1. Commendador vs.

de Villa 200 Scra 80

2. National Development Company vs. Hervilla 151 scra 200
3. Ty vs. Trampe 250 Scra 500

COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA [200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO.

93177; 2 AUG 1991]
Thursday, February 12, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes 
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the
AFP were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers
for the alleged participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9, 1989.
Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as
mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their
motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but
the application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of
preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty.
However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even
military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail. 

The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for
habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in CampCrame
without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no
formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year
after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.

Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities

to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing
of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of
February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their
counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for
reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had
been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits
on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit
controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge.
(Right to challenge validity of members of G/SCM)

It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the ArmedForces

accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have
no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial
proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and
on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.

The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been
recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general
rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more
emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.

On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year
from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with therequirements of due
process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special
Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only
after one year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were
involved in the failed coup.
Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In
G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to
allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under article
18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also
granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private
respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 93177               August 2, 1991

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT.
MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON,
LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO
LIGOT LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PERA,
MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO
LIM, CAPT. ELMER AMON, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners, 
vs.
GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI INVESTIGATING PANEL
COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S. MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA MAJ.
FELIX V. BALDONADO and MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO.
14 COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and
CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, respondents.

No. 95020               August 2, 1991

B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL.
ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Q.C.,
LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA., respondents.

No. 96948               August 2, 1991

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO PN,
CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC.
RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC.
JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ.
CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA,
CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL
NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners, 
vs.
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL.
ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14, respondents.

No. 97454               August 2, 1991

AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT.
COL. ALBERTO OLARIO, Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP Detention
Center/Jail, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86,
CAPTAIN REYNALDO S. RAFAEL, 1 LT SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO
JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT. ATANACIO T. MACALAN JR PMM 2LT ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS
CALLEJA PC, 2LT JAIRUS JS GELVEZON III PMM 2LT JOSELITO CABREROS PMM 2LT
MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L. CANTACO PC, respondents.

Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito Sanchez, Tiburcio Fusillero,
Ericson Aurelio, Levino Valencia, Danilo Arnon Vergel Nacino, Florencio Flores, Benigno Junio and
Joey Sarroza.
Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim.
Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson
Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros.
Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison.
Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro.
Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo.
Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador.
Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando.
Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio.
Efren C. Moncupa for All Tecson.
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison .
Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.
Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pena.
Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioners in G.R. No. 93177.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and
related issues arising from the same incident.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and
97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged
participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.
The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code (Murder).

In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are questioning
the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel constituted to investigate the charges against
them and the creation of the General Court Martial GCM convened to try them.

In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14,
seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by Article
18 of Com. Act No. 408.

In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are
assailed on certiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority
either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private respondents.

In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents.
Jurisdictional objections are likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020.

Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel had been
constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990,
individually addressed to the petitioners, to wit:

You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating
Officers on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame Quezon City, then and there
to submit your counter-affidavit and the affidavits of your witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial
investigation of the charge/charges against you for violence of AWs _______________. DO
NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.

Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be
deemed a waiver of your right to submit controverting evidence.

On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn
statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.

At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds,
prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing This was
done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated February 21, 1990.

In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5
days from notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.

On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial and the
PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing. This was done on March
14,1990.
The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by
Article of War 71, which provides:

Art. 71. Charges Action upon. — Charges and specifications must be signed by a person
subject to military law, and under the oath either that he has personal knowledge of, or has
investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the best of his
knowledge and belief.

No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and
impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include inquiries
as to the truth of the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what disposition
of the case should be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation full
opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are
available and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or
mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the
accused. If the charges are forwarded after such investigation, they shall be accompanied by
a statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)

They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no
prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits. while the motion for summary
dismissal was denied, the motion for reconsideration remains unresolved to date and they have not
been able to submit their counter-affidavits.

At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they were
exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM
No.14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however,
that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No. 39.

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied
by GCM No.14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction.
After considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and members of GCM
No.14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional liberty to Ligot.

On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release and to
declare in contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey 'ng the said order. He
later also complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him "pending final
resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this Court.

After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of
intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of
additional intervenors Ltc Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.

On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:

(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all
persons with the defined exception is applicable and covers all military men facing court-
martial proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court- Martial No. 14
denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does not
apply to military men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no
precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null and void. Respondent General Court-
Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the
 petitioner, intervenors and which may as well include other persons facing charges before
General Court-Martial No. 14.

Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial No. 14,
this Court reiterates its orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot
as well as intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.

On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a petition
for habeas corpuson the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The
petition was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was raffled to respondent
Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the
petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

II

The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows.

It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities to
present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990,
and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until
March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for
reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. This they did on March 13, 1990.
The motion was in effect denied when the PTI Panel resolved to recommend that the charges be
referred to the General Court Martial for trial.

The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the investigation
was resolved against them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits. They had
been expressly warned In the subpoena sent them that "failure to submit the aforementioned
counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit
controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the warning. As their motions appeared to be
dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting for the
petitioners to submit their defense.

Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard.  If it is not
1âwphi1

availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.

There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is
now settled that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-
martial of jurisdiction." We so held in Arula v. Espino,  thus:
1

x x x           x x x          x x x

But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial
of jurisdiction.

The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory,
and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695,
93 L ed 986 (1949), the Court said:

We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by Article 70 (The Philippine
counter-part is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408) can properly be construed
 as an indispensable pre-requisite to the exercise of the Army General court martial
jurisdiction.. The Article does serve important functions in the administration of court-
martial procedures and does provide safeguards to an accused. Its language is
clearly such that a defendant could object to trial in the absence of the required
investigation. In that event the court-martial could itself postpone trial pending the
investigation. And the military reviewing authorities could consider the same
contention, reversing a court- martial conviction where failure to comply with Article
70 has substantially injured an accused. But we are not persuaded that Congress
intended to make otherwise valid court-martial judgments wholly void because pre-
trial investigations fall short of the standards prescribed by Article 70. That Congress
has not required analogous pre-trial procedure for Navy court-martial is an indication
that the investigatory plan was not intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional level.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of the
Army did hold that where there had been no pre-trial investigation, court-martial
proceedings were void ab initio. But this holding has been expressly repudiated in
later holdings of the Judge Advocate General. This later interpretation has been that
the pre-trial requirements of Article 70 are directory, not mandatory, and in no way
effect the jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War Department's interpretation was
pointedly called to the attention of Congress in 1947 after which Congress amended
Article 70 but left unchanged the language here under consideration. compensable
pre-requisite to the exercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction

A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation under article
of war 71 would of course be altogether irregular but the court-martial might nevertheless
have jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in criminal procedure in
the civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary investigation does not go into the
jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings.

As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that issue was resolved
more than two years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa,  where we declared:
2

The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77,
as amended by P.D. No. 911. The amended charge sheets, charging petitioners and their
co-respondents with mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer, were signed by Maj.
Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to military law, after he had investigated the matter through
an evaluation of the pertinent records, including the reports of respondent AFP Board of
Officers, and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies on record. The charge sheets
were sworn to by Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser," in accordance with and in the manner provided
under Art. 71 of the Articles of War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No.
911, is only of suppletory application, the fact that the charge sheets were not certified in the
manner provided under said decrees, i.e., that the officer administering the oath has
personally examined the affiant and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood its affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial
investigation" was conducted by respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D. No.
77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their
counter-affidavit. However, instead of doing so, they filed an untitled pleading seeking the
dismissal of the charges against them. That petitioners were not able to confront the
witnesses against them was their own doing, for they never even asked Maj. Baldonado to
 subpoena said witnesses so that they may be made to answer clarificatory questions in
accordance with P. D, No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911.

The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance with Article 8 of
the Articles of War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened the body, was not
signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff.

Article of War No. 8 reads:

Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. — The President of the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary and, when empowered by the
President, the commanding officer of a major command or task force, the commanding
officer of a division, the commanding officer of a military area, the superintendent of the
Military Academy, the commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may
appoint general courts-martial; but when any such commander is the accuser or the
prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, the court shall be appointed by superior
competent authority. ...

While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt that he
authorized it because the order itself said it was issued "By Command of General De Villa" and it
has not been shown to be spurious. As observed by the Solicitor General, the Summary Disposition
Form showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief of Staff, AFP, actually constituted GCM No. 14 and
appointed its president and members. It is significant that General De Villa has not disauthorized or
revoked or in any way disowned the said order, as he would certainly have done if his authority had
been improperly invoked. On the contrary, as the principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177, he
sustained General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and the other respondents by the
Solicitor General.

Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was originally provided for under
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12,
1948, to wit:

Art. 18. Challenges. — Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged by

the accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall
determine the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not receive a challenge to more than
one member at a time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be presented
and decided before those by the accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled to the
peremptory challenge, but the law member of the court shall not be challenged except for
cause.

The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Alejandro,  thus:

3

In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a
handful of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military and naval
academies who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of
officers learned in military law, its aside from the fact that the officer corps of the developing
army was numerically made equate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of the
national defense program. Because of these considerations it was then felt that peremptory
challenges should not in the meanwhile be permitted and that only challenges for cause, in
any number, would be allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act
No. 408), as worded on September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no
 mention or reference to any peremptory challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a
court- martial or by the accused. After December 17,1958, when the Manual for Courts-
Martial of the Philippine Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's Service of
the Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive program of training and education
in military law, encompassing the length and breadth of the Philippines. This program was
pursued until the outbreak of World War 11 in the Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the
formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines had expanded to a very large number, and a great many of the officers had been
indoctrinated in military law. It was in these environmental circumstances that Article of War
18 was amended on June 12,1948 to entitle "each side" to one peremptory challenge, with
the sole proviso that "the law member of court shall not be challenged except for cause.

On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel
and such other cases as may be referred to them.

On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition,

Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the
peremptory challenge, thus:

No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may be entertained to

insure impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined by
a majority of the members excluding the challenged member. A tie vote does not disqualify
the challenged member. A successfully challenged member shall be immediately replaced.

On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National Security Code,
which was a compilation and codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies intended "to
meet the continuing threats to the existence, security and stability of the State." The modified rule on
challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in this decree.

On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the
state of martial law throughout the Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and
declared the dissolution of the military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final determination of
the cases pending therein.

P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders mentioned
therein. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created
thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio
legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.

Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in L P.D. No.
39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of
Proclamation No. 2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was
automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.

We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory challenge
remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn
when martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still be
considered no longer operative, having been cast out under the new dispensation as, in the words of
the Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.

The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. It is curious that the
present government should invoke the rules of that discredited body to justify its action against the
accused officers.

The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited by a
respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment. It is
hoped that the accused officers in the cases at bar will not be so motivated. At any rate, the wisdom
of Com. Act No. 408, in the light of present circumstances, is a matter addressed to the law-makers
and not to this Court. The judiciary can only interpret and apply the laws without regard to its own
misgivings on their adverse effects. This is a problem only the political departments can resolve.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the petition for certiorari and
mandamus and the petition for habeas corpus filed by the private respondents with the Regional
Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed
Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order
their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings.

The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the Court of Appeals is vested with
"exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions." Rather
irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite the case of Yang v. Court of Appeals  where this Court held that
4

"appeals from the Professional Regulation Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court
of Appeals.

It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to ordinary appeals and not
to the remedies employed by the accused officers before the respondent courts.

In Martelino, we observed as follows:

It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the
proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to
consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally true that in the
exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of
discretion — what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" —
as to give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point at issue in this action
suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and prohibition ... .

The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies
and on petitions for habeas corpusand quo warranto.  In the absence of a law providing that the
5

decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial or the Office of the Chief of Staff can be questioned
only before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can
exercise similar jurisdiction.

We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally
not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule
embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right
to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:

The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from
the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.

Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the
framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the
government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues
collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of
and against the existing political system.

x x x           x x x          x x x

National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release
on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000
putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25,1990 Order
were sustained, on "provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is already discomforting. But,
the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which
could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable
Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government
and justice.

The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection
clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly
situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others.
The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not.
But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same
right that is extended to civilians.

On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been charged after
more than one year from their arrest, our finding is that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial.

The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18, 1991, and was
referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was heard on
February 26, 1991, by the respondent court, where the petitioners submitted the charge
memorandum and specifications against the private respondents dated January 30, 1991. On
February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel was created and initial
investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991, the private
respondents received the copies of the charges, charge sheets and specifications and were required
to submit their counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay of more than
one year in the investigation and preparation of the charges against the private respondents.
However, this was explained by the Solicitor General thus:

... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete it pre-charge investigation
only after one (1) year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were
involved in the failed coup. All of them, as well as other witnesses, had to be interviewed or
investigated, and these inevitably took months to finish. The pre-charge investigation was
rendered doubly difficult by the fact that those involved were dispersed and scattered
throughout the Philippines. In some cases, command units, such as the Scout Rangers,
have already been disbanded. After the charges were completed, the same still had to pass
review and approval by the AFP Chief of Staff.
While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the following admonition:

This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the point that if the
participation of petitioner in several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders of
Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established and no charges can be filed against
him or the existence of a prima facie case warranting trial before a military commission is
wanting, it behooves respondent then Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now General) to
release petitioner. Respondents must also be reminded that even if a military officer is
arrested pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War, indefinite confinement is not
sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof mandates that immediate steps must be taken to try the
person accused or to dissmiss the charge and release him. Any officer who is responsible for
unnecessary delay in investigating or carrying the case to a final conclusion may even be
punished as a court martial may direct. 6

It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge Solano on February 26,
1991, the government filed a notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for reconsideration, the
latter was ultimately denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48- hour period for appeal under
Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules of Court did not run until after notice of such denial was received
by the petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to the private respondents' contention, therefore, the
decision had not yet become final and executory when the special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was
filed with this Court on March 12, 1991.

III

Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following observations of the
Court in Arula:

The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion
(AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds
because, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it
in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be
reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to
justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.

As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave abuse of
discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and the
reversal of the acts complained of by the petitioners. Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No.
96948, where we find that the right to peremptory challenge should not have been denied, and in
G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondents should not have been ordered released.

ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948,
the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise
the right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and
97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of
the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
 Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Cruz, but I dissent insofar as he
would deny bail to accused military personnel.

The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to "all persons" before conviction, with the only
exception of "those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong."  The Charter also states that "[T]he right to bail shall not be impaired even if the writ of
1

habeas corpus is suspended."  To deny the military officers here concerned of the right to bail is to
2

circumscribe the inclusive meaning of "all persons" — the coverage of the right.

I believe that military officers fall within "persons".

The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of "a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the
streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were sustained, on
"provisional" bail [t]he sheer number alone is already discomforting . . . [b]ut, the truly disquieting
thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the
overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with
a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice."  But would a scenario of
3

1,000 murderers or drug pushers roaming the streets of the metropolis justify a denial of the right to
bail? Would not that dark picture painted by the Solicitor General be reproduced by 1,000 "equally
dangerous" elements of society?

We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the petitioners should not be
granted the same right.

The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as an argument to deny bail. I
submit, however, that tradition is no argument. First, the Constitution does not say it. Second, we are
a government of laws, not tradition.

If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a reexamination is in order.

2.
G.R. No. L-65718
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY AND DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners, 
vs.
WILFREDO HERVILLA, respondent.

PADILLA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision   dated 10 November 1983 of the
1

Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-G.R. No. CV-66215 entitled, "Wilfredo
Hervilla, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus Dole Philippines, Inc., Candido de Pedro, and National
Development Co., Defendants-Appelleea, "which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance
of South Cotabato, General Santos City, as well as its resolution dated 9 August 1985 denying the
motion for reconsideration of said decision.

The facts of the case, as gathered from the decision under review, are as follows:

An action for Recovery of Possession and Damages filed on December 20, 1973 by Wilfredo
Hervilla against Dole Philippines, a duly registered corporation doing business in Polomolok,
South Cotabato, involving Lots Nos. 3284, and 3283, GSS-269-D, each containing four (4)
hectares, more or less, situated at Sitio Bahsong, Palkan, Polomolok, South Cotabato, now
in the possession of defendant corporation as Administrator of the properties of National
Development Corporation (NDC) impleaded as party defendant (Records, p. 48).

On December 28, 1958, claimant Rolando Gabales, for a consideration of P450.00, sold to
Hernane Hervilla all his rights and interest over a four-hectare land located in Palkan,
Polomolok, South Cotabato but Identified only by its boundaries:

... On the North, by the property of Teopisto Espafiola; on the south, by Mr.
Macarandan; on the east by Francisco Macarandan and on the west by Regina
Fabrea ...(Exh."K").

It was apparently on the strength of the Tax Declaration No. 1376 that Hernane Hervilla was
induced to acquire it (Exh. "L").

On August 1, 1959, its adjoining occupant-claimant, Fernando Jabagat, for a consideration

of P270.00, also sold his interest and rights to Hernane Hervilla over another four (4)
hectares of land, situated at Balisong, Bo. Kablon, Tupi [later plotted in Palkan, Polomolok]
South Cotabato, Identified by its boundaries:

...On the North by the property of Candido de Pedro; on the south by the property of
Santiago Macarandan; on the East by creek and on the West by the property of
HernaneHervilla ...(Exh."H").

Undoubtedly, while adjoining each other, one of these is situated on Polomolok, South
Cotabato, while the other is in Tupi, South Cotabato [the two lots were later plotted to be in
Palkan, Polomolok). For, at the time of these transfers, the boundary between these places
had not definitely been settled. Hence, the discrepancy.
On June 1, 1961, Wilfredo Hervilla, claiming to be the successor-in-interest of his brother,
Hernane Hervilla who vacated these properties, [in favor of the former], filed with the District
Land Office of the Bureau of Lands in General Santos City Free Patent Application Nos.
2054 and 2054-A, respectively, over the lots, after the same were surveyed and designated
as Lot Nos. 3264, GSS-269-D and 3l66 (Exhs. "A", "A-7", "B", "B-4", tsn, p. 249).

On April 1, 1963, as claimant and occupant of Lots 3283 and 3284, GSS-269-D, situated at
Balisong, Kablon, Tupi, South Cotabato since 1945, Candido de Pedro filed with the Bureau
of Lands, Manila, his Free Patent Application, having planted it to abaca, coffee, banana,
corn and other seasonal crops, erecting therein a farm house (Exhs, "E", "2", "2-A", "2-B").
Land taxes from 1945 until 1963 were paid per Official Receipts Nos. B-9134501 and B-
913492 (Record, pp. 126, 131). Then, exactly four months after filing his application,
Candido de Pedro ceded all his rights to the National Development Corporation, represented
by Pedro Changco, Jr. (Exhs. "J", "J-1").

On April 27, 1968, Wilfredo Hervilla who was then in Palawan, thru his wife, Enuna V.
Hervilla, filed an ejectment suit against Dole before the Municipal Court of Tupi, South
Cotabato (then Cotabato) alleging that "sometime in the early part of March 1968 defendant
by means of threats, of force, intimidation, strategy and stealth and against the wig of the
plaintiffs, entered and occupied the entire parcels (lots Nos. 3264 and 3265, GSS-269-D)...
constructing ..." (Exh. "F", Record, p. 109). This was dismissed, however, on September 30,
1970 for failure to state a cause of action and without the benefit of trying it upon the merits
(Exh. "H", Record, p. 195).

On July 28, 1972, as Lots 3264 and 3265 applied by plaintiff on June 1, 1961, had obviously
been designated as Lots 3283 and 3284 initially applied on August 1, 1963 by Candido de
Pedro, predecessorin-interest of Dole, counsel for plaintiff's Wilfredo Hervilla wrote the
District Land Officer of the Bureau of Lands, stationed in Koronadal, South Cotabato,
requesting for an Investigation of these Lots (Exh. "G").

On January 30, 1975, Jesus Ma. Baltazar, supplied with verbal information by Wilfredo
Hervilla in his occular inspection about the facts surrounding the claim of plaintiff, [in an
investigation duly conducted with the aid of the map of the Bureau and in the presence of
Candido de Pedro] submitted his report to the District Land Officer, recommending:

... that PPa, Nos. (VIII-4)-40 54 and (VII-4) 2054-A be amended accordingly such
that it shall cover Lot No. 3284 and 3283, respectively both of GSS-269-D, Palkan,
Polomolok, South Cotabato, instead of Lot Nos. 3264 and 3265, respectively, both of
GSS-269-D, and Kablon, Tupi, South Cotabato (Exh. "H", "H l").

On June 15, 1973, Hernando Jereos, Provincial Officer of Koronadal, South Cotabato,
pursuant to the report of the Land Investigator, Jesus Ma. Baltazar, issued an order:

"That the Free Patent Application No. (VIII-4) 2054 and Free Patent Application No.
(VIII-4) 2054-A of Wilfredo D. Hervilla for Lots Nos. 3264 and 3265, GSS-269-D,
respectively, be, as hereby they are, modified in the sense that the disposition
therein contained shall in the order named refer to Lots Nos. 3284 and 3283, GSS-
269-D and, as thus modified, further action on the herein mentioned application held
in abeyance pending the final determination of the adverse claim of Dolefil
thereto"(Exh."D").
 So, on September 20, 1973, armed with that recommendation, counsel for plaintiff wrote
Dolefil demanding the immediate return of Lots 3284 and 3283 to Wilfredo Hervilla as well as
payment of actual and moral damages since the former's occupation and fencing of the land
in March 1968, with a warning of a court suit if it failed (Exh. "I", Record, p. 125). Falling on
deaf ears, plaintiff instituted the presentsuit, engaged the services of a counsel in the sum of
P2,000.00 (tsn, p. 115).  2

On the basis of the foregoing facts, the court a quo rendered a decision in favor of the National
Development Company (NDC, for short) and Dole Philippines, Inc., (Dolephil, for short), petitioners
herein, by dismissing the herein private respondent's complaint against them. On 30 March 1979,
private respondent iplaintiff in the trial court) appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which, on
10 November 1983, rendered the herein assailed decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of an the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is

hereby REVERSED and set aside and another one entered herein;

1. Declaring that plaintiff-appellant, Wilfredo Hervilla, the rightful possessor of the subject lots
or lots designated as Lots Nos. 3283 and 3284, GSS-269-D, situated at Palkan,
Polomololok, South Cotabato;

2. Ordering the NDC and DOLE to vacate the said lots and deliver possession thereof to the
said plaintiff-appellant;

3. Ordering the defendants-appellees: Dole (Philippines, Inc.); Candido de Pedro and

National Development Co. (NDC), jointly and severally to pay Wilfredo Hervilla P700.00 per
annum, representing the value of the yearly harvest of the land at the time it was taken, with
legal interest from the tune of judicial demand until funy paid; and

4. Ordering the said defendants-appeuees jointly and severally to pay P5,000.00 in the
concept of attorney's fees and to pay the costs.  3

A motion for reconsideration was timely filed by herein petitioners and on 9 January 1984, a
Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for New Trial was filed praying that the
case be reopened and a new trial conducted for the purpose of submitting original certificate of Title
Nos. 26651 and 26653. Petitioners alleged therein that, on 5 December 1980, or while the case was
pending with respondent Court, the Bureau of Lands issued the free patents in favor of Petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest.

On 9 August 1985, respondent Court issued a resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration
and Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for New Trial, stating thus:

Finding that all the grounds and arguments raised in the Motion for Reconsideration are
practically the same or at least included, considered and passed upon adversely against
movant by this Court in its decision now sought to be reconsidered, the Court RESOLVED to
DENY the Motion for Reconsideration.

Regarding the Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for New Trial, in
which defendants-appellees now claim that the "issue of possession and ownership have
been conclusively determined in favor of defendant-appellee National Development Co. " per
patents OCTs Nos. p-26651 and p-26653 both recently dated December 5, 1980, as
Annexes "1" & "2", We do not think the Bureau of Lands could validly make a
 pronouncement on the issue of possession over the subject land upon which rested the
issuance of the patents in favor of defendants-appellee, as against the prior finding of this
Court that the plaintiff-appellant had the prior, superior and physical possession thereof,
since said issue is the very sameDecision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, issue litigated
in this case submitted by the parties to the court of justice. In other words, when the Bureau
of Lands issued the patents and OCT's in question, the case was already pending in court;
hence, subjudice. The issuance of the patents and Original Certificates of Title over the
subject land, therefore, is nun and void, the same having been issued, while the case is still
pending in court.

In view thereof, this Court likewise hereby RESOLVES to DENY the Supplement to the
Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for New Trial, for being unmeritorious.  4

Hence, the present petition interposed by the National Development Company (NDC).

There is no question that the authority given to the Lands Department over the disposition of public
lands   does not exclude the courts from their jurisdiction over possessory actions, the public
5

character of the land notwithstanding  and that the exercise by the courts of such jurisdiction is not
6

an interference with the alienation, disposition and control of public lands.  The question that is
7

raised by petitioner NDC before this Court is: "May the Court in deciding a case involving recovery of
possession declare null and void title issued by an administrative body or office during the pendency
of such case? Specifically, is the Bureau of Lands precluded, on the ground that the matter
is subjudice, from issuing a free patent during the pendency of a case in court for recovery of
possession?

The questions are answered in the negative. It is now well settled that the administration and
disposition of public lands are committed by law to the Director of Lands primarily, and, ultimately, to
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.   The jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is
8

confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimantsx to public lands   or to cases
9

which involve disposition and alienation of public lands.   The jurisdiction of courts in possessory
10

actions involving public lands is limited to the determination of who has the actual, physical
possession or occupation of the land in question (in forcible entry cases, before municipal courts) or,
the better right of possession (in accion publiciana, in cases before Courts of First Instance, now
Regional Trial Courts).  11

In forcible entry cases, moreover, title is not in issue; as a matter of fact, evidence thereof is
expressly barred, except to prove the nature of the possession.  12

In any event, petitioners' possession of the lands in question has been confirmed by the issuance of
Free Patents in favor of their predecessor-in-interest. By this act, nothing more is left for the courts to
pursue. Thus, the private respondent's cause of action has been rendered moot and academic by
the decision of the Director of Lands. In Rallon vs. Ruiz,  this Court said:
13

The reason then for possessory actions in court, namely, to "facilitate adjudication" by the
Lands Department of a dispute over public land no longer exists. For, defendants'
applications are no longer pending investigation. Defendants' possession of the lands
disputed, for purposes of the free patents, has been confirmed in the administrative case.
The administrative branch of the government has thus already spoken. Its action has lapsed
into finality. Accordingly, plaintiffs' claim of possession is lost. Since plaintiffs' protests, in
reference to possession, has already been resolved adversely against them by the Lands
Department, nothing more is left for the courts to pursue.
In Realize vs. Duarte,   this Court stated:
14

The land on which Duarte settled may be initially presumed as pubhe land, his homestead
application over it having been approved by the Director of Lands. It is our considered
opinion that the approval of his homestead application legalized his possession, and such
approval constitutes a justifiable defense against the action for revival of judgment as it
necessarily affects the appellee's right of possession of the land from which Duarte was
ordered ejected.

The principle was reiterated in De los Santos vs. Rodriguez thus:[[15

At the time of the rendition of the decision in CA-G.R. No. 18912-R, the question of whether
or not said portion was to be part of her homestead had not as yet been definitely settled.
Accordingly, it became necessary to determine in that case who rhafl meanwhile be in
possession. The aforementioned question was finany decided in favor of Rodriguez, in the
order of the Director of Fisheries, dated February 27, 1959. Thereafter he is, therefore, the
party entitled to said possession. In other words, the decision in CA-G.R. 18912-R may no
longer be executed, not because the decision in CA-G.R. 32970-R has annulled it, but
because of events subsequent to the first decision, which events have changed materially
the situation between the parties. Thus, in Hernandez vs. Clapis, this Court, speaking
through then Chief Justice Paras, said:

In our opinion the present appeal is meritorious. While the decision in the forcible entry and
detainer case is final, it can no longer be executed at least in so far as the possession of the
land in question is concerned, because, under section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the
Director of Lands has direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any
other form of concession of disposition and management of the lands of the public domain,
and his decisions as to questions of fact are conclusive when approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture; and because the latter had already cancelled the right of plaintiff Maria L.
Hernandez to administer the land in question and rejected both her sales application and
that of her husband, plaintiff Antonio Hernandez, at the same time giving the defendants the
preferential right to apply for said land in virtue of the provisions of Republic Act No. 65. The
correctness of the final decision of the Secretary of Agriculture is not herein involved, but it is
valid and binding until reversed in a proper proceeding by the No. L-23170, January 31,
1968, 22 SCRA 451, 457court. The situation is not that the judgment in the forcible entry and
detainer case has lost its virtuality, but that the plaintiffs had subsequently ceased to be
entitled to the relief awarded by said judgment. (Emphasis supplied.)

Moreover, records do not show that private respondent Wilfredo Hervilla ever filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Director of Lands issuing free patent over the lands in dispute
in favor of petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. Neither did he appeal said decision to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, nor did he appeal to the office of the President of the Philippines.
In short, Hervilla failed to exhaust administrative remedies, a flaw which, to our mind, is fatal to a
court review. The decision of the Director of Lands has now become final. The Courts may no longer
interfere with such decision. 16

WHEREFORE, the decision dated 10 November 1983 and the resolution dated 9 August 1985 of the
respondent Appellate Court are hereby reversed and set aside. The decision of the court a
quo dated 28 February 1979 is hereby ordered reinstated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
3. Petitioner Alejandro B. Ty is a resident of and registered owner of lands
and buildings in the Municipality (now City) of Pasig, while petitioner MVR
Picture Tube, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws and is likewise a registered owner of lands and buildings in
said Municipality[1].

Respondent Aurelio C. Trampe is being sued in his capacity as presiding

judge of Branch 163, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region, sitting in Pasig, whose Decision dated 14 July 1994 and Order
dated 30 September 1994 in Special Civil Action No. 629 (entitled
"Alejandro B. Ty and MVR Picture Tube, Inc. vs. The Hon. Secretary of
Finance, et al.") are sought to be set aside.  Respondent Secretary of
Finance is impleaded as the government officer who approved the Schedule
of Market Values used as basis for the new tax assessments being enforced
by respondents Municipal Assessor and Municipal Treasurer of Pasig and
the legality of which is being questioned in this petition. [2]

The Antecedent Facts

On 06 January 1994, respondent Assessor sent a notice of assessment

respecting certain real properties of petitioners located in Pasig, Metro
Manila.  In a letter dated 18 March 1994, petitioners through counsel
"request(ed) the Municipal Assessor to reconsider the subject
assessments[3]".

Not satisfied, petitioners on 29 March 1994 filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 163, presided over by
respondent Judge, a Petition for Prohibition with prayer for a restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to declare null and void the
new tax assessments and to enjoin the collection of real estate taxes based
on said assessments.  In a Decision[4]dated 14 July 1994, respondent Judge
denied the petition "for lack of merit" in the following disposition:

"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, petitioners' prayer to

declare unconstitutional the schedule of market values as prepared by the
Municipal Assessor of Pasig, Metro Manila, and to enjoin permanently the
Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, Metro Manila, from collecting the real
property taxes based thereof (sic) is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.  Cost
(sic) de oficio."

Subsequently, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was also denied by

respondent Judge in an Order[5] dated 30 September 1994.

Rebuffed by said Decision and Order, petitioners filed this present Petition
for Review directly before this Court, raising pure questions of law and
assigning the following errors:

"The Court a quo gravely erred in holding that Presidential Decree No. 921
was expressly repealed by R.A. 7160 and that said presidential decree
including its Implementing Rules (P.D. 464) went down to the statutes'
graveyard together with the other decision(s) of the Supreme Court affect-
ing the same.

"The Court a quo while holding that the new tax assessments have
tremendously increased ranging from 418.8% to 570%, gravely erred in
blaming petitioners for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies
provided for by law.

"The Court a quo blatantly erred in not declaring the confiscatory and

oppressive nature of the assessments as illegal, void ab initioand
unconstitutional constituting a deprivation of property without due process
of law."[6]

In a resolution dated 21 November 1994, this Court, without giving due

course to the petition, required respondents to comment thereon. 
Respondents Municipal Treasurer and Municipal Assessor, through
counsel, filed their Comment on 19 December 1994, and respondent
Secretary of Finance, through the Solicitor General, submitted his on 11
May 1995. Petitioners filed their Reply to the Comment of respondent
Assessor and Treasurer 06 January 1995, and their Reply to that of the
respondent Secretary on 18 May 1995.  After careful deliberation on the
above pleadings, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition, and,
inasmuch as the issues are relatively simple, the Court dispensed with
requiring the parties to submit further memoranda and instead decided to
consider the respondents' respective Comments as their answers and
memoranda.  Thus the case is now considered submitted for resolution.

The Issues

The issues brought by the parties for decision by this Court are:

1.    Whether Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, repealed the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 921;

2.    Whether petitioners are required to exhaust administrative remedies

prior to seeking judicial relief; and

3.    Whether the new tax assessments are oppressive and confiscatory, and
therefore unconstitutional.

In disposing of the above issues against petitioners, the court a quo ruled

that the schedule of market values and the assessments based thereon
prepared solely by respondent assessor are valid and legal, they having
been prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160).  It held also that said Code had effectively
repealed the previous law on the matter, P.D. 921, which required, in the
preparation of said schedule, joint action by all the city and municipal
assessors in the Metropolitan Manila area.  The lower court also faulted
petitioners with failure to exhaust administrative remedies provided under
Sections 226 and 252 of R.A. 7160. Finally, it found the questioned
assessments consistent with the "tremendously increased ... price of real
estate anywhere in the country."[7] Stated the court:

"This Court is inclined to agree with the view of defendants that R.A. 7160
in its repealing clause provide (sic) that Presidential Decree Nos. x x x 464 x
x x are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect.  Hence said
presidential decrees including their implementing rules went down to the
statutes' graveyard together with the decisions of the Supreme Court on
cases effecting (sic) the same.

"This Court is also in accord with respondents (sic) view that petitioners
failed to avail of either Section 226 of R.A. 7160, that is by appealing the
assessment of their properties to the Board of Assessment Appeal within
sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the written Notice of Assessment,
and if it is true that petitioner (sic) as alleged in their pleadings was not
afforded the opportunity to appeal to the board of assessment appeal, then
they could have availed of the provisions of Section 252, of the same R.A.
7160 by paying the real estate tax under protest. Because of petitioners (sic)
failure to avail of either Sections 226 or 252 of R.A. 7160, they failed to
exhaust administrative (sic) remedies provided for by law before bringing
the case to Court. (Buayan Cattle Co., Inc. vs. Quintillan, 128 SCRA 276)
Therefore the filing of this case before this Court is premature, the same not
falling under the exception because the issue involved is not a question of
law but of fact (Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256).

"Petitioners also alleged that the New Tax Assessments are not only
oppressive and confiscatory but also destructive in view of the tremendous
increase in its valuation, from P855,360.00 to P4,121,280.00 a marked
increase of 418.8% of one of its properties, while the other, from
P857,600.00 to P4,374,410.00, an increased (sic) of 510%.  This Court
agree (sic) with petitioners (sic) observation, but the reality (sic) the price
of real property anywhere in the country tremendously increased. This is
shown in the Real Estate Monitor of Econotic Incorporated (copy attached
with the memorandum of respondents). For example real properties in
Pasig in 1991 located at the Ortigas Commercial Complex command (sic) a
price of P42,000.00 per square meter which price is supported by a case
filed before this Court (civil case no. 64506, Jesus Fajardo, et al. vs. Ortigas
and Co.) for Recovery (sic) of agents (sic) commission.  The property
subject of the sale which was also located at the Ortigas Commercial
Complex at Pasig, Metro Manila was sold to a Taiwanese at P42,000.00 per
square meter.  It is therefore not surprising that the assessment of real
properties in Pasig has increased tremendously.  Had petitioners first
exhausted administrative remedies they would have realized the fact that
prices of real estate has (sic) tremendously increased and would have
known the reason/reasons why."[8]

In its Order dated 30 September 1994 denying the Motion for

Reconsideration, the court a quo ruled:

"This Court despite petitioners' exhaustive and thorough research and

discussion of the point in issue, is still inclined to sustain the view that P.D.
921 was impliedly repealed by R.A. 7160, P.D. 921 to the mind of this Court
is an implementing law of P.D. 464, Sections 3, 6, 9, 12 and 13 of said P.D.
provide how certain provisions of P.D. 464 shall be implemented.  Since
P.D. 464 was expressly repealed by R.A. 7160, P.D. 921 must necessarily be
considered repealed, otherwise, what should Sections 3, 6, 9, 12 and 13 of
P.D. 921 implement?  And, had the law makers intended to have said P.D.
921 remain valid and enforceable they would have provided so in R.A.
7160.  Since there is none, P.D. 921 must be considered repealed."[9]

Issue:

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

We now come to the second issue. The provisions of Sections 226 and 252
of R.A. 7160, being material to this issue, are set forth below:

"Sec. 226.  Local Board of Assessment Appeals.    Any owner or person

having legal interest in the property who is not satisfied with the action of
the provincial, city or municipal assessor in the assessment of his property
may, within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the written notice of
assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province or
city by filing a petition under oath in the form prescribed for the purpose,
together with copies of the tax declarations and such affidavits or docu-
ments submitted in support of the appeal.

"Sec. 252.  Payment under Protest.    (a) No protest shall be entertained

unless the taxpayer first pays the tax. There shall be annotated on the tax
receipts the words "paid under protest".  The protest in writing must be
filed within thirty (30) days from payment of the tax to the provincial, city
treasurer or municipal treasurer, in the case of a municipality within
Metropolitan Manila Area, who shall decide the protest within sixty (60)
days from receipt.

(b)  The tax or a portion thereof paid under protest shall be held in trust by
the treasurer concerned.
(c)  In the event that the protest is finally decided in favor of the taxpayer,
the amount or portion of the tax protested shall be refunded to the
protestant, or applied as tax credit against his existing or future tax liability.

(d)  In the event that the protest is denied or upon the lapse of the sixty-day
period prescribed in subparagraph (a), the taxpayer may avail of the
remedies as provided for in Chapter 3, Title Two, Book II of this Code."

Respondents argue that this case is premature because petitioners neither

appealed the questioned assessments on their properties to the Board of
Assessment Appeal, pursuant to Sec. 226, nor paid the taxes under protest,
per Sec. 252.

We do not agree.  Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be

exhausted before resort to judicial action can prosper, there is a well-settled
exception in cases where the controversy does not involve questions of fact
but only of law.[20] In the present case, the parties, even during the
proceedings in the lower court on 11 April 1994, already agreed "that the
issues in the petition are legal"[21], and thus, no evidence was presented in
said court.

In laying down the powers of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, R.A.
7160 provides in Sec. 229 (b) that "(t)he proceedings of the Board shall be
conducted solely for the purpose of ascertaining the facts x x x".  It follows
that appeals to this Board may be fruitful only where questions of fact are
involved.  Again, the protest contemplated under Sec. 252 of R.A. 7160 is
needed where there is a question as to the reasonableness of the amount
assessed.  Hence, if a taxpayer disputes the reasonableness of an increase in
a real estate tax assessment, he is required to "first pay the tax" under
protest.  Otherwise, the city or municipal treasurer will not act on his
protest.  In the case at bench however, the petitioners are questioning the
very authority and power of the assessor, acting solely and independently,
to impose the assessment and of the treasurer to collect the tax.  These are
not questions merely of amounts of the increase in the tax but attacks on
the very validity of any increase.

Finally, it will be noted that in the consolidated cases of

Mathay/Javier/Puyat-Reyes cited earlier, the Supreme Court referred the
petitions (which similarly questioned the schedules of market values
prepared solely by the respective assessors in the local government units
concerned) to the Board of Assessment Appeal, not for the latter to exercise
its appellate jurisdiction, but rather to act only as a fact-finding
commission.  Said the Court[22] thru Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa:

"On November 5, 1991, the Court issued a Resolution clarifying its earlier
one of May 16, 1991.  It pointed out that the authority of the Central Board
of Assessment Appeals `to take cognizance of the factual issues raised in
these two cases by virtue of the referral by this Court in the exercise of its
extraordinary or certiorari jurisdiction should not be confused with its
appellate jurisdiction over appealed assessment cases under Section 36 of
P.D. 464 otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code.  The Board is not
acting in its appellate jurisdiction in the instant cases, but rather, it is acting
as a Court-appointed fact-finding commission to assist the Court in
resolving the factual issues raised in G.R. Nos. 97618 and 97760.'"

In other words, the Court gave due course to the petitions therein in spite of
the fact that the petitioners had not, a priori, exhausted administrative
remedies by filing an appeal before said Board.  Because there were factual
issues raised in the Mathay, et al. cases, the Supreme Court constituted the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals as a fact-finding body to assist the
Court in resolving said factual issues.  But in the instant proceedings, there
are no such factual issues.  Therefore, there is no reason to require
petitioners to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in R.A. 7160,
nor to mandate a referral by this Court to said Board.

G.R. No. 117577 December 1, 1995

ALEJANDRO B. TY AND MVR PICTURE TUBE, INC., petitioners, 

vs.
THE HON. AURELIO C. TRAMPE, in his capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila, THE HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR OF
PASIG AND THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF PASIG, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
ARE THE INCREASED REAL ESTATE TAXES imposed by and being collected in the Municipality
(now City) of Pasig, effective from the year 1994, valid an legal? This is the question brought before
this Court for resolution.

The Parties

Petitioner Alejandro B. Ty is a resident of and registered owner of lands and buildings in the
Municipality (now City) of Pasig, while petitioner MVR Picture Tube, Inc. is a corporation duly
organized and existing under Philippine laws and is likewise a registered owner of lands and
buildings in said Municipality  .
1

Respondent Aurelio C. Trampe is being sued in his capacity as presiding judge of Branch 163.
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, sitting in Pasig, whose Decision dated
14 July 1994 and Order dated 30 September 1994 in Special Civil Action No. 629 (entitled
"Alejandro B. Ty and MVR Picture Tube, Inc. vs. The Hon. Secretary of Finance. et al.") are sought
to be set aside. Respondent Secretary of Finance is impleaded as the government officer who
approved the Schedule of Market Values used as basis for the new tax assessments being enforced
by respondents Municipal Assessor and Municipal Treasurer of Pasig and the legality of which is
being questioned in this petition  .
2

The Antecedent Facts

On 06 January 1994, respondent Assessor sent a notice of assessment respecting certain real
properties of petitioners located in Pasig, Metro Manila. In a letter dated 18 March 1994, petitioners
through counsel "request(ed) the Municipal Assessor to reconsider the subject assessments"  . 3

Not satisfied, petitioners on 29 March 1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 163, presided over by respondent Judge, a Petition for Prohibition with
prayer for a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to declare null and void the new tax
assessments and to enjoin the collection of real estate taxes based on said assessments. In a
Decision  dated 14 July 1994, respondent Judge denied the petition "for lack of merit" in the following
4

disposition.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, petitioners' prayer to declare

unconstitutional the schedule of market values as prepared by the Municipal
Assessor of Pasig, Metro Manila, and to enjoin permanently the Municipal Treasurer
of Pasig, Metro Manila, from collecting the real property taxes based thereof (sic) is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Cost (sic) de oficio.

Subsequently, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was also denied by respondent Judge in an
Order   dated 30 September 1994.
5

Rebuffed by said Decision and Order, petitioners filed this present Petition for Review directly before
this Court, raising pure questions of law and assigning the following errors:

The Court a quo gravely erred in holding that Presidential Decree No. 921 was
expressly repealed by R.A. 7160 and that said presidential decree including its
Implementing Rules (P.D. 464) went down to the statutes' graveyard together with
the other decision(s) of the Supreme Court affecting the same.
 The Court a quo while holding that the new tax assessments have tremendously
increased ranging from 418.8% to 570%, gravely erred in blaming petitioners for their
failure to exhaust administrative remedies provided for by law.

The Court a quo blatantly erred in not declaring the confiscatory and oppressive
nature of the assessments as illegal. void ab initio and unconstitutional constituting a
deprivation of property without due process of law. 6

In a resolution dated 21 November 1994, this Court, without giving due course to the petition,
required respondents to comment thereon. Respondents Municipal Treasurer and Municipal
Assessor, through counsel, filed their Comment on 19 December 1994, and respondent Secretary of
Finance, through the Solicitor General, submitted his on 11 May 1995. Petitioners filed their Reply to
the Comment of respondent Assessor and Treasurer 06 January 1995, and their Reply to that of the
respondent Secretary on 18 May 1995. After careful deliberation on the above pleadings, the Court
resolved to give due course to the petition, and, inasmuch as the issues are relatively simple, the
Court dispensed with requiring the parties to submit further memoranda and instead decided to
consider the respondents' respective Comments as their answers and memoranda. Thus the case is
now considered submitted for resolution.

The Issues

The issues brought by the parties for decision by this Court are:

1. Whether Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991, repealed the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 921;

2. Whether petitioners are required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to

seeking judicial relief; and

3. Whether the new tax assessments are oppressive and confiscatory, and therefore
unconstitutional.

In disposing of the above issues against petitioners, the court a quo ruled that the schedule of
market values and the assessments based thereon prepared solely by respondent assessor are
valid and legal, they having been prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160). It held also that said Code had effectively repealed the
previous law on the matter, P.D. 921, which required, in the preparation of said
schedule, joint action by all the city and municipal assessors in the Metropolitan Manila area. The
lower court also faulted petitioners with failure to exhaust administrative remedies provided under
Sections 226 and 252 of R.A. 7160. Finally, it found the questioned assessments consistent with the
"tremendously increased . . . price of real estate anywhere in the country."
7

Stated the court:

This Court is inclined to agree with the view of defendants that R.A. 7160 in its
repealing clause provide (sic) that Presidential Decree Nos. . . . 464 . . . are hereby
repealed and rendered of no force and effect. Hence said presidential decrees
including their implementing rules went down to the statutes' graveyard together with
the decisions of the Supreme Court on cases effecting (sic) the same.
 This Court is also in accord with respondents (sic) view that petitioners failed to avail
of either Section 226 of R.A. 7160, that is by appealing the assessment of their
properties to the Board of Assessment Appeal within sixty 160) days from the date of
receipt of the written Notice of Assessment, and if it is true that petitioner (sic) as
alleged in their pleadings was not afforded the opportunity to appeal to the board of
assessment appeal, then they could have availed of the provisions of Section 252, of
the same R.A. 7160 by paying the real estate tax under protest. Because of
petitioners (sic) failure to avail of either Sections 226 or 252 of R.A. 7160, they failed
to exhaust administratives (sic) remedies provided for by law before bringing the
case to Court. (Buayan Cattle Co., Inc. vs. Quintillan, 128 SCRA 276). Therefore the
filing of this case before this Court is premature, the same not falling under the
exception because the issue involved is not a question of law but of fact (Valmonte
vs. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256).

Petitioners also alleged that the New Tax Assessments are not only oppressive and
confiscatory but also destructive in view of the tremendous increase in its valuation,
from P855,360.00 to P4,121,280.00 a marked increase of 418.8% of one of its
properties, while the other, from P857,600.00 to P4,374,410.00, an increased (sic) of
510%. This Court agree (sic) with petitioners (sic) observation, but the reality (sic) the
price of real property anywhere in the country tremendously increased. This is shown
in the Real Estate Monitor of Economic Incorporated (copy attached with the
memorandum of respondents). For example real properties in Pasig in 1991 located
at the Ortigas Commercial Complex command (sic) a price of P42,000.00 per square
meter which price is supported by a case filed before this Court (civil case no. 64506,
Jesus Fajardo, et al. vs. Ortigas and Co.) for Recovery (sic) of agents (sic)
commission. The property subject of the sale which was also located at the Ortigas
Commercial Complex at Pasig, Metro Manila was sold to a Taiwanese at P42,000.00
per square meter. It is therefore not surprising that the assessment of real properties
in Pasig has increased tremendously. Had petitioners first exhausted administrative
remedies they would have realized the fact that prices of real estate has (sic)
tremendously increased and would have known the reason/reasons why. 8

In its Order dated 30 September 1994 denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the court a quo ruled:

This Court despite petitioners' exhaustive and thorough research and discussion of
the point in issue, is still inclined to sustain the view that P.D. 921 was impliedly
repealed by R.A. 7160. P.D. 921 to the mind of this Court is an implementing law of
P.D. 464, Sections 3, 6, 9, 12 and 13 of said P.D. provide how certain provisions of
P.D. 464 shall be implemented. Since P.D. 464 was expressly repealed by R.A.
7160. P.D. 921 must necessarily be considered repealed, otherwise, what should
Sections 3, 6, 9, 12 and 13 of P.D. 921 implement? And, had the law makers
intended to have said P.D. 921 remain valid and enforceable they would have
provided so in R.A. 7160. Since there is none, P.D. 921 must be considered
repealed. 9

Re: The First Issue:

Repeal of P.D. 921?

To resolve the first issue, it is necessary to revisit the following provisions of law:
1. Section 15 of P.D. No. 464, promulgated on 20 May 1974, otherwise known as the Peal Property
Tax Code:

Sec. 15. Preparation of Schedule of Values. — Before any general revision of

property assessments is made, as provided in this Code, there shall be prepared for
the province or city a Schedule of Market Value for the different classes of real
property therein situated in such form and detail as shall be prescribed by the
Secretary of Finance.

Said schedule, together with an abstract of the data (on) which it is based, shall be
submitted to the Secretary of Finance for review not later than the thirty-first day of
December immediately preceding the calendar year the general revision of
assessments shall be undertaken. The Secretary of Finance shall have ninety days
from the date of receipt within which to review said schedule to determine whether it
conforms with the provisions of this Code.

2. Subsequently, on 12 April 1976, P.D. 921 was promulgated, which in Section 9 thereof, states:

Sec. 9. Preparation of Schedule of Values for Real Property within the Metropolitan
Area. — The Schedule of Values that will serve as the basis for the appraisal and
assessment for taxation purposes of real properties located within the Metropolitan
Area shall be prepared jointly by the City Assessors of the Districts created under
Section one hereof, with the City Assessor of Manila acting as Chairman, in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 464, as
amended, otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code, and the implementing
rules and regulations thereof issued by the Secretary of Finance.

3. Section One of P.D. 921, referred to above, provides:

Sec. 1. Division of Metropolitan Manila into Local Treasury and Assessment Districts.
— For purposes of effective fiscal management, Metropolitan Manila is hereby
divided into the following Local Treasury and Assessment Districts:

First District — Manila

Second District — Quezon City, Pasig, Marikina,

Mandaluyong and San Juan

Third District — Caloocan City, Malabon,

Navotas and Valenzuela

Fourth District — Pasay City, Makati, Paranaque,

Muntinlupa, Las Piñas, Pateros and
Taguig

Manila, Quezon City, Caloocan City and Pasay City shall be the respective Centers
of the aforesaid Treasury and Assessment Districts.

4. On 01 January 1992, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, took effect. Section 212 of said law is quoted as follows:
 Sec. 212. Preparation of Schedule of Fair Market Values. — Before any general
revision of property assessment is made pursuant to the provisions of this Title, there
shall be prepared a schedule of fair market values by the provincial, city and the
municipal assessors of the municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area for the
different classes of real property situated in their respective local government units
for enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned. The schedule of fair
market values shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province, city or municipality concerned, or in the absence thereof, shall be posted in
the provincial capitol, city or municipal hall and in two other conspicuous public place
therein.

5. The repealing clause of R.A. 7160 found in the Section 534 thereof is hereby reproduced as
follows:

Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. —

(a) . . .

(b) . . .

(c) . . . ; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 626, 632, 752, and 1136
are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect.

xxx xxx xxx

(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charter, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly. (emphasis supplied)

It is obvious from the above provisions of R.A 7160, specifically Sec. 534, that P.D. 921 was NOT
EXPRESSLY repealed by said statute. Thus, the question is: Was P.D. 921 IMPLIEDLY repealed by
R.A. 7160?

Petitioners contend that, contrary to the aforequoted Decision of the lower court, "whether the
assessment is made before or after the effectivity of R.A. 7160, the observance of, and compliance
with, the explicit requirement of P.D. 921 is strict and mandatory either" because P.D. 921 was not
impliedly repealed by R.A. 7160 and is therefore still the applicable statute, or because the Supreme
Court, in three related cases   promulgated on 16 December 1993 — after the Local Government
10

Code of 1991 already took effect — ruled that a schedule of market values and the corresponding
assessments based thereon "prepared solely by the city assessor . . . failed to comply with the
explicit requirement (of collegial and joint action by all the assessors in the Metropolitan Manila area
under P.D. 921) . . . and are on that account illegal and void."

On the other hand, respondents aver that Section 9 of P.D. 921 and Section 212 of R.A. 7160 are
clearly and unequivocally incompatible because they dwell on the same subject matter, namely, the
preparation of a schedule of values for real property within the Metropolitan Manila Area. Under P.D.
921, the schedule shall be prepared jointly by the city assessors of the District, while, under R.A.
7160, such schedule shall be prepared "by the provincial, city and municipal assessors of the
municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila area . . . ". Furthermore, they claim that "Section 9 (of
P.D. 921) merely supplement(ed) Section 15 of P.D. 464 in so far as the preparation of the schedule
of values in Metro Manila (is concerned)." Thus, "with the express repeal of P.D. 464 . . . P.D.
921 . . .can not therefore exist independently on its own." They also argue that although the
aforecited Supreme Court decision was promulgated after R.A. 7160 took effect, "the assessment of
the Municipal Assessors in those three (3) cited cases were assessed in 1990 prior to the effectivity
of the Code." Hence, the doctrine in said cases cannot be applied to those prepared in 1994 under
R.A. 7160.

We rule for petitioners.

R.A. 7160 has a repealing provision (Section 534) and, if the intention of the legislature was to
abrogate P.D. 921, it would have included it in such repealing clause, as it did in expressly rendering
of no force and effect several other presidential decrees. Hence, any repeal or modification of P.D.
921 can only be possible under par. (f) of said Section 534, as follows:

(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charter, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations, part or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

The foregoing partakes of the nature of a general repealing provision. It is a basic rule of statutory
construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless
it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and
patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. This is based on the rationale that the will of the
legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial function of construction and interpretation. Courts
cannot take the place of Congress in repealing statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize, as
much as possible, seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve doubts in favor of their validity and co-
existence.

In Villegas v. Subido,  the issue raised before the Court was whether the Decentralization Act had
11

the effect of repealing what was specifically ordained in the Charter of the City of Manila. Under the
Charter, it was provided in its Section 22 that "The President of the Philippines with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments shall appoint . . . the City Treasurer and his Assistant." Under the
Decentralization Act, it was provided that "All other employees, except teachers paid out of
provincial, city or municipal general funds and other local funds shall . . . be appointed by the
provincial governor, city or municipal mayor upon recommendation of the head of office concerned."

The Court, in holding that there was no implied repeal in this

case  , said:
12

. . . It has been the constant holding of this Court that repeals by implication are not
favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so
intended. Such a doctrine goes as far back as United States v. Reyes, a 1908
decision (10 Phil. 423, Cf. U.S. v. Academia, 10 Phil. 431 [1908]). It is necessary
then before such a repeal is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or
statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be
inconsistent with the former. (Cf. Calderon v. Provincia del Santisimo Rosario, 28
Phil. 164 [1914]). There must be a showing of repugnancy clear and convincing in
character. The language used in the latter statute must be such as to render it
irreconcilable with what has been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short
of that standard does not suffice. What is needed is a manifest indication of the
legislative purpose to repeal. [Citing numerous cases]
 More specifically, a subsequent statute, general in character as to its terms and
application, is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment,
unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. This is so even if the provisions of
the latter are sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set forth in the special
act. This principle has likewise been consistently applied in decisions of the Court
from Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty (40 Phil 224), decided as far back as 1919. A
citation from an opinion of Justice Tuason is illuminating. Thus: "From another angle
the presumption against repeal is stronger. A special law is not regarded as having
been amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal or alter is
manifest. Generalia specialibus non derogant. An this is true although the terms of
the general act are broad enough to include the matter in the special statute. . . . At
any rate, in the event harmony between provisions of this type in the same law or in
two laws is impossible, the specific provision controls unless the statute, considered
in its entirety, indicates a contrary intention upon the part of the legislature. . . . A
general law is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit
any subject or place naturally belonging to such class, while a special act is one
which relates to particular persons or things of a class." (citing Valera v. Tuason, 80
Phil. 823, 827-828 [1948].)

In the relatively recent case of Mecano vs. Commission on Audit   , the Court en banc had occasion
13

to reiterate and to reinforce the rule against implied repeals, as follows:

Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date
clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the
subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal,
there must be a clear showing on the part of the law maker that the intent in enacting
the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and
manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a
continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the
two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.

There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the
two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to
the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second
is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as
a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.

Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency take place when the two statutes cover
the same subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each
other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect,
that is that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other.

In the same vein, but in different words, this Court ruled in Gordon vs. Veridiano   :
14

Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should

endeavor to reconcile the same instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as
against the other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise policy is for the judge to
harmonize them if this is possible, bearing in mind that they are equally the
handiwork of the same legislature, and so give effect to both while at the same time
also according due respect to a coordinate department of the government. It is this
policy the Court will apply in arriving at the interpretation of the laws above-cited and
the conclusions that should follow therefrom.
In the instant case, and using the Courts' standard for implied repeal in Mecano, we compared the
two laws.

Presidential Decree No. 921 was promulgated on 12 April 1976, with the aim of, inter alia, evolving
"a progressive revenue raising program that will not unduly burden the tax payers . . . "   in
15

Metropolitan Manila. Hence, it provided for the "administration of local financial services in
Metropolitan Manila" only, and for this purpose, divided the area into four Local Treasury and
Assessment Districts, regulated the duties and functions of the treasurers and assessors in the cities
and municipalities in said area and spelled out the process of assessing, imposing and distributing
the proceeds of real estate taxes therein.

Upon the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise "known and cited as the Local 'Government
Code of 1991'"   took effect on 01 January 1992  . It declared "genuine and meaningful local
16 17

autonomy" as a policy of the state. Such policy was meant to decentralize government "powers,
authority, responsibilities and resources" from the national government to the local government units
"to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the attainment of national goals."  In the formulation and implementation of
18

policies and measures on local autonomy, ''(l)ocal government units may group themselves,
consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to
them." 19

From the above, it is clear that the two laws are not co-extensive and mutually inclusive in their
scope and purpose. While R.A. 7160 covers almost all governmental functions delegated to local
government units all over the country, P.D. 921 embraces only the Metropolitan Manila area and is
limited to the administration of financial services therein, especially the assessment and collection of
real estate (and some other local) taxes.

Coming down to specifics, Sec. 9 of P.D. 921 requires that the schedule of values of real properties
in the Metropolitan Manila area shall be prepared jointly by the city assessors in the districts created
therein: while Sec. 212 of R.A. 7160 states that the schedule shall be prepared "by the provincial,
city and municipal assessors of the municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area for the
different classes of real property situated in their respective local government units for enactment by
ordinance of the sanggunian concerned. . . ."

It is obvious that harmony in these provisions is not only possible, but in fact desirable, necessary
and consistent with the legislative intent and policy. By reading together and harmonizing these two
provisions, we arrive at the following steps in the preparation of the said schedule, as follows:

1. The assessor in each municipality or city in the Metropolitan Manila area shall
prepare his/her proposed schedule of values, in accordance with Sec. 212, R.A.
7160.

2. Then, the Local Treasury and Assessment District shall meet, per Sec. 9, P.D.
921. In the instant case, that district shall be composed of the assessors in Quezon
City, Pasig, Marikina, Mandaluyong and San Juan, pursuant to Sec. 1 of said P.D. In
this meeting, the different assessors shall compare their individual assessments,
discuss and thereafter jointly agree and produce a schedule of values for their
district, taking into account the preamble of said P.D. that they should evolve "a
progressive revenue raising program that will not unduly burden the taxpayers".
 3. The schedule jointly agreed upon by the assessors shall then be published in a
newspaper of general circulation and submitted to the sanggunian concerned for
enactment by ordinance, per Sec. 212, R.A. 7160.

By this harmonization, both the preamble of P.D. 921 decreeing that the real estate taxes shall "not
unduly burden the taxpayer" and the "operative principle of decentralization" provided under Sec. 3,
R.A. 7160 encouraging local government units to "consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services
and resources" shall be fulfilled. Indeed the essence of joint local action for common good so
cherished in the Local Government Code finds concrete expression in this harmonization.

How about respondents' claim that, with the express repeal of P.D. 464, P.D. 921 — being merely a
"supplement" of said P.D. — cannot "exist independently on its own"? Quite the contrary is true. By
harmonizing P.D. 921 with R.A. 7160, we have just demonstrated that it can exist outside of P.D.
464, as a support, supplement and extension of R.A. 7160, which for this purpose, has replaced
P.D. 464.

Since it is now clear that P.D. 921 is still good law, it is equally clear that this Court's ruling in the
Mathay/Javier/Puyat-Reyes cases (supra) is still the prevailing and applicable doctrine. And,
applying the said ruling in the present case, it is likewise clear that the schedule of values
prepared solely by the respondent municipal assessor is illegal and void.

Re: The Second Issue:

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

We now come to the second issue. The provisions of Sections 226 and 252 of R.A. 7160 being
material to this issue, are set forth below:

Sec. 226. Local Board of Assessment Appeals. — Any owner or person having legal
interest in the property who is not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city or
municipal assessor in the assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days
from the date of receipt of the written notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of
Assessment Appeals of the province or city by filing a petition under oath in the form
prescribed for the purpose, together with copies of the tax declarations and such
affidavits or documents submitted in support of the appeal.

Sec. 252. Payment under Protest. — (a) No protest shall be entertained unless the
taxpayer first pays the tax. There shall be annotated on the tax receipts the words
"paid under protest". The protest in writing must be filed within thirty (30) days from
payment of the tax to the provincial, city treasurer or municipal treasurer, in the case
of a municipality within Metropolitan Manila Area, who shall decide the protest within
sixty (60) days from receipt.

(b) The tax or a portion thereof paid under protest shall be held in trust by the
treasurer concerned.

(c) In the event that the protest is finally decided in favor of the taxpayer, the amount
or portion of the tax protested shall be refunded to the protestant, or applied as tax
credit against his existing or future tax liability.
 (d) In the event that the protest is denied or upon the lapse of the sixty-day period
prescribed in subparagraph (a), the taxpayer may avail of the remedies as provided
for in Chapter 3, Title Two, Book II of this Code.

Respondents argue that this case is premature because petitioners neither appealed the questioned
assessments on their properties to the Board of Assessment Appeal, pursuant to Sec. 226, nor paid
the taxes under protest, per Sec. 252.

We do not agree. Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort
to judicial action can prosper, there is a well-settled exception in cases where the controversy does
not involve questions of fact but only of law.   In the present case, the parties, even during the
20

proceedings in the lower court on 11 April 1994, already agreed "that the issues in the petition are
legal"   , and thus, no evidence was presented in said court.
21

In laying down the powers of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, R.A. 7160 provides in Sec.
229 (b) that "(t)he proceedings of the Board shall be conducted solely for the purpose of ascertaining
the facts . . . ." It follows that appeals to this Board may be fruitful only where questions of fact are
involved. Again, the protest contemplated under Sec. 252 of R.A. 7160 is needed where there is a
question as to the reasonableness of the amount assessed. Hence, if a taxpayer disputes the
reasonableness of an increase in a real estate tax assessment, he is required to "first pay the tax"
under protest. Otherwise, the city or municipal treasurer will not act on his protest. In the case at
bench however, the petitioners are questioning the very authority and power of the assessor, acting
solely and independently, to impose the assessment and of the treasurer to collect the tax. These
are not questions merely of amounts of the increase in the tax but attacks on the very validity
of any increase.

Finally, it will be noted that in the consolidated cases of Mathay/Javier/Puyat-Reyes cited earlier, the
Supreme Court referred the petitions (which similarly questioned the schedules of market values
prepared solely by the respective assessors in the local government units concerned) to the Board
of Assessment Appeal, not for the latter, to exercise its appellate jurisdiction, but rather to act only as
a fact-finding commission. Said the
Court   thru Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa:
22

On November 5, 1991, the Court issued a Resolution clarifying its earlier one of May
16, 1991. It pointed out that the authority of the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals "to take cognizance of the factual issues raised in these two cases by virtue
of the referral by this Court in the exercise of its extraordinary or certiorari jurisdiction
should not be confused with its appellate jurisdiction over appealed assessment
cases under Section 36 of P.D. 464 otherwise known as the Real Property Tax
Code. The Board is not acting in its appellate jurisdiction in the instant cases but
rather, it is acting as a Court-appointed fact-finding commission to assist the Court in
resolving the factual issues raised in G.R. Nos. 97618 and 97760."

In other words, the Court gave due course to the petitions therein in spite of the fact that the
petitioners had not, apriori, exhausted administrative remedies by filing an appeal before said Board.
Because there were factual issues raised in the Mathay, et al. cases, the Supreme Court constituted
the Central Board of Assessment Appeals as a fact-finding body to assist the Court in resolving said
factual issues. But in the instant proceedings, there are no such factual issues. Therefore, there is
no reason to require petitioners to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in R.A. 7160, nor to
mandate a referral by this Court to said Board.

Re: The Third Issue:

 Constitutionality of the Assessments

Having already definitively disposed of the case through the resolution of the foregoing two issues,
we find no more need to pass upon the third. It is axiomatic that the constitutionality of a law,
regulation, ordinance or act will not be resolved by courts if the controversy can be, as in this case it
has been, settled on other grounds. In the recent case of Macasiano vs. National Housing
Authority   , this Court declared:
23

It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of

the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly
raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the
case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. To
reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the
constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the
constitutional question must be raised by a proper party, (c) the constitutional
question must be raised at the earliest opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the
constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case. (emphasis
supplied)

The aforequoted decision in Macasiano merely reiterated the ruling in Laurel vs. Garcia  , where this
24

Court held:

The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these
questions are properly raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary
for the determination of the case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). The Court will
not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if
the case can be disposed of on some other ground such as the application of a
statute or general law (Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, [1909],
Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 [1941]).   (emphasis supplied)
25

In view of the foregoing ruling, the question may be asked: what happens to real estate tax
payments already made prior to its promulgation and finality? Under the law   , "the taxpayer may
26

file a written claim for refund or credit for taxes and interests . . . ."

Finally, this Tribunal would be remiss in its duty as guardian of the judicial branch if we let pass
unnoticed the ease by which the respondent Judge consigned "to the statutes' graveyard" a
legislative enactment "together with the (three) decisions of the Supreme Court" promulgated jointly
and unanimously en banc. An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws and the stability of
judicial doctrines laid down by superior authority should have constrained him to be more
circumspect in rendering his decision and to spell out carefully and precisely the reasons for his
decision to invalidate such acts, instead of imperiously decreeing an implied repeal. He knows or
should have known the legal precedents against implied repeals. Respondent Judge, in his decision,
did not even make an attempt to try to reconcile or harmonize the laws involved. Instead, he just
unceremoniously swept them and this Court's decisions into the dustbin of "judicial history." In his
future acts and decisions, he is admonished to be more judicious in setting aside established laws,
doctrines and precedents.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the questioned
Decision and Order of respondent Judge, DECLARING as null and void the questioned Schedule of
Market Values for properties in Pasig City prepared by respondent Assessor, as well as the
corresponding assessments and real estate tax increases based thereon; and ENJOINING the
respondent Treasurer from collecting the real estate tax increases made on the basis of said
Schedule and assessments. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.