well established with above
average level of knowledge of actors and prominent participation in institutional
bargaining with most states in the region as members of the regime. In the formation of
the regime, the problem requiring collective response is accurately identified with the
institutional setting regionally operationalised and national measures evident in every
member state of the regime. The structure over time indicates a high level of concern
amongst stakeholders with a strong regulatory framework for legitimising the norms
and principles of the regime and a high level of political, legal and administrative
capacity amongst member states of the regime. The broader consequences across space
show above average level of learning with decisive cooperation and quite significant
change in the capacity of every member state in participating at the international level.
127
Table 5.3 summarises the level 4 measurement of actor-structure interplay and Table 5.4
illustrates the complete rubric used in the analysis of the case studies.
Table 5.3: Level 4 measurement of actor-structure interplay

Variable Sub-variable 1 Sub-variable 2 Sub-variable 3
Stages of Knowledge based Interest-based actors/ Power-based
regime actors/intellectual entrepreneurial actors/structural
formation leadership leadership leadership
Intellectual leadership on Entrepreneurial Structural leadership by
part of knowledge based leadership by interest power based actors
actors reasonably well based actors reasonably reasonably well established.
established. Epistemic well established. Commitment to issue-
Community and/or non- Prominent participation specific resources is above
state actors are quite well of interest based actors average. The more powerful
integrated and play some in institutional resource States pledge
influential role in regime bargaining. Responsive substantial allocative and
formation and interest in present and authoritative resources and
implementation processes. future impacts of the are joined by most other
Above average level of problem. member States. Nearly all
consensual knowledge States from the region are
base. party to the regime.
Stages of Agenda Formation Institutional choice Operationalisation
regime
formation
Problems that require The institutional setting National measures for
collective response are is regionally operationalisation of the
accurately identified and operationalised in regime are evident in every
agenda converted into member States and also member State from the
measures for collective provides some low-key region.
action by member States political inputs besides
from the region. acting as a mediator or
go-between.
Structure Signification/level of Legitimisation/ Domination/ National
over time concern Contractual capacity
environment
High level of concern High level of credible High level of political, legal
amongst stakeholders. commitment amongst and administrative national
Concerns shared by every member States from the capacity amongst member
member State from the region. Strong States from the region.
region. regulatory framework Strong regional effort at
for legitimising capacity building.
international norms and
principles within the
region.
Broader State learning at the unit Regional cooperation International cooperation
consequences level at the sub-system level at the system level
across space
Above average level of Decisive cooperation Quite significant change in
cognitive learning amongst every member capacity of every member
amongst member States State from the region on State from the region to
from the region about the establishing well- effectively participate at the
nature of problem and defined activities and international level in regime
information about the resources, needed to implementation.
options available for move from norms to
addressing the problem. rules.
128
Table 5.4: Rubric for measuring regime effectiveness
1 2 3 4 5
Knowledge Based Intellectual leadership on part of knowledge based Intellectual leadership on part of knowledge based Intellectual leadership on part of knowledge based Intellectual leadership on part of knowledge based Intellectual leadership on part of knowledge based
actors not at all established. Epsitemic community actors somewhat established. Epistemic community actors reasonably established. Epistemic community actors reasonably well established. Epistemic actors well established and energised. Epistemic
actors and
Actor Behaviour and Leadership
and/or non-state actors inactive. Very poor level of and/or non-state actors active but do play an and/or non-state actors loosely integrated but by no Community and/or non-state actors are quite well Community and/or non-state actors are well
Intellectual consensual knowledge base. influential role. Below average level of consensual means a coherent actor. Average level of consensual integrated and play some influential role in regime integrated and penetrate deep into national
leadership knowledge base. knowledge base. formation and implementation processes. Above governments to play an active and influential role in
average level of consensual knowledge base. regime formation and implementation processes.
Very good level of consensual knowledge base.
Interest Based Entrepreneurial leadership by interest based actors Entrepreneurial leadership by interest based actors Entrepreneurial leadership by interest based actors Entrepreneurial leadership by interest based actors Entrepreneurial leadership by interest based actors
not at all established. No participation of interest somewhat established. Some participation of interest reasonably established. Good participation of interest reasonably well established. Prominent participation well established and energised. Remarkable
actors and based actors in institutional bargaining. No interest in based actors in institutional bargaining. Little interest based actors in institutional bargaining. Keen interest of interest based actors in institutional bargaining. participation of interest based actors in institutional
entrepreneurial present and future impacts of the problem. in present and future impacts of the problem. in present and future impacts of the problem. Responsive interest in present and future impacts of bargaining. Notable interest in present and future
leadership the problem. impacts of the problem.
Power based actors Structural leadership by power based actors not at all Structural leadership by power based actors Structural leadership by power based actors Structural leadership by power based actors Structural leadership by power based actors well
established. Commitment to issue-specific resources somewhat established. Commitment to issue-specific reasonably established. Commitment to issue-specific reasonably well established. Commitment to issue- established and energised. Commitment to issue-
and structural is very poor, even by the more powerful resource resources is below average. The more powerful resources is average. The more powerful resource specific resources is above average. The more specific resources is very good. All States from the
leadership States. Not all States from the region are party to the resource States have not fully pledged allocative and States pledge greater allocative and authoritative powerful resource States pledge substantial allocative region are party to the regime and pledge substantial
regime. authoritative resources. Since inception of the regime, resources and are joined by few other member States. and authoritative resources and are joined by most allocative and authoritative resources.
more States from the region are party to the regime. A good number of States from the region are party to other member States. Nearly all States from the
the regime. region are party to the regime.
Agenda Formation Problems that require collective response are not Problems that require collective response are Problems that require collective response are Problems that require collective response are Problems that require collective response are
identified. somewhat identified. accurately identified and agreed upon by member accurately identified and agenda converted into accurately identified and agenda converted into
States from the region. measures for collective action by member States from measures for collective action by all States from the
Stage of Regime
the region. region as participants.

Formation
Institutional Choice There is no institutional setting. The institutional setting is confined to office and The institutional setting has a secretarial role for The institutional setting is regionally operationalised A system level institution that generates effective
record keeping functions for member States. building regional administrative capability in in member States and also provides some low-key cooperation amongst all States from the region is
member States and also provides some descriptive or political inputs besides acting as a mediator or go- operational and also provides political inputs, acting
informational inputs into the negotiation process. between. as advocate in promoting own ideas and solutions.
Operationalisation No national measures for operationalisation of the National measures for operationalisation of the National measures for operationalisation of the National measures for operationalisation of the National measures for operationalisation of the
regime are evident. regime are evident in few member States from the regime are evident in most member States from the regime are evident in every member State from the regime are evident in all States from the region, now
region. region. region. participants in the regime.
Signification/ Level Very low level of concern amongst stakeholders. Low level of concern amongst stakeholders. Concerns Moderate level of concern amongst stakeholders. High level of concern amongst stakeholders. Very High level of concern amongst stakeholders.
Concerns not shared by States from the region. shared by few member States from the region. Concerns shared by most member States from the Concerns shared by every member State from the Concerns shared by all States from the region, now
of concern
Structure over time
region. region. particpants in the regime.
Legitimisation/ Very low level of credible commitment amongst Low level of credible commitment amongst member Moderate level of credible commitment amongst High level of credible commitment amongst member Very High level of credible commitment amongst all
States from the region. Very weak regulatory States from the region. Weak regulatory framework member States from the region. Neither weak/strong States from the region. Strong regulatory framework States from the region as participants. Very Strong
Contractual framework for legitimising international norms and for legitimising international norms and principles regulatory framework for legitimising international for legitimising international norms and principles regulatory framework for legitimising international
Environment principles within the region. within the region. norms and principles within the region. within the region. norms and principles within the region.
Domination/ Very low level of political, legal and administrative Low level of political, legal and administrative Moderate level of political, legal and administrative High level of political, legal and administrative Very High level of political, legal and administrative
national capacity amongst States from the region. national capacity amongst member States from the national capacity amongst member States from the national capacity amongst member States from the national capacity amongst all States from the region,
National Capacity Very weak regional effort at capacity building. region. Weak regional effort at capacity building. region. Neither weak/strong regional effort at region. Strong regional effort at capacity building. now participants in the regime. Very strong regional
capacity building. effort at capacity building.
State Learning at Very poor level of cognitive learning amongst States Below average level of cognitive learning amongst Average level of cognitive learning amongst member Above average level of cognitive learning amongst Very Good level of cognitive learning amongst all
from the region about the nature of problem and member States from the region about the nature of States from the region about the nature of problem member States from the region about the nature of States from the region, now participants in the
Broader Consequences
the Unit Level information about the options available for problem and information about the options available and information about the options available for problem and information about the options available regime, about the nature of problem and information
addressing the problem. for addressing the problem. addressing the problem. for addressing the problem. about the options available for addressing the
across space
problem.
Regional Insignificant cooperation amongst member States Critical cooperation amongst few member States Essential cooperation amongst most of the member Decisive cooperation amongst every member State Conclusive cooperation amongst all States from the
from the region on establishing well-defined activities from the region on establishing well-defined activities States from the region on establishing well-defined from the region on establishing well-defined activities region, now participants in the regime, on
Cooperation at the and resources, needed to move from norms to rules. and resources, needed to move from norms to rules. activities and resources, needed to move from norms and resources, needed to move from norms to rules. establishing well-defined activities and resources,
sub-system level to rules. needed to move from norms to rules.
International Hardly any change in capacities of member States Somewhat significant change in capacities of few Fairly significant change in capacities of most Quite significant change in capacity of every Very significant change in capacities of all States
from the region to effectively participate at the member States from the region to effectively member States from the region to effectively member State from the region to effectively from the region, now particpants in the regime, to
Cooperation at the international level in regime implementation. participate at the international level in regime participate at the international level in regime participate at the international level in regime effectively participate at the international level in
system level implementation. implementation. implementation. regime implementation.
129
In Table 5.5, the scores of each sub-variable are added to provide an average score for
the four sets of independent variables used to measure behavioural change and
institutional effectiveness. The scores of the independent variables are then averaged to
provide a measure of the level of collaboration as the intervening variable. It is
important to note that the numerical scores are dynamic and indicative of the state of
affairs as they exist now, based on the accessible public documentation at the time.
Table 5.5: Measurement of level 4 regime collaboration

Independent Average
Variable sets Single Variable Measured Verbal Description Score
Variable Score
Knowledge Based actors and Intellectual leadership on part of knowledge based actors
reasonably well established. Epistemic Community and/or non-
Intellectual leadership (KIL) state actors are quite well integrated and play some influential
role in regime formation and implementation processes. Above
4
average level of consensual knowledge base.
Entrepreneurial leadership by interest based actors reasonably

Actor Behaviour Interest Based actors and
BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE
well established. Prominent participation of interest based

and Leadership entrepreneurial leadership (IEL) actors in institutional bargaining. Responsive interest in present 4 4.0
(ABL) and future impacts of the problem.
Power based actors and Structural leadership by power based actors reasonably well
established. Commitment to issue-specific resources is above
structural leadership (PSL) average. The more powerful resource States pledge substantial
allocative and authoritative resources and are joined by most 4
other member States. Nearly all States from the region are
party to the regime.
Agenda Formation (AF) Problems that require collective response are accurately
identified and agenda converted into measures for collective 4
action by member States from the region.
Stage of Regime Institutional Choice (IC) The institutional setting is regionally operationalised in
member States and also provides some low-key political inputs 4 4.0
Formation (SRF)
besides acting as a mediator or go-between.
Operationalisation (OP) National measures for operationalisation of the regime are
evident in every member State from the region. 4
Signification/ High level of concern amongst stakeholders. Concerns shared
by every member State from the region. 4
Level of concern (SLC)
INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
Legitimisation/ High level of credible commitment amongst member States

Structure over time from the region. Strong regulatory framework for legitimising 4
Contractual Environment (LCE) international norms and principles within the region.
4.0
(SOT)
Domination/ High level of political, legal and administrative national
capacity amongst member States from the region. Strong 4
National Capacity (DNC) regional effort at capacity building.
State Learning at the Unit Level Above average level of cognitive learning amongst member
States from the region about the nature of problem and
(SL) information about the options available for addressing the 4
problem.
Broader
Decisive cooperation amongst every member State from the
Consequences Regional Cooperation at the sub- region on establishing well-defined activities and resources,
4.0
4
across space (BCS) system level (RC) needed to move from norms to rules.
International Cooperation at the Quite significant change in capacity of every member State
from the region to effectively participate at the international 4
system level (IC) level in regime implementation.
Intervening
Level of Collaboration (LOC) 4.00
Variable
Figure 5.2 illustrates the performance of each variable. A uniform score of four across
each of the three sub-variables is perceived as a better outcome for the independent
variable. At the same time, a lower score for one sub-variable compared to the scores of
the other two sub-variables can indicate an area for improvement. The scores of each of
the two independent variables for behavioural change and institutional effectiveness are
then combined to provide a similar picture (Figure 5.3).
130
Figure 5.2: Measure of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness variable sets
Institutional Effectiveness Behavioural Change

Structure over Time Actor Behaviour and Leadership
Signification/ Knowledge based
Level of Concern Intellectual leadership
SLC KIL
5 5
4 4
3 3
2 2
1 1
Domination/ Legitimisation/ Power based Interest based

National Capacity Contractual Environment Structural leadership Entrepreneurial leadership
Broader Consequences across Space Stages of Regime Formation

State Learning
at the Unit level Agenda Formation
SL AF
5 5
4 4
3 3
2 2
1 1
International Cooperation Regional Cooperation Operationalisation Institutional choice

at the System level at the Sub-system level
Figure 5.3 further aggregates the scores of both behavioural change and institutional
effectiveness into a single and coherent standard metric of measurement for the level of
collaboration on a sliding scale of 1 to 5.
Figure 5.3: Measure of level of collaboration

I E
5
N F 5
B 5
4 S F 4 E 4
3 T E 3 H 3
2 I C C
2 A 2
1 T T V H
1 1
U I I A
T V N
O
I E G
U
O N E
R
N E A
A S L
SL L S
AF
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
i.eveM of Collaboration
131
Table 5.6 describes the level of collaboration, as the intervening variable, measured on
the five point ordinal scale. A level 4 measurement shows substantial understanding and
leadership at the national level and a strong regional structure with comparitively
decisive cooperation amongst member states of the regime. There is quite significant
change in the capacity of every member state from the region to participate effectively
at the international level in the regime.
Table 5.6: Level of collaboration ordinal scale

Scale Level of collaboration
1 No collaborative action.
Elementary understanding and leadership at the national level and a weak regional structure
with comparatively critical cooperation, leads to somewhat significant change in the capacity
2
of a few of the member states from the region to participate effectively at the international
level.
Average understanding and leadership at the national level and neither a weak/strong regional
structure with comparatively essential cooperation, leads to fairly significant change in the
3
capacity of most member states from the region to participate effectively at the international
level.
Substantial understanding and leadership at the national level and a strong regional structure
4 with comparatively decisive cooperation, leads to quite significant change in the capacity of
every member state from the region to participate effectively at the international level.
World-class understanding and leadership at the national level and a very strong regional
5 structure with comparatively conclusive cooperation, leads to very significant change in the
capacity of all states from the region to participate effectively at the international level.
Table 5.7 shows the performance for actor behaviour and leadership, stages of regime
formation, structure over time and broader consequences across space using the
averaged scores from Table 5.5. A level 4 score for each of the variables indicates
substantial actor-structure interplay leading to substantial formation of the regime in the
region. The broader consequences across space are that state learning at the unit level
and cooperation at the regional level has been substantial for member states.
Table 5.7: Recoded scores of variable sets
Actor Perfun~CI)'a£10!
Elemer,taryactor Av~rageactor Substa!rilloctor W orld-clasmtor
Bdl11iour btJaviol!and bcbaviourand bcba1iourand bcbaviourand bcba1iourand
ud le~dtrsh~ lead~rship lead~rship , l~ad~rsh:o lead~rship
Leldlnbip
Sllge\ol PerfunctCI)' Eleme!JIIJ)' AVI!ager . W
orld-class
Rrgime regimefol1llatro refimefonnatlon formatiooin tt
Forn11non inthmg.on intherefion. refion.
Slru!ltl'l PerfunctCI)' Elemellll.l)' Av~rage
omn111 structnreo~er structJreover structJreover structJreOI'I!
tin:e tice time time
Broader Perfun~CI)' Elemer,tary Av~rage ~5;:::~ World-class
constqui'D[es leamingand l~mingand learningand learningand
acro ~ spact OOOpeFoton oooperrion oooperrion oooperrion cooperation
132
Taken together with the level of collaboration score (Table 5.6), the scores of the two
sets of variables each that define behavioural change and institutional effectiveness
illustrate the assessed effectiveness of a regime (Figure 5.4). Again, a uniform score of
four across each of the five measurements is perceived as a better outcome for the
regime. At the same time, a lower score of one measurement compared to the scores of
other measurements can indicate an area for improvement.
Figure 5.4: Regime effectiveness
Regime Effectiveness
LOC
5
4
3
2
BCS ABL
1
LOC Level of Collaboration

ABL Actor Behaviour and Leadership
SRF Stages of Regime Formation
SOT Structure Over Time
BCS Broader Consequences across Space
Conclusion
An international regime (regime theory) defines a manner, method or system
(structuration) of governance (ocean governance) across a particular geographic space
(region) and over time (regime effectiveness) in an issue area of common interest.
The regime is effective should it achieve success in performing a certain (set of)
function(s) or solve the problem(s) that motivated its establishment. Measures of
behavioural change and institutional effectiveness are integrated to arrive at a measure
for the level of collaboration as the intervening variable in the measurement of the
broader consequences of the regime across space. The focus is on measuring ongoing
regional governing efforts to improve the situation and it is not necessary for the
problem to be solved.
133
The actor-structure interplay brings to the fore measurement of behavioural change and
institutional effectiveness. The measurement of actor behaviour and leadership and
stages of regime formation variables inform behavioural change. Similarly,
measurement of structure over time and the broader consequences across space
variables inform institutional effectiveness. Taken together, behavioural change and
institutional effectiveness provide a measurement of the level of collaboration that
facilitates an overall assessment of regime effectiveness.
In Part II, the theoretical model for regime effectiveness is empirically tested in two
case studies on marine scientific research (Chapter 7) and ports state control
(Chapter 9).
134
Part II
Indian Ocean Rim Area
Indian
Ocean
0 60 "20
Source: University of Texas, Perry Castaneda Library map collection, viewed 18 Apr 2009,
<http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/islands_oceans_poles/indianoceanarea.jpg>
Chapter 6
Regime for marine scientific research in the Indian Ocean Region
This chapter describes the regime for marine scientific research. One of the major
focuses of international cooperation in the field of marine scientific research is the
Global Ocean Observing System. This chapter assesses the effectiveness of the Global
Ocean Observing System in the Indian Ocean Region as a case study.
Importance of marine scientific research

Marine science is ‘the scientific investigation of the ocean, its biota and its physical
boundaries with the solid earth and the atmosphere.’1 The two main objectives of all
scientific investigation highlighted by Revelle are gaining greater understanding of
oceanic phenomena; and solving problems arising from human uses of the ocean,
particularly those arising from the development and utilisation of ocean resources.2
Besides the conduct of ocean surveying and mapping for peacefully delimiting maritime
boundaries, following from the earlier discussion on the marine related problems of
society, the conduct of Marine Scientific Research (MSR) assumes its greatest
significance in the need to:
 Make informed decisions in the area of fisheries management, disaster and

environment management and climate change;
 Protect and preserve the marine environment;
 Understand distribution and abundance of ocean resources for sustainable and
equitable use; and
 Explore the ocean depth to provide the missing knowledge for completing the
three-dimensional ecological understanding of the marine environment.3
One would expect a freedom of sorts in the conduct of oceanic research. Contrary to
popular belief, ocean science once for the curious mind and largely unregulated until the
1
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, Ocean Sciences for the year 2000, 12th session of the
Assembly, Paris, 3-20 Nov 1982, reprinted in Ocean Yearbook 1983.
2
Roger Revelle, The need for international cooperation in marine science and technology, Ocean
Yearbook 1985.
3
See Montserrat Gorina-Ysern, An international regime for marine scientific research (New York:
Transnational Publishers, 2003); Douglas M. Johnston, The theory and history of ocean boundary-making
(Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988); and Alfred H.A. Soons, Marine scientific research
and the Law of the Sea (Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1982).
136
1950s, for reasons of economic benefit, has quickly moved towards a controlled and
regulated regime in the conduct of all marine research.
Now that a legal regime exists, making the MSR regime work is most basic in the
continuing quest for greater ocean knowledge. Informed decision-making made possible
from the knowledge gained is essential in reversing the alarming trends and making
quantifiable progress towards addressing the marine related problems of society and in
protecting the marine environment for the benefit of present and future generations.
Maritime zones and marine scientific research

The permissible or consensual conduct of Marine Scientific Research (MSR) detailed in
Part XIII of LOSC emerged from the 1958 Geneva Convention on the continental shelf.
The first of its kind the MSR legal regime was brought into force to try regulating the
conduct of non-resource related oceanographic research by all states. Developing
coastal states limited in their capacity to gather ocean data sought to regulate the
conduct of all forms of oceanic research or institute a system whereby data gathered by
all kinds of vessels is shared with the concerned coastal state.
Although, the legal regime gives ‘all states’ the right to conduct marine scientific
research, the conduct of MSR essential to gaining greater understanding of oceanic
phenomena and solving marine related problems had now become harder to achieve
under LOSC. The new legal regime places significant restrictions on oceanographers in
the study of oceans than previously when it was considered a freedom up to the limits of
the territorial sea. The MSR legal regime for regulation purposes divides the ocean
space into two zones. In the national maritime zones, a coastal state exercises sovereign
rights and/or jurisdiction over foreign MSR activities both in the water column and on
the seabed. Part XIII gives exclusive jurisdiction and real but not absolute control to the
coastal state in the conduct of MSR within the EEZ and the continental shelf.4
The international maritime zone still provides for relative freedom to conduct MSR on
the ‘high seas’ or the water column beyond the Exclusive Economic Zone. The MSR
regime also sets the criteria for conduct of similar activities in the Area or the seabed
and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of the continental shelf claimed by
4
See Miles, Global ocean politics, p. 90.
137
coastal states. Table 6.1 provides the scope of the MSR legal regime in the different
national and international maritime zones.
Table 6.1: Conduct of marine scientific research in the maritime zones

Maritime Zone Conduct of Marine Scientific Research LOSC Article
National Zone
Internal Waters Coastal state sovereignty with no right to conduct marine Article 2,8
(waters internal to the scientific research (unless specifically authorised by a
baseline) coastal state).
Archipelagic Waters Right of sea-lane passage but no right to conduct marine Articles 53, 54
(waters internal to scientific research and hydrographic survey activities and 40 mutatis
archipelagic baselines) without prior authorisation of the archipelagic state. mutandis
Territorial Sea (up to Right of innocent passage but marine scientific research Articles 17, 19,
12 nm from the prohibited without the express consent of the coastal 245
baseline) state including any act aimed at collecting information to
the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal
state.
Contiguous Zone (12 Right to conduct marine scientific research if the coastal Article 33
to 24 nm) state has not claimed an Exclusive Economic Zone.
Exclusive Economic Coastal state right to regulate, authorise and conduct Articles 56,
Zone (12 to 200 nm) marine scientific research and in normal circumstances 246
and Continental shelf grant consent to flag states for conduct marine scientific
research
International Zone
High Seas (outside Freedom to conduct marine scientific research subject to Article 87
200 nm) Part XI (continental shelf) and Part XIII (MSR regime)
and with ‘due regard’ for the interests of other states and
‘due regard’ to the rights of the other states concerning
activities in the Area.
The Area Marine scientific research conducted by the Authority or Articles 143,
by State Parties through the Authority. 256
International legal regime for marine scientific research

The present day international legal regime of MSR detailed in Part XIII of LOSC
balances the rights and responsibilities of coastal states and research states in the
conduct of research.5 This balancing of rights and responsibilities was at the core of
negotiations that produced the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.6
Even as, the regime exhorts international cooperation and imposes obligations on states
to promote oceanographic research, the actual conduct of MSR has been subjected to a
5
The convention contains new rules on marine scientific research which strike an equitable balance
between the interests of the research states and the interest of coastal states in whose economic zones or
continental shelves the research is to be carried out – ‘A constitution for the oceans’ statement by T. T. B.
Koh in Myron H. Nordquist (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary
Volume I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985).
6
For a comprehensive discussion on the decision process, see Miles, Global ocean politics; and see
overview of the contents of the LOS convention in McDorman et al., International ocean law: Materials
and commentaries, p.28.
138
consent regime in the EEZ and on the continental shelf. The raison d’être for the
consent regime was the desire of coastal states to safeguard their sovereign rights over
the natural resources within the coastal zone.
In balancing the interests of coastal states and the international scientific community,
the MSR legal regime emphasises that coastal states shall grant their consent for MSR
projects in ‘normal circumstances’ without unreasonable delay or denial.7 Normal
circumstances would constitute project outcomes that remain for peaceful purposes
aimed at increasing the collective scientific knowledge of the marine environment for
the benefit of all humanity.8
The discretion to withhold consent would be limited by such circumstances where MSR
projects are likely to interfere with the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of coastal states
within the coastal zone.9 The right to withhold consent could also apply in
circumstances where the project description provided contained inaccurate information
or if the researching state or international organisation has outstanding obligations to the
coastal state from a prior research project.10
Research states and international organisations intending to undertake MSR in the EEZ
or on the continental shelf of a coastal state are required to provide a full description of
the project at least six months in advance.11 Research states and international
organisations are further required to comply with specific conditions, such as, coastal
state right to participation; access to all data and samples; and receiving of all reports,
conclusions or results.12
The coastal state has the right to require suspension or cessation of MSR activities
where the research in progress does not comply with the original information provided
under article 248 or fails to meet the specific conditions under article 249 and following
notification of suspension or cessation the research state or international organisation
must terminate the research activities.13
7
LOSC Article 246 (3) (4).
8
LOSC Article 246 (3).
9
10
LOSC Article 252 (b).
11
LOSC Article 248.
12
LOSC Article 249.
13
LOSC Article 253.
139
To balance interests of the international scientific community, the MSR legal regime
contains an ‘implied consent’ rule applicable to situations when coastal state consent is
not forthcoming within four months of the receipt of the communication of the research
project.14 In such circumstances, the research state or international organisation may
proceed with the MSR project six months after the date upon which the information
required was provided to the coastal state.15 There are practical problems in making this
regime work, such as, coastal states ignoring the implied consent rule or delaying
consent or cancelling permission at the last moment. There are also problems of marine
scientific research expeditions sharing data.
Just as the right of the coastal state is not absolute in the national zone, the freedom to
conduct MSR in the high seas or the international zone is no longer an absolute
freedom. All states must conduct marine scientific research on the high seas exclusively
for peaceful purposes using only appropriate scientific methods and means with due
regard to safety of navigation and human life. The research must be carried out in
conformity with regulations for protection and preservation of the marine environment
and in a manner that unjustifiably does not interfere with other legitimate uses of the
sea.16
Similar new restrictive principles of international law apply in the Area or the other
international zone known as the common heritage of mankind to ‘all states’ in the
conduct of MSR or other activities.17 The interesting point here is that although the legal
regime prohibits the conduct of MSR in pursuit of resources in the national zone the
regime allows for the conduct of such activity by the International Seabed Authority
when concerned with the Area and its resources.18
Significantly, MSR activities cannot constitute the legal basis for any rightful claim to
explore, exploit or own any part of the marine environment or its natural resources.19
Overall, coastal states enjoy sovereign rights and/or jurisdiction within the national
zones. While in the international zones, the high seas are open to all and within the Area
14
LOSC Article 252.
15
LOSC Article 252.
16
LOSC Article 240, 257.
17
18
19
LOSC Article 137.
140
all such rights are exercised by the International Seabed Authority acting like a State on
behalf of and for mankind as a whole.
The MSR regime represents an outcome from the confrontation between states seeking
to regulate the conduct of research, many of them developing coastal states and states in
favour of absolute freedom of research in the world’s oceans or research states,
principally led by the United States.20
The mainstay of this confrontation has been the significant gap in the scientific and
technological capabilities of developing coastal states and research states.21 A strong
supposition of the need to protect their economic and security interests was the
motivation for most coastal states.
Marine scientific research and economic interests

Marine minerals have been estimated to generate nearly $1 trillion every year.22 These
valuable minerals include offshore oil and gas, gold, tin, diamonds, sand, and gravel,
which can be found both within and beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Offshore
oil production accounts for about 30 percent of total world oil production, and offshore
gas production accounts for about half of world production.23 Huge deposits of frozen
compounds of methane gas (methane hydrates) can be found at 600 to 1,500 feet below
the ocean floor on continental margins throughout the world.24 These ocean-floor
deposits are potentially an enormous source of energy. Scientists estimate that they
contain twice the amount of organic carbon as all recoverable and non-recoverable oil,
gas, and coal deposits on earth.
Oceanic (seabed and water column) data gathered in coastal state thinking could provide
valuable information on the available extent of natural resources. In taking a closed
position, the overriding factor for developing coastal states has been the near impossible
task of distinguishing between activities of scientific vessels engaged in ‘pure or
20
North-South Confrontation, see McDorman et al., International ocean law: Materials and
commentaries, p.20; for US position, see Miles, Global ocean politics, p. 77.
21
See discussion in Miles, Global ocean politics; and Soons, Marine scientific research and the Law of
the Sea.
22
23
24
141
applied’ research for benefit of ‘mankind as a whole’ and the activities of commercial
exploration vessels.25
Moreover, publishing of certain pure scientific research findings could potentially

provide valuable information to commercial entities confirming the presence or absence
of natural resources in a particular region.26 Developing coastal states lacked the
scientific and technological capability for them to determine the economic potential of
the region and viewed the publishing of such scientific research findings as detrimental
to their economic interests.27
Finally, developing coastal states were guided by the desire to gain access to all data
obtained and receive all results of the scientific research conducted in an effort to be
equally aware of the economic potential of their maritime zones.28
Marine scientific research and military interests

Oceanic data is equally critical to predicting sonar conditions in the conduct of covert
submarine and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) military operations.
In essence, research vessels operating near a coastal state could provide valuable
intelligence on submarine operations and other military intelligence by monitoring
electronic signals and communications. The research vessels could also be used for
detecting military installations on the seabed or for implanting electronic arrays.29
Between 2004 and 2005, considerable epistemic discussion ensued in the Marine Policy
journal on military and intelligence gathering activities in the EEZ of a coastal state.30 A
number of declarations have been filed by states against the conduct of military
activities in the EEZ by developing coastal states and vice versa, research states have
filed sharply opposing declarations.
25
Gorina-Ysern, An international regime for marine scientific research; Soons, Marine scientific
research and the Law of the Sea.
26
Soons, Marine scientific research and the Law of the Sea.
27
Gorina-Ysern, An international regime for marine scientific research.
28
29
30
Mark J. Valencia and K. Akimoto, ‘Introduction: military and intelligence gathering activities in the
exclusive economic zones: consensus and disagreement II,’ Marine Policy Vol. 29 No. 2, 2005
142
The problem lay in the distinction between military intelligence gathering and ‘pure and
applied’ scientific research compounded by the verity that many scientific research
vessels are owned, manned, and operated by navies with military government markings.
Although, UNCLOS did contain provisions on the legal status and immunities of
military vessels, these provisions in any way did not abet in the distinction between
marine scientific research and military intelligence gathering.
A number of incidents have occurred since the capture of the US spy ship Pueblo in
1968 by North Korea.31 The Cold War tensions, reflected somewhat in the contribution
by Desmond Ball, also played a part in the efforts of coastal states to limit the
intelligence gathering ability of ships designed specifically for signal intelligence
collection.32
Intelligence gathering incidents have related to both EEZ freedoms of overflight and
navigation. In 2001, a Chinese F-8 fighter aircraft collided with the US EP-3E
surveillance aircraft flying over China’s EEZ.33 In the same year, India protested against
the activities of a US hydrographic survey vessel USS Bowditch 30 nm from the
Nicobar Islands and a British survey vessel HMS Scott 190 nm from Diu near Probander
on the west coast of India.34
Djalal points out that under article 58 states differ in their interpretation on the meaning
of ‘freedoms’ of navigation and overflight and the precise meaning of ‘other
internationally lawful uses of the sea.’35 Bateman fleshes out the meaning of
hydrographic surveying, military survey and military data gathering to point out that
there is an overlap to some extent in the conduct of these otherwise legitimate military
activities and marine scientific research.36 The definitional and operational issues
31
32
Desmond Ball, ‘Intelligence collection operations and EEZs: the implications of new technology,’
Marine Policy, Vol. 28, 2004, pp. 67-82.
33
Jon M. Van Dyke, ‘Military ships and planes operating in the exclusive economic zone of another
country,’ Marine Policy, Vol. 28, 2004, pp. 29-39.
34
Van Dyke, ‘Military ships and planes operating in the exclusive economic zone of another country.’
35
Hasjim Djalal, ‘Options for resolving disagreements,’ Marine Policy Vol, 28, 2004, pp. 83-87.
36
Sam Bateman, ‘Hydrographic surveying in the EEZ: differences and overlap with marine scientific
research,’ Marine Policy, Vol. 29, 2005, pp. 163-174.
143
remain unresolved and states remain divided on the legitimacy of military and
intelligence gathering activities in the EEZ of another state.37
Under such conditions, Dyke argues that the freedom of navigation in the EEZ no
longer exists to the same extent as the high seas.38 Valencia concludes that the right to
engage in military and intelligence gathering activities in the EEZ of another state
remains controversial.39
There is lack of common understanding of key UNCLOS terms particularly ‘peaceful

uses,’ ‘peaceful purpose,’ ‘freedom of navigation and overflight,’ ‘other internationally
lawful uses of the sea,’ ‘installations and structures,’ ‘residual rights,’ ‘due regard,’
‘normal mode,’ ‘hostile intent,’ and a abuse of rights.40 Then, there are significant
differences and overlap in hydrographic surveying including military survey and
military data gathering and marine scientific research.41 The issue goes to highlight the
contending positions of maritime powers that argue for high seas freedoms being
retained within EEZs and that of creeping jurisdiction by coastal states seeking to
regulate the EEZs.
International cooperation in marine scientific research

The lack of national capacity in the conduct of research and the limited capability in
monitoring and surveillance of illegal activities are the main dampeners to effectively
using scientific knowledge in pursuit of policies and projects for solving marine related
problems of society and in protecting and preserving the marine environment.
Promoting international cooperation in MSR therefore takes on a compelling logic and

becomes critical for effectively integrating human activity and ocean uses in a
sustainable manner. Recognising that oceanic phenomena know no political boundaries,
the conduct of MSR for peaceful purposes based on mutual benefit requires states and
international organisations to cooperate in accordance with the principle of respect for
sovereignty and jurisdiction.42
37
Jon M. Van Dyke, ‘The disappearing rights to navigational freedom in the exclusive economic zone,’
Marine Policy, Vol. 29, 2005, pp. 107-121.
38
Van Dyke, ‘The disappearing rights to navigational freedom in the exclusive economic zone.’
39
Mark J. Valencia, ‘Conclusions and way forward,’ Marine Policy, Vol. 29, 2005, pp. 185-187.
40
Valencia, ‘Conclusions and way forward,’ p. 186.
41
Valencia, ‘Conclusions and way forward,’ p. 186.
42
144
Specifically, cooperative arrangements apply in the conduct of MSR ‘necessary to
prevent and control damage to the health and safety of persons and the environment’
within the coastal zone.43 Soons has observed that such arrangements covers collection
of data necessary for predicting earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, cyclones, typhoons,
and monsoons and monitoring of the environment with a view to prevent or minimise
the harmful effects of natural disasters or otherwise man-made conditions of polluting
the environment.44
The MSR regime requires states to conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements for
the creation of favourable conditions and integrating efforts of all scientists involved in
the process of data gathering.45 The MSR regime also makes it mandatory for research
states and international organisations to publish and disseminate information and
knowledge resulting from the conduct of MSR for actively promoting the flow of
scientific data and information and the transfer of knowledge, especially to developing
states.46
Moreover, the MSR regime requires states to promote strengthening of autonomous

MSR capability for developing states by initiating programmes aimed at providing
education and training of technical and scientific personnel.47 Similar cooperative
arrangements are provided for in the conduct of MSR in the Area.48
In principle, the MSR regime ensures that all states benefit from all research conducted
not just in the practical application of research results but also in furtherance of marine
scientific progress in general.
The International Oceanographic Commission (IOC) is the recognised competent

organisation within the United Nations system for the operationalisation of the MSR
regime and is complemented by the FAO, UNEP, WMO, IMO, IHO, and IAEA (see
gloassary) in the formulation of ocean science programs. UN agencies led ocean science
programs include cooperation with other agencies, namely, IUCN, ICES, and GCRMN.
Marine scientific cooperation programs are in the three broad areas of ocean science,
43
44
45
LOSC Article 243.
46
LOSC Article 244.
47
LOSC Article 244 (2)
48
LOSC Article 144.
145
fisheries and living resources, and marine pollution. The application of the regime for
marine scientific research in the Indian Ocean (IO) is analysed using the cooperative
program for a Global Ocean Observing System (GOOS). The IOGOOS memorandum
of understanding is the only agreement between Indian Ocean countries as a whole in
the field of marine scientific research. The theoretical framework developed for regime
analysis is used for determining the effectiveness of the MSR regime in the Indian
Ocean using the GOOS regional alliance as a case study.
Process of regime formation: Global Ocean Observing System (GOOS)

The Global Ocean Observing System (GOOS) fructified in 1991 after decade long
deliberations on the need for a world ocean watch to understand and forecast climate
change.49 In less than a month climate change was no longer the sole focus. The system
requirements were broadened to include physical, chemical and biological coastal ocean
monitoring.
GOOS as an enabler of marine scientific research is designed to monitor, understand,

and predict weather and climate change; describe and forecast the state of the ocean,
including living resources; improve management of marine and coastal ecosystems and
resources; mitigate damage from natural hazards and pollution; and protect life and
property on the coastline and at sea.50 As an operational system, GOOS is where science
(research) informs international and national policy (operational) on the effects of
human activity (users), climate change and natural disasters in the ocean and coastal
zones.
Over eighteen long years scientists as actors have grappled with establishing an
institutionalised framework for operationalising and implementing the concept of
GOOS.
In March 1991, the 16th IOC assembly decided to move from ad hoc to permanent
arrangements by establishing the GOOS support office (GSO) wherein existing GLOSS
activities became the fundamental building blocks of GOOS. In March 1992,
49
Colin Summerhayes, ‘A brief history of the Global Ocean Observing System,’ GOOS information
document 01/02/2006, viewed 8 Feb 2009,
<http://www.ioc-goos.org/index.php?option=com_oe&task=viewDocumentRecord&docID=134>.
50
Global Ocean Observing System, ‘What is GOOS,’ viewed 8 Feb 2009,
<http://www.ioc-goos.org/content/view/12/26/>.
146
disbanding TC/OPC the IOC, WMO and UNEP jointly sponsored an Intergovernmental
Committee for GOOS (I-GOOS) for providing intergovernmental coordination in the
implementation of GOOS.
When I-GOOS met for the first time in February 1993, the committee formed J-GOOS
as technical and scientific advisory panel to inform scientists in I-GOOS. In the same
year, Health of the Ocean (HOTO) and Living Marine Resources (LMR) ad hoc panels
were also created for advancing the development of specific aspects of GOOS.
The panels were the first signs of a complex hierarchy being created where HOTO
became a formal advisory panel to J-GOOS, which in turn acted as the advisory panel to
I-GOOS with each panel consisting of scientists as members informing other scientists.
J-GOOS eventually met for the first time in May 1994, jointly sponsored by IOC,
WMO, and ICSU not UNEP as the sponsor of I-GOOS. Alongside developments at the
international level for establishing a GOOS structure, OECD widely promoted GOOS to
stimulate development at the regional level. The founding of EURO-GOOS in 1994 led
the way to create a seven other regional alliances by 2003 including the Indian Ocean
GOOS.51
In 1994, I-GOOS formed a second ‘executive’ Strategy Sub-Committee (SSC) for

developing a GOOS Strategic Plan, only to be merged with J-GOOS forming a new
GOOS Steering Committee (GSC) in 1997, this time sponsored by IOC, WMO, UNEP,
and ICSU.
The GSC became responsible for all aspects of GOOS planning requiring scientific and
technical expertise. By 1998, GSC had finalised the strategic plan published as a GOOS
prospectus. In the interim on the coastal side, the ad hoc LMR panel met in 1996 with
another ad hoc coastal panel started in 1997 and formalised in 1998 both reporting to
the GSC.
In the end, the LMR, HOTO and coastal panels were combined into a Coastal Ocean
Observations Panel (COOP) reporting to the GSC, which in turn reported to I-GOOS.
COOP published the design and implementation strategies for the coastal module of
GOOS in 2003 and 2005 respectively.
51
Summerhayes, ‘A brief history of the Global Ocean Observing System.’
147
Soon thereafter COOP was dissolved and the GSC expanded into the GOOS Scientific
Steering Committee (GSSC) charged with added responsibility of coordinating the
coastal module.52
On the open ocean side, the IOC, WCRP, and SCOR sponsored Ocean Observing
System Development Panel (OOSDP) created in the late 1980s completed its work in
1995 with the publishing of the ‘Scientific Design for the common module of GOOS
and GCOS: An Ocean Observing Climate.’
The Ocean Observations Panel for Climate (OOPC) succeeded OOSDP as the scientific
advisory group making recommendations for a sustained global ocean observing
system. Sponsored by GCOS, GOOS, and WCRP, OOPC became responsible for the
global climate component of GOOS and the ocean component of GCOS.
In 2001, OOPC published a document ‘Observing the Ocean in the 21st century: A
strategy for Global Ocean Observations’ as guidance in observations of the open ocean.
OOPC advises the Joint WMO-IOC technical Commission for Oceanography and
Marine Meteorology (JCOMM) that is further divided into observations, services and
data management programmes.53
The GOOS structure in the end developed into two distinct modules, namely, the open
ocean module and the coastal ocean module. Strategy and guidance for the open ocean
module is provided by OOPC and JCOMM undertakes the implementation of the
strategy.
The institutional mechanism to implement the coastal ocean module is different. The
GSSC provides the strategy and guidance for implementation by GOOS Regional
Alliances (GRAs). Inter-regional governance and identification of commitment is
undertaken by I-GOOS, which is advised by the GSSC. A GOOS project office
coordinates the functioning of I-GOOS, GRAs and JCOMM.
In 2007, the I-GOOS committee proposed formation of the GOOS Regional Council
(GRC) to act as a conduit between GRAs and I-GOOS in addressing the collective
52
53
148
needs of GRAs.54 The I-GOOS committee further endorsed formation of a Panel for
Integrated Coastal Observations (PICO) as a technical sub-committee for providing
technical advice to GSSC in the implementation of the coastal module.55
The complex international institutional structure (Figure 6.1) for implementation of

regional programmes is largely limited to an advisory role. Within the GOOS structure,
there are no apparent linkages between the coastal module and the open ocean module.
What is apparent though is that successful implementation of the coastal ocean module
would depend on the effectiveness of standalone regional alliances.
Figure 6.1: GOOS international institutional structure

Intergov ernmental
Committee for GOOS
(I-GO OS)
Ocean Observations
Panel for Climate
(OOPC)
Panel for
Integrated Coastal
Observations
(PICO)
GOOS
Regional Commission for
Alliances Oceanography and Marine
(GRAs) _. Coordination M eteorology (JCOMM)
Advisory
Representation
Coastal Module j • • -> Collaboration [ Open Ocean Module
Source: Developed by author from GOOS website and recent I-GOOS decisions
Indian Ocean Global Ocean Observing System (IOGOOS) regional alliance

The Indian Ocean Global Ocean Observing System (IOGOOS) regional alliance has
been analysed from the annual reports and documentation available on its formation on
the IOGOOS website.
The text of the documentation has been classified by the independent variables of
behavioural change: stages of regime formation; and actor behaviour and leadership,
54
Eighth Session of the IOC-WMO-UNEP Intergovernmental Committee for the Global Ocean
Observing System (I-GOOS-VIII), 13-16 June 2007, Report No. 165, UNESCO 2007.
55
Eighth Session of IOC-WMO-UNEP Intergovernmental Committee for the Global Ocean Observing
System (I-GOOS-VIII), Report No. 165.
149
and institutional effectiveness: structure over time; and broader consequences across
space. The coding and classification of text is provided at Appendix 2.
The analysis that follows is a qualitative assessment interspersed with the what, when,
where and whom of the IOGOOS process and is presented in descriptive style to tell a
very different story from the one told by the annual reports.
As a follow on from the GOOS process of regime formation, seven countries (Australia,
India, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Seychelles, and South Africa) bordering the Indian
Ocean met in November 2001 at New Delhi emphasising on cooperation in the forming
of an Indian Ocean regional alliance for promoting GOOS.56
The regional alliance would focus on raising national capacities through the formation
of national GOOS coordination committees, promoting mutual assistance initiatives and
providing access to oceanic knowledge in its application for the benefit of the Indian
Ocean Region.
At the first conference in November 2002, ten of the 16 countries that participated
(Australia, India, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Reunion (France),
Sri Lanka, and South Africa) from the region signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU).57
IOGOOS was established as an association of nineteen marine operational and research

agencies for planning, coordinating and implementing a regional ocean observing
system in the Indian Ocean.58 Since then, Tanzania in 2002, Indonesia in 2005 and
56
IOGOOS Meeting statement, ‘Indian Ocean principal’s meeting – a high-level consultation,’ New
Delhi, 8-9 November 2001, viewed 24 Jul 2007,
<http://www.incois.gov.in/Incois/iogoos/New_Delhi_Statement.htm>.
57
First conference statement of the Indian Ocean Global Ocean Observing System (IOGOOS), Mauritius,
4-9 November 2002, viewed 8 Feb 2009,
<http://www.incois.gov.in/Incois/iogoos/Conference_Statement.jsp>; and List of participants, viewed 8
Feb 2009, <http://www.incois.gov.in/Incois/iogoos/participants.jsp>.
58
First conference statement of IOGOOS. Signatories of IOGOOS MOU: Australian Bureau of
Meteorology; Australian Commonwealth Scientific and Research Organisation; Indian National Centre
for Ocean Information Services; National Institute of Ocean Technology, India; Iranian National Centre
For Oceanography, Kenya Marine and Fisheries Research Institute; University of La Réunion; Mauritius
Oceanography Institute; Interim National Committee for IOGOOS, South Africa; University of Port
Elizabeth, South Africa; University of Natal, South Africa; Institute for Aquatic Biodiversity, South
Africa; Curtin University, Australia; University of Toliara, Madagascar; National Aquatic Resources
Research and Development Agency, Sri Lanka; National Institute for Hydrography and Navigation
(INAHINA), Mozambique; NOAA Office of Global Programs, USA; and IOC Perth Regional Office.
150
Maldives and Thailand in 2007 have joined the IOGOOS marine scientific research
program.
Through IOGOOS, the IOC and other GOOS sponsors, namely, UNEP, WMO, ICSU,
and FAO came one-step closer to operationalising a global ocean observing system.59
Envisioned as a network of local, national, regional and global system of systems the
regional alliance could cost-effectively link oceanic programs enhancing existing
knowledge, infrastructure and expertise.60
The network would allow more rapid and systemic acquisition of data for making
timely predictions of environmental changes.61 The idea being to serve better the needs
of marine and coastal user groups in government, private sector, scientific community,
academia, non-governmental organisations, and the coastal community.
Re-affirming IOC, WMO and ICSU support, the UNESCO chairperson citing examples
of investments made by US and Europe towards GOOS emphasised the need for similar
investments by Indian Ocean countries if the benefits of the regional alliance were to be
fully realised.62
At the Sri Lanka meeting in 2004, one can detect the top-down imposed approach to the
process of regime formation. According to the chair IOGOOS and vice-chair IOC, what
was being envisaged is for an internationally acceptable global ocean observing system
that is capable of addressing the broad realms of oceanic climate and coastal issues.63
Regional alliances would allow focussing on issues of regional concern and interests
with the implementation of the ocean observing system more or less dependent on
national contributions.64
In the GOOS process of regime formation, establishing the Indian Ocean GRA is one of
imposition in accomplishing the international marine scientific research agenda. The
process of negotiation remains in its infancy. Collaborative partnerships with other
59
IOGOOS I [13222-13514] Appendix 2.
60
61
62
63
IOGOOS II [4813-5273] Appendix 2.
64
151
regional bodies, such as, GOOS Africa and SEA GOOS have not been fully
negotiated.65
IOGOOS members remain in the process of negotiating use of existing facilities, pilot
projects, operational satellites, and pre-operational projects, such as, the IOC established
IODE program for data management.66 IOGOOS members acknowledge the importance
of moving from imposition towards self-generation. Such a move would empower all
members in not only generating and sharing data but also benefiting from the use of
resultant IOGOOS products and services.67 As a result, members would ensure long-
term sustainability of national and regional ocean observations capacity thereby fully
operationalising IOGOOS into a user-oriented ocean services system.68
Actor behaviour and leadership

Knowledge based actors and intellectual leadership
As a regional alliance between nations of the Indian Ocean, at least three national
organisations (authorities/agencies/institutions) from a single nation could become
independent members of the regional alliance.69 Ironically, inter-agency collaboration
within a nation appears difficult to achieve.
India, Australia and South Africa, with more than one established research agency,
preferred independent institutional membership instead of a single national
representative coordinating GOOS effort. Despite the limitation clause of not more than
three institutional members, there were four signatories from South Africa. In effect, on
inception 10 of the 17 signatory research agencies represented the Australia-India-South
Africa triangle. The other seven research agencies were from Iran, Kenya, La Réunion,
Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique and Sri Lanka. The remaining two signatories
included the IOC Perth regional office and the United States National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).70 Evidently, the regional ocean observing
65
66
IOGOOS I [94609-94707] Appendix 2 and IOGOOS-IV report 10-12 October 2006.
67
68
69
IOGOOS I report 2-9 November 2002.
70
Global Ocean Observing System for the Indian Ocean, ‘IOGOOS Memorandum of Understanding,’
viewed 20 Apr 2007, <http://www.incois.gov.in/Incois/iogoos/Mou1.htm>.
152
agenda was going to be established, institutionalised and operationalised by knowledge-
based actors from these three nations.
Organisationally, the knowledge-based actors were encouraged to take part-ownership

and pursue the task of ocean observation through expert groups and coordination
committees.71 Wider participation from universities and other relevant institutions was
sought in assembling a new collective of regional expertise for ocean observations.72
Interest based actors and entrepreneurial leadership

Malone captures the essence of an operational ocean observing system as an end-to-end
system driven by user groups73 including government agencies, private enterprises,
scientists, educators, NGOs, and the public. An effective system required the provision
of data and data products to be routinely sustained in forms and rates specified by the
users.74
In all the annual meetings, knowledge-based actors have identified the importance of
entrepreneurial leadership by interest-based actors ranging from other international and
regional bodies, coastal zone managers, coastal communities, industry based developers
and owners of tourism infrastructure, port and marine authorities, non-governmental
organisations and the international scientific community.
Repeated discussions at the 2004 IOGOOS meeting stressed the importance of getting
user inputs, attracting funding from interest-based actors, and engaging coastal
communities for utilising existing local level resources to meet project demands within
otherwise constrained budgets.75 In the aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami, the Bali meeting
reviewed the IOGOOS strategy. A key consideration was that the task of a real time
24x7 warning system over long-term ocean observations for climate would be far in
excess of the IOGOOS resource capacity under current regional arrangements.76 It was
felt the IOGOOS could commit to better characterisation of other hazards such as, sea
level changes arising from climate change, cyclone events and coral bleaching.77
71
IOGOOS I [190151-190264] and IOGOOS I [161013-161494] Appendix 2.
72
73
74
75
IOGOOS II report 26-29 April 2004.
76
IOGOOS III report 9-12 August 2005.
77
IOGOOS III report 9-12 August 2005.
153
Undoubtedly, for the Indian Ocean with 60% of the world population and comprising
mostly of developing countries, user-driven operational oceanography that mobilised
governments, scientists and citizens remains the biggest challenge for IOGOOS regime
effectiveness.
Power based actors and structural leadership

Structural leadership by power-based actors was seen as fundamental by IOGOOS
members to the successful establishment of an Ocean Observing System in the Indian
Ocean.
From an IOC perspective across nations, government recognition of the importance and
consequential commitment of allocative and authoritative resources would be crucial for
operationalising the regional ocean observing system.78
When 17 national scientific agencies/institutions from the 10 participating countries

signed a MoU, they stopped short of reaching an agreement requiring formal
consideration and signature at the government level.79
Not surprisingly, government support continued to elude the strong scientific

engagement at subsequent meetings.80 At the second IOGOOS annual meeting in 2004,
the need to sensitise and get commitment from Governments (power-based actors -
decision makers) was acknowledged as being essential for assuring future sustainability
of the IOGOOS network.81
Moreover, there was further recognition that government departments and institutes
should be engaged from the start of a project if the benefits from monitoring keystone
coastal ecosystems are to become routine government business.82 The chanting of the
mantra seeking government support for IOGOOS projects continued during the 2005
meeting in Indonesia and the 2006 meeting in Tanzania.
78
79
80
IOGOOS-III [35094-35204] Appendix 2.
81
82
IOGOOS II [42376-42820] Appendix 2
154
Structure over time
Signification – communication and level of concern
The knowledge-based epistemic community communicated a high-level of concern for
the fragility of the living marine environment and its sensitivity to climate change,
natural disasters and human impacts.
Open communication amongst this small epistemic group limited by capacity, resources
and even time for discussions reveals severe shortcomings that need to be overcome
before an ocean wide data and information system could be set up for the larger good of
all Indian Ocean countries and ocean science as a whole.83
Foremost being the unacceptable disconnect between detection, processing and

prediction of ocean changes for timely, effective and sustainable management of the
marine environment and living resources.84
Then there is the problem of providing data and information over time and across space
for rapid and continuous linking of the changes occurring at the local or ecosystem scale
to the regional and global scales and vice-versa.85
All told, engaging in adaptive management and building an integrated data and
information management system visualised as the ‘life blood’ of the IOGOOS system
appeared to have been uppermost on the minds of the epistemic group.86
At close of the first meeting, enthusiasm remained high on the prospects for regional
cooperation to develop an ocean observation system for the Indian Ocean. The first step
identified was establishing an inventory of regional capability and capacity.87
Two years hence with a workshop on data and information management in between not
much had changed as the epistemic group reiterated effective management of data as
central to the success of an ocean observing system for the Indian Ocean.88
Clearly, commitment to IOGOOS from power-based actors remained elusive as the

group discussed a marketing strategy to sensitise and obtain commitment from their
83
84
85
86
87
88
155
respective governments. The second significant challenge still facing the group was
how to produce national services using other global/regional/national sources of
information to solve varying local problems of individual nations.89
To ‘walk the talk’ the second meeting repeatedly focussed on different aspects of
expanding communications by setting up a network of committed researchers/contact
persons and institutions in the region, developing an informative website, holding
capacity building workshops, and setting up e-groups for discussion, information
sharing, and project development.90
By 2006, again not much changed as the marginally expanded epistemic group
continued the talk organising workshops and meetings. The annual meetings show not
only extended communication for gauging interest of members in different projects,
firming up projects, and establishing links to other projects but also concern for
securing funding, formalising agreements, and affirming commitment for implementing
projects.91
Legitimisation – contractual environment

The success of an Indian Ocean observing system legitimised within the framework of
GOOS would depend on a workable contractual environment. To start with, cooperation
at the national level by itself posed a considerable challenge. Diverse national scientific
agencies had different objectives and priorities.92
After debating on the nature of contractual environment, the epistemic group chose
signing a Memorandum of Understanding amongst scientific agencies instead of an
agreement requiring formal consideration and signature by power-based actors in
government.93 A MoU without question is in itself a powerful instrument in the
knowledge that a formal government agreement is not going to be possible. Sadly, the
evidence on hand suggests that from the very beginning the regional alliance has lacked
sufficient contractual teeth in getting governments to commit resources.
89
90
IOGOOS II [35747-35901]; IOGOOS II [37366-38068]; IOGOOS II [44325-44842]; and IOGOOS II
[46991-47398] Appendix 2.
91
IOGOOS III report 9-12 August 2005; and IOGOOS IV report 10-12 October 2006.
92
93
156
IOGOOS members have been unable to secure the allocative and authoritative
resources94 needed for operationalising the ocean observing system.95 As a result,
significant time was spent at all the meetings in deliberating on different ways for
getting governments to commit resources. It came as no surprise that by the fourth
meeting in 2006, the initial wave of enthusiasm towards Indian Ocean regional
cooperation had somewhat petered out. IOGOOS members had come to accept limiting
cooperative endeavours amongst select scientific agencies that had the capability and
capacity to undertake ocean wide observations within the existing agency resources.
Domination – national capacity

The epistemic group of Indian Ocean scientists in a commendable way decided to
mobilise their [limited] resources, knowing additional funding to study and monitor
coastal areas and adjacent ocean space was not exactly a priority with governments in
the region.96
At the inaugural meeting, the main concern appeared to be the development and
maintenance of a minimum scientific capability to collect ocean data necessary for the
calibration, validation and enhancement of assimilative and predictive models.97 The
strategy for achieving this centred on building capacity within countries. Prominent
amongst others was education and training for better understanding of the value and use
of in situ and space-based ocean observations.98
Another measure was the building of institutional support structure that allowed
countries to contribute to and benefit from the global observing systems.99 This would
encourage long-term investment in acquiring facilities to receive, process, and interpret
data from in situ and space-based sources.100
IOGOOS members also sought to build capacity by networking of scientific laboratories

using internet based and other communication networks for exchange of data and
94
For allocative and authoritative resources see discussion in Chapter 4.
95
See brainstorming discussion and consolidated progress report on Coastal working groups IOGOOS III
report 9-12 august 2005 p. 24, 44-49; and IOGOOS IV report 10-12 Oct 2006 has references to lack of
national funding and coordinators of projects being absent from the meeting with decisions taken to
abandon projects.
96
97
98
99
100
157
information.101 Such capacity building measures would result in realising the desired
infrastructural goal of established national and regional platforms and sensors, and data
and modelling centres.102
To implement the capacity building strategy, the epistemic group sought active support
from the IOC institutional framework comprising both the GOOS project office and
regional office in Perth besides the participation of COOP and OOPC panels.103 In
looking towards IOC for support instead of national governments in turning ideas and
current enthusiasm into real action, this well-meaning epistemic group tacitly admitted
that own governmental commitment of added allocative and authoritative resources
would not be readily forthcoming.
As a result, the already weak scientific and technological base became further
constrained by economic and logistical capacity to undertake ocean observations.104
Lacking a permanent, systematic, routine and long-term ocean observation system in the
region, individual Indian Ocean countries were just passive spectators in their ability to
monitor the state of the marine environment and predict climate change.105
Given the wide disparity in capacities, IOGOOS members sought a detailed assessment
of available capacities and requirements for establishing an equitable balance between
providing and requesting data and services.106 Moreover, even after four years, capacity
to downscale ocean observations to local coastal applications continued to elude the
epistemic group.
In addition, funding issues limited training of scientists in the use downscaling models
and tools.107 Participation of IOGOOS members in global research programmes also
remained restricted by the lack of funding from governments.108 The consensus appears
to be to work within existing resources and capacities undertaking small pilot projects
using local-level resources at no extra costs.
101
102
103
104
105
106
IOGOOS II [24051-24309] and IOGOOS II [23596-23891] Appendix 2.
107
IOGOOS-IV [30128-30783] Appendix 2.
108
IOGOOS-IV [31180-31593] Appendix 2.
158
From the annual meeting reports it becomes clear that the epistemic group could not
secure necessary allocative resources from their own governments as the group
contemplated developing a strategy to attract funding from international sources
including POGO, APN and the EU as late as its fourth meeting at Tanzania in 2006.
Notwithstanding, with one hand tied behind their back the epistemic group reaffirmed
commitment to try and continue building a ocean wide observing system within existing
capacities. Mauritius, which was developing a GIS based marine and coastal
information system for its own coastal waters, reaffirmed commitment for contributing
to the mooring buoys programme.109
India, in the process of modernising the Indian coastal tide gauge network outlined its
plans for an observing system in the Indian Ocean.110 Indonesia, the newest member to
launch the Indonesian node of GOOS whilst seeking to intensify own ocean observation
capacity demonstrated willingness to contribute research vessels and scientists for
various research programmes and become a hub for data and information
management.111
Indian Ocean remained a top priority for Australia with the Australian Integrated Ocean
Observing System being developed as a high-level initiative.112 Sri Lanka, interested in
upwelling and current systems, expressed willingness to share data from their tide
gauges and provide use of research vessels for deploying instruments.113 The associate
members France and the US expressed willingness to support capacity-building
initiatives.114
Broader consequences across space

Sate learning at the unit level
The Indian Ocean is poorly monitored in comparison to the other major oceans.115 At
the unit level, countries lacked in capability and because of insufficient data there
remained an unacceptable disconnect between processes.116
109
IOGOOS I [200901-201212] and IOGOOS-III [58439-58755] Appendix 2.
110
IOGOOS II [18984-19288] and IOGOOS-III [55669-56223] Appendix 2.
111
IOGOOS III [56731-56919] Appendix 2.
112
113
114
IOGOOS III [53753-54847] and IOGOOS III [60269-60696] Appendix 2.
115
159
The IOGOOS regional alliance envisaged achieving state learning by establishing a
minimum scientific capability in ocean observation systems. The group recognised that
state learning would require long-term investments in ocean observation scientific
capacity and associated training in the provision of services and products.117
At the unit level, this meant running education programs for creating awareness
amongst the public and decision makers on the benefits of utilising ocean observations
in solving socio-economic problems facing individual nations.118 One of the major
impediments to state learning comes from strategic considerations and national security
interests that hampers sharing of information amongst the nations on the state of the
marine environment.119 It becomes apparent from the inaugural meeting that state
learning followed a vicious cycle that repeated itself over time and scientists in
individual nations were challenged in breaking this cycle.
To start with, scientists working with minimal national resources, generated information
from limited ocean observations. Constrained in the sharing of information being
classified as sensitive in nature scientists could not utilise associated data available at
the regional and global scales. Such data would actually have assisted in producing
more meaningful and accurate products, which in turn would then have attracted greater
investments into building national capability required for enhancing the ocean
observation system.
Not surprisingly, at the inaugural meeting the epistemic group strongly urged member
states to increase support levels for sustained high-quality data generation and
information management.120 The limited capability weighed repeatedly on attempts to
commission large-scale regional projects. An example citing the benefits from large-
scale collaborative projects was the International Indian Ocean expedition in the 1960s,
which led to the establishment of the Indian National Institute of Oceanography and
now one of the leading scientific institutions in the IOGOOS regional alliance.121
116
IOGOOS I [22842-22924]; IOGOOS I [31610-31738]; and IOGOOS I [31944-32012] Appendix 2.
117
118
IOGOOS I report 2-9 Nov 2002.
119
120
121
160
At the 2004 Sri Lanka meeting, emphasis continued on the need to empower individual
nations to generate their own products and services.122 The epistemic group recognised
that sharing of data may be needed in providing some of the services and sought a
marketing strategy for drawing attention of international and regional entities to
local/national problems.123
The group identified small-scale pilot projects on shoreline changes and coastal erosion
as the way forward in starting up limited services.124 The projects in themselves
required instituting training and capacity building programs given the wide disparity in
the state of knowledge amongst the countries in the region.
Taking a broader IOGOOS perspective much of state learning depended on building

capacity in operational oceanography. Other than conducting of training workshops
there is little evidence to suggest the existence of a coherent, coordinated, and
collaborative program within the regional alliance. There is also little indication of
individual governments committing greater allocative and authoritative resources for the
regional alliance formed in the Indian Ocean for ocean observations.
Regional cooperation at the sub-system level

At the sub-system level, relevant regional cooperative programs identified by IOGOOS
members included the Regional Ocean Observing and Forecasting System for Africa
(ROOFS AFRICA) a GOOS Africa project, South-East Asia GOOS in collaboration
with South-East Asia Centre for Atmospheric and Marine Prediction (SEACAMP), and
the Western Indian Ocean Marine Applications Programme (WIOMAP).125
Australia maintains a standalone Western Australia GOOS (WAGOOS) program. The

annual meetings do not suggest the presence of marine science cooperative programs in
South Asia and Middle East sub-regions.126
ROOFS Africa has seven countries from the Indian Ocean from the 26 member states
and is building capacity through training and technology transfer for developing
122
123
124
IOGOOS II [46371-46962] and IOGOOS II [49854-50213] Appendix 2.
125
IOGOOS I report 2-9 Nov 2002, pp. 44-46.
126
IOGOOS I report 2-9 Nov 2002, pp.44-45.
161
essential capabilities in delivering user products for management and protection of the
marine and coastal environment.127
SEAGOOS with five Indian Ocean states that are also Pacific states from the eight
member states jointly with SEACAMP and JCOMM is developing a collaborative storm
surge project for the South China Sea.128
Nine WIOMAP participating countries planned for developing specialised regional

marine application centres that would deliver services in operational meteorology,
marine safety, fisheries, weather forecasting, and disaster preparation.129
IOGOOS members agreed that sub-regional GOOS programs should work closely with
national meteorological offices and ocean data centres, link their individual organisation
websites, and represent each other at meetings of other sub-regional alliances.130
At the inaugural meeting, expectations for regional cooperation were high. The thinking
that IOGOOS as a regional alliance will stimulate Indian Ocean countries into investing
in the regional partnership was largely based on the belief that the MoU is one of the
strongest instruments of cooperation and collaboration in the region.131 In the eyes of
the epistemic group, for a region dominated by developing countries with limited
capacity bringing these countries together in the quest for oceanic knowledge could
benefit the Indian Ocean people as a whole.132
Subsequent meetings repeatedly underscored the significance of IOGOOS as a vehicle

for regional cooperation and synergising oceanographic studies. The sentiment stemmed
from the knowledge that individual countries had limited marine scientific research
capability for conducting their own oceanographic research needed in tackling marine
resource and environmental problems at the national level.133
A regional uptake on weather and climate predictions could enhance specific

management decisions in agriculture, water-resource usage and public safety.134 For
127
IOGOOS I report 2-9 Nov 2002, p. 44.
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
162
example, associated with the Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD) there existed a high correlation
between Sea Surface Temperature and rainfall in Africa and Indonesia, the western and
eastern extremities of the Indian Ocean.135
Then, the sharing of ecosystem data could increase national capacity for developing
integrated coastal zone management programs, establishing environmentally sound
marine protected areas, and adopting planning measures for the conservation and
restoration of marine habitats.136
The availability of ocean climate observations for localised predictions, determination

of effects, and monitoring of changes in fisheries yield by creating a regional data hub
for products/services could help elevate the generally poor state of coastal fish stocks.
The rationale behind commissioning the prawn fisheries project was the regional
distribution and dependence on fish stocks and the need for building sustainable
capacity and infrastructure in support of the artisanal and commercial fisheries
established across the region.137 The value of ocean forecasting to fisheries management
was again highlighted at IOGOOS V in December 2007 and the need for the Indian
Ocean Tuna Commission to be made aware of the information that IOGOOS can
provide in meeting the objectives of sustainable fisheries.138 Amongst other operational
elements requiring a regional approach IOGOOS member countries identified the need
for educating fishing fleets in an effort to curb vandalism of mooring arrays deployed
for ocean observations.139
From a UNESCO perspective, through regional and international cooperation on the

most pressing environmental dangers IOGOOS could achieve the ancillary goal of
bringing nations and peoples together by tearing down barriers of dissention, conflict
and fear. The ocean observation initiative by defining common problems and needs of a
region could provide the framework for developing trust, understanding of diverse
views, and resolving differences by working towards a common purpose for the good of
all humankind.140
135
136
137
138
IOGOOS V report 30 November – 03 December 2007, p. 21-22.
139
140
163
International cooperation at the system level
The Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) has the mandate to be the
United Nations focal point for marine scientific research.141 This intergovernmental
organisation of UNESCO acts as the forum for recommending, promoting, planning and
coordinating international ocean and coastal area programmes in research and the
dissemination and use of their results.142
The IOC, in promoting international cooperation and coordination of programmes in

marine observations and research, protection of the marine environment and capacity
building, brings together the scientific research community and the governments of
member states.143
The IOC holistic vision is of ‘one planet, one ocean’ for its 50th anniversary in 2010.144
The IOC is administered by an Assembly, Executive Council and a Secretariat besides a
number of subsidiary bodies.145
As on 25 April 2007, there were 136 member states in the Assembly, which meets once
every two years.146 In the Indian Ocean Region, Bahrain is the only coastal state that is
not a member and Afghanistan is the only landlocked country to be a member of the
IOC.
The IOC is divided into five electoral groups along continental lines instead of oceanic
divisions for the purposes of election to the Executive Council.147 A panel of seven IOC
officers oversee the functioning of the executive council, which meets every year. The
IOC officers include the elected and past chairperson and five vice-chairpersons
representing each of the five electoral groups.
141
IOC, ‘The IOC and marine scientific research,’ viewed 19 Aug 2008,
<http://ioc.unesco.org/iocweb/activities/ocean_sciences/>.
142
IOC Statuts Article 3, IOC/INF-1148, Document No. SC-2000/WS/57, Published by UNESCO in
2000.
143
IOC Statuts Article 2, IOC/INF-1148, UNESCO 2000.
144
IOC One planet, One Ocean, viewed 24 Mar 2009, <http://www.ioc-
unesco.org/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1>.
145
IOC governing bodies, viewed 24 Mar 2009, <http://ioc.unesco.org/iocms/contents.php?id=3>.
146
IOC Member States, viewed 19 Aug 2008, <http://www.ioc-
unesco.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=4&id=8&Itemid=54>.
147
IOC, Twenty-Fourth session of the IOC Assembly, 19-28 June 2007, Electoral Groupings, grouping of
the IOC member states for the purpose of election to the Executive Council, viewed 24 Mar 2009,
<http://ioc3.unesco.org/ioc-24/electoral_groupings.html>.
164
In addition to the IOC officers, the council can have membership of maximum 40 states
including those of the states represented by the officers.148 Besides the officers, the
council presently comprises of 34 member states.149
While the Indian Ocean GOOS is possibly the only ocean-wide GOOS regional
program, the region, as such, is represented in the council by two electoral groups
(Table 6.2). In the establishment of electoral groupings, the Indian Ocean countries have
been divided into electoral group IV (Asia and Pacific Island States) with 28 member
states and electoral group V (Africa and Middle East States) with 45 member states.
Table 6.2: Indian Ocean countries IOC membership

Electoral Groups Indian Ocean Countries Other Member States
Electoral Group Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, China, Cook Islands, Timor-Leste, Fiji,
IV (Asia and India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand,
Pacific Island Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, North Korea Papua New Guinea,
States) Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Philippines, South Korea, Samoa,
Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vietnam.
Electoral Group V Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cameroon,
(Africa and Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Cape Verde, Congo, Cote d’ Ivoire,
Middle East Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
States) Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Guinea Bissau, Lebanon, Libya,
Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Mauritania, Morocco, Namibia,
Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Syria,
Tanzania and Yemen Togo and Tunisia
Electoral group I has 24 states from Europe and North Americas; group II has 13 states
from European economies in transition; and group III has 26 South America states.
There are 18 members in the Executive Council from the 63 States in these three
electoral groups with only 16 of the 73 member states from the two electoral groups IV
and V as members. Amongst these 16 member states, there are 11 Indian Ocean
countries in the Executive Council. As of 25 April 2007, for the period 2007-2009,
Australia (IOC Officer – vice chairperson electoral group IV), Egypt, India, Indonesia,
Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Tanzania
are members of the executive council.150
148
IOC governing bodies, viewed 24 Mar 2009, <http://ioc.unesco.org/iocms/contents.php?id=3>.
149
IOC, Twenty-Fourth session of the IOC Assembly, 19-28 June 2007, Results of the election, IOC-
XXIV/NOM/WP 4, viewed 24 Mar 2009, <http://ioc3.unesco.org/ioc-
24/documents/Elec_results%20document.pdf>.
150
IOC, Twenty-Fourth session of the IOC Assembly, 19-28 June 2007, Results of the election, IOC-
XXIV/NOM/WP 4, viewed 24 Mar 2009, <http://ioc3.unesco.org/ioc-
165
It becomes evident that politics of representation overshadows the ‘one ocean’ concept
where the Indian Ocean is abjectly divided into two separate electoral groupings. This
division of the Indian Ocean goes beyond the Executive Council and percolates into
IOC marine scientific research regional programmes.
The IOC has constituted two separate regional committees for the Indian Ocean. The
IOC regional committee for the Central Indian Ocean (IOCINDIO) has members
belonging to electoral groupings IV and V from Asia and the Middle East countries in
the region. The IOC regional committee for the Western Indian Ocean (IOCWIO) has
members belonging to electoral grouping V from East Africa (Figure 6.2).
Figure 6.2: IOC regional committees
IOCARIBE
GOOS
MontevldtH> Rio
• IOCARIBE WESTPAC • IOCEA • IOCWIO • IOCINDIO

151
Source: Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
In addition, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand are not only members of the
Central Indian Ocean (IOCINDIO) but are also members of the IOC regional sub-
commission for the Western Pacific (WESTPAC). Singapore, which is not a member of
the regional committee for the Central Indian Ocean (IOCINDIO), is a member of the
sub-commission for the Western Pacific (WESTPAC).152
The GOOS program is divided into the global ocean component153 and the coastal
component154 administered regionally. There is not a single Indian Ocean country as a
151
IOC Regional Committees, viewed 24 Mar 2009, <http://www.ioc-
unesco.org/index.php?option=com_weblinks&catid=21&Itemid=82>.
152
IOC sub-commission for the Western Pacific, Member states, viewed 24 Mar 2009,
<http://www.unescobkk.org/special-programmes/westpac/about-us/member-states/>.
153
Global Ocean Observing System, Global GOOS viewed 24 Mar 2009, <http://www.ioc-
goos.org/index.php?option=com_livedata&task=global_goos&Itemid=59>.
166
member of the Ocean Observations Panel for Climate (OOPC) advising on the global
ocean component of GOOS.155 The research effort of some Indian Ocean countries for
the coastal component of GOOS is spread across GOOS-Africa, IO-GOOS, SEA-
GOOS and PI-GOOS (Figure 6.3). Similarly, the Oceanographic Data and Information
Network (ODIN) spans three research programmes: ODIN-WESTPAC for the Western
Pacific, ODIN-CINDIO for the Central Indian Ocean and ODIN-Africa for the East and
West coasts of Africa.156
Figure 6.3: GOOS regional alliances
157
Source: Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
Further, only 16 of the 36 Indian Ocean coastal states have established National
Oceanographic Data Centres or have a Designated National Agency (DNA) as part of
the International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange (IODE) program.158
The data centres and designated national agencies are discussed in more detail later in
the chapter under IOGOOS project on data and information management. The complex
web of subsidiary bodies and Indian Ocean member states representation in
administering GOOS and IODE marine scientific research programmes is mapped in
Table 6.3.
154
Global Ocean Observing System, Coastal GOOS, viewed 24 Mar 2009, <http://www.ioc-
goos.org/content/view/14/28/>.
155
Ocean Observations Panel for Climate, Panel members, viewed 24 Mar 2009,
<http://ioc3.unesco.org/oopc/about/members.php>.
156
International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange, Regional Activities, viewed 24 Mar
2009, <http://www.iode.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=43&Itemid=55>.
157
IOC GOOS regional alliances, viewed 24 Mar 2009, <http://www.ioc-
158
International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange, ‘IODE NODCs and DNAs,’ viewed 24
Mar 2009, <http://www.iode.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=61&Itemid=103>.
167
Table 6.3: GOOS and IODE Marine Scientific Research programmes
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168
Stages of regime formation
Agenda formation
The advancement of national and regional marine scientific research formed the basis
for the 17 scientific institutions from the region to come together and mobilise their
resources for the formation of a permanent ocean observation system in the Indian
Ocean. The other signatories were the IOC regional office in Perth and the United States
National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration (see earlier discussion).
The epistemic group hoped that wholesome ocean observations would provide for a
fuller development of ocean knowledge and help better understand the negative effects
of natural disasters, climate change and human impact on the marine and coastal
environment.159 Free and open access to ocean knowledge, data and information would
enable their application to the ocean and climate change problems of the Indian
Ocean.160
The IOGOOS agenda included minimising the disconnect between procedures and
requirements; developing baseline data; producing coastal maps; and providing
meaningful forecasts on all relevant time-scales. This would enable detection of changes
in the marine and coastal environment with the least possible lag between changes and
detection.161
Most of the Indian Ocean countries with large percentages of their population living
near the coast placed emphasis on the need for urgently addressing coastal issues.
Taking their impact on the socio-economics of countries into consideration a number of
phenomena of interest were identified as being feasible for study and as good subjects
for pilot projects.
The prioritised subject areas included coastal erosion, loss of habitat/biodiversity,

nutrient pollution, overfishing and sustainable fisheries, chemical contamination,
invasive/non-native species, aquaculture, coastal flooding, harmful algae blooms and
safety of life at sea.162
159
160
161
162
169
The available resource capacity of countries limited the development of pilot projects to
three areas of interest, namely, coastal erosion, loss of habitat/biodiversity and
sustainable fisheries.163 The feeling was that should pressing coastal issues be addressed
IOGOOS had a good chance of becoming an operationally successful ocean observing
system.164
Participants agreed that tools exist to deliver required products and services to end
users. All that remained was organising of resources for implementing the pilot projects.
Key considerations towards building resource capacity in data collection, modelling,
and applications included creating the awareness necessary for securing much needed
funding, improving the ability to use satellite data, strengthening communication links,
and improving the overall infrastructure in the region.165 Subsequent meetings were a
reiteration of the agenda with a focus on the development and implementation of the
pilot projects.
Institutional choice
The epistemic group accepted that the creation of a regional observing system guided by
national and regional priorities is the critical building block of a global ocean observing
system.166
A hierarchical network of local and national sub-subsystems structured as a regional

observing system for the Indian Ocean could feed ocean data into the global network of
similar regional systems.167 Implicit in the structure is that the local level would benefit
from the system of ocean observations only by feeding data into the larger global
network.
The epistemic group categorised the establishing of an integrated data-management and

communication sub-system as the ‘life-blood’ or ‘lifeline’ of the Indian Ocean regional
alliance.168
Arguably, in terms of institutional choice, the ‘one stop shop’ for multiple data sets
from many sources became the highest priority.169 The epistemic group focused on the
163
164
165
166
167
168
170
IOC established IODE program for institutional development. The group agreed that
developing an ODIN project administered by IOCINDIO under the IODE program
would be a suitable institutional response for implementation of the IOGOOS agenda.170
Such a program could complement the already successfully established ODINAFRICA

project. A detailed discussion is provided later in the analysis on IOGOOS projects.
Amongst other steps identified included the establishing of national GOOS coordination
committees for developing national activities in support of the regional alliance.171
The group also identified the need for networking of universities and government
agencies for the design and implementation of projects.172 Moreover, a coastal
development committee was formed to serve as the focal point of contact to oversee,
promote and coordinate the implementation of projects.173 In the absence of a formal
agreement between governments, the institutional response was overseen by the
secretariat funded and hosted by India’s INCIOS.174
Operationalisation
An operational ocean observing system routinely providing data and data products in
forms and rates specified by end users emerged as a new concept for oceanographers.175
The operationalisation of IOGOOS required an observing system that provided precise

and accurate monitoring of required variables in specified time-space scales. An
integrated data management and communication subsystem would be needed for
providing captured data of known quality in real-time or delayed mode. A managed and
efficient flow of data and information could then facilitate sustained analysis and
modelling in conformity with user requirements.176
The problems of operationalising the development of user-friendly products lay

predominantly in data acquisition, management, and archiving for analysis and
169
170
IOGOOS I [125258-125445] Appendix 2
171
172
173
174
175
176
171
modelling.177 One of the weaknesses lay in the relative separation between data
managers and the wider user community.178
In addition, since the data needs varied significantly from country to country the
diversity of the data required became enormous with very few data management centres
capable of dealing with both the diversity and volume of data. What is more, in both the
ocean and coastal modules of IOGOOS local scale data and data products were
lacking.179
Another difficulty came from the lack in capacity to take advantage of global level
large-scale data products by downscaling for use at the local level in much needed
climate predictions and other uses.180
Furthermore, the satellite remote sensing community had their own independent data
centres that were largely removed from the needs of the IOGOOS fraternity, which had
insufficient expertise in satellite remote sensing.181 In all of this, a clearinghouse
mechanism became essential for assembling data and making relevant data products
available to end users.182
The epistemic group came to the view that pilot projects could help pave the way for
operationalising the ocean observing system.183 Towards this end, at the first annual
meeting in 2002, the four core sentiments echoed repeatedly included the need for
securing funds, building technical and infrastructural capacity, establishing data
management and communication links, and developing the use of satellite remote
sensing for IOGOOS applications.184 During the second annual meeting in 2004, the
IOGOOS participants agreed on a detailed action plan for the implementation of pilot
projects, analysed later in the chapter.
At the third annual meeting in 2005, the Mauritius sentiment that progress of IOGOOS
projects had not been as rapid as required appears to have been picked up by the
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
172
participants with the chairperson eliciting suggestions to improve the functioning of
IOGOOS.185
A number of suggestions were made on how to improve the effectiveness of

IOGOOS.186 What these suggestions show is that operationalisation of IOGOOS
remained a challenge.
Take the suggestion of the need for collaboration on regional projects demonstrates that
regional cooperation was not yet as strong as it needed to be.
Calling for IOGOOS activities and progress on pilot projects to be publicised at the
national level implies need for greater state learning and involvement of power-based
and interest-based actors.
Stating the need for developing a user interface implies a continued disconnect between
knowledge-based, interest-based, and power-based actors.
Espousing individual champions for projects to succeed implies need for stronger
leadership.
Emphasis on projects being able to cut across national boundaries and for countries to
be convinced of the project benefits implies need for countries to start believing in and
formally legitimising the IOGOOS agenda for ocean observations.
Reaffirming the need to establish national GOOS coordination committee’s implies that
countries were far from taking action at the national level to strengthen institutional
development.
Finally, in asking IOGOOS to spend more time on delivering products and useful
information through its website and undertaking capacity building shows the need for
greater commitment of allocative and authoritative resources.
The fourth annual meeting in 2006 went a step further in suggesting that IOGOOS
could coordinate an audit for more targeted activity in the future. The audit of national
programmes could include a range of aspects from coastal monitoring, in situ, and
185
IOGOOS report 9-12 August, 2005, p. 23 and IOGOOS-III [61223-62674] Appendix 2.
186
173
remote sensing capability, data products that were available, and modelling, prediction,
and data management activities.187
At the end of four years, more work was needed at national levels for the regional
alliance to succeed in operationalising a permanent ocean observing system in the
Indian Ocean.
IOGOOS projects
As a regional initiative, IOGOOS mirrors the GOOS strategy of developing an ocean
climatic module and a coastal module concerned with the impacts of human activity.
The project outcomes from the first IOGOOS meeting in November 2002 centred on a
basin-wide structure to monitor temperature, salinity, and currents in understanding
regional climate variability and change; a data-management structure to disseminate
ocean data, analyses, and climate predictions to regional users; and a coastal segment
dealing with coastal erosion, conservation of habitats and biodiversity, and sustainable
fisheries.
Indian Ocean Panel (IOP) and the Indian Ocean Observing System (IndOOS)
The IOC and World Climate Research Programme (WCRP) through GOOS and the
Climate Variability and Predictability (CLIVAR) project joined forces to establish the
Indian Ocean Panel (IOP) as an IOGOOS initiative in February 2004.188 The panel is
designed to develop, coordinate and implement a plan for basin-wide sustained ocean
observations in the Indian Ocean. The IOP plan is intended to support research on the
unique climatic phenomena prevalent in the only ocean that is not open to the northern
subtropical regions and has a low-latitude opening in its eastern boundary.189
The IOP membership currently includes China (1), France (1), Japan (1),
Netherlands (1), USA (6) and the Indian Ocean countries Australia (2), India (2) and
Indonesia (1).190 South Africa once a member acted more as a representative of the
187
IOGOOS IV [41293-41611] Appendix 2.
188
189
For the only ocean not open to the northern subtropical regions and a low-latitude opening on in its
eastern boundary see World Climate Research Programme (WCRP), ‘Understanding the role of the
Indian Ocean in the climate system — Implementation plan for sustained observations,’ WCRP Informal
Report No. 5/2006,, CLIVAR Publication Series No.100, p. 9.
190
World Climate Research Programme (WCRP), ‘CLIVAR/GOOS Indian Ocean Panel members,’ last
updated 26 January 2009, viewed 27 Mar 2009,
<http://www.clivar.org/organization/indian/indian_members.php>.
174
CLIVAR project on Variability in the African Climate System (VACS) than an Indian
Ocean participating country.
The emergence of an integrated observing system could address the diversity of time
and space scales of climate relevant variability. The constitution of the IOP came from
the recognition that implementing basin-wide observations is beyond the scientific
community of any individual nation. To be cost effective, such a large-scale effort
would require coordination of the available resources of every nation in the region and
beyond.191 By August 2005, the IOP had formulated a plan for an integrated Indian
Ocean Observing System (IndOOS) that would make use of the available types of
deployable instrumentation across all relevant time-scales of variability for providing
data on the state of the ocean.192 Although, the envisaged integrated observing system
deals only with in-situ observations the IOP recognised the need for satellite
observations of oceanic surface temperatures. The satellite observations could
complement in-situ observations in resolving climate research issues and vice-versa in-
situ observations could help in the calibration of satellite data.193
By far, the overall success of the plan depended upon observed data being distributed
openly in a timely manner and close coordination between the research and operational
oceanography communities.194 Above all, the plan identified international and inter-
agency cooperation and good will as being essential for the successful implementation
of an ocean observing system for the Indian Ocean.195
The forward plan (Figure 6.4) for integrated Indian Ocean Observing System (IndOOS)
is to provide high-quality ocean observations for GOOS ocean applications and services
and support the needs of the international CLIVAR research project on climate
variability.196 CLIVAR is a component of the WCRP that deals with climate variability
191
World Climate Research Programme (WCRP), ‘Understanding the role of the Indian Ocean in the
climate system,’ p.9.
192
IOGOOS III report 9-12 August 2005, p. 18.
193
194
195
196
World Climate Research Programme (WCRP), ‘Forward plan for the Integrated Indian Ocean
observing system (IndOOS),’ CLIVAR, viewed 27 Mar 2009,
<http://www.clivar.org/organization/indian/IndOOS/obs.php>.
175
and predictability on time-scales from months to centuries.197 The IOP a subset of the
Asian Australian Monsoon Panel (AAMP) within the CLIVAR project would
administer IndOOS as an IOGOOS project.198
Figure 6.4: Integrated Indian Ocean Observing System (IndOOS)
Multi-platform
Long-term
10N
observations
10S
20S
• Surface mooring • ADCP XBT/XCTD lines
~ ARGO noat array ~Surface drifting buoy array

e Real-time and near real·lime tide gauge network @ Process studies
ASEA: Arabian Sea; BOB: Bay of Bengal; ITF: Indonesian Thorough Flow
WBC: Western Boundary Current off Africa; EBC: Eastern Boundary Current off Australia
Source: CLIVAR website last updated 12 December 2007
The implementation of IndOOS envisaged a basin-wide mooring array, 3°x3° array of

Argo floats, 5°x5° array of surface drifters, real-time and near real-time tide gauge
network, satellites, biogeochemical observations and an enhanced XBT network.199
The resources would come from national programmes of member countries. For the
basin-scale mooring array, this involved implementation over 5 years of 40 surface
moorings, and five sub-surface Doppler current profiler (ADCP) moorings with an
197
World Climate Research Programme (WCRP), ‘About CLIVAR,’ viewed 27 Mar 2009,
<http://www.clivar.org/about/objectives.php>.
198
The Indian Ocean Panel (IOP) is to report to CLIVAR Scientific Steering Group (SSG) through the
Asian-Australian Monsoon Panel (AAMP); See ‘Report of the 1st Indian Ocean Panel & 6th Asian-
Australian Monsoon Panel joint meeting,’ 18-24 February 2004, viewed 27 Mar 2009,
<http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/19363/01/AAMP6report.htm>.
199
Gary Meyers and Roberta Boscolo, ‘The Indian Ocean Observing System (IndOOS),’ CLIVAR
Exchanges, Vol. 11 No. 4, Oct 2006.
176
estimated 180 days ship time per year.200 The Argo programme design included the
deployment of 450 floats in the Indian Ocean to 400S with 125 deployments per year
assuming a floating lifetime of 3-4 years. A number of high-priority XBT lines were
identified for implementing a full XBT network.201
For the implementation of the surface drifter array in the northern Indian Ocean the
current number of about 60 drifters would need to be increased to an estimated 160
drifters.202 The development of the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation
System (IOTWS) provided added impetus for enhancing real-time and near real-time
tide gauges in the Indian Ocean.203
To undertake biogeochemical observations member countries agreed to develop

appropriate instrumentation on all suitable research ships and XBT lines, surface
moorings, and Argo floats supported by satellite based ocean-colour sensors. In
addition, a number of process studies were identified as pilot projects for major
international study of intra-seasonal variation.204
At the second IOGOOS meeting in April 2004, IOP identified its future challenges as
linking of the ocean observing system to the coastal component of IOGOOS and
downscaling to smaller scales of interests to address the planning and policy needs of
marine information users in the coastal environment.205
At the third IOGOOS meeting in August 2005, the major issues identified included ship
time of 180 days per year, vandalism from fishing boats, scientific objectives being
insufficient to sustain funding, international coordination, system integration and data
management.206
200
climate system,’ p. 35.
201
202
203
204
climate system,’ pp. 45-46.
205
206
177
By the fourth IOGOOS meeting in October 2006, IndOOS had made good progress as
per plan in deployment of instrumentation for ocean observations.207 The success of the
IndOOS project can be attributed to commitment of national resources made possible by
major oceanic research countries in the Indian Ocean joining hands with the
international marine scientific research community.
In the wider context of the Indian Ocean Region, the rim countries were mostly
observed to be visibly inactive and East Africa remained to be linked into the large-
scale oceanography and climate program. A need was felt for this operational
oceanography project to become more users driven in an effort to mobilise resources
from other governments and scientists in the region. The panel was of the view that this
could possibly be achieved by deriving products from the ocean climatic models to meet
the user requirements in dealing with coastal issues.208
Coastal module of IOGOOS

The coastal module of IOGOOS became a high priority and successful culmination of
pilot projects was vital to the success of IOGOOS. At the inaugural meeting of
IOGOOS in November 2002, the key issues facing the countries in the Indian Ocean
Region were prioritised as coastal erosion from storm surges; cyclones; sea-level rise;
coastal construction; sand mining and in cases land reclamation; coastal pollution and
chemical contamination; and overexploitation of fisheries and illegal fishing.209
In every case, one or all of the three core issues of coastal erosion, coastal pollution and
overexploitation of fisheries could be responsible for habitat alteration and loss of
biodiversity and degradation of the coastal ecosystem. Some of the other country
specific issues identified included coastal flooding in Bangladesh, harmful algal blooms
in Kenya and India, safety of life at sea in Mozambique, aquaculture in Bangladesh, and
coastal desertification in Madagascar.210 An IOGOOS Coastal Development Committee
with an Executive Committee assumed the task of promoting three pilot projects on
coastal erosion, habitat/biodiversity and sustainable fisheries.211
207
IOGOOS IV report 10-12 Oct 2006, p. 8.
208
IOGOOS IV report 10-12 Oct 2006, pp. 10-11.
209
IOGOOS I report 2-9 November 2002, pp. 18-19.
210
211
IOGOOS I report 2-9 November 2002, p. 23.
178
Although the pilot projects were localised in nature, IOGOOS members were depending
on the active support of the regional alliance itself and the IOC umbrella involving the
Perth regional office, Project Office in Paris, COOP and OOPC for their success.212
The pilot project on coastal erosion seeks to establish a regional network in quantifying,
understanding and predicting coastal shoreline change. The project envisages a phased
approach beginning with an assessment and relying on remote sensing and community-
based monitoring with costs absorbed within existing capabilities of countries in the
development of an analytical and modelling capability.213 Once data became available,
the project would generate products that could be used by coastal zone managers,
coastal communities, hotel and housing estates, port and marine authorities and users
and the scientific community. An e-group set up for compiling country specific
information on existing monitoring facilities, coastal zone management framework and
current knowledge of coastal processes did not generate much response.214
At the second meeting in 2004, the working group agreed as a starting point to initiate a
shoreline change monitoring system in Sri Lanka. In the interim, the working group
agreed to finalise a project proposal for initiation in 2006 having duration of five to
seven years.215 The third meeting in 2005 was informed that continuing efforts over two
and a half years had failed to generate interest in developing a network of contacts and
compiling country specific information.216 Moreover, the commencement of the
shoreline monitoring system in 2005 in Sri Lanka had to be postponed indefinitely after
the tsunami.217 Because of the inability to generate sufficient regional interest, the
annual report suggests that there was no specific planning for project development
undertaken at this meeting.
The pilot project on habitat/biodiversity relied on individual country implementation

plans for undertaking multi-scale monitoring and mapping of coral reefs, mangroves
and seagrass beds as keystone coastal ecosystems for conservation.218 Dependant on
remote sensing and community-based monitoring the project would produce baseline
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
179
data and maps of the keystone ecosystems. The project would enhance the overall
environmental awareness making predictions of important changes, and
recommendations on conservation and restoration strategies using spectral analysis,
statistical comparisons and specific indices of change.219 During the annual meetings in
2004 and 2005, countries that had expressed an interest in the project included
Australia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mauritius, Réunion (France),
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Thailand. The working group intended building
capacity in remote sensing through the Western Indian Ocean Marine Science
Association (WIOMSA) a non-governmental organisation and CORDIO.220
At the third annual meeting in 2005, the working group reported that the project
proposal including country plans would be finalised by 2006 for seeking funds from
international and nation agencies.221 The project over the next five years would
undertake training, monitoring, remote sensing and analysis before writing a full report
including management recommendations.222 On completion of the project, it was
thought that the monitoring of keystone ecosystems would be taken over by
governments and research institutions in the respective countries making this as a
routine part of government business. Engaging relevant government departments and
research institutions from the inception stage therefore became essential to the success
of the project.223
The pilot project on sustainable fisheries was designed to develop a monitoring and
management system for the Penaeid Prawn resources in the Indian Ocean given the poor
state of coastal fish stocks, the high value of prawn resources, and the regional
distribution of prawns. The project envisaged making a determination of the effects of
local conditions, study ocean-climate conditions, and detect changes in prawn-fishery
yield in relation to local and regional oceanic/climatic events. The project aspired to
create links amongst scientists, coastal managers and coastal communities; establishing
a central data hub; and build sustainable capacity and infrastructure.224
219
220
IOGOOS II report 26-29 April 2004 and IOGOOS III report 9-12 August 2005, p. 56.
221
222
IOGOOS III report 9-12 August 2005 Appendix 2, p. 66.
223
224
180
A workshop convened in 2003 was attended by Australia, Bangladesh, India, Kenya and
South Africa for identifying the important features of prawn fisheries in individual
countries.225 During the 2004 and 2005 annual meetings, discussions progressed on the
modus operandi for hosting a webpage on the IOGOOS website (to be completed
initially by 2004), which would be populated with prawn fishery data from Australia,
Bangladesh, India, Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Mozambique, South Africa, Sri Lanka and
Tanzania.226 For the purposes, a webpage including Australia, India and South Africa
was constructed with the intent of being tested on the website of the Marine and
Estuarine Research Centre in Durban.227
Little progress was made over three years and by the fourth IOGOOS meeting in 2006,
decision was taken to scale down the keystone coastal ecosystem project to a pilot test
involving India and Tanzania and the other two projects on sustainable fisheries and
coastal erosion were virtually shelved due to the lack of progress.228
Data and information management

Ocean Observation translated into data and information allows end users to make
knowledgeable decisions in the management of the coastal and marine environment.
Simplistically, a Data and Information Management (DIM) system is fundamental to the
successful implementation of an ocean observing system in the Indian Ocean Region.229
Realising the importance of an oceanographic DIM system for IOGOOS, the epistemic
group as its first task in 2003 conducted a strategy development workshop. Three
sessional working groups were formed to assess needs, establish status and determine
strategy. Data and information needs were assessed to be in the fields of marine
meteorology, operational oceanography, coastal and marine management, and marine
resources.230
In marine meteorology, ocean observations across weekly, seasonal, annual and decadal
time-scales were designed to generate data and information required for predicting
225
226
227
228
IOGOOS IV report 10-12 Oct 2006, pp. 11-12.
229
IOGOOS workshop report, ‘Capacity building and strategy for ocean data and information
management in the Indian Ocean region,’ 8-10 December 2003, IOGOOS: DIM: 2003 (01).
230
management in the Indian Ocean region.’
181
weather, cyclones, storms, monsoons and climate change. Data and information in
operational oceanography was designed to enable determinations in optimal ship
routing and potential fishing zones; monitor cyclones, storm surges, oil spills, and the
ocean state; and assist in guiding search and rescue operations.231 Ocean observations
were equated to fulfil data and information needs for coastal and marine management in
areas of marine pollution, water quality, coastal habitats, fish culture, biodiversity and
ecosystem preservation. Ocean parameters required for generating data and information
in marine resource applications were also identified.232
Australia, Bangladesh, Comoros, India, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius,

South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Thailand informed on the status of in-country
capacity. The workshop revealed substantial differences in ocean data and information
management capacity between participating countries.233 A detailed assessment of
available capacity and requirement in the region became the start point for developing
capacity-building programs addressing data assimilation and modelling; satellite
oceanography; and data products. Whether any such comprehensive assessment was
undertaken is not evident from subsequent meetings other than a reference to the
regional remote sensing capacity (Table 6.4).
Table 6.4: Indian Ocean countries remote sensing capability

Capability in the Indian Ocean Countries
Remote Sensing Program in place Australia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius,
Pakistan, Reunion, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand
Ocean Remote Sensing capability Australia, India, Indonesia, Reunion, South Africa
Remote Sensing training facilities Australia, India, Indonesia, Thailand, South Africa
Source: Compiled by author from IOGOOS reports
In determining a strategy, the workshop acknowledged the need for solving

local/national problems might require DIM from regional and global sources in different
time-space scales whilst taking into consideration the different capacity levels of
231
management in the Indian Ocean region,’ pp.11-12.
232
management in the Indian Ocean region,’ pp. 11-13.
233
management in the Indian Ocean region,’ pp. 7-8.
182
countries.234 The workshop identified some of the constraints as absence of a
clearinghouse mechanism for assembling and making available relevant data; limited
remote sensing experience and capacity; shortage of skills in data management; and the
need for ocean teacher modules for coastal projects.235
The success of an IOGOOS DIM system depended on empowering countries in the

region for generating their own services by sensitising decision-makers in government
to make firm commitments and assuring the sustainability of the system.236 Moreover,
workshop participants agreed that there is a strong basis for joining forces with another
of IOC administered program called International Oceanographic Data and Information
Exchange (IODE). This would allow building on existing facilities taking advantage of
an established network of global and regional IODE projects. The successful model of
IODE regional project ODIN-AFRICA an Ocean and Data Information Network
(ODIN) under the aegis of IOC regional committees for the Western Indian Ocean
(IOCWIO) and Central Indian Ocean (IOCINDIO) became the basis for expanding the
ODIN strategy to the entire region.237
With a view to complement ODIN-AFRICA, an ODIN project ODIN-CINDIO was

established in 2005 for the central Indian Ocean under the aegis of the IOC regional
committee for the central Indian Ocean (IOCINDIO).238 This led to the creation of a
complex regional structure under the IODE program whereby ODIN-CINDIO, with
inputs from ODIN-AFRICA, would be the medium to build a DIM system for IOGOOS
as part of the GOOS regional alliance network.239 What this means is that the
IOCINDIO secretariat in Iran and IOGOOS secretariat in India would jointly coordinate
the implementation of an oceanographic DIM system for the entire Indian Ocean
Region with many of the western Indian Ocean countries already committed to the
ODIN-AFRICA project.
234
management in the Indian Ocean region,’ p. 14.
235
management in the Indian Ocean region,’ pp. 4-5, 14.
236
237
238
239
183
The IOCINDIO administered ODIN-CINDIO project, as the instrument for building
IOGOOS DIM capacity required first an understanding of the IODE program and ODIN
projects. IODE programmes are managed by a nine member IODE Committee of which
Australia and India are members. The IODE program requires countries to establish
National Oceanographic Data Centres (NODCs) and/or Designated National Agencies
(DNAs) and nominate national coordinators for data management.
In the Indian Ocean, 16 countries have established NODCs and/or DNAs. Of these 16
countries, Malaysia is the only country with DNA status while Tanzania has a NODC
and DNA and India and South Africa each have two NODCs. Data centres were
established by Australia, India, and Pakistan in the 1960s, Egypt, South Africa in the
1970s, Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Seychelles, and Sri Lanka in the 1990s, Madagascar,
Mauritius and Mozambique in 2000, Comoros and Israel in 2001, and Tanzania in
2002.240 In addition, Bangladesh and Kuwait have nominated IODE national
coordinators for data management even though the countries have not established
NODCs.241
In terms of the ODIN-CINDIO project capacity, only Australia, India, Iran, Malaysia,
Pakistan and Sri Lanka are the six countries that have established NODCs from the 17
IOCINDIO Indian Ocean member countries.242 Of these, Pakistan and Malaysia are not
members of IOGOOS although Malaysia has participated in IOGOOS meetings.
Indonesia, Maldives and Thailand are IOGOOS and IOCINDIO members but are still to
establish an NODC and nominate a national coordinator for data management. The
other countries include Bangladesh, Iraq, Kuwait, Myanmar, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia and UAE (Figure 6.5).
Effectively, with many of the oceanographic data centres established in the late 1990s,
not only is there limited capacity but there is a mismatch in the membership structure of
IOGOOS and IOCINDIO for the development of an oceanographic DIM system for the
entire region.
240
International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange, ‘IODE NODCs and DNAs.’
241
International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange, ‘IODE national coordinator for ocean
data management,’ viewed 27 Mar 2009,
<http://www.iode.org/index.php?option=com_oe&task=viewGroupRecord&groupID=59&Itemid=42>.
242
France and the United Kingdom are the other two members of IOCINDIO. See IOC regional
committee for the central Indian Ocean, ‘member states,’ viewed 27 Mar 2009,
<http://www.inco.ac.ir/iocindio/memberstate.htm>.
184
Figure 6.5: Regional committee for Central Indian Ocean (IOCINDIO) member states
Source: Regional Committee for the Central Indian Ocean
Adding to the structural complexity, IODE operates a Marine Information Management

(MIM) program to help understand and protect the marine environment. IOC marine
information products ocean expert, ocean portal, ocean teacher and OceanDocs have
been pioneered and supported by the MIM program.243 Indian Ocean countries that have
nominated MIM national coordinators include Australia, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iran,
Kenya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka.244
ODIN-CINDIO with the objective of providing assistance, training and education in the
development, operation and maintenance of NODC and MIM remain largely as national
capacity-building projects even as attempts are made for building IOGOOS capacity.
In contrast, ODIN-AFRICA, also an ODIN project under the IODE program, has
implemented three thematic work packages involving a coastal ocean observation
system, data and information management, and product development and end user
communication and information delivery independently of GOOS Africa. ODIN-
AFRICA has made notable progress across all the work packages focusing on sea level
243
International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange, ‘Marine Information Management,’
viewed 27 Mar 2009,
<http://www.iode.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4&Itemid=35>.
244
International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange, ‘IODE national coordinators for marine
Information management’ viewed 27 Mar 2009,
<http://www.iode.org/index.php?option=com_oe&task=viewGroupRecord&groupID=60&Itemid=43>.
185
data facility, capacity building through established NODCs, African library catalogue,
marine biodiversity database and an African marine atlas.245
The envisaged DIM structure involved at the national level autonomous scientific
institutions with an NODC acting as the focal point. Data and information coordination
at the regional level would be undertaken by the IOGOOS secretariat with plans to
develop a regional data archive. A DIM working group through an e-group and
discussion forum would identify standards and methods, data exchange formats, and
regional service/application providers. Mostly external sources of funding were
emphasised with no reference in the actionable items list for members to seek additional
funding from own governments (Table 6.5).246
Table 6.5: IOGOOS Data and information management timeline

Objective Actionable item Timeline
Coordination and Strengthen secretariat at INCOIS for coordination 2004
Communication Form an e-group and discussion forum for DIM and start services
on the internet to IOGOOS members
Conduct national level surveys, identify national contact points,
and set up national coordination committees
Data standards and Study national data archival policies and explore need for a secure 2004-
policies regional archive 2005
Study standard formats, circulate JGOFS protocols and IODE
formats, and incorporate parameters required for different
regional applications
Training and Identify higher education programs, examine fellowships with 2004-
education POGO 2007
Introduce experts exchange and visiting scientists programme
Progress ODIN project proposal for IOGOOS
Provide training in Remote sensing applications and satellite
oceanography.
Funding Sources Invite potential funding agencies including UN agencies and other 2004
regional bodies.
Future trajectory Have back-to-back DIM meetings with IOGOOS annual meetings 2005-
Evaluate pilot projects 2007
Formulate 7 year plan
Source: IOGOOS II report 26-29 April 2004
The priority areas of the action plan endorsed at the 2004 IOGOOS meeting essentially
included survey completion, e-group formation, establishing a clearinghouse
mechanism, and starting internet services for IOGOOS members. In all, seven countries
245
Ocean Data and Information Network for Africa (ODIN-Africa), ‘About ODIN-Africa,’ viewed 27
Mar 2009, <http://www.odinafrica.org/>.
246
186
responded to an IOC survey to assess data management capacity in the Indian Ocean
Region.247 IOCINDIO countries Australia, India and Iran and IOCWIO countries
Kenya, Mauritius, Madagascar and South Africa responded to the survey.
At the following IOGOOS meeting in 2005, working groups evaluated the IOP, remote
sensing capacity building, and coastal pilot projects. There was no progress report on
the DIM system despite the intent of having back-to-back DIM meetings with IOGOOS
annual meetings.
In 2006, the IOGOOS secretariat informed that the discussion group was now available
online. However, the effectiveness remains to be reported. Moreover, the secretariat
failed to receive comments from members on the interface design for making the e-
group and discussion forum available on the IOGOOS website.248 During the IOGOOS
meeting in 2006, further DIM deliberations were limited to building capacity through a
range of training courses and workshops.249
Besides starting of internet services there is little indication of starting other

products/services for IOGOOS members. India has started SST, PFZ, and OSF services
on their own INCOIS website but it is not self-evident that these services are available
for IOGOOS members as has been provided for in the DIM work plan.250
Analysis of regime effectiveness

The IOGOOS case study analysed the progress of IOGOOS in descriptive form of what,
when, where and by whom. The story that unfolds is very different from that contained
in the IOGOOS documentation for the period from 2001 to 2007. After 2005, there is
largely more of the same from earlier reports and little new information on the progress
made. Using the rubric for measuring regime effectiveness the variables of actor
behaviour and leadership, structure over time, broader consequences across space and
stages of regime formation are analysed for measuring effectiveness of the regime for
marine scientific research in the Indian Ocean.
247
248
249
250
Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services (INCOIS), ‘Homepage,’ viewed 27 Mar 2009,
<http://www.incois.gov.in/Incois/incois1024/index/index.jsp?res=1024>.
187
There is evidence that problems that require collective response have been accurately
identified and agreed upon by member states and issues clearly prioritised. At the same
time the evidence suggests that agenda could not be effectively converted into measures
for collective action by member states give a score of three on a scale of 1 to 5 for
agenda formation. The institutional choice appears limited to office and record keeping
functions for the secretariat with practically no role in building regional administrative
capability and hardly any input into the implementation of the agenda giving a score of
two on a scale of 1 to 5 for institutional choice. A number of problems in
operationalisation of the regime, such as, lack of funding, absence of data management
and communication links, limited capacity and inability to develop use of satellite
remote sensing for IOGOOS applications were evident. As a result, the coastal pilot
projects were largely shelved. Evidence of national measures appears limited to a few
member states with most lacking in capacity giving a score of two on a scale of 1 to 5
for operationalisation. The average score for stages of regime formation is 2.3 on a scale
of 1 to 5 (Table 6.6 and Figure 6.6).

The evidence suggests that reasonably established intellectual leadership on part of
knowledge based actors resulted in the formation of the regional alliance. However,
endeavours to integrated non-state actors, such as, POGO, APN and WIOMSA have by
no means resulted in any coherent outcome giving a score of three on a scale of 1 to 5
for intellectual leadership and knowledge based actors. Entrepreneurial leadership by
interest based actors remains a challenge for IOGOOS with little evidence of user
interest in the IOGOOS programme giving a score of one on a scale of 1 to 5 for
entrepreneurial leadership and interest based actors. Evidence of structural leadership by
power based actors suggests that the IOGOOS regional alliance has not been a priority
for governments from the region. Even the more powerful research states in the region,
India and Australia, do not appear to have pledged sufficient resources for IOGOOS
coastal programmes. It must be said though that the Indian Ocean Panel project in
collaboration with the international research community where the two countries did
188
commit resources has seen some results. As for membership, only Tanzania251 and
Indonesia in 2005 have joined the regional alliance since inception. The evidence
overall gives a score of two on a scale of 1 to 5 for structural leadership and power
based actors. The average score for actor behaviour and leadership is two on a scale of 1
to 5 (Table 6.6 and Figure 6.6).
Table 6.6: Numerical score of variable sets and level of collaboration

Independent Average
Variable Score
Knowledge Based actors and Intellectual leadership on part of knowledge based actors
reasonably established. Epistemic community and/or non-state
Intellectual leadership (KIL) 3
actors loosely integrated but by no means a coherent actor.
Average level of consensual knowledge base.
Interest Based actors and Entrepreneurial leadership by interest based actors not at all
BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE
Actor Behaviour entrepreneurial leadership (IEL) established. No participation of interest based actors in
institutional bargaining. No interest in present and future 1
and Leadership impacts of the problem.
2.0
(ABL)
Power based actors and Structural leadership by power based actors somewhat
established. Commitment to issue-specific resources is below
structural leadership (PSL)
average. The more powerful resource States have not fully
pledged allocative and authoritative resources. Since inception
2
of the regime, more States from the region are party to the
regime.
Agenda Formation (AF) Problems that require collective response are accurately
identified and agreed upon by member States from the region. 3
Stage of Regime The institutional setting is confined to office and record
Institutional Choice (IC) 2.3
Formation (SRF) keeping functions for member States. 2
evident in few member States from the region. 2
Signification/ High level of concern amongst stakeholders. Concerns shared
by every member State from the region. 4
Legitimisation/ Moderate level of credible commitment amongst member

Structure over time Contractual Environment (LCE) States from the region. Neither weak/strong regulatory
framework for legitimising international norms and principles 3 2.7
(SOT)
within the region.
Domination/ Very low level of political, legal and administrative national
capacity amongst States from the region. Very weak regional 1
National Capacity (DNC)
effort at capacity building.
State Learning at the Unit Level Average level of cognitive learning amongst member States
from the region about the nature of problem and information 3
(SL)
about the options available for addressing the problem.
Broader Regional Cooperation at the sub- Critical cooperation amongst few member States from the
Consequences system level (RC) region on establishing well-defined activities and resources, 2 2.3
across space (BCS) needed to move from norms to rules.
International Cooperation at the Somewhat significant change in capacities of few member
system level (IC)
States from the region to effectively participate at the 2
international level in regime implementation.
Intervening
Variable
251
Personal email communication on 23 Aug 2008 from Dr. Ing. Alfonse M. Dubi from University of Dar
es Salaam indicating hesitation in initially joining the alliance being tagged to a membership fee. Personal
email communication on 19 Jan 2009 from Dr Srinivas Kumar from IOGOOS secretariat does not
confirm the year when Tanzania took membership. Dr Kumar does provide information that there is an
annual membership fee of $500, which is a token contribution and institutional membership is not
discontinued if the membership fee is not paid.
189
Figure 6.6 Measure of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness

5I.C KIL
5 5
4 4
3 3
2 2
1 1


State Learning
Sl AF
5 5
4 4
3 3
2 2
1 1

Structure over time

The evidence suggests a high-level of concern amongst the scientific community with
concerns shared by every member state and agenda clearly identified. However, the
concerns do not appear to have motivated other states in the region, Tanzania and
Indonesia aside, to join the regional alliance giving a score of four on a scale of 1 to 5
for signification – level of concern. The choice of a memorandum over a formal
agreement to legitimise the regional alliance can be viewed as neither a weak or strong
regulatory framework. The contractual environment could be strong should
governments choose to commit resources and weak should they choose not to do so.
Moreover, there appears only a moderate level of credible commitment amongst
scientific institutions of member states with cooperation at the national level seemingly
a challenge giving a score of three on a scale of 1 to 5 for legitimisation – contractual
environment. What appears to be clearly missing in action is domination or the
commitment of resources by governments resulting in a weak regional effort at capacity
190
building. The evidence suggests very low level of political, legal and administrative
national capacities amongst most member states in the region giving a score of one on a
scale of 1 to 5 for domination – national capacity. The average score for structure over
time is 2.7 on a scale of 1 to 5 (Table 6.6 and Figure 6.6).

The evidence suggests that cognitive learning about the nature of and options available
to address the problem at the state level has at best been average given the limited
resources and constraints in the sharing of information giving a score of three on a scale
of 1 to 5 for state learning at the unit level. In a region dominated by developing
countries with limited capacity a strong sentiment for regional cooperation is evident in
the implementation of the regime. The IOC international structure in pursuit of an
international research agenda appears to have weighed heavily on the regional
cooperation endeavour with some evidence of critical cooperation, at best, amongst few
member states giving a score of two on a scale of 1 to 5 for regional cooperation at the
sub-system level. Evidence suggests that international cooperation at the system level
has been complicated by the division of the Indian Ocean into a number of electoral
groups (Table 6.2) and splitting the ocean research across different geographic divisions
(Figure 6.2 and 6.3). As a result there is somewhat significant change in capacities of
few member states to effectively participate at the international level and no more,
borne out by the relative success of the Indian Ocean Panel compared to the coastal
module giving a score of two on a scale of 1 to 5 for international cooperation at the
system level. The average score for broader consequences across space is 2.3 on a scale
of 1 to 5 (Table 6.6 and Figure 6.6).
Level of collaboration
Such an analysis of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness gives a good
insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the regime for marine scientific research in
the Indian Ocean Region.
In terms of behavioural change knowledge based actors have shown reasonable

leadership in formulating an agenda for implementation. However, the institutional
choice has not been able to generate sufficient participation by interest based actors.
Moreover, lack of commitment by power based actors has hampered the
operationalisation of the regime (Figure 6.7).
191
In term of institutional effectiveness a high level of concern has yielded just about
average level of state learning. The open ended contractual environment has not seen
the desired commitment by governments to regional cooperation. As a result national
capacities continue to remain limited with cooperation at the international level
confined to a handful of states from the region (Figure 6.7).

I E Kll
5
N F 5 5
4 B
S F 4 4
3 T E E
3 3
H IEL
2 I C 2 C 2
1 T T A
1 V H 1
U I A
I
T V N
O
I E G
U
O N E PSt
R
N E
A
A S
L
L S M
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
What becomes evident is that the regime for marine scientific research has created the
desired atmosphere for regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region. There is no
evidence to suggest that the regime is not working. Neither is there evidence to suggest
that regional cooperation amongst Indian Ocean states is not sustainable in
implementation of the marine scientific research regime through GOOS.
On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that recognition by governments of the
importance of the regime for marine scientific research not just in the national interest
but as an instrument for greater regional cooperation can enhance the level of
collaboration amongst states and strengthen marine scientific research for the benefit of
the Indian Ocean Region as a whole. Such recognition by governments is likely to see
commitment of the required allocative and authoritative resources, generate greater user
interest or entrepreneurial leadership and bring about the institutional changes necessary
to effectively operationalise the regime.
The combined effect of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness is to give a

level of collaboration of 2.33, between 2 and 3 on a scale of 1 to 5. What this means is
that there is elementary to average understanding and leadership at the national level
192
and a somewhat weak regional structure with comparatively critical cooperation limited
to a few member states in the Indian Ocean Region. In other words, there is enormous
potential for regional cooperation in the field of marine scientific research with the
foundation of the regime firmly established (Table 6.7).
Table 6.7: Level of collaboration marine scientific research in the Indian Ocean Region
Level Of Collaboration : 2.33

2 Elementary understanding and leadership at the national level and a weak regional structure
with comparatively critical cooperation, leads to somewhat significant change in the
capacity of a few of the member states from the region to participate effectively at the
international level.
3 Average understanding and leadership at the national level and neither a weak/strong
regional structure with comparatively essential cooperation, leads to fairly significant
change in the capacity of most member states from the region to participate effectively at
the international level.
Effectiveness of the regime for marine scientific research

In assessing the effectiveness of the regime for marine scientific research, it may be said
that elementary actor-structure interplay has resulted in elementary to average formation
of the regime with elementary results for state learning and regional cooperation in the
region (Table 6.8). Taken together with the score for level of collaboration, the scores of
the two sets of variables that define behavioural change and institutional effectiveness
illustrate the assessed effectiveness of a regime on a scale of 1 to 5 where a score of five
indicates a world-class regime (Figure 6.8).
Table 6.8: Marine scientific research regime effectiveness

1 2 3 I 4 5
D
Actor Perfunctory actor Elementary actor Average actor Substantial actor World-class actor
Behaviour behaviour and behaviour and behaviour and behaviour and behaviour and
and leadership leadership leadership leadership leadership
Leadership
Stages of Perfunctory Elementary Average regime Substantial World-class
Regime regime formation regime formation formation in the regime formation regime formation
Formation in the region in the region. region. in the region. in the region.
Structure Perfunctory Elementary Average Substantial World-class
over time structure over structure over structure over structure over structure over
time time time time time
Broader Perfunctory Elementary Average Substantial World-class
consequences learning and learning and learning and learning and learning and
across space cooperation cooperation cooperation cooperation cooperation
193
Figure 6.8: Marine scientific research regime effectiveness
Regime Effe~tiveness
"'""
LOC
5
4
3
2
BCS ABl
1

Conclusion
The IOGOOS regional alliance has been one of imposition formed as GOOS regional
Alliance dictated by the structural requirements of the Global Ocean Observing System
(GOOS). A key positive aspect has been the MoU for cooperation, given the deep
concerns of Indian Ocean countries over sharing of marine scientific research data and
information. The imposition of the regime to a certain degree also enhanced research
capacity in the region with countries agreeing to pool their limited resources, which is
evident from the success of the Indian Ocean Panel. In an otherwise frosty relationship
between India and Australia,252 which only recently has begun to warm, the imposition
of the regime got the major IOP contributing nations to work more closely and combine
the research efforts.
252
See Dennis Rumley, The geopolitics of Australia’s regional relations, pp. 236, 257; and D. Gopal and
Dennis Rumley (eds.), India and Australia: Issues and opportunities, (New Delhi: Authorspress, 2004).
194
However, the epistemic group, despite various attempts, has been unable to advance
negotiations in improving the contractual environment for progressing IOGOOS and
this is reflected in the dismal performance of the coastal module, the primary reason for
the regional alliance. What this means is that in the process of regime formation the
IOGOOS regional alliance has not been able to generate sufficient concern leading to
lack of commitment in resources and it will take quite some more time before the
regional alliance can transcend the imposition stage towards self-generation.
The main feature of actor behaviour is that an epistemic group has been able to sustain a
regional alliance for seven years in the absence of any significant participation from
interest-based actors and power-based actors. Intellectual leadership demonstrated in the
epistemic group’s willingness and capability to cooperate in large-scale regional action
led to the conceptualisation of IOGOOS as a regional alliance. Interest-based and
power-based actors, by displaying entrepreneurial and structural leadership, are yet to
forge the missing link between scientists (knowledge-based actors), ocean and coastal
managers (power-based actors), and communities (interest-based actors) in the conduct
of marine scientific research for the benefit of the Indian Ocean Region as a whole.
From the outset, a regional system that linked the global and local scales seemed to be
the best way for providing specific user group information. The underlying assumption
being that a regional system conforming to international standards and protocols could
provide economies of scale, improve cost effectiveness, minimise redundancy, optimise
data and information exchange, and establish reference and sentinel stations. The
attempt by the epistemic group was to provide an ocean-wide data and information
network as the backbone of the IOGOOS structure. In developing an implementation
structure for the ocean observing system, the fledgling regional alliance was faced with
hard realities of inadequate capacities and varying priorities amongst Indian Ocean
nations and sub-regions alike. Within existing national capacities, there is a clear intent
of garnering available resources into a collective combine and building capacities across
nations.
The oddity in developing the IOGOOS structure is the decision to mirror the
international GOOS and IODE structure. The regional alliance just as in GOOS chose
developing ocean and coastal modules separately, despite limited resources and in the
knowledge that success of the coastal module will determine the future of IOGOOS.
195
The challenge has been in bridging the divide between the relatively successful ocean
module and the coastal module for starting coastal projects, which are central to
generating interest in IOGOOS by power-based and interest-based actors in turn
building resource capacity in the region. Moreover, the Data and Information
Management system as the core of the IOGOOS structure adopted the IODE established
ODIN structure. The Indian Ocean split into two projects ODINAFRICA under the
aegis of the IOC regional committee the North and Central Western Indian Ocean
(IOCINCWIO) and ODINCINDIO under the aegis of the IOC regional committee for
the central Indian Ocean (IOCINDIO). All this when membership of Indian Ocean
countries was already split by GOOS-Africa (1998), WAGOOS (2000), SEA-GOOS
(2001), before starting of IOGOOS (2002) and then followed up with the Indonesian
node of GOOS (2005).
In terms of the broader consequences across space, the MoU in face of the political
realities of mistrust and suspicion amongst countries has sustained for over four years
proving to be a strong instrument of cooperation and collaboration in the region. The
epistemic group has succeeded in establishing a launching pad for the regional alliance
and what remains is for governments to make firm commitments of the added allocative
and authoritative resources needed for operationalising IOGOOS. Structural leadership
by power-based actors in all likelihood will galvanise inter-based actors in
institutionalising the established IOGOOS research agenda. By linking societal and
scientific issues on a regional scale for making use of otherwise unavailable information
in the localised management of the marine and coastal environment, promoting marine
scientific research under the IOGOOS regional alliance could benefit nearly 1.5 billion
people in the Indian Ocean Region.
The next chapter analyses trade in the Indian Ocean Region followed by an analysis of
Indian Ocean shipping fleets in chapter 8 leading to an assessment of the effectiveness
of the port state control regime.
196
Chapter 7
IntraIndian Ocean trade
This chapter reviews the dynamics of intra-Indian Ocean trade. The discussion focuses
on the trends and provides an analysis of the exports in intra-Indian Ocean trade. The
focus on exports rather than total intra-Indian Ocean trade provides a useful backdrop
for shipping fleets and port state control in the Indian Ocean Region.
Indian Ocean commerce

The history of trade in the Indian Ocean Region is well established. Historians like
Chaudhuri and McPherson have each made important contributions to show that even
prior to the arrival of Vasco da Gama in 1498 the entire Indian Ocean Region was
enmeshed in high-level trade connected by a far-reaching network of sea links.1
According to Stienberg, for societies of the Indian Ocean from 500 B.C. to 1500 A.D.
the overall conception of ocean-space was a separating space of great distance to be
crossed as quickly as possible and used extensively for transporting goods. Under such
conditions, the Indian Ocean was immune to assertions of power by land-based entities.
The connections were religious and cultural not political and neither were there attempts
to claim or organise the sea as a means of generating economic wealth. Power where
exerted was only to ensure that the Indian Ocean remained free for all to cross, if one
could cope with its hostile nature.2
In this chapter, the International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade statistical database
has been used to establish the modern day value of merchandise exports for Indian
Ocean rim countries. The trade data in appendices 4 to 10 allows for a more detailed
analysis of exports and imports. However, the assessment has been limited to exports as
it not the purpose of this chapter to provide a comprehensive assessment of trade
patterns and flows. This chapter has a limited purpose and that is to provide the
backdrop for shipping fleets of Indian Ocean countries, which are at the core of
determining regime effectiveness on port state control in the Indian Ocean Region, the
second case study in chapter 8.
1
McPherson, The Indian Ocean; and Chaudhuri, Trade and civilisation in the Indian Ocean.
2
See discussion on the Indian Ocean: the ocean as distance in Philip E. Steinberg, The social construction
of the ocean, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 41-52.
197
Intra-Indian Ocean trade overview
The Indian Ocean Region Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2008 was over 15 per cent
of the world GDP.3 In 2001, world merchandise exports from the rim countries to
industrialised countries were marginally higher at US dollars 361,610.41 million than
exports to developing countries at US dollars 337,345.06 million. By 2007, growth in
world merchandise exports from rim countries to developing countries had increased by
nearly three times to US dollars 1,015,266.86 million. This trade surpassed the value of
exports to industrialised countries, which otherwise more than doubled to US dollars
760,527.53 million.4 Between 2001 and 2007, intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports
registered a 2.8 times growth that was marginally higher than world merchandise
exports from the region (Table 7.1).
Table 7.1: Indian Ocean rim countries total exports in USD (millions) 2001-2007
Nature of Exports 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Intra-IOR exports 177595.59 186965.88 231103.31 295108.25 362762.09 439731.36 504614.15
Intra-IOR exports not
163830.16 173219.95 216424.91 275468.90 339917.25 412959.56 473955.49
including Australia
Exports to the World 729209.97 747240.61 887678.83 1109050.42 1349570.63 1620678.40 1838229.08
Exports to Developing
337345.06 357456.94 439551.81 563599.98 699963.34 860096.34 1015266.86
Countries
Exports to
361610.41 358501.51 415361.74 504631.44 603013.02 709565.54 760527.53
Industrialised Countries
Source: Derived from IMF Direction of Trade statistical database in Appendix 3
Figure 7.1: Intra-IOR exports by region in USD (millions) 2001-2007
2008
2007
2006
• South East Asia
• Middle East
2005
•South Asia
2004 •Australia
2003 • Red Sea
2002 •East Africa
2001
2000
3
Calculated for the 35 Indian Ocean rim countries and landlocked Ethiopia (36 countries with shipping
fleets) used in the analysis from CIA World fact book 2008, viewed 23 April 2009,
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html>.
4
Appendix 3.
198
As seen from Table 7.2 and Figure 7.1, the intra-IOR exports from each of the sub-
regions more than doubled with South East Asia accounting for more than half of the
total intra-IOR trade.
Notwithstanding the strong South East Asian economic influence on the Indian Ocean
Region, the international community firmly views countries from South East Asia as
economies belonging to the Asia Pacific region under the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) grouping.
Table 7.2: Intra-IOR exports by region in USD (millions) 2001-2007

Region / South East Middle South East
Australia Red Sea Total
Year Asia East Asia Africa
2007 256669.99 132799.86 55190.72 30658.66 16663.65 12631.28 504614.15
2006 251806.48 119987.64 43875.67 26771.79 13776.28 10285.28 466503.15
2005 188763.06 92027.60 37336.51 22844.84 11793.26 9996.82 362762.09
2004 158338.16 69770.50 29059.56 19639.35 10317.03 7983.64 295108.25
2003 127841.90 50532.48 23134.70 14678.40 8546.94 6368.90 231103.31
2002 100072.17 43134.94 17547.75 13745.94 7441.02 5024.07 186965.88
2001 93808.40 44010.04 13438.79 13765.43 7393.70 5179.24 177595.59
In 2007, the Middle East and South Asia regions combined accounted for over 37 per
cent of the intra-IOR exports. The combined percentage shares of East Africa and Red
Sea countries from the western rim of the Indian Ocean was less than six per cent and
marginally lower than the percentage share of Australia’s intra-IOR exports.
Effectively, only the Middle East and South Asian countries are seen as significant
contributors to the economic value of exports from the Indian Ocean Region.
During the same period, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports as a
percentage of: total world exports increased from 24 to 27 per cent (Table 7.3).
Table 7.3: Intra-IOR exports as a percentage share of total exports 2001 to 2007
Intra IOR exports as a % of 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
World exports 24 25 26 27 27 27 27
Exports to developing countries 53 52 53 52 52 51 50
Exports to industrialised countries 49 52 56 58 60 62 66
not including Australia
World exports 22 23 24 25 25 25 26
Exports to developing countries 49 48 49 49 49 48 47
Exports to industrialised countries 45 48 52 55 56 58 62
199
Although the intra-IOR exports as a percentage of exports to developing countries
declined from 53 to 50 per cent, the exports to industrialised countries increased
significantly from 49 to 66 per cent.
The intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports not including Australia, which is the only
industrialised country in the region, also shows a similar trend. The value of
merchandise exports from intra-Indian Ocean developing countries as a percentage of:
world exports increased from 22 to 26 per cent; exports to developing countries
declined from 49 to 47 per cent; and of exports to industrialised countries increased
significantly from 47 to 62 per cent.
Using the trend lines from 2001 to 2007 with and without including Australia in the
total value of exports from Indian Ocean rim countries it is argued that the significance
of intra-Indian Ocean trade increased in importance over the past seven years. The
percentage of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports compared to world exports
increased by three to four per cent and although intra-Indian Ocean exports to
developing countries declined by two to three per cent, these exports compared to
industrialised countries increased by 17 per cent.
Country specific intra-Indian Ocean trade performance

Intra-Indian Ocean trade and world exports
During the last seven years, there were six countries: Djibouti, Jordan, Maldives,
Myanmar, Somalia and Yemen from the region with a value of intra-Indian Ocean
merchandise exports between 45 to 97 per cent of world exports (Table 7.4).
Table 7.4: Value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as a % of world exports in 2007

45 to 97 per
< 10 per cent Between 11 to 35 per cent
cent
Decline Unchanged Growth
Bangladesh, Egypt, Australia, Bahrain, )ndia, )ndonesia, Malaysia, Djibouti, Jordan,
)raq, )srael, Ethiopia, Comoros, Kuwait, Mauritius, Pakistan, Qatar, Maldives,
Madagascar, )ran, Mozambique, Seychelles, Singapore, South Myanmar,
Sudan Kenya, Saudi Arabia Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Somalia, Yemen
Oman Thailand, United Arab Emirates
Intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports for five countries: Bangladesh, Iraq, Israel,
Madagascar and Sudan showed a declining trend in value remaining throughout below
10 per cent of world exports.
200
For the remainder of countries in the region the value of merchandise exports remained
between 11 to 35 per cent of world exports. Of these countries, the value of
merchandise exports declined for Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Kenya and Oman and remained
unchanged for Australia, Bahrain, Comoros, Kuwait, Mozambique and Saudi Arabia.
The value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports compared to world exports for
Mauritius, Qatar and Seychelles registered over 10 per cent growth followed by India,
Singapore and Sri Lanka with 6 to 10 per cent growth. The remaining countries,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand and United Arab
Emirates, all registered a 2 to 5 per cent growth in value of intra-Indian ocean trade
compared to world exports.5
Intra-Indian ocean trade and developing countries

In the same period, the value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as a percentage of exports to
developing countries declined for most countries in the region. The three most
significant changes from 2001 to 2007 were the percentage changes for Comoros, Iran
and Qatar. In the case of Comoros, the value decreased from 86 per cent to 32 per cent
and for Iran, the value decreased from 45 per cent to 8 per cent, while for Qatar, the
value more than doubled from 43 per cent to 87 per cent.
Besides Qatar, eight other countries (Bahrain, India, Myanmar, Seychelles, Singapore,
Somalia, Sri Lanka and United Arab Emirates) registered a one to eight per cent
increase in the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports as a percentage of
exports to developing countries.6
Table 7.5 summarises the value of intra-ocean trade as a percentage of exports to

developing countries in 2007.
Table 7.5: Value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as a percentage of exports to developing

countries in 2007
5 – 25 % 30 – 40 % 41 – 50 % 51 – 60 % 61 – 70 % 71 – 85 % 86 – 99 %
)ran, Australia, Bangladesh, )ndia, Madagascar, Bahrain, Djibouti,
)raq, Comoros, Egypt, Ethiopia, )ndonesia, Seychelles, Sri Jordan, Qatar,
Sudan )srael, Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Lanka, United Maldives, Somalia
Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Mozambique, Arab Mauritius,
South Africa Arabia, Tanzania, Singapore Emirates, Myanmar
Thailand Yemen
5
Appendix 3.
6
Appendix 3.
201
Intra-Indian Ocean trade and industrialised countries
On the other hand, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports as a percentage
of exports to industrialised countries increased for most countries in the region. The
percentage increase in value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports for most
countries has been between 15 to 40 per cent of the exports to industrialised countries.
In seven countries (Bahrain, Djibouti, Jordan, Myanmar, Oman, Somalia and Yemen),
the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports has remained significantly higher
than exports to industrialised countries.
For Oman and Bahrain in 2007, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports
was 1.6 times and 1.9 times more than the value of exports to industrialised countries
respectively.
For Djibouti, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports increased from 3.5
times in 2001 to more than 38 times the value of exports to industrialised countries in
2007.
For Myanmar, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports increased from 1.1
times to more than 5.1 times the value of exports to industrialised countries in 2007.
For Somalia, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports increased from 15
times in 2001 to 59 times the value of exports to industrialised countries in 2007.
While for Jordan, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports declined
somewhat from 3.9 times in 2001 to 1.8 times the value of exports to industrialised
countries in 2007.
Also for Yemen, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports declined from 6.9
times in 2001 to 3.7 times the value of exports to industrialised countries in 2007.
Besides these seven countries with significant intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports,
the value for Maldives increased from 60% in 2001 to 106 per cent the value of exports
to industrialised countries in 2007.
Similarly, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports for Singapore also
increased from 75% of the value of exports to industrialised countries in 2001 to 128
per cent in 2007.
202
In the past seven years, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports as a
percentage of exports to industrialised countries for Iran (~ 30%) and Mozambique
(~24%) remained constant.
For Madagascar, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports declined from 29
per cent in 2001 to just 8 per cent of the value of exports to industrialised countries in
2007.
While the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports for Bangladesh (~7%) as a
percentage of exports to industrialised countries continued to remain insignificant.
Even for Iraq, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports as a percentage of
exports to industrialised countries has been insignificant and further declined from nine
per cent in 2001 to two per cent in 2007.7
Table 7.6 summarises the value of intra-ocean trade as a percentage of exports to

industrialised countries in 2007.
Table 7.6: Value of intra-Ocean trade as a percentage of exports to industrialised

countries in 2007
< 20 % 20 – 40 % 41 – 60 % 61 80 % 81 – 99 % 1 to 51 times
Bangladesh, Egypt, )ran, Australia, )ndia, Malaysia, Bahrain, Djibouti,
)raq, )srael, Mauritius, Comoros, )ndonesia, United Arab Jordan, Maldives,
Madagascar Mozambique, Ethiopia, Kenya, Kuwait, Emirates Myanmar, Oman,
Seychelles, Qatar, Saudi Pakistan, Singapore, Somalia,
South Africa, Sri Arabia Tanzania, Yemen
Lanka, Sudan Thailand
IOR regional exports

Over the last seven years, on average with 31 per cent of world exports South East Asia
had the highest value of IOR regional exports as a percentage of world exports (Table
7.7). The value of IOR regional exports from South Asia as a percentage of world
exports averaged 26 percent followed by Middle East with 23 per cent; Australia with
22 per cent; Red Sea with 16 per cent; and East Africa with 15 per cent.
South East Asia and South Asia regions have seen a 6-7 per cent growth in value of
exports while the value of IOR regional exports from Australia, Middle East, Red Sea
and East Africa has remained relatively constant.
7
Appendix 4.
203
Table 7.7: Value of IOR regional exports as a percentage of world exports
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Australia
South East Asia
South Asia
Middle East
Red Sea
East Africa
During the same period, the value of IOR regional exports as a percentage of exports to
developing countries has remained relatively constant for South East Asia and South
Asia (Table 7.8). On the other hand, the value of exports declined by 5 per cent for
Australia, 6 per cent for Middle East, 7 per cent for East Africa and 10 per cent for the
Red Sea region.
Table 7.8: Value of IOR regional exports as a percentage of exports to developing

countries
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Australia
South East Asia
South Asia
Middle East
Red Sea
East Africa
As seen from Table 7.9, the value of IOR regional exports as a percentage of exports to
industrialised countries is significantly higher for most regions other than the Red Sea
and East Africa regions.
Table 7.9: Value of IOR regional exports as a percentage of exports to industrialised

countries
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Australia
South East Asia
South Asia
Middle East
Red Sea
East Africa
204
The value of IOR regional exports from South East Asia as a percentage of exports to
industrialised countries increased steadily and in 2007, the value was 33 per cent higher
than in 2001.
Similarly, the value of IOR regional exports from South Asia as a percentage of exports
to industrialised countries also increased steadily and in 2007, the value was 28 per cent
higher in 2001.
The Middle East registered a 9 per cent growth and Australia registered a 6 per cent
growth in 2007 compared to 2001 value of IOR regional exports.
The value of IOR regional exports for the Red Sea and East Africa regions has remained
constant at about 28 to 31 per cent of the value of exports to industrialised countries.
Top performing IOR countries

In 2007, there were 10 IOR countries with 88 per cent of the Intra-IOR exports by value
compared to eight countries in 2001 with 82 per cent of the Intra-IOR exports by value
(Table 7.10).
Table 7.10 IOR country exports by value (> USD 10,000 millions) to IOR country of
destination
RANKING 2001
,- -
2002 - 2005 ~
2003 2004
1
2006 2007
1 SGP 37212.35 SGP 38518.44 SGP 58212.30 SGP 71801.85 SGP 85631.90 SGP 99958.05 SGP 112861.75
2 MYS 26745.48 MYS 29446.26 MYS 33110.96 MYS 41081.31 MYS 48173.94 MYS 54600.08 MYS 60965.60
3 SAU 16967.82 T HA 15845.57 SAU 19360. 11 SAU 26278. 18 SAU 35081.82 SAU 44588.60 SAU 48347.31
4 THA 14632. 19 SAU 15438.86 THA 19314.88 THA 24860.35 INO 31805.77 INO 37358.50 INO 47144.02
5 ION 14058.83 ION 14867.46 INO 18815.51 INO 24673.45 THA 29271.89 ARE 35139.37 THA 41707.99
6 AUS 13765.43 INO 14060.55 ION 15789.48 ARE 20114.52 ARE 27044.67 THA 33760.34 ARE 40530.78
7 ARE 11279.00 AUS 13745.94 AUS 14678.40 AUS 19639.35 ION 23268.59 ION 33693.21 ION 37951.49
8 INO 10340.82 ARE 11683.01 ARE 14437.25 ION 18741.20 AUS 22844.84 AUS 26771.79 AUS 30658.66
9 KWT 10757.72 KWT 12702.65
10 QAT 10637.28
TOTAL 145001.90 153606.07 193718.90 247190.21 303123.42 376627.66 443507.52
Int ra- lOR 177595.59 186965.88 231103.31 295108.25 362762.09 439731.36 504614.15
% 82 82 84 84 84 86 88
Source: Derived from IMF Direction of Trade statistical database in Appendix 4 to 10
The top three ranking countries were Singapore, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia
respectively and their position between 2001and 2007 remained unchanged. India from
the eighth ranked country in 2001 moved to becoming the fourth ranked country in
2007. The share of Australian intra-IOR exports by value declined in 2007 when
Australia ranked above United Arab Emirates and India in 2001 came eighth in ranking.
Kuwait entered the club of countries with greater than USD 10,000 million value of
intra-IOR exports in 2006 and Qatar in 2007.
205
Essentially, Australia and India are the two countries along with South East Asia
(Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia) and Middle East (Saudi Arabia, United
Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar) responsible for the majority of intra-IOR exports by
value. In 2007, 11 IOR countries of destination accounted for 85 per cent of the intra-
IOR exports by value (Table 7.11).
Table 7.11: Intra-IOR exports by value (> USD 10,000 millions) to IOR country of
destination
RANKING 2001 2002 2003 2004 ,- 2005 - 2006 2007
1 SGP 38872.79 SGP 40299.42 SGP 42631.80 SGP 51134.70 SGP 64552.25 SGP 77452.74 SGP 80766.29
I 2 MYS 30145.67 MYS 30477.79 MYS 33534.08 MYS 41277.79 MYS 46643.24 MYS 55638.47 MYS 62076.94
I 3 THA 17926.03 THA 19483.58 ION 25828.75 ION 32637.66 THA 38946.22 T HA 46576.43 ION 51470.09
I 4 INO 13396.82 INO 12161.34 THA 22443.35 THA 30179.01 ION 38135.47 ION 42836.07 INO 51044.24
I 5 AUS 10967.23 ARE 11802.39 INO 15543.44 INO 24315.65 INO 32648.43 INO 40953.78 THA 49990.24
I 6 AUS 11561.83 ARE 15395.80 AUS 19176·.51 ARE 25179.83 ARE 30005.46 ARE 38463.78
I 7 AUS 14521.29 AR E 18764.18 A US 23151.54 AUS 27699. 12 AUS 32933.94
I 8 PAK 10947.78 ZAF 16704.20 ZAF 16520.73
I 9 SAU 10176.81 PAK 13364.60 PAK 16340. 19
I 10 SAU 13062.69 SAU 15545.34
11 IRN 11736.59
TOTAL 111308.53 125786.33 169898.51 217485 .49 290381.56 364293.55 426888.37
Int ra- lOR 177595.59 186965.88 231103.31 295108.25 362762.09 439731.36 504614.15
% 63 67 74 74 80 83 85
In terms of IOR countries of destination, there was greater differentiation in 2001 as the
five countries having more than USD 10,000 million of exports by value had only a 63
per cent share of the intra-IOR exports.
Throughout the seven-year period, Singapore and Malaysia remained the top two
ranking countries of destination. Since 2003, Thailand, Indonesia and India have
occupied the top five ranking for countries of destination of intra-IOR exports by value.
From 2005, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and South Africa joined Australia and United
Arab Emirates as the other countries of destination for intra-IOR exports by value.
Australia
The share of Australia’s major IOR trading partners in intra-IOR exports increased from
69 per cent in 2001 to 90 per cent in 2007 (Figure 7.2).
Australian exports predominantly to South East Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore

and Thailand) declined marginally from 50 per cent in 2001 to 43 per cent in 2007.
While Australia’s trade with India increased from 9 per cent in 2001 to 27 per cent in
2007, the highest for any IOR country of destination for Australian exports.
206
On average, Australia has also had about 11 per cent exports by value to Saudi Arabia
and United Arab Emirates. Since 2004, share of Australian exports to South Africa also
increased with about 6-7 per cent of the intra-IOR exports by value.
The share of Australian exports to other countries of destination in the Indian Ocean
Region declined from 31 per cent in 2001 to 10 per cent in 2007.
Figure 7.2: Australia’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001-2007

AUSTRALIA 2001 AUSTRALIA 2002
SGP, 20% SGP, 1 9%
ION, 1 2% ION, 1 2%
M aj or lOR M aj or lOR
Tr ading SAU, 10% Tr ading THA, 10 %
Part ner s, 69% Partner s, 70%
M YS, 10% INO, 10%
IND, 9% SAU, 10 %
THA, S% MYS, 9 %
AUSTRALIA 2003 AUSTRALIA2004
SGP, 1 5% IND, 20%
IND, 1 5%
ION, 1 2%
M aj or lOR ION, 1 3% SGP, 1 2%
Tr ading
Partner s, 78% THA, 10% THA, 11%
MYS, 9 %
t------t
MYS, 9%
A RE, 8% SA U, B%
SAU, 8% 2AF, 6%
AUSTRALIA 2005 AUSTRALIA 2006
IND, 23% IND, 2 5%
THA, 14% SGP, 1 3%

M aj or lOR M aj or lOR
Tr ading Tr ading ION, 12%
SGP, 1 3%
Partner s, 83% Part ner s, 88%
THA, 1 2%
ION, 1 2%
M Y$, 8%
M YS, 9 % ZAF, 7%
ZAF, 6% SAU, 6%
SAU, 6% ARE, 5%
AUSTRALIA 2007
INO, 27%
M ajo r lOR THA, 1 2%

Tr ading ION, 11%
Partner s, 90%
SGP, 11%
MYS, 9 %
A RE, B%
SAU, 6%
ZAF, 6%
207
Singapore
Singapore has maintained a steady pattern of exports to IOR countries. About 92-95 per
cent of Singapore’s exports by value are with the major IOR trading partners, of which
the destination for over 70 per cent of exports has been to countries within the South
East Asian region (Figure 7.3). In addition, Singapore has had about nine per cent
exports by value to Australia, eight per cent to South Asian countries and three per cent
to the United Arab Emirates. In all, only 5-8 per cent of intra-IOR exports by value have
been to other IOR countries.
Figure 7.3: Singapore’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001-2007

SINGAPORE 2001 SINGAPORE 2002
MYS, 57% MYS, 56%
THA, 14 % lHA, lS%
AUS, 9% AUS, 9 %
1N~E~~
IND. 7%
ARE,3%
BGD, 2 % BGO, 2%
MYS, 39%
Major lOR
Others, 5% · · · · · - - Partne
Tradrs,
ing ION, 27%
9 5%
THA, l l%
AUS, 8%
~~\\
MMR., l %
MYS, 35% MYS, 36%
Major lOR Major lO R

Trading
Othm,5%
·····-- Partners, 95%
ION, 26%
THA, 11%
others, S% · · · · · - - Trading
Partners, 9 5%
ION, 25%
THA, 11%
AUS, lO% AUS, 10%
IND, 7% INO, S%
~.N~ ~u~
BGO, 1%
SINGAPORE 2007
MY'S, 34%
M ajo r lOR
Othm,5%
····- Tr ading
Partners, 95%
ION, 26 %
THA, l l %
AUS, l O%
lNR~~~
BGO, l %
PAK, l%
208
Malaysia
Malaysia’s export destinations too have been largely within the South East Asian
region. Malaysian exports to destination countries in South East Asia declined
marginally from 72 per cent in 2001 to 65 per cent in 2007 (Figure 7.4). Over time,
other regions experienced incremental increases in exports. In 2007, Australia and India
were the country of destination for 10 per cent of exports by value. The United Arab
Emirates also had the highest percentage of exports by value in seven years. From 2005,
South Africa emerged as a favoured destination of Malaysian exports within the IOR
region. Exports to other countries of destination in the region declined to just six percent
in 2007.
Figure 7.4: Malaysia’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001-2007

MALAYSIA 2001 MALAYSIA2002
SGP, 56% SGP, 54%

M ajor lOR
M ajo r lOR
Trading
Tr ading
Partners, 90%
Part ners, 9 1%
THA, 12% THA, 14%
AUS, .S% AUS, 7%
IN0, 6 % ION, 6 %
ION, 6%
ARE, 3% ~FPE. ~~
MALAYSIA 2003 MALAYSIA 2004
SGP, SO% SGP, 4 6%
M ajor lOR
Tr ading
Part ners,92% THA, l S%
THA, 1 4%
AUS, .S% A US, 10%

INO, B% ION, 7%
IND, 7%
1~~ ~~
~~~.~~ ----""'--- - - ---"===----' ~5.il~
MALAYSIA 2005 MALAYSIA 2006
•
SGP, 46% SGP, 4 5%
M ajor lOR
Trading
Part ners, 93% THA, 1 6%
AUS, 10 %
IND, S%
ION, 7%
~:Ri~
ZAF, l %
• M aj o r lOR
Trading
Partne rs, 94%
THA, 16%
AUS, 8%
IN0, 9%
!PR~ ~~
~~~:
LKA, l %
M ALAYSIA 2007
SGP, 4 2%
• M ajor lOR
Tr ading
Partners, 94%
THA, 14 %
AUS, 10%
IND, 10%
ION, 9%
ARE, S%
PAI( 2%
ZAF,l%
SAU, l %
209
Indonesia
The percentage share of Indonesian exports by destination has remained steady over the
last seven years (Figure 7.5). The South East Asian countries have maintained on
average a 60 per cent share of the total intra-IOR exports over the last seven years. The
share of Indonesian exports to Australia declined marginally from 13 per cent in 2001 to
11 per cent in 2007, while India’s share of Indonesian exports increased from 7 per cent
to 11 per cent over the same period. Indonesian exports to the Middle East also
remained steady at about 5 per cent annually. Since 2006, South Africa emerged as a
favoured destination of Indonesian exports. Exports to other countries in the region
declined from 16 per cent in 2001 to nine per cent in 2007.
Figure 7.5: Indonesia’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001-2007

INDONESIA 2001 INDONESIA 2002
51G, 38% SIG, 3 6%
M oj oc iOR M ajor lOR

Tr ading AUS,13% Tr ading MYS, 1 4%
Part ners, 84% Partners, 85%
MYS,13% A US, 13%
THA, 8% IND, 9 %
IND, 7% THA, 8%
ARE, S% ARE, S%
51G, 34% SIG, 32%
M•j o c iOR
MYS,lS% MYS, 16%
Trading
Part nt:r s,8 8% IND, 12%
AUS, 11%
IND, 11% THA, 11%
THA, 9 %
ARE, S%
SAU,3%
..--~~~---~~~~==~ ~~~:l~"
SAU,2%
PAK, 2%
SIG, 34%
SIG, 4 0%
Mo1o c iOR
MY$, 15%
Tr ading MYS, 13%
Partne rs,89% IND, 12%
IND, 11%
THA, 10% AUS, 10%
AUS, 9 % THA, 10%
ARE, 4% ARH"
~~.)~ ~u: 2~
ZAF, l%
INDONESIA 2007
SIG, 35%
M ajor lOR
MYS, l S%
Tr ading
Partner s, 9 1% IND, 11%
AU$, 11%
THA, 10%
ARE, 3%
~~j~
ZAF, 2%
210
Thailand
The nature of Thailand’s intra-IOR exports followed a similar pattern of trading as the
other three South East Asian countries – Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia (Figure
7.6). Thailand’s exports to destination countries in South East Asia declined marginally
from 64 per cent in 2001 to 58 per cent in 2007. The percentage share of exports to
Australia increased from nine per cent in 2001 to 14 per cent in 2007 and doubled for
India from three to six percent over the same period. The percentage share of exports to
the United Arab Emirates also increased from five to eight per cent. From 2004, South
Africa replaced Israel as the favoured destination of Thailand’s exports. Exports to other
countries in the region declined from 19 per cent in 2001 to 13 per cent in 2007.
Figure 7.6: Thailand’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001-2007

THAILAND 2001 THAILAND 2002
S IG, 36% SIG, 3 5%
M ajor lOR M•Jo, IOR

Trading Tr ading MYS, 18%
MYS, 19%
Partnoe:rs,8 1% Part ne rs ,84%
ION, 11%
IDN, 9%
AUS, 10%
AUS, 9%
ARE, 4 %
ARE, S% ISR,3%
IND, 3%
IND,3%
SIG,30% SIG,28%
M ajor lOR MYS,21%

MY$, 20%
Trading
Partner s, 83%
IDN, 1 2% ION, 13%
AUS, 10%
AUS, 11%
fNRJ: j~
ISR, 3%
..--~~:___JE~~:::I ff~·1H
~~R~~"
SIG, 25%
M aj or lOR MYS, 20%

Tr ading
Partner s, 86% AUS, l 3%
ION, 10%
~:&.~a
~~~~----~------~ ~~;1%
THAILAND 2007
SIG,23%
MYS, 19%
M ajo r lOR
Tri!d ing
AUS, 14%
Partners, 87%
ION, 1 2%
IND, 6%
ARE, S%
SAU, 3%
ZAF, 3%
MMR, 2%
211
India
India’s intra-IOR exports have been fairly well distributed throughout the region. In
2001, major IOR trading partners accounted for 56 per cent share of exports and the rest
of the region received a solid 44 per cent share of India’s exports (Figure 7.7).
Figure 7.7: India’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001-2007

INDIA 2001 INDIA 2002
A RE, 1 6% A RE, 22%
M aj or lOR BGOr lO% SIG, 9%

M aj or lOR
Tr ading Tr ading BGO, B%
Partne rs, 56% SIG, 1 0%
Part n er s, 68%
SAU, 7%
MYS..- 7% LKA, 6%
SA U, 7 % MY$, 6%
ION, 5%
THA, 6 % THA, 5%
INDIA 2003 INDIA 2004
ARE, 2 5% ARE, 2 7%
M aj or lOR SIG, 1 0%
SG P, 14%
Tr ading BG0..- 8%
Partne rs, 75% BGD, 6%
l KA, 6%
lKA, S%
SA U, 6%
SA U, 5%
ION, 6% ION, 5%
MYSr S%
IRN, 5% ~~~.5~
THA, 4 % ISR, 4%
INDIA 2005 INDIA2006
A RE, 25% A RE, 27%
M aj or lOR M ajo r lOR

S IG, 1 6% S IG, 1 2%
Tr ading Tr ading
Part ner s, 72% LKA, 6% Part ne rs, 73% LKA, 6%
SAU,. 5% SAU, 6%
BGD, 5% BGD, 5%
ZAF, 4% ION, 5%
ZA~ 4%
1ISR,
1
W~·t~
3% JrN,'4~
INDIA 2007
ARE, 2 8%
M ajor lOR
SIG, ll%
Tr ading
Pa rtners, 73% LKA , 6%
SA U, 6%
BGO, S%
ION, 5%
t~~.~~
MYS, 4 %
The distribution by major IOR trading partners included 23 per cent each to Singapore,
Malaysia and Thailand in South East Asia and to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi
Arabia in the Middle East. Bangladesh was the destination country for 10 per cent of the
exports by value. Since 2002, Indonesia as a major trading partner was the destination
212
country for about 4 to 6 per cent of the exports by value. In 2005 and 2006, Malaysia
dropped off in the percentage share of exports by value. Overall, South East Asia’s
share of exports remained unchanged over the seven-year period.
The share of exports to the Middle East increased from 23 per cent in 2001 to 38 per
cent in 2007. The United Arab Emirates share increased from 16 per cent to 28 per cent
while the share of exports to Saudi Arabia remained constant at about 5-7 per cent. In
2003, Iran emerged as a major trading partner with about 4-5 per cent share of exports
by value.
India’s exports to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka as major trading partners have remained
constant at about 10-14 per cent share of exports by value. Amongst India’s other major
IOR trading partners were Israel in 2004-05 and South Africa in 2005-06. Both
countries have had a mixed percentage share of exports by value. Australia does not
appear in the list of India’s major IOR trading partners.
Although, India’s share of exports to other countries in the IOR region declined from 44
per cent in 2001 to 27 per cent in 2007, it remains the highest amongst the other IOR
countries for intra-IOR exports.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia’s major IOR trading partners have remained largely unchanged over the
last seven years (Figure 7.8).
The percentage share of exports to South East Asia has been the maximum varying
between 33 to 45 per cent. India after 2001 was overtaken by Pakistan in the South
Asian region as a major IOR trading partner.
Since 2002, Pakistan share of Saudi Arabia’s exports has remained constant at 7-8 per
cent. The percentage share of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates within the Middle
East region also remained steady at about 15-17 percent of the percentage share of
exports by value. South Africa’s percentage share of exports declined slightly from 10
per cent in 2001 to eight per cent in 2007.
Within the Red Sea region, Egypt in 2003 and Jordan in 2004 emerged as Saudi
Arabia’s major IOR trading partners. Interestingly, Australia, again like India, does not
appear in the list of major IOR trading partners of Saudi Arabia. Exports to other
countries in the region declined from 37 per cent in 2001 to 25 per cent in 2007.
213
Figure 7.8: Saudi Arabia’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001-2007
SAUDI ARABIA 2001 SAUDI ARABIA 2002
SIG, 23% SIG, 22%
M ajo r lOR ZAF, lO% Maj.or iOR BHR, 11%

Tr ading Tr ading
Partne rs, 63% BHR, 9 % Part ne rs, 53% ZAF, B%
THA, 7% PAK, B%
IND, 7% THA, 7%
IDN, 7% ION, 7%
SAUDI ARABIA 2003 SAUDI ARABIA 2004
SIG, 19 % SIG, 18 %
BHR, 10 % BHR, 10 %
M aj or lOR
ZAF, l O% ZAF, l O%
Tr ading
Partne rs, 71% THA, 8% THA, 8 %
ION, 7% PAK, 7%
PAK, 7% ION, 7%
ARE, 6% JOR, 6%
EGY, 4 % ARE, S%
SAU Dl ARABIA 2005 SAUDIARABIA2006
SIG, 23% SIG, l 9 %
BHR, 10 %
THA, l l %
Maj or lOR M aj-or lOR THA, 9%
Tr ading BHR, 10% Tr a d ing
Partner s, 78% ZAF, B%
PA K, 7% Part ne r s, 76%
PAK, 7%
ION, 7%
ION, 7%
JOR, 7%
A RE, 5% JOR, 6%
A RE, 5%
~~s.~~ MYS, 5%
SAUDI ARABIA 2007
SGP, 1 7%
BHR, 11%
M ajor lOR THA, 9%

Tr ading
PAK, 8%
Part ner s, 75%
ZAF, B%
ION, 7%
ARE,6%
JOR, 5%
EGY, 4 %
United Arab Emirates

Similar to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates major IOR trading partners remained
largely unchanged. The percentage share of exports to Singapore and Thailand in South
East Asia and to Oman and Iran in the Middle East varied between 23 to 30 per cent
(Figure 7.9). The percentage share of exports to India and Pakistan in South Asia also
varied between 17 to 26 per cent. Yemen in 2005 and Australia in 2006 emerged as
major IOR trading partners. Exports to other countries in the region declined from 31
per cent in 2001 to 20 per cent in 2007.
214
Figure 7.9: United Arab Emirates intra-IOR exports by value 2001-2007
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 2001 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 2002
O MN, 1 3% IRN, 1 7%
I RN, 13%
OMN, 13%
M aj or lOR M aj o r lOR
THA, 12%
Tr ading Tr ading SGP, 12%
Partne r s, 69% Partne r s, 70%
SGP, ll%
THA, 11%
PAK, 11%
PAK, lO%
IND, 9% IND, 7%
IRN, 1 5% IND, 18%
ii'HA, 1 3%
THA, 1 7%
M ajo r lOR SGP, 1 2%
Tr ading IRN, 1 3%
Partne rs, 75% I NO, 11%
SGP, 8%
PAK, 9%
PAK, S%
OMN, 9% OMN, 7%
SAU, 6% SAU, S%
VHA, 19 % THA, 1 9%
I NO, 1 5% INO, 14%

M aj or lOR Major lOR
IRN, 12% IRN, 11%
Tr ading Trading
Partner s, 82% PAK, 9% Partne rs, 81% SGP, 11%
SGP, 9% PA K, B%
O MN, 7% O MN, 7%
SAU, 5% SAU, 5%
YEM , 3%
KEN, 3% XD~: !~
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 2007
THA, 15%
IND, 1 5%
M aj or lOR IRN, 1 2%
Tr ading
P artne rs, SO% SGP, 10%
PAK, 9 %
OMN, 7%
SAU, S%
A US, 4%
YEM, 3%
Conclusion
The exports to developing countries for the 36 countries in the analysis had significantly
surpassed the exports to industrialised countries by 2007 where previously these exports
were higher. This is despite a 17 per cent increase in exports to industrialised countries
between 2001 and 2007. By 2007, exports to the world had more than doubled to nearly
US $1.9 trillion with intra-Indian Ocean trade accounting for 27 per cent of the export
value.
215
The intra-Indian Ocean trade with and without Australia, the only industrialised
country, in the region had nearly trebled from 2001. Only Bangladesh, Iraq, Madagascar
and Sudan had less than 10 per cent of value of intra-Indian Ocean exports as a
percentage of world exports. For Djibouti, Jordan, Maldives, Myanmar, Somalia and
Yemen the value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as percentage of world exports ranged
from 45 to 97 per cent.
Another correlation validates the significance of the intra-Indian Ocean trade. The value
of intra-Indian Ocean trade as a percentage of exports to developing countries for all
countries other than for Iran, Iraq and Sudan ranged from 30 to 99 per cent with 24
countries in the 41 to 85 per cent range. As for the value of intra-Indian Ocean exports
as percentage of exports to industrialised countries there were 9 countries whose exports
were predominantly to other countries within the region. The value of intra-Indian
Ocean exports for another 14 countries ranged from 41 to 99 per cent of the exports to
industrialised countries. Most of these trades would be moved by ships from within the
region.
The South East Asian countries which otherwise are viewed to be part of the Asia-
Pacific region and not the Indian Ocean accounted for more than half of the total intra-
Indian Ocean trade. In all, 10 of the 36 countries – Singapore, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia,
India, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Australia, Kuwait and Qatar in order
of ranking – accounted for 88 per cent of the exports by value in 2007. Of these
countries Kuwait and Qatar were new entrants in 2006 and 2007 respectively. From the
remaining 8 countries only India, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had more
than 20 per cent of their exports by value to other countries in the Indian Ocean Region.
Exports from Australia and South East Asian were limited to between 5 and 13 per cent
of the total exports by these countries. In all cases exports to other countries declined
from a high in 2001 that suggests a consolidation of trade amongst the faster developing
economies in the region.
The next chapter describes the shipping fleets from the Indian Ocean Region for a
comprehensive analysis of the regime for port state control in the Indian Ocean.
216
Chapter 8
Shipping and port state control in the Indian Ocean
This chapter discusses world shipping fleet operations and the structure of shipping
fleets in the Indian Ocean Region. This chapter analyses the effectiveness of the regime
for port state control in the Indian Ocean Region by assessing the Indian Ocean
Memorandum of Understanding for port state control as a case study.
Shipping a globalised industry

Shipping is by far the critical joining shackle in the chain anchoring the world economy.
By its inherent mobility, the shipping industry is potentially the most international and
globalised industry that necessitates equity in enforcement of regulatory standards
across the globe to be effective in regulating the industry.1
World Shipping operates in competition where only some shipping companies are bad
and they are in competition with the many good ones.2 Shipping is the cornerstone of
the global transport infrastructure and yet has the lowest public profile and the least
representative public image.3
The complexity of managing a globalised shipping industry has been exacerbated by the
fragmentation in ownership of the world shipping fleet. Broadly, merchant fleets can be
categorised into fleets by registration (nominal ownership) and fleets by nationality of
owner (beneficial ownership).
UNCLOS stipulates that ships must sail under the flag of one state alone specifying
duties of the flag state to not only effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in
administration, technical and social matters and also take measures to ensure safety of
the ship at sea.4 A ship must compulsorily assume the nationality of the flag state with
1
See International Maritime Organization (IMO), ‘International shipping and world trade: facts and
figures,’ Maritime Knowledge Centre, 2008. Available online:
<http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D23754/InternationalShippingandWorldTrad
e-factsandfigures..pdf>; Helen Sampson and Michael Bloor, ‘When jack gets out of the box: The
problems of regulating a global industry,’ Sociology, vol 41(3), 2007, pp. 551-569 and John Braithwaite
and Peter Drahos, Globalised Business Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
2
Bad ones are those that exercise the lowest levels of social responsibility (cheapskate policy) and the
good ones are those that exercise the highest (management intensive policy) - see discussion in Richard
Goss, ‘Social responsibility in shipping,’ Marine Policy, Vol 32, 2008 pp. 142-146.
3
IMO Maritime Knowledge Centre, ‘International shipping and world trade.’
4
LOSC Article 92, 94.
217
which it has been registered and has been granted the right to fly its flag. The flag flown
by the ship thereby creates the necessary link between flag state and ship but as we shall
see later this does not necessarily capture the genuine link between ship and shipowner.
The intense competition in the shipping industry in the 20th century led to the
emergence of international or open registers and bareboat charters besides time
honoured closed registers (see discussion below).
The stringent criteria applied by closed registries of ownership by citizens only and
employment of nationals alone as crew led to the creation of international registries in
an effort by traditional maritime nations to retain tonnage and yet maintain a
competitive advantage.
The creation of international registers effectively encouraged a shipowner to maintain

ships registry with the flag state operating a closed register while benefiting from lower
operating costs, such as, lower taxation and employment of non-nationals.
This phenomenon of ‘flagging out’ began in the late 1980’s with France-Kerguelen
Islands (1987), the Norwegian Ship Register (1987), the Danish International Ship
Register (1988), Portugal-Madeira (1988) and Spain-Canary Islands (1992). The Lloyds
Register Fairplay identifies China (2), New Zealand (1) and seven European countries –
Denmark (3), France (2), Netherlands (2), Norway (1), Portugal (1), Spain (1) and
United Kingdom (9) - as having 22 international registries between them.5
Another response to ‘flagging out’ has been the creation of bareboat charter or dual
flags. The underlying principle is the compatibility of the two registries whereby
matters regarding title, mortgage and encumbrances are provided by the first registry
while the charterer under the second registry is responsible for costs associated with the
operations of the vessel, such as, crew, provisions, bunkers and port charges.
The right to fly the flag of the first registry is suspended for the duration of the bareboat
charter. Some examples of countries that allow bareboat charter include Germany,
5
Lloyds Register, ‘World fleet statistics 2007,’Fairplay Ltd., 2007. Table 1A – China - Hong Kong,
Macao; New Zealand – Cook Islands; Denmark – Denmark (DIS), Faeroe Islands, Faeroes (FAS); France
– France (FIS), Wallis and Futuna; Netherlands – Aruba, Netherlands Antilles; Norway – Norway (NIS);
Portugal – Portugal (MAR); Spain – Spain (CSR); and United Kingdom – Anguilla, Bermuda, Cayman
Islands, Channel Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Isle of Man, Turks & Caicos Islands, British Virgin
Islands.
218
Denmark, Australia, Malta, Liberia and Philippines. Both international registries and
bareboat charter have provided traditional maritime states with some or all of the
flexibility of ‘Flags of Convenience (FoC)’ or open registries.
Although open registers have been in existence for centuries6 it was not until 1905 when
a legal distinction was first drawn between the nationality of a ship and the nationality
of the shipowners - by the flag flown and registry certifying the ships nationality.7 Since
then open registers became an attractive choice to increase profitability. European fleets
including those of Greece, Great Britain, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Germany,
Denmark, France, Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria followed American
shipowners in the period between the two world wars to register with Panama and reap
the benefits yielded by low registration fees and taxes together with the freedom to
employ cheap labour from the international market.8
The International Transport Federation (ITF) defines a Flag of Convenience (FoC) ship
as one that flies the flag of a country other than the country of beneficial ownership.9
The 1970 Rochdale Committee Inquiry into shipping set out six basic characteristics of
FoC countries:
 The country of registry allows ownership and/or control of ships by non-

citizens;
 Access to or transfer from the registry is easy and a ship may usually be
registered at a consul's office abroad;
 Taxes on income from ship operations are not levied locally or are low.
Normally the only charges include a registration fee and an annual fee based on
tonnage with a guarantee or acceptable understanding regarding freedom from
future taxation;
6
Francisco J. Montero Llacer, ‘Open registers: past, present and future’ Marine Policy, Vol 27, 2003, pp.
513-523.
7
Muscat Dhows under French Flag and owned by Muscat Sultanate a British Protectorate at that time –
see Permanent Court of Arbitration, ‘Muscat Dhows case: France v Great Britain,’ Award of the tribunal
of arbitration constituted in virtue of the compromis signed at London on 13 October 1904 between Great
Britain and France, The Hague, 8 Aug 1905. Available online: <http://www.pca-
cpa.org/upload/files/Muscat%20Dhows%20English%20Award.pdf>.
8
Joseph E. Vorbach, ‘The vital role of non-flag state actors in the pursuit of safer shipping,’ Ocean
Development & International Law, vol 32:1, 2001, pp. 27-42.
9
International Transport Federation (ITF), Flag of Convenience Campaign, viewed 22 Jan 2009,
<http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/index.cfm>.
219
 The country of registry is usually a small state which has no foreseeable
requirement for all the tonnage registered but the small charges on a large
tonnage can significantly affect its national income and balance of payments;
 Manning of ships by non-nationals is freely permitted; and
 The country of registry has neither the power nor the administrative machinery
for effectively imposing national or international rules of navigation and has
neither the desire nor the power to control the shipping companies
themselves.10
The feature where registration by itself is not considered essential for the exercise of
sovereignty by the state and the features of ownership and/or control by non-citizens
and the manning of ships by non-nationals makes it next to impossible to establish a
‘genuine link’11 between the vessel and the state of beneficial ownership by the flag
flown.
Flag States under various international conventions have the prime responsibility for
championing and enforcing standards of professional, safety, environmental, and social
performance of ships. Such accountability is unambiguously underpinned by the UN
Convention on Law of the Sea where ‘every state shall effectively exercise its
jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying
its flag.’12
In the protection and preservation of the marine environment, states shall ensure
compliance by vessels flying their flag or of their registry with applicable international
rules and standards and with the laws and regulations where ‘flag states shall provide
for the effective enforcement of such rules, standards, laws and regulations, irrespective
of where a violation occurs.’13
10
International Labour Organization (ILO), ‘The impact on seafarers living and working conditions of
changes in the structure of the shipping industry,’ JMC/29/2001/3, Report for discussion at the 29th
session of the Joint Maritime Commission, Geneva 2001.
11
12
LOSC Article 94.
13
LOSC Article 217.
220
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) framework
The IMO first met in 1959 and for 60 years has had the task of developing and
maintaining a comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping, which is captured by
its mission statement ‘safe, secure and efficient shipping on clean oceans.’14
Towards accomplishing the ideals reflected in this mission statement, the IMO has
developed a body of international conventions governing every aspect of shipping from
maritime safety, prevention of marine pollution and liability and compensation, to
conventions dealing with facilitation, tonnage measurement, unlawful acts against
shipping and salvage.
The purpose of the organization is ‘to provide machinery for cooperation among
Governments in the field of governmental regulation and practices relating to technical
matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade; to encourage and
facilitate the general adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning
maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution
from ships.’15
The IMO spearheads the International Conventions for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS), Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and on the Standards
Training Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) to establish
environmental, safety, navigation, shipbuilding, watchkeeping and registration
requirements for all ships. The legal framework for quality shipping adopted by the
International Maritime Organisation and implemented through country specific
legislation has been further strengthened from the labour-related initiatives taken by the
International Labour Organisation (ILO). The ILO through Convention No 147 and the
Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) 2006 has responsibility for establishing guidelines
on employment conditions for seafarers. There are numerous other international
conventions related to international shipping standards concerning vessel construction,
design, equipment, operation and manning requirements but STCW, SOLAS,
MARPOL, and MLC are seen as the four pillars supporting the foundation and structure
of the international regime for quality shipping.
14
International Maritime Organization (IMO), ‘Introduction to IMO,’ viewed 17 Jan 2009,
<http://www.imo.org/>.
15
IMO, ‘Introduction to IMO.’
221
At present, there are 10 IMO conventions that are yet to enter into force, some of which
have been superseded:
 International Convention for Safe Containers (CSC) 1993 amendments – 42

acceptances required to enter into force. Australia is the only Indian Ocean
Region member state from the nine acceptances to date;
 Torremolinos Protocol of 1993 relating to the Torremolinos International
Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels, 1977 (SFV PROT 1993) – entry
into force 12 months after being accepted by 15 contracting states with
aggregate number of whose fishing vessels of 24 metres in length and over is
not less than 14,000. There is not a single Indian Ocean Region member state
to date from the 2 signatories and 14 contracting states with 3064 fishing
vessels of 24 metres in length and over;
 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel (STCW-F) 1995 – entry into force
12 months after being accepted by 15 contracting states. There is not a single
Indian Ocean Region member state to date from the eight contracting states
and 2 signatories;
 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, 1978 (disputes) amendments – 52 acceptances necessary to
enter into force. South Africa is the only Indian Ocean member state from the
20 acceptances to date;
 Protocol of 2002 to amend the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of
Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, 1974 (PAL PROT 2002) – entry into
force 12 months after being accepted by 10 states. There is not a single Indian
Ocean Region member state to date from the 4 contracting parties and 6
signatories subject to acceptance/ratification;
 Operating Agreement on the International Mobile Satellite Organization
(INMARSAT OA) 1994 and 2006 amendments - Two-thirds of Signatories
holding at least two-thirds of total investment shares at time of adoption to
enter into force;
 International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in
connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by sea
(HNS), 1996 – entry into force 18 months after the date on which the
222
following conditions are fulfilled: at least 12 States, including four States each
with not less than 2 million units of gross tonnage have expressed their
consent to be bound by it and the Secretary-General received information that
States who would be liable to contribute have received a total quantity of at
least 40 million tonnes of cargo during the preceding calendar year. There is
not a single Indian Ocean member state from the eight signatories subject to
ratification and 10 contracting states;
 International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast
Water and Sediments (BWM), 2004 – entry into force 12 months after at least
30 member states with a combined merchant fleet of not less than 35 per cent
of the world gross tonnage have accepted. Australia from the five signatories
subject to ratification and Egypt and Maldives from the 11 contracting states
are the only Indian Ocean member states;
 Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA 2005) - 90 days following the
date on which 12 member states have accepted. Australia is the only Indian
Ocean member state from the 10 signatories subject to ratification and the two
contracting states; and
 Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf (SUA PROT
2005) – 90 days following the date on which three member states have
accepted. However, the protocol may not enter into force before SUA 2005.
Australia is the only Indian Ocean member state from the 10 signatories
subject to ratification.16
World shipping
Shipping moves 90 per cent of global trade.17 In 2007, seaborne trade an enabler of, and
supported by, the growth in world economies recorded an annual growth of 4.8 per
cent.18
16
IMO, ‘Status of Multilateral Conventions or Instruments in respect of which the International Maritime
Organization or its Secretary-General performs depositary or other functions as at 31 December 2007.’
17
IMO Maritime Knowledge Centre, ‘International shipping and world trade.’
18
Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, ‘Review of Maritime Transport, 2008,’ United Nations, New York
and Geneva, 2008.
223
As on 31 December 2007, the world fleet stood at 97,504 ships of 774.9 million GT and
an average age of 22 years.19 The world cargo carrying fleet comprised 51,538 ships of
737.3 million GT and average age of 20 years.20
The 20 leading merchant fleets by registration account for 47 per cent of the total
number of ships in the world fleet but 80 per cent by gross tonnage. While the cargo
carrying fleet of the leading merchant fleets by registration stands at 56 per cent and 82
per cent by gross tonnage.
Singapore and India are the only two Indian Ocean Region countries in the top 20
merchant fleets by registration. Singapore’s fleet is ranked fourth with 2257 ships of
36,251,735 million GT and average age of 15 years. India’s fleet is ranked 19th with
1417 ships of 9,168,046 million GT and average age of 18 years.21
While the 20 leading merchant fleets by nationality of owner of ships 1000 GT and
above account for 67 per cent of the total number of ships in the fleet and 81 per cent by
gross tonnage. The cargo carrying fleet of the leading merchant fleets by nationality of
owner similarly stands at 68 per cent and 81 per cent by gross tonnage.22
The combined fleet of Singapore, India, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia stands at 5 per cent
and 6 per cent by gross tonnage amongst the leading merchant fleets by nationality of
owner. The cargo carrying fleet of the four Indian Ocean Region countries similarly
stands at 4 per cent of the world fleet and 6 per cent by gross tonnage.
The market share of ship completions in 2007 by region by gross tonnage stands at
South Korea 35 per cent, Japan 31 per cent, China 18 per cent, Europe 12 per cent and
rest of the world 4 per cent.23
The Indian Ocean Region merchant fleet by registration stands at 16 per cent of the
world fleet and of 11 per cent by gross tonnage with an average age of 24 years
compared to an average age of 22 years for the world fleet. The cargo carrying fleet by
19
Lloyds Register – Fairplay Ltd., ‘World fleet statistics 2007.’
20
21
22
23
224
registration similarly stands at 14 per cent and of 10 per cent by gross tonnage with an
average age of 26 years compared to an average age of 20 years for the world fleet.24
IOR shipping fleet

In the last eight years, there were 10 countries by number of ships from the region
amongst the principal merchant fleets by country of registration (Table 8.1 and Figure
8.1). Between 2001 and 2007, the combined fleets of these countries as a percentage of
the world fleet recorded a 3 per cent growth.
Table 8.1: Principal merchant fleets by Indian Ocean country of registration

Year Indonesia Singapore India Malaysia Australia Thailand Iran Egypt Saudi Arabia Kuwait
2001 2528 1729 1018 882 622 568 389 364 274 200
2002 2628 1768 1010 915 624 629 380 361 280 201
2003 2700 1761 1028 972 643 671 382 346 285 208
2004 2826 1842 1066 1013 652 751 430 341 292 213
2005 3214 1977 1096 1052 671 789 453 344 300 222
2006 4271 2079 1181 1101 672 789 475 348 304 220
2007 4469 2257 1417 1151 692 858 508 344 311 212
Source: Compiled from World Fleet Statistics 2007 in Appendix 11
Figure 8.1: Principal merchant fleets by Indian Ocean country of registration
2008
2007
• Indonesia
• Singapore
2006 • India
• Malaysia
2005
•Australia
2004 • Thailand
e Iran
2003 0 Egypt
u Saudi Arabia
2002
• Kuwait
2001
2000
Source: Compiled from World fleet statistics 2007 – Appendix 11
Amongst the principal merchant fleets from the region, the Indonesian register had the
highest growth of 76 per cent with 1941 more ships added to the fleet in 2007 than
2001. The registered fleets of other South East Asian countries and India also recorded
over 30% growth in the same period.
24
Appendix 11.
225
There were 528 ships added to Singapore’s register, 399 ships to India’s register, 290
ships to Thailand’s register and 269 ships to Malaysia’s register. In the Middle East sub-
region, Iran recorded a 30 per cent growth with 119 ships added to the registered fleet.
The registered fleet of Saudi Arabia added 37 ships; Kuwait added 12 ships; and
Egypt’s fleet declined by 20 ships. Australia’s registered fleet increased just 11 per cent
with 70 ships added to the register.
The combined gross tonnage of the principal merchant fleets from the region as a
percentage of world fleet gross tonnage remained static and recorded a marginal
increase of one per cent between 2001 and 2007 (Table 8.2 and Figure 8.2).
Table 8.2 Tonnage of principal merchant fleets by Indian Ocean country of registration
Saudi
Year Singapore India Malaysia Iran Indonesia Kuwait Australia Thailand Egypt
Arabia
2001 21022604 6688153 5207136 3943576 3613139 2291672 1887808 1771382 1350449 1132533
2002 21148090 6142073 5394356 4128389 3723052 2255972 1861321 1879581 1274990 1472135
2003 23240945 6960567 5745771 4851927 3840408 2324290 1905778 2268686 1151430 1363912
2004 26282777 7517583 6056561 5324254 4072144 2377628 1971876 2889877 1143201 1678474
2005 30989786 8065009 5758729 5270599 4330407 2315680 1794928 3025332 1128712 1028103
2006 32173922 8381185 6389000 5207276 5287148 2156836 1852796 2882703 1141729 1021845
2007 36251735 9168046 6974618 3576860 5669830 2426799 1911160 2846939 1113268 942204
Figure 8.2: Tonnage of principal merchant fleets by Indian Ocean country of registration
2008
2007
•Singapore
• India
2006 •Malaysia
2005
•Iran
• Indonesia
2004 •Kuwait
G Australia
2003 G Thailand
Col Egypt
2002
a Saudi Arabia
2001
2000
Source: Compiled from World fleet statistics 2007 – Appendix 11
Comparatively the South East Asian countries and India added significant tonnage to
their registered fleets with Singapore outperforming the other nations. The gross
tonnage of Singapore’s register grew by 72 per cent followed by Thailand’s register 60
per cent, Indonesia 57 per cent, India 37 per cent and Malaysia 34 per cent. The Middle
226
East countries all recorded a decline in tonnage except Kuwait with a growth of six per
cent in registered gross tonnage. Australia’s registered gross tonnage too remained static
with a one per cent growth in eight years.
The Indian Ocean Region merchant fleet by nationality of owner of ships 1000 GT and
above stands at 11.5 per cent of the world fleet with 11 per cent by gross tonnage and
average age of 22 years same as the average age of the world fleet. The cargo carrying
fleet by nationality of owner similarly stands at 11 per cent with 11 per cent by gross
tonnage and average age of 22 years compared to average age of 21 years for the world
fleet.25 There were 12 countries from the region amongst the principal merchant fleets
by nationality of owner of ships 1000 GT and above (Table 8.3 and Figure 8.3).
Table 8.3: Number of ships of principal merchant fleets by nationality of owner

Saudi South
Year Singapore Indonesia India Malaysia Thailand UAE Iran Egypt Australia Kuwait
Arabia Africa
2001 714 605 407 312 258 185 163 126 121 87 35 27
2002 1284 1400 740 535 396 4 286 329 334 438 135 126
2003 758 616 394 335 254 1 156 114 126 88 32 27
2004 715 672 386 327 298 1 172 119 123 85 57 29
2005 764 724 411 325 316 301 179 127 134 80 69 26
2006 794 793 456 357 298 366 184 139 150 85 68 30
2007 869 850 538 393 342 425 179 144 165 85 69 34
Figure 8.3: Number of ships of principal merchant fleets by nationality of owner
• Singapore
2008
• Indonesia
2007 • India
2006 • Malaysia
• Thailand
2005
• UAE
2004 • Iran
2003 • Egypt
Saudi Arabia
Cll
2002
•Kuwait
Australia
2001 • Cll South Africa

2000
25
Appendix 11.
227
The combined fleet of these countries as a percentage of world fleet remained static
increasing marginally by one per cent in the eight-year period between 2001 and 2007.26
The striking aspect is that by nationality of owner for ships of 1000 GT and above, only
Australia’s fleet declined during the eight-year period from 2001 to 2007. All other
fleets recorded growth. The fleets of United Arab Emirates and Kuwait doubled, while
the fleets of Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia from the Middle East sub-region recorded a
10 to 36 per cent growth in the number of ships by nationality of owner. The South East
Asian countries and India recorded between 22 to 40 per cent growth and South Africa
recorded 26 per cent growth in the number of ships by nationality of owner. At the same
time, the combined gross tonnage of the ships from these countries as a percentage of
world gross tonnage increased by two per cent (Table 8.4 and Figure 8.4).
The South East Asian countries recorded a 56 to 87 per cent growth in gross tonnage of
ships by nationality of owner. India and South Africa recorded a 38 per growth in the
same period. Amongst the Middle East countries, United Arab Emirates more than
doubled its gross tonnage by nationality of owner. Besides Egypt that remained static,
the other countries Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia all recorded 38 to 58 per cent growth
in gross tonnage by nationality of owner. While the gross tonnage of Australia’s fleet by
nationality of owner declined.
Table 8.4: Gross tonnage of principal merchant fleets by nationality of owner

Year Singapore )ndia Saudi Arabia Malaysia )ran )ndonesia UAE Australia Kuwait Thailand Egypt South Africa

26
Data for 2002 has not been included in the analysis, as no logical explanation could be found for the
sudden increase in fleet size from 2001 and an immediate decline in 2003 in the Lloyds Register –
Fairplay Ltd. statistics.
228
Figure 8.4: Gross tonnage of principal merchant fleets by nationality of owner
2009
•Singapore
2008
•India
2007 •Saudi Arabia
2006 •Malaysia
•Iran
2005
•Indonesia
2004 •UAE
2003 •Australia
•Kuwait
2002
•Thailand
2001 • Egypt
2000 •South Africa
Indian Ocean port state control

The MV Amoco Cadiz incident27 in 1978 provoked the first regional response to
eliminating substandard shipping from European waters. European port states party to
the relevant IMO maritime safety conventions for the first time in 1982 created a
regional grouping in an effort to coordinate regular and systematic control of ships. A
group of 14 European countries initially signed the Paris Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU). Similar groupings in other regions did not emerge for nearly a
decade.
In the process of regime formation, the trigger for eliminating substandard shipping
altogether seems to be a 1992 report by the Australian Parliament that noted, ‘It is a
world of too many ships that are over aged and under maintained chasing too little
freight for too little return.’28 Since then eight regional memoranda have come into force
with the United States of America enforcing its own port state control regime. As of 01
January 2008, 113 of the 170 IMO member states/associate members exercise port state
control in the implementation of IMO and ILO conventions (Table 8.5).
27
The Merchant Vessel (MV) Amoco Cadiz, a Very Large Crude Carrier, split in two after running
aground three miles off the coast of Brittany (France) on 16 March 1978 with its entire cargo of 227, 000
tons of crude oil spilling into the sea. It was the largest oil spill at that time – See Cedre, ‘Amoco Cadiz,’
viewed 28 Mar 2009, <http://www.cedre.fr/en/spill/amoco/amoco.php>.
28
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Ships of Shame: Inquiry into ships safety,’ Report from
the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Transport Communications and Infrastructure,
1992.
229
Table 8.5: Port state control regimes
Port State
Region Members Target Inspection rate
Control
European Paris MoU Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, 25% annual inspection rate
Union 1982 Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, per country
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian
Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United
Kingdom [20]
Latin America Acuerdo de Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, 15% annual inspection rate
Vina del Mar Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, per country within 3 years
MoU 1992 Venezuela [13]
Asia Pacific Tokyo MoU Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Fiji, Hong Kong 75% annual regional
1993 (China), Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, inspection rate
Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea,
Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand,
Vanuatu, Vietnam [18 including Australia in IOMOU
& Canada in Paris MoU]
United States United States Annual targeted flag list
of America Coast Guard
1994
Caribbean Caribbean Antigua & Barbuba, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, 15% annual inspection rate
MoU 1996 Cayman Islands, Cuba, Grenada, Guyana , Jamaica, per country within 3 years
Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, Netherland Antilles
[12]
Mediterranean Mediterranean Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 15% annual inspection rate
MoU 1997 Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey [11] per country within 3 years
Indian Ocean Indian Ocean Australia, Eritrea, India, Iran, Kenya, Maldives, 10% annual inspection rate
MoU 1998 Mauritius, Oman, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, per country within 3 years
Tanzania, Yemen [13 including Australia in Tokyo
MoU Oman in GCC MoU and South Africa in Abuja
MoU]
West Abuja MoU Benin, Cape Verde, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, 15% annual inspection rate
&Central 1999 Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, per country within 3 years
Africa Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South
Africa, Togo [17 including South Africa in IOMOU]
Black Sea Black sea Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russian Federation, 15% annual inspection rate
MoU 2000 Ukraine, Turkey [6] per country within 3 years
Persian Gulf GCC MoU Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United 10% annual inspection rate
2004 Arab Emirates [6 including Oman in IOMOU] per country within 3 years
Source: Compiled by author from regional PSC websites
In the words of John Hare, potentially the only serious intellectual contribution from the
region, port state control involves ‘the powers and concomitant obligations vested in,
exercised by, and imposed upon a national maritime authority by international
convention or domestic statute or both, to board, inspect and where appropriate detain a
merchant ship flying a flag foreign to that state in order to ensure compliance by that
ship with all applicable international safety at sea instruments and with any domestic
legislative maritime safety requirements.’29 Figure 8.5 provides a simplified overview
of the port state control regime for quality shipping.
29
John Hare, ‘Port state control: Strong medicine to cure a sick industry,’ Georgia journal of
International and Comparative Law, Vol 26 (3), 1997 reprinted online, viewed 4 Jan 2009,
<http://www.uctshiplaw.com/psc2.htm>.
230
Figure 8.5: Overview of the port state control regime
United Nations
Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea
International
International Maritime Organization Labour
Organization
Guide
National STCW SOLAS MARPOL
ILO 147 / MLC
2006
Legislation Regime
Implementation
Ship operator Monitor
Compliance
Nominal Ship
Flag State Classification
Owner Administration Societies Registration
System Pillars of
Beneficial Port State
Owner Control
• Bahrain, Kuwait, • Australia, Indonesia,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Malaysia, Singapore,
Arabia, United Arab Thailand
Emirates
Financiers
Riyadh Tokyo
Financial MOU MOU
Institutions Port Interface
Port State • Inspection • Australia, Eritrea,
Control • Verification India, Iran, Kenya,
P & I clubs Opportunity • Targeting
Maldives, Mauritius,
Oman, South Africa,
Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Tanzania, Yemen
IOMOU
Charterer
Freight Ship
IDDD
Commercial Commercial
Forwarder Requirements Incentives Vetting
I Cargo
Owner
System

Power based actors and structural leadership
The Indian Ocean (IO) MoU was initially signed by eight of the 22 countries that
participated in the preparatory meeting on developing port state control capabilities in
the Indian Ocean. By establishing the IOMOU on PSC, the process of PSC regime
formation is one of negotiation amongst port states in an effort to eliminate substandard
shipping in the region. Now in the tenth year of port state control the IOMOU
comprises 13 member states (Australia, Eritrea, India, Iran, Kenya, Maldives, Mauritius,
Oman, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania and Yemen) from the 36 Indian Ocean
rim countries with observers from IMO, ILO, Ethiopia, Equasis, Black Sea MoU, Abuja
MoU, Tokyo MoU and the United States Coast Guard.
231
The majority of Gulf countries and all of South East Asian countries in the Indian
Ocean Region are members of the GCC MoU and Tokyo MoU respectively. Further,
Australia and South Africa at the eastern and western limits of the ocean space are also
members of the Tokyo MoU and Abuja MoU respectively. Taken together 22 of the 36
Indian Ocean rim countries are members of the regime for regional port state control.
Table 8.6 gives the flag state performance of Indian Ocean countries under the Paris
MoU, Tokyo MoU and IOMOU that are members of either/both the Tokyo MoU and
IOMOU port state control regimes. None of the Eastern and Southern Africa region
countries has more than 30 inspections across three port state control regimes for the
periods 2001-2003 and 2004-2006.
Table 8.6: Flag state performance of Indian Ocean PSC countries

No of Inspections No of Detentions
Countries
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Australia 10 10 6 20 13 11 70 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eritrea 1 2 1 4 2 1 11 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
India 222 198 162 263 160 155 1160 18 15 15 14 14 8 84
Indonesia 152 143 237 453 225 206 1416 50 33 66 132 55 49 385
Iran 148 130 121 159 181 143 882 19 14 15 11 9 3 71
Kenya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malaysia 472 373 368 744 339 272 2568 40 37 27 45 27 22 198
Maldives 10 9 15 12 14 15 75 2 1 3 3 2 2 13
Mauritius 7 5 2 0 2 3 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oman 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Singapore 1007 1081 1019 1598 1192 1289 7186 38 44 51 69 41 33 276
South Africa 3 3 4 3 1 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sri Lanka 5 13 11 27 30 15 101 0 1 4 7 7 6 25
Sudan 4 6 5 1 0 0 16 1 3 2 1 0 0 7
Tanzania 4 0 4 5 1 3 17 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Thailand 287 293 250 631 454 464 2379 26 20 19 74 39 40 218
Yemen 2 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Note:
1) The information is the cumulative total of the data available from the Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU, and
IOMOU. Annual reports/databases of other regional MoU’s are not available. The USCG PSC does not
constitute a regional port state control regime.
2) The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) annual reports are used to correct for duplication of
Australia’s inspection reports in the Tokyo MoU and IO MoU.
3 Personal email communication on 23 February 2008 from Captain A.M. Al-Janahi, Director GCC MoU
indicated that the MoU has just started functioning and so no data is available as yet
Source: Compiled from Port State Control data – Appendix 11
Table 8.7 provides the 3-year average detention percentage of the Indian Ocean
countries, which have had 30 or more inspections over at least one 3-year period.
Australian flagged ships are the top performers with no detentions in the three port state
control regimes for the six-year period. Most countries improved their detention
percentage during 2004-2006. The detention percentage of ships flagged in Sri Lanka
was higher for 2004-2006.
232
Table 8.7: 3-Year average detention percentage of Indian Ocean PSC countries
Countries 2001-2003 2004-2006
Inspections Detentions Detention % Inspections Detentions Detention %
Australia 26 0 0.00 44 0 0.00
India 582 48 8.25 578 36 6.23
Indonesia 532 149 28.01 884 236 26.70
Iran 399 48 12.03 483 23 4.76
Malaysia 1213 104 8.57 1355 94 6.94
Maldives 34 6 17.65 41 7 17.07
Singapore 3107 133 4.28 4079 143 3.51
Sri Lanka 29 5 17.24 72 20 27.78
Thailand 830 65 7.83 1549 153 9.88
Note:
1) The PSC countries listed are those with 30 or more inspections over at least one 3-year period.
2) The Information is the cumulative total of the data available from the Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and IOMOU.
3) The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) annual reports are used to correct for duplication of
Australia’s inspection reports in the Tokyo MoU and IOMOU.
In Table 8.8, using the Tokyo MoU formula that requires minimum 30 inspection
reports to determine the Black-Grey-White list performance, only Singapore from the
Tokyo MoU makes it consistently to the white list amongst Indian Ocean PSC
countries.
Table 8.8: Black-Grey-White list performance of Indian Ocean PSC countries

Countries 3- Year period List Inspections Detentions BG Limit GW Limit Excess factor
2001-2003 <30 reports 26 0 4 -1 0.16
Australia
2004-2006 44 0 6 0 0.30
2001-2003 582 48 51 30 0.84
India
2004-2006 578 36 51 30 0.29
2001-2003 532 149 47 27 6.94
Indonesia
2004-2006 884 236 75 49 6.76
2001-2003 399 48 37 19 1.83
Iran
2004-2006 483 23 44 24 -0.09
2001-2003 1213 104 100 70 1.10
Malaysia
2004-2006 1355 94 111 79 0.47
2001-2003 34 6 5 -1 1.46
Maldives
2004-2006 41 7 6 0 1.55
2001-2003 3107 133 241 194 -0.69
Singapore
2004-2006 4079 143 313 258 -0.99
2001-2003 <30 reports 29 5 5 -1 1.17
Sri Lanka
2004-2006 72 20 9 1 5.14
2001-2003 830 65 71 46 0.77
Thailand
2004-2006 1549 153 125 91 1.56
Note:
1) The PSC countries listed are those with 30 or more inspections over at least one 3-year period.
2) The Information is the cumulative total of the data available from the Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and IOMOU adjusted for
Australia’s reports.
India’s flag state performance remained unchanged in the grey list between the two
three-year periods of assessment. Indonesia and Maldives flag state performance
continued to be in the black list. Iran’s flag state performance improved from black to
white list and so too Malaysia’s flag state performance improved from black to grey list.
Thailand’s flag state performance went from the grey to black list whereas Australia and
233
Sri Lanka with less than 30 inspection reports in 2001-2003 were in the grey and black
list respectively during the period 2004-2006.
Knowledge based actors and intellectual leadership

The starting year for the literature review is 1993, soon after the Australian Parliament
Report Ships of Shame: Inquiry into ship safety in 1992 exposed the menace of sub-
standard shipping.30 The report further drew international attention on the importance of
coordinated port state control.31 Using bibliometrics the ‘Web of Science’ Journal
Citation Reports reveal five journals of relevance on maritime affairs. An expanded
literature search of cited journals and UNSW@ADFA library cross search/e-journals
databases shows three other journals of relevance. Not one of the eight journals
originates in the Indian Ocean Region.
The few localised journals published by a small number of maritime ‘think tanks’ from
Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore enjoy limited patronage and
readership.32 The lack of national annual reports on port state control, but for Australia
and South Africa, further exacerbates the problem of establishing effectiveness.
The IOMOU database that came online only in 2002 and annual reports provide limited
statistics for evaluating individual port state effectiveness. For instance, these annual
reports do not provide the number of individual ship visits and the number of individual
ships inspected needed to establish the inspection rate for a particular port state.
This rather limited intellectual leadership by knowledge-based actors within the region
creates an unfathomable ‘abyss’ in establishing the extent of implementation and
effectiveness of port state control. Table 8.9 and 8.10 summarise the results of the
keyword, country/territory and subject category search of the Journal Citation Reports.
30
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Ships of Shame: Inquiry into ships safety.’
31
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Ships of Shame: Inquiry into ships safety,’ p. 70.
32
Australia: Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), Australian
Association for Maritime Affairs (AAMA), Sea Power Centre (SPC); India: National Maritime
Foundation (NMF) and Society of Indian Ocean Studies (SOIS); Indonesia: Forum for Defence and
Maritime Studies; Malaysia: Maritime Institute of Malaysia; and Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies Centre - Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (Maritime Security programme);
and the Indian Ocean Research Group (IORG) – potentially the only Indian Ocean wide think tank.
234
Table 8.9: Indian Ocean intellectual leadership in port state control
Subject category J omnals I
Area Studies 3-t

EnviroumentaiStudies 51
Iutemational Relations 50
Political Science 85
Lmv 100
TrmupOt1ation[social scieme] 13
Oceanogr8J)hy -1-8
Mmine &. Fn:sh Water Biology 79
Civi!Eugineaing 83
.Tonrnals Impact
Factm Kcv:·d Subject
rank
Jourual CltationRepo11s (JCR) Sodal Sdenct Editiom
Marine Policy 1.050 111 19/5~
Ioumal ofMaritime Law and Commerce OA86 111 ~9/50
Ocean Developmeut &. h1temational Lmv 0.16' 111 ~/50
TransportReseR"Cb. PartE- Logistics 111d TrlllSJlOI1ation Review 0.6-4-3 10/11 1~13
Jourual CltationRep011s (JCR) Sdm<'f' Editions
Ocean &. Coastal Managemeut 1.011 3/7 & 3/7 ~9/ 18
Oth« :l:dition.s
MaritimePoliC}·aud Mauagc1ncut NA NA NA
MaritimeEconOtllics and Logistics NA NA NA
1nremationa1Jowual of.Mmine & Coastal Law NA NA NA
bullan O<'f'Rit JCR Sodal Sdftt<'f' Editions
Australian 1oumal of Political Science- Australia 0.397 718 5-1-/85
Australian 1oumal oflntemationalAffain -Australia OA89 ~ ~8/50
bullan O<'f'Rit JCR Sdftt<'f' Editions
htdian1oumal of Marine Sciences- htdia 0.~09 3-t/3-t -t5/-t8
f!OM!al Fngineering.Tonmai-Sin!tlll>ore 03.H 717 10/R~
Afric1111oumal ofMmiue Sciences - SouthA.fiica 1.086 ~0/3-t 3/79
The results of the keywords search were analysed to identify four journals in the social
sciences, one non-technical journal in the science edition and three other editions. A
country/territory search showed only five Indian Ocean countries publish journals in the
social sciences and 16 countries publish science editions. Only three journals from the
193 science editions contained one of the keywords [used to identify PSC relevant
journals internationally] and two from the 26 social science editions, but none of the
editions is relevant to the analysis on port state control. A search of the subject category
reveals a large number of international editions in the same subject category as that of
the identified journals. For instance, there are 52 other journals in Environmental
Studies, the same subject category as the Marine Policy journal (Table 8.9).
The Marine Policy and Ocean & Coastal Management editions together returned 145
search results with the phrase ‘Indian Ocean,’ but only 14 articles mention ‘Indian
Ocean’ in the title, abstract or keywords. The two journals returned 52 articles with the
235
phrase ‘port state control,’ but only 10 of those articles mentioned the Indian Ocean.
Besides the Marine Policy edition, the Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce
returned the maximum number of search results for the majority of word phrases used.
However, in the entire journal the phrase ‘Indian Ocean’ returned just 12 search results.
The Ocean Development & International Law edition returned 36 search results with
the word phrase ‘Indian Ocean’ and 16 search results with the word phrase ‘port state
control’(Table 8.10). Most of the literature has tended to focus on the necessity for port
state inspections and how best to achieve implementation, rather than on effectiveness
of port state control.
Table 8.10: Keyword search in identified maritime journals

Journal Engine Period Type PS PSC FS CS P&I MSa MSe FOC IO
Science 1993- TAK 8 (2) 7 (2) 7 (2) 3 (0) 5 (0) 6 (0) 6 (2) 3 (0) 6
Marine Policy Direct 2008 FT 65 (8) 42 (5) 102 (18) 31 (4) 91 (9) 59 (9) 18 (5) 35 (4) 65
Ocean & Coastal Science 1993- TAK 1 (0) 0 1 (0) 0 0 0 0 0 8
Management Direct 2008 FT 18 (8) 10(5) 22 (6) 2 (0) 0 17(4) 5 (2) 6 (0) 80
Ocean Development EBSCO 1996- TAK 3 2 1 0 0 0 4 2 4
& International 2008 FT 27 16 60 4 1 19 14 19 36
Law
Journal of ProQuest / 1993- FT 40 32 40 26 6 43 22 20 12
Maritime Law and Heinonline 2008
Commerce
Transportation Science 1993- FT 4 3 3 4 1 3 0 3 1
Research Direct 2008
Part E
Maritime Policy & EBSCO 1999- FT 14 11 9 7 1 20 6 13 6
Management 2008
Maritime ProQuest 2003- FT 7 5 7 7 1 9 16 4 1
Economics & 2008
Logistics
International Ingenta 1993- TAK 4 3 8 0 0 2 1 1 3
Journal of Marine Connect 2008
& Coastal Law
Notes:
1. Figures in parenthesis indicate the number of hits for ‘Indian Ocean’ within the search results containing that particular word.
For example, in Marine Policy only 5 of the 42 full text search results had word phrases ‘port state control’ and ‘Indian Ocean’
2. Abbreviations used:
PS – Port State; PSC – Port State Control; FS – Flag State; CS – Classification Societies; P&I – P&I Insurance;
MSa – Maritime Safety; MSe – Maritime Security; FOC – Flags of Convenience; IO – Indian Ocean
TAK – Title, Abstract, Keyword search; FT – Full Text search
According to a 1993 report on the UK Government position, port state control had
started to address safety issues, – ship management, crew standards and state of ship –
but not without limitations placing continued emphasis on flag state control.33
Dijxhoorn in focusing on the limitations of port state control – conditional inspections,
avoiding undue delay and sunk administrative costs – places emphasis on responsible
33
Douglas Bell, ‘Port state control v Flag state control: UK Government position,’ Marine Policy, Vol.
17 (5), 1993, pp 367-370.
236
ownership, effective flag state supervision and properly crewed ships.34 As an IMO
officer, Dijxhoorn defends IMO’s limited enforcement powers and foresees a new IMO
role of greater scrutiny and development of guidelines for classification societies and
other inspection agencies by the IMO sub-committee on Flag State Implementation.
Boisson traces the history of classification societies, most founded by marine insurers to
assess risks and the gradual move from rating to certification as maritime nations took
over regulatory responsibilities from private bodies.35 A Bureau Veritas team member,
Boisson evaluated how classification societies trapped between certification and
evaluation came under criticism from insurers, charters and bankers, which led to the
P&I clubs and charterers establishing their own ship quality appraisal systems.
Payoyo from the Dalhousie Law School examined the implementation of international
conventions under the 1982 Paris MoU on regional port state control to argue that
European regional cooperation was able to establish baseline data on substandard
shipping in the region, mobilise the shipping industry into complying with international
standards, and optimise employment of national resources.36 However, even after 10
years of implementation, this has not eliminated substandard shipping and the limited
success has come at substantial cost to participating countries.37 Payoyo suggests in his
findings that introducing similar regional PSC regimes on a global scale could achieve
far greater results in combating substandard shipping and even optimise cost sharing.38
Professor Wonham, Chair of International Transport, University of Wales, highlights

the progress made at the IMO in extending port state control to operational requirements
under SOLAS and MARPOL conventions.39 The IMO adopted Assembly resolution
A.787 (19) on ‘Procedures for Port State Control’ to address concerns of unfair
targeting of open registries that includes a 10-point list on what constitute ‘clear
grounds’ to conduct a more detailed investigation than simple verification of papers.
34
O. H. J. Dijxhoorn, ‘Port and shipping management: the role of IMO,’ Marine Policy, Vol. 17 (5),
1993, pp. 363-366.
35
Philippe Boisson, ‘Classification societies and safety at sea,’ Marine Policy, Vol. 18 (5), 1994, pp. 363-
377.
36
Peter Bautista Payoyo, ‘Implementation of international convention through port state control: an
assessment,’ Marine Policy, Vol. 18(5), 1994, pp. 379-392.
37
Payoyo, ‘Implementation of international convention through port state control,’ pp. 391-392.
38
Payoyo, ‘Implementation of international convention through port state control,’ p. 392.
39
J. Wonham, ‘Some recent regulatory developments in IMO for which there are corresponding
requirements in the United Nations convention on the Law of the Sea: A challenge to be met by state
parties?,’ Marine Policy, Vol. 20 (5), 1996, pp. 377-388.
237
Kiehne from German port state control provides a practitioners perspective on the
inspection process and the sanctions – rectification of deficiencies in port/next port of
call/within two weeks to detention – available to a PSC officer.40
Ademuni-Odeke, Reader in Law and Director, City Centre for International Law and
Arbitration, London Guildhall University and a consultant on maritime legislation to the
IMO, draws on the UK experience to demonstrate that port state control far from
hindrance actually helps curb substandard shipping and by enhancing maritime safety
and pollution prevention strengthens international law.41 Li from University of Wales
statistically shows that even though open registers exhibit higher than average casualty
and detention rates, as the fastest growing fleets the safety record of open registers
improved because of port state control.42
By end 1999, besides the Paris MoU, regional PSC frameworks existed for the Asia
Pacific, Caribbean, Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, West & Central Africa regions and
United States of America took unilateral action on port state control. Canadian
academic McDorman, from Faculty of Law at the University of Victoria, establishes the
legal jurisdiction of port state control in international law where a port state ‘has
extensive authority over vessels voluntarily in port’ that includes access to port being
denied or conditions are imposed with powers of detention, arrest and seizure of vessels
where national laws are breached.43 Nevertheless, McDorman concludes that effective
port state control is contingent upon cooperation – through regional port state control –
and not competition among ports.44
Vorbach, from the US Coast Guard Academy, asserts that port state control is driving
compliance with international standards and building links with industry based on
transparency, self-regulation and incentive schemes can further improve international
40
Gerhard Kiehne, ‘Investigation, detention and release of ships under the Paris memorandum of
understanding on port state control: A view from practice,’ The International Journal of Marine and
Coastal Law, Volume 11, No. 2, 1996 , pp. 217-224.
41
Ademuni-Odeke, ‘Port state control and UK law,’ Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, Vol. 28,
1997, pp. 657-665.
42
K. X. Li, ‘The safety and quality of open registers and a new approach for classifying risky ships,’
Transportation Research Part E, Vol. 35, 1999, pp.135-143.
43
Ted L. McDorman, ‘Regional port state control arrangements: Some issues of international law,’
Journal of Ocean & Coastal Law, Vol. 5, 2000, pp. 207-225.
44
McDorman, ‘Regional port state control arrangements: Some issues of international law,’ p. 225.
238
shipping safety.45 Alderton and Winchester, from Cardiff University, and Roberts and
Marlow, from University of Oxford, focussed on casualty rates of ships with somewhat
contrasting findings.46 Alderton and Winchester raise the question whether the profit
centric bottom end of the market can ever be effectively regulated to force substandard
ships off the market for good.47 Roberts and Marlow establish the need to identify
additional risk factors associated with the design of bulk carriers.48 What both studies
firmly establish is that notwithstanding the arguments over the relevance of the flag
state, ‘flag’ does matter.
Llacer, from University of Cadiz, in analysing open registers stresses the necessity for a
‘genuine link’ between ship and flag state (register) and the need for a technically
competent and streamlined maritime administration within the flag state.49 Llacer puts
forward that port state control remains as the most efficient and only method of
verifying flag state – open or closed register – compliance with international
standards.50 Kovats, from maritime industry research institute at London, makes the
case that in a globalised economy traditional sovereign control of shipping must make
way for a unified and universal system of legal and administrative arrangements.51
Recently there has been interest shown in the effectiveness of port state control, but
none that specifically examines the IOMOU. Hare is possibly the first true assessment
on the effectiveness of port state control and a rare find for intellectual leadership within
the Indian Ocean Region on port state control.52 Hare identifies the twin benefits of
regional MoU’s – judicial use of limited inspection capacity and/or to be put on alert –
from the sharing of information. Hare uses five national case studies including Australia
and South Africa to show that trading options for substandard ships have significantly
diminished. The caveat is for port jurisdictions to have the capacity and the will to
enforce port state control.
45
Joseph E. Vorbach, ‘The vital role of non-flag state actors in the pursuit of safer shipping.’
46
Tony Alderton and Nik Winchester, ‘Flag states and safety: 1997-1999,’ Maritime Policy &
Management, Vol. 29 (2), 2002, pp. 151-162; Stephen E. Roberts and Peter B. Marlow, ‘Casualties in dry
bulk shipping (1963 -1996),’ Marine Policy Vol. 26, 2002, pp. 437-450.
47
Alderton and Winchester, ‘Flag states and safety: 1997-1999,’ pp. 157-159.
48
Roberts and Marlow, ‘Casualties in dry bulk shipping (1963 -1996),’ p. 449.
49
Llacer, ‘Open registers: past, present and future.’
50
Llacer, ‘Open registers: past, present and future,’ p. 522.
51
Laszlo J. Kovats, ‘How flag states lost the plot over shipping’s governance: Does a ship need a
sovereign?,’ Maritime Policy & Management, Vol. 33 (1), 2006, pp. 75-81.
52
Hare, ‘Port state control: Strong medicine to cure a sick industry.’
239
Knapp completed a doctoral thesis on ‘The Econometrics of Maritime Safety:
Recommendations to Enhance Safety at Sea’ in 2007 and reported some of the findings
in a number of journal articles. 53 Knapp and Franses evaluated that 36.5 per cent of the
cargo carrying fleet was without problems and for 43.2 per cent of the fleet, inspections
were effective in decreasing the probability of casualty by at least 5 per cent per
inspection for very serious casualties.54 Of the remaining 20.3 per cent of the fleet, 6.9
per cent is over targeted and 13.3 per cent is where either inspections or targeting or
both inspections and targeting can be improved.55
Knapp and Franses suggest a global dataset to make targeting more effective.56 In other
words, the key to effective port state control would be a global network of regional port
state control MoU’s. Cariou et al., using Swedish Maritime Administration data,
identifies age of vessel at time of inspection, type of ship and flag/registry of vessel as
significant predictors of the number of deficiencies detected in PSC inspections.57 For
Cariou et al. repeated inspections presents an effective way to differentiate the effects of
each of the predictors with more than 63% of vessels exhibiting a reduction in the total
number of deficiencies during subsequent inspections.58
Knapp and Franses are surprised by the findings (Figure 8.6) that the strongest effect of
port state control in decreasing the probability of a serious/less-serious casualty is the
Indian Ocean MoU (minus AMSA inspections) followed by the Latin American MoU
and AMSA.59 Knapp and Franses judge the effectiveness of inspections to be higher
because in their casualty statistics determinations the Indian Ocean Region is one of the
53
Sabine Knapp, ‘The Econometrics of Maritime Safety: Recommendations to Enhance Safety at Sea,’
Econometric Institute, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, viewed 2 Mar 2009,
<http://repub.eur.nl/publications/eco_man/erim/erim3/580882487/>; Sabine Knapp and Philip Hans
Franses, ‘Econometric analysis on the effect of port state control inspections on the probability of
casualty: Can targeting of substandard ships for inspections be improved?,’ Marine Policy, Vol. 31 (4),
2007 pp. 550-563; ‘Econometric analysis to differentiate effects of various ship safety inspections,’
Marine Policy, Vol. 32 (4), 2008, pp. 653-662.
54
Knapp and Franses, ‘Econometric analysis on the effect of port state control inspections on the
probability of casualty: Can targeting of substandard ships for inspections be improved?.’
55
probability of casualty: Can targeting of substandard ships for inspections be improved?,’ p. 557.
56
probability of casualty: Can targeting of substandard ships for inspections be improved?,’ p. 560.
57
Pierre Cariou, Maximo Q. Mejija Jr. and Francois-Charles Wolff, ‘On the effectiveness of port state
control inspections,’ Transportation Research Part E, Vol. 44, 2008, pp. 491-503.
58
Cariou et al., ‘On the effectiveness of port state control inspections,’ p. 503.
59
Knapp and Franses, ‘Econometric analysis to differentiate effects of various ship safety inspections.’
240
high-risk areas with many more substandard ships engaged in local trade as compared to
the European and North American regions.60
Figure 8.6: Effect of PSC inspection - serious and less serious casualty
Serious Casualty Inspection Etfect. Difference across Regimes Less Serious Casualty Inspection Etfed ·Difference across Regimes
0.10 0 .10
0.09
0.08
0.07 ~
0 .09
0 .08
0 .07
!:"•''"'"""".
~ ca.
~···..p'"'""'
o.....,
Q.
Tlll ..
·::_.E
J<ee:14 yn, Tonnage: 3NIIgt
............ awrage
-- --
0.06 0 .06
0.05
........... ......._ '::":
0.06
~ averane
- =---
0.04 0 .04
Vina del Mar
0.03 r-·:::::;_,%8.:;.
P•n."'•
r--- ~1•1
*'•• 0 .03 Vina del Mar
0.02 ca.-G.. 0 .02
0.01
Owner. J iliN Indian Ocean ,:;;u O.Q1
AMSA
Indian Ocean M oU
0.00 0 .00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0 .50 0.60 0.70 0 .80 0 .90 1.00
Percentage Olange in Frequency c:llnspecUons Percentage Change in Frequency of Inspections
~ - Vinadei Mar
- AMSA
-
-
Indian MoU
Average
I I-
Vina del Mar
AMSA -
Indian MoU
Average
I
Source: Sabine Knapp and Philip Hans Franses, 2008, p. 661
The literature shows that with the exception of the Australian Government inquiry into
ship safety and an academic paper by Hare, knowledge based actors from the region
show poor intellectual leadership in raising public awareness and informing policy
makers on the extent of substandard shipping calling at ports in the Indian Ocean.
Interest based actors and entrepreneurial leadership

Since the 1980’s, the international regulatory structure has raised shipping standards in
an effort to eliminate substandard shipping. The ship industry response has been to take
collective action. Different interest-based actors (classification societies, insurers,
shipowners and producers) created ‘exclusive clubs’ such that members could achieve
the mandated standards without competition with each other based on reputation and
cost. The access to a particular club remains exclusive to an entrepreneur willing to
meet the self-regulated industry standard of that club.
Such entrepreneurial leadership gave members a competitive edge over low cost ship-
operators in navigating the regulatory environment. Relying on the reputation of a club
to meet standards mandated by the most stringent flag states, shipowners reduce the risk
of their ship being targeted in ports around the world or having to be excluded from the
international market. With the port state control regime, Flag States have to establish a
reputation while industry clubs have a reputation to protect.
60
Knapp and Franses, ‘Econometric analysis to differentiate effects of various ship safety inspections,’ p.
661.
241
Classification societies
Shipowners hire classification societies to class ships in meeting regulatory standards,
while Flag States rely on classification societies for technical support and compliance
verification in the application of the international conventions. Aided by significant
research departments classification societies establish and apply technical requirements
for the design, construction and survey of ships. Classification societies are required to
comply with IMO resolution A.739 (18) for ‘Recognised Organisations’ in verifying
compliance with international conventions and national statutory regulations.61
The ten most reputable societies have formed the International Association of
Classification Societies (IACS), which collectively class 94 percent of all commercial
tonnage engaged in international trade. The Indian Register of Shipping is currently the
only associate member of IACS.62 In 2000, IACS expelled Polski Rejestr Statkow from
the associate membership after it concluded that the society showed ‘serious
shortcomings’ in its work, and in effect had failed to comply with IACS standards.63
The IACS, by publishing its own classification rules, strives to achieve uniform
application of the requisite technical standards in a way that allows the club member to
remain individually competitive. Members are free to adopt standards that are even
more stringent. The current members include, American Bureau of Shipping (ABS);
Bureau Veritas (BV); China Classification Society (CCS); Det Norske Veritas (DNV);
Germanischer Lloyd (GL); Korean Register of Shipping (KR); Lloyd’s Register (LR);
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (NK); Registro Italiano Navale (RINA); Russian Maritime
Register of Shipping (RS); and Indian Register of Shipping (IRS) as associate member.
Each of the IACS members were approached to provide information on shipping from
Indian Ocean countries classed with them in 2007. Only Class NK and Class GL
responded with data (Table 8.11).64 There was no response from the other classification
societies except for Class LR, which required a subscription to the sea-web internet
61
International Maritime Organization, Guidelines for Organizations acting on behalf of the
Administration, Assembly 18th session, A.18.res.739, 22 November 1993.
62
International Association of Classification Societies (IACS), ‘Members,’ viewed 4 Jan 2009,
<http://www.iacs.org.uk/explained/members.aspx>.
63
Elizabeth R. DeSombre, Flagging standards: Globalization and environmental, safety, and labor
regulations at sea, London: MIT Press, 2006, p. 186.
64
Personal email communication on 26 March 2008 from Mr H. Oikawa, General Manager, Information
Services Department, Class NK and Peter Graaf, Deputy Head Flag State Affairs, Class GL.
242
database at a cost beyond the scope of this research. Peter Graaf, Deputy Head Flag
State Affairs from Class GL, makes the point that the ‘majority of the figures are of
insignificant amount.’65 The available data and the comment from Peter Graaf seems to
suggest that the majority of the ships are classed by non-IACS classification societies,
giving some indication of the state of flag state affairs in the region.
Table 8.11: IACS classed cargo-carrying ships from IOR countries on record
Country Number of ships in 2007
Class NK Class GL
Australia
Bangladesh
Comoros
Djibouti
Egypt
Eritrea
Ethiopia
)ndia
)ndonesia
)ran
)srael
Kuwait
Malaysia
Maldives
Mauritius
Oman
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Somalia
South Africa
Thailand
Source: Class NK and Class GL personal email communications
From Table 8.12, the eleven IACS member/associate member societies during 2001-03
classed 93.22% and during 2004-06 classed 95.24% of all ships inspected under the
IOMOU. The remaining 6.78% of ships inspected in 2001-03 and 4.76% in 2004-06,
classed by non-IACS members, accounted for 20.86% and 23.16% of all detentions
respectively. In 2001-03, non-IACS societies had one in five ships detained compared
to one in eighteen ships for IACS members. In 2004-06, non-IACS societies performed
even more poorly with one in three ships detained compared to one in sixteen ships for
IACS members. The collective performance of all class societies also shows a decline in
performance from the white list in 2001-03 to the black list in 2004-06.
65
Personal email Communication from Peter Graaf, Deputy Head Flag State Affairs, Class GL.
243
Table 8.12: Black-Grey-White list IOMOU performance of classification societies
BG GW Excess
Classification Society Period List Inspections Detentions
Limit Limit factor
American Bureau of ‐ ‐ .
Shipping ABS ‐ .
‐ .
Bureau Veritas BV
‐ .
China Classification ‐ .
Society CCS ‐ ‐ .
Det Norske Veritas ‐ ‐ .
DNV ‐ ‐ .
‐ .
Germanischer Lloyd GL
‐ .
Korean Register of ‐ .
Shipping KRS ‐ ‐ .
‐ .
Lloyd’s Register LR
‐ .
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai ‐ ‐ .
NKK ‐ ‐ .
Registro )taliano Navale ‐ .
R)NA ‐ .
Russian Maritime ‐ ‐ .
Register of Shipping RS ‐ .
)ndian Register of ‐ .
Shipping )RS ‐ .
‐ ‐ .
)ACS + Associate )ACS
‐ ‐ .
~
‐ .
Non )ACS societies
‐ .
‐ .
All classification societies
‐ .
Source: Compiled from IOMOU annual reports in Appendix 13
Although, IACS societies are the better performing classification societies remaining in
the white list during 2001-03 and 2004-06, the performance of individual IACS
members varies considerably as seen from Table 8.12. Class BV and RINA are in the
black list for 2001-03 and 2004-06. During 2001-06, Class BV had 221 (2.13%)
detentions from 2309 (7.64%) inspections and Class RINA had 66 (3.6%) detentions
from 532 (1.75%) inspections. The performance of Class GL, KR and LR analysed to
be in the grey list also remained unchanged. During 2001-06, Class GL 172 (9.45%)
detentions from 2485 (8.22%) inspections; Class KR had 62 (3.40%) detentions from
1118 (3.67%) inspections; and Class LR had 342 (18.78%) detentions from 4861
(16.10%) inspections. The performance of Class ABS deteriorated from the white list in
2001-03 to the grey list in 2004-06. While the performance of Class RS faded from
white to the black list. The performance of Class IRS got worse from grey to the black
list. In contrast, Class CCS turned a corner from grey to the white list. In all, Class DNV
and NK were the only two IACS societies to remain in the white list throughout.
244
Protection and Indemnity insurance
Shipowners voluntary subscribe to Protection and Indemnity (P&I) insurance clubs to
have cover against third party liabilities arising from the use and operation of ships. P&I
insurance includes a wide range of liabilities, such as personal injury to crew,
stevedores, passengers and others, loss and damage of cargo, pollution, salvage,
collision, towing, and wreck removal. The clubs separately provide war risk insurance
and legal expense insurance for freight, demurrage and defence risks. A group of
thirteen independent P&I clubs of American, British, Japanese, Scandinavian and
Swedish origin form the international group of P&I clubs (‘the Group’). The Group
together underwrite liability cover – protection and indemnity – for 90 per cent of the
world’s ocean going tonnage.66
Besides coordinating the operation and regulation of the clubs claim sharing agreement,
the Group acts as a forum for sharing of information and developing common policy
and promotes shipowners interests within the IMO and shipping associations besides
other international, national and industry organisations.67 The mantra of P&I clubs is
coordination, collaboration and cooperation with shipowners putting money into a
collective fund for managing risk associated with the operation of a ship. One of the
main roles of the Group is management of the pooling agreement where clubs share all
qualifying claims in excess of $7 million.68
The policy of sharing information amongst the Group makes it difficult for shipowners
to hide bad performance. Club membership is invariably limited to shipowners with
ships deemed to present the least risk. For the shipowners the possession of a P&I
certificate is reflective of a quality ship, which gives a licence to trade anywhere in the
world. About 5 per cent of ocean-going ships are not covered for liability.69 The club-
like nature of insurance by the mutual non-profit-making association of shipowners
reflects on the entrepreneurial leadership of the shipping industry.
66
International Group of P&I Clubs, ‘Homepage,’ viewed 10 Jan 2009, <http://www.igpandi.org/Home>.
67
International Group of P&I Clubs, ‘The role of the group,’ viewed 10 Jan 2009,
<http://www.igpandi.org/About>.
68
International Group of P&I Clubs, ‘The role of the group’ online.
69
UK P&I Club, ‘History of the P& I Clubs,’ viewed 10 Jan 2009,
<http://www.ukpandi.com/ukpandi/Infopool.nsf/HTML/About_ClubHistory>.
245
Shipowners
A number of shipowner clubs represent the interests of individual shipping companies
within the IMO and ILO. The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS)/International
Shipping Federation (ISF) are the shipowner’s international trade association and
employer organisations. ICS is concerned with all regulatory, operational and legal
issues. ISF is concerned with labour affairs and training issues.
Figure 8.7: Working of International Chamber of Shipping

ICS represents global in~stry's views at international fora
National ,....= = - -fialflll•lllllll --===1- National

Associations Associations
advise advise individual
individual govenments of
shipping ICSpolicy
CCllllpaniesof andp~ate
international on government
~velopments delegations at
international
meetings
Source: International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) website – How ICS works70
The membership of ICS/ISF combine includes the national shipowners associations

from 39 flag states with Indian Ocean shipowners associations from Australia, India,
Kuwait, Pakistan and Singapore (ICS only).71 A key strength of ICS/ISF is that the
membership base comprises national shipowners associations. These national
associations not only advise individual shipowners on international developments, but
also inform governments of ICS policy in consultations on framing national shipping
polices. As a result, both ICS and ISF can be quite influential at the IMO and ILO in
representing the shipping industry view.
The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) as of

January 2008 had 261 members with a combined fleet of more than 2,880 tankers
totalling 236 million DWT72 or 75 per cent of the independent tanker fleet.73
70
International Chamber of Shipping, ‘How ICS works,’ viewed 12 Jan 2009,
<http://www.marisec.org/ics/icsworks.htm>.
71
International Chamber of Shipping and International Shipping Federation Annual Review 2008.
72
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) ‘Membership,’ viewed 12
Jan 2009, <http://www.intertanko.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=20475>.
73
INTERTANKO, ‘About us,’ viewed 12 Jan 2009,
<http://www.intertanko.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=1086>.
246
Independent tanker shipowners – non-oil companies and non-state controlled tanker
owners - operate 80 per cent of the world tanker fleet.74 Among the 300 associate
members are oil companies, state owned tanker companies, law firms, shipping agents,
shipyards, shipbrokers, insurance companies, marine suppliers, national administrations
and port authorities.75
It is mandatory for all INTERTANKO members to have a certified and fully

implemented international ship management system; classed by a full member of IACS;
and insurance by an International Group P&I club or an equivalent third party and oil
pollution liability cover. INTERTANKO best practices include a commitment towards
continuous improvement in achieving goals of zero fatalities, pollution incidents and
detentions. Members must ensure transparency of ownership; allocate sufficient
resources to achieve compliance with IMO/ILO rules and regulations in force; report
deficiencies to the classification society for the vessel; and discourage breaches of
MARPOL.76
The International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO) represents

the interests of owners, operators and managers of dry cargo shipping.77 The flags most
frequently used by INTERCARGO members are Panama (31%), Liberia (11%), Hong
Kong (9%), China (7%) and Greece (6%).78 The members’ charter calls for ‘quality
ships and operation’ with vessels classed by an IACS member society and entered with
an International Group P&I club.79 As of 1 July 2008, there were an estimated 6,337 dry
bulk vessels over 10,000 dwt trading internationally.80 In 2007, an estimated 462 bulk
carriers and similar vessels were detained under the Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and USCG
port state control inspections and an additional 44 vessels detained in the Indian
Ocean.81 Preliminary evidence suggests that vessels entered with INTERCARGO
74
INTERTANKO, ‘About us’ online.
75
INTERTANKO, ‘About us’ online.
76
INTERTANKO, ‘Membership Criteria/Best Practices,’ 24 May 2007, viewed 12 Jan 2009,
<http://www.intertanko.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=36184>; ‘Mission Statement’ viewed 12 Jan 2009,
<http://www.intertanko.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=1054>.
77
International Association of Dry Cargo Owners (INTERCARGO) ‘What we do’ viewed 12 Jan 2009,
<http://www.intercargo.org/>.
78
INTERCARGO ‘Industry issues,’ 12 Jan 2009, <http://www.intercargo.org/>.
79
INTERCARGO ‘Members Charter,’ 12 Jan 2009, <http://www.intercargo.org/>.
80
INTERCARGO ‘What we do,’ 12 Jan 2009, <http://www.intercargo.org/>.
81
INTERCARGO ‘What we do’ online.
247
accounted for 8 per cent of the detentions reported by Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and
USCG.82
The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) is an independent international

shipping association focussed on promoting higher standards to ensure quality
shipping.83 The membership includes over 900 shipowners, 1400 brokers and more than
100 P&I clubs across 120 countries.84 The BIMCO members represent more than
14,000 vessels totalling 525 million DWT or 65 per cent of the total cargo capacity
available worldwide.85 BIMCO applies a vetting process to assess shipowner vessels
based on criteria, such as, flag, class, age and PSC detentions.86 The ‘BIMCO Owner
Member Vetting Process’ is applied to all applications for membership and at least once
a year for all existing members.87
In 2006, the major clubs – ICS/ISF, INTERTANKO, INTERCARGO and BIMCO –

formed the Roundtable of International Shipping Associations. The mission of the
Roundtable ‘to work together to serve, represent and advance the international shipping
industry’ is suggestive of taking further collective action in navigating the international
regulatory environment.88
The Round Table of International Shipping Associations discourages shipping

companies from registering with poorly performing flag states in an industry effort to
promote satisfactory flag state performance. The Roundtable publishes the Industry
Guidelines on Flag State Performance and a separate performance table. The Shipping
Industry Guidelines sets out the criteria to assist shipping companies in determining
whether a flag state administration takes its responsibilities seriously and even provides
information for assessing the performance of flag states. Table 8.13 summarises 2007
82
INTERCARGO ‘Industry issues’ online.
83
Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), ‘About BIMCO,’ viewed 13 Jan 2009,
<http://www.bimco.org/Corporate%20Area/About/BIMCO_a_century_of_service.aspx>.
84
MK Shipping, ‘MK Shipping is a BIMCO member,’ viewed 13 Jan 2009,
<http://www.mkshipping.dk/aboutus/bimcomembership/>.
85
MK Shipping, ‘MK Shipping is a BIMCO member’ online.
86
BIMCO, ‘Rules, Rule -06 Application for Membership,’ viewed 13 Jan 2009,
<http://www.bimco.org/Corporate%20Area/About/BIMCO_Rules/Rule_06.aspx>.
87
BIMCO, ‘Rules, Rule -06 Application for Membership’ online.
88
Roundtable of International Shipping Associations, ‘Round table strategic plan,’ viewed 13 Jan 2009,
<http://www.marisec.org/shippingfacts/home/roundtable>.
248
flag state performance by the number of possible negative indicators for Indian Ocean
countries, Flags of Convenience89 and other flag states.
Table 8.13: Flag state performance as on June 2007

Flag States Total number of possible negative indicators
<4 > 5 < 10 > 11
Indian Ocean India, Singapore Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Kenya, Madagascar,
Rim Flag Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Thailand
States Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritius (FOC),
Malaysia, Myanmar (FOC),
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South
Africa, Sri Lanka (FOC)
Flags of Antigua & Barbuda, Belize, Jamaica, Panama, St Bolivia, Cambodia,
Convenience1 Bahamas, Barbados, Vincent & Grenadines, Tonga Georgia, Honduras,
and Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Lebanon, Mongolia,
International Cyprus, Gibraltar, Hong North Korea, Sao
Registers Kong, Isle of Man, Tome & Principe
Netherlands Antilles, Malta,
Marshal Islands, Liberia,
Vanuatu
Other Flag Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Albania, Colombia,
States Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, Costa Rica, Cote
France, Germany, Greece, Dominica, Ghana, Iceland, Libya, d’Ivoire, Congo,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Suriname, Syria
Lithuania, Luxemburg, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea,
Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Romania,
Portugal, South Korea, Russia, Switzerland, Trinidad &
Spain, Sweden, UK, USA Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Vietnam
Note:
1) Flags of Convenience as listed by the International Transport Worker’s Federation
2) Only those Flag states that have been assessed by the Roundtable of International Shipping associations
Source: Shipping Industry Flag State Performance Table 2007 and World Fleet Statistics 2007
Cargo industry
The dry bulk cargo and oil industry organisations have initiated own inspection systems
in an effort to ensure safe and environmentally responsible delivery of their cargo. In
minimising the risk of using substandard ships these inspections are in addition to those
performed by classification societies, P&I clubs, Flag States or port state control.
The Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) with 67 members90 launched
the Ship Inspection Report (SIRE) Programme in 1993 to measure tanker quality.91 As a
89
International Transport Workers Federation list 32 FoC countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, Burma, Cambodia, Cayman Islands, Comoros, Cyprus, Equatorial
Guinea, French International Ship Register (FIS),German International Ship Register (GIS), Georgia,
Gibraltar (UK), Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands (USA), Mauritius,
Mongolia, Netherlands Antilles, North Korea, Panama, Sao Tome and Príncipe, St Vincent & Grenadines,
Sri Lanka, Tonga, Vanuatu, viewed 25 Jan 2009, <http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/flags-
convenien-183.cfm>.
249
risk assessment tool SIRE uses a questionnaire based uniform inspection protocol for
tankers and from 2004 includes barges.92 The web-based SIRE system operated to the
ISO 9001 standard consists of over 30,000 inspection reports for 2007-08 on more than
8000 tankers and is available to port state control authorities and MoU’s free of
charge.93
A similar online risk management system ‘RightShip,’ born from a 2001 workshop
conducted in Western Australia is the largest dry bulk cargo ship vetting information
system in the world.94 The three parent companies – BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and
Cargill Ocean transportation from 200695 – created a ship rating system from one to five
stars on ship quality and suitability for a task. The system is based on a rigorous
assessment – almost 50 separate factors covering structural integrity and quality of
crewing and management – for over 48,000 dry bulk, petroleum, gas and liner vessels.96
BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto are world leaders in the resources industry. Cargill Ocean
transportation carries grains, oilseeds, vegetable oils/proteins and sugar, on behalf of
Cargill Corporation. The business houses cannot afford to take risks involving undue
delays and costs while a ship is inspected under the PSC regime; falling foul with
regulators; rising insurance costs; and casualties - from delays through to total loss of
cargo – with severe commercial, human and environmental costs.97 The ship vetting
system uses data from a number of agencies including regional PSCs, OCIMF SIRE
programme, IACS, USCG, AMSA, the Roundtable of International Shipping
Associations, terminals and ports, Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit and Lloyd’s
Register Fairplay.
There were 65,531 vessels rated as of 31 December 2008 with 21,900 ships vetted
representing 1,953,521,069 DWT of which 9386 vessels were vetted as five stars.98 A
90
Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF), ‘Members,’ viewed 17 Jan 2009,
<http://www.ocimf.com/custom.cfm?action=members>.
91
OCIMF, ‘SIRE introduction,’ viewed 17 Jan 2009,
<http://www.ocimf.com/pages.cfm?action=sire_introduction2>.
92
OCIMF, ‘ SIRE introduction’ online.
93
OICMF ‘SIRE introduction’ online.
94
RightShip, ‘About RightShip,’ viewed 17 Jan 2009, <http://site.rightship.com/about.aspx>.
95
RightShip, ‘Directors/Shareholders,’ viewed 17 Jan 2009,
<http://site.rightship.com/about_directors.aspx>.
96
RightShip, ‘Why RightShip,’ viewed 17 Jan 2009, <http://site.rightship.com/why.aspx>.
97
RightShip, ‘What is ship vetting,’ viewed 17 Jan 2009, <http://site.rightship.com/why_whatis.aspx>.
98
RightShip, ‘Live statistics’ viewed 17 Jan 2009, <http://site.rightship.com/default.aspx >.
250
three/four/five-star rating is an acceptable risk. A two-star rating means that the user
should contact RightShip for further review of the risk profile. A one-star rating
indicates need for a more detailed investigation including a physical inspection of the
ship and/or an audit of the vessel and its management system.99 Under a new agreement,
vessels entered with INTERCARGO would receive bonus points from March 2008 in
the RightShip online ship vetting information system.100
Structure over time

Signification – communication and level of concern
The lack of an effective knowledge based epistemic community seems to have affected
open communication and level of concern over substandard shipping within the Indian
Ocean Region. Cooperation and harmonisation with other regional PSC regimes appears
to be limited to gaining observer status and participation in meetings alone.101The
IOMOU annual reports provide little information on specific outcomes if any from
these meetings. What runs contrary to the process of cooperation and harmonisation is
that there are two regional PSC regimes now in operation within the Indian Ocean
Region and countries in the region are members across four PSC regimes.102 One can
only conclude that there has been minimal communication on steps to improve
cooperation amongst Indian Ocean countries to harmonise PSC inspections.
The annual reports reveal minimal level of concern amongst Indian Ocean countries on
improving the effectiveness of PSC in the region taking membership and rate of
inspections as indicators. The PSC regime in the Indian Ocean Region is yet to develop
a ship-targeting factor vital to optimisation of resources and improving effectiveness of
the regime.103
99
RightShip, ‘RightShip rating,’ viewed 17 Jan 2009, <http://site.rightship.com/why_rightship.aspx>.
100
RightShip press release, RightShip and INTERCARGO initiative to jointly recognise quality
principles, 26 February 2008, viewed 28 Mar 2009,
<http://site.rightship.com/resources.ashx/downloads/39/fileName/0692EEF7D4B6F06904B42AA006702
B6E/Intercargo-Rightship_press_release2_Feb_2008_-_Final_version_26_Feb_2008.pdf>.
101
Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (IOMOU on PSC) Annual reports
2001 to 2008, viewed 17 Jan 2009, <http://www.iomou.org/armain.htm>.
102
Regimes in the Indian Ocean - IOMOU and Riyadh MoU established in 2005; the 4 regimes are
IOMOU, Tokyo MoU, Abuja MoU and Riyadh MoU.
103
IOMOU on PSC annual report 2007.
251
Legitimisation – contractual environment
All the regional memoranda recognise the need to increase maritime safety, protect the
marine environment and improve the living and working conditions on board ships. The
member states remain mindful that principal responsibility for the effective application
of internationally agreed standards rests upon flag state maritime administrations.
Nevertheless, port states concede that port state control is indispensable in minimising
the operation of substandard ships. The uniform application of international instruments
also avoids distorting competition between ports. For these reasons, member states
remain convinced of the necessity for strengthening cooperation and exchange of
information, and instituting an improved and harmonised system of port state control.104
The member states guided by IMO resolution A.682 (17) on regional cooperation105
showed preference for a MoU as the implementing instrument rather than a convention
in concluding regional agreements. A memorandum is not a legally binding document
while a convention from a jurisdictional point of view proves to be a more powerful
instrument.
However, a convention usually requires lengthy ratification procedures with similar

problems faced for bringing any amendments. By not imposing legal obligations,
member states, acknowledge that individual maritime administration capacities can
differ. Such recognition allows participation by port states to the extent possible. There
is remarkable consistency in the philosophy and language, and intent and structure of
each of the memoranda. It is rare for so many regional MoU’s to be contractually
similar in nature.
A reading of the different memoranda suggests a convergence of expectations and tacit

acceptance by IMO member states of the importance of regional port state control to try
to eliminate substandard ships internationally.
104
Reading of memorandum of understanding texts of IOMOU, Riyadh MoU and Tokyo MoU.
105
International Maritime Organization, ‘Regional cooperation in the control of ships and discharges,’
Assembly 17th session, A.17.res.682, 6 November 1991.
252
Domination – national capacity
With the GCC MoU inspection data being unavailable106, the effectiveness of the port
state control regime is measured using inspection data gathered from the participation
by Indian Ocean Region countries in the Indian Ocean and Tokyo MoU’s. The
IOMOU107 and GCC MoU108 have a target inspection rate of 10 per cent annually per
country, which happens to be the lowest amongst the different regional groupings. The
Tokyo MoU109 is unique in that it allows for a 75 per cent regional target inspection rate
that caters to the varying capacities of participating countries. The 3-year average
regional inspection percentage (number of individual ships inspected/number of
individual ships visited) for 2001-2003 is 75.18 per cent110 and for 2004-2006 is 69.51
per cent.111 The drop in regional PSC inspection rate may be due to the change in 2004
in the method of counting the number of ships visited.112
From Table 8.14, the 3-year average inspection contribution from Indian Ocean rim
states participating in the Tokyo MoU is 28.95 per cent for 2001-2003 and 23.89 per
cent for 2004-2006. The fall in the port state inspection contribution during 2004-2006
is due to the drop in Indonesian inspection reports.
Table 8.14: Tokyo MoU port state inspection contribution from IOR countries
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Countries
No % No % No % No % No % No %
Australia1 2913 16.76 2842 14.51 2827 14.05 3201 14.96 3072 14.59 3080 14.20
Indonesia2 934 5.37 985 5.03 1067 5.30 32 0.15 52 0.25 59 0.27
Malaysia 380 2.19 351 1.79 352 1.75 353 1.65 355 1.69 434 2.00
Singapore 1189 6.84 1221 6.23 1189 5.91 1612 7.53 1359 6.45 1290 5.95
Thailand 76 0.44 11 0.06 126 0.63 153 0.71 149 0.71 124 0.57
Total 5492 31.60 5410 27.62 5561 27.63 5351 25.00 4987 23.68 4987 23.00
Regional 17379 19588 20124 21400 21058 21686
Note:
1) The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) has transmitted different number of inspection reports to
the Tokyo MoU and IOMOU databases. The data in the table is as indicated in the AMSA Port State Control
annual reports and is closest to the IOMOU database.
2) Tokyo annual report 2003- The authority reported 1067 inspections in 2003 but only 5 inspection reports
were transmitted to the MoU database.
106
Personal email communication on 23 February 2008 from Captain A.M. Al-Janahi, Director GCC
MoU indicated that the MoU has just started functioning and so no other data is available as yet.
107
Reading of IOMOU on PSC Section 1.3.
108
Personal email Communication on 23 February 2008 from Captain A.M. Al-Janahi.
109
Reading of Tokyo MoU on PSC section 1.4.
110
Tokyo Annual reports 2001-2003, Table 2 Column 1 & 6 totals:
[(20124+19588+17379)/(26142+25202+24590)]*100
111
Tokyo Annual reports 2004-2006, Table 2 Column 1 & 6 totals:
[(12148+11430+10922)/(17520+16270+15838)]*100
112
Tokyo MoU on PSC annual report 2004, p. 12.
253
Table 8.15 provides the breakdown of port state inspection contribution by IOMOU
member states. Effectively, other than for India, Iran and South Africa there is little
contribution from the other member states. Australia has provided the same inspection
reports to the IOMOU as those that have been performed under the Tokyo MoU
arrangement.
Table 8.15: IOMOU port state inspection contribution

20011 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Countries
Australia2 2913 2842 52.13 2827 55.51 3201 56.26 3072 59.02 3080 60.10
Eritrea NA 22 0.40 15 0.30 12 0.21 8 0.15 0 0.00
India NA 461 8.46 452 8.87 878 15.43 912 17.52 653 12.74
Iran NA 1120 20.54 1255 24.64 1230 21.62 666 12.80 579 11.30
Kenya NA 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 132 2.57
Maldives NA 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Mauritius NA 16 0.29 1 0.02 2 0.03 8 0.15 20 0.39
Oman NA 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
South Africa NA 714 13.10 264 5.18 222 3.90 508 9.76 654 12.76
Sri Lanka NA 4 0.07 5 0.10 6 0.10 4 0.08 7 0.14
Sudan NA 273 5.01 274 5.38 111 1.95 23 0.44 0 0.00
Tanzania NA 0 0.00 0 0.00 29 0.50 3 0.06 0 0.00
Yemen NA 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.02 0 0.00
Total3 5520 5452 5093 5689 5205 5125
Note:
1) The IOMOU 2001 annual report does not provide port state inspection reports by individual authorities. Person email
communication E 422 on 28 February 2008 from Mr B. Ganguli, Secretary IOMOU indicates that as the system was not
computerised until 2002, the data for 2001 collated manually cannot be made available by the secretariat.
2) The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) has transmitted different number of inspection reports to the Tokyo MoU
and IOMOU databases. The data in this table is closest to the IOMOU database and has been taken from the AMSA Port State
Control annual reports.
3) Personal email Communication E 422 on 28 February 2008 from Mr B. Ganguli, Secretary IOMOU confirms the assumption
that where there is no data on IOMOU member states in the annual reports these states have not participated in the PSC regime
for that year.
Table 8.16 brings together the Tokyo and Indian Ocean MoU inspection contribution to
determine the relative contribution of Indian Ocean countries considered by the thesis.
Between 2001 and 2006, Australia, India, Iran and Singapore on average are the only
countries to contribute over 10 per cent of the total inspections annually. Australia
consistently outperformed the other countries. In 2006, South Africa performed better
than India and Iran with Malaysia significantly improving their inspection contribution.
In 2006, Kenya transmitted inspection reports for the first time. Indonesia’s inspection
contribution during 2001-2003 was better than 2004-2006 when it dropped to less than
one per cent. Sudan remained active until 2004, while Thailand’s inspection
contribution averaged 1.43 per cent. There is little or no participation (< 0.3 per cent) by
authorities from Eritrea, Maldives, Mauritius, Oman, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Yemen.
What emerges is the vast difference in the capacities of individual port state countries.
254
Table 8.16: Indian Ocean port state inspection contribution
20011 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Countries
Australia2 2913 35.96 2842 35.44 2827 36.12 3201 40.82 3072 43.15 3080 43.80
Eritrea -- -- 22 0.27 15 0.19 12 0.15 8 0.11 0 0.00
India -- -- 461 5.75 452 5.77 878 11.20 912 12.81 653 9.29
Indonesia3 934 11.53 985 12.28 1067 13.63 32 0.41 52 0.73 59 0.84
Iran -- -- 1120 13.97 1255 16.03 1230 15.69 666 9.35 579 8.23
Kenya -- -- 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 132 1.88
Malaysia 380 4.69 351 4.38 352 4.50 353 4.50 355 4.99 434 6.17
Maldives -- -- 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Mauritius -- -- 16 0.20 1 0.01 2 0.03 8 0.11 20 0.28
Oman -- -- 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Singapore 1189 14.68 1221 15.22 1189 15.19 1612 20.56 1359 19.09 1290 18.34
South Africa - -- 714 8.90 264 3.37 222 2.83 508 7.13 654 9.30
Sri Lanka - -- 4 0.05 5 0.06 6 0.08 4 0.06 7 0.10
Sudan -- -- 273 3.40 274 3.50 111 1.42 23 0.32 0 0.00
Tanzania -- -- 0 0.00 0 0.00 29 0.37 3 0.04 0 0.00
Thailand 76 0.93 11 0.14 126 1.61 153 1.95 149 2.09 124 1.76
Yemen -- -- 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.01 0 0.00
Total 8099 8020 7827 7841 7120 7032
Note:
1) The IOMOU 2001 annual report does not provide port state inspection reports by individual authorities. Person email
communication E 422 on 28 February 2008 from Mr B. Ganguli, Secretary IOMOU indicates that as the system was not
computerised until 2002, the data for 2001 collated manually cannot be made available by the secretariat.
2) The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) has transmitted different number of inspection reports to the Tokyo MoU
and IOMOU databases. The data closest to the IOMOU database has been taken from the AMSA annual reports.
3) Tokyo MoU annual report 2003 - The authority reported 1067 inspections in 2003 but only 5 reports transmitted database
The region seems to be devoid of regional or individual training and capacity-building

efforts.113 In 2002, the IMO conducted two courses on ‘Training of the trainers for
PSCO’ in Eritrea and India and attended separately by participants from Bangladesh,
Eritrea, India, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Myanmar, Oman, Seychelles,
Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.114 Translation of these
courses into national training efforts is not apparent from the annual reports. The annual
reports from 2001-2007 provide little or no information on training and harmonisation
activities and the region could benefit from detailing national training and capacity
building efforts even if regional capacity building initiatives are not forthcoming.
Regrettably, the secretariat could not provide information on the number of PSC
officers employed by individual states and the number of ship visits by each member
state to try and better establish the capacity of governments.115
113
Reading of IOMOU annual reports 2001-2007.
114
IOMOU annual report 2002, p. 6.
115
Personal email communication on 25 Mar 2008 from Mr B. Ganguli, Secretary IOMOU.
255
State learning at the unit level
The catastrophe of six bulk carriers sinking in quick succession between January 1990
and August 1991 in the Indian Ocean off Western Australia prompted Australian
maritime authorities to hold an inquiry.116 In all 47 bulk carriers were lost worldwide
between 1988 and 1991 with 80% suffering structural failure.117 A surprising aspect was
that members of IACS, considered to be amongst the better performing classification
societies, had the majority of bulk carriers lost.118
The findings of inquiry made it abundantly clear that competitive (inattentive) practices
of flag states, classification societies and insurers allowed (substandard)
shipowners/operators and charters to sail substandard ships.119 In the operation of
unseaworthy ships, poorly trained and inexperienced crews and their gross mistreatment
also emerged as a major factor influencing safety of ships.120 The inquiry called for
AMSA to have access to sufficient resources ‘to increase the rate and effectiveness of
port state control inspections to the level where it ceases to be viable for substandard
shipping to call at Australian ports.’121
Moreover, the inquiry recommended for AMSA to impose a penalty surcharge and in a
move to ‘name and shame’ substandard ships publish each month details of inspections
including name of ship, beneficial owner, manager of the ship, classification society,
charter and flag state.122 With regard to the role of port states, the inquiry makes the
assertion that ‘Regional PSC inspection systems... achieve a much higher effective rate
of inspection than does a single nation on its own.’123
In 1997, representatives of 22 Indian Ocean maritime administrations met in India to

take stock of the maritime safety infrastructure in the region.124 There is no assessment
available of the extent of substandard shipping plying the Indian Ocean, but participants
116
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Ships of Shame: Inquiry into ships safety,’ p. xv.
117
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Ships of Shame: Inquiry into ships safety,’ pp. 2, 6.
118
119
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Ships of Shame: Inquiry into ships safety,’ pp. 28-31
and pp. 52-54.
120
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Ships of Shame: Inquiry into ships safety,’ pp. 31-37.
121
122
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Ships of Shame: Inquiry into ships safety,’ pp. 81, 83.
123
124
256
sought regional cooperation in developing flag and port state capabilities in the region.
This led to the establishment of the Indian Ocean MoU in 1999 with the ‘ultimate goal,
to identify and eliminate substandard shipping from the region.’125 The goal is idealistic
as there is no charted route for state learning at the unit level. In the annual reports,
there is little evidence of technical expertise and administrative capacity of the majority
of maritime administrations in the region to function as responsible flag and port
states.126
Regional cooperation at the sub-system level

The IOMOU targets substandard shipping throughout the Indian Ocean, but
implementation at the sub-system level displays vast differences in the extent of
regional cooperation. The Persian Gulf countries, for instance, have chosen to establish
an independent GCC MoU on PSC. The countries from the South East Asian region
have opted to join the Tokyo MoU. In the South Asian region, Pakistan is not a member
and Bangladesh, which participated in the drafting of the MoU, is not a party to the
memorandum. Although, most of the major port states along the East African coast are
members, their inspection capacity has been limited as seen from the annual reports.
What is also disappointing is that the annual reports from 2001 to 2007 show a dismal
record of regional cooperation in training and capacity building. Logically, developing
flag and port state capabilities should have been a key consideration. There were no
training programmes conducted in 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2006.127 In 2005, the IOMOU
held its first regional seminar on training and harmonisation of PSC activities128 and in
2007 held the second such seminar.129 The annual reports do not clearly enunciate any
of the seminar outcomes.
In contrast, the Tokyo MoU successfully developed and implemented a number of

technical cooperation programmes. By 2006, the region had held its 16th basic training
course and the 14th seminar for PSC officers besides conducting regular fellowship
training courses.130
125
126
127
IOMOU annual report 2001, 2003, 2004, 2006.
128
IOMOU annual report 2005.
129
130
Tokyo MoU annual report 2006.
257
In sum, there is very little evidence of regional efforts to strengthen maritime
administrations of member countries or non-member countries in combating
substandard shipping within the region. As part of its 2008 training and capacity
building activities, IOMOU had planned to hold a third seminar in Sri Lanka and
conduct the first regional basic PSC course in South Africa.131
International cooperation at the system level

At the system level, the IMO as a specialised agency of the United Nations has 168
members132 with 13 landlocked states133 from the 192 UN member states.134 The cost of
administration at the IMO is shared amongst member states in proportion to the size of
the country’s merchant fleet.135 The top ten contributors in 2008 were Panama, Liberia,
Bahamas, United Kingdom, Greece, Marshall Islands, Singapore, Japan, China and
United States.136
The ‘Assembly’ is the highest governing body of the IMO, which approves the work
programme, determines the financial arrangements and elects the council. The ‘Council’
is the Executive Organ of the IMO and is responsible for supervising the work of the
five ‘Committees’ – Maritime Safety, Marine Environment Protection, Legal, Technical
Cooperation and Facilitation.137
The Council is the only body of the IMO that has representative membership
comprising three different categories of members separately elected by a majority vote
of the assembly. Category (a) includes 10 member States with the largest interest in
providing shipping services: China, Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway, Panama, Russia,
Republic of Korea, United Kingdom and United States of America. Category (b)
includes 10 other member States with the largest interest in international seaborne trade:
Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, India, Netherlands, Spain and
Sweden. Category (c) includes the remaining 20 member States not elected under (a) or
(b) which have special interest in maritime transport or navigation and whose election
131
132
IMO, ‘Introduction to IMO’ online.
133
Mongolia, Nepal, Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Slovakia, Switzerland, Bolivia, Paraguay – see Manoj Gupta, Maritime Affairs: Integrated Management
for India (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2005).
134
United Nations, List of member states,’ viewed 17 Jan 2009, <http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml>.
135
IMO, ‘Budget 2008-2009,’ viewed 17 Jan 2009, <http://www.imo.org/>.
136
IMO, ‘Budget 2008-2009’ online.
137
IMO, ‘Structure,’ viewed 17 Jan 2009, <http://www.imo.org/>.
258
will ensure representation of all major geographic areas of the world: Australia,
Bahamas, Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, Malta,
Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa,
Thailand, and Turkey.138 The representative from South Africa is the Vice-Chairman of
the council. In all nine Indian Ocean countries are council members, which is 25 per
cent of the States in the region.
The IMO also maintains a regional presence in select developing regions to facilitate
IMO input into national and regional development polices as part of the Integrated
Technical Cooperation Programme (ITCP). The regional coordinators identify maritime
needs and priorities in conjunction with the concerned country, plan coordinate and
ensure delivery of IMO technical assistance activities including cooperation in capacity
building programmes. There are four such regional centres in Kenya, Ghana, Cote
d’Ivoire and Philippines.139
The Kenya office for the Eastern and Southern Africa sub region covers Angola and
Namibia in addition to the following Indian Ocean countries – Botswana, Burundi,
Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda,
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.140 Eight of the countries - Eritrea, Kenya, Maldives,
Mauritius, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Yemen - are members of the IOMOU on port
state control. The inspection contribution of these countries has been limited.
The drafting and adoption of a convention can take several years and on average, it
takes five years for the convention to enter into force after adoption.141 There have been
instances, when confronted with an emergency, Governments have accelerated the
process in the IMO, such as the implementation of the International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) code on 01 July 2004.
The process involves raising issues of concern in one of the six committees of the IMO
where agreement on the matter is referred to the council that meet every alternate year
and if necessary referred to the Assembly in the following year. On adoption, the
138
IMO, ‘Council members for the 2008-2009 biennium,’ viewed 22 Jan 2009, <http://www.imo.org/>.
139
IMO, ‘Regional coordination,’ viewed 22 Jan 2009, <http://www.imo.org/>.
140
IMO, ‘Regional Coordination’ online; see Table 3.2 and note 169 for Indian Ocean countries.
141
IMO, ‘Conventions,’ viewed 22 Jan 2009, <http://www.imo.org/>.
259
representative of member states in the relevant committee begins the process of drafting
the instrument in consultation with international non-governmental organizations that
have a working relationship with the IMO. The draft instrument is then put before the
Council or Assembly to convene a conference for adoption. All member states
participate on equal footing including members. Once adopted the convention is opened
for signature, usually for a period of 12 months. The conditions that have to be met vary
for each convention to enter into force. Most convention require the conditions of a
specific number of member states and a minimum percentage of the world gross
tonnage to be fulfilled before it can enter into force.142
Once the convention enters into force, it is contingent upon member states to enact
national legislation to enforce the provisions of the convention. Contracting
governments enforce the provisions for their own ships and in certain cases for ships of
other member states through the regime of port state control. Each of the 36 Indian
Ocean rim countries are members of IMO but lack of participation in port state control
weakens the implementation outcomes from international cooperation within the region.

Agenda formation
The IMO established regime for port state control lies within the realm of coastal state
jurisdiction that can monitor Flag State Implementation (FSI) of international standards
for quality shipping. The regime encourages coastal states to enact national legislation
that empowers Port State Control Officers (PSCOs) to survey, inspect and detain
foreign-flagged vessels failing to comply with international ship safety and quality
standards when in port.
At the invitation of the IMO, when 22 of the 36 Indian Ocean rim countries met in
October 1997 there is immediate recognition of the problem from sub-standard shipping
in the region. The memorandum of understanding finalised at the second preparatory
meeting in June 1998 establishes a four point agenda and came into effect on 1 April
1999.143
142
IMO, ‘Conventions’ online.
143
IOMOU, ‘History,’ viewed 17 Jan 2009, <http://www.iomou.org/historymain.htm>.
260
Foremost, member states must take all necessary steps to ratify/accede to relevant
international instruments. Table 8.17 provides the present status of relevant
international instruments that should logically form the basis for PSC activities in the
region. However, the Load Line 1988, SOLAS 1978 and 1988 instruments are not
included as relevant instruments in the memorandum.144
Table 8.17: IOMOU status of port state control relevant IMO instruments
IOMOU TONNAGE LOADLINE SOLAS COLREG STCW MARPOL ILO
MEMBER 1969 1966 1988 1974 1978 1988 1972 1978 I/II III IV V VI 147
STATES
Australia 21 29 07 17 17 07 29 07 14 Oct 10 27 14 07
May Jul Feb Aug Aug Feb Feb Nov 1987 Oct Feb Aug Aug
1982 1968 1997 1983 1983 1997 1980 1983 1994 2004 1990 2007
Eritrea 22 22 04 22 04 22 22
Apr Apr Feb Apr Feb Apr Apr
1996 1996 2000 1996 2000 1996 1996
India 26 19 10 16 03 22 30 16 24 11 Jun 11 Jun 11 Jun 26
May Apr Aug Jun Apr Aug May Nov Sep 2003 2003 2003 Sep
1977 1968 2000 1976 1986 2000 1973 1984 1986 1996
Iran 28 05 31 17 Oct 31 31 17 01 25 Oct 25 Oct
Dec Oct Oct 1994 Aug Oct Jan Aug 2002 2002
1973 1973 2006 2000 2006 1989 1996
Kenya 02 12 21 Jul 15 15 15 15 15 15
Mar Sep 1999 Dec Dec Dec Dec Dec Dec
1983 1975 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992
Maldives 02 29 14 Jan 20 14 22 20 20
Jun Jan 1981 May Jan Jan May May
1983 1968 2005 1981 1987 2005 2005
Mauritius 11 11 17 01 17 26 04 06 06 06 06
Oct Oct Dec Feb Dec May Jul Apr Apr Apr Apr
1988 1988 2002 1988 2002 1989 1991 1995 1995 1995 1995
Oman 24 20 17 25 25 17 25 24 13 13 13 13
Sep Aug Jun Apr Apr Jun Apr Sep Mar Mar Mar Mar
1990 1975 1991 1985 1985 1991 1985 1990 1984 1984 1984 1984
South 24 14 23 11 20 27 28 05 13
Africa Nov Dec May Jan Dec Jul Nov Feb May
1982 1966 1980 1982 1976 1983 1984 1997 1992
Sri Lanka 11 26 30 04 22 24 24 24 24
Mar Sep Aug Jan Jan Jun Jun Jun Jun
1992 1991 1983 1978 1987 1997 1997 1997 1997
Sudan 21 26 15 11 26
May Sep May Mar Feb
2002 1991 1990 2003 1997
Tanzania 28 28 28 16 27
Mar Feb Mar May Oct
2001 1989 2001 2006 1982
Yemen 06 06 06 06 14
Mar Mar Mar Mar Feb
1979 1979 1979 1979 2005
Entry into 18 21 03 25 01 03 15 28 02 01 27 31 19 28
Force Jul Jul Feb May May Feb Jul Apr Oct Jul Sep Dec May Nov
1982 1968 2000 1980 1981 2000 1977 1984 1983 1992 2003 1988 2005 1981
Source: Derived from IMO website
Amongst the IOMOU member states, Australia, India and Oman are the only three port
states that have acceded to all the relevant IMO conventions not including MARPOL
Annex VI that entered into force in 2005.
144
Reading of IOMOU memorandum.
261
Since the adoption of the IOMOU in 1999, there is evidence of some behavioural
change [in yellow colour] amongst member states in taking steps to accede/ratify
relevant international instruments. With Yemen signing the STCW 78 convention in
2005, all the member states comply with the Load Line, Tonnage, SOLAS, STCW and
COLREG instruments for the purposes of the memorandum. However, a significant gap
remains in the signing of the MARPOL and ILO related instruments. The new Maritime
Labour Convention (MLC) 2006, which consolidates more than 65 international labour
standards related to seafarers, is set to replace the ILO Convention No 147, ratified so
far by India alone from the Indian Ocean countries.145 Only Bahamas, Liberia, Marshall
Islands, Norway and Panama have ratified MLC 2006.146 Some member states have
taken steps [in orange colour] to accede to the other Load Line 1988 and SOLAS 1978
and 1988 instruments. These instruments remain a sticking point with most member
states including Eritrea, Kenya, Maldives, Mauritius, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Tanzania and Yemen.
There is also an obligation on the part of member states to establish and maintain an
effective non-discriminatory system for port state control. Each member state within
three years of signing the memorandum must achieve an annual target rate of inspecting
10% of individual ships visiting its ports.147 Now in the 10th year of operation, whether
or not the IOMOU achieved the annual target rate is difficult to analyse. The secretariat
does not have data on the number of individual ships entering ports in the region,
information that can help establish the target inspection rate achieved.148 Australia the
only member state that publishes data on number of individual ship visits has a target
inspection rate of 65-70%, well above the stated 10% target. In terms of sheer numbers,
there is no visible increase in the total number of inspections from 2001 through to
2006, with 2007 showing a marked decrease in the total number of inspections in the
region.149 The 2008 annual report suggest an improvement with all states other than
Oman providing inspection data for the first time since inception of the memoranda ten
145
International Labour Organisation (ILO), ‘Maritime Labour Convention,’ viewed 17 Jan 2009,
<http://www.ilo.org/global/What_we_do/InternationalLabourStandards/MaritimeLabourConvention/lang-
-en/index.htm>.
146
ILO, ‘Convention no. MLC,’ viewed 23 April 2009, <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/ratifce.pl?C186>.
147
IOMOU memorandum section 1.3.
148
Personal email Communication on 25 Mar 2008 from Mr B. Ganguli, Secretary IOMOU.
149
262
years ago.150 Although encouraging, this increase in inspection reports is insufficient to
suggest a behavioural change in state performance. The IOMOU membership also does
not show any significant increase with only Kenya joining in 2002, Oman in 2003 and
Yemen in 2004.
Further, the agenda seeks the commitment of member states to share information in
advancing the memorandum’s aim of eliminating sub-standard shipping from the
region. As seen from Table 8.18, there is significant gap in reporting of inspection data
by member states.
Table 8.18: Inspection contributions by IOMOU member states

Member State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Australia X X X X X X X
Eritrea X X X X X
India X X X X X X X
Iran X X X X X X X
Kenya X X X
Maldives X X
Mauritius X X X X X X X
Oman
South Africa X X X X X X X
Sri Lanka X X X X X X
Sudan X X X X X
Tanzania X X X
Yemen X X
Note: For 2001 there is incomplete data on individual member state contribution
Source: Compiled from IOMOU Annual reports 2001-2008
Only Australia, India, Iran, Mauritius and South Africa consistently report inspection
data to the IOMOU secretariat. While on one side Kenya and Maldives began reporting
in 2006/07, on the other side Eritrea, Sudan, Tanzania and Yemen stopped reporting
from 2006 and Sri Lanka in 2007. Oman since becoming a member in 2004 remains the
only member state not to have reported inspection data even once. At the same time,
there is progress in sharing of real-time information. The Indian Ocean Computerised
Information System (IOCIS) brought online on 21 June 2005 allows national authorities
to confidentially consult and share information online.151 The IOCIS database also
stores information from 2002 onwards for public access.152 In 2007, the number of page
150
151
152
263
views and data downloaded more than doubled since operationalisation of the
database.153
Institutional choice
The IOMOU established a port state control committee giving equal representation to
all member states. The work of the committee would be supported by a secretariat
located in Goa, India (Figure 8.8).
Figure 8.8: Organisational structure of IOMOU

MJtmhi.'t"
,\utilmriiies
l:'"nrt State Cootm!

Cann:nitlett
Nntiooul
l'o•rl Stnbt i "~mtrnl
()¢11:tR''I:
Source: IOMOU annual report 2007
The committee is charged with promoting by all means necessary the harmonization of
procedures and practices relating to implementation of the memorandum. The
committee also reviews the operational effectiveness of the memorandum in which
representatives of IMO, ILO and other regional MoU’s participate as observers. Since
2001, an inter-sessional management group oversees the technical functions.
However, the institutional capability shows signs of limited capacity. For instance,
amendments to the PSC manual first envisaged in 2003 remained to be finalised even at
the start of 2008.154 Moreover, deliberations since 2005 are continuing on finalising the
procedures for a ‘Detention Review Panel’ and developing a ‘Ship Targeting Factor’
including a white, grey, and black list for the region.155 The 2005 Committee
153
IOMOU annual report 2005, p. 7 and annual report 2007, p. 8.
154
155
264
deliberations on Inter-Governmental Organisation (IGO) status at IMO meetings have
yet to fructify.156 In 2006, the Paris MoU received IGO status at the IMO and attended
the 14th session of the FSI sub-committee.157
Operationalisation
The responsibility of implementing the memorandum rests with national maritime
administrations. The memorandum in conformity with IMO Assembly resolution A.787
(19) on ‘Procedures for Port State Control’ details the inspection, rectification and
detention guidelines.158
Under the memorandum, each authority is required to indicate the number of PSCOs
working on port state inspections. So far, within the IOMOU, the Australian Maritime
Safety Authority (AMSA) alone has provided this information. In 2007, 42 PSCOs
located in 14 ports around Australia conducted port state inspections.159 On average,
with 2963 inspections reported during the year each PSCO performed 70 inspections.
Altogether, Australia, India, Iran and South Africa account for over 95% of the total
inspection effort under the memorandum. It is encouraging to see that 10 per cent of the
inspection data reported in 2008 was from other members (Table 8.19).
Table 8.19: Inspection effort of IOMOU member states

Inspection Efforts in % 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Australia 52.13 55.51 56.26 59.02 60.10 61.60 49.6
India/Iran/South Africa
Other Members I I I I I I I
42.10
5.77
38.69
5.80
40.95
2.79
40.08
0.90
36.80
3.10
Note: For 2001 there is incomplete data on individual member state contribution
37.11
1.29
40.4
I 10.0
Source: Derived from IOMOU annual reports 2001-2008
Analysis of regime effectiveness

The IOMOU case study analysed the progress of IOMOU using statistical data. Again,
the story that unfolds is very different from that contained in the IOMOU
documentation for the period from 2001 to 2006. Using the rubric for measuring regime
effectiveness the variables of actor behaviour and leadership, structure over time,
broader consequences across space and stages of regime formation are analysed for
measuring effectiveness of the regime for port state control in the Indian Ocean.
156
157
Paris MoU annual report 2006, pp. 5-6.
158
International Maritime Organization, ‘Procedures for Port State control,’ Assembly 19th session,
A.19.res.787, 23 November 1995.
159
Australian Maritime Safety Authority, Report on Port State Control in Australia 2007, p. 2.
265
The evidence suggests that although there is acknowledgement of the problem of
substandard shipping in the region the extent of the problem has not been
comprehensively identified. Moreover, the inspection data of the Paris MoU, Tokyo
MoU and the Indian Ocean MoU suggests that a major component of the shipping fleets
of Indian countries is operating within the region. The inspection data suggests that only
9 shipping fleets are trading outside the Indian Ocean Region. Of these countries only
India, Iran, Maldives and Sri Lanka are members solely of the IOMOU. Australia is a
member of both Indian Ocean and Tokyo MoUs. The remaining four countries
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand are members only of the Tokyo MoU.
Additionally, lack of transparency in determining whether the target inspection rate is
being met suggests that the agenda has not been converted into measures for collective
action. Even amongst the more influential states only Australia has consistently reported
the inspection rate that well exceeded the target rate of inspection. This gives a score of
one on a scale of 1 to 5 for agenda formation.
The evidence also suggests that the institutional choice of a port state committee
supported by a secretariat provides for building of regional administrative capability and
promoting harmonization and effectiveness of the operation and effectiveness of the
IOMOU giving a score of three on a scale of 1 to 5 for institutional choice. The
evidence further suggests a number of problems in operationalisation of the regime,
such as, lack of resources and non-reporting with 95 per cent of all inspections confined
to just four member states giving a score of two on a scale of 1 to 5 for
operationalisation.
The average score for stages of regime formation is 2.0 on a scale of 1 to 5 (Table 8.20
and Figure 8.9).

The evidence for structural leadership by power based actors suggests that port state
control under the IOMOU regional alliance has not been a priority for governments
from the region. Moreover, port state control in the region is fragmented operating
under three if not four different MoUs. The performance of shipping fleets with 30 or
more inspections from the region indicates most fleets to be operating in the grey to
black list band (Table 8.8). This tends to suggest less than satisfactory flag state
266
implementation. Since inception of the regime only five more states (Iran, Kenya,
Maldives, Oman and Yemen) have become members and a good number of states from
the region are still to become members of the IOMOU. The evidence overall gives a
score of two on a scale of 1 to 5 for structural leader ship and power based actors.
Intellectual leadership by knowledge based actors is a big challenge for the port state
control regime in the region. There is little evidence of knowledge based actors raising
public awareness and establishing the extent of substandard shipping in the Indian
Ocean Region. The level of consensual level knowledge is very poor giving a score of
one on a scale of 1 to 5. The evidence also suggests keen interest on part of interest
based actors in present and future impacts of the port state control regime.
Entrepreneurial leadership by interest based actors is reasonably established and there is
good participation of interest based actors in institutionalising port state control
measures giving a score of three on a scale of 1 to 5 for entrepreneurial leadership and
interest based actors.
The average score for actor behaviour and leadership is two on a scale of 1 to 5 (Table
8.20 and Figure 8.9).
Table 8.20: Numerical score of variable sets and level of collaboration

Independent Average
Variable score
Knowledge Based actors and Intellectual leadership on part of knowledge based actors not at
all established. Epsitemic community and/or non-state actors
Intellectual leadership (KIL) 1
inactive. Very poor level of consensual knowledge base.
Interest Based actors and Entrepreneurial leadership by interest based actors reasonably
BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE
Actor Behaviour entrepreneurial leadership (IEL) established. Good participation of interest based actors in
institutional bargaining. Keen interest in present and future 3
and Leadership impacts of the problem. 2.0
(ABL) Structural leadership by power based actors somewhat
Power based actors and
established. Commitment to issue-specific resources is below
structural leadership (PSL)
average. The more powerful resource States have not fully
pledged allocative and authoritative resources. Since inception 2
of the regime, more States from the region are party to the
regime.
Agenda Formation (AF) Problems that require collective response are not identified. 1
Institutional Choice (IC) The institutional setting has a secretarial role for building
Stage of Regime regional administrative capability in member States and also
provides some descriptive or informational inputs into the 3 2.0
Formation (SRF) negotiation process.
evident in few member States from the region. 2
Signification/ Low level of concern amongst stakeholders. Concerns shared
by few member States from the region. 2

Low level of credible commitment amongst member States
Structure over time Legitimisation/ from the region. Weak regulatory framework for legitimising 2
Contractual Environment (LCE) 2.0
(SOT) international norms and principles within the region.
Domination/ Low level of political, legal and administrative national
capacity amongst member States from the region. Weak 2
National Capacity (DNC)
regional effort at capacity building.
State Learning at the Unit Level Very poor level of cognitive learning amongst States from the
region about the nature of problem and information about the
(SL) 1
options available for addressing the problem.
Broader
Regional Cooperation at the sub- Insignificant cooperation amongst member States from the
Consequences region on establishing well-defined activities and resources, 1 1.0
across space (BCS) system level (RC) needed to move from norms to rules.
International Cooperation at the Hardly any change in capacities of member States from the
system level (IC) region to effectively participate at the international level in 1
regime implementation.
Intervening
Variable
267
Figure 8.9: Measure of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness

Sl.C IIIL
5 5
4 4
3 3
2 2
1 1


State Learning
Sl.
5 5
4 4
3 3
2 2
1 1

Structure over time

The evidence suggests a low-level of concern amongst the member states with concerns
shared by few member states from the region giving a score of two on a scale of 1 to 5
for signification – level of concern.
The contractual environment is such that port state control participation by maritime
administrations is limited to the extent that administration consider it possible despite a
convergence of expectations. The evidence suggests a low level of credible commitment
where on occasions member states have failed to provide inspection data operating
under the regional port state control MoU indicating a weak regulatory framework. This
gives a score of two on a scale of 1 to 5 for legitimisation – contractual environment. As
for domination or the commitment of resources by governments, the evidence suggests
low level of political, legal and administrative national capacities amongst most
268
member states in the region giving a score of two on a scale of 1 to 5 for domination –
national capacity.
The average score for structure over time is 2.0 on a scale of 1 to 5 (Table 8.20 and
Figure 8.9).

The evidence suggests very poor level of cognitive learning amongst member states
from the region about the nature of substandard shipping in the region and the options
available to address the problem at the state level giving a score of one on a scale of 1 to
5 for state learning at the unit level. With Indian Ocean countries under four MoUs on
port state control there is insignificant cooperation amongst states from the region to
establishing well defined activities and resources needed to implement port state control
in the region giving a score of one on a scale of 1 to 5 for regional cooperation at the
sub-system level. Although all 36 Indian Ocean countries are members of the IMO and
9 of these countries are members of the IMO council, the international cooperation
outcomes are weakened by the lack of participation in regional port state control giving
a score of one on a scale of 1 to 5 for international cooperation at the system level.
The average score for broader consequences across space is 1.0 on a scale of 1 to 5
(Table 8.20 and Figure 8.9).
Level of collaboration
The analysis of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness gives a good insight
into the strengths and weaknesses of the regime for port state control in the Indian
Ocean Region.
In terms of behavioural change interest based actors have shown reasonable leadership
in institutionalising port state control measures. Whilst power based actors have shown
some change in behaviour since joining the regime for port state control, lack of priority
and commitment of resources has hampered the operationalisation of the regime. The
problem is exacerbated by the weak agenda and lack of intellectual leadership in
identifying the extent of the problem of substandard shipping in the region (Figure
8.10).
In terms of institutional effectiveness the low level of concern has yielded very poor
level of state learning. The contractual environment is weak and there is insignificant
269
regional cooperation. Efforts at capacity building are low and national capacities
continue to remain limited. There is hardly any change in capacities of states from the
region to effectively cooperate at the international level in port state control efforts
(Figure 8.10).

I E
N F 5
S F 4 B
T E E
3
I C H
2 C
T T A
1 V H
U I A
I
T V N
O
I E G
U
O N E
R
N E
A
A S
L
L S
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Level of Collaboration
The evidence suggests states in the region are conscious of the need to meet
international obligations in tackling the problem of substandard shipping. There is
recognition of the need for regional cooperation in port state control. In actual practice
there is more than one regional MoU on port state control in the region with the
majority of states from the region as members of one or the other MoU and in some
cases more than one MoU. What this suggests is that states in the region consider
regional cooperation as critical to tackling the problem of substandard shipping.
However, the Indian Ocean states are yet to establish how best to make the regime for
port state control work for them.
All the available evidence points towards the need for power based actors to give high
priority to port state control and strengthen maritime administrations in the region. The
lack of national capacity in port state is seen as the main dampener to greater regional
cooperation, which when achieved would only further enhance the level of collaboration
amongst states and strengthen port state control for the benefit of the Indian Ocean
Region as a whole. Making port state control a priority is likely to come from greater
intellectual leadership and is likely to see commitment by government of the required
allocative and authoritative resources to effectively operationalise the regime.
270
The combined effect of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness is to give a
level of collaboration of 1.75, closer to 2 on a scale of 1 to 5. What this means is that
there is perfunctory to elementary understanding and leadership at the national level and
a regional structure weakened by four MoUs with comparatively critical cooperation
limited to a few member states in different MoUs from the Indian Ocean Region. The
potential for regional cooperation is enormous given the common understanding of the
problem of substandard shipping and recognition that regional agreements are needed to
tackle the problem (Table 8.21).
Table 8.21: Level of collaboration port state control in the Indian Ocean Region
Level Of Collaboration : 1.75

1 No Collaborative Action.
2 Elementary understanding and leadership at the national level and a weak regional structure
with comparatively critical cooperation, leads to somewhat significant change in the
capacity of a few of the member states from the region to participate effectively at the
international level.
Effectiveness of the regime for port state control

In assessing the effectiveness of the regime for port state control, it may be said that
elementary actor-structure interplay has resulted in at best elementary formation of the
regime with less than elementary results for state learning and regional cooperation in
the region (Table 8.22). Taken together with the score for level of collaboration, the
scores of the two sets of variables that define behavioural change and institutional
effectiveness illustrate the assessed effectiveness of a regime on a scale of 1 to 5 where
a score of five indicates a world-class regime (Figure 8.11).
Table 8.22: Port state control regime effectiveness

I 1 I 2 3 I 4 I 5
Actor
Behaviour
and
Leadership
behaviour and
leadership
[
Perfunctory actor Elementary actor
behaviour and
leadership
)
Average actor
behaviour and
leadership
Substantial actor
behaviour and
leadership
World-class actor
behaviour and
leadership
Stages of
Regime
Formation
Perfunctory
regime formation
in the region
[ Elementary
regime formation
in the region.
)
Average regime
formation in the
region.
Substantial
regime formation
in the region.
World-class
regime formation
in the region.
Structure
over time
Perfunctory
structure over
time [ Elementary
structure over
time
)
Average
structure over
time
Substantial
structure over
time
World-class
structure over
time
Broader
consequences
across space [
I
Perfunctory
learning and
cooperation )
I
Elementary
learning and
cooperation
Average
learning and
cooperation
Substantial
learning and
cooperation
World-class
learning and
cooperation
271
Figure 8.11: Port state control regime effectiveness
Regime Effe<::tiveness
LOC
5
4
3
2
ABL
1

Conclusion
The IOMOU port state control case study analyses progress of the regional alliance
using quantitative data from the annual reports. A measure of the effectiveness of port
state control has been possible by the use of regime theory despite being confined to
statistical data in annual reports. There is no qualitative information in the annual
reports for analysis and the wider international data was instrumental in establishing the
regime implementation. Drawing on the theoretical framework for regime analysis, the
discussion on the IOMOU regional alliance on port state control provides key insights
into the implementation and effectiveness of the regime.
The IOMOU regional port state control as a negotiated regime arising from a consensus
process of bargaining has been thrust upon Indian Ocean states by the need to maintain
their international obligations of enforcing IMO standards for shipping. The positive
aspect has been for the MoU to evince behavioural change in member states to
accede/ratify relevant international instruments. Member states have been encouraged to
share information. The MoU established a clear agenda to achieve a 10 per cent annual
target rate of inspection. However, limited in institutional capacity member states have
been unable to finalise important procedures, such as the ship-targeting factor.
Moreover, operationalisation of port state control continues to remain embryonic after
272
nearly a decade. Outside the four countries – Australia, India, Iran and South Africa –
there is no significant participation by member states.
Structural leadership in the Indian Ocean Region on port state control has been fractured
by sub-system power play. Consequently, the Indian Ocean Region is subject to three
PSC control regimes, and Eastern and Southern Africa sub-region remains devoid of
any substantial port state control. Intellectual leadership by knowledge-based actors has
not created sufficient public and industry awareness for governments in the region to
feel pressurised into implementing port state control. Entrepreneurial leadership by
interest-based actors has to a degree institutionalised port state control and getting the
shipping industry in the region to participate in the various global initiatives to improve
the quality of shipping.
Communicating a level of concern over sub-standard shipping is limited to select

countries in the region. The token participation by the majority of members is
suggestive of simply maintaining a front to appear as a responsible flag state, potentially
to improve the public image of their shipping industry and no more. Even as rates of
inspection remain poor, the problem is further exacerbated by the regional alliances’
failure to develop a ship-targeting factor to optimise meagre resources at the disposal of
member states. The contractual environment allows maritime administrations to
participate to the extent possible and is jurisdictionally weak in pressurising non-
performing administrations to act. Consequently, the structure over time has been
unsuccessful in improving capacity of member states or facilitating new states in the
region to join the IOMOU on port state control.
It took 15 years since the 1982 Paris MoU and four years since the 1993
Commonwealth of Australia report into ship safety before the Indian Ocean states met
in 1997 to implement port state control in the region.
State learning has been slow and even now, there is no assessment on the extent of
substandard shipping from the region. Nor have member states charted a route to grasp
the extent of the problem and build administrative and technical capacity to address the
issues. There is clear evidence from the statistical data to show that ships from a number
of flag states in the region are not being picked up by port state control. In effect,
quality of these ships is dependent on the extent of enforcement of international
standards by flag states. The fractured regional cooperation has created gaps in the
273
inspection and affected the regional efforts to strengthen maritime administrations.
Effectiveness of international cooperation at the system level is contingent upon the
participation of all the Indian Ocean rim countries in port state control efforts.
This concludes the analysis of the second case study and the next chapter presents the
summary and conclusions of the research.
274
Conclusion
Power of the sea from coast to coast in 15 minutes to 11 hours
The Indian Ocean

Tsunami of
26 December 2004
Leadership of Rim countries in the Indian Ocean
Leadership of landlocked countries in the Indian Ocean
Map source: Australian Government, Bureau of Meteorology, Tsunami information page, viewed 21 April 2009,
<http://www.bom.gov.au/info/tsunami/tsunami_info.shtml> and Travel times for Indian Ocean Tsunami, Map provided by Kenji
Satake, Geologival Survey of Japan, AIST at <http://www.bom.gov.au/info/tsunami/travel_time.shtml>
Chapter 9
Prospects for regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region
Open maritime space or a region

The Indian Ocean maritime space conceived as one oceanic space ‘yes’ but as one
region not quite. Historians have written about the long history of contact and trade
done by people from its coasts.1 Geographers have for centuries given various names to
the oceanic space.2 Over time the maritime space connecting the shores of East Africa,
Middle East, South Asia, South East Asia and Australia has come to be pictured as the
Indian Ocean. While in IR theory and geopolitics the Indian Ocean is often discussed as
four sub-regions – East Africa, Middle East, South Asia and Australasia (South East
Asia and Australia combine) – instead of one region.3
In the post Cold War era there has been a paradigm shift in the way the Indian Ocean is
viewed in IR theory and geopolitics. The convergence of two related factors has
influenced this change. Both factors came about at nearly the same time in the early
1990s. Firstly, in the post Cold-war era has been the emergence of a new regime for
ocean governance, the focus of this research. Secondly, this new ‘ocean regime’ is one
of interdependence in which the centre of political gravity has unendingly shifted from
land to oceans. These factors are related because without the power to govern the sea
first, a nation is unlikely to be able to project power from the sea to the land. Here
power is not to be confused with superpower, great power or middle power authority
and/or influence in international affairs but power as the ability to do or act in national
interest and if called upon in national defence.4
The growing intensity of ocean use is impinging on the carrying capacity of ocean and
the Indian Ocean is no exception. There exists potential for conflict amongst competing
ocean use. The Law of the Sea convention promises to alter radically the traditional
freedom of access as traditional international and national mechanisms are further
strained in preserving peace. There is increasing emphasis on interdependence and
regional cooperation in areas of marine scientific research, fisheries management,
1
See note 1, Introduction; note 2, chapter 3; and note 3, chapter 3.
2
See discussion chapter 3.
3
4
276
environmental protection, maritime safety and maritime security as individual states are
unable to cope alone with matters of ocean governance.5
The paradigm shift in thinking stems from the recognition that the power to govern the
sea is beyond the capacity of individual states. Governance at sea stresses regional
cooperation and for scholars of IR theory and geopolitics, the maritime space that
defines the Indian Ocean may be better served when the Indian Ocean is viewed as one
macro-region for ocean governance instead of four sub-regions.6 Firstly, without
cooperation across the four sub-regions it is difficult to build capacity in many of the
Indian Ocean states for governance of the maritime space.7 Secondly, lack of
governance at sea by one state would have consequences for neighbouring states and
beyond.8 In other words, regional cooperation in maritime issues across the Indian
Ocean space is in the interests of all states.
The power to govern the sea stems from political will to be able to act or function at sea
in a manner of governing or control. Indian Ocean nation states must articulate a
national maritime vision and policy that informs the rules, norms, principles and
procedures for the nation, similar to the framework of international regimes to
constitutionally conduct maritime policy, actions and affairs of the nation at sea.9 The
assertion here is that the Indian Ocean can be conceived, understood and analysed as a
‘region’ through the theoretical framework of international regimes and practical
application of ocean governance conceptual constructs. Just as in history, through the
exploration of cross-cultural interaction and merchant trade, there is emerging scholarly
recognition of the integrated world of the Indian Ocean, long before European
colonisation.10
International regimes and ocean governance

This thesis set out to understand international regimes, identify issues in ocean
governance to which international regime theory could apply and arrive at a measure of
5
6
See discussion chapters 2 and 3.
7
See chapters 6 and 8.
8
See discussion importance of ocean governance by all coastal states chapter 2.
9
10
See note 1 ibid.
277
International regimes in theory further cooperation to provide governance by making
expectations of governments consistent with one another. By facilitating agreement in
an otherwise anarchic world of politics, regimes provide a framework of rules, norms,
principles and procedures for cooperation.11 The empirical analysis validates the theory.
In the two case studies, many of the Indian Ocean countries reached agreement for an
Indian Ocean Global Ocean Observing System for marine scientific research and a port
state control arrangement to eliminate sub-standard shipping in the Indian Ocean
Region. The international regimes under which these regional agreements were reached
were sponsored primarily by UN agencies that facilitated agreement at the international
level in the first instance. The internationally agreed regimes made expectations of most
Indian Ocean countries consistent with one another having reached regional agreement
on having to meet their obligations under the regime.12
In theory, regimes establish a clear legal framework that specifies legitimate and
illegitimate behaviour.13 In both case studies, Indian Ocean countries established a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that recognised need for cooperation and
collaboration and at the minimum established objectives, commitments, procedures,
sharing of information protocols and capacity building efforts. The MoU’s may not
have specified illegitimate behaviour but they do provide a legal framework of sorts to
legitimise behaviour. In the case of the IOGOOS MoU, there is clear intent and desire to
cooperate in promoting the Global Ocean Observing System for marine scientific
research. In the case of the IOMOU on port state control, again there is clear intent to
align regional efforts with international instruments to increase maritime safety, protect
the marine environment and improve the living and working conditions of ships. In both
cases, international regimes facilitated establishing a form of legal framework for the
Indian Ocean Region in areas where countries from the region may otherwise not have
considered regional cooperation.14 The strength and weaknesses or shortcomings of the
MoU’s are discussed in the section on regime effectiveness later in the chapter. Suffice
it to say a MoU makes a good beginning but arrangements that are more formal are
needed to secure commitment from participating governments.
11
12
See chapters 6 and 8 for analysis.
13
See note 23 and discussion on conceptual clarification of regimes in chapter 4.
14
278
Regimes in theory are also said to create mutual trust by improving the quality and
quantity of information exchanged between states.15 The empirical analysis shows that
amidst economic and security concerns countries from the region were able to align
expectations and develop a framework of rules, norms, principles and procedures for
cooperation in marine scientific research. True, not all countries from the region are
members of the Indian Ocean Global Ocean Observing System. At the same time, there
are no rules under the MoU that exclude other Indian Ocean countries from joining nor
were there any stated positions evident that seek exclusion of specific countries. For
example, despite the well-known competitive security rivalry between India and
Pakistan, under the MoU, Pakistan can join the Indian Ocean Global Ocean Observing
System. Similarly, the Indian Ocean MoU on port state control seeks membership from
all states in the region. As for exchanging information, in both case studies there is
evidence that member states are willing to exchange information.16 The quantity and
quality of information being exchanged is discussed in the section on regime
effectiveness later in the chapter. Suffice it to say that the port state control regime with
at least three MoUs for the region suggests capacity constraints rather than issues of
mutual trust in the exchange of information. After all, port state control data in the
public domain was accessed for the research.
Finally, even though not cost-free, regimes in theory reduce transaction costs associated
with the negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of agreements.17 Both case studies
show that the regional agreements were not cost free. The primary funding to support
IOGOOS activities and operations is through annual subscriptions from members and
voluntary contributions. However, as brought out by the IOGOOS secretariat, the
annual subscription is a token contribution and membership is not annulled if the fee is
not paid. There was separate communication to suggest that at least one of the countries
initially hesitated to join IOGOOS as the membership was tagged to a fee that might
have proven to be difficult to honour over time. Similarly, cost of running the secretariat
and information centre under the IOMOU on port state control was to be met from
financial contributions of parties to the memorandum, and gifts and subscriptions by
15
16
17
279
donor countries or organisations.18 The transaction costs are discussed in the section on
regime effectiveness later in the chapter. Suffice it to say that that cost of membership
may have discouraged countries either from joining the regional alliance as in the case
of IOGOOS or those that did join may have stopped reporting information unable to
meet their obligations as in the case of IOMOU for port state control.
Effectiveness of maritime regimes in the Indian Ocean Region

The purpose of this sub-section is not only to examine the legal framework, quantity
and quality of information exchange and transaction costs but also to compare and
contrast the two regional agreements for their effectiveness.
The two case studies suggest varying degrees in the level of concern also evident from
the agenda of the regimes. Under the IOGOOS regime member states communicated a
high level of concern to accurately identify and agree upon the problems. While under
the port state control regime maritime administrations established a MoU but there is
little evidence to suggest that member states clearly identified the problems and extent
of sub-standard shipping in the region and how to deal with the issue in
operationalisation of port state control.19
In both marine scientific research and port state control regimes only one set of actors
provided reasonable leadership in promoting regional cooperation. The involvement of
interest based actors in IOGOOS and knowledge based actors in IOMOU for port state
control remains a challenge. More importantly, empirical findings suggest lack of
structural leadership by power based actors or governments in both case studies.20
In the case of IOGOOS, knowledge based actors provided intellectual leadership in

taking the initiative to promote regional cooperation in marine scientific research.
Throughout IOGOOS history the test for the epistemic group of scientists has been to
get governments to commit resources and build capacity in marine scientific research.
As a consequence even interest based actors have not committed to research projects
whereas user driven oceanography is key to optimising the research effort.21
18
19
See sections on signification - level of concern and agenda formation in chapters 6 and 8.
20
See section on actor behaviour and leadership in chapters 6 and 8.
21
See section on actor behaviour and leadership in chapters 6.
280
In the case of IOMOU for port state control, it is maritime administrations of
governments as power based actors that signed the memorandum for regional
cooperation to undertake port state control. However, it is more from the efforts of
interest based actors and not the commitment of governments as such that has
potentially limited sub-standard shipping mostly to ports in states that are not members
of any port state control regime or to states that lack the capacity to undertake port state
control inspections. Had there been commitment from power based actors all states in
the region would be members and states would be committed to meeting the target
inspection rate, establishing a ship targeting factor and reporting on the number of port
state control officers. There would be no hesitancy in promulgating black-grey-white
lists for flag states as is the case under better established MoU’s and even starting a new
black-grey-white list for classification societies.22
In both cases the legal framework in the form of a memorandum of understanding

makes a good beginning for regional cooperation in the region. The strength of the
framework lies in the ability of countries to contribute to regional efforts depending
upon their individual capacities. Effectively the MoU’s are as binding as power based
actors want and because there are no legally enforceable commitments these power
based actors appear to have remained indifferent to making both regimes more
effective. This is despite convergence between states from the region on issues
concerning the Global Ocean Observing System in pursuit of marine scientific research
and port state control to eliminate sub-standard shipping.23
The evidence suggests that the framework for regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean
Region has been established. The very same memoranda can be transformed into
effective mechanisms for regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region, should
countries choose to do so. Take the example of India and Australia, where both
countries are known to have greater resources and greater commitment, the two
countries can build greater capacity in the region increasing the effectiveness of these
maritime regimes in the Indian Ocean.
Both cases studies in institutionalising the regimes demonstrate a preference for a

secretariat. As a result annual meetings are reduced to a meeting of officials. The Indian
22
See section on actor behaviour and leadership in chapters 8.
23
See section on legitimisation -contractual environment in chapter 6 and 8.
281
Ocean port state control secretariat has some role in building regional administrative
capability though with little success compared to the secretariat for IOGOOS that seems
to rely mainly on the individual research institutions capacity from within existing
resources made available by governments. As a result, the regional effort at capacity
building continues to be weak.24 The lack of institutionalised mechanisms for higher
level political engagement and leadership is seen as an impediment to building regional
capacity and improving the effectiveness of these regimes. Not surprisingly, both case
studies show low levels of political, legal and administrative capacity amongst states.25
The quantity and quality of information exchange under both memoranda could be
better. This would greatly enhance effectiveness of the regimes. There is clear evidence
of capacity constraints under both memoranda. Apart from capacity constraints the
IOGOOS data and information management system suggests significant problems in
exchange of information. It is suggested that information gathering and exchange for
marine scientific research in the region has been hindered by the structural complexity
created from attempting to mirror the international structure.26
On the other hand, the IOMOU on port state control suggests a lack of structure in data
and information gathering and dissemination. The majority of countries did not publish
annual reports and neither is the inspection data in public domain.27 The data and
information gathering under the GCC MOU is in the initial stages of development.28
While even the tenth IOMOU annual report of 2008 does not fully report on the
inspection efforts of each country for which information on the number of ship visits is
needed to establish the inspection rate. Encouraging though is that every member state
other than Oman provided inspection data in 2008, unlike previous years and for the
first time the annual report has a table reporting on the results of port state control
inspections undertaken by individual member states.29
24
See sections on institutional choice and structure over time in chapters 6 and 8.
25
See sections on domination – national capacity and state learning chapters 6 and 8.
26
See sections on signification – communication and level of concern and domination – national capacity
in chapters 6.
27
See sections on signification – communication and level of concern and domination – national capacity
in chapters 8.
28
See Riyadh MoU on port state control database – total number of ships inspected: 428; 2007- 96 ships;
2008 – 273 ships; 2009 – 59 ships, downloaded 16 Apr 2009, < http://www.riyadhmou.org/search.asp>.
29
IOMOU on PSC annual report 2008.
282
All these aspects taken together bring to the surface the low level of state learning in the
region. Comparing the two regimes does suggest that where there has been greater state
learning as in the case of marine scientific research the level of regional cooperation and
capacity to participate at the international level has been better than for port state
control. In the case of marine scientific research some critical cooperation between
select states in the region with the research capacity is already happening that not only
needs to be progressed but also advanced to include other states. As for the regime for
port state control, states are left to their own devices in conduct of activities and
commitment of resources. Greater emphasis on regional cooperation could promote a
better resourced and more structured approach to port state control and improve
effectiveness of the regime in the Indian Ocean Region.30
Now in its tenth year of operation in the region the evidence on port state control
suggests poor level of state learning about the nature of sub-standard shipping in the
region. The research could not identify any open source of information other than for
port state control inspection data that quantifies the extent of sub-standard shipping in
the region. Moreover, inspection data by itself is not an indicator of sub-standard
shipping but serves more as an indicator of deficiencies that need to be rectified. Further
research is needed in identifying trade routes and ports in the region being visited by
sub-standard ships.
This brings the discussion to transaction costs. Theoretically, regimes reduce transaction
costs. In the case of countries in the Indian Ocean Region by doing nothing there were
no costs and now by joining a regional arrangement there were added transaction costs
to do something. In other words, where previously countries may have had no need for
committing resources they now had to invest in building capacity for conduct of marine
scientific research and undertaking port state control inspections.31 In both case studies
the evidence suggests that transaction costs associated with building national capacity
has held back greater participation by countries in the regime.32 It also depends on how
transaction costs are viewed. In the case of marine scientific research, one could argue
30
See section on broader consequences across space in chapters 6 and 8.
31
See section on domination – national capacity in chapters 6 and 8.
32
See note 251, Chapter 6 on costs of IOGOOS membership and Tables 8.18 and 8.19 in chapter 8 that
suggests lack of capacity as a reason for non-reporting of port state control inspection contributions and
effort.
283
for countries that did join the IOGOOS MoU to have reduced transaction costs by
getting an opportunity to participate in international marine scientific research
programmes which otherwise may not have been feasible. Similarly, it could be argued
for countries that did join the IOMOU on port state control to have reduced transaction
costs by improving their international image in eliminating sub-standard shipping as
part of the regional arrangement in the Indian Ocean.
To the extent that the Indian Ocean states share common interests and agree to
cooperate the two maritime regimes have been effective. Indian Ocean states that are
not members of the regimes are from their own choosing. The effectiveness of these
regimes in the issue areas of marine scientific research and port state control is a work
in progress. The maritime regimes are well established and are here to stay.
Commitment of resources and leadership in promoting regional cooperation can deliver
on improving the effectiveness of these regimes.
Challenge to building good order at sea and prospects for regional cooperation
The research has highlighted the absence of power-based actors and structural
leadership and other behavioural and institutional challenges facing countries in the
region. One challenge is singled out for more discussion and that is the challenge of
political will and leadership. As the research comes to a close recent events in the Indian
Ocean amply highlight this as the greatest challenge facing Indian Ocean countries.
The first event is the terrorist attack on Mumbai, where the terrorists came from the sea,
which finally awakened India into introducing new maritime security measures along its
coastline.33 All states in the Indian Ocean must have the power to govern the sea where
states in the region must cooperate in building good order in the knowledge that no state
not even India with one of largest navies in the world can by itself build sufficient
power to govern at sea. This leads to articulating a national maritime vision and policy
by each state in the region. Again, articulation of a national policy alone is not
sufficient. Political will and leadership to promote the policy is paramount. Australia
33
Rajat Pandit, The Times of India, ‘Now, Navy gets charge of coastline,’ 1 March 2009, viewed on 16
Apr 2009, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Opinion/Editorial/Navy-to-head-Indian-maritime-security-
Antony/articleshow/4204435.cms>.
284
despite a decade long commendable National Ocean’s policy34 has continued to neglect
the importance of oceans for national prosperity and security.35
The second event relates to piracy off the Somali coast where ship crews now have to
fight off pirates attempting to hijack the ship and take the crew hostage for a ransom.36
The purpose here is not to launch into a detailed discussion on piracy but to demonstrate
the challenge of political will and leadership in the region and internationally. It is two
years ago on 23 March 2007 when fifteen British sailors from HMS Cornwall were
taken captive by Iranian forces in tidal waters of the Shat-al-Arab.37 Amongst
conflicting claims38, the incident was a stark reminder of what the future held, if nations
did not soon enough come together in addressing issues of jurisdiction in policing the
oceans under the Law of the Sea. At that time in a paper with Hasjim Djalal the author
argued for political will and leadership in developing a common doctrine for navies
under the aegis of the United Nations where navies could even agree to fly the United
Nations Flag in maintaining good order at sea.39 Under article 93 of LOSC, the use of
the UN Flag at sea on ships employed on the official service of the United Nations is an
acceptable norm.40 It is encouraging to see some political leadership from the region,
specifically on part of the Australian Government, which has announced an inquiry into
piracy even though there is no piracy in Australian waters.41 More is needed though.
The research indicates that in the implementation of different maritime regimes

prospects for regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region are good. Here one point
34
Australian Government Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, ‘Australia’s Ocean
Policy,’ viewed 16 Apr 2009, < http://www.environment.gov.au/coasts/oceans-policy/index.html>.
35
Sam Bateman in interview with ABC Radio Australia, ‘Australia urged to better manage maritime
domain’ viewed 21 Mar 2009, <http:radioaustralia.net.au/connectasia/stories/200903/s2520598.htm>.
36
See Daniel Howden, The Independent, ‘ High seas drama as American sailors fight off pirates,’ 09
April 2009, viewed 16 Apr 2009, < http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/high-seas-drama-as-
american-sailors-fight-off-pirates-1666138.html>; Nicholas Paphitis, The Huffington Post, ‘Somali
pirates: crew use water jets to defend oil tanker,’ 02 January 2009, viewed 16 Apr 2009, <
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/02/somali-pirates-crew-use-w_n_154744.html>; The Telegraph,
‘Chinese crew use molotov cocktails to fight off Somali pirates,’ 20 December 2008, viewed 16 Apr
2009, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/3849969/Chinese-ship-uses-Molotov-
cocktails-to-fight-off-Somali-pirates.html>.
37
Sky news, ‘UK marines and sailors seized by Iran,’ 23 March 2007, viewed 16 Apr 2009,
<http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/Sky-News-Archive/Article/20080641257281>.
38
BBC news, ‘The capture of the UK crew,’ 30 March 2007, viewed 16 Apr 2009, <
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/6502805.stm>.
39
Manoj Gupta and Hasjim Djalal, ‘The key to maritime cooperation.’
40
LOSC Article 93.
41
Official website of the Australian Labor Party, ‘Inquiry into maritime piracy,’ 23 February 2009,
viewed 16 Apr 2009, <http://www.alp.org.au/media/0209/mstard230.php>.
285
is worth emphasising. The research analysed two of the most important maritime
regimes and found that all states were welcome as members of the regimes unlike the
IOR-ARC regional grouping where some states like India had political considerations
on who is in and who is out.42 The advantage of taking a regimes approach is that each
of the regime is issue based where states have an interest in the issue; agree to comply
with international norms; and are willing to cooperate regionally in the implementation
of the regime. In addition, there is realisation that no state can afford to go alone in
addressing issues of ocean governance.
Besides the two regimes the other regimes that hold immediate prospect for regional
cooperation are the resource based fisheries regime of the Indian Ocean Tuna
Commission (IOTC), regional seas programme of the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) and the emerging maritime security regime under the International
Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code, Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA)
convention, Container Security and the Proliferation Security initiatives. The prospects
are there for regional cooperation. Regimes other than maritime security have been in
existence for quite some time and although in an embryonic stage they remain viable
regimes for regional cooperation. Even the issues surrounding maritime security that
demand regional cooperation are well known to Indian Ocean states. The question is can
political will and leadership now deliver on regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean
Region in the use of the sea by Indian Ocean states for the benefit of the region as a
whole.
Indian Ocean as a regional framework in international relations

One of the major hypothesis was can maritime regimes improve prospects for regional
cooperation in the Indian Ocean, for a new geopolitical region to emerge within the
geostrategic maritime realm? As indicated at the beginning of the thesis the emphasis
has been on the regional and not the unit level of analysis to determine prospects for
greater regional cooperation. All of the empirical evidence on regime effectiveness
points to the practical aspects of both regimes where the framework for regional
cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region has been firmly established and using these and
42
See note 5, Introduction.
286
other maritime regimes as the start point the right political leadership can deliver on a
new geopolitical region within the geostrategic maritime realm.
It can be said that there is definite value in looking at the Indian Ocean as a region for
future analysis of maritime regimes. The research integrated structuration theory with
regime theory, relied on original data for analysis which has not featured in the current
literature and made the case for maritime regimes in ocean governance. The research
provided a methodological framework in making the case for the Indian Ocean Region
and created a structure for future policy. Take the case of marine scientific research that
clearly demonstrates the need for strengthening the regime so that other maritime
regimes that affect human and food security in the Indian Ocean Region can be
addressed. Or even in the case of port state control where strengthening the regime
would vastly enhance maritime safety and have a strong bearing on improving maritime
security in the region. It is no longer possible for Indian Ocean states to ignore maritime
regimes as they impact all of humankind.43
43
LOSC preamble says ‘common heritage of mankind.’
287
Appendix 1
List of Persons
Interviews/formal/informal discussions in Australia

1. Bateman, Sam, Research Fellow University of Wollongong
2. Burgess, Phil, Department of Environment, water, Heritage and the Arts
3. Curran, Stuart, Department of Agriculture , Fisheries and Forestry
4. Drummond, Barry, Geoscience Australia
5. Emmett, Lindsay, Australian Maritime Safety Authority
6. Exel, Martin, Austral Fisheries
7. Forbes, Andrew, Sea Power Centre
8. Goldrick, James, Commander Border Protection Command
9. Kenchington, Richard, Visiting Professorial Fellow, University of Wollongong
10. Lee, James, Department of Agriculture , Fisheries and Forestry
11. McCaffrie, Jack, Sea Power Centre
12. Smith, Barbara, Department of Agriculture , Fisheries and Forestry
13. Symonds, Phil, Geoscience Australia
14. Tsamenyi, Martin, University of Wollongong
Interviews/formal/informal discussions in Indonesia

1. Anggoro, J. Kusnanto, Centre for Strategic and International Studies
2. Bandoro, Bantarto, Centre for Strategic and International Studies
3. Barani, Husni Mangga, Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries
4. Djalal, Hasjim, Senior Advisor to the Indonesian Minister for Marine Affairs
and Fisheries
5. Hendrawan, Indonesian National Shipowners Association
6. Hilaman, Masnellyarti, Deputy Minister for Nature Conervation Enhancement
and Environmental Degradation Control, Ministry of Environment
7. Hutagalung, P., Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries
8. Indraningsih, Wahyu, State Ministry of Environment
9. Kirom, A. Cholik, Director General of Sea Transportation
10. Mangindaan, Robert, Forum for Defense and Maritime Studies
11. Mao, Hidayat, Japan International Cooperation Agency
12. Marsetio, Indonesian Navy
288
13. Prasetyono, Edy, Centre for Strategic and International Studies
14. Purwanto, Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries
15. Sitepu, M.J., Maritime Education and Training Center
16. Sitorus, Thomas A., Japan International Cooperation Agency
17. Soerjo, Astrid, Confederation of ASEAN Journalists
18. Soesastro, Hadi, Centre for Strategic and International Studies
19. Sukarno, Agus, National SAR Agency
20. Sukono, S.E., Asosiasi Pendidikan dan pelatihan maritime Indonesia
21. Tambunan, Adolf R., Ministry of Transportation
22. Tardan, Samsidik, Japan international Cooperation Agency
23. Tarigan, Hartanta, Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries
24. Wahab, M.S., Germanischer Lloyd
25. Zainuddin, Ardius Ministry for Marine Affairs and Fisheries
Other interviews/formal/informal discussions

1. Agarwal, Vinod K., Berkeley Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Study Center
2. Berlin, Donald, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
3. Biswas, Aparjita, University of Mumbai
4. Bouchard, Christian, Laurentian University, Canada
5. Chaturvedi, Sanjay, Panjab University, India
6. Doyle, Timothy, University of Adelaide
7. Forbes, Vivian Louis, Curtin University, Australia
8. Hettne, Bjorn, University of Gotheborg, Sweden
9. Rao, P. V., Osmania University, India
10. Richardson, John B, Directorate-General for fisheries and Maritime Affairs,
European Commission
11. Rumley, Dennis, Edith Cowan University, Australia
12. Telo, Mario, University Livre de Bruxelles, Belgium
13. Valencia, Mark, Internationally known maritime policy analyst
14. Yasin, Mat Taib, Maritime Institute of Malaysia
289
Appendix 2
Coding and Classification of IOGOOS annual reports
Use of Wef QDA Software
 Each annual report was uploaded by the software.

 Qualitative judgement made for each sentence of the annual reports and coded
against the 20 different codes representing the 5 different variables (4 codes
each) of the regimes.
 Each selected text extracted by the software for each code
 software generated its own number in brackets [ ] for each extraction.
 All the extract put together provide a sense of the variable to be assessed
 Qualitative assessment done for each variable based on the emerging picture
Example
For Power based/Structured (POBAS)
In IOGOOS I [140225-140437] – report states:
Should the document be simply an MOU or rather an Agreement? It was agreed that an
Agreement was a more formal text than an MOU and would require more formal
consideration, and signature, at a governmental level.
In the thesis:
When 17 national scientific agencies/institutions from the 10 participating countries

signed a MoU, they stopped short of reaching an agreement requiring formal
consideration and signature at the government level
In IOGOOS-III [35094-35204] – report states:
Important to identify government support before committing funding to that countries

participation in workshop
In the thesis:
Not surprisingly, government support continued to elude the strong scientific

engagement at subsequent meetings.
Actor Behaviour/Leadership (ACBEL)

IOGOOS I [12740-12926]
290
The significance of the Conference lies in its explicit statement of commitment of the
participating countries, agencies and institutions, and of interested nongovernmental
organizations
IOGOOS I [31242-31289]
Linking science and management more effectively
IOGOOS I [35282-35417]
In this model, scientific knowledge, technologies and research provide the means to
design and develop GOOS in response to user needs.
IOGOOS I [113480-113593]
Project objectives Creation of links amongst scientists (coastal laboratories), coastal

managers and communities;
IOGOOS I [142116-142216]
Nineteen persons representing national agencies/institutions, signed the Memorandum

of Understanding
IOGOOS I [155448-155722]
The private sector and individuals with an interest in ocean science, engineering and
management have been meeting regularly since November 2000 to develop and
implement WAGOOS which is being constituted as an incorporated body to afford
appropriate protection for members.
IOGOOS I [166994-167257]
The IOGOOS Conference Chairman, K. Radhakrishnan, stressed the fact that the
Conference had shown that the countries of the region and those especially interested in
it had demonstrated a willingness and a capability to cooperate in a large-scale regional
action.
IOGOOS I [208106-208261]
We also have, thanks to the Government of India, a "nest" for our newest GOOS, at the
Indian National Center for Ocean Information Services, in Hyderabad.
IOGOOS II [44027-44223]
291
Countries interested in undertaking the project increased from 4 to 11. These include
Australia, Bangladesh, India, Iran, Kenya, Mauritius, Reunion, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania and Thailand.
IOGOOS-III [4935-5104]
Further, he recognized the efforts of Indonesia in setting up Indonesian GOOS

(InaGOOS), which is Indonesia's new mechanism for coordinating GOOS activities
nationally.
Dr. Jan Sopaheluwakan made a presentation on the establishment of the Indonesian

GOOS [InaGOOS]. He stressed the importance of the seas around Indonesia due to the
strong influence of Monsoon, Indian Ocean Dipole Mode (IODM) and El Nino. The
Indonesian through-flow is a complex phenomenon that is being studied through
projects such as INSTANT. Upwelling and sinking processes are being studied in
relation to Monsoon and the El Nino event. He stated that Indonesia is using remote
sensing data operationally for the identification of fishing grounds. He also listed the
imperatives for the formation of InaGOOS and provided the list of marine institutions in
Indonesia that are a part of InaGOOS. He reiterated that the effective role of InaGOOS
will enhance the regional alliances like IOGOOS and SEAGOOS. During the discussion
that followed, Mr. William Erb stated that InGOOS could be used by the IOGOOS
members as a model for development of national GOOS organizations elsewhere. He
suggested that the list of participants in InaGOOS could be provided to IOGOOS
Secretariat so that they could be loaded onto the IOGOOS website.
IOGOOS-III [13292-13955]
He then made a presentation addressing a proposed strategy revision of IOGOOS. The

initial IOGOOS strategy was written in 2000 and was adopted by IOGOOS in 2002.
The tsunami disaster has suggested that a revision to the strategy might be appropriate
to consider new responsibilities that may be taken up by IOGOOS. The likelihood of
storm surge, tropical cyclones, droughts and flooding in the Indian Ocean Region are far
greater than that of tsunamis. He suggested that awareness building and education will
be far more expensive and time consuming than building the warning/observing system
itself and that IOGOOS should be able to help with capacity building.
292
IOGOOS-III [14786-15452]
IOGOOS will need strengthening if it is to take on additional IOTWS tasks. Full time
staff for the secretariat is a critical need even without the IOTWS tasks. The downside
considerations for IOGOOS taking on IOTWS are (a) IOGOOS is operational
oceanography whereas IOTWS is a 24x7 warning system and the communities involved
are somewhat different and (b) the IOGOOS Secretariat has neither the funding nor staff
to take on these additional tasks. The upside considerations include (a) a moderately
developed communication network, and an active community, as well as, (b) the
IOGOOS Secretariat is also the heart of Indian TWS and there already is some
capability.
IOGOOS-III [18825-19064]
Dr Gary Meyers informed that climate and tsunami requirements for tide gauges have
commonalities; however, there is a conflict between the real-time data reception for
tsunami vs. the long term observations that are required for climate.
IOGOOS-III [50614-50726]
The scientific basis is strong and the engagement of Indian Ocean scientists in the
process is to be commended.
IOGOOS-III [55285-55641]
He concluded, noting that in this part of the ocean 60% of the world population is living
and that most members are developing countries. Therefore, as I-GOOS Chair the
suggestion is that we should focus on operational oceanography that is user-driven, to
mobilize governments, scientists and citizens. This is the challenge for IOGOOS and
GOOS as a whole.
Power based/Structured (POBAS)

IOGOOS I [140225-140437]
IOGOOS I [141151-141330]
293
It was stressed that no country should have more than three member
agencies/institutions and that these were committed to cooperate fully in the overall
interest of the Alliance.
IOGOOS I [181534-181914]
At the beginning of the new millennium, the IOC and the Government of Australia
joined together and established an Office in Perth to assist in the development of GOOS
in the Indian Ocean as well as the South Pacific. The State Government of Western
Australia plays a key role in this partnership and views Western Australia as helping to
pin down the eastern boundary of IOGOOS.
IOGOOS I [183828-184281]
However, we would only be fooling ourselves if we thought that the UN can underwrite
the establishment of a truly global observing system. GOOS will only be successful in
the Indian Ocean and elsewhere if governments and nations understand its importance
and agree to provide the funds and support required to make it work. IOC will continue
to help but the real costs involved in running an operational system will have to be met
by the region itself.
IOGOOS II [22899-23206]
The Hyderabad workshop agreed that the strategy for Oceanographic Data and
Information management in the Indian Ocean Region should be based on the following
requirements: (i) there is a need to sensitize and get commitment from Governments
(decision makers) to assure sustainability of the IOGOOS network.
IOGOOS II [42376-42820]
At the completion of the project, the work of monitoring the keystone ecosystems will
be taken over by the governments and/or research institutions of the respective
countries. Therefore, the relevant government departments and institutes must be
engaged at an early stage in the project so that they become aware of the benefits
available and the commitment required and will come to regard monitoring as a routine
part of government business.
IOGOOS-III [35094-35204]
294
Important to identify government support before committing funding to that countries
participation in workshop
Interest based/Entrepreneurial (INBAE)

OGOOS I [10008-10642]
he Government of Mauritius, through its Mauritius Oceanography Institute, facilitated

this landmark Conference, with sponsorship from eleven international and national
agencies and programs: Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, World
Meteorological Organization, Department of Ocean Development of India, US Office of
Naval Research, US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, US National
Science Foundation, Mauritius Oceanography Institute, Climate Variability and
Prediction Program, Australian Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research
Organization, Land-Ocean Interaction in the Coastal Zone, Météo France.
IOGOOS I [31058-31242]
For these reasons, environmental scientists and managers are advocating a new, more
integrated, approach that considers both environmental effects and the effects of human
activities.
IOGOOS I [32906-32967]
specified by the users. Such a user-driven, end-to-end system
IOGOOS I [34845-34980]
to serve the needs of many user groups, including government agencies, private
enterprise, scientists, educators, NGOs and the public.
IOGOOS I [44793-45488]
These may include the SE Asia Center for Atmospheric and Marine Prediction; the
Regional Cooperation in Scientific Information Exchange and the Oceanographic Data
and Information Network of East Africa; fishery bodies such as the Indian Ocean Tuna
Commission, Western Indian Ocean Tuna Organization, Regional Commission for
Fisheries, and South West Indian Ocean Fishery Commission; Regional Seas
Conventions such as the Nairobi Convention; Large Marine Ecosystem programs
(LMEs) such as those planned for the Agulhas Current, Somali Coastal Current,
295
Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal; and the Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network and the
Coral Reef Degradation in the Regional Indian Ocean program.
IOGOOS I [102934-103489]
The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, based in Mauritius, was recognized as a good
focal point for industry and a channel for promoting best scientific practice and
informed decisions. Capacitybuilding in this area calls for joint end-to-end workshops
(ocean-climate-fisheries) to better identify needs and to cross-fertilize ideas. Ocean data
and products The prominent application areas identified by the Working Group were:
oil and gas industry (e.g., WAGOOS Timor Sea Project); coastal erosion; coral reef
bleaching; coastal management and vulnerability.
IOGOOS I [105504-105736]
Community-based monitoring (community, schools, hotels, local government) will be

used as far as possible, with organization, motivation and quality control through a
central body, and at various levels of technical sophistication.
IOGOOS I [106187-106363]
Product users Coastal-zone managers; coastal communities; developers and owners of

hotels and housing estates; port and marina authorities and users; the scientific
community.
IOGOOS I [107104-107547]
Project objectives Monitor the keystone ecosystems by large-scale remote sensing, by

small-scale remote-sensing in specific areas, by community-based monitoring at
specific sites under the supervision of scientists; and disseminate information to
governments, to integrated coastal-zone management programs, to communities and
fishermen (especially those dependent on the mangrove ecosystem), tourist
organizations, and to the IOGOOS network.
IOGOOS I [108640-108995]
The measurement basis will comprise: long-term time-series measurements made by the
community on a regular basis (e.g., every six months or one year) over a long period,
along with regular analysis of remote-sensing data; large-scale, spatially synoptic
296
measurements to be taken at the same time with the same method(s) in various places
over a wide area.
IOGOOS I [112516-112729]
Sustainability Community-based monitoring, which has a low cost and a high cost-
effectiveness, will be required, with community cooperation via government agencies
and integrated coastal-zone management programs.
IOGOOS I [123900-124163]
The Workshop also recommended that IOC approach POGO with a view to obtaining
fellowships to enable data managers from the IOGOOS region to undertake internships,
although it was noted that data management was currently not identified as a priority
area by POGO.
IOGOOS I [136882-137548]
POGO is a recently founded NGO. Its membership comprises 50 institutions and

organizations, including three from the Indian Ocean: the National Institute of
Oceanography (Goa, India); Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research
Organization (CSIRO, Australia); and the University of Cape Town. POGO promotes
observations and improvement of scientific knowledge, interprets scientific and
technical results for policy-makers, enhances public awareness, and provides training
and technology transfer. POGO also supports summer courses, fellowships, workshops,
and the Argo program. It is looking for increased participation by Indian Ocean groups
and institutions.
IOGOOS I [137585-138034]
Srinivasa Kumar briefly described a project funded by the Asian Pacific Network for
Global Change Research. In the Indian Ocean Region, five countriesBangladesh, India,
Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lankaundertook a coastal-fluxes project comprising small-
scale studies of sediment sources and movement, and of the impact of fertilizers in the
southeast Asia coastal zone. Capacitybuilding and regional studies on coastal zone
fluxes are also envisaged.
297
IOGOOS I [138067-138517]
Yuichiro Kumamoto described the Operation Magellan 2003-2004." This is a Japanese

Marine Science and Technology Center (JAMSTEC) round-the-world expedition
starting in Brisbane and ending in Freemantle, Australia, in which hydrographic and
benthic sampling will be carried out in the southern hemisphere, in all three major
oceans. JAMSTEC is seeking scientific participation of scientists of the IOGOOS
region in the Indian Ocean leg of this cruise.
IOGOOS I [156276-156712]
The WAGOOS region hosts many important industries, including oil and gas
operations, and fisheries, and is of national strategic importance. The key WA
stakeholders in this region have identified several important drivers for research and
development: a safe and secure operating environment; management of risk, particularly
of risk to the environment; and development of efficient and cost-effective structures
and operating methods.
IOGOOS II [39606-39813]
The medium term goal would be primarily the development of a detailed project
proposal which could be circulated to various national funding agencies as well as
organisations such as IOC, ONR and World Bank.
IOGOOS II [41087-41179]
Relevant information will be provided to environmental managers and coastal resource

users.
IOGOOS II [46991-47398]
An e-group was set up to facilitate discussions, information sharing and project

development. A request for preliminary country information on existing monitoring,
coastal zone management framework and current knowledge of coastal processes was
circulated to all the participants in the coastal section of the first meeting. However,
progress has been minimal due to the limited response to these requests.
IOGOOS II [47656-48263]
Expansion of network: It was decided to develop a network of contact persons and

institutions in the region who are interested in participating in this project. These
298
contacts would then undertake the task of filling in the required details of the coastal
zone management framework, state of knowledge of coastal processes and existing
monitoring programs for the respective countries. Compilation of this information
would be a ticket to further participation in developing the project proposal. Some of
those attending the conference volunteered to compile the information of to identify
contact persons.
IOGOOS II [50288-50589]
However, continuous, detailed monitoring by the responsible central authority is not

feasible due to the costs involved. Therefore it was decided to undertake a pilot
monitoring program using the resources available at the local level such as tourist
hotels, fishery harbours and coastal communities.
IOGOOS II [63455-64015]
The IOGOOS project on monitoring of keystone coastal ecosystems is directly

addressing issues concerning degradation of seagrass beds, coral reefs and mangrove
forests. It was recognized that a coherent and coordinated approach can deliver
improved management p o l i c i e s and mitigate impacts. A draft proposal has been
prepared based on the recommendations of the Census of Marine Life (CoML)
Workshop held at Goa during December 2003 to ensure community participation in the
measurement/monitoring of variability and change in these important ecosystems.
IOGOOS II [64016-64239]
The IOGOOS prawn project is addressing the risks and opportunities facing the prawn
industry and establishing a network and website, and pooling the expertise to gather
observations and improve understanding of the issues.
IOGOOS II [64240-64530]
IOGOOS is addressing issues of coastal change and developing a network of people and
countries to examine shoreline position changes in a coherent and systematic way. A
pilot project to be undertaken in Sri Lanka will interact with the broader GOOS
community and demonstrate methodologies.
299
Knowledge based/Intellectual (KNBAI)
IOGOOS I [151482-151818]
The Chairman, in summing up, stressed the view that the Alliance would collaborate
closely with all the concerned IOC regional bodies. He felt it would be vital for the
Alliance to get the support of universities and other relevant institutions, with a view to
building up a new corps of regional expertise for ocean/climate monitoring.
IOGOOS I [161013-161494]
Organizationally, the work will be pursued through expert groups and coordination
committees. To this end, WIOMAP works closely with JCOMM which provides the
necessary intergovernmental coordination in the management of marine meteorology
and oceanography in an analogous way to the WMO Commission on Marine
Meteorology in the field of operational meteorology. JCOMM also services the
Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) in respect of sea ice, waves, surges and
pollution.
IOGOOS I [190151-190264]
I encourage you all to take part-ownership of these meetings and make it your goal to
contribute and be involved.
IOGOOS-III [53753-53884]
Dr. Francois Gerard - France; He congratulated Dr. Gary Meyers and felt that the design
is scientifically sound and comprehensive.
Structure over time (STROT)

IOGOOS I [37066-38019]
The design must also take into consideration certain important realities: priorities vary
among nations and regions; many of the elements required to build the observing
system are already in place; those elements of the observing system required to improve
marine services and forecast natural hazards are most developed while those required
for ecosystem-based environmental protection and management of living resources are
least developed; and most nations do not have the capacity to contribute to and benefit
from the observing system at this time. In addition, the design of the coastal module
300
must take into consideration the importance of the regional scale that links global- and
local-scale changes, i.e., most agreements and conventions that target environmental
protection and resources are regional in scope and regional bodies provide the most
effective venue for specifying user-group requirements for environmental data and
information.
IOGOOS I [39181-39409]
This can best be achieved through a global federation of regional systems in which the
global network is established to measure and process a small set of common variables
that are required by most, if not all, regional systems.
IOGOOS I [39410-39734]
The network provides economies of scale and improves the costeffectiveness of

regional observing systems by minimizing redundancy and optimizing data and
information exchange; establishes reference and sentinel stations; and establishes
international standards and protocols for measurements, data exchange and
management.
IOGOOS I [55788-55915]
The Strategy will be based on the following operational satellites providing

oceanographic data for the Indian Ocean at present
IOGOOS II [27943-28322]
The IOGOOS-II meeting acknowledged the results of the Hyderabad Meeting and
endorsed its proposed work plan (attached as Annex-1). The meeting recalled the
importance of Capacity building as the basis for the achievements of IOGOOS
objectives in terms of Data and Information Management and recognized the
importance of ODINCINDIO as the Capacity Building Instrument for IOGOOS.
IOGOOS II [28740-28929]
The meeting strongly welcomed the close collaboration between IOGOOS, IOCINDIO,
IOCINCWIO and IODE on the advancement of Data and Information Management
capacity in the Indian Ocean Region.
IOGOOS II [43198-43277]
it is proposed that the project be considered as a joint IOGOOS/ CoML project.

301
Signification/Level of Concern (SIGLOC)
IOGOOS I [31355-31609]
to engage in adaptive management, a process that depends on our ability to routinely

and rapidly detect changes in the environment and living marine resources and to
provide timely predictions of changes in or the occurrence of the phenomena of interest.
IOGOOS I [31738-32265]
Effective management and sustainable use also depend on efficient/timely coupling of

the processes by which new scientific knowledge is gained and the fruits of this
knowledge are used for the public good. Today, there is an unacceptable disconnect
between these processes. A new approach is needed that enables adaptive management
through routine, continuous and rapid provision of data and information over the broad
spectrum of time space scales required to link ecosystem scale changes to basin – and
global – scale forcings.
IOGOOS I [41280-41509]
the data-management and communications subsystem is the "life-blood" of the

observing system, and the development of an integrated data management and
communications subsystem is arguably the highest priority for implementation.
IOGOOS I [66537-66701]
However, the other elements of the sustained integrated ocean observing system for
climate that have been identified as needed were not discussed, for lack of time.
IOGOOS I [162274-163785]
William Erb, speaking on behalf of Gary Meyers (departed), said that the Ocean
Dynamics and Climate Workshop had moved GOOS activity in this field greatly
forward and would ensure a sound basis for future growth. Mohammed Wafar, speaking
on behalf of Tom Malone (departed), stressed the fact that the Coastal Ocean Observing
Workshop had revealed the eagerness of the participants to cross barriers as a direct
result of their learning that many of the coastal problems in the region are shared; the
Workshop had therefore provided a great opportunity to develop regional cooperation in
this field. Mika Odido, speaking on behalf of Peter Pissierssens (departed), said that the
Data Management Workshop had recognized the challenges: the diversity and huge
volume of the data, which called for rapid evolution in the application of the latest
302
information technology. To do this, there was a need to survey present regional
capabilities and incorporate them into a complete network within a regional data-
management system. Merv Lynch, speaking for the Satellite Applications Workshop,
noted that the role of remote sensing had been embraced more vigorously than he had
expected. The principal needs now were to disseminate more widely the available
remote-sensing information, facilitate access to it and its exploitation. An inventory of
regional capabilities for IOGOOS purposes is needed, with substantial capacity-building
to make this effective and to produce high-quality data products and interpretation.
IOGOOS I [196602-197822]
As coastal states we are largely influenced by the sea and now we are aware of the
fragility of our living environment and its sensitivity to climatic change, natural
disasters and human impacts. Climatic change and associated sea level rise and tropical
diseases can seriously undermine our economy and upset the economic, social and
political stability. The rapid global warming caused by human-induced changes in the
atmosphere that is projected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
would have dramatic effects on the ocean, threatening valuable coastal ecosystems and
the economic sectors that depend upon them. The IPCC predicts that storms and other
extreme weather events will increase in frequency and intensity, increasing natural
disturbances to coastal ecosystems and perhaps reducing their ability to recover. There
is particular concern about the possible effects of global warming on coral reefs. During
the intense El Niño of 1997-98, extensive coral bleaching occurred on coral reefs
worldwide. While some reefs quickly recovered, others, particularly in the Indian
Ocean, Southeast Asia and the far western Pacific, suffered significant mortality, in
some cases more than 90 per cent.
IOGOOS II [22549-22710]
He recalled that the workshop acknowledged that the effective management of data is
central to the successful implementation of GOOS in the Indian Ocean Region.
IOGOOS II [23206-23591]
This will require a marketing strategy; (ii) there is a need to give due attention to
local/national problems and producing services to solve these; (iii) local problems often
have regional/global sources. To solve local/national problems data might be required
303
from other countries in the IOGOOS region This is one of the important justifications
for the regional approach of IOGOOS;
IOGOOS II [34925-35335]
This was done for several reasons including the value of the resource, the ease of human
access to the stocks by virtue of the use of shallow inshore waters and estuaries by the
juvenile stages, the general existence of catch data as a measure of population
fluctuations, and the perception of the significance of the physico-chemical components
of the environment in the population dynamics of these species.
IOGOOS II [35747-35901]
The first step in the development of the programme involved the formation of a network
of prawn researchers in the Indian Ocean rim and island countries.
IOGOOS II [36018-36314]
an exploratory workshop funded by the IOC was held in Perth, Australia in November
2003. This was attended by representatives from Australia, Bangladesh, India, Kenya
and South Africa, all of whom gave presentations on the prawn fisheries and
aquaculture situations in their particular countries.
IOGOOS II [36969-37126]
Additional contacts in Tanzania were established following the Perth workshop and
contacts in Sri Lanka and Iran during this workshop in Colombo, Sri Lanka.
IOGOOS II [37366-38068]
It was further agreed that a website be created which would incorporate the following
information: Map of region institutions and people with interests, links and expertise
relating to penaeid prawns Species involved Types of fisheries - techniques, fleets
Summary fact sheet for each area Institutional arrangements Bibliography information
& literature pertaining to penaeids on a region specific basis Oceanic events
influencing prawn resources e.g. currents, water temperature etc. Upcoming events,
recent publications This was discussed at the IOGOOS ll meeting in Colombo, Sri
Lanka in April 2004 and a commitment was made that the network and website be
completed by the end of 2004.
304
IOGOOS II [38967-39557]
In summary the short term goals for the various implementation modules of the project
(to be completed by the end of 2004) are: Sl. No 8.5.1 8.5.2 Action Generate the report
of the Perth Workshop Circulation of a letter to the Indian Ocean rim countries and
islands with prawn resources and establishment of a Network of participants
Development of the Website A capacity building workshop in remote sensing
techniques with a directed focus for prawn fisheries to be arranged in collaboration with
Dr Merv Lynch Time line end of May 2004 Dec 2004 Action Coordinator A T. Forbes
A T. Forbes
IOGOOS II [44325-44842]
The Way Forward: During the workshop, the following schedule of events was agreed
upon for 2004/05: Sl. No Action Time line August 2004 Dec 2004 Action Coordinator
Greg Wagner Greg Wagner 8.6.1 Complete draft proposal and country implementation
plans 8.6.2 Hold regional Workshop (to be attended by two or more experts from each
country) to agree on methodologies, sites, equipment required, budget and
implementation strategies and finalize the proposal 8.6.3 Produce final proposal and
send it to funding agencies
IOGOOS II [46991-47398]
An e-group was set up to facilitate discussions, information sharing and project

development. A request for preliminary country information on existing monitoring,
coastal zone management framework and current knowledge of coastal processes was
circulated to all the participants in the coastal section of the first meeting. However,
progress has been minimal due to the limited response to these requests.
IOGOOS II [47656-48263]
Expansion of network: It was decided to develop a network of contact persons and

institutions in the region who are interested in participating in this project. These
contacts would then undertake the task of filling in the required details of the coastal
zone management framework, state of knowledge of coastal processes and existing
monitoring programs for the respective countries. Compilation of this information
would be a ticket to further participation in developing the project proposal. Some of
305
those attending the conference volunteered to compile the information of to identify
contact persons.
IOGOOS II [51366-51915]
Action plan for next year: The following actions and deadlines were decided upon for
the 12 months following the meeting. Sl. No 8.7.1 Action Develop a network of
contacts, institutions and countries interested in participating in the project Obtain
information on the coastal zone management framework, state of knowledge of coastal
processes and existing monitoring programs for these countries Interact with the COOP
panel to develop suitable and feasible methodologies for monitoring Time line August
2004 Action Coordinator Nalin Wikramanayake
IOGOOS-III [30805-30842]
"What IOGOOS can contribute to IOTWS"
IOGOOS-III [31123-32504]
The following are the major recommendations:
The Sea Level Observing System: IOGOOS person should be nominated to join the ad
hoc sea level working group established by ICG-1 under the leadership of Dr B.
Kilonsky. The deep-sea mooring network: The IOGOOS to identify an individual
familiar with the rationale and plan for the IOP network should join the IOTWS
mooring discussion group. Ocean modeling: IOGOOS to ensure that several people
from IOGOOS agencies, with knowledge of IOGOOS and its work beyond tsunamis,
participate in the Hyderabad Ocean modeling Workshop (12-13 Dec 2005).
Vulnerability and Risk Assessment: IOGOOS could commit to provide a better
characterization of other hazards such as sea level changes arising from climate and
climate change; intraseasonal/tropical cyclone events including both direct (wind,
flooding) and indirect (storm surge) effects; coral bleaching; and the vulnerability of the
ocean environment (reefs, ecosystems, etc.). The multi-hazard framework: IOGOOS
should participate in the planned workshop (1st quarter of 2006), with the areas touched
on in 6 to be the main topics of the paper Communication to ICG: This discussion
should form the basis of a communication from IOGOOS to the ICG Chair and
Officers, emphasizing to keep communication lines open and to ensure the ICG
Secretariat and IOGOOS Office work closely together.
306
IOGOOS-III [34271-35312]
The Coastal Erosion Pilot Project is consistent with the Marine Impacts on Lowland
Agriculture and Coastal Resources project of the COOP Implementation Strategy for
the Coastal Module of GOOS. In order to progress the pilot project a number of
important steps were identified as follows: a) Gauge interest in this project at WIOMSA
Meeting beginning September 2005. b) Poster/written Information provided to
WIOMSA Dr. Wikramanayake to develop flyer/poster to be sent from IOGOOS and
provide to Dr. Bhikajee to deliver. c) Workshop proposed, follow up to UNEP
Workshop, these may be regional depending on level of interest March 2006. d)
Workshop(s) would require funding (IOGOOS/ IOC/ UNEP). e) Seek support from
IOGOOS to promote projects for funding by member countries (nominate relevant
agency, funding source). Important to identify government support before committing
funding to that countries participation in workshop). f) Seek to integrate post-tsunami
monitoring of shoreline recovery into the proposal development process.
IOGOOS-III [35655-36591]
In order to progress the Coastal Pilot Project the following steps were identified leading
up to a project planning and capacity building workshop. a) Hold preliminary
discussions at WIOMSA Symposium early Sept 2005 b) Hold project planning
workshop on 16 20 February, University of Dar es Salaam (re-evaluate venue). The
overall objective of this workshop will be to finalize the project proposal for submission
to donors and discuss details of how to implement the project. c) Country
Implementation Plans (Lead Institutions/individuals responsible, institutions,
Implementing collaborating d) Identify funding sources for the project CoML, IOC,
POGO e) Establish links to other projects. f) Seek support from IOGOOS to promote
projects for funding by member countries (they should need to nominate relevant
agency, funding source) important to do this before committing funding to that
countries participation in workshop).
IOGOOS-III [37209-38303]
The following tasks have been identified to be carried out to pursue this initiative: a)
Affirm the commitment of individuals in the Indian Ocean Region to a cooperative
regional approach in the form of an IOGOOS Coastal Project Dr Keesing to contact
interested individuals/organisations in each country (these already identified for the
307
countries identified above (and invite additional contacts to be put forward by other
countries) September 2005. b) Determine the interest/relevance/links to COOP
Implementation Strategy for the Coastal Module of GOOS
Dr Keesing to discuss with the IOGOOS Secretariat and IOC Perth Office the best way
to do this. c) If there is sufficient agreement and commitment among individuals in the
Indian Ocean, then a proposal will be developed to hold a workshop in 2006 to bring
together all existing observations and make firm plans to finalise the development of
and plan implementation of the project plan. Support and sponsorship for the workshop
would need to be sought from a variety of sources. A report on activities would be made
at IOGOOS IV.
IOGOOS-III [38527-38768]
Timor Sea Deep Ocean to Continental Shelf Model Demonstration Proposal: This
project proposed by Dr. Ray Steedman aims to examine the feasibility of demonstrating
the coupling of the deep ocean operational model Bluelink with a shelf model.
IOGOOS-IV [25091-26809]
Issues of project implementation were discussed during a breakout session at the Fourth
WIOMSA Scientific Symposium held at Grand Baie, Mauritius, 29 August 3
September 2005.
There was extensive email correspondence with all interested participants from more
than 10 countries in order to develop contacts with the appropriate institutions in each
country and to get input into the proposal. This culminated in holding a Pre-project
Planning Workshop in Phuket, Thailand, 17-19 February 2006, which was attended by
2-4 people from each of 8 countries who were experts in coral reefs, mangrove forests,
seagrass bed or remote sensing and many of whom were from government institutions.
From this workshop, we received the following inputs: o o o o standardization of
methodologies for data collection, work plan and timeframe, overall project
implementation and country implementation plans, including designation of lead
implementing institutions and individuals, study sites, budget and training needs.
Immediately following this workshop, the project was presented at the conference on
Post-Disaster Assessment and Monitoring of Changes in the Coastal, Ocean and Human
Systems in the Indian Ocean and Asian Waters also held in Phuket, Thailand, 20-23
308
February 2006. Since the Pre-Project Planning Workshop a lot of the input has been
incorporated into the overall proposal, though more work is needed to fully capture
those extensive inputs. Through these meetings as well as workshops held in previous
years, valuable input has been received from a large number of people from many
countries and many organizations having a wide range of expertise who, in addition,
have shown their support for the project.
Legitimisation/Contractual Environment (LEGCOE)

IOGOOS I [9847-9874]
Memorandum of Understanding
IOGOOS I [30785-31057]
a compelling case for a more holistic, unified approach to resource management and
environmental protection, especially in coastal ecosystems where habitat alterations,
water pollution and problems associated with harmful algal blooms and invasive species
are most severe.
IOGOOS I [52124-52275]
Within individual countries, different agencies may have different objectives, and
priorities and mechanisms that would allow cooperation are lacking.
IOGOOS I [140225-140438]
IOGOOS II [39606-39813]
The medium term goal would be primarily the development of a detailed project
proposal which could be circulated to various national funding agencies as well as
organisations such as IOC, ONR and World Bank.
IOGOOS II [63171-63454]
IOGOOS is working within the framework of the GOOS Coastal Panel and taking
responsibility in collaboration with that Panel in the implementation of initiatives within
309
the region, including contributions to the measurement of key common variables and
testing of common methodologies.
Domination/Capacity of Governments (DOMCOG)

IOGOOS I [9348-9388]
have decided to mobilize their resources
IOGOOS I [51791-51965]
Many of the countries of the region have limited resources and the extra funds required
to study and monitor their coastal seas and the adjacent oceans are a lower priority.
IOGOOS I [56338-56695]
The Strategy incorporates relevant capacity-building involving: education and training;

the building of appropriate institutional support structures; the creation of networks;
development of infrastructural elements (e.g., platforms, sensors, data and modeling
centers); and provision of access to communication networks for data telemetry and
dissemination
IOGOOS I [57053-57115]
Development and maintenance of a minimum scientific capability
IOGOOS I [57151-57238]
Raising understanding of the value of in situ and space-based observations of the ocean
IOGOOS I [57435-57556]
Collection of ocean data necessary for the calibration, validation, and enhancement of
assimilative and predictive models
IOGOOS I [57557-57874]
Raising the ability of countries to contribute to and benefit from global observing
systems, by long-term investment in facilities for receiving, processing, and interpreting
data from ocean and space-based sources, accompanied by training in the use of such
facilities and in the provision of services and products.
310
IOGOOS I [71101-71368]
Initiate planning to establish a network of coastal laboratories for internet-based data

and information exchange relevant to important environmental and ecological
variability and change (sea level, river and stream flows, habitat modification,
biodiversity, etc.).
IOGOOS I [89289-89613]
Active support of the IOGOOS Regional Alliance, the IOC Perth Regional Programme
Office, the IOC GOOS Project Office in Paris, the GOOS Coastal Ocean Observations
Panel (COOP) and the Ocean Observations Panel for Climate (OOPC) will be required
to turn the ideas and current enthusiasm of the participants into real actions.
IOGOOS I [91009-91205]
An array of about 450 floats is required to meet the Argo program goal (describe ocean
temperature and salinity variability down to 40°S, roughly the southern boundary of the
Indian Ocean proper).
IOGOOS I [96652-96896]
The Working Group noted that substantial ship time will be required to deploy and
maintain mooring arrays in the Indian Ocean, making the shared use of available ships
very important. Suitable ships may be available, if funding can be supplied.
IOGOOS I [97819-97879]
The Working Group endorsed a new SOOP XBT sampling strategy.
IOGOOS I [98189-98277]
India, supported by Australia, will take the lead in establishing the new XBT sections.
IOGOOS I [99057-99596]
The plan to provide the sustained observations required to meet the relevant objectives
identified by CLIVAR, GOOS and GCOS include: surface--climate-quality basin-wide
SST, surface-wind and sea-surface-height fields and surface reference sites; upper
ocean--seasonal and longertime-scale temperature and salinity fields and certain
boundary-current-flow information; water column--decadal-time-scale basin changes in
311
the carbon inventory and carbon distribution, nutrients and tracers and flows over
certain sills and off certain shelves.
IOGOOS I [106363-106458]
Capacity-building Satellite-data assimilation; modeling of coastal processes; GIS

applications.
IOGOOS I [109431-109860]
Capacity-building Training of community members involved in coastal ecosystem

monitoring in the relevant techniques; strengthening the capacity of the concerned
regional, national and local government agencies through acquisition of equipment and
staff training in monitoring techniques, data-base management, data analysis and
interpretation. Environmental NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) may
also assist in this.
IOGOOS I [130980-131354]
Present capabilities cover: coastal-zone and oceanic applications up to the regional

level; and hazard assessment--storm surges, oil spills, flooding, habitat mapping. Iran's
satellite remotesensing capabilities are limited; at present it receives data from NOAA.
In the region, such capabilities are limited to Oman, and there are satellite-receiving
facilities in Kuwait.
IOGOOS I [131574-131936]
There is a low level of expertise; fisheries still do not make use of satellite remote
sensing. Hence there is a need for training courses, to establish a national oceanographic
data center and a regional oceanographic data center for the Persian Gulf. It is also
desirable to increase intraregional cooperation, possibly through a joint regional pilot
project.
IOGOOS I [132087-132645]
S. Rughooputh presented a paper on "Mauritius Marine and Coastal-Zone Information

System". The main purpose of the system is to provide a large and organized body of
information, mostly in the form of maps, as a geographical information system, for
planners, scientists, and decisionmakers. The information base comprises some 30,000
maps organized in some 12 modules, covering all aspects of the geography of the Island
312
of Mauritius. Some of these maps concern the coastal zone and territorial waters. One
likely to be most useful is a shore classification.
IOGOOS I [160887-161013]
The work of WIOMAP will be carried out technically using ships, moored and drifting
buoys, Argo floats, and sea-level gauges.
IOGOOS I [174087-174279]
At the same time, it is critical that sufficient attention is also given to the specific
priorities and problems of the developing countries given their weak scientific and
technological base.
IOGOOS I [197823-198305]
As developing nations, we have not been able hitherto to devote sufficient resources to
understand the oceanic processes in this part of the world where almost one third of the
world population live. We do not have a permanent, systematic, routine and long-term
ocean-observation system for assessing the state of the marine and coastal environment
and to forecast climate variability and change. Indeed we have been passive spectators
to the changes to our oceans and coastal seas.
IOGOOS I [199120-199632]
The major limitation in making the Indian Ocean understood is the financial constraints
of the countries of the region. Few of our countries have the economic or logistical
capacity to undertake oceanographic research on their own. However, by working in
partnership and sharing resources available in the countries, such work is possible.
Opening the research work to other institutions interested in the region and with the
assistance of donor agencies it is possible to develop the oceanography in our region.
IOGOOS I [200901-201212]
However, at the national level Mauritius has taken concrete steps to protect the coastal
zone, namely: the complete phasing out of lagoonal sand mining the updating of the
National Physical Development Plan the development of an ICZM plan studies on
wetlands, coastal erosion, islets, sensitive areas etc.
313
IOGOOS II [3708-4244]
Dr. Lalith Weeratunga, Secretary to the Honourable Prime Minister of the Government
of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka underscored the significant role of
IOGOOS for ensuring synergy and regional cooperation for oceanographic studies and
ocean observations under globally accepted standards as many countries in the region
especially the island nations h a v e only limited scientific and engineering capability to
undertake oceanographic research and tackle problems related to resources and
environment in the ocean
IOGOOS II [17554-17947]
IOP members have undertaken drafting of an Implementation Plan based on an outline

plan prepared by the Chair, with initial input due in May, and completion of the first
draft in early 2005. A key aspect of preparing this plan is to develop a high degree of
consensus among all the agencies that can contribute. This is essential to achieve a high
degree of coordination in the implementation.
IOGOOS II [18984-19288]
Indian Meteorological Department is preparing a proposal to modernize the Indian

coastal tide gauge network using instrumentation developed at NIOT. The new
instrumentation will allow the collection of real time sea level data, which will assist
IMDs efforts to predict storm surge and coastal flooding.
IOGOOS II [23596-23891]
there is a need to establish an equitable balance between providing and requesting of

data and services but this needs to take into consideration the different capacity levels
between countries (more developed countries may need to provide more than they can
request from developing countries)
IOGOOS II [24051-24309]
With respect to Capacity Building the Hyderabad Workshop concluded that there are
big differences in Data and Information Management capacity between IOGOOS
members. Therefore a detailed assessment of available capacity and requirements is to
be undertaken.
314
IOGOOS II [24778-25014]
However, funding for the ODINCINDIO capacity building initiatives needs to be

identified, since O D I N C I N D I O itself is in the initial planning stages. Accordingly
ODINCINDIO should be the capacity building instrument for IOGOOS.
IOGOOS II [39814-40068]
The long term goals would be the implementation of this project with the collection of
appropriate parameters in various countries around the Indian Ocean rim to improve
management and predictions of change with regard to prawn fisheries in the region.
IOGOOS II [44848-45202]
Once funding is obtained, launch the project with a capacity building workshop, with
separate sessions on remote sensing, coral reefs, mangrove forests, seagrass beds, and
rocky shores for standardization of techniques and training of trainers; as well as
plenary sessions so that these groups can interact and make project implementation
more coherent.
IOGOOS II [48276-48614]
It was decided that the methodology to be adopted to monitor shoreline changes should
conform to the guidelines and specifications being developed by the COOP panel.
However it was recognised that the requirements of the methodology in terms of cost,
equipment and training should be within the capabilities of the countries concerned.
IOGOOS II [50288-50589]
However, continuous, detailed monitoring by the responsible central authority is not

feasible due to the costs involved. Therefore it was decided to undertake a pilot
monitoring program using the resources available at the local level such as tourist
hotels, fishery harbours and coastal communities.
He announced with pleasure, the launch of the Indonesian node of GOOS, InaGOOS
and then signed the InaGOOS declaration.
315
IOGOOS-III [22379-22983]
Dr. Radhakrishnan briefly described the importance of remote sensing and indicated
that the USA, Europe and India have major remote sensing programmes that cover the
Indian Ocean. He gave an example of fisheries as a case where remote sensing data is
being used for an operational purpose. Remote sensing data could also be used to
provide inputs for coastal land use, shoreline changes, etc. He suggested that the
IOGOOS website should have a page on remote sensing data availability, tools, etc. He
gave an overview of the training programme offered by CSSTE-AP and Indian Institute
of Remote Sensing.
IOGOOS-III [39419-39575]
Short Duration Training Programs proposed are as follows: At least two or three short-
duration training programmes are proposed to be conducted during 2006.
IOGOOS-III [40006-40095]
One long duration training program: Proposed to be held at CSSTE: Asia-Pacific,

Dehradun
IOGOOS-III [40102-40576]
Web site: IOGOOS web site to host ocean remote sensing tutor. Content generation and
case studies to be done by volunteers and IOGOOS Secretariat. The site could provide
links to sources of Remote Sensing data (IOCCG, CEOS, PODAAC, NDC etc). 11.3.4
Expert Faculty sponsored to Country/Institution: For onthe-job training, it was
suggested that a programme be worked out where the trainer visits the trainees.
Sponsorship could be requested from the Nippon Foundation / POGO.
IOGOOS-III [51135-51955]
For the Bureau of Meteorology, we can confirm our intent to at least sustain and, as
resources permit, enhance our ocean observing activity in the region. The Indian Ocean
Region remains a top priority. This includes a surface drifter program through the
DBCP; Surface met observations through VOS; Upper ocean measurements through
XBTs/SOOP; Upper ocean measurements from Argo profilers; SST observations; Sea
level measurements (tsunami, climate) through the NTC; and Various products that will
complement the observing system including surface wind analyses and TC predictions.
316
With CSIRO, the RAN and AIMS and others, we continue to advocate a substantial
enhancement of the observing system. The so-called Australian Integrated Ocean
Observing System is being developed as a high-level initiative within Australia.
IOGOOS-III [53753-54847]
Dr. Francois Gerard France; He congratulated Dr. Gary Meyers and felt that the design
is scientifically sound and comprehensive. He listed the activities that France conducts
in the Indian Ocean such as the Regional specialized centre for cyclones at La Réunion
and the newly established Tsunami warning centre. France also has research vessels
operating in the Indian Ocean, able to host people from the region on their research
ship. The RV "Marion Dufresne" is presently operating west of Sumatra for a post
tsunami cruise, and Indian Ocean will be part of the programme of the French research
fleet in 2006. France has agreed to contribute to the IOTWS and has developed plans to
contribute to tidal observation networks in the Western Indian Ocean and to upgrade the
warning dissemination capabilities in the region. France is willing to continue to
contribute to the IBPIO action group for surface drifters; to the Argo Programme and to
XBT lines. France also has the capability to contribute to ocean monitoring and
forecasting thru the MERCATOR project, which will be presented later
IOGOOS-III [55669-56223]
Dr. Radhakrishnan made a presentation on the Indian plan for observing systems in the
Indian Ocean, elaborating on the Indian plans for ocean observation, information and
advisory services. He also mentioned the satellites planned for launch for coastal and
ocean studies. Dr. Mahesh Zingde of NIO commented on the insitu observations being
implemented by NIO viz. XBT, Drifting buoys and current meter moorings. Dr. S.
Kathiroli, Director, NIO, presented on the Indian programme on moored data buoys,
tide gauges, Argo floats and research vessels.
IOGOOS-III [56731-56919]
Indonesia is participating and also contributing its research vessels and scientists for
programmes like INSTANT, CoML as well as several marine and coastal resources
management projects.
317
IOGOOS-III [58439-58755]
Considering the importance of ocean on climate, Mauritius is committed to contributing

to the moorings programme in the Indian Ocean. Two tide gauges are operational and
they are also willing to deploy Argo floats. Mauritius has expertise and would be
willing to collaborate with the IOP and IOGOOS initiatives.
IOGOOS-III [59214-59481]
Sri Lanka is interested in activities related to upwelling and current systems. They are
operating a tide gauge and are ready to share their data. Sri Lanka welcomes
deployments of Argo floats in its EEZ. Their vessel can be used to deploy instruments
in the region.
IOGOOS-III [60269-60696]
The US is ready to support capacity building activities. IOGOOS could identify the
areas requiring capacity building. Data from satellites also need to be used. IOGOOS
needs to articulate their operational and scientific needs for satellites so that satellite
systems can be sustained. He suggested IOP to consider adding a statement about the
potential role of the Indian Ocean in the global climate context (teleconnections).
IOGOOS-IV [26813-28389]
Update on Capacity Building Initiatives for Ocean Data and Information Management
by Dr. Zaker Dr N. H. Zaker Chairman of IOCINDIO and Coordinator of
ODINCINDIO presented a detailed repot on history, achievements and advances of
ODINCINDIO project. ODINCINDIO project was first initiated at IOGOOS I meeting
in 2002 and the meeting recommended the development of an ODIN project for
IOCINDIO, complementing ODINAFRICA. The proposal for the establishment of
ODINCIDNIO was proposed to IODE17 in 2003 by the Chairman of IOCINDIO. It was
supported by IOCINDIO Member States, IOGOOS, ROPME and was discussed in
IOGOOS Workshop on data and information management in Hyderabad in 2003. Later
it was recognized as the capacity building tool of IOGOOS on MDM and MIM in
IOGOOS meeting II, 2004. It was also discussed in ODINCINDIO planning meeting in
Tehran in 2004 and was approved by IODE 18 and IOC assembly in 2005.
ODINCINDIO has become operational since 2005 and since then several workshops
and training courses under this project has been conducted in IODE office including
318
:ODINCINDIO Marine Data Management Training Course, October 2005;
ODINCINDIO Marine Information Management Training Course, February 2006;
ODINCINDIO Data Management Training Course, May 2006. Dr Zaker also briefed
the meeting on the strong support of IOCINDIO VI meeting, 2005 of ODINCINDIO as
the joint activity of IOCINDIO, IODE and IOGOOS. The meeting welcomed the
successful achievements of ODINCINDIO and highly supported the close collaboration
of IOGOOS, IOCINDIO and IODE on this project.
IOGOOS-IV [30128-30783]
From ocean reanalysis/prediction to coastal applications: Goal--train IOGOOS

members/associates how to use downscaling models and tools. The practice and
application of downscaling requires research to make the model as correct as possible.
Actions: · IOP chair writes expression of interest to Ehrlich Desa (IOC in charge of
capacity building). · IOGOOS and IOP Chairs find someone in the modelling
community to take charge of the project (e.g. write proposal). · Submit proposal to IOC
before March 2007 for a training session in late 2007 or 2008. Resources: Full cash-
funding from IOC required and possibly in kind funding from modelling groups.
IOGOOS-IV [31180-31593]
IOGOOS members want to participate in global research programs but national funding
is lacking because it is always directed to local coastal problems. Programs like POGO
provide resources for visits, but not research projects per se. Funding for research may
be available from APN for the SE Asia region and from EU for western Indian Ocean.
IOGOOS needs to develop a strategy to access these funding resources.
IOGOOS-IV [38034-39072]
The following capacity building requirements were identified by the Working Group.
Basic Training Courses Advanced training course on marine data management: 2007.
Advanced training course on marine information management: 2007. Training course
on marine biodiversity data management: 2008. Data management and related capacity
building for specific IOGOOS projects Workshop on marine RS/GIS data management
in relation to IOGOOS projects: 2007. Workshop on DM and Modeling in relation to
IOGOOS projects: 2007. Workshop on sea level data management in relation to
IOGOOS projects: 2008. Expert Exchange and visiting scientists in relation to IOGOOS
319
projects: 2007-2008. The meeting noted that the above capacity building initiatives map
well with the training requirements of IOGOOS' Remote Sensing Working Group,
Ocean and Climate Working Group, as well as the Coastal Working Group. Hence it
was suggested that all these initiatives be well coordinated. Funding for this training is
to be drawn from IOGOOS and ODINCINDIO initiatives.
Broader consequences across space (BREAS)

IOGOOS I [9547-9703]
ineteen organizations of 10 Indian Ocean countries signed a Memorandum of

Understanding to create and actively participate in a Regional Alliance for IOGOOS
IOGOOS I [9842-10006]
This Memorandum of Understanding is one of the strongest instruments of cooperation

and collaboration in the context of the oceanographic development of the region.
IOGOOS I [10975-11444]
IOGOOS is intended to elevate the Indian Ocean from one of the least studied to one of
the most studied of the world's major oceans, with a real emphasis on the link between
societal and scientific issues. The 1.5 billion people of the Indian Ocean rim can now
look forward to an increased ability to make use of the ocean observations and
information produced by GOOS to improve the management of their marine
environment and to use the ocean's resources sustainably.
IOGOOS I [46479-46723]
The NOAA-NASA-Navy Indian Ocean Meteorological Imager (IOMI) will be launched

(as GIFTS) in early 2006, spend a year over the United States, then move (as IOMI)
into geosynchronous orbit over the Indian Ocean Region over 75°E longitude in 2007.
IOGOOS I [46831-47044]
will provide enhanced atmospheric-structure information to national weather services,

ensure improved performance of synoptic weather models, and should improve
forecasts of typhoon and monsoon intensity changes.
320
IOGOOS I [48881-49193]
During it's planned 7-year lifespan, IOMI will thus be providing more detailed
environmental information for the Indian Ocean Region than will be available over the
USA. How the IOGOOS community pioneers the applications of this free information
will be of great interest to the world's environmental scientists.
IOGOOS I [50062-50264]
Since oceanic processes in one part of the globe remotely influence changes in weather
in other parts, there is a need to observe ocean parameters in a coordinated way through
international cooperation.
IOGOOS I [68779-69057]
At the global level, international programs (e.g., CLIVAR, IOGOOS) will establish
observing networks, and major analysis centres will prepare products and predictions
covering global themes relevant to the Indian Ocean Region, such as meteorology,
oceanography, and climatology.
IOGOOS I [69058-69403]
At the regional level, such global products generally do not have enough spatial detail
for applications (e.g., agriculture, fisheries) and, consequently, downscaling by
statistical and/or dynamical methods is required. Specific oceanic features may need to
be enhanced in the products, which may require better ocean climatology and
bathymetry.
IOGOOS I [70599-70763]
60 representatives of the coastal research and coastal-zone management communities

from 16 countries in the Indian Ocean Region met for the first time and agreed to
IOGOOS I [201213-202062]
I understand that one of the highlights will be signing of an MOU, a commitment of the
nations in this region to synergise their efforts. I hope and I sincerely wish that it will
result in increased collaboration in the region. I am sure that projects will be elaborated,
strategies discussed and an operational program would be set up to make the IOGOOS a
reality. It is our expectation that this conference will see the start of new partnerships
and finally enable us to change the reputation of the Indian Ocean from one of the least
321
known oceans to one which is well studied and sustainably managed. With its strategic
location in the middle of the Indian Ocean, multicultural background, and its political,
social and economic stability, Mauritius offers an ideal platform for a synergy of
African, Asian and Australian oceanographic interests.
IOGOOS I [207136-207528]
This is an onerous task; challenges are many; expectations are high; maintaining
credibility is important. The concern, cooperation and commitment that was the driving
force over the recent past need to be sustained to achieve our goals. I wish you all
success. May God bless us to serve humanity better. Finally, I thank you once again for
giving me the opportunity to thank you once again.
IOGOOS I [207717-208106]
We have clearly accomplished the objectives of the Conference. The Indian Ocean
GOOS Regional Alliance is now in place, with nineteen members and more to come.
The Chairman and Officers have been elected and the Secretary has been appointed.
Under Dr Radhakrishnan's leadership, we should move forward quickly towards our
goal of a fully operational observing system for the Indian Ocean.
IOGOOS II [60772-61176]
Over the last 18 months since its formal launch at the First Indian Ocean Conference
held at Mauritius in November 2002, IOGOOS has taken a place of pride among the
GOOS Regional Alliances. The membership of IOGOOS has grown from 19 to 21
institutions from 13 countries. IOGOOS has now been endorsed by the
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO as one of the nine GOOS
Regional Alliances.
IOGOOS II [61337-61973]
IOGOOS is providing a focus for the region, developing cooperation and opportunities
for synergy among members, and creating the ability to take advantage of global
initiatives such as Global Ocean Data Assimilation Experiment (GODAE), Climate
Variability and Predictability Programme (CLIVAR) and Argo. IOGOOS is playing an
important regional role in terms of observations and associated research, using pilot
projects and focussed initiatives to enhance the capacity and productivity of the region.
322
It is facilitating regional cooperation with research programs such as CLIVAR and Land
Ocean Interactions in the Coastal Zone (LOICZ).
IOGOOS II [61974-62660]
IOGOOS has been instrumental in the formation of the Indian Ocean Panel (IOP) to
address the ocean and climate observing system in the region. The first meeting of IOP
held at Pune in February 2004 assessed the state of the observing networks. IOGOOS
members have played a key role in Argo deployments and in enhancing the tropical
moored buoy array. The IOP is operated jointly with CLIVAR and is providing an
energetic and effective link to the climate research community. An implementation plan
will be prepared during 200405, including extension of the mooring array, assessment
and review of the ship of opportunity program, and initiating a series of observing
system experiments.
IOGOOS II [62661-63171]
The IOGOOS II meeting endorsed the recommendations of the IOGOOS Workshop

held at Hyderabad in December 2003 and decided to create a Regional Data Centre at
the Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services (INCOIS), to provide a
focus for data assembly and distribution activities. The Centre will also develop a
clearinghouse for the region to allow members to efficiently and effectively exploit
observations and products from the region. The delivery of key information to users will
be expedited.
IOGOOS II [65258-65538]
IOGOOS welcomed the international adoption of a data policy that will enhance the
timely exchange and utility of observations. The meeting agreed to test the
implementation of the IOC s data policy and to demonstrate the advantages that accrue
to the region from such an approach.
IOGOOS II [65539-65860]
IOGOOS will give specific attention to enhancing the capacity of the region and
developing a coherent education and training program. The meeting, above all else,
demonstrated that IOGOOS has developed a community spirit for the region, a oneness
among all agencies and participants for the benefit of the entire region.
323
IOGOOS-III [48929-49569]
Data management Progress and shortfall: CSIRO and APDRC have compiled and
carefully edited all the available subsurface temperature data for the Indian Ocean
collected during the 20th century. Though data from various instruments at various
centres are available, what is missing is a one-stop shop for research. INCOIS and
APDRC have the capability to do this. IOP recommended that they together prepare a
joint plan for Indian Ocean data management and dissemination, optimizing the great
capability available in these agencies. Capacity building in all the nations around the
Indian Ocean rim needs to be addressed through ODINCINDIO.
State Learning/Unit Level (SLUL)

IOGOOS I [10975-11444]
IOGOOS is intended to elevate the Indian Ocean from one of the least studied to one of
the most studied of the world's major oceans, with a real emphasis on the link between
societal and scientific issues. The 1.5 billion people of the Indian Ocean rim can now
look forward to an increased ability to make use of the ocean observations and
information produced by GOOS to improve the management of their marine
environment and to use the ocean's resources sustainably.
IOGOOS I [18323-18390]
The Indian Ocean is poorly monitored in comparison to the Pacific.
IOGOOS I [22842-22924]
Nevertheless, at this time there are insufficient data for initializing the model.
IOGOOS I [31610-31738]
We do not have this capability today and this is an important reason for linking the
coastal and ocean-climate modules of GOOS.
IOGOOS I [31944-32012]
Today, there is an unacceptable disconnect between these processes.
324
IOGOOS I [41708-41944]
data are often not exchanged freely among nations and, even when data are not
proprietary, data management and analysis tend to be program-specific, and analyses
that require multi-disciplinary data from many sources take too much time.
IOGOOS I [51677-51790]
regional marine science cooperation in the Indian Ocean has, in general, been difficult
to initiate and sustain.
IOGOOS I [51965-52124]
Another obstacle is the priority accorded to strategic considerations and national

security which hamper the sharing of information on the marine environment.
IOGOOS I [57052-57873]
Development and maintenance of a minimum scientific capability to support and

participate in GOOS Raising understanding of the value of in situ and space-based
observations of the ocean in solving socio-economic problems, through educating the
public and politicians on the benefits to be obtained from investing in, developing,
maintaining, and utilizing ocean-observation systems Collection of ocean data
necessary for the calibration, validation, and enhancement of assimilative and predictive
models Raising the ability of countries to contribute to and benefit from global
observing systems, by long-term investment in facilities for receiving, processing, and
interpreting data from ocean and space-based sources, accompanied by training in the
use of such facilities and in the provision of services and products.
IOGOOS I [102458-102583]
The capacity-building required in this area involves targeted training in the application
of information and risk management.
IOGOOS I [125445-125775]
The Workshop noted that resources allocated to data and information management were
often minimal at the national and regional level, and strongly urged the member states
participating in the Indian Ocean GOOS Regional Alliance to increase their levels of
support to ensure sustained, high-quality data and information management.
325
IOGOOS I [169245-169329]
In fact, it is the first time that Mauritius is hosting a meeting of oceanographers.
IOGOOS I [180794-181147]
IOC has had, in a relatively short time, an influential role in organizing Indian Ocean
oceanographic activities. The International Indian Ocean Expedition in the 1960s
included many research cruises by many countries, the study of oceanographic
processes and the creation of oceanographic institutes such as India's National Institute
of Oceanography.
IOGOOS I [181313-181534]
Other successful projects followed in the 1980s and 1990s, including the World Ocean
Circulation Experiment (WOCE) and the Joint Global Ocean Flux Study (JGOFS),
likewise contributing to the knowledge base of the region.
IOGOOS II [23206-23591]
This will require a marketing strategy; (ii) there is a need to give due attention to
local/national problems and producing services to solve these; (iii) local problems often
have regional/global sources. To solve local/national problems data might be required
from other countries in the IOGOOS region This is one of the important justifications
for the regional approach of IOGOOS;
IOGOOS II [23896-23983]
there is a need to empower the countries in the region to generate their own services;
IOGOOS II [26422-26787]
The objectives that will be met during the Short-term include: (i) identify
national/regional problems, required services/products, required data types,
national/regional partners, users/stakeholders through surveys/studies.; (iii) arrange the
Data and Information training (ODIN+ cycle, etc.) and (iv) startup limited services to all
IOGOOS members for public use.
IOGOOS II [46371-46962]
The objectives of the project are as follows: To assess historical data on shoreline
change, establish trends and place these in the context of coastal geomorphology,
326
hydrodynamic regime and natural and anthropogenic drivers of change. To establish an
adequate, cost effective system to monitor changes in the shoreline and coastal
morphology. To develop a quantitative understanding of coastal processes and the
relationship between shoreline change and the various natural and anthropogenic
drivers. To develop the ability to make predictions of shoreline change due to extreme
events
IOGOOS II [49300-49853]
Capacity Building Needs: Several capacity building requirements were identified during
the discussions. One of the first steps toward predicting shoreline change is to use
historical data to obtain an understanding of ongoing coastal processes in the context of
geomorphology and forcing. There appears to be a wide disparity in the state of
knowledge of coastal processes among the countries in the region. Capacity building is
also needed to process and interpret remotely sensed data and to model shoreline
changes using data on ocean wind and waves.
IOGOOS II [49854-50213]
Pilot Project in Sri Lanka: In response to the severe coastal erosion that has taken place
over the last three decades, many of the activities envisaged by the project including
assessment of historical data, obtaining a qualitative and quantitative understanding of
coastal process and modelling nearshore hydrodynamics have been carried out in Sri
Lanka.
IOGOOS II [52845-53467]
The actual project would have duration of five to seven years. It is expected that the first
year of project implementation would involve the final selection of sites, training of
personnel involved in monitoring, quality control and data management and setting up a
regional data sharing network. Monitoring would begin late in the first year and
products would be available by the end of the second year. Acquiring and interpreting
remotely sensed data on shoreline change would also begin in the first year while
development of a c a p a b i l i t y to predict shoreline change would begin in the second
or third year.
327
Regional Cooperation/Sub-system level (RCSSL)
IOGOOS I [100416-100569]
The Working Group comprised participants representing the various Indian Ocean
regions--southern Africa, East Africa, South Asia, SE Asia and Australia.
IOGOOS I [152689-153711]
GOOSAFRICA brings an African dimension and contribution to the Global Ocean

Observing System. It aims to build up a Regional Ocean Observing and Forecasting
System for Africa (ROOFS AFRICA) which will develop new capabilities in the use of
remotely sensed data, in situ ocean measurements and observation/validation networks,
coastal and marine modelling and forecasting, and delivery systems for user products. It
will thus contribute to the capacity-building (training and technology transfer) essential
for the proper development, management and protection of the socio-economically
important coastal and marine environment of Africa. ROOFSAFRICA will work
interactively with relevant regional and national programs, such as IOGOOS. Twenty-
six African countries participate in GOOSAFRICA: Angola, Benin, Cameroon,
Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar,
Mauritius, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, South Africa, Tanzania and Togo.
IOGOOS I [158429-158626]
The following countries are participating in SEAGOOS: Australia, Cambodia,

Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanamar, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. The region is
characterized by numerous small seas.
IOGOOS I [158870-159253]
SEAGOOS countries have had long-term cooperation with WMO in the field of marine
meteorology, but less in the field of operational oceanography. However, SEAGOOS is
developing this aspect, particularly through its South-East Asian Center for
Atmospheric and Marine Prediction (SEACAMP), which is running a South China Sea
storm-surge, wave and circulation pilot project with JCOMM.
IOGOOS I [159520-159839]
It was proposed and agreed that each regional GOOS alliance should do three things:
Cooperate closely with national meteorological offices and national ocean data centers
328
in the execution of GOOS pilot regional projects Link their websites Send a
representative to the meetings of the other regional GOOS Alliances.
IOGOOS I [160266-160886]
Nine countries are participating in WIOMAP. Its creation was preceded by a survey, in
1997, of the relevant institutions in the Indian Ocean Region, followed by an expert
mission in 1999. The WIOMAP project was drafted in 2000 and reviewed in 2001. It
covers operational meteorology, marine safety and fisheries; weather forecasting and
disaster preparation. It is aimed at providing services, facilitating marine
communication and capacity-building, and developing an observational network and
specialized regional marine applications centers. It is planning regional marine
applications to be implemented in 20042008.
IOGOOS II [50626-50943]
Several connections between the requirements of this project and the activities planned
by other panels under IOGOOS were discussed. The prediction of shoreline change,
particularly in response to extreme events, is one of the customers of the operational
oceanography that is the ultimate goal of the climate panel.
Dr. Freddy Numberi, Hon. Minister for Marine Affairs and Fisheries of Indonesia stated
that IOGOOS has taken up the challenge to implement an ocean observing system in the
Indian Ocean and also basinscale pilot projects. He briefly recalled the history of
oceanographic activities in Indonesia and its recent initiatives in developing the Indian
Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System (IOTWS). He stressed that IOGOOS
III needs to address the requirements of capacity building for operational oceanography.
IOGOOS-III [57188-57368]
In short, Indonesia has two agendas- Indonesia wishes to intensify their observational
lines, and making Indonesia a hub for data dealing with data archival, rescue, and
exchange.
IOGOOS-IV [27725-28080]
ODINCINDIO has become operational since 2005 and since then several workshops
and training courses under this project has been conducted in IODE office including
329
:ODINCINDIO Marine Data Management Training Course, October 2005;
ODINCINDIO Marine Information Management Training Course, February 2006;
ODINCINDIO Data Management Training Course, May 2006.
International Cooperation/System Level (ICSL)

IOGOOS I [9878-9943]
one of the strongest instruments of cooperation and collaboration
IOGOOS I [10642-10745]
The oceans may be viewed as keeping countries apart, but GOOS may be viewed as
bringing them together.
IOGOOS I [13149-13220]
for the benefit of all the people of the Indian Ocean Region and beyond
IOGOOS I [44554-44693]
IOGOOS has the potential of being a model for the development of a regional observing
system in a region dominated by developing countries.
IOGOOS I [45489-45822]
The formation of a GOOS Regional Alliance for IOGOOS should not only provide the
most effective means of establishing regional priorities and user requirements, it should
provide a venue or framework for establishing and maintaining the regional partnerships
that will be needed to implement and develop the coastal module of IOGOOS.
IOGOOS I [101833-101917]
The Working Group identified three areas in which regional activity may take place.
IOGOOS I [101973-102146]
regional uptake of weather and climate information and predictions by tailoring them to
specific management decisions in agriculture, water-resource usage and public safety
IOGOOS I [102605-102770]
The ocean analyses and predictions will provide: relevant data (e.g., high-resolution
SST, altimetry) and integrated analyses to the less competitive fishing nations
330
IOGOOS I [104183-104308]
The capacity-building identified in this area includes technical aspects of a regional

distributed data center and service.
IOGOOS I [112090-112515]
International cooperation Keystone coastal ecosystems are interdependent over large

geographical areas; ecosystem changes in one place will affect other places; therefore,
sharing of data on ecosystem condition or change throughout the region will enable
governments, integrated coastal-zone management programs, marine protected areas
etc. to take necessary action in habitat/ecosystem conservation and restoration planning.
IOGOOS I [113018-114007]
Rationale for choosing penaeid prawns Regional dependence on fisheries; the generally
poor state of coastal fish stocks; the high value of the prawn resources; the wide
regional distribution of prawns; artisanal and commercial fisheries already established
regionally; generally the same species regionally; general availability of catch data; the
aquacultural value of prawns; the prawn life-cycle integrates inshore marine and
estuarine environmental effects. Project objectives Creation of links amongst scientists
(coastal laboratories), coastal managers and communities; creation of a central data
service/product hub available to all; building of sustainable capacity and infrastructure;
monitoring of prawn recruitment and abundance via existing fisheries; determination of
effects of local conditions (e.g., freshwater run-off); creation of a link to ocean climate
observations; detection of change in prawn-fishery yield in relation to local and regional
oceanic/climatic events.
IOGOOS I [131827-131936]
It is also desirable to increase intraregional cooperation, possibly through a joint

regional pilot project.
IOGOOS I [171397-171735]
Centres of excellence exist in many parts of the world to help foster international
cooperation in capacity building, dissemination of knowledge and experience and as
well as for research activities. In Europe, for example, there is a network of over 300
marine research institutes and university departments to carry out ocean research.
331
IOGOOS I [179711-180697]
Initiatives such as GOOS are one of the mechanisms that tears down these barriers of
dissention, conflict and fear. GOOS brings nations and peoples together to work at a
common purpose for the good of all. It helps to define the common problems and needs
of a region and then provides the framework for taking joint action to address those
needs. Through meetings, workshops and projects, people come together and learn to
trust and understand each other's views and to resolve differences. I am hopeful that
IOGOOS will contribute to this ancillary goal as it goes along its way to establish an
ocean and coastal observing system for the entire Indian Ocean. Representing
UNESCO, as I do, I can easily see how GOOS supports the ideals of the organization to
build peace in the minds of people. The ocean, the largest global common on Earth,
offers us the opportunity to put into practice these ideals in an area of activity that we
are certain will bring direct benefits to humankind.
IOGOOS I [199633-199795]
It is possible through regional and international cooperation between our nations to

focus effort on and address the most pressing regional environmental dangers.
IOGOOS I [200559-200901]
Being one of the oceans where oceanographic understanding is lagging behind that of
other oceans, there is yet much work to be done in the Indian Ocean Region and I am
sure that you will all use the opportunity of this gathering to define the important issues
of the area and develop a viable plan for the oceanographic future of this region.
IOGOOS II [3708-4245]
Dr. Lalith Weeratunga, Secretary to the Honourable Prime Minister of the Government
of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka underscored the significant role of
IOGOOS for ensuring synergy and regional cooperation for oceanographic studies and
ocean observations under globally accepted standards as many countries in the region
especially the island nations h a v e only limited scientific and engineering capability to
undertake oceanographic research and tackle problems related to resources and
environmentin the ocean.
332
IOGOOS II [33651-33877]
It was suggested that IOGOOS may endorse MILAC-India, with the proviso that the
efforts of the pilot project would not only result in operational capability but also the
knowledge base would be adaptable for the entire region.
IOGOOS-III [43287-43414]
He showed the high correlation between SST and rainfall in Africa and Indonesia
associated with the Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD).
IOGOOS-III [43900-44009]
The Indian Ocean observing system is needed to identify the ocean-processes and
initialize prediction models.
IOGOOS-III [50751-51135]
Australia attaches great importance to the Indian Ocean Region for Global and regional
weather prediction; Tropical cyclone and other extreme weather prediction; Studies and
prediction of intraseasonal variability such as the MJO; Emerging operational ocean
analysis and prediction systems; Seasonal to interannual climate prediction; and
Monitoring and understanding climate change.
IOGOOS-III [55285-55422]
He concluded, noting that in this part of the ocean 60% of the world population is living
and that most members are developing countries.
IOGOOS-III [57820-58169]
The continuous vandalism is a major obstacle for the mooring array and it cannot be
solved without commitment by IOGOOS member countries to reach and educate fishing
fleets. JAMSTEC is also making a research cruise named MISMO focusing on air-sea
interaction during MJO in 2006 by R/V Mirai that will contribute to the Indian Ocean
climate studies.
IOGOOS-III [58198-58438]
Mauritius is a small country but is fully committed to cooperate with the world
community. Mauritius has hosted the IOTWS Meeting and will host the forthcoming
333
WIOMSA Meeting. They are members of IOCINDIO and have a national GOOS
community.
Stages of Regime Formation (STAREGFOR)

IOGOOS I [9195-9545]
Being constantly aware of their living environment and its sensitivity to climate change,
natural disaster, and human impact, the Indian Ocean countries have decided to
mobilize their resources to safeguard and manage their oceans and coastal waters
through a permanent ocean observing system, the Indian Ocean Global Ocean
Observing System (IOGOOS).
IOGOOS I [38020-39096]
These considerations have important consequences in terms of the design of the coastal
module: (1) the design must respect the fact that priorities vary among regions and
should leave system design on the regional scale to stakeholders in the regions; (2)
economies of scale can be achieved by establishing a global system that measures
variables and manages data streams required by most regions; (3) the global coastal
network will come into being through a combination of national, regional and global
processes; (4) the system can be implemented by selectively linking existing elements
and can be developed by enhancing and complementing these elements over time; and
(5) high priority must be placed on capacity-building in developing countries,
establishment of the data communications and management infrastructure,
establishment of internationally accepted standards and protocols for measurements,
data exchange, and data management; and on marine research to develop the sensors
and models required to achieve those goals that require biological and chemical data.
IOGOOS I [163786-164383]
William Erb spoke on behalf of IOC; his statement is in Annex 1g. He believed that the
objectives of the Conference had been accomplished. The Indian Ocean GOOS
Regional Alliance had been established at this Conference, the Chairman and Officers,
elected, and its Secretary, appointed. Under Dr Radhakrishnan's leadership, IOGOOS
should move forward quickly towards becoming a fully operational observing system
for the Indian Ocean. He thanked the Government of India for providing a "nest" for the
334
newest regional GOOS at the Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services, in
Hyderabad.
Agenda Formation (AGFOR)

IOGOOS I [11520-11930]
IOGOOS will minimize the disconnect between procedures and requirements in the
observation of the Indian Ocean, and enable the community to derive benefits from
baseline data, routine and timely maps of ocean properties, and useful forecasts on all
relevant time-scales. This will enable the detection of climate change in the marine
environment with the least possible lag between changes and their detection.
IOGOOS I [12928-13147]
to the generation of oceanic knowledge, data, and information and their application to
the ocean- and climate-change problems of the Indian Ocean, and to the free and open
access to such knowledge, data, and information
IOGOOS I [28709-30050]
The combined effects of climate and human alterations of the environment are
especially pronounced in the coastal zone where people and ecosystem goods and
services are most concentrated and inputs of energy and materials from land, sea and air
converge. Simply put, these are the primary reasons for making the establishment of the
coastal module of GOOS a high priority. The phenomena of interest in coastal
ecosystems include global warming and sea-level rise and changes in circulation,
coastal flooding and erosion, public health risks, coastal eutrophication, habitat
modification, harmful algal blooms, invasive species, loss of biodiversity, sustainable
capture and aquaculture fisheries, and chemical contamination. Changes in these
phenomena affect marine operations, public safety and health, the integrity of marine
ecosystems, and the sustainability of the living marine resources they support. In terms
of human impacts, overfishing was not only the first major human perturbation of
coastal ecosystem dynamics; it is also a primary driver of ecosystem degradation on a
global scale in that it exacerbates the effects of nutrient pollution, contributes to habitat
modification and loss of biodiversity, and increases the susceptibility of coastal
ecosystems to invasive species, harmful algal blooms, and outbreaks of disease.
335
IOGOOS I [35782-36362]
The sponsors charged COOP to formulate design and implementation plans for an
observing system that will provide the data and information required to achieve six
goals: (1) improve the safety and efficiency of marine operations, (2) mitigate the
effects of natural hazards on coastal communities and ecosystems more effectively, (3)
improve predictions of climate changes and their effects on coastal communities and
ecosystems, (4) minimize public health risks, (5) more effectively protect and restore
healthy coastal marine ecosystems, and (6) sustain living marine resources.
IOGOOS I [39096-39181]
Clearly, the coastal module must include both global- and regional-scale components.
IOGOOS I [42422-43376]
The creation of a Joint Technical Commission for Oceanography and Marine

Meteorology and initiatives such as the Argo and GODAE projects reflect the progress
that is being made in the design and implementation of the global ocean module of
GOOS. In contrast, although a high priority of the international community, progress in
developing the coastal module has been slow. This is primarily a consequence of (1) the
challenge of designing and implementing an internationally accepted coastal module to
achieve the six goals in a diversity of complex coastal ecosystems; (2) the challenges of
developing the regional and global partnerships needed to fund, implement, operate, and
develop operational observing systems; (3) inefficient and ineffective data
communications and management systems; and (4) the primitive state of our capacity to
rapidly and routinely detect and predict changes that require measurements of biological
and chemical variables.
IOGOOS I [49827-50061]
Our ability to forecast weather, to sustainably use the marine resources, and maintain
the ecosystem values of the marine environment is effectively dependent on rapid
detection and timely prediction of the changes in ocean processes.
IOGOOS I [58252-58374]
the purpose of the Workshop was to take the next steps in planning implementation of a
basin-wide, pilot observing system,
336
IOGOOS I [65951-66536]
The Working Group proposed three pilot projects: (1) to develop the deployment of
Argo floats, from the present level of about 67 to 170 in 2003, and to 450 in 2005; (2) to
develop Indian Ocean mooring arrays, especially in the equatorial zone, but also in the
four zones of high seasurface temperature anomalies (northern Bay of Bengal, off the
southern coasts of Sumatra and Java, western Arabian Sea, and the southern Indian
Ocean); (3) the implementation of a new Ship-of-Opportunity XBT Project, with
emphasis on high-resolution, frequently repeated lines across the Indian Ocean.
IOGOOS I [68514-68654]
The Working Group covered three main issues: exploitation of climate predictability;
fishery applications; and ocean data and data products.
IOGOOS I [69404-69695]
At the local level, which was specifically addressed by the Conference's Coastal Ocean
Observing Workshop, the regional concerns, such as management of the risk of climate
variability and of change in the marine environment, fish production, and coastal
erosion, will need to be addressed.
IOGOOS I [70766-71101]
Formulate three proposed pilot projects that (1) target high-priority phenomena of
interest in coastal waters that are important to at least one of the six goals of GOOS and
(2) require regional (multi-national) to global approaches to improve the ability to more
rapidly detect changes and/or to provide timely predictions of changes.
IOGOOS I [71947-72521]
To achieve these goals, it was agreed that a representative from each country would
briefly describe 23 phenomena that are accorded the highest priority in the country. The
presentations are summarized below. This provided the basis for selecting 23
phenomena that are (1) high priorities for the Indian Ocean Region in terms of their
impact on the socio-economics of the countries in the region; (2) are feasible; and (3)
make good subjects for pilot projects that would demonstrate the effectiveness of the
GOOS approach and would therefore be likely to attract funding.
337
IOGOOS I [85050-85623]
In the light of these country reports, the phenomena of interest in coastal waters were
prioritorized as follows: coastal erosion; habitat/biodiversity; nutrient pollution;
sustainable fisheries; chemical contamination; non-native species; aquaculture; coastal
flooding; harmful algal blooms; safety of life at sea. It was decided to develop pilot
projects for three of these as follows: coastal erosion; habitat/biodiversity; sustainable
fisheries, the latter being preferred to nutrient pollution on the ground that it
encompassed a wider range of environmental factors.
IOGOOS I [104801-104898]
The Working Group proposed a pilot project on Monitoring and Predicting Coastal
Shoreline Change.
IOGOOS I [106639-106785]
The Working Group proposed a pilot project on Multi-scale Monitoring and Mapping of
Keystone Coastal Ecosystems. Greg Wagner presented the report.
IOGOOS I [112775-112927]
The Working Group proposed a pilot project on the Development of a Monitoring and
Management System for the Penaeid Prawn Resources in the Indian Ocean.
IOGOOS I [128035-128335]
It is also necessary to decide which possible products are appropriate; for this, it is
necessary to know precisely what the problems are. That of fishery management,
especially in shallow water, is a common one. And the assimilation of data into models
is another; but the question is: which models?
IOGOOS I [131354-131574]
The priorities for Iran are habitat, pollution, and coastal-zone mapping, and the needs
are for increasing public awareness, capacity-building, data and information exchange
within the region and with the outside world.
IOGOOS I [138563-139045]
Mark Jury presented three regional pilot projects: Storm surges in the Bay of Bengal;
the Western Indian Ocean Marine Application Project (WIOMAP); and the Indian
338
Ocean Moored Array Project (I-MAP)." These projects are part of the Indian Ocean
Observing Strategy. The Bay of Bengal storm-surge project is important because of the
tremendous loss of life and property from such surges. IMAP is proposing nine deep-
sea moorings, involving Australia, France, India and the USA. WIOMAP
IOGOOS I [139122-139263]
seeks to enhance coastal observations and the training of local people in oceanography
and meteorology. I-MAP also involves WIOMAP countries.
IOGOOS I [146678-146940]
The Development Committee expanded on the draft Indian Ocean Observing Strategy,
originally drafted by the IOC Perth Regional Programme Office. This Strategy is
underpinned by the intention to anchor IOGOOS firmly in the IOC Global Ocean
Observing System (GOOS).
IOGOOS I [153907-154214]
Priorities issues for GOOSAFRICA are: (1) sustainable use of living marine resources;
(2) management of key habitats and ecosystems; (3) coastal erosion; (4) pollution,
including landbased sources and marine pollution; and (5) socio-economic benefits to
be derived from the development of the ROOFSAFRICA.
IOGOOS I [155799-156276]
The WAGOOS goal is to establish GOOS activities in Western Australia (WA) to

benefit the State and Australia and the GOOS community of nations. Consistent with
this goal, a preliminary strategy for the period 2002 to 2007 has been developed. The
outcome is expected to be a unified regional network that systematically acquires,
integrates and distributes observations, analyses, forecasts and other useful products to
users throughout Western Australia and its adjacent seas.
IOGOOS I [156712-156867]
The development of best practice in safety and environmental management is a high

priority and this requires knowledge and a detailed information database.
339
IOGOOS I [158627-158870]
SEAGOOS priorities currently lie in CLIVAR, coastal dynamics and pollution,

ecosystems, and fisheries. Climate variation is important on the seasonal scale
(featuring tropical storms) and the interannual scale (featuring droughts and floods).
IOGOOS I [184625-184753]
GOOS is designed with a broad purpose of "public service" in mind, and its
development is financed by the member states of IOC.
IOGOOS I [189403-189631]
You may have noticed that this is not a typical conference simply with papers to listen
to. It is a series of meetings designed to produce plans, recommendations and objectives
for establishing an Indian Ocean observing system.
IOGOOS I [195702-196601]
As we are all aware, the study of the Indian Ocean is important for the countries of the
region and outside the region for various reasons. It is important to understand ocean
processes for several reasons, namely: the optimum exploration and sustainable
exploitation of ocean resources tuna migration has a direct relation to variation in the
sea surface temperature pattern with the season air-sea interactions in the open ocean
affect also weather globally and regionally; for example, a direct correlation has been
found between the sea surface temperature in the Indian Ocean and the rainfall in the
region the circulation of oceans transports pollutants across national and geopolitical
boundaries and can affect regions near and far from where these pollutants originated
resources in the ocean, such as pelagic species, know no boundaries, traveling from one
national water to another.
IOGOOS I [199796-200559]
I think I express the wish of all the countries of the region when I say that equal
importance should be given to coastal and oceanic processes. Most of the countries here
today, representing the Indian Ocean Region, have a large percentage of their
population living in coastal areas. These areas are facing increasing pressures from
landbased activity due to development, growing populations and global problems such
as sea level rise. This particular problem due to global warming will become a real
340
threat to small islands like those in the southwest Indian Ocean. Hence coastal issues
need to be urgently addressed. By addressing pressing issues of the coastal states in the
region, the IOGOOS has better chances of becoming a successful operational system.
IOGOOS I [208261-209104]
Although much work is yet to be done, we have discovered that there are products and
applications that can be delivered to the users in this region with the tools that already
exist. It is a matter of organizing ourselves to deliver them, and the Conference has
identified many people and institutions to assist in this task. There are some things we
still need to do: We must have pilot projects to pave the way for operational
observing systems Capacity-building in data collection, modeling, and applications is
necessary We must build awareness of GOOS and secure funds to carry out our work
We must develop plans for implementation of ocean and climate, and coastal-ocean
observing systems Improved use of satellites for our applications is essential We must
strengthen communication links and improve infrastructure in the region.
IOGOOS II [5274-5794]
He reiterated that systematic ocean observation is essential for understanding the

structure and dynamics of ocean as well as for improving predictability of ocean and
climate, especially for the Indian Ocean that is quite complex and unique but still
underobserved. After giving an overview of the progress accomplished by IOGOOS
since its formal launch in November 2002, he stated that the focus of this meeting is to
come up with concrete action plans and proposals as IOGOOS is entering the phase of
implementation.
IOGOOS II [20130-20389]
Briefly, the TOR instructs the Panel to Provide scientific and technical oversight of
oceanographic observations Develop an implementation plan for sustained observations
Liaise with relevant bodies (e.g. AAMP JCOMM), and , Report to CLIVAR SSG and
GOOS.
IOGOOS II [20436-20681]
IOP faces two important future challenges. Firstly, it is essential to build bridges to the
coastal component of IOGOOS. Climate impact is one of the key drivers of coastal
ecosystems, f i s h e r i e s (prawn in particular) and coastal erosion.
341
IOGOOS II [21112-21515]
Secondly, IOP needs to develop an integrated theme of oceanographic research on the

role of the Indian Ocean in climate variability and change. The theme needs to look at
the full impact of the Indian Ocean, from regionally controlled monsoon variability to
the global ocean linkages that play a role in the global transports of mass, heat,
freshwater, nutrients, carbon and other important properties.
IOGOOS II [22899-23205]
The Hyderabad workshop agreed that the strategy for Oceanographic Data and
Information management in the Indian Ocean Region should be based on the following
requirements: (i) there is a need to sensitize and get commitment from Governments
(decision makers) to assure sustainability of the IOGOOS network.
IOGOOS II [30539-30951]
The group ultimately converged on some more specific projects. Following the
suggestion of Prof Lynch in the Plenary session, they agreed that an initiative to develop
an advanced high-resolution SST product for the Indian Ocean Region would both meet
identified needs across a range of areas and provide a framework for cooperation in
delivering a unique product: a product that what be associated with IOGOOS.
IOGOOS II [31565-31646]
It was also agreed that a regional ocean colour product should also be developed.
IOGOOS II [33651-33877]
It was suggested that IOGOOS may endorse MILAC-India, with the proviso that the
efforts of the pilot project would not only result in operational capability but also the
knowledge base would be adaptable for the entire region.
IOGOOS II [34164-34722]
A major outcome of the inaugural meeting of the Indian Ocean Global Ocean Observing
System (IOGOOS) held in Grand Baie, Mauritius in November 2002 was the
incorporation of a coastal component into what had historically been a programme
aimed at oceanic processes. This developed out of a survey of Indian Ocean rim and
island countries in which representatives were asked what they considered to be major
342
coastal environmental problems. These were then, by consensus, reduced to three, viz.
biodiversity loss, coastal erosion and sustainability of fisheries.
IOGOOS II [34800-34925]
After consideration by the relevant committee the sustainable fishery issue was focused
on the shallow water prawn resource.
IOGOOS II [40400-41087]
The primary keystone ecosystems in the Indian Ocean Region are coral reefs, mangrove
forests, seagrass beds and rocky shores, which have been partially or severely degraded
in most countries and which have therefore been selected as the targets of this project.
Monitoring of these ecosystems will facilitate their proper management, which can have
significant positive impact on the entire coastal/marine environment. Goal or
Development Objective: The goal of this project is to take a regional approach to
rapidly detecting changes and making timely predictions of changes in high priority
phenomena of interest in coastal waters, namely, keystone ecosystems and their
biodiversity.
IOGOOS II [46260-46371]
The aim of the project is to establish a Regional Network to quantify, understand and
predict shoreline change
IOGOOS II [52352-52844]
Outlook for the future: Looking beyond the one year period covered by the action plan
outlined above, the following activities are anticipated over the next few years.
Capacity building workshops in the assessment of shoreline change using existing data,
use of remote sensing data to quantify shoreline change and modelling of nearshore
hydrodynamics using large scale ocean data 2005/2006 Final project proposal
development workshop late 2005 Initiation of project late 2006 or beyond
IOGOOS II [64530-64793]
The IOGOOS II meeting recognised the urgent need for satellite products and
associated capacity building, through all activities, and agreed to assist in the
development of enhanced SST products as well as other products for the coastal and
biological community.
343
Dr. Radhakrishnan, Chairman of IOGOOS recalled the evolution and growth of

IOGOOS since its formal launch at Mauritius in November 2002, and acknowledged the
contributions made by several individuals and institutions to bring it up as one of the
best GOOS regional alliances (GRA) with 19 members from 12 countries in the region
and two associate members. . He informed the meeting that the IOP had made excellent
progress in preparing a draft implementation plan for ocean observations in the Indian
Ocean for climate. He stressed that the coastal GOOS pilot projects have to be evolved
into concrete proposals in conformance with the IOC's Coastal GOOS implementation
plan.
IOGOOS-III [46031-46345]
The high level objective of the observing system is to observe, describe, understand,
model and predict: seasonal monsoon variation with related intraseasonal variability;
the interactions among monsoon--El Nino Southern Oscillation--Indian Ocean Dipole;
and the multidecadal warming trends and natural variation.
IOGOOS-IV [29172-29445]
How can IOP activities (large scale oceanography and climate) connect with African
activity? · Ocean reanalysis and climate model results linked to coastal IOGOOS: How
to get the products out? · IOC/IOGOOS science programs: How can the region become
active in the science?
Institutional Choice (INCHO)

IOGOOS I [9445-9487]
through a permanent ocean observing system
IOGOOS I [39734-39838]
GOOS Regional Alliances, guided by national and regional priorities, create Regional
Application Centers
IOGOOS I [40271-40346]
the global network will not, by itself, provide all of the data/information
344
IOGOOS I [41043-41247]
regional observing systems are critical building blocks of the coastal module of GOOS,
especially for achieving the goals of sustaining and restoring healthy marine ecosystems
and living marine resources.
IOGOOS I [41280-41509]
the data-management and communications subsystem is the "life-blood" of the

observing system, and the development of an integrated data management and
communications subsystem is arguably the highest priority for implementation.
IOGOOS I [41957-42166]
to establish an integrated data-management subsystem that serves data in both real-time

and delayed mode and allows users to exploit multiple data sets from many different
sources through "one-stop-shopping."
IOGOOS I [42422-43377]
The creation of a Joint Technical Commission for Oceanography and Marine

Meteorology and initiatives such as the Argo and GODAE projects reflect the progress
that is being made in the design and implementation of the global ocean module of
GOOS. In contrast, although a high priority of the international community, progress in
developing the coastal module has been slow. This is primarily a consequence of (1) the
challenge of designing and implementing an internationally accepted coastal module to
achieve the six goals in a diversity of complex coastal ecosystems; (2) the challenges of
developing the regional and global partnerships needed to fund, implement, operate, and
develop operational observing systems; (3) inefficient and ineffective data
communications and management systems; and (4) the primitive state of our capacity to
rapidly and routinely detect and predict changes that require measurements of biological
and chemical variables.
IOGOOS I [50701-50844]
A data-management and communication system that provides rapid access to data and
information will be the "lifeline" of the observing system. I
345
IOGOOS I [50914-51052]
should develop a hierarchical, distributed network of local, national, and regional

mechanisms feeding eventually into a global framework,
IOGOOS I [71369-71558]
This will be the first step toward establishing the data communications infrastructure
that will be required to build the data-management infrastructure for the coastal
component of IOGOOS.
IOGOOS I [71559-71942]
Establish a Development Committee that will (1) oversee the development of pilot
projects, including the coastal laboratory network, and (2) serve as a point of contact for
the ocean climate component of IOGOOS and other bodies interested in the
development of the coastal component of IOGOOS (other regional bodies, research
programs important to the development of IOGOOS, etc.).
IOGOOS I [86821-87324]
The Breakout Session II concluded by forming an IOGOOS Coastal Development

Committee (ICDC) with an Executive Committee (* in membership list herebelow) that
will (1) promote the development of the three pilot projects and a network of coastal
laboratories for data and information exchange, (2) coordinate their development with
oceanclimate pilot projects, and (3) provide the focal point for the IOGOOS Secretariat
to coordinate the development of the ocean climate and coastal modules of IOGOOS.
IOGOOS I [109937-110454]
Institutional and infrastructural development Development of a network of universities

and government offices to help in designing and implementing the project; many
universities and governments have environmental monitoring programs, so that sharing
information amongst them would help to optimize project design, thus enabling the
project to be carried out in many countries in a standardized way. Designation of
contact persons in each country to help network people in their country with those in
other countries.
346
IOGOOS I [115172-115871]
The International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange (IODE) program was
established by the IOC in 1960 to: (1) facilitate and promote the exchange of
oceanographic data and information; (2) develop standards, formats, and methods for
the global exchange of oceanographic data and information; (3) assist member states to
acquire the necessary capacity to manage oceanographic data and information and
become partners in the IODE network. Over 60 centers have been established; these
include Designated National Agencies (DNAs), National Oceanographic Data and
Information Centers (NODCs), Responsible National Oceanographic Data Centers
(RNODCs) and World Data CentersOceanography (WDCs).
IOGOOS I [125258-125445]
Since it was agreed that the ODIN strategy should benefit the entire region, the
Workshop therefore recommended the development of an ODIN project for IOCINDIO,
complementing ODINAFRICA.
IOGOOS I [145286-145781]
Conference had created a good spirit of cooperation, thanks to the hard work of the last
two years, and a good basis for future work. In particular, he confirmed the continuing
support of the Government of India in the development of IOGOOS, not least through
its hosting of the IOGOOS Secretariat at the Indian National Centre for Ocean
Information Services (INCOIS), in Hyderabad, for a period of six years beginning 7
November 2002. The cost of running the Secretariat will be met by INCOIS.
IOGOOS I [149386-149702]
The organization of a joint Ocean Dynamics and Climate and Coastal Ocean
Observation Workshop to develop a sound overall coordination of IOGOOS projects
(possibly in May 2003) The nomination of a Project Coordinator to ensure effective
follow-up The creation of an IOGOOS bulletin Improvement of the IOGOOS website.
IOGOOS I [151819-152008]
He also called on the countries represented in the Alliance to establish national

IOGOOS Committees with a view to developing the appropriate national activities in
support of the Alliance.
347
IOGOOS I [170050-170434]
These challenges will require an array of new knowledge and technologies to erect a
shield of protectionbiological, physical, environmental and strategic, in order to ensure
our sustainable development. At the same time, they will require an institutional
response by governments and agencies and by society at large on the way we do
business, with new ways of thinking and new ideas.
IOGOOS I [185268-186490]
There are several aspects to this challenge. The first one is institutional development.
Member states, and the IOC, need to prepare themselves to meet the needs posed by the
development of GOOS. The financing of ocean research has allowed the building of
much of what we have today, especially the trial scaled-up runs of prototype systems.
However, the financing of the fully operational GOOS cannot depend exclusively on the
funding for science. Since no other known source is visible on the horizon, waiting to
fill the gap, this shifting of the sources of funding is perceived as a huge menace to the
stability of ongoing international research efforts. The second challenge refers to the use
of the data and information generated by operational oceanographic services. Effective
use requires the organization of sophisticated systems for processing, modelling and
distributing the information. It is not just a matter of securing access to the data,
important as this aspect is. It is necessary to establish a highly technical and dedicated
organization with the mission of using the data, and producing and distributing final
products. These organizations exist today, both in the public and in the private sector.
IOGOOS II [25443-26242]
With respect to Structure and Coordination the Hyderabad Workshop concluded that at
the national level, a mix of distributed as well as centralized mechanism is to be
adopted. Each country needs to have a focal point for data management and the NODC
could take up this responsibility. Countries without an NODC should be encouraged to
establish such a facility. It is necessary to have a coordination mechanism for data and
information management at the regional level as well. An IOGOOS data and
information management working group is to be set up with national contact points and
experts as members. The need for a regional data archive for the Indian Ocean was
discussed and it was decided this should be agreed upon during the first meeting of the
data and information management working group.
348
IOGOOS II [41514-41868]
This project will be a multi-scale operation involving, firstly, large-scale remote sensing
over wide areas; secondly, detailed remote sensing in particular areas of interest; and
thirdly, community-based or participatory monitoring in situ at selected sites.
Measurements at all three levels of monitoring will be repeated on a regular basis over
time.
IOGOOS II [50943-51366]
The project has many requirements related to capacity building in processing and
interpreting r e m o t e l y sensed data. It was also recognised that the creation of a
clearinghouse for all available data on the winds and waves in the Indian Ocean
whether from satellites or global models would be a very useful step in stimulating
work through out the region in linking observed shoreline changes to the ocean climate.
IOGOOS II [63171-63454]
IOGOOS is working within the framework of the GOOS Coastal Panel and taking
responsibility in collaboration with that Panel in the implementation of initiatives within
the region, including contributions to the measurement of key common variables and
testing of common methodologies.
IOGOOS II [64793-65258]
The IOGOOS II meeting noted that the Secretariat at INCOIS, Hyderabad has been
energetic, competent and proactive in supporting the activities of IOGOOS, in
cooperation with the IOC Perth Office. With the support of the Department of Ocean
Development, India the Secretariat has grown significantly supporting various activities
such as data management. The Secretariat has developed an informative web site that is
providing effective communication for the region
IOGOOS-III [51955-52210]
The strategic approach has been endorsed and we are planning to establish a secretariat
over the coming months, probably in the National Oceans Office. The Indian Ocean
Region is a major focus of this plan and it will be strongly guided by the IOP Panel.
349
Operationalisation (OPSTA)
IOGOOS I [32607-32724]
An operational observing system for the marine environment is a new concept for
oceanographers and marine ecologists,
IOGOOS I [32801-32929]
in which the provision of data and data-products is sustained and routine in forms and at
rates that are specified by the users.
IOGOOS I [32968-33421]
requires a managed and efficient flow of data and information among three essential
subsystems: (1) an analysis and modeling subsystem, the data requirements of which
guide the development of (2) an integrated data communications and management
subsystem for serving data of known quality in real-time or delayed mode as needed
and (3) an observing subsystem for monitoring the required variables on specified time-
space scales, precision and accuracy.
IOGOOS I [101218-101506]
For applicability at the regional level, the global products will have to be downscaled
for practical applications (e.g., agriculture, fisheries). Specific oceanic features such as
fronts, upwelling zones or the resolution of sea state and currents may need to be
enhanced in the products
IOGOOS I [105754-105946]
A phased approach, beginning with assessment and a shoreline monitoring system;

incorporation of local funding; then development of analytical and modeling capability
as data become available.
IOGOOS I [110455-112089]
Establishment of marine protected areas (MPAs) to act as control areas (unlikely to

experience significant impacts of human activities) with which to compare other areas
that receive significant human impacts; establishment of reference stations, which
would have a use similar to that of MPAs, but, in addition, may be selected so as to
represent areas that are least likely to experience natural disasters. In addition, sentinel
sites carefully chosen in order to quickly detect change and allow rapid planning of
350
appropriate mitigation measures. Identification and management of the drivers of
ecosystem degradation (i.e., human activities and natural phenomena). For coral reefs:
The relevant human activities are destructive fishing, overfishing; coral mining; nutrient
and chemical water pollution; boat transport and anchoring; land-based activities that
cause sedimentation. The relevant natural phenomena are coral bleaching (possibly due
to climate change), outbreaks of the crown-of-thorns starfish; storms and cyclones. For
mangroves: The relevant human activities are harvesting of mangroves for fuel, building
poles and boat-making, clear-cutting of mangrove forests for construction of houses and
roads; aquaculture, agriculture and salt-making. The relevant natural phenomena are
sea-level rise, storms and cyclones, floods. For seagrass beds: The relevant human
activities are destructive fishing practices (drag nets, trawling), movement of boats and
people, land-based activities that cause sedimentation. The relevant natural phenomena
are cyclones, storms, excessive rainfall which causes increased sedimentation.
IOGOOS I [119888-121052]
Gary Meyers noted that the data and data products required for the Ocean Dynamics and
Climate pilot projects are composed of two streams: (1) large-scale data products and
analyses on a global scale (e.g., climate prediction, ocean state, weather products, wave
products); and (2) local scale. The data and data products on the local scale are lacking
and will require special efforts in the region to develop them. There may also be some
problems of down-scaling data products from the large scale to the local scale, but
"external" sources (e.g., Global GOOS) could be combined with "local sources" (e.g.,
IOGOOS), if downscaling problems can be overcome. Tom Malone pointed out that
coastal data is nearly always "local". In general, the diversity of data required for the
proposed IOGOOS pilot projects is huge and varies from country to country. In
addition, very few data-management systems are available in the region to deal with
these data. The challenges will therefore be substantial, but so will be the benefits if the
necessary systems can be put in place. A clearing-house mechanism will be necessary to
assemble and make available the relevant data.
IOGOOS I [121247-121882]
Mervyn Lynch informed the Workshop that there is limited experience in the remote-
sensing community concerned with the IOGOOS program. Quite independently and to
serve their own needs, the wider remote-sensing community has established data
351
centers, sets of data products, quality control procedures, and metadata-base
management systems. However, there are some areas of concern, such as the often
onerous access to such data, the need for validation of remote-sensing data with field
data and their proper integration, product consistency across laboratories for the same
sensor, or product consistency between different/new sensors.
IOGOOS I [122575-122899]
Peter Pissierssens felt that independent local data management was still a long way off,
but ODINAFRICA data centers could help in the Indian Ocean; so could POGO and
INCOIS. The present weakness of the IODE data-center system was the still relative
separation of the datamanagement community from the wider user community.
IOGOOS I [123455-123899]
It recommended that IOC undertake a survey to identify and document in detail all
existing oceandata and management facilities in the region. This will enable the
identification of suitable dataand information-management partners able to handle all
relevant data types and develop the required data products and services. Particular
attention should be given to whether these centers are covering or can cover all data
types relevant to IOGOOS.
IOGOOS I [126643-127143]
About a dozen satellites covering the Indian Ocean are now operating. Regarding the
application of satellite remote sensing in the region, it appears necessary to stimulate
regional interest and to identify problems whose solution would be facilitated by
satellite remote sensing, and to set priorities. As a first step, it would be useful to
construct inventories of experts, of interests, and of existing infrastructure. Training
workshops and demonstration pilot projects would help in this sense.
IOGOOS I [127144-127310]
The likely problems lie predominantly in the data acquisition, management, and
archiving, in the exploitation of the data and the development of useful data products.
352
IOGOOS I [128336-128567]
There are still some credibility gaps with respect to satellite remote sensing; and
capabilities vary from nation to nation. So capacity-building and training are needed,
preceded, however, by an assessment of training facilities.
IOGOOS I [128697-128775]
The majority of the relevant data come from the SeaWiFS and are held at NASA.
IOGOOS I [129364-129418]
SeaWiFS and OCM satellites carry ocean-color scanners;
IOGOOS I [129986-130109]
Although the coral reefs and mangroves are being monitored, it is not easy to show
changes in mangrove species composition.
IOGOOS I [130688-130856]
It is clearly very important to ensure that the data products are useful and made
available at the right levels: societal, national, and of international organizations.
IOGOOS I [132752-133566]
Regarding data exchange, some of the problems are technical. The hardware and
software needs of users need to be determined. Duplication (in data acquisition,
processing etc.) must be avoided and made unnecessary by full and free access by all
participants in IOGOOS pilot projects to all data in relevant data sources. The needs of
the Ocean Dynamics and Climate pilot projects are reasonably well met, now, but those
in Coastal Ocean Observing are more difficult to meet, because the algorithms are more
complex, and compliance with standards and protocols for measurements and for data
products is more difficult to achieve. The priority for the coastal pilot projects is the
detection of environmental change (mitigation/degradation), and for this it is necessary
to concentrate on quality control of the data.
IOGOOS I [133567-134336]
There are also some pragmatic questions, particularly regarding costs and title to data or
data products, to be resolved. High spatial- and spectral-resolution data may be
necessary for some purposes but are costly, so hard choices often have to be made.
353
Planned actions are to prepare: a resource directory of satellites and their data
products--descriptors, accuracy, spatial and temporal resolution, availability (real time,
delayed time) an inventory of research and capacity-building centers a list of specific
needs for capacity-building with respect to scatterometry, altimetry, inshore currents,
sea-surface temperature and ocean fronts, and the oceanic water column (chlorophyll a,
suspended sediments, dissolved organic compounds, light attenuation etc.).
IOGOOS I [154215-154633]
Work on these priority issues will be enabled through four inter-related technical
activities: (1) improving the African Network of In Situ Ocean Measurements and
Observation Validation, with particular emphasis on the Sea-Level Network; (2)
improving access to remote-sensing technology and information; (3) validation and
forecasting modelling; (4) development of an enduser interactive information delivery
system.
IOGOOS I [164383-164925]
The Conference had made it clear that there are products and applications that can be
delivered to the users in this region, but some things are still needed: pilot projects to
pave the way for operational systems; capacity-building in data collection, modeling,
and applications; building awareness of GOOS and securing funds for the work; plans
for implementation of ocean and climate, and coastal-ocean observing systems;
improved use of satellites for IOGOOS applications; and better communication links
and infrastructure in the region.
IOGOOS I [172740-173070]
The existing multilateral frameworks should however be revitalized to ensure that they
develop and implement specific initiatives, such as funding mechanisms to facilitate
international scientific collaboration between countries. Joint research projects and
information-sharing networks should be other components of their output.
IOGOOS I [186524-186692]
Is this a development that each member state of the IOC wishes to face independently,
or would it be a possible "joint" effort within IOC, organized at a regional scale
IOGOOS I [186953-187274]
354
The third challenge is economic in nature. Global observations constitute a very
particular case of all the observations that can be made. The main feature is the very
large scale at which they are collected. At the upper limit, GOOS will be sampling the
properties of a single system: the ocean. The sample size is one.
IOGOOS I [187431-187790]
In theory, full forecasting capabilities would be available only if all scales were properly
sampled. This is a huge technical requirement. Conceptually this is not a minor detail.
In GOOS, what is a local observation made on the east coast of Africa becomes a
"remote and distant" observation for a forecast in the Bay of Bengal, for example, and
viceversa.
IOGOOS II [17553-17947]
IOP members have undertaken drafting of an Implementation Plan based on an outline

plan prepared by the Chair, with initial input due in May, and completion of the first
draft in early 2005. A key aspect of preparing this plan is to develop a high degree of
consensus among all the agencies that can contribute. This is essential to achieve a high
degree of coordination in the implementation.
IOGOOS II [20682-21112]
A capability for downscaling the basin scale observations to the smaller scales of
interest at the coasts needs to be addressed and needs to be founded on a two way flow
of information and plans between developers of the climate component and users of
marine information in the coastal environment. With this challenge in mind, IOP will
open a discussion with GODAE to identify how products can be made available to
IOGOOS users.
IOGOOS II [23992-24051]
coastal and climate GOOS require data at different scales.
IOGOOS II [26788-27169]
The objectives to be met during the Medium term are: (i) assist members to develop the
necessary national capacity to participate fully in IOGOOS (ODIN+, modeling and data
assimilation, satellite oceanography); (ii) .start data collection, management and
355
service/product development through relevant pilot projects; and (iii) provide services
to all IOGOOS members for public use.
IOGOOS II [38072-38463]
Substantial discussion at the Sri Lankan meeting was devoted to the potential and
feasibility of the use of remote sensing techniques in monitoring of environmental
parameters of possible significance to prawn population dynamics. This technique was
also mooted as being of potential significance to the other two coastal IOGOOS pilot
projects on costal biodiversity and shoreline dynamics.
IOGOOS II [41514-41867]
This project will be a multi-scale operation involving, firstly, large-scale remote sensing
over wide areas; secondly, detailed remote sensing in particular areas of interest; and
thirdly, community-based or participatory monitoring in situ at selected sites.
Measurements at all three levels of monitoring will be repeated on a regular basis over
time.
IOGOOS II [41906-42375]
Data from all levels of monitoring will be fed into GIS databases and processed to
obtain a number of valuable outputs, including maps, baseline information, detection of
change over time and predictions about future changes. Interpretation of these outputs
will result in outputs at a higher level such as recommendations for management and/or
further research, as well as information that can be used to increase environmental
awareness of the respective communities.
IOGOOS II [43278-44023]
Progress during the IOGOOS Workshop at Colombo, 26-29 April 2004: It is gratifying
that significant progress was made during the workshop in terms of valuable input by
additional countries, new commitments to undertake the project, recruitment of
individuals and exchange of information. The main inputs/changes in the proposal as a
result of this workshop included a new title, so that it mentions the purpose of the
project as being to facilitate sustainable management; improvements in methodologies
on remote sensing, identification of possible sources of funding, the necessity of linking
data from the climate community, particularly, temperature, salinity, turbidity, sea level,
etc., which all affect ecosystem health and area coverage.
356
IOGOOS II [48782-49299]
Two types of remotely sensed data will be required for this project. The first type is
highresolution data on shoreline change while the second is lower resolution data on
wind and waves. The second category can be supplemented by the output of global
climate models, particularly for the case of wind data. It was noted that wave and wind
statistics compiled from such sources are already available commercially for the region.
Local measurements of waves and wind are needed to validate the hydrodynamic
models.
IOGOOS II [52845-53467]
The actual project would have duration of five to seven years. It is expected that the first
year of project implementation would involve the final selection of sites, training of
personnel involved in monitoring, quality control and data management and setting up a
regional data sharing network. Monitoring would begin late in the first year and
products would be available by the end of the second year. Acquiring and interpreting
remotely sensed data on shoreline change would also begin in the first year while
development of a c a p a b i l i t y to predict shoreline change would begin in the second
or third year.
IOGOOS II [61176-61338]
The Second Annual meeting (IOGOOS II) held at Colombo during April 26-29, 2004
agreed on a detailed action plan and on the implementation of several initiatives.
Dr. Radhakrishnan, Chairman of IOGOOS recalled the evolution and growth of

IOGOOS since its formal launch at Mauritius in November 2002, and acknowledged the
contributions made by several individuals and institutions to bring it up as one of the
best GOOS regional alliances (GRA) with 19 members from 12 countries in the region
and two associate members. . He informed the meeting that the IOP had made excellent
progress in preparing a draft implementation plan for ocean observations in the Indian
Ocean for climate. He stressed that the coastal GOOS pilot projects have to be evolved
into concrete proposals in conformance with the IOC's Coastal GOOS implementation
plan.
357
IOGOOS-III [22379-22983]
Dr. Radhakrishnan briefly described the importance of remote sensing and indicated
that the USA, Europe and India have major remote sensing programmes that cover the
Indian Ocean. He gave an example of fisheries as a case where remote sensing data is
being used for an operational purpose. Remote sensing data could also be used to
provide inputs for coastal land use, shoreline changes, etc. He suggested that the
IOGOOS website should have a page on remote sensing data availability, tools, etc. He
gave an overview of the training programme offered by CSSTE-AP and Indian Institute
of Remote Sensing.
IOGOOS-III [33786-34231]
The foundation of the web site for this project has been constructed with an emphasis on
graphics and user friendliness as it is intended to be accessed as a general source of
information and used not only by researchers in the field. It is expected, pending
adequate funding, that the bulk of the website details will be completed by the end of
2005 and the site hosted by the IOGOOS secretariat by mid-2006 in advance of the
IOGOOS IV meeting.
IOGOOS-III [41034-41485]
The Panel has met face to face twice (Pune, India, 2004; Hobart, Australia, 2005), but
works primarily between sessions by email and internet. The Panel's plan for IOGOOS
is reported on the web site of the International CLIVAR Project Office at
http://www.clivar.org/organization/indian/IOOS/obs.html . The Panel has published a
Report entitled, "The Role of the Indian Ocean in the Climate System--an
implementation plan for sustained observations."
IOGOOS-III [45571-46030]
Dr. Gary Meyers presented an overview of the design for an Indian Ocean Observing
System. It is integrated in the sense (a) that it makes use of all the available types of
instrumentation that can be deployed in the ocean for long periods of time, (b) it
provides data for a wide range of parameters relevant to the physical and biological state
of the ocean and (c) it observes all the relevant time-scales of variability from
intraseasonal to multi-decadal.
358
IOGOOS-III [49569-49846]
The major issues that have to be resolved to fully establish the mooring array include:
Ship time (180 days per year), Fishing Vandalism, Operational Funding, International
Coordination, System Integration (e.g. commonalities with multi-hazard warning
system), Data management.
IOGOOS-III [51955-52210]
The strategic approach has been endorsed and we are planning to establish a secretariat
over the coming months, probably in the National Oceans Office. The Indian Ocean
Region is a major focus of this plan and it will be strongly guided by the IOP Panel.
IOGOOS-III [54989-55285]
One of the concerns is the way that the network will be implemented and sustained. It
also has to cater to operational activities since just science objectives will not be
sufficient to sustain funding. He noted that the GEOSS framework can provide new
approaches for securing long term funding.
IOGOOS-III [58828-59024]
He commented that progress in the IOGOOS projects has not been as rapid as required
and that the IOGOOS officers could be given the responsibility of individual projects
based on their expertise.
IOGOOS-III [61223-62674]
Dr. K. Radhakrishnan, Chairman IOGOOS elicited suggestions from the participants to

improve the functioning of IOGOOS. IOGOOS has already achieved some good
progress in respect of evolving a design for basin-scale observations. It has also
embarked on coastal pilot projects that are complex and would take some time to see the
results. The recent tsunami demanded serious attention of some of the IOGOOS
functionaries for evolving the tsunami early warning system and related capacity
building for the Indian Ocean. The following suggestions were received from the
participants on how to further enhance the effectiveness of IOGOOS. · · · · · There is a
need to collaborate on regional projects. Individual champions are needed to take ahead
successful projects. Projects should be able to cut across national boundaries and
countries should be sufficiently convinced that the project is useful to them. Activities
359
of IOGOOS including the Pilot projects and progress need to be made known at the
National level. National GOOS coordinating committees should be formed which also
include the government agencies that are involved in the pilot projects. IOGOOS
probably needs to spend more time on delivering products and useful information
through the Website, Capacity building for Modeling, tsunami, Coastal inundation
modeling etc. It might be useful to have an IOGOOS Workshop along with the IGOOS
Meeting. IOGOOS needs to develop a user interface
IOGOOS-IV [23582-25015]
Dr Meyers presented an overview of the implementation plan for sustained observations

for climate research and operational prediction. The mooring array is composed of 44
moorings to observe weather and upper ocean parameters and three moorings to observe
the deep equatorial currents. The rationale for the array was discussed. At the present
time the three deep moorings and nine of the surface moorings are active, located near
80E and 90E. An additional three moorings are scheduled for implementation in late
2006/early 2007, including one in the western Indian Ocean. Implementation of a
mooring south of Java is under discussion. Challenges in implementing the full array
are: vandalism by fishers and commitment of ship time. Maintenance of the full array
will require about 142 days of ship time per year. About 400 Argo floats are now active
in the Indian Ocean out of 480 required for full implementation. Floats to complete the
array are available but ships to take them to the void locations are lacking.
Implementation of all the XBT lines is on track except IX10 (lacking a principal
investigator) and IX08 (lacking useful shipping.) The XBT line IX07 was dropped
because it is redundant and not as effective as IX08 for monitoring inflow to the western
boundary current system. NOAA and NIO are working together to implement IX08. Dr
Meyers reported progress (though limited) in coordinating IOP activity with IOTWS.
IOGOOS-IV [29445-30125]
The participants identified three possible projects that address these questions: a). Easy
access/small data sets: Goal--provide the ocean re-analysis and/or climate prediction
data required for two or three specific projects in an archive and format that will be user
friendly. The data will be targeted specifically for IOGOOS members/associates.
Actions: · IOGOOS Secretariat announces opportunity and call for proposals. ·
IOGOOS Chairman, IOP Chair and possibly a Panel select the projects, taking account
360
of common need for data. · Chair of ODIN-INCINDIO responsible for assembly of data
set. Resources: $3-4K for data assembly. Projects to be funded by national resources.
IOGOOS-IV [31595-31807]
IOGOOS needs to develop a strategy to maximize IOGOOS members/associates

participation in IOC training programs · IOGOOS needs to develop a strategy to convert
regional research projects to operational activity.
IOGOOS-IV [31927-32185]
For the ecosystem project, it was suggested that perhaps we should start small and set
up a pilot project. While beginning with a pilot test, the project should remain as an
integrated whole. Suggested that India and Tanzania could start with pilot testing.
IOGOOS-IV [35475-36058]
Coastal Erosion and Prawn Pilot Projects · The coordinators of these projects did not
turn up for the meeting. It was also noted that there was no progress in the activities
identified in the previous annual meetings. Considering this the meeting decided that
these projects are to be abandoned unless other scientists have the interest to take over
and coordinate them. As such, the action decided was for the IOGOOS Secretariat to
contact the project coordinators and determine new leaders or termination of the project.
Complete action by February 2007, and report to membership.
IOGOOS-IV [41293-41611]
The meeting suggested that an audit could be coordinated from IOGOOS as a basis for a
more targeted activity in the future. This audit could cover national programmes in
coastal monitoring, in-situ and remote sensing activities, data products, modelling and
prediction activities, Data and Information Management, etc.
Process of Regime Formation (PROREGFOR)

IOGOOS I [10745-10975]
International conventions, such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change

and the Convention on Biodiversity, and the economic challenges and social
commitments have mandated countries to implement ocean observing systems.
361
IOGOOS I [53868-53945]
The Strategy will take advantage of existing observing systems and facilities
IOGOOS I [54186-54236]
It will also take advantage of some pilot projects
IOGOOS I [54743-54808]
the Strategy will take advantage of some pre-operational projects
IOGOOS I [55303-55474]
For data management, the Strategy will take advantage of the following projects that are
part of the IOC's International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange (IODE)
IOGOOS I [55788-55915]
the Strategy will be based on the following operational satellites providing

oceanographic data for the Indian Ocean at present
IOGOOS-III [69226-69580]
The Members noted the efforts put in by IOGOOS Members & IOGOOS Secretariat
over the last two years for the GRAND Project. After detailed assessment of its utility
vis a vis the efforts put in, it was considered appropriate to withdraw from the GRAND
Project. On behalf of IOGOOS, Chairman was authorized to communicate the same to
the GRAND Secretariat.
Imposition (IMPOS)
IOGOOS I [10745-10974]
International conventions, such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change

and the Convention on Biodiversity, and the economic challenges and social
commitments have mandated countries to implement ocean observing systems.
IOGOOS I [13222-13514]
Through the Conference, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (of

UNESCO) and its UN and regional partners are now one step closer to establishing a
fully operational Global Ocean Observing System in the Indian Ocean with the
collaboration of the countries of the Indian Ocean Region
362
IOGOOS I [33421-33531]
Under the oversight of the GOOS sponsors (IOC, UNEP, WMO, ICSU, FAO), the
observing system is being organized
IOGOOS I [34064-34356]
the GOOS movement is an attempt to more effectively link and enhance existing
programs for more cost-effective use of existing knowledge, infrastructure and
expertise; and more rapid detection and timely prediction of environmental changes and
events in coastal marine and estuarine systems.
IOGOOS I [34676-34979]
the observing system is envisioned as a network of national, regional, and global

systems that rapidly and systematically acquire and disseminate data and data products
to serve the needs of many user groups, including government agencies, private
enterprise, scientists, educators, NGOs and the public.
IOGOOS I [36809-36931]
the fact that the phenomena of interest are globally ubiquitous and tend to be local
expressions of larger-scale forcings;
IOGOOS I [140844-140950]
It was agreed that GOOS principles apply to all GOOS activities, including data
acquisition and exchange.
IOGOOS I [188373-188857]
Simply look at Europe and the United States to see how much they are investing in
GOOS to benefit their own regions. The IOC and its UN partners, the World
Meteorological Organization and the UN Environment Programme, as well as the
International Council of Science (ICSU), will continue to support the development
process, but the implementation phase requires your countries' support. This begins with
signing the IOGOOS Memorandum of Understanding to become a contributing
member.
363
IOGOOS II [4813-5273]
In his opening remarks, Dr. K. Radhakrishnan, Chairman IOGOOS and Vice Chairman
IOC stated that the Global Ocean Observing System (GOOS) envisages (i) an
internationally accepted global design to address the broad realms of Oceans & Climate
and Coastal Ocean, (ii) a set of regional alliances of countries that will focus on issues
of common concerns and interests of the region and (iii) national contributions for
implementation of the observational systems.
IOGOOS II [15157-15436]
GOOS (through Indian Ocean GOOS and the Perth Office of the IOC) and CLIVAR
have established the Indian Ocean Panel initially charged to develop, coordinate and
implement a plan for sustained ocean observations of the Indian Ocean for climate
research and ocean state estimation.
IOGOOS-III [69226-69580]
The Members noted the efforts put in by IOGOOS Members & IOGOOS Secretariat
over the last two years for the GRAND Project. After detailed assessment of its utility
vis a vis the efforts put in, it was considered appropriate to withdraw from the GRAND
Project. On behalf of IOGOOS, Chairman was authorized to communicate the same to
the GRAND Secretariat.
Negotiation (NEGOT)
IOGOOS I [44694-44792]
Implementing the coastal module in the Indian Ocean will require partnering among
regional bodies.
IOGOOS I [45823-45920]
In addition, the development of IOGOOS should involve collaboration with GOOS-

Africa and SEAGOOS.
IOGOOS I [94609-94707]
However, the Working Group could not finalize the large-scale open-ocean moored-
buoy array design.
364
Self-Generation (SELFG)
IOGOOS II [27169-27529]
The Long-term objectives identified are: (i) empowering ALL members to

generate/share and disseminate products and services by themselves using data from
national and regional sources; (ii) develop user-oriented and userfriendly ocean services
system accessible by all; and (iii) ensure long-term sustainability of the national and
regional IOGOOS facilities.
365
Appendix 3
Value of IntraIndian Ocean trade (in USD millions) 2001 to 2007
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Australia 13765.43 13745.94 14678.40 19639.35 22844.84 26771.79 30658.66
Bahrain 1395.69 1303.89 1501.84 2152.50 2790.67 3432.79 4002.48
Bangladesh 293.14 253.21 299.90 320.70 456.12 624.07 706.86
Comoros 6.97 3.90 2.86 6.35 6.09 4.83 5.77
Djibouti 181.68 194.39 236.76 240.76 263.46 325.70 406.65
Egypt 1023.17 1043.92 1425.64 2087.11 3021.64 3539.94 4318.39
Eritrea
Ethiopia 181.85 144.80 198.17 139.17 216.93 249.96 310.27
India 10340.82 14060.55 18815.51 24673.45 31805.77 37358.50 47144.02
Indonesia 14058.83 14867.46 15789.48 18741.20 23268.59 33693.21 37951.49
Iran 3302.33 2811.17 3626.07 5523.12 6623.60 8334.54 8766.39
Iraq 836.12 936.56 410.86 396.70 293.96 651.27 429.03
Israel 2312.70 2199.10 2408.50 2972.30 3224.90 3340.40 4086.40
Jordan 1362.67 1515.65 1438.18 1743.61 2064.49 2375.53 2744.19
Kenya 679.42 672.79 710.93 838.06 885.93 1055.37 1307.89
Kuwait 4170.44 4004.61 4653.16 6891.30 8966.37 10757.72 12702.65
Madagascar 145.28 53.46 105.12 80.97 60.62 65.89 81.73
Malaysia 26745.48 29446.26 33110.96 41081.31 48173.94 54600.08 60965.60
Maldives 27.28 31.02 43.31 51.00 45.97 84.21 80.26
Mauritius 140.96 139.62 210.91 232.11 372.47 472.65 601.21
Mozambique 117.41 137.53 187.22 251.77 335.11 436.86 425.37
Myanmar 1159.56 1394.46 1414.28 1853.45 2416.74 3023.00 3183.16
Oman 4068.61 4281.10 3851.07 3679.24 5729.56 8677.87 7383.94
Pakistan 2119.22 2479.92 3104.54 2972.71 3713.96 4297.45 5370.15
Qatar 1990.03 2675.74 2692.11 4734.94 5496.96 8405.48 10637.28
Saudi Arabia 16967.82 15438.86 19360.11 26278.18 35081.82 44588.60 48347.31
Seychelles 6.30 4.65 2.63 19.95 27.33 43.62 58.08
Singapore 37212.35 38518.44 58212.30 71801.85 85631.90 99958.05 112861.75
Somalia 64.03 96.89 133.39 169.75 234.49 281.18 356.20
South Africa 3902.74 3828.83 4923.72 6243.40 7979.52 7802.70 9669.33
Sri Lanka 658.33 723.06 871.44 1041.72 1314.69 1511.46 1889.44
Sudan 185.30 286.06 954.49 533.11 501.04 621.69 560.96
Tanzania 180.16 183.29 225.51 311.04 329.77 403.37 481.90
Thailand 14632.19 15845.57 19314.88 24860.35 29271.89 33760.34 41707.99
United Arab Emirates 11279.00 11683.01 14437.25 20114.52 27044.67 35139.37 40530.78
Yemen 2082.32 1960.21 1751.82 2431.23 2266.31 3041.88 3880.59
Grand Total 177595.59 186965.88 231103.31 295108.25 362762.09 439731.36 504614.15
Source: Developed from International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade online
366
Value of exports to the world (in USD millions) 2001 to 2007
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Australia 63399.30 65221.20 70900.20 86161.80 105055.00 121827.00 141350.00
Bahrain 8254.80 8455.21 10354.40 13592.50 15943.40 19793.00 24023.10
Bangladesh 5735.61 5443.26 6229.39 7585.60 8494.40 12740.20 13909.70
Comoros 37.50 28.47 32.96 34.51 24.09 31.94 30.53
Djibouti 236.27 202.28 247.11 252.31 274.49 340.22 422.66
Egypt 4140.41 7048.54 8499.16 12187.10 15593.00 20704.40 23229.40
Eritrea
Ethiopia 285.93 421.46 467.86 570.37 781.89 1085.64 1207.21
India 45512.70 50496.30 61118.50 75385.20 97918.10 123032.00 151932.00
Indonesia 56317.70 57154.30 61012.60 71550.20 85622.60 113601.00 129428.00
Iran 24336.90 22176.20 31782.30 40997.50 55402.80 70594.10 81865.40
Iraq 11064.50 9133.97 8140.66 16119.10 17656.70 23863.40 27271.90
Israel 29046.00 29512.10 31291.20 38519.80 42513.60 46448.50 54048.50
Jordan 2291.50 2769.49 3081.12 3530.40 4300.60 5203.56 5534.00
Kenya 1872.57 2143.97 2403.73 2702.77 3544.70 4107.56 4846.27
Kuwait 16155.10 15525.80 18746.10 25520.10 35190.80 42220.30 47312.50
Madagascar 673.89 494.69 848.13 1253.25 1004.83 1071.49 1221.68
Malaysia 88201.00 93386.60 104968.00 126509.00 140977.00 160664.00 176207.00
Maldives 76.57 90.71 112.71 122.83 98.72 167.15 170.35
Mauritius 1524.91 1746.41 1807.97 1914.13 2000.19 2177.47 2256.65
Mozambique 703.70 682.02 1043.91 1503.86 1745.26 2381.13 2764.24
Myanmar 2625.44 2753.15 2767.95 3158.84 3702.15 4377.99 4786.62
Oman 10681.10 11126.70 10361.70 12725.60 17419.40 23665.50 24760.80
Pakistan 9211.43 9880.35 11928.00 13284.20 16046.00 17183.00 19626.80
Qatar 10868.50 10976.50 13380.10 18545.80 18001.00 25090.40 30767.60
Saudi Arabia 68831.90 66140.40 86547.20 112687.00 156967.00 189418.00 200491.00
Seychelles 152.44 174.80 213.86 367.93 416.74 350.34 339.14
Singapore 121826.00 125219.00 160073.00 198694.00 229447.00 272057.00 299173.00
Somalia 77.20 112.95 150.50 190.09 250.63 301.21 380.15
South Africa 29510.30 29898.70 36353.30 45554.80 51561.60 52439.00 63484.30
Sri Lanka 4722.42 4678.38 5133.30 5757.23 6383.65 7494.75 8522.03
Sudan 1699.87 1941.58 2609.37 3773.70 4821.78 5699.26 8703.83
Tanzania 774.44 948.64 934.14 1220.71 1474.42 1572.38 1827.32
Thailand 65113.20 68849.80 80318.20 96213.90 110158.00 130555.00 152459.00
United Arab
Emirates
39878.70 39135.70 50096.20 66787.90 93172.80 111980.00 126705.00
Yemen 3370.17 3270.99 3724.01 4076.39 5606.29 6440.51 7171.40
Grand Total 729209.97 747240.61 887678.83 1109050.42 1349570.63 1620678.40 1838229.08
Note: All data is as generated from the IMF database. From the database the subsequent totals
of exports to developing countries and industrialised countries do not add up to world exports.
367
Value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as percentage of world exports
2001 to 2007
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Australia 21.71 21.08 20.70 22.79 21.75 21.98 21.69
Bahrain 16.91 15.42 14.50 15.84 17.50 17.34 16.66
Bangladesh 5.11 4.65 4.81 4.23 5.37 4.90 5.08
Comoros 18.59 13.70 8.68 18.40 25.26 15.13 18.89
Djibouti 76.89 96.10 95.81 95.42 95.98 95.73 96.21
Egypt 24.71 14.81 16.77 17.13 19.38 17.10 18.59
Eritrea
Ethiopia 63.60 34.36 42.36 24.40 27.74 23.02 25.70
India 22.72 27.84 30.79 32.73 32.48 30.36 31.03
Indonesia 24.96 26.01 25.88 26.19 27.18 29.66 29.32
Iran 13.57 12.68 11.41 13.47 11.96 11.81 10.71
Iraq 7.56 10.25 5.05 2.46 1.66 2.73 1.57
Israel 7.96 7.45 7.70 7.72 7.59 7.19 7.56
Jordan 59.47 54.73 46.68 49.39 48.00 45.65 49.59
Kenya 36.28 31.38 29.58 31.01 24.99 25.69 26.99
Kuwait 25.81 25.79 24.82 27.00 25.48 25.48 26.85
Madagascar 21.56 10.81 12.39 6.46 6.03 6.15 6.69
Malaysia 30.32 31.53 31.54 32.47 34.17 33.98 34.60
Maldives 35.63 34.20 38.43 41.52 46.56 50.38 47.11
Mauritius 9.24 7.99 11.67 12.13 18.62 21.71 26.64
Mozambique 16.69 20.17 17.93 16.74 19.20 18.35 15.39
Myanmar 44.17 50.65 51.09 58.68 65.28 69.05 66.50
Oman 38.09 38.48 37.17 28.91 32.89 36.67 29.82
Pakistan 23.01 25.10 26.03 22.38 23.15 25.01 27.36
Qatar 18.31 24.38 20.12 25.53 30.54 33.50 34.57
Saudi Arabia 24.65 23.34 22.37 23.32 22.35 23.54 24.11
Seychelles 4.13 2.66 1.23 5.42 6.56 12.45 17.12
Singapore 30.55 30.76 36.37 36.14 37.32 36.74 37.72
Somalia 82.94 85.78 88.63 89.30 93.56 93.35 93.70
South Africa 13.23 12.81 13.54 13.71 15.48 14.88 15.23
Sri Lanka 13.94 15.46 16.98 18.09 20.59 20.17 22.17
Sudan 10.90 14.73 36.58 14.13 10.39 10.91 6.45
Tanzania 23.26 19.32 24.14 25.48 22.37 25.65 26.37
Thailand 22.47 23.01 24.05 25.84 26.57 25.86 27.36
Yemen 61.79 59.93 47.04 59.64 40.42 47.23 54.11
368
Value of exports to developing countries (in USD millions) 2001 to 2007
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Australia 31052.40 31952.70 34141.50 43919.50 55503.20 65322.00 78762.30
Bahrain 1865.14 1779.36 2111.48 2860.92 3595.01 4364.55 5200.54
Bangladesh 542.67 528.82 557.13 652.68 850.38 1288.28 1522.64
Comoros 8.08 4.37 3.82 8.72 7.15 7.34 18.01
Djibouti 183.58 195.61 239.26 243.41 265.41 328.51 412.12
Egypt 1566.86 1929.57 2704.32 4389.43 5811.48 7063.00 8847.23
Eritrea
Ethiopia 185.77 165.04 223.73 201.44 322.77 563.74 623.74
India 20042.70 24647.40 32229.20 41891.20 55035.20 69418.50 89578.40
Indonesia 25141.20 26974.20 29503.70 35311.10 44509.10 60536.00 70591.20
Iran 10388.10 8829.13 12889.60 17590.10 24394.80 33609.40 40481.70
Iraq 1847.71 2466.10 1185.31 2979.76 3452.83 4454.23 5350.74
Israel 7011.40 6947.80 7307.70 9986.80 10986.40 12499.80 14783.80
Jordan 1657.86 1865.31 1885.28 2224.26 2677.07 3037.27 3508.79
Kenya 1280.87 1371.00 1484.59 1716.11 1900.94 2302.01 2857.05
Kuwait 7955.95 8101.11 10172.00 14477.90 20068.80 24989.10 28994.60
Madagascar 166.64 69.66 130.61 112.53 98.10 109.51 134.91
Malaysia 43354.50 49191.30 56594.00 69322.80 77872.00 89920.50 103119.00
Maldives 30.90 32.96 46.71 51.97 51.16 96.21 94.69
Mauritius 161.67 203.79 251.73 272.96 445.10 588.29 745.89
Mozambique 174.88 201.07 290.87 383.24 486.05 611.67 801.62
Myanmar 1589.14 1871.79 1910.29 2417.85 3127.54 3735.71 4075.45
Oman 7768.98 8236.61 8057.62 10321.00 13786.20 19686.70 20073.50
Pakistan 3937.62 4232.31 5274.29 5662.83 7295.64 9179.63 11235.80
Qatar 4591.34 4710.10 5733.21 8333.65 6641.03 9248.42 12120.60
Saudi Arabia 32516.30 30935.00 40523.90 55192.30 76425.50 95484.90 108315.00
Seychelles 9.58 5.16 5.65 45.61 49.34 61.87 86.74
Singapore 71793.40 75950.40 103115.00 129051.00 154418.00 185337.00 210445.00
Somalia 72.97 109.77 148.14 186.46 248.23 298.09 374.03
South Africa 8586.06 8634.65 11010.00 13995.50 16321.80 18375.80 24465.10
Sri Lanka 1148.93 1163.02 1375.98 1660.90 1954.25 2317.35 2898.37
Sudan 1219.31 1493.60 2159.60 3180.89 4024.98 2698.69 6745.42
Tanzania 247.52 343.79 505.75 667.72 869.39 978.14 1156.43
Thailand 28151.30 30907.20 38786.60 48448.20 58143.20 69787.20 85698.90
Yemen 2909.65 2980.54 3448.34 3723.43 4577.79 5481.92 6070.96
Grand Total 337345.06 357456.94 439551.81 563599.98 699963.34 860096.34 1015266.86
369
Value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as percentage of exports
to developing countries 2001 to 2007
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Australia 44.33 43.02 42.99 44.72 41.16 40.98 38.93
Bahrain 74.83 73.28 71.13 75.24 77.63 78.65 76.96
Bangladesh 54.02 47.88 53.83 49.14 53.64 48.44 46.42
Comoros 86.25 89.27 74.82 72.82 85.15 65.79 32.04
Djibouti 98.97 99.37 98.95 98.91 99.26 99.15 98.67
Egypt 65.30 54.10 52.72 47.55 51.99 50.12 48.81
Eritrea
Ethiopia 97.89 87.73 88.58 69.09 67.21 44.34 49.74
India 51.59 57.05 58.38 58.90 57.79 53.82 52.63
Indonesia 55.92 55.12 53.52 53.07 52.28 55.66 53.76
Iran 31.79 31.84 28.13 31.40 27.15 24.80 21.66
Iraq 45.25 37.98 34.66 13.31 8.51 14.62 8.02
Israel 32.98 31.65 32.96 29.76 29.35 26.72 27.64
Jordan 82.19 81.25 76.28 78.39 77.12 78.21 78.21
Kenya 53.04 49.07 47.89 48.83 46.60 45.85 45.78
Kuwait 52.42 49.43 45.74 47.60 44.68 43.05 43.81
Madagascar 87.18 76.74 80.49 71.95 61.79 60.17 60.58
Malaysia 61.69 59.86 58.51 59.26 61.86 60.72 59.12
Maldives 88.30 94.11 92.72 98.12 89.85 87.52 84.76
Mauritius 87.19 68.51 83.78 85.04 83.68 80.34 80.60
Mozambique 67.14 68.40 64.36 65.69 68.94 71.42 53.06
Myanmar 72.97 74.50 74.03 76.66 77.27 80.92 78.11
Oman 52.37 51.98 47.79 35.65 41.56 44.08 36.78
Pakistan 53.82 58.59 58.86 52.50 50.91 46.82 47.80
Qatar 43.34 56.81 46.96 56.82 82.77 90.89 87.76
Saudi Arabia 52.18 49.91 47.77 47.61 45.90 46.70 44.64
Seychelles 65.76 90.09 46.59 43.73 55.39 70.51 66.96
Singapore 51.83 50.72 56.45 55.64 55.45 53.93 53.63
Somalia 87.76 88.27 90.04 91.04 94.47 94.33 95.23
South Africa 45.45 44.34 44.72 44.61 48.89 42.46 39.52
Sri Lanka 57.30 62.17 63.33 62.72 67.27 65.22 65.19
Sudan 15.20 19.15 44.20 16.76 12.45 23.04 8.32
Tanzania 72.78 53.32 44.59 46.58 37.93 41.24 41.67
Thailand 51.98 51.27 49.80 51.31 50.34 48.38 48.67
Yemen 71.57 65.77 50.80 65.30 49.51 55.49 63.92
370
Value of exports to industrialised countries (in USD millions) 2001 to 2007
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Australia 30625.60 31846.20 35443.50 40574.90 47956.10 54693.10 60659.00
Bahrain 1102.00 937.30 979.78 1192.67 1449.36 1958.16 2105.93
Bangladesh 4273.74 4033.87 4688.50 5921.80 6354.97 9858.73 10409.90
Comoros 29.28 23.95 28.95 25.54 16.66 24.25 12.10
Djibouti 52.70 6.67 7.85 8.90 9.08 11.71 10.54
Egypt 1775.08 4252.42 4698.06 6357.22 8135.75 11607.30 11857.80
Eritrea
Ethiopia 100.10 254.91 242.80 362.62 455.42 517.33 577.79
India 23780.70 24960.40 28497.90 33054.40 42554.90 53208.60 61850.90
Indonesia 31101.30 30119.70 31486.80 36229.90 41104.90 53053.80 58824.00
Iran 10305.90 9473.51 14196.70 17193.50 22555.40 26358.20 28564.00
Iraq 9216.83 6667.87 6955.36 13139.30 14203.90 19409.20 21921.20
Israel 20712.50 21094.00 22473.80 27031.10 30094.50 32811.70 37171.40
Jordan 350.34 686.66 974.99 1176.62 1289.53 1775.11 1502.95
Kenya 533.59 691.09 793.28 830.31 1465.12 1584.77 1715.22
Kuwait 8199.11 7424.73 8574.07 11042.20 15122.10 17231.20 18317.90
Madagascar 497.28 414.39 701.03 1119.07 881.99 931.41 1048.83
Malaysia 44806.70 44170.30 48339.10 57117.70 63031.10 70683.00 73002.30
Maldives 45.67 57.75 66.00 70.86 47.56 70.93 75.66
Mauritius 1363.15 1542.58 1550.90 1634.05 1554.45 1589.05 1510.60
Mozambique 487.11 431.41 681.83 1035.86 1172.41 1634.45 1795.08
Myanmar 1008.29 850.95 819.18 690.45 516.87 570.91 622.60
Oman 2912.11 2890.13 2304.07 2404.57 3633.28 3978.76 4687.31
Pakistan 5266.57 5643.85 6651.68 7613.81 8739.18 7989.51 8373.85
Qatar 6268.60 5741.63 6772.13 8802.02 11360.00 15842.00 18647.00
Saudi Arabia 36273.90 35161.10 45969.50 57423.50 80444.20 93811.10 92029.30
Seychelles 142.35 169.18 207.86 321.85 366.88 287.83 251.59
Singapore 49646.30 48837.20 56425.90 68954.90 74198.80 85691.50 87897.70
Somalia 4.20 3.15 2.31 3.56 2.34 3.03 6.01
South Africa 13262.90 13833.70 19972.30 25752.20 30243.30 33983.00 38882.20
Sri Lanka 3530.77 3447.35 3540.46 4043.26 4280.72 4993.65 5395.63
Sudan 479.36 446.67 428.40 583.75 781.78 2982.01 1957.15
Tanzania 526.62 597.18 418.69 540.25 590.47 576.24 648.55
Thailand 36820.00 37058.60 41240.60 47425.20 51642.50 60438.30 66239.40
Yemen 303.87 283.72 267.15 326.19 995.82 918.20 1050.33
Grand Total 361610.41 358501.51 415361.74 504631.44 603013.02 709565.54 760527.53
371
Value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as percentage of exports
to industrialised countries 2001 to 2007
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Australia 44.95 43.16 41.41 48.40 47.64 48.95 50.54
Bahrain 126.65 139.11 153.28 180.48 192.54 175.31 190.06
Bangladesh 6.86 6.28 6.40 5.42 7.18 6.33 6.79
Comoros 23.81 16.28 9.88 24.86 36.52 19.92 47.68
Djibouti 344.77 2915.19 3014.45 2705.72 2903.10 2781.40 3858.13
Egypt 57.64 24.55 30.35 32.83 37.14 30.50 36.42
Eritrea
Ethiopia 181.66 56.80 81.62 38.38 47.63 48.32 53.70
India 43.48 56.33 66.02 74.64 74.74 70.21 76.22
Indonesia 45.20 49.36 50.15 51.73 56.61 63.51 64.52
Iran 32.04 29.67 25.54 32.12 29.37 31.62 30.69
Iraq 9.07 14.05 5.91 3.02 2.07 3.36 1.96
Israel 11.17 10.43 10.72 11.00 10.72 10.18 10.99
Jordan 388.96 220.73 147.51 148.19 160.10 133.82 182.59
Kenya 127.33 97.35 89.62 100.93 60.47 66.59 76.25
Kuwait 50.86 53.94 54.27 62.41 59.29 62.43 69.35
Madagascar 29.22 12.90 15.00 7.24 6.87 7.07 7.79
Malaysia 59.69 66.67 68.50 71.92 76.43 77.25 83.51
Maldives 59.73 53.72 65.62 71.97 96.65 118.71 106.07
Mauritius 10.34 9.05 13.60 14.20 23.96 29.74 39.80
Mozambique 24.10 31.88 27.46 24.31 28.58 26.73 23.70
Myanmar 115.00 163.87 172.65 268.44 467.57 529.51 511.27
Oman 139.71 148.13 167.14 153.01 157.70 218.10 157.53
Pakistan 40.24 43.94 46.67 39.04 42.50 53.79 64.13
Qatar 31.75 46.60 39.75 53.79 48.39 53.06 57.05
Saudi Arabia 46.78 43.91 42.12 45.76 43.61 47.53 52.53
Seychelles 4.42 2.75 1.27 6.20 7.45 15.16 23.08
Singapore 74.95 78.87 103.17 104.13 115.41 116.65 128.40
Somalia 1523.46 3079.69 5764.39 4762.93 10029.43 9267.57 5922.85
South Africa 29.43 27.68 24.65 24.24 26.38 22.96 24.87
Sri Lanka 18.65 20.97 24.61 25.76 30.71 30.27 35.02
Sudan 38.65 64.04 222.80 91.33 64.09 20.85 28.66
Tanzania 34.21 30.69 53.86 57.57 55.85 70.00 74.30
Thailand 39.74 42.76 46.83 52.42 56.68 55.86 62.97
Yemen 685.28 690.89 655.74 745.33 227.58 331.29 369.46
372
Appendix 4
Intra Indian Ocean exports by value (in USD millions) by country 2001
AUS BHR BGD COM DJI EGY ERI ETH IND IDN IRN IRQ ISR JOR KEN KWT MDG MYS MDV MUS MOZ MMR OMN PAK QAT SAU SYC SGP SOM ZAF LKA SDN TZA THA ARE YEM Total
AUS 51.508 183.374 0.095 0.342 372.565 0.379 3.071 1242.660 1663.680 387.807 438.877 143.341 48.087 49.430 251.418 3.280 1335.850 8.612 68.724 98.958 19.568 106.755 222.336 61.008 1352.450 2.858 2768.230 0.122 672.161 177.493 67.654 65.296 1177.030 657.620 62.790 13765.429
BHR 4.049 0.000 0.000 13.379 0.000 0.000 246.694 21.653 65.689 0.064 7.164 71.574 56.062 47.136 50.698 0.419 30.103 0.000 0.000 39.263 38.808 20.005 180.853 6.922 180.898 0.005 44.329 17.566 0.002 51.612 51.881 138.273 10.588 1395.689
BGD 13.604 1.453 0.000 1.361 7.023 0.000 0.408 60.800 4.859 36.845 2.445 0.000 1.297 2.550 2.762 0.119 4.765 0.242 0.023 0.274 0.677 0.951 25.597 1.815 11.783 0.000 35.653 0.000 2.020 2.019 2.470 1.046 16.735 50.558 0.985 293.139
COM 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.428 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 6.428 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.971
DJI 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 44.494 0.427 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.266 0.031 0.000 0.001 1.428 0.000 0.318 0.000 0.041 88.492 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 46.130 181.679
EGY 1.687 2.314 0.231 0.000 0.000 0.421 2.501 252.132 9.174 4.297 90.559 189.862 25.197 19.853 16.755 1.459 9.724 0.000 5.205 0.726 0.020 4.195 20.855 4.593 146.882 0.002 86.125 0.102 4.752 0.602 33.358 3.800 8.790 59.048 17.949 1023.170
ERI 0.000
ETH 1.166 0.000 0.000 0.000 121.376 0.019 9.698 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.749 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.160 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.144 0.000 37.533 181.845
IND 409.360 81.779 1086.810 1.297 20.424 258.478 82.954 442.053 509.801 75.038 390.455 66.748 148.465 187.121 16.713 702.188 37.308 145.326 22.888 53.047 205.973 219.144 79.071 681.470 5.898 1016.690 8.170 245.148 546.801 100.712 79.520 611.724 1679.360 122.881 10340.815
IDN 1844.890 17.906 215.608 2.126 14.847 196.804 3.100 6.395 1053.940 121.498 82.968 0.000 68.709 25.181 74.510 19.004 1778.630 11.311 36.754 7.968 68.978 19.936 178.634 20.754 482.472 2.197 5363.830 12.522 160.061 159.472 62.140 36.496 1063.620 756.978 88.587 14058.826
IRN 13.691 0.000 9.338 0.000 0.000 9.647 0.000 462.229 120.050 0.000 0.000 10.732 9.097 0.000 1.799 135.576 0.024 6.258 0.000 0.000 41.964 198.296 22.428 108.170 0.016 519.416 0.000 1027.000 211.999 0.000 4.847 69.314 316.091 4.352 3302.334
IRQ 0.000 0.005 0.214 0.000 0.895 0.000 54.048 0.001 21.645 0.000 622.650 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 2.847 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 63.278 0.000 0.000 0.000 70.381 0.000 0.077 836.117
ISR 231.200 0.200 0.000 0.000 47.100 1.100 5.900 471.600 24.400 0.000 65.300 24.200 0.000 615.900 6.000 0.000 0.300 0.000 0.000 261.800 0.000 166.400 56.700 0.000 4.400 330.200 0.000 2312.700
JOR 1.274 18.667 0.664 0.000 0.787 23.426 2.959 5.907 205.212 29.985 9.222 533.840 111.974 3.391 36.946 0.002 23.545 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 13.913 25.624 25.630 142.120 0.000 1.812 0.499 4.589 1.344 24.263 0.322 5.394 91.694 17.660 1362.665
KEN 9.998 0.436 0.357 4.514 10.741 90.639 6.045 27.409 30.064 0.906 5.312 0.000 15.406 1.353 0.422 3.265 3.138 0.030 4.324 3.766 1.144 0.041 112.993 0.048 7.359 2.707 6.753 30.879 5.388 2.442 31.152 171.976 7.044 64.092 17.274 679.417
KWT 62.546 14.929 25.511 0.000 0.000 45.837 0.882 551.835 643.902 10.167 0.000 16.672 6.253 0.023 60.615 0.001 0.178 0.000 0.000 38.349 721.046 14.036 100.214 0.000 1237.180 0.000 93.619 6.389 0.000 2.040 307.126 94.546 116.539 4170.435
MDG 0.751 0.000 0.040 2.245 0.017 0.249 0.001 1.465 22.441 0.007 0.000 0.393 0.004 1.218 0.000 0.182 0.000 23.438 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.318 0.000 0.133 0.838 81.520 0.000 2.054 0.149 0.304 0.511 6.083 0.766 0.006 145.283
MYS 2052.090 27.119 171.335 0.204 4.582 209.917 0.205 6.168 1577.050 1563.110 178.346 33.029 0.000 66.454 20.384 63.292 7.330 28.891 27.090 4.664 197.011 96.737 399.270 29.482 341.235 2.144 14912.900 2.618 256.078 187.001 19.488 16.041 3359.950 833.448 50.820 26745.483
MDV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.211 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.482 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.719 0.000 15.785 0.000 7.064 0.021 27.282
MUS 3.873 1.107 0.257 3.603 0.022 0.492 0.025 2.246 0.494 0.000 0.000 0.913 0.000 5.769 0.016 95.183 0.431 0.003 1.034 0.047 0.077 0.123 0.000 0.056 5.138 1.400 0.000 12.331 1.082 0.086 2.762 0.324 2.052 0.010 140.956
MOZ 0.590 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.534 0.018 0.808 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.661 0.000 0.000 1.289 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.158 0.000 0.041 0.012 1.173 0.000 107.635 0.000 0.000 0.181 0.127 1.110 0.000 117.414
MMR 11.121 0.413 17.924 0.000 2.2 0 179.827 18.933 0 0.000 0 0.024 0 2.066 0 71.088 0 0.313 0.144 15.88 0 0.774 0 102.135 0.000 0.114 1.138 0.000 0 735.406 0 0.055 1159.555
OMN 1.038 15.357 0.414 0.051 2.159 147.652 0.667 2.292 143.145 32.348 454.836 20.735 0.000 44.304 29.004 25.376 0.017 303.235 0.121 0.415 0.075 0.002 7.382 20.786 188.740 0.000 508.608 10.644 121.522 5.326 16.893 64.652 1031.740 822.393 46.682 4068.611
PAK 102.214 45.051 119.483 0.349 1.493 44.534 0.000 1.776 66.183 95.089 28.934 22.660 0.000 25.251 28.373 53.128 7.958 53.303 1.657 29.545 0.000 3.263 48.683 34.917 296.031 0.270 46.892 3.538 71.679 74.857 8.397 23.001 53.180 697.106 30.427 2119.222
QAT 171.376 29.581 4.017 0.001 11.675 2.492 0.876 156.667 19.855 5.479 0.178 15.285 4.173 17.442 23.082 41.260 0.014 0.009 0.489 0.006 6.421 12.550 150.550 0.022 737.568 0.073 51.252 11.704 3.831 13.690 257.379 233.182 7.853 1990.032
SAU 578.932 1554.240 215.742 0.000 105.719 616.976 13.056 183.088 1196.660 1194.670 201.400 0.000 142.265 182.514 539.925 6.068 578.628 0.667 34.714 0.792 2.450 168.220 1034.190 181.618 36.922 3844.720 4.364 1730.440 32.355 140.896 52.935 1226.030 888.455 278.170 16967.821
SYC 0.393 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.068 3.568 0.051 0.000 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.000 1.912 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.000 6.298
SGP 3171.130 20.912 846.599 1.252 9.234 125.508 3.843 2743.510 0.000 251.088 0.000 191.843 14.066 17.466 66.558 36.695 21122.000 105.234 83.339 3.754 423.234 72.540 365.297 38.661 312.722 22.184 0.000 259.810 395.545 23.112 10.188 5304.380 1146.720 23.922 37212.346
SOM 0.004 2.097 0.000 0.000 0.401 0.418 0.000 2.534 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.871 0.114 3.073 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.733 0.919 0.000 6.538 0.000 0.000 0.238 0.000 0.023 0.007 2.471 38.182 2.378 64.031
ZAF 440.338 6.235 3.933 8.838 6.707 30.625 1.632 12.771 361.932 98.962 57.333 3.129 509.882 12.788 218.452 14.898 53.270 153.309 1.639 244.473 664.260 0.235 5.029 63.672 8.658 122.141 25.749 231.549 0.147 21.759 20.279 179.817 169.316 143.796 5.187 3902.740
LKA 45.214 1.805 10.084 0.000 13.612 0.760 71.985 5.456 29.450 19.063 55.306 22.045 1.564 9.093 1.566 6.651 50.451 1.219 0.000 0.593 4.634 24.871 0.884 31.060 0.395 57.120 0.000 10.143 0.033 0.191 36.877 145.381 0.823 658.329
SDN 0.095 2.106 5.047 0.000 0.000 58.240 0.000 0.802 7.678 31.312 0.000 0.000 0.000 14.892 11.918 0.622 0.070 0.212 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.005 0.265 3.801 0.000 26.078 0.000 9.797 0.777 0.162 0.000 0.044 6.365 0.000 4.999 185.297
TZA 2.476 0.044 0.902 0.017 0.028 1.834 0.336 0.734 82.203 3.302 0.054 0.000 1.905 0.093 38.412 0.036 0.674 2.957 0.262 0.329 1.497 0.232 0.544 7.005 0.000 4.894 0.035 5.954 0.148 8.946 0.136 0.238 4.277 9.555 0.098 180.157
THA 1358.120 33.016 231.125 3.333 3.630 142.290 7.627 481.888 1365.730 132.062 57.774 455.539 38.667 29.086 65.013 4.730 2721.610 12.700 27.315 10.865 355.040 40.141 178.474 19.450 348.160 2.121 5287.440 17.110 315.199 140.709 18.237 33.922 636.347 57.715 14632.185
ARE 438.050 111.999 102.288 4.293 10.328 100.964 0.000 1057.220 157.797 1484.530 0.000 53.408 479.811 275.177 54.078 148.947 29.521 32.824 12.129 0.000 1496.000 1183.670 177.572 575.730 19.524 1240.590 12.837 99.250 137.251 14.432 99.068 1390.000 279.708 11278.996
YEM 0.000 10.395 0.304 0.000 6.894 10.965 3.034 3.353 618.522 0.900 0.049 4.889 1.403 0.058 64.180 0.000 218.274 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.931 1.293 1.718 67.879 0.000 316.798 8.718 111.508 0.220 2.500 0.024 605.680 19.827 2082.316
Total 10967.226 2050.479 3255.850 32.217 321.093 2583.963 35.426 404.037 13396.816 7571.510 3996.693 1385.248 2068.568 1385.729 1429.022 1825.959 387.453 30145.666 289.107 808.109 834.289 1125.852 2417.460 5066.498 763.134 5687.021 135.954 38872.790 201.765 5649.018 2207.844 590.500 918.389 17926.033 9526.669 1332.198 177595.585
Source: Developed from International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics online
373
Appendix 5
AUS 53.395 172.107 0.138 1.303 359.093 0.430 4.467 1353.810 1695.900 332.235 362.642 134.610 64.210 43.658 285.915 3.059 1243.630 13.442 75.649 97.008 8.891 95.296 230.219 44.826 1283.960 3.341 2641.010 0.517 708.533 161.710 79.256 61.361 1371.270 691.333 67.713 13745.937
BHR 0.000 0.000 0.000 14.520 0.000 0.000 113.046 38.664 51.278 0.067 9.483 32.666 57.984 51.510 35.100 2.383 33.549 0.000 0.000 78.625 40.558 30.593 250.200 0.050 67.178 0.006 10.622 95.133 0.002 63.972 52.034 147.000 27.662 1303.885
BGD 13.162 0.903 0.000 0.927 11.765 0.000 0.097 39.326 7.082 38.236 0.000 0.000 1.312 3.959 3.684 0.177 5.550 0.000 0.043 0.180 0.966 1.116 27.180 2.312 11.997 0.000 26.557 0.078 3.090 1.938 16.685 0.126 11.117 21.879 1.767 253.211
COM 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.422 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.012 0.066 0.000 0.011 0.006 0.000 3.167 0.128 0.001 0.000 0.000 3.900
DJI 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 54.849 0.727 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.019 0.000 0.000 8.129 0.000 0.286 0.000 0.297 96.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 33.983 194.385
EGY 14.698 2.511 6.569 0.000 0.000 0.456 17.611 177.195 19.26 13.249 93.664 18.455 69.164 33.08 17.330 2.337 14.567 0.08 9.165 0 0.022 15.617 36 14.219 197.477 0.017 77.388 0.110 10.315 0 36.203 4.759 9.512 93 39.892 1043.922
ERI
ETH 0.896 0.000 0.000 0.000 54.350 4.887 10.969 0.000 0.000 0.000 15.138 0.000 0.024 0.001 0.000 4.271 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 13.777 0.000 28.071 0.000 1.425 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.258 0.009 1.073 0.000 7.646 144.795
IND 482.638 93.551 1132.540 5.384 32.120 339.365 69.182 753.804 554.305 212.858 582.909 96.583 191.694 239.485 14.268 755.453 30.409 163.997 42.731 71.528 186.204 190.624 84.330 912.166 6.065 1309.260 18.708 451.218 848.459 109.430 109.290 691.681 3118.560 159.746 14060.545
IDN 1924.360 16.670 245.709 2.215 12.585 179.643 3.895 11.745 1301.960 128.586 62.793 0.000 91.388 23.497 74.261 14.276 2029.950 10.401 33.457 9.503 54.361 18.820 264.892 24.306 474.963 1.688 5349.080 3.246 167.205 153.350 92.580 57.185 1227.350 719.552 81.983 14867.455
IRN 20.866 0.000 9.083 0.000 0.000 10.258 0.000 240.618 60.658 0.000 0.000 11.266 2.792 0.000 3.374 118.497 0.006 5.248 0.000 0.000 20.439 185.801 17.116 81.919 0.000 543.333 0.000 916.835 166.534 0.000 3.517 56.389 332.091 4.529 2811.169
IRQ 20.525 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.952 0.000 0.027 93.180 13.631 0.000 683.911 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.140 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 86.782 0.013 0.000 0.000 37.393 0.000 0.000 936.563
ISR 267.700 0.000 0.000 0.000 26.200 1.200 2.500 613.700 9.900 0.000 69.100 27.500 0.000 289.700 5.600 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 276.500 0.000 164.200 47.400 0.000 3.300 393.600 0.000 2199.100
JOR 1.298 19.256 2.062 0.000 0.829 18.982 0.525 16.607 226.391 20.850 11.411 603.969 136.701 1.989 36.249 0.000 17.259 0.000 0.803 3.083 0.024 15.184 31.376 28.393 156.483 0.000 1.986 0.926 7.823 1.846 34.935 0.299 3.706 95.881 18.527 1515.653
KEN 5.979 6.910 0.352 3.459 5.983 85.739 5.477 25.151 32.290 2.429 1.818 0.000 15.931 1.537 0.855 8.332 3.974 0.000 2.074 4.233 0.986 0.423 105.914 0.007 5.727 3.114 3.350 57.859 6.578 1.893 35.790 180.079 4.038 31.343 23.161 672.785
KWT 87.374 15.874 106.723 0.000 0.000 48.740 0.264 139.137 614.033 12.460 0.000 16.040 18.035 1.952 42.124 0.001 1.390 0.000 0.000 25.461 688.768 26.245 113.724 0.000 1587.230 0.000 18.247 87.909 0.000 1.273 117.546 95.091 138.972 4004.613
MDG 0.173 0.369 0.096 1.640 0.006 0.297 0.055 1.825 0.530 0.000 0.002 0.356 0.050 1.870 0.000 0.194 0.000 15.630 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.396 0.000 0.287 0.514 20.741 0.000 0.926 0.556 0.032 0.000 6.733 0.177 0.001 53.460
MYS 2108.490 32.125 225.845 0.287 5.043 295.537 1.167 5.963 1760.850 1801.220 229.474 74.280 0.000 62.744 13.455 71.002 8.143 19.726 43.570 61.583 239.188 49.551 524.416 39.500 383.284 4.761 15958.500 3.425 250.913 233.269 17.925 13.785 3972.220 858.463 76.554 29446.258
MDV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.118 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.767 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 2.787 0.001 13.936 0.000 13.279 0.123 31.019
MUS 3.235 0.004 0.396 3.197 0.002 0.627 0.000 3.366 1.112 0.000 0.000 0.967 0.091 7.011 0.023 68.344 0.960 0.000 1.798 0.001 0.915 0.170 0.010 0.085 13.186 7.736 0.000 19.109 1.400 0.003 3.479 1.002 1.386 0.000 139.615
MOZ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 14.594 0.417 0.099 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.216 0.000 0.000 0.298 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.905 0.000 120.412 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.199 0.327 0.000 137.532
MMR 9.888 0.448 21.612 0.000 2.387 0.000 314.217 28.617 0.179 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 2.137 0.000 69.785 0.000 0.426 0.330 13.735 0.324 0.689 0.000 97.260 0.000 0.105 1.073 0.000 0.000 831.193 0.000 0.044 1394.455
OMN 2.582 22.437 0.806 0.115 5.267 5.829 1.294 4.495 121.581 17.037 520.020 69.881 0.000 24.546 64.466 26.230 0.000 268.781 0.181 0.152 0.032 0.205 13.607 34.205 180.950 0.105 425.127 16.251 4.367 3.462 11.654 74.770 1283.840 1026.730 50.095 4281.100
PAK 113.153 43.112 103.802 0.355 3.514 53.286 0.048 5.302 48.860 81.430 41.877 32.922 0.000 24.103 92.912 59.927 9.751 64.064 2.532 25.375 3.879 7.835 47.946 32.367 389.696 0.314 53.129 3.515 82.903 71.325 15.325 28.539 67.183 834.600 35.041 2479.922
QAT 54.645 29.253 2.075 0.019 263.419 0.132 2.843 101.981 11.693 24.235 0.166 13.354 4.106 32.899 0.271 4.401 0.013 0.825 1.167 1.428 9.884 16.570 191.027 0.000 1017.080 0.066 46.907 23.411 1.099 0.555 375.313 436.087 8.815 2675.739
SAU 674.335 1652.670 94.396 0.000 112.414 656.047 13.883 100.974 449.581 1003.200 304.344 0.000 131.431 155.222 509.231 3.283 361.874 0.467 45.946 3.946 2.605 200.425 1195.610 229.180 53.168 3467.180 4.640 1293.900 141.146 149.819 42.978 1113.410 951.364 320.191 15438.860
SYC 0.456 0.164 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.237 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.146 2.646 0.018 0.000 0.109 0.128 0.000 0.073 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.420 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.073 0.000 4.652
SGP 3372.950 30.038 749.165 1.760 12.483 127.632 3.473 2649.450 0.000 319.964 0.000 143.536 23.011 25.670 66.997 28.198 21807.100 93.443 76.288 4.996 524.199 48.376 393.384 43.579 356.284 24.087 0.000 239.559 382.164 15.263 9.432 5709.770 1215.910 20.278 38518.439
SOM 0.001 2.276 0.000 0.000 0.435 0.454 0.000 21.420 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.031 3.179 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 9.221 0.984 0.413 5.383 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.025 0.005 1.578 33.364 17.618 96.887
ZAF 483.988 9.483 4.875 12.617 5.678 17.723 1.986 16.364 349.711 103.847 34.794 1.288 518.268 14.397 220.890 9.395 39.027 165.033 1.347 253.701 597.015 0.582 5.284 43.068 4.418 126.344 33.535 167.949 0.364 24.532 28.824 191.349 187.605 150.250 3.300 3828.831
LKA 47.167 2.649 10.183 0.000 0.000 0.201 170.575 8.407 35.046 22.725 39.422 23.176 2.588 9.685 1.877 8.664 45.910 1.725 0.000 0.274 4.936 28.842 0.992 30.303 0.000 72.250 0.000 10.588 0.039 0.000 14.158 130.041 0.633 723.056
SDN 0.076 2.286 4.032 0.000 0.000 63.206 0.000 0.739 19.750 0.241 1.997 0.000 0.000 10.178 2.932 0.643 0.000 0.157 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.126 4.633 1.356 149.238 0.000 10.644 0.843 0.329 0.000 0.105 9.532 0.000 3.013 286.062
TZA 3.000 0.000 1.155 0.359 0.050 1.665 0.235 0.372 64.241 4.097 0.163 0.000 4.335 0.002 35.342 0.000 0.689 2.933 0.217 0.290 1.630 0.583 0.071 8.800 0.000 15.445 0.284 3.949 0.339 16.532 0.085 0.269 1.728 14.398 0.034 183.292
THA 1640.250 34.918 229.023 3.721 2.383 125.627 14.982 413.166 1678.330 176.985 75.708 499.731 53.040 27.568 66.964 3.704 2834.910 14.405 26.042 8.831 323.527 42.923 228.423 22.383 393.915 3.302 5553.510 15.073 332.393 152.009 21.230 33.371 716.823 76.395 15845.565
ARE 207.932 119.092 138.342 4.565 10.982 107.357 0.000 860.469 104.548 1956.500 0.000 71.375 335.468 259.534 31.551 128.254 25.459 52.543 6.195 0.000 1496.390 1197.970 259.593 743.747 5.956 1429.140 13.650 67.105 244.461 15.346 88.256 1298.310 402.916 11683.006
YEM 0.001 13.478 0.050 0.000 9.076 14.304 3.585 2.509 545.963 50.960 0.274 3.475 1.249 0.126 103.306 0.097 199.449 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 17.507 1.762 0.384 93.405 0.242 123.716 9.183 57.915 0.086 1.758 0.001 619.813 86.540 1960.214
Total 11561.826 2203.883 3260.998 39.812 275.449 2835.541 34.313 360.745 12161.336 8211.745 4803.397 1616.440 2110.432 1566.997 1368.767 1937.062 296.902 30477.786 260.422 873.728 847.942 1238.211 2391.146 5495.777 941.051 6577.069 153.729 40299.419 244.836 5096.003 2859.100 685.750 971.798 19483.575 11802.386 1620.509 186965.882
~
374
Appendix 6
AUS 69.061 147.216 0.268 0.158 158.012 3.524 4.522 2194.250 1863.410 168.853 162.569 128.074 85.086 18.883 364.135 7.406 1354.870 9.838 65.856 147.957 7.970 132.014 237.377 82.828 1182.550 3.655 2232.950 0.236 863.012 104.867 95.035 34.507 1461.700 1226.830 58.922 14678.401
BHR 0.000 0.000 0.000 18.378 0.000 0.000 78.339 42.555 56.996 0.074 17.042 145.912 64.450 16.826 40.237 0.726 83.755 0.000 0.000 120.816 71.742 58.692 185.293 0.067 55.757 0.007 2.349 3.673 12.560 80.968 85.346 224.273 35.011 1501.844
BGD 12.229 1.421 0.000 3.385 5.990 0.000 0.000 55.340 8.231 36.548 0.000 0.000 1.232 2.314 2.927 0.108 3.879 0.000 0.140 0.461 2.441 0.847 42.696 1.654 11.292 0.000 37.538 0.000 3.952 5.801 23.515 2.451 9.449 22.257 1.799 299.897
COM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.402 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.141 0.010 0.667 0.000 0.020 0.136 0.000 1.424 0.036 0.001 0.021 0.000 2.859
DJI 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 60.167 0.999 0.134 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.015 0.000 0.000 5.591 0.000 0.168 0.000 0.151 121.552 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.003 0.005 4.909 43.011 236.755
EGY 9.763 3.178 9.347 0.000 0.000 0.578 20.671 118.452 27.973 14.727 104.108 20.273 107.173 58.128 19.262 7.665 21.147 0.127 12.629 0 0.028 20.514 32.302 26.369 275.382 0 113.27 0.140 47.246 3.518 94.733 6.023 48.425 152 50.490 1425.641
ERI 0.000
ETH 1.274 0.000 0.000 0.000 119.825 2.372 7.593 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.505 0.000 0.816 0.053 0.000 1.943 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.251 0.000 35.770 0.000 1.148 0.000 0.000 0.000 7.418 0.000 1.029 0.000 16.174 198.171
IND 564.263 108.606 1599.550 3.060 64.609 350.174 75.817 1053.100 852.263 110.095 701.620 138.695 223.006 301.958 33.016 856.914 39.651 193.357 63.526 86.001 243.894 266.744 120.358 1077.660 9.103 1949.020 35.068 525.505 1219.640 106.826 160.701 801.561 4676.050 204.101 18815.512
IDN 1791.600 17.407 265.786 1.145 16.297 170.351 2.098 19.554 1742.490 185.022 12.372 0.000 89.423 28.245 73.079 14.691 2363.850 10.275 32.186 21.586 45.659 16.586 265.383 24.618 434.553 2.379 5399.660 1.262 233.204 184.931 48.230 70.713 1392.630 759.792 52.423 15789.480
IRN 33.675 0.000 18.097 0.000 0.000 12.436 0.000 240.630 88.181 0.000 0.000 13.708 29.937 0.000 76.168 91.042 0.000 0.613 0.000 0.000 41.558 273.958 16.373 104.725 0.000 685.595 0.000 1237.750 226.827 13.697 4.264 65.257 346.091 5.490 3626.072
IRQ 27.577 0.007 0.000 0.000 1.154 0.000 0.100 0.028 15.166 0.000 340.579 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.032 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.000 24.156 2.000 0.000 410.859
ISR 278.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 26.200 1.200 10.800 720.200 9.900 0.000 86.800 36.400 0.000 274.800 5.500 0.000 1.800 0.000 0.000 281.900 0.000 174.500 41.400 0.000 4.600 454.100 0.000 2408.500
JOR 2.216 18.255 1.768 0.000 0.522 26.898 0.504 7.145 199.004 27.110 26.710 542.516 108.027 2.232 39.687 0.052 19.459 0.000 0.549 0.000 0.000 16.917 22.980 26.465 161.716 0.000 0.564 0.932 5.893 2.334 28.656 1.096 8.058 117.266 22.647 1438.178
KEN 8.772 0.567 0.381 4.050 4.982 71.808 5.408 21.393 32.894 2.991 0.971 0.045 16.317 1.377 0.732 6.240 4.419 0.008 9.792 2.971 0.000 0.679 120.530 0.138 5.102 2.618 2.296 49.297 14.036 3.443 57.662 192.114 7.663 27.757 31.480 710.933
KWT 89.041 19.244 157.679 0.000 0.000 59.088 42.196 137.943 624.192 13.864 0.000 18.862 9.055 0.049 49.072 0.002 1.347 0.000 0.000 31.598 756.208 18.670 118.528 0.017 1921.340 0.000 82.956 15.609 2.885 1.544 152.329 161.364 168.477 4653.159
MDG 0.199 0.035 0.000 2.089 0.000 0.380 0.021 4.120 0.151 0.016 0.002 0.254 0.000 0.430 0.000 0.476 0.000 44.010 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.393 0.001 0.808 0.584 24.770 0.000 16.171 0.249 0.065 0.033 8.924 0.875 0.000 105.124
MYS 2613.740 33.146 320.315 0.401 12.788 454.656 0.268 5.770 2533.820 2129.150 328.218 12.522 0.000 79.198 18.243 89.776 7.114 21.763 50.208 17.316 140.230 52.359 670.852 39.309 408.709 3.479 16522.600 3.416 334.075 304.238 41.385 26.442 4615.310 1115.550 104.591 33110.957
MDV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.348 4.798 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 3.264 0.000 15.344 0.000 18.512 0.001 43.310
MUS 3.804 0.003 0.017 4.550 0.003 0.619 0.321 6.058 0.554 0.012 0.000 1.244 0.000 8.042 0.053 117.000 7.380 0.013 1.789 0.000 0.140 0.685 0.004 0.011 9.698 11.991 0.000 28.197 1.068 0.004 2.317 1.208 4.102 0.025 210.912
MOZ 0.000 0.000 0.958 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.609 2.984 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.233 0.000 0.000 1.482 0.613 0.000 0.000 0.419 0.000 0.244 0.000 0.501 0.000 169.634 0.000 0.000 1.265 2.029 0.244 0.000 187.215
MMR 10.058 0.567 30.208 0.000 3.021 0.000 355.244 13.590 0.199 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.000 2.375 0.001 72.620 0.000 0.349 1.115 8.364 0.345 0.655 0.000 76.223 0.000 0.323 2.082 0.000 0.000 826.958 9.909 0.056 1414.275
OMN 2.728 21.296 0.769 0.231 8.517 8.603 1.582 8.983 67.980 118.382 429.523 23.594 0.000 58.784 2.517 44.331 0.117 342.280 0.329 0.188 0.046 0.068 11.939 29.831 197.570 0.000 277.258 17.585 5.723 0.000 17.671 16.078 1267.190 807.567 61.807 3851.067
PAK 115.385 39.399 166.332 1.467 4.572 41.075 0.341 2.352 83.535 47.305 82.091 3.600 0.000 24.583 85.410 76.901 19.410 94.042 2.572 33.583 12.969 5.341 41.901 34.368 469.224 0.534 137.770 4.378 114.703 83.542 11.559 21.220 69.392 1121.030 52.653 3104.539
QAT 40.794 35.386 9.472 0.038 24.310 0.218 4.300 147.826 3.147 10.501 3.915 8.460 6.828 32.665 0.432 4.548 0.000 0.000 18.669 0.000 13.869 16.326 196.875 0.000 1273.610 0.007 38.397 23.461 1.695 4.839 399.007 369.305 3.210 2692.110
SAU 584.831 2003.550 181.812 0.000 136.280 795.333 16.831 231.307 617.732 1362.000 338.628 0.000 589.030 290.977 566.595 5.581 530.118 0.381 53.383 16.731 3.159 204.026 1288.040 264.634 58.948 3566.030 5.626 1944.470 68.482 399.902 52.103 1560.420 1235.000 388.171 19360.111
SYC 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.019 0.093 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.148 0.000 0.000 0.204 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.926 0.000 0.574 0.555 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.000 2.631
SGP 4681.030 31.499 682.488 2.207 16.229 109.826 7.846 3091.770 15776.800 394.716 0.000 169.218 19.327 21.510 89.451 39.823 22793.200 113.327 86.485 13.644 650.876 83.455 455.779 62.529 336.252 26.616 0.000 306.954 485.321 21.574 11.305 6156.460 1451.520 23.267 58212.304
SOM 0.003 2.880 0.000 0.000 0.551 0.575 0.000 12.654 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.411 0.108 3.533 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 8.724 0.526 0.493 6.881 0.000 0.000 0.118 0.000 0.330 0.007 0.455 72.818 22.299 133.388
ZAF 740.939 11.328 6.182 16.127 4.052 35.211 2.982 17.231 378.034 163.179 39.721 3.530 505.694 9.864 286.065 19.407 98.662 225.279 1.702 269.799 741.163 0.587 10.016 85.581 7.282 152.304 38.506 227.182 0.135 24.047 41.085 247.440 215.458 294.750 3.194 4923.718
LKA 57.590 3.300 11.170 0.000 11.120 0.418 245.050 8.560 35.280 8.720 45.002 29.020 3.320 9.990 5.331 12.460 55.460 3.199 0.000 0.240 3.126 36.730 1.077 29.980 0.000 65.860 0.000 12.970 0.160 0.000 11.540 163.510 1.260 871.443
SDN 28.224 37.926 15.810 0.000 0.041 62.274 0.000 0.535 79.003 36.176 5.418 0.061 0.000 21.189 15.702 2.270 0.057 12.594 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 1.774 14.632 1.497 447.270 0.000 5.569 0.013 11.988 0.000 0.000 14.143 140.304 0.000 954.487
TZA 3.205 0.000 0.000 0.455 0.064 2.107 0.297 0.000 95.250 11.266 0.181 0.000 4.182 0.042 16.373 0.000 2.885 2.919 0.275 0.652 1.459 0.738 0.785 8.793 0.067 1.734 0.168 7.809 0.429 17.657 0.000 0.149 13.073 32.455 0.042 225.511
THA 2167.400 40.683 273.068 4.243 5.482 173.455 10.097 640.938 2273.520 297.784 110.740 529.856 76.048 36.242 82.237 11.527 3886.570 21.283 28.307 10.975 439.396 51.635 338.080 28.206 435.271 4.633 5872.980 14.125 378.773 160.540 18.313 29.939 758.959 103.574 19314.879
ARE 632.606 144.376 171.762 5.534 13.314 130.150 0.000 1621.930 102.796 2176.900 0.000 130.880 382.116 288.770 24.159 272.518 32.359 15.805 10.314 0.000 1288.990 1322.820 296.590 870.645 6.077 1715.280 16.548 72.768 163.600 78.204 106.994 1853.990 488.459 14437.254
YEM 19.889 17.059 0.000 0.000 11.488 18.104 4.538 9.164 29.887 26.572 0.305 3.862 1.965 7.448 114.826 0.022 192.863 0.000 3.235 0.000 0.000 12.619 3.510 0.861 78.223 0.000 159.562 11.623 26.815 0.327 2.225 0.001 897.549 97.273 1751.815
Total 14521.291 2660.186 4070.187 45.827 423.197 2773.680 40.369 560.610 15543.443 25828.749 5510.632 1102.325 2231.359 1948.791 1739.492 2289.463 494.658 33534.079 310.091 996.428 1081.644 1384.534 2399.958 6360.283 1143.259 7225.541 167.082 42631.798 282.379 6670.749 3144.899 1125.582 1078.968 22443.347 15395.798 1942.633 231103.311
375
Appendix 7
AUS 82.139 195.954 0.019 1.488 476.834 0.594 4.998 3994.560 2377.240 111.812 345.699 94.138 88.683 28.873 383.777 3.620 1766.500 14.774 93.959 239.538 20.381 180.754 379.539 89.617 1516.170 2.726 2368.650 0.158 1178.200 156.405 141.747 54.522 2233.660 944.525 67.099 19639.352
BHR 0.000 0.000 0.000 24.136 0.000 0.000 93.621 97.945 74.125 0.096 5.150 182.657 83.819 22.098 71.142 31.571 132.931 0.000 0.000 157.126 57.713 72.222 409.505 0.088 67.902 0.010 23.749 33.001 33.385 106.338 79.011 291.675 1.487 2152.503
BGD 13.569 1.695 0.000 0.976 8.702 0.000 1.157 66.147 9.003 34.855 0.000 0.000 1.790 4.451 3.674 0.138 7.739 0.000 0.000 0.911 1.889 0.793 40.455 2.635 17.907 0.000 33.171 0.000 4.886 9.679 19.473 0.367 12.518 20.428 1.689 320.697
COM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.212 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.185 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.106 0.020 0.000 5.688 0.068 0.001 0.001 0.000 6.349
DJI 0.004 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 57.653 2.365 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.027 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.677 0.000 0.263 0.000 0.057 159.639 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.074 6.384 13.566 240.755
EGY 26.2 4.174 6.185 0.000 0.000 0.759 27.706 115.629 16.660 19.153 135.397 26.364 274.875 73.789 25.051 10.066 28.022 0.286 17.217 0.000 0.036 26.679 49.620 18.278 385.349 0.000 229.578 0.184 16.744 1.160 189.773 7.911 75.895 197.682 80.687 2087.109
ERI 0.000
ETH 1.406 0.000 0.000 0.000 27.119 2.401 9.454 0.000 0.000 0.000 16.444 0.000 1.061 0.037 0.000 3.450 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.473 0.000 40.966 0.000 2.291 0.000 0.000 0.000 12.540 0.987 2.029 0.000 15.516 139.174
IND 661.346 134.089 1624.820 2.312 111.395 409.343 60.361 1251.220 1138.840 115.156 923.455 127.579 368.471 382.847 35.088 970.457 42.466 236.892 76.142 104.705 257.237 450.816 135.009 1308.140 10.100 3377.840 45.091 853.788 1345.110 255.010 170.209 849.972 6605.000 233.141 24673.447
IDN 1887.360 19.768 281.669 1.077 22.879 197.268 6.120 30.924 2170.510 188.381 43.114 0.000 310.648 34.802 63.407 9.914 3016.050 14.679 35.247 33.694 60.282 20.861 415.896 35.493 418.242 2.333 6001.180 1.124 260.026 238.314 54.611 80.425 1976.240 744.622 64.039 18741.199
IRN 20.653 0.000 15.377 0.000 0.000 16.455 0.000 332.648 64.495 0.000 0.000 8.266 23.801 0.000 100.788 234.992 0.009 6.419 0.000 0.000 47.845 247.290 12.426 248.771 0.000 932.627 0.000 2356.520 380.679 24.951 5.642 36.457 398.455 7.552 5523.118
IRQ 4.264 0.009 0.000 0.000 1.527 0.000 0.778 64.964 17.461 0.000 58.466 0.000 0.000 0.008 141.332 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.422 0.030 0.277 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.110 0.000 0.000 104.186 2.303 0.557 396.695
ISR 381.600 0.300 0.000 0.000 29.200 0.400 14.000 1035.600 11.200 0.000 133.000 47.200 0.000 203.300 7.800 0.000 1.600 0.000 0.000 357.500 0.000 233.900 44.800 0.000 8.800 462.100 0.000 2972.300
JOR 1.658 19.183 1.072 0.000 0.123 29.814 0.616 74.324 249.966 34.531 51.445 621.522 108.900 11.019 53.114 0.002 23.079 0.000 1.044 3.649 0.000 15.518 20.986 23.079 198.993 0.000 2.069 0.955 6.052 3.486 34.008 4.729 7.585 114.598 26.486 1743.605
KEN 6.641 2.301 1.284 4.611 6.619 87.372 2.583 28.013 52.373 6.001 1.585 0.008 11.173 0.460 0.256 3.546 5.470 0.000 7.677 7.214 0.000 0.774 143.469 0.218 18.845 3.058 2.428 41.369 20.838 4.876 70.406 226.350 13.027 30.264 26.951 838.060
KWT 82.786 25.465 580.537 0.000 0.000 78.187 0.533 232.501 969.431 15.961 0.000 26.318 11.508 0.065 61.364 0.234 7.191 0.000 0.000 36.379 909.105 25.714 186.494 0.022 2871.810 0.000 53.025 13.561 9.230 2.042 281.784 185.778 224.279 6891.304
MDG 0.284 0.046 0.000 2.743 0.001 0.500 0.000 6.273 0.492 0.021 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.000 3.573 0.000 30.823 0.089 0.000 0.000 1.486 0.108 0.074 0.767 26.891 0.000 1.222 1.256 0.069 0.043 3.054 1.138 0.000 80.966
MYS 4153.360 34.637 364.224 0.376 13.383 365.420 0.703 8.885 3002.750 3072.940 345.872 60.337 0.000 343.647 42.904 107.949 9.530 36.382 54.995 16.016 149.348 71.448 701.298 50.302 481.762 4.394 18993.800 4.209 478.078 345.002 39.182 23.118 6040.490 1553.450 111.115 41081.306
MDV 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.458 0.976 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.654 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.075 0.000 4.826 0.046 15.127 0.000 28.818 0.015 50.997
MUS 5.064 0.313 1.252 4.342 0.006 0.274 0.039 18.140 0.938 0.037 0.000 1.452 0.090 9.041 0.031 97.790 2.608 0.559 3.309 0.000 0.901 0.737 0.012 0.053 11.855 5.244 0.000 28.168 2.576 0.000 5.878 3.113 28.291 0.000 232.113
MOZ 0.000 0.000 3.880 0.000 0.000 0.000 33.052 5.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.645 0.000 0.000 4.023 0.195 0.000 0.000 1.304 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.231 0.000 193.994 0.000 0.000 2.231 2.455 0.758 0.000 251.769
MMR 12.075 0.745 24.817 0.000 3.968 0.000 363.684 15.835 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.078 0.000 3.089 0.002 97.145 0.015 0.534 1.451 19.169 0.172 0.621 0.000 64.511 0.000 0.205 1.847 0.000 0.000 1230.340 12.887 0.004 1853.453
OMN 1.478 28.179 0.000 0.305 11.270 11.384 2.094 0.000 25.161 0.639 494.510 27.163 0.000 8.464 1.179 51.038 0.155 361.263 0.482 1.592 0.061 0.090 28.109 40.266 146.459 0.000 73.915 23.270 3.719 2.725 4.217 21.275 1323.980 929.753 55.048 3679.243
PAK 125.465 44.090 197.483 4.936 2.222 48.293 0.765 3.547 157.712 57.080 102.710 4.374 0.000 21.233 59.559 75.251 16.415 64.709 1.952 35.513 18.587 2.456 56.054 37.565 335.998 0.202 80.347 3.802 151.501 134.244 15.949 13.806 61.027 982.038 55.823 2972.708
QAT 159.862 36.868 3.508 0.016 17.730 0.036 10.816 1005.760 23.824 60.810 2.936 27.565 10.441 77.543 0.709 14.340 0.000 1.457 9.258 0.000 27.287 116.703 194.033 0.000 1694.830 0.000 77.424 10.588 8.990 1.148 511.710 616.183 12.561 4734.936
SAU 762.881 2651.160 148.695 0.000 180.331 1052.410 22.271 346.322 1027.370 1787.970 389.862 0.000 1469.840 362.022 652.321 7.385 895.630 1.177 46.875 5.235 4.179 234.895 1879.470 519.222 78.002 4589.690 7.444 2643.650 161.597 428.628 68.944 2112.860 1421.860 317.981 26278.179
SYC 0.715 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.410 0.054 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.195 0.577 0.007 6.172 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.705 0.000 4.273 1.299 0.000 0.000 5.429 0.048 0.000 19.947
SGP 6611.900 38.374 742.163 4.225 13.253 129.070 7.437 4174.400 19019.700 533.795 0.000 225.884 35.581 21.606 76.540 43.667 27280.300 186.354 99.168 11.482 651.872 86.761 556.913 90.617 322.884 35.252 0.000 474.602 592.319 30.831 12.658 7756.550 1902.670 33.024 71801.852
SOM 0.038 3.783 0.000 0.000 0.724 0.755 0.000 6.651 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.470 1.031 4.595 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 11.346 2.922 0.516 6.373 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.192 0.009 5.593 94.703 30.035 169.751
ZAF 1020.250 11.921 7.392 11.512 6.059 24.767 2.707 37.318 563.385 161.486 53.463 16.356 631.917 13.753 446.909 22.362 88.790 265.217 4.542 267.953 782.099 1.244 25.520 83.831 10.306 222.784 34.226 306.892 0.165 25.131 47.041 339.221 350.646 339.713 16.519 6243.397
LKA 53.881 5.052 13.917 0.000 12.512 0.422 391.508 8.741 57.893 10.843 28.964 31.629 5.399 10.058 2.842 9.036 61.432 3.638 0.000 0.210 2.541 39.454 1.904 31.033 0.184 86.481 0.000 12.003 0.288 1.663 19.408 137.784 0.995 1041.715
SDN 0.020 0.000 14.412 0.000 0.000 108.504 0.000 1.569 27.905 50.637 0.000 0.000 0.000 9.557 2.180 0.736 0.020 0.104 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020 7.301 0.600 164.194 0.000 49.694 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.130 85.527 0.000 533.110
TZA 2.455 0.000 0.000 0.597 0.084 2.768 0.390 0.000 112.325 11.382 0.236 0.000 4.636 0.055 23.076 0.000 3.789 9.951 0.361 2.756 3.139 0.969 1.021 17.371 0.094 1.987 0.221 12.037 0.564 31.850 0.073 0.000 24.492 42.208 0.152 311.039
THA 2459.780 51.416 373.254 2.758 5.662 217.326 11.720 909.884 3207.430 451.686 169.414 563.905 93.917 58.775 93.711 26.500 5295.100 29.446 32.728 41.375 604.882 73.780 434.750 49.476 616.508 3.511 7008.980 12.499 656.006 182.447 26.385 38.992 964.652 91.695 24860.350
ARE 690.716 191.044 197.905 7.323 17.618 172.219 0.000 3592.200 309.471 2506.260 0.000 131.996 516.834 332.461 31.968 410.673 60.550 57.432 21.949 0.000 1484.020 1611.440 344.976 1078.700 8.041 1688.130 21.896 107.585 184.265 217.499 141.577 3373.530 604.243 20114.521
YEM 28.793 0.357 0.648 0.000 10.235 12.848 1.907 4.311 540.259 0.350 2.998 10.731 1.362 0.455 59.417 0.066 29.972 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 4.678 6.038 0.724 96.390 0.578 192.701 18.798 113.464 0.330 3.078 0.086 1180.850 108.787 2431.228
Total 19176.506 3386.818 4800.748 47.136 431.463 3541.987 41.945 732.055 24315.651 32637.658 6654.054 1563.149 2637.232 3224.474 2351.743 2563.084 515.368 41277.789 487.278 1188.293 1273.747 1604.143 2825.690 8227.863 1561.581 8449.870 195.560 51134.696 341.177 9985.586 3892.007 1667.483 1338.976 30179.014 18764.179 2092.244 295108.247
376
Appendix 8
AUS 87.616 179.086 0.000 1.533 263.397 0.409 2.597 5266.280 2757.120 132.487 218.332 120.363 68.931 32.279 359.603 3.198 1914.750 14.954 77.337 308.400 30.729 176.295 359.976 99.070 1323.910 3.002 3043.640 0.081 1434.590 136.528 164.457 30.822 3144.190 944.503 144.375 22844.840
BHR 0.000 0.000 0.000 27.577 0.000 0.000 155.140 125.660 94.384 0.123 5.498 208.701 106.727 25.249 98.325 13.641 156.740 0.000 0.000 200.069 40.070 55.947 520.715 0.101 132.990 0.011 47.175 3.323 166.491 121.500 106.953 371.391 6.165 2790.666
BGD 29.549 2.106 0.000 0.635 11.669 0.000 1.731 118.880 23.102 46.047 0.000 0.000 1.754 2.928 5.516 0.903 10.356 0.000 0.000 0.661 1.507 0.668 52.002 3.191 26.060 0.000 53.141 0.000 5.588 8.809 9.105 0.339 14.496 21.118 4.257 456.118
COM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.793 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.211 0.021 0.009 0.000 0.060 0.772 0.000 3.935 0.283 0.001 0.000 0.000 6.085
DJI 0.058 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 59.007 2.969 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.031 0.009 0.060 0.000 0.819 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.115 182.400 0.000 0.000 0.188 0.004 0.219 8.129 9.334 263.456
EGY 10.378 4.769 19.128 0.000 0.000 0.867 46.508 183.306 36.415 24.387 172.401 44.636 334.641 84.310 31.898 11.502 33.530 0.354 19.416 1.650 0.042 33.970 113.408 42.910 725.136 0.000 260.723 0.210 27.441 1.572 335.864 9.039 58.611 251.709 100.910 3021.641
ERI 0.000
ETH 2.222 0.000 0.000 0.000 53.119 13.563 9.136 0.000 0.000 0.000 21.805 0.000 2.438 0.111 0.000 5.803 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.882 0.000 53.786 0.000 7.627 0.000 0.000 0.000 20.011 1.261 1.313 0.000 21.852 216.929
IND 788.889 181.479 1632.110 4.597 205.039 609.388 68.816 1361.730 1190.160 141.843 1161.760 168.367 533.479 486.138 44.958 1134.690 62.301 211.148 123.624 110.748 370.349 641.652 240.637 1708.220 10.543 5177.530 47.890 1410.000 1867.160 314.462 223.425 1022.040 8281.560 269.037 31805.769
IDN 2227.610 17.849 353.301 0.586 42.448 290.485 1.106 44.409 2878.350 289.540 85.486 0.000 156.635 42.801 83.584 21.223 3431.300 17.280 42.193 23.893 77.990 29.215 634.220 61.696 524.242 3.424 7836.590 8.896 313.999 337.930 77.794 84.480 2246.460 906.654 74.924 23268.593
IRN 25.665 0.000 21.293 0.000 0.000 22.384 0.000 560.864 72.015 0.000 0.000 21.351 32.376 0.000 137.102 316.338 0.013 1.816 0.000 0.000 63.510 329.938 47.440 442.817 0.000 1166.650 0.000 2256.580 476.241 51.173 7.675 37.220 528.908 4.229 6623.598
IRQ 0.002 0.012 0.000 0.000 2.077 0.000 1.653 0.130 23.178 0.000 25.235 0.000 0.000 0.010 27.243 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 1.257 0.035 0.338 0.000 0.000 0.307 0.000 0.070 0.001 208.611 3.056 0.748 293.964
ISR 419.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 93.200 0.500 41.900 1224.200 12.900 0.000 116.200 48.800 0.000 129.900 6.300 0.000 1.800 0.000 0.000 365.500 0.000 271.200 36.800 0.000 8.500 448.100 0.000 3224.900
JOR 2.057 20.629 1.286 0.000 0.212 45.467 0.588 36.790 348.974 13.521 37.223 735.579 118.300 1.255 72.516 0.001 24.114 0.093 2.452 0.740 0.000 27.653 21.769 34.593 252.827 0.000 1.908 0.384 4.336 2.557 43.637 1.857 6.550 171.144 33.479 2064.491
KEN 11.381 2.629 0.000 5.269 7.563 99.829 2.952 23.409 43.482 8.975 2.019 0.011 18.636 1.624 0.326 4.051 6.434 0.008 8.727 3.218 0.000 0.985 164.714 3.262 7.510 3.494 9.106 47.268 31.139 6.277 36.970 258.623 15.141 38.535 12.361 885.928
KWT 180.864 34.640 1071.600 0.000 0.000 106.357 1.268 383.512 1159.410 21.187 0.000 55.640 15.654 0.088 247.420 1.801 0.761 0.000 0.000 48.290 1148.920 42.735 203.057 0.030 3351.920 0.000 47.157 7.007 14.765 2.778 282.612 246.602 290.297 8966.372
MDG 0.812 0.053 0.000 3.134 0.001 0.571 0.000 12.761 0.559 0.027 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 1.904 0.000 13.440 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.856 0.050 0.471 0.877 16.929 0.000 1.751 0.649 0.330 0.049 3.932 1.449 0.000 60.619
MYS 4765.890 41.687 409.372 0.651 21.810 457.090 0.244 8.466 3955.040 3322.330 358.784 23.564 0.000 113.773 51.854 122.160 13.356 53.675 60.374 15.212 245.696 81.005 740.632 95.954 473.165 6.494 22009.600 7.274 571.549 438.418 128.084 30.089 7584.640 1846.980 119.029 48173.941
MDV 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.002 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.513 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.000 5.744 0.000 16.157 0.000 22.409 0.003 45.966
MUS 3.921 0.005 2.518 3.745 0.202 0.088 0.796 8.720 0.630 0.001 0.000 1.749 0.121 7.021 0.070 114.350 3.517 0.381 1.290 0.000 0.290 0.600 0.010 0.112 14.213 7.422 0.000 26.711 1.618 0.002 2.678 3.448 166.240 0.000 372.469
MOZ 0.000 0.000 0.131 0.000 0.000 0.000 25.307 3.058 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.107 0.000 0.000 3.853 0.577 0.000 0.000 1.483 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.430 0.000 282.867 0.000 0.101 0.452 10.994 1.745 0.000 335.105
MMR 11.107 0.851 29.345 0.000 4.534 0.000 449.135 12.868 0.329 0.000 0.000 0.263 0.000 3.933 0.002 121.513 0.000 0.864 1.847 35.776 0.829 0.709 0.000 98.532 0.000 1.217 3.697 0.000 0.000 1622.980 16.409 0.000 2416.740
OMN 1.631 38.332 0.000 0.415 15.331 15.486 2.848 0.000 179.679 0.314 656.413 36.056 0.000 10.925 1.604 67.748 0.211 463.626 0.279 1.076 0.083 0.123 32.888 70.220 220.799 0.000 225.245 31.653 123.698 3.260 9.693 28.940 2197.560 1234.150 59.271 5729.557
PAK 120.373 41.677 234.358 6.648 3.707 52.079 0.157 3.316 337.387 68.274 178.356 17.526 0.000 25.649 66.434 77.456 28.081 66.630 2.933 34.114 43.332 2.248 51.522 40.326 354.938 0.364 32.427 2.982 221.773 153.736 24.113 15.421 90.918 1256.220 58.488 3713.963
QAT 132.582 45.643 8.223 0.000 38.253 0.000 8.330 880.049 4.404 0.000 0.352 31.096 34.640 16.731 1.948 27.132 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.000 11.654 206.841 173.429 0.000 2103.820 0.000 159.547 17.017 13.066 7.223 520.275 1050.120 4.500 5496.957
SAU 1022.820 3606.340 265.911 0.000 245.302 1431.580 30.295 545.520 1398.480 2465.700 517.503 0.000 2254.600 492.456 865.891 10.046 1407.060 1.028 105.066 2.317 5.685 311.799 2563.130 522.745 106.106 8143.380 10.126 0.000 134.397 570.422 93.785 3676.460 1887.370 388.499 35081.819
SYC 1.722 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.913 0.169 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.222 0.259 0.038 8.684 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.708 0.000 2.774 0.709 0.716 0.000 10.211 0.061 0.000 27.329
SGP 8429.070 170.404 695.873 3.155 10.090 152.303 8.620 5896.720 22109.100 493.639 0.000 344.710 33.625 40.973 101.561 40.617 30405.000 196.792 120.077 9.534 596.461 89.706 646.810 116.411 424.343 48.067 0.000 550.117 681.282 41.005 12.778 9431.280 3693.230 38.550 85631.903
SOM 0.008 4.322 0.000 0.000 0.827 0.862 0.000 9.577 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.611 1.178 5.851 0.000 2.434 0.000 0.000 0.000 14.446 4.069 1.474 7.824 0.000 0.000 0.988 0.000 0.292 0.010 7.149 120.585 51.980 234.488
ZAF 1412.180 15.132 10.170 7.495 5.641 38.597 3.959 25.570 1182.310 238.158 128.845 12.015 759.575 25.127 459.316 29.189 84.892 236.592 2.449 338.010 994.008 2.702 29.067 157.447 12.221 0.000 96.650 415.285 0.733 28.548 65.872 418.693 269.777 437.066 36.229 7979.520
LKA 64.593 4.841 15.767 0.000 14.478 0.503 566.409 25.159 74.140 20.247 50.950 27.466 4.402 12.228 2.927 14.457 27.269 2.505 0.000 2.447 6.415 43.556 2.948 38.589 0.953 79.392 0.001 11.563 0.497 1.714 27.398 170.289 0.590 1314.693
SDN 0.000 0.000 19.686 0.000 0.000 78.692 2.502 55.128 30.771 40.077 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.115 2.215 1.556 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 18.078 0.398 136.425 0.000 5.833 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.673 90.037 10.846 501.043
TZA 3.773 0.000 0.000 0.682 0.096 3.162 0.446 0.000 111.316 8.301 0.300 0.000 5.727 0.102 26.366 0.000 4.329 19.664 0.412 2.382 3.965 1.107 1.301 12.078 0.130 3.342 0.253 6.195 0.644 38.682 0.104 0.000 21.081 53.744 0.082 329.766
THA 3151.270 65.867 392.655 2.801 6.907 265.814 21.875 1519.810 3953.500 314.755 142.876 578.699 109.841 65.640 152.406 33.750 5780.740 38.325 41.975 42.872 706.634 157.694 587.907 112.194 1002.550 3.372 7640.980 1.188 840.395 193.064 45.857 37.205 1167.940 92.528 29271.886
ARE 296.333 259.875 321.130 9.961 23.965 234.268 0.000 3994.870 311.564 3326.810 0.000 192.511 703.045 441.308 43.485 681.812 106.509 110.575 37.893 0.000 1969.880 2381.810 588.392 1422.190 10.938 2306.970 29.785 412.844 269.374 358.873 192.586 5181.220 823.893 27044.669
YEM 35.676 0.532 0.029 0.000 9.442 22.377 4.621 6.412 910.635 0.230 0.099 21.163 1.630 0.281 117.129 0.023 26.298 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.257 2.068 3.077 128.391 0.037 39.985 29.152 2.946 0.541 13.726 0.371 666.303 212.880 2266.311
Total 23151.538 4647.301 5682.972 49.139 653.870 4395.627 51.494 1010.971 32648.430 38135.465 7910.644 1627.578 3226.910 3786.331 2964.617 3161.636 626.777 46643.237 540.535 1366.760 1612.692 1785.919 3687.888 10947.784 2198.895 10176.805 308.918 64552.252 400.678 9099.217 4826.775 2507.636 1592.299 38946.224 25179.827 2656.453 362762.094
377
Appendix 9
AUS 96.624 140.050 0.017 1.265 314.529 0.706 2.588 6738.870 3327.570 310.633 91.593 133.122 80.151 43.147 406.188 5.178 2078.530 17.237 90.400 237.461 26.082 205.985 234.239 149.365 1675.650 4.513 3459.630 0.146 1743.740 126.845 214.156 24.534 3239.360 1439.260 112.430 26771.794
BHR 1.445 0.000 0.000 34.083 0.000 0.000 191.742 155.128 116.518 0.151 30.994 257.938 131.755 31.206 127.846 16.859 38.664 0.000 0.000 246.986 49.524 110.979 642.825 0.125 321.055 0.014 33.928 4.107 77.946 150.165 194.704 458.483 7.620 3432.790
BGD 29.181 2.603 0.000 0.785 14.422 0.000 2.139 146.927 28.519 56.845 0.000 0.000 1.344 3.618 6.809 1.116 20.740 0.000 0.247 0.000 1.862 0.825 64.271 3.809 32.171 0.000 102.936 0.000 11.644 10.887 16.173 0.419 32.441 26.071 5.261 624.065
COM 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.980 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.261 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.074 0.952 0.000 2.504 0.000 0.002 0.039 0.000 4.831
DJI 0.183 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 72.928 3.670 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.012 0.000 0.039 0.377 0.000 0.000 1.012 0.000 0.115 0.000 0.273 225.433 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.005 0.039 10.036 11.537 325.702
EGY 12.762 5.894 22.907 0.000 0.000 1.071 57.481 226.552 44.955 30.106 212.829 70.091 444.170 104.200 39.378 14.215 44.488 0.438 25.400 0.000 0.051 41.936 140.164 81.571 895.183 0.000 76.720 0.259 94.685 1.943 389.291 11.171 14.573 310.735 124.718 3539.937
ERI 0.000
ETH 2.815 0.000 0.000 0.000 65.652 16.763 11.291 0.000 0.000 0.000 20.091 10.159 3.013 0.138 0.000 3.516 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.562 0.000 66.399 0.000 0.286 0.000 3.552 0.000 12.227 1.559 1.861 0.000 27.008 249.961
IND 961.420 224.294 1967.800 5.681 253.413 753.158 85.052 1681.060 1469.250 175.106 1303.000 161.674 659.340 600.139 55.565 1211.980 76.999 449.962 83.772 136.877 457.197 793.034 410.095 2108.800 13.030 4439.730 59.188 1586.360 2307.670 544.582 276.137 1491.020 10223.600 332.510 37358.495
IDN 3233.170 22.439 396.407 0.736 53.365 365.194 1.391 55.830 3618.620 346.634 102.342 79.182 131.914 53.809 100.066 26.681 4501.630 21.724 67.240 26.642 98.048 34.975 797.332 118.674 627.617 4.305 13415.400 11.184 437.960 424.841 65.091 106.207 3166.930 1085.440 94.193 33693.213
IRN 29.320 0.000 25.504 0.000 0.000 28.141 0.000 705.110 86.215 0.000 0.000 7.905 40.703 0.000 172.362 528.376 0.017 2.163 0.000 0.000 76.033 414.793 48.442 530.136 0.000 1587.950 0.000 2709.900 598.723 42.855 9.648 51.723 633.203 5.317 8334.539
IRQ 115.600 0.015 0.000 0.000 2.611 0.000 2.078 0.156 27.748 0.000 6.599 0.000 0.000 0.013 34.678 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 1.581 0.060 0.405 0.000 0.000 154.900 0.000 0.000 0.001 300.224 3.659 0.941 651.270
ISR 437.200 1.500 0.000 0.000 125.800 0.000 10.600 1270.400 12.800 0.000 136.800 49.600 0.000 67.800 3.800 0.000 0.600 0.000 0.000 410.300 0.000 329.300 45.000 0.000 18.700 420.200 0.000 3340.400
JOR 1.043 23.058 5.050 0.000 0.806 56.018 0.785 3.635 396.850 21.576 65.692 634.393 132.531 8.560 97.264 0.014 44.897 0.085 2.431 2.875 0.000 21.718 7.143 52.810 396.683 0.032 0.572 0.578 7.302 2.084 54.507 1.530 5.449 291.388 36.167 2375.526
KEN 12.162 3.249 0.000 6.512 9.347 123.381 3.648 28.932 53.741 11.080 2.492 0.013 16.455 1.343 0.403 5.007 11.013 0.010 12.050 2.817 0.000 1.216 203.574 1.531 9.271 4.318 9.842 58.420 23.866 7.757 36.227 319.638 13.201 47.572 15.277 1055.365
KWT 164.648 43.548 1281.820 0.000 0.000 133.711 1.594 482.146 1388.030 25.364 0.000 31.986 19.680 0.111 279.406 2.264 0.526 0.000 0.000 57.812 1444.410 78.284 243.098 0.038 4098.460 0.000 21.549 8.809 28.046 3.493 258.702 295.229 364.957 10757.721
MDG 0.383 0.065 0.000 3.874 0.001 0.706 0.000 15.772 0.690 0.033 0.004 0.000 0.019 0.012 0.001 0.425 0.000 13.712 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.058 0.025 0.582 1.083 19.118 0.000 1.933 0.802 0.345 0.061 3.401 1.789 0.000 65.894
MYS 4553.360 54.561 422.217 0.865 32.969 342.000 0.105 12.476 5128.620 4074.020 441.387 27.667 0.000 150.182 78.324 159.935 11.307 67.168 79.206 23.803 165.025 99.813 842.869 186.414 530.310 9.822 24743.900 6.224 667.825 534.135 51.554 68.109 8501.780 2269.740 262.389 54600.081
MDV 0.642 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.238 0.112 0.000 0.275 0.000 0.381 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.031 2.894 0.000 19.969 3.301 55.305 0.004 84.207
MUS 3.951 0.070 3.357 4.270 0.000 0.124 0.530 12.371 2.124 0.026 0.000 2.789 0.067 4.359 0.097 103.869 7.178 0.046 1.111 0.008 4.216 0.734 0.000 0.065 14.967 4.567 0.000 46.918 0.670 0.000 1.225 5.167 247.773 0.000 472.649
MOZ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 30.197 13.083 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.403 0.000 0.000 9.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.255 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.494 0.000 361.707 0.000 0.000 4.522 3.648 3.523 0.000 436.855
MMR 15.921 1.052 33.282 0.000 5.603 0.000 555.097 15.886 0.407 0.000 0.182 0.311 0.000 4.856 0.002 113.533 0.000 1.073 2.280 44.216 1.788 0.876 0.000 63.180 0.000 2.906 4.569 0.000 0.000 2135.720 20.257 0.000 3022.997
OMN 2.087 48.191 0.000 0.522 19.274 19.469 3.581 0.000 225.890 0.376 785.850 43.166 0.000 13.112 2.017 81.107 0.266 804.097 0.351 8.962 0.104 0.155 41.347 109.950 264.338 0.000 204.703 39.794 1821.410 4.099 27.555 36.383 2517.690 1477.510 74.514 8677.870
PAK 116.309 51.509 261.726 8.217 4.582 64.365 0.194 4.098 416.986 84.285 220.181 21.636 0.000 20.704 82.108 95.619 34.707 53.952 3.625 35.536 31.755 2.778 63.604 47.263 438.172 0.450 41.817 3.685 132.312 190.006 30.955 19.059 92.160 1550.810 72.287 4297.452
QAT 200.846 51.907 30.201 0.000 20.550 0.000 12.332 1647.030 24.332 0.000 0.706 43.896 23.052 20.126 0.203 54.154 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.000 13.085 374.030 216.214 0.000 3208.740 0.041 133.357 44.247 10.739 23.247 930.346 1318.210 3.871 8405.484
SAU 946.480 4533.840 316.951 0.000 308.391 1799.770 38.087 685.819 1758.150 2951.920 619.549 0.000 2668.270 619.108 1036.640 12.630 2117.990 1.293 114.572 1.686 7.148 373.282 3222.320 762.952 133.395 8448.600 12.730 3598.540 168.962 590.300 117.905 3873.360 2259.540 488.415 44588.595
SYC 2.540 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.128 0.209 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.275 0.477 0.047 29.730 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.084 0.000 0.000 2.353 0.000 2.221 0.877 0.827 0.000 2.687 0.076 0.000 43.624
SGP 10186.400 55.619 931.887 3.370 13.023 291.790 8.288 7672.860 24901.300 456.399 0.000 357.303 42.870 48.716 120.921 35.505 35537.200 196.629 96.861 13.562 563.277 99.675 771.387 181.548 743.751 54.502 0.000 1046.880 921.643 29.376 19.063 11312.700 3193.860 49.887 99958.052
SOM 0.035 5.341 0.000 0.000 1.022 1.066 0.000 11.837 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.518 1.456 7.223 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 17.834 5.029 2.210 9.659 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.536 0.012 4.292 148.863 64.243 281.178
ZAF 1190.720 11.932 25.669 8.332 16.476 31.779 4.352 33.905 782.175 210.609 212.486 32.344 665.859 23.000 476.778 23.238 72.623 347.001 3.141 289.044 909.696 0.000 50.352 160.750 21.426 294.633 72.838 492.403 0.449 22.791 63.137 400.363 266.151 552.387 33.858 7802.697
LKA 69.991 5.983 17.899 0.000 17.894 0.622 700.040 31.059 91.526 24.995 32.182 18.042 5.441 15.096 3.618 19.772 33.703 2.250 0.000 3.024 7.919 53.832 6.481 47.639 1.178 48.115 0.001 15.223 0.000 2.119 24.859 210.222 0.730 1511.455
SDN 0.012 0.000 22.393 0.000 0.000 97.258 3.092 68.134 38.031 49.475 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.638 2.738 1.921 0.014 0.208 0.710 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 22.343 1.086 168.417 0.000 15.389 0.000 0.345 0.000 0.000 2.933 111.151 13.405 621.694
TZA 8.155 0.000 1.044 0.843 0.118 3.908 0.551 0.000 137.578 10.248 0.370 0.000 6.273 0.077 32.586 0.000 5.351 33.661 0.510 1.118 7.612 1.369 1.606 14.927 1.793 4.126 0.312 3.343 0.796 42.971 0.128 0.000 15.545 66.347 0.101 403.367
THA 4379.130 79.250 469.773 2.319 14.055 379.737 29.781 1822.020 3335.960 565.820 198.920 587.148 148.166 72.222 193.221 20.358 6655.950 58.764 48.321 33.731 761.729 232.859 651.776 194.270 1253.410 8.553 8411.190 5.189 1100.960 296.535 89.521 49.027 1485.920 124.759 33760.344
ARE 947.089 326.711 364.257 12.523 30.129 294.519 0.000 5022.300 373.002 3982.820 0.000 195.385 883.858 528.329 54.669 880.849 133.901 94.877 53.926 0.000 2358.320 2994.370 900.737 1702.640 13.751 3799.850 37.446 570.003 338.654 404.245 242.117 6562.300 1035.790 35139.367
YEM 75.560 0.658 0.027 0.000 11.669 27.656 5.711 7.925 1125.480 0.284 0.122 26.125 3.824 0.347 144.597 0.029 47.342 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.000 12.663 2.556 1.386 158.499 0.045 13.429 36.030 0.000 0.668 0.000 0.459 1075.920 262.802 3041.884
Total 27699.120 5648.427 6743.166 58.081 836.342 5366.005 63.274 1184.689 40953.777 42836.065 9828.296 1591.990 3406.208 4376.128 3578.475 3815.067 667.194 55638.470 635.521 1508.322 1430.553 1768.033 4482.192 13364.596 3474.949 13062.691 337.288 77452.743 497.607 16704.197 6087.421 2780.212 1910.181 46576.430 30005.460 3362.185 439731.355
378
Appendix 10
AUS 111.247 175.051 0.051 2.010 319.855 0.719 2.126 8279.130 3346.840 160.454 6.772 138.087 63.714 51.329 477.753 6.357 2653.490 21.157 82.511 271.631 30.478 295.767 344.645 164.533 1776.450 10.932 3296.720 0.253 1893.530 116.833 131.780 24.422 3666.090 2632.760 103.179 30658.656
BHR 1.794 0.000 0.000 42.297 0.000 0.000 237.951 200.955 150.939 0.196 68.305 320.100 170.678 38.726 111.706 20.922 47.982 0.000 0.000 319.950 61.459 143.764 832.727 0.155 228.573 0.017 35.498 5.096 54.391 186.354 118.565 593.927 9.456 4002.483
BGD 30.025 3.231 0.000 0.975 17.898 0.000 2.654 182.335 36.945 73.638 0.000 0.091 2.032 4.490 8.821 1.384 29.384 0.000 0.306 0.000 2.311 1.069 79.760 4.934 41.675 0.000 76.966 0.000 24.332 13.511 14.209 0.520 13.061 33.773 6.529 706.859
COM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.216 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.324 0.096 0.017 0.000 0.092 1.234 0.000 2.786 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 5.768
DJI 0.160 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 90.504 4.554 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.048 1.959 0.000 0.000 1.256 0.000 0.148 0.000 0.621 279.760 0.000 0.000 0.282 0.006 0.000 13.000 14.317 406.647
EGY 14.497 7.315 28.427 0.000 0.000 1.330 71.333 281.150 58.235 39.000 275.703 85.273 536.990 129.312 51.011 17.641 77.768 0.544 31.522 0.000 0.064 54.325 173.943 105.668 1159.640 0.000 60.043 0.322 29.195 2.411 448.155 13.863 6.400 402.532 154.774 4318.386
ERI 0.000
ETH 3.589 0.000 0.000 0.000 81.473 20.803 14.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 23.636 11.928 3.740 0.178 0.000 2.129 0.086 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.420 0.000 86.015 0.000 2.777 0.000 4.481 0.000 14.509 1.935 1.043 0.000 33.516 310.270
IND 1181.940 278.348 2442.030 7.051 314.484 934.664 105.549 2177.670 1903.290 226.835 1535.550 275.040 818.237 777.430 68.956 1872.980 95.556 558.400 103.961 169.863 592.261 984.150 531.244 2731.780 16.170 5335.490 73.452 1776.420 2863.800 496.818 342.684 1895.470 13243.800 412.643 47144.016
IDN 4019.180 27.070 478.218 0.888 64.378 440.563 1.678 67.353 4365.430 408.899 120.726 80.727 109.045 64.914 118.040 32.187 5666.620 26.207 81.118 32.141 118.283 41.258 961.887 139.991 740.353 5.194 13324.800 13.492 634.758 512.520 71.936 128.126 3659.470 1280.410 113.632 37951.492
IRN 30.111 0.000 30.767 0.000 0.000 33.949 0.000 850.631 101.702 0.000 0.000 6.735 49.103 0.000 207.934 388.882 0.020 2.610 0.000 0.000 89.691 500.398 57.143 625.362 0.000 1223.000 0.000 2956.520 722.288 44.964 11.640 79.582 746.943 6.414 8766.389
IRQ 13.762 0.018 0.000 0.000 3.150 0.000 2.507 0.184 32.733 0.000 11.242 0.000 0.000 0.015 42.840 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 1.907 0.071 0.478 0.000 0.000 257.908 0.000 0.000 0.001 56.756 4.316 1.135 429.025
ISR 519.900 0.000 0.000 0.000 153.400 0.200 12.000 1613.200 17.400 0.000 250.300 97.200 0.000 70.100 10.000 0.000 1.300 0.000 0.000 415.600 0.000 393.100 60.200 0.000 15.100 457.400 4086.400
JOR 1.680 44.954 2.045 0.003 0.974 72.974 0.626 11.505 459.006 31.194 33.051 712.292 158.526 7.396 71.867 0.631 54.176 0.098 0.816 2.063 0.000 22.951 33.724 58.799 414.383 0.000 3.406 0.509 6.923 1.712 54.296 3.071 6.106 429.631 42.798 2744.186
KEN 13.192 4.032 0.000 8.081 11.600 153.115 4.527 35.904 66.692 14.353 3.228 0.017 19.818 1.907 0.522 6.214 11.380 0.012 14.955 3.496 0.000 1.576 252.634 1.983 12.010 5.359 8.898 72.498 28.235 9.627 52.027 396.669 12.743 61.626 18.959 1307.889
KWT 210.762 52.536 1546.360 0.000 0.000 161.306 1.923 581.652 1637.360 29.921 0.000 124.170 23.741 0.134 546.990 2.732 0.634 0.000 0.000 68.196 1742.510 92.346 286.764 0.046 4624.630 0.000 1.132 10.627 15.591 4.214 147.837 348.259 440.277 12702.650
MDG 0.470 0.081 0.000 4.808 0.001 0.876 0.000 19.573 0.894 0.043 0.006 0.000 0.447 0.015 0.001 1.275 0.000 17.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.313 0.032 0.754 1.345 20.748 0.000 5.876 0.996 0.327 0.076 2.440 2.318 0.000 81.731
MYS 5938.700 61.399 406.653 1.620 79.311 476.905 1.422 12.682 5884.090 5171.300 617.698 20.477 0.006 87.352 101.916 168.175 23.234 112.410 84.042 35.410 210.504 151.604 1257.200 292.202 716.050 10.993 25771.500 15.405 809.790 371.406 52.934 123.288 8729.710 2947.500 220.710 60965.598
MDV 0.811 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.537 0.145 0.000 0.341 0.000 0.243 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.072 0.039 2.118 0.000 24.781 4.096 46.072 0.005 80.260
MUS 2.718 0.086 4.166 5.299 0.000 0.154 0.658 15.352 2.752 0.034 0.000 1.455 0.054 5.409 0.126 128.901 6.201 0.057 1.379 0.010 5.462 0.911 0.001 0.085 18.573 9.965 0.000 62.199 0.831 0.264 1.521 5.619 320.970 0.000 601.212
MOZ 0.930 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 37.474 16.948 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.535 1.741 0.000 0.000 1.392 0.000 0.000 0.000 7.762 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.516 0.000 336.011 0.000 0.000 5.612 9.843 4.564 0.045 425.373
MMR 19.765 1.305 41.303 0.000 6.954 0.000 688.872 20.578 0.527 0.000 0.727 0.789 0.000 6.290 0.003 126.638 0.000 1.332 2.954 54.872 2.316 1.134 0.000 55.615 0.000 14.387 5.670 0.000 0.000 2104.890 26.242 0.000 3183.163
OMN 3.305 58.136 0.000 0.630 23.252 23.487 4.320 0.000 272.510 0.443 927.009 50.920 0.000 14.478 2.433 95.676 0.321 425.903 0.424 10.811 0.125 0.186 49.880 129.700 311.820 0.000 235.847 48.007 417.681 4.944 13.100 43.892 2381.900 1742.910 89.892 7383.942
PAK 127.095 63.923 324.801 10.197 5.686 79.877 0.241 5.086 517.476 109.184 285.226 28.027 0.000 19.158 101.895 123.867 43.071 75.693 4.499 44.100 39.408 3.448 82.394 61.225 567.616 0.558 48.485 4.574 136.578 235.796 36.191 23.652 62.469 2008.950 89.708 5370.154
QAT 221.127 62.619 36.433 0.000 24.791 0.000 14.878 1986.940 28.703 0.000 0.833 7.406 27.810 23.742 0.245 21.537 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.000 15.436 451.223 255.052 0.000 3808.450 0.050 105.931 53.379 28.105 28.045 1874.850 1555.000 4.670 10637.282
SAU 789.423 5469.540 382.364 0.000 372.037 2171.210 45.947 827.360 2121.000 3482.150 730.836 0.000 2588.950 746.881 1222.840 15.236 1796.860 1.559 138.218 2.034 8.623 440.334 3887.350 899.998 160.925 8012.160 15.358 3623.740 203.832 595.109 142.238 4198.570 2665.410 589.215 48347.307
SYC 3.554 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.400 0.270 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.341 0.067 0.058 36.895 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.000 1.781 0.000 6.197 1.088 1.091 0.000 5.014 0.098 0.000 58.076
SGP 11190.900 53.677 936.349 5.486 9.104 330.726 16.148 10000.200 29466.800 534.027 0.000 464.239 54.777 48.130 249.098 47.919 38626.300 236.893 115.495 31.244 778.029 125.119 846.481 251.565 838.277 52.832 0.000 733.232 836.493 27.173 27.790 12390.300 3485.920 51.026 112861.749
SOM 0.155 6.629 0.000 0.000 1.268 1.323 0.000 14.689 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.424 1.807 9.357 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 23.102 6.241 2.863 12.513 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.173 0.015 3.073 192.840 79.726 356.200
ZAF 1276.800 22.593 19.825 12.067 10.105 66.841 6.288 34.030 1350.640 222.946 213.311 47.902 854.432 12.713 643.463 40.083 162.956 407.000 3.043 270.126 1267.710 0.000 39.820 220.934 37.396 336.389 58.290 359.268 1.118 25.491 92.818 382.600 431.177 710.499 28.656 9669.330
LKA 77.565 7.425 22.212 0.000 22.206 0.771 868.744 40.235 118.564 32.379 33.636 16.589 6.752 19.555 4.490 29.230 41.825 2.792 0.000 3.753 10.259 66.805 8.396 61.712 1.462 63.211 0.001 19.727 0.000 2.629 33.279 272.326 0.905 1889.435
SDN 0.007 0.000 21.913 0.000 0.000 80.716 3.201 27.472 33.901 62.483 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.799 1.977 2.100 0.047 0.073 0.408 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 50.354 0.814 146.880 0.000 0.239 0.000 0.812 0.000 0.000 0.669 104.294 15.804 560.964
TZA 6.168 0.000 1.295 1.047 0.147 4.850 0.684 0.000 170.734 13.275 0.480 0.000 6.455 0.085 40.439 0.000 6.640 34.102 0.633 1.387 9.447 1.698 2.080 18.525 2.323 5.345 0.387 3.803 0.988 51.951 0.159 0.000 10.698 85.947 0.125 481.897
THA 5725.850 96.322 510.998 3.941 15.386 479.417 41.247 2664.120 4767.770 775.237 202.915 700.889 173.903 105.226 225.120 32.649 7792.170 55.274 65.331 63.216 958.760 280.875 661.913 216.079 1368.830 5.985 9534.630 1.096 1322.180 273.550 87.422 84.731 2206.570 208.387 41707.989
ARE 1509.790 394.138 439.433 15.108 36.347 355.302 0.000 6058.810 440.002 4698.240 0.000 261.195 1066.270 623.231 65.952 1175.630 161.536 114.458 65.056 0.000 2781.930 3612.360 1062.530 2008.470 16.589 4174.840 45.174 690.518 408.545 436.700 292.085 6270.990 1249.550 40530.779
YEM 0.009 0.816 0.034 0.000 14.481 34.321 7.088 9.834 1396.710 0.368 0.158 33.843 48.784 0.431 187.313 0.036 26.128 0.001 0.089 0.000 0.000 16.403 3.173 1.796 205.323 0.056 56.807 44.713 141.891 0.829 0.000 0.569 1308.150 340.438 3880.592
Total 32933.940 6827.457 7852.471 76.277 1043.019 6513.930 78.271 1391.017 51044.238 51470.086 11736.592 1759.843 4103.547 4755.846 4472.581 4672.874 912.592 62076.942 785.868 1733.077 1928.321 2287.310 5464.818 16340.187 4269.712 15545.341 365.890 80766.293 616.787 16520.733 6766.415 2770.365 2291.446 49990.237 38463.778 3986.048 504614.149
379
Appendix 11
Shipping fleets by country of registration 31 December 2007
Ships of
Total Cargo carrying ships Miscellaneous
S.No. Registration activities
No GT Age No Gt Dwt Age No GT Age
1 Australia 696 1911160 23 169 1351433 1541588 22 527 559727 23
2 Bahrain 182 325126 20 16 222459 317294 31 166 102667 19
3 Bangladesh 320 440517 32 219 412485 608397 33 101 28032 30
4 Comoros 264 755304 31 184 675289 964547 32 80 80015 26
5 Djibouti 15 4104 27 1 500 50 27 14 3604 27
6 Egypt 344 1113268 26 122 983828 1484097 25 222 129440 27
7 Eritrea 14 14478 19 6 13087 15717 34 8 1391 9
8 Ethiopia 10 122729 17 10 122729 159314 17
9 India 1417 9168046 18 652 8407884 14348787 15 765 760162 20
10 Indonesia 4469 5669830 21 2464 5145628 6806563 24 2002 524202 18
11 Iran 508 3576860 22 243 3430445 5884213 19 265 146415 26
12 Iraq 89 159118 34 21 87060 132291 28 68 72058 35
13 Israel 51 728130 19 22 717373 846536 17 29 10757 21
14 Jordan 28 368722 26 27 368546 508158 26 1 176 29
15 Kenya 36 15110 26 12 7318 10410 35 24 7792 22
16 Kuwait 212 2426799 24 61 2389287 3954784 20 151 37512 25
17 Madagascar 106 35363 29 32 22365 29466 39 74 12998 24
18 Malaysia 1151 6974618 16 556 6360309 8618250 20 595 614309 13
19 Maldives 94 125545 28 76 115981 159934 29 18 9564 24
20 Mauritius 43 39733 27 4 13556 11821 18 39 26177 28
21 Mozambique 129 37914 27 7 5223 9968 36 122 32691 27
22 Myanmar 118 203219 27 51 179798 226039 25 67 23421 29
23 Oman 36 24132 16 12 16157 10260 22 24 7975 12
24 Pakistan 53 348964 24 17 326386 538056 27 36 22578 23
25 Qatar 84 619535 15 22 568095 852373 15 62 51440 15
26 Saudi Arabia 311 942204 23 74 822932 1028012 28 237 119272 22
27 Seychelles 54 182643 19 16 138821 213409 19 38 43822 19
28 Singapore 2257 36251735 10 1317 34965786 54378645 11 940 1285949 8
29 Somalia 18 9912 35 5 5022 6259 44 13 4890 32
30 South Africa 250 192585 31 6 28066 30615 31 244 164519 31
31 Sri Lanka 85 163283 26 36 144503 204950 26 49 18780 26
32 Sudan 19 25904 30 6 22640 28009 38 13 3264 26
33 Tanzania 53 38138 30 34 33216 40296 32 19 4922 27
34 Thailand 858 2846939 26 633 2740045 4186416 26 225 106894 23
35 United Arab Emirates 446 807218 21 142 635453 877174 21 304 171765 22
36 Yemen 47 29169 25 6 16171 22973 37 41 12998 23
Total 14867 76698054 24 7281 71495876 109055671 26 7583 5202178 23
World Total 94936 721855399 22 50214 687980619 1014553957 20 44722 33874780 24
% of World Total 15.7% 10.6% 14.5% 10.4% 10.7% 17.0% 15.4%
Source: Developed from Lloyds Register Fairplay – World Fleet Statistics 2007
380
Shipping fleets by nationality of owner 1000 GT and above
31 December 2007
Ships of
Total Cargo carrying ships Miscellaneous
S.No Registration activities
No GT Age No Gt Dwt Age No GT Age
1 Australia 85 1783475 15 65 1426914 1456748 14 20 356561 17
2 Bahrain 11 53095 34 3 42963 59771 33 8 10132 34
3 Bangladesh 47 403973 25 46 400747 566499 25 1 3226 16
4 Comoros
5 Djibouti
6 Egypt 144 1096390 25 115 1030733 1344798 26 29 65657 22
7 Eritrea 4 11126 31 4 11126 12757 31
8 Ethiopia 9 117747 17 9 117747 149990 17
9 India 538 9736879 17 393 9134045 15587451 16 145 602834 19
10 Indonesia 850 5331002 23 818 5225610 7192815 23 32 75392 21
11 Iran 179 5900355 16 156 5826769 10191362 14 23 73586 27
12 Iraq 26 118607 31 14 83559 126546 26 12 35048 37
13 Israel 72 2007371 18 70 2004897 2585618 17 2 2474 33
14 Jordan 26 482175 28 26 482175 685765 28
15 Kenya 7 18936 37 7 18936 22070 37
16 Kuwait 69 3402004 16 67 3396810 5295131 16 2 5194 3
17 Madagascar 8 12336 39 8 12336 17046 39
18 Malaysia 393 8877388 16 297 8533087 10669378 16 96 344301 15
19 Maldives 19 81596 31 18 80165 106666 30 1 1431 42
20 Mauritius 1 2709 25 1 2709 3357 25
21 Mozambique 2 3420 4 2 3420 4
22 Myanmar 29 141375 21 23 132602 159200 21 6 8773 19
23 Oman 17 161521 8 3 130763 84526 11 14 30758 8
24 Pakistan 33 641028 26 30 631118 1044254 27 3 9910 17
25 Qatar 33 458932 7 13 420962 570115 3 20 37970 10
26 Saudi Arabia 165 7228610 15 112 7142775 12867337 16 53 85835 12
27 Seychelles 4 93045 2 4 93045 152987 2
28 Singapore 869 17742911 15 717 17160420 27805450 16 152 582491 10
29 Somalia
30 South Africa 34 214667 24 7 108299 166297 12 27 106368 27
31 Sri Lanka 21 119389 25 18 115425 171858 26 3 3964 24
32 Sudan 3 21311 35 3 21311 26179 35
33 Tanzania 8 22678 35 8 22678 29088 35
34 Thailand 342 2694242 23 322 2657087 4007848 23 20 37155 24
35 United Arab Emirates 425 6453382 21 346 6256971 8761847 21 79 196411 22
36 Yemen 17 134301 29 17 134301 218307 29
Total 4490 75567976 22 3740 72859085 112139061 22 750 2678891 20
World Total 39209 703263146 22 33730 680847086 1003865069 21 5479 22416060 23
% of World Total 11.5% 10.7% 11.1% 10.7% 11.2% 13.7% 12.0%
381
Indian Ocean Region principal merchant fleets 31 December 2007
country of 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

registration No GT Age No GT Age No GT Age No GT Age No GT Age No GT Age No GT Age
Australia 622 1887808 19 624 1861321 22 643 1905778 21 652 1971876 22 671 1794928 22 672 1852796 23 692 1911160 23
Egypt 364 1350449 23 361 1274990 25 346 1151430 25 341 1143201 25 344 1128712 25 348 1141729 26 344 1113268 26
India 1018 6688153 17 1010 6142073 18 1028 6960567 18 1066 7517583 18 1096 8065009 19 1181 8381185 19 1417 9168046 18
Indonesia 2528 3613139 24 2628 3723052 26 2700 3840408 25 2826 4072144 26 3214 4330407 25 4271 5287148 22 4469 5669830 21
Iran 389 3943576 20 380 4128389 22 382 4851927 20 430 5324254 21 453 5270599 22 475 5207276 22 508 3576860 22
Kuwait 200 2291672 23 201 2255972 24 208 2324290 23 213 2377628 23 222 2315680 23 220 2156836 24 212 2426799 24
Malaysia 882 5207136 16 915 5394356 17 972 5745771 17 1013 6056561 17 1052 5758729 16 1101 6389000 16 1151 6974618 16
Saudi Arabia 274 1132533 22 280 1472135 23 285 1363912 22 292 1678474 23 300 1028103 23 304 1021845 23 311 942204 23
Singapore 1729 21022604 11 1768 21148090 12 1761 23240945 11 1842 26282777 11 1977 30989786 11 2079 32173922 11 2257 36251735 10
Thailand 568 1771382 24 629 1879581 25 671 2268686 24 751 2889877 24 789 3025332 25 789 2882703 25 858 2846939 26
Total 8574 48908452 20 8796 49279959 21 8996 53653714 21 9426 59314375 21 10118 63707285 21 11440 66494440 21 12219 70881459 21
World Total 87939 574551264 20 89010 585583396 21 89899 605218368 21 89960 633321120 22 92105 675115956 22 94936 721855399 22 94936 721855399 22
% of World Total 9.7% 8.5% 9.9% 8.4% 10.0% 8.9% 10.5% 9.4% 11.0% 9.4% 12.1% 9.2% 12.9% 9.8%
nationality of owner 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

1000 GT & above No GT Age No GT Age No GT Age No GT Age No GT Age No GT Age No GT Age
Australia 87 2239678 15 438 2282537 19 88 2214007 16 85 2227457 15 80 2136764 16 85 2547226 16 85 1783475 15
Egypt 126 1084686 22 329 1108230 25 114 921448 23 119 1031543 23 127 1101760 23 139 1150512 25 144 1096390 25
India 407 7082501 16 740 6496075 18 394 7363160 17 386 7600321 17 411 8273962 17 456 8782101 18 538 9736879 17
Indonesia 605 3419365 20 1400 3671433 25 616 3599745 22 672 4288581 22 724 4663221 22 793 4978382 23 850 5331002 23
Iran 163 3731500 16 286 4173180 20 156 5027552 16 172 5481274 16 179 5694064 16 184 5766156 16 179 5900355 16
Kuwait 35 2187098 17 135 2024959 24 32 2010569 18 57 2891308 18 69 3302733 18 68 3148137 18 69 3402004 16
Malaysia 312 5466785 13 535 5650037 16 335 7290745 14 327 7321482 15 325 7521941 15 357 6248611 16 393 8877388 16
Saudi Arabia 121 5729753 18 334 6206391 20 126 6689528 17 123 6131429 17 134 6314713 16 150 6658587 16 165 7228610 15
Singapore 714 11113528 15 1284 12147642 15 758 14420979 15 715 12940212 15 764 14300265 16 794 15842261 15 869 17742911 15
South Africa 27 154974 21 126 191323 27 27 127192 24 29 176400 22 26 160529 23 30 163584 24 34 214667 24
Thailand 258 1444423 22 396 1464755 25 254 1450984 24 298 1935607 23 316 2102819 24 298 1931098 23 342 2694242 23
United Arab Emirates 185 2505906 21 4 4181 9 1 3463 4 1 3463 5 301 4323046 21 366 5005335 22 425 6453382 21
Total 3040 46160197 18 6007 45420743 20 2901 51119372 18 2984 52029077 17 3456 59895817 19 3720 62221990 19 4093 70461305 19
World Total 35471 557130893 17 35678 567632818 21 36105 587414421 21 36252 615535866 21 37644 657048704 22 39209 703263146 22 39209 703263146 22
% of World Total 8.6% 8.3% 16.8% 8.0% 8.0% 8.7% 8.2% 8.5% 9.2% 9.1% 9.5% 8.8% 10.4% 10.0%
382
Appendix 12
Indian Ocean countries Port State Control inspection data 2001 to 2006
Number of Inspections Number of Detentions Inspections with Deficiencies
Country PSC
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
IOMOU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Paris Mo 0 0 0 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0
Australia
Tokyo MoU 10 10 6 10 12 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 1 5 8 4
Total 10 10 6 20 13 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 1 10 8 4
IOMOU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Paris Mo 5 3 5 2 5 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 2 1 2 2 1
Bahrain
Tokyo MoU 3 4 4 2 1 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 3 3 2 0 0
Total 8 7 9 4 6 6 0 0 1 0 1 0 6 5 4 4 2 1
IOMOU 5 17 15 21 13 7 0 10 4 8 6 3 2 17 13 17 13 6
Paris Mo 6 0 2 12 0 1 2 0 2 2 0 0 6 0 2 9 0 1
Bangladesh
Tokyo MoU 13 14 11 12 9 7 6 1 3 2 2 1 13 14 9 9 9 7
Total 24 31 28 45 22 15 8 11 9 12 8 4 21 31 24 35 22 14
IOMOU 2 4 15 7 11 15 1 0 2 2 3 10 2 0 4 3 7 15
Paris Mo 3 25 49 9 130 120 2 10 15 2 26 23 3 20 44 9 95 93
Comoros
Tokyo MoU 1 2 3 9 7 14 0 0 0 2 0 4 1 2 3 9 7 14
Total 6 31 67 25 148 149 3 10 17 6 29 37 6 22 51 21 109 122
IOMOU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Paris Mo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Djibouti
Tokyo MoU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
383
Country PSC
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
IOMOU 21 17 18 12 7 8 1 3 4 1 1 0 14 8 10 10 6 5
Paris Mo 62 68 52 14 59 46 11 9 7 2 0 6 46 57 38 13 19 33
Egypt
Tokyo MoU 12 11 17 7 5 14 0 1 5 1 1 1 6 9 13 6 2 11
Total 95 96 87 33 71 68 12 13 16 4 2 7 66 74 61 29 27 49
IOMOU 2 7 8 8 4 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 3 3 4 3 1
Paris Mo 11 14 8 3 12 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 11 10 7 3 9 5
Ethiopia
Tokyo MoU 1 3 1 3 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 3 4 2
Total 14 24 17 14 21 9 0 2 1 1 0 1 12 16 10 10 16 8
IOMOU 88 78 52 74 45 49 4 6 5 6 6 2 51 42 29 38 29 26
Paris Mo 79 53 39 111 58 41 13 3 4 5 2 0 55 36 28 75 28 16
India
Tokyo MoU 55 67 71 78 57 65 1 6 6 3 6 6 40 50 58 43 38 50
Total 222 198 162 263 160 155 18 15 15 14 14 8 146 128 115 156 95 92
IOMOU 22 15 15 17 23 18 3 4 5 9 8 7 19 13 15 17 23 16
Paris Mo 1 0 0 225 1 1 1 0 0 63 0 0 1 0 0 202 1 0
Indonesia
Tokyo MoU 129 128 222 211 201 187 46 29 61 60 47 42 117 122 203 188 189 175
Total 152 143 237 453 225 206 50 33 66 132 55 49 137 135 218 407 213 191
IOMOU 44 40 13 26 22 16 5 5 4 1 4 0 37 31 9 20 18 12
Paris Mo 80 70 64 75 93 77 12 4 7 5 2 2 44 44 42 57 56 39
Iran
Tokyo MoU 24 20 44 58 66 50 2 5 4 5 3 1 5 13 31 43 47 37
Total 148 130 121 159 181 143 19 14 15 11 9 3 86 88 82 120 121 88
IOMOU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Paris Mo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iraq
Tokyo MoU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
384
Country PSC
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
IOMOU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Paris Mo 23 13 18 33 16 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 15 1 1
Israel
Tokyo MoU 12 23 29 33 35 25 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 10 17 15 23 17
Total 35 36 47 66 51 37 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 10 17 30 24 18
IOMOU 2 3 6 8 9 11 0 0 2 5 5 9 0 1 4 8 7 11
Paris Mo 0 3 1 4 3 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 3 1 3 3 1
Jordan
Tokyo MoU 0 0 2 8 3 2 0 0 1 5 1 1 0 0 2 8 3 1
Total 2 6 9 20 15 14 0 1 4 11 7 11 0 4 7 19 13 13
IOMOU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Paris Mo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kenya
Tokyo MoU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IOMOU 23 14 11 8 9 6 1 1 2 0 3 0 9 7 8 4 5 4
Paris Mo 15 12 9 24 11 12 2 1 0 0 0 0 9 6 3 13 5 4
Kuwait
Tokyo MoU 9 5 8 16 16 8 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 4 8 2 2
Total 47 31 28 48 36 26 5 2 2 0 3 0 21 14 15 25 12 10
IOMOU 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Paris Mo 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Madagascar
Tokyo MoU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
IOMOU 78 77 64 81 65 44 5 5 3 5 5 5 53 48 41 50 39 32
Paris Mo 45 62 58 357 36 34 3 2 2 21 1 1 30 33 29 252 16 16
Malaysia
Tokyo MoU 349 234 246 306 238 194 32 30 22 19 21 16 234 224 208 216 179 134
Total 472 373 368 744 339 272 40 37 27 45 27 22 317 305 278 518 234 182
385
Country PSC
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
IOMOU 2 2 3 2 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 2 3 2 1 1
Paris Mo 0 0 0 5 2 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 2
Maldives
Tokyo MoU 8 7 12 5 11 11 1 1 1 1 1 2 8 7 11 4 11 9
Total 10 9 15 12 14 15 2 1 3 3 2 2 10 9 14 10 14 12
IOMOU 2 3 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 2
Paris Mo 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
Mauritius
Tokyo MoU 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
Total 7 5 2 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 1 0 1 3
IOMOU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Paris Mo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mozambique
Tokyo MoU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IOMOU 11 5 10 14 13 8 2 1 0 3 1 1 8 4 8 12 12 6
Paris Mo 12 16 7 49 9 2 0 0 0 5 0 0 7 8 2 39 4 0
Myanmar
Tokyo MoU 33 40 37 44 35 31 4 0 7 4 4 2 28 27 31 32 28 18
Total 56 61 54 107 57 41 6 1 7 12 5 3 43 39 41 83 44 24
IOMOU 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Paris Mo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oman
Tokyo MoU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
IOMOU 6 3 7 6 4 9 0 0 2 0 2 2 6 3 5 4 4 8
Paris Mo 8 10 4 12 5 8 2 2 0 0 1 2 6 9 3 11 5 8
Pakistan
Tokyo MoU 10 15 15 12 9 11 2 0 1 0 1 0 9 14 13 11 8 10
Total 24 28 26 30 18 28 4 2 3 0 4 4 21 26 21 26 17 26
386
Country PSC
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
IOMOU 18 11 8 8 8 2 1 2 0 2 2 0 2 4 1 5 3 1
Paris Mo 11 7 9 4 7 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 9 6 1 3 4 7
Qatar
Tokyo MoU 4 12 6 3 8 3 1 1 2 0 0 0 3 9 6 2 3 1
Total 33 30 23 15 23 15 3 3 2 2 2 0 14 19 8 10 10 9
IOMOU 24 23 23 10 8 3 6 1 3 2 0 0 6 10 6 4 0 2
Paris Mo 26 16 16 11 18 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 6 3 9 3 10
Saudi Arabia
Tokyo MoU 7 11 10 9 12 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 7 7 4 2
Total 57 50 49 30 38 24 7 1 3 2 0 0 27 23 16 20 7 14
IOMOU 2 3 2 1 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 3 1 1 2 2
Paris Mo 0 2 3 1 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 0
Seychelles
Tokyo MoU 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 1
Total 2 6 7 3 8 4 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 5 5 3 4 3
IOMOU 215 235 200 260 254 266 12 17 15 15 16 19 114 118 107 136 143 149
Paris Mo 193 207 240 761 317 324 12 6 8 31 5 3 91 80 104 459 135 130
Singapore
Tokyo MoU 599 639 579 577 621 699 14 21 28 23 20 11 276 490 396 338 356 397
Total 1007 1081 1019 1598 1192 1289 38 44 51 69 41 33 481 688 607 933 634 676
IOMOU 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Paris Mo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Somalia
Tokyo MoU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
IOMOU 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Paris Mo 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
South Africa
Tokyo MoU 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0
Total 3 3 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 2 0 0
387
Country PSC
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
IOMOU 5 11 9 17 19 10 0 1 3 3 5 3 2 8 9 15 19 9
Paris Mo 0 1 2 5 6 4 0 0 1 2 1 2 0 0 1 4 5 4
Sri Lanka
Tokyo MoU 0 1 0 5 5 1 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 4 5 1
Total 5 13 11 27 30 15 0 1 4 7 7 6 2 8 10 23 29 14
IOMOU 4 6 5 1 0 0 1 3 2 1 0 0 1 5 3 1 0 0
Paris Mo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sudan
Tokyo MoU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 4 6 5 1 0 0 1 3 2 1 0 0 1 5 3 1 0 0
IOMOU 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
Paris Mo 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0
Tanzania
Tokyo MoU 1 0 4 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 2 1 2
Total 4 0 4 5 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 5 1 3
IOMOU 40 31 29 72 53 58 3 1 2 14 3 4 23 18 14 47 38 33
Paris Mo 36 35 36 294 80 90 0 1 1 33 9 7 25 22 25 222 54 60
Thailand
Tokyo MoU 211 227 185 265 321 316 23 18 16 27 27 29 175 175 169 211 261 231
Total 287 293 250 631 454 464 26 20 19 74 39 40 223 215 208 480 353 324
IOMOU 14 18 12 20 11 8 1 2 3 5 3 5 5 11 6 11 8 7
Paris Mo 14 14 12 6 8 9 1 0 1 1 0 0 6 7 6 3 4 3
UAE
Tokyo MoU 3 3 4 3 3 7 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 4 2 3 1 3
Total 31 35 28 29 22 24 3 2 5 6 3 6 14 22 14 17 13 13
Note: Inspection data reported by Australia under the Tokyo MoU and Indian Ocean MoU has been adjusted with the data only added to inspections
under the Indian Ocean MoU
Source: Compiled by author from annual reports for Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and Indian Ocean MoU
388
Appendix 13
Indian Ocean port state control inspection data for classification societies
BG GW Excess
Classification society List
2001 2002 2003 Total 2001 2002 2003 Total limit limit factor
American Bureau of
585 520 414 1519 18 30 27 75 123 89 -0.35 W
Shipping
Bureau Veritas 413 198 353 964 28 16 43 87 81 54 1.19 B
China Classification
129 128 179 436 7 7 10 24 40 21 0.15 G
Society
Det Norske Veritas 558 530 522 1610 15 16 33 64 130 95 -0.71 W
Germanischer Lloyd 375 453 380 1208 25 26 34 85 100 69 0.51 G
Korean Register of
169 155 158 482 7 13 9 29 43 24 0.26 G
Shipping
Lloyd's Register 896 848 723 2467 48 52 75 175 194 151 0.55 G
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai 1555 1551 1422 4528 61 62 77 200 346 288 -0.68 W
Registro Italiano Navale 85 92 71 248 13 6 9 28 24 10 1.41 B
Russian Maritime Register
390 430 531 1351 5 12 50 67 110 79 -0.32 W
of Shipping
Indian Register of
60 58 44 162 2 2 8 12 17 5 0.56 G
Shipping
Non IACS 305 489 296 1090 62 64 97 223 91 62 4.83 B
IACS + Associate 5215 4963 4797 14975 229 242 375 846 1100 996 -0.34 W
Total 5520 5452 5093 16065 291 306 472 1069 1178 1071 0.00 W
BG GW Excess
Classification society List
2004 2005 2006 Total 2004 2005 2006 Total limit limit factor
American Bureau of
466 442 461 1369 42 31 27 100 112 80 0.63 G
Shipping
Bureau Veritas 423 485 437 1345 52 53 29 134 110 78 1.56 B
China Classification
210 226 228 664 6 6 15 27 58 35 -0.47 W
Society
Det Norske Veritas 535 518 460 1513 23 30 27 80 123 89 -0.22 W
Germanischer Lloyd 415 418 444 1277 31 29 27 87 105 74 0.42 G
Korean Register of
187 222 227 636 6 15 12 33 56 33 -0.03 G
Shipping
Lloyd's Register 852 785 757 2394 77 47 43 167 189 147 0.49 G
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai 1700 1602 1668 4970 76 56 76 208 378 318 -0.77 W
Registro Italiano Navale 89 99 96 284 12 13 13 38 27 12 2.08 B
Russian Maritime Register
470 115 66 651 56 11 15 82 57 34 2.18 B
of Shipping
Indian Register of
64 44 45 153 7 7 5 19 16 5 1.47 B
Shipping
Non IACS 279 249 235 763 101 76 117 294 66 41 10.54 B
IACS + Associate 5411 4956 4889 15256 388 298 289 975 1120 1016 -0.09 W
Total 5690 5205 5124 16019 489 374 406 1269 1175 1068 1.19 W
Source: Compiled from annual reports for Indian Ocean MoU
389
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U N IV ER S I T Y O F NEW S O UT H WAL E S

In fulfillment of the requirements

Professor Clive Schofield

SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

I have either used no substantial portions of copyright material in my thesis or I have

The thesis uses a ‘rubric model of effectiveness’ constructed from a synthesis of

The study is an interdisciplinary one drawing on international maritime law, political

My especial thanks go to the librarians at the Australian Defence Force Academy.

My sincere thanks to the Australian Government Department of Infrastructure,

And to God, who made all things possible.

COPYRIGHT STATEMENT ....................................................................................... ii

Chapter 1 Researching the Indian Ocean Region ........................................................ 1

Indian Ocean Region ................................................................................................. 1

Maritime regime building for regional cooperation .................................................. 2

Importance of the Indian Ocean ................................................................................ 3

Regional cooperation for ocean governance ............................................................. 4

Centrality of the thesis .............................................................................................. 6

Contribution of the thesis to IR and IO studies ....................................................... 10

Structure of thesis.................................................................................................... 11

A note on sources and methods............................................................................... 13

Chapter 2 The new regime for ocean governance ..................................................... 17

Regime change in the oceans .................................................................................. 18

Importance of oceans .............................................................................................. 20

Changing maritime dimension ................................................................................ 24

Defining ocean governance ..................................................................................... 31

Pressures of ocean governance ............................................................................... 33

Indicators of ocean governance............................................................................... 34

Objectives and principles of ocean governance ...................................................... 36

Initiatives for ocean governance ............................................................................. 39

Strategy for ocean governance ................................................................................ 42

Regulation and control at sea .................................................................................. 46

Attributes of the power to govern the sea ............................................................... 49

Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 54

Chapter 3 Indian Ocean Region ................................................................................. 55

Indian Ocean Region as a concept .......................................................................... 55

Regions and regional orders .................................................................................... 56

New concept of security .......................................................................................... 59

Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) .......................................................... 60

Indian Ocean RSCs ................................................................................................. 61

Regions and the Indian Ocean ................................................................................ 63

Understanding the geostrategic maritime realm ..................................................... 64

Indian Ocean political geography ........................................................................... 68

Indian Ocean regional initiatives ............................................................................ 72

Indian Ocean regionalism ....................................................................................... 73

Indian Ocean Region defined .................................................................................. 78

Chapter 4 Regime theory and application of structuration theory ............................. 81

Regime effectiveness an agenda for research ......................................................... 81

Structurational approach to regimes ....................................................................... 82

Conceptual clarification of regimes ........................................................................ 84

Regime definitions .................................................................................................. 84

Attributes and classification of regimes .................................................................. 86

Norm for ocean governance and maritime regimes ................................................ 90

Driving social forces of regime formation .............................................................. 92

Process of regime formation ................................................................................... 95

Actor-structure interplay ......................................................................................... 95

Actors and leadership .............................................................................................. 97

Structure in regime analysis .................................................................................... 98

Elements of structuration theory ............................................................................. 99

Application of structuration theory to regime theory............................................ 105

Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 109

Chapter 5 Methodological considerations for case study analysis .......................... 111

Meaning of regime effectiveness .......................................................................... 115

Objects of assessment ........................................................................................... 116