Character Contests and Violent Criminal Conduct: A Critique

Author(s): Lonnie Athens

Source: The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3, Special Feature: The Sociology of Nuclear
Threat (Autumn, 1985), pp. 419-431
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Midwest Sociological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106224
Accessed: 05/02/2009 15:53

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Midwest Sociological Society and Blackwell Publishing are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to The Sociological Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org
 CharacterContestsand ViolentCriminal
Conduct: A Critique*

LonnieAthens
Georgetown UniversityLawCenter

Goffman'stheoryof violentcriminalbehavior,whichis baseduponthecomplementary

notionsof "character contest"and "stakein conventionalinstitutions,"
is relatively
uniquein thatit makesproblematic boththeviolentcriminalactandactor.However,
theexplanation Goffman'sworkprovidesis inadequate forthreemajorreasons.First,
mutualconsentamongthe conflictingpartiesto use violenceto settletheirdispute
rarelyoccursin violentcriminalacts.Secondly,themeaningswithwhichmostviolent
criminalactsareimbuedaredifferentfromthatof a character contest.Finally,violent
peoplecannotbe distinguished fromnon-violentones merelyon the basisof whether
or not they have a stakein conformity.Thus,a moreaccurateandadequatetheory
of violentcriminalbehaviorwhichtakesinto accountboththe natureof the violent
criminalactand actoris needed.Theoutlinesof sucha theoryarebrieflydescribed.

INTRODUCTION
In one of his moreprovocativeessays entitled:"Wherethe Action Is," Goffman(1967:149-
270) analyzed and subsequentlypopularizedthe notion of "charactercontest." Although
he did not state in this essay that he was providinga theory of violent criminal behavior
based upon this intriguingidea, he neverthelessdid provide one. His theory is relatively
unique in that it makes problematicboth the natureof the violent criminal act and the
actor, ratherthanjust the latter as is done in most theories.
Several persons have alreadydrawnupon limited aspects of Goffman's theory in their
analysesof violentinterpersonal conduct(see, Felson, 1978, 1981;Hepburn,1973;Horowitz
and Schwartz, 1974). Luckenbill (1977) has carriedout a more precise specification of
the partof Goffman'stheorydealing with violent criminalaction, andFelson andSteadman

* Direct all communicationsto: Dr. Lonnie

Athens, Senior Research Criminologist, Georgetown University
Law Center, 600 New Jersey Avenue, N.W., Washington,D.C. 20001.

The SociologicalQuarterly,Volume26, Number3, pages419-431.

Copyright? 1985by JAI Press, Inc.
All rightsof reproductionin any form reserved.
ISSN:0038-0253
420 THESOCIOLOGICAL Vol. 26/No. 3/1985
QUARTERLY

(1983) have provided a test of sorts of Luckenbill's specification. Since this theory has
provided a major source of ideas for explaining interpersonalviolence, it deserves to be
subjectedto critical examination;that is the purpose of this article.
My examinationof this theory will proceed as follows. I will first discuss Goffman's
original ideas in some detail and then describe Luckenbill'sfurtherspecificationof those
ideas dealing with the violent act. Second, I will subjectboth Goffman's and Luckenbill's
ideas to criticalexamination.Lastly, I will brieflydescribethe foundationsof an alternative
interactionisttheory of violent criminal behavior.

BACKGROUND IDEAS
According to Goffman (1967:216-218), characteris a quality of a person which derives
from how the person manages him or herself during fateful activities. An activity is
fateful only if it is both consequentialand problematic:the consequences of the activity
must go beyond itself, and its ultimateoutcome must be in some doubt (p. 164). A person
demonstrates"strong" characterwhen he or she stands "correct" and "steady" in the
face of perceived fateful activities and "weak" characterwhen he or she does not do so
(p. 217). Although characterrefers to what is "characteristic"or relatively enduring
about a person, it can be dramaticallychanged as a result of a person's conduct during
a single fateful activity or event (pp. 238-239).
"Action," for Goffman (pp. 184-185), refers to a fateful activity which is voluntarily
undertakenas an end in itself. What transformsordinaryfateful activity into action is
that the person is underno social obligation either to undertakethe fateful activity in the
first place or once begun, to continue it. Rather, he or she freely chooses to undertake
and continue the fateful activity merely for the sake of it. The more the propertiesjust
described are displayed in a fateful activity, then the more real or serious the action
becomes.
Characterand action are, of course, closely connected. Action provides the context or
circumstancesunderwhich people demonstratethe truestrengthsof theircharacters.Since
people may demonstratea weak or strongcharacterwhen they engage in action, character
is always gambled upon during action. Goffman describes the critical significance of
action for characterin the following way:

Plainly,it is duringmomentsof actionthattheindividualhastheriskandopportunity

of displayingto himselfandsometimesto othershis styleof conductwhenthe chips
aredown.Character is gambled;a singlegoodshowingcanbe takenas representative,
anda badshowingcannoteasilybe excusedor reattempted. (p. 237)

CHARACTERCONTEST
"Interpersonalaction" is more complicatedthan "action," since the separateactions of
two or morepersonsbecome directlylinkedtogether(Goffman, 1967: 206-208). Goffman
describes the way in which actions become interlinkedas follows: "While one person is
providing a field of action for another, that other can in turn use the first individual as
CharacterContestsand ViolentCriminalConduct:A Critique 421

his field of action" (p. 207). As in the case of action, interpersonalaction is voluntarily
engaged in, but unlike action, it is mutuallyfateful: the outcome of interpersonalaction
can be consequentialand problematicfor both parties ratherthanjust one party.
For Goffman (pp. 239-240), a charactercontest is a special form of interpersonal
action where people's separateactions become linked togetherin the common pursuitof
demonstratingwhose respectivecharacteris the strongest.He providesa concise description
of a charactercontest:

Eachpersonwill be atleastincidentally
concerned withestablishing evidenceof strong
character,and conditionswill be such as to allow this only at the expenseof the
The very fieldthatone uses to expresscharacter
characterof the otherparticipants.
may be the other's expression.Andat timestheprimarypropertiesat play
character
maythemselves be openlymadea convenience, pointedlyservingmerelyas anoccasion
for doingbattleby and for character.A charactercontestresults;a specialkindof
moralgame. (p. 240, emphasisadded)

Goffman (pp. 241-242) points out that whenever charactercontests are played in
deadly earnest, the very selves and honor of the contestants are at stake. On the one
hand, if a contestantdemonstratesa strong characterand thereby wins the contest, then
he or she maintainshonor and "face" or positive image of self. On the other hand, if a
contestant demonstratesa weak characterand thereby loses the contest, then he or she
loses honor and face. Consequently,during serious charactercontests, intense emotions
of pride or shame are always aroused among the contestants(pp. 236-237).
But as Goffman (p. 244) is careful to point out, charactercontests do not usually
display the "zero-sumrestrictions"just describedsince most end long before a clear cut
winner or loser ever emerges. In fact, most charactercontests end with the characters,
honors, and faces of the contestantsrelatively intact (p. 258). A full-fledged character
contest displaying a zero-sum quality only becomes possible when each contestant is
absolutely determinedto prove that his or her characteris definitely the strongest.
The use of violence only becomes a distinct possibility during full-fledged character
contests. However, in orderfor this possibility to actuallyoccur, at least two things must
happen. First, the contestantsmust outrightrefuse to back down or else appearto have
weak character,even in the face of the perceived risk that violence may ultimately be
the result. Secondly, once this criticalpoint has been reached, both contestantsmust then
agree to continue the contest and thereby to use violence as the means of determining
whose characteris the strongest. Because in every step of this process mutualconsent is
necessary in order for violence to actually take place, charactercontests rarely end in
this manner(see, Goffman, 1967: 242-258).
Finally, it takes a very special type of person to push a charactercontest to the point
where violence must ultimatelybe resortedto. As his remarksbelow make clear, Goffman
believessuchpersonsarewithoutanycurrentstakein conformityor conventionalinstitutions:

To findthosewho indulgein thissportwe arelikelyto lookto "outsiders"who, like

adolescents,havenot beentightlywoveninto organizational structures.
Presumably
amongthemthesefatefulactivitieswill be leastdisruptiveandthe mosttolerable;it
422 THESOCIOLOGICAL Vol. 26/No. 3/1985
QUARTERLY

is a case of havinglittleto lose, or littleto lose yet, a case of beingwell organized

for disorganization.(pp. 211-212)

SPECIFICATION
OF THEPROCESS
In a widely cited study, Luckenbill (1977) examined "situatedtransactions"that ended
in criminalhomicides which were not contractor felony murders.A situatedtransaction,
anotherterm coined by Goffman, merely refers to the interactionwhich occurs between
people while they are in each other's immediate presence. Informationon 70 of these
situatedtransactionswas obtainedfromofficial documentssuch as police andpre-sentence
reportsand grandjury testimony.'
On the basis of his examinationof these transactions,Luckenbillconcluded that:
Transactions resultingin murderinvolvedthejoint contributionof the offenderand
victimto the escalationof a "character contest,"a confrontationin whichat least
one, but usuallyboth, attemptto establishor save face at the other'sexpenseby
standingsteadyin the face of adversity(Goffman,1967:218-219, 238-257). Such
transactions additionallyinvolveda consensusamongparticipants thatviolencewas
a suitable,if not requiredmeansfor settlingthe contest(1977:177).

Luckenbill (1977: 179-185) also found that charactercontests bring about criminal
homicides in a five stage process.2 In stage one, person A makes an opening move that
threatensthe "honorand face" of personB. The opening move which threatensB's honor
and face is done eitherby A making a verbal or non-verbalexpressionof some sort which
B suspects might be an insult, or by A outright refusing to comply with some request
which B suspects might be "a denial of his ability or right to command obedience" (p.
180). The importanceof this opening move derives not from the means by which it is
performed but from the fact that it sets into motion a charactercontest between A and
B (pp. 179-180).
In stage two, B interpretsthe move made by A as definitely being an attempton A's
partto insult B. B may draw this conclusion by questioningA or the otherpeople present
about the meaning of the move, or by drawing upon his or her own past experience
interactingwith A. By either means, B draws the conclusion that A's move is definitely
a deliberateinsult (pp. 180-181).
In stage three, B makes a move which expresses his or her "anger and contempt" for
A and therebysignifies thatA is an "unworthyperson" (p. 181). B's purposefor making
this move is to demonstratethe strengthof his or her characterin order to regain honor
and face earlierlost as a result of A's previousmove. B makes one of two types of moves
for this purpose:he or she either "verballyor physically" challenges A in some way, or
else kills A on the spot. In the latter case, the charactercontest is broughtto a sudden
and quick end. Most of the contests, however, do not usually end this suddenly and
quickly (pp. 181-182).
In stage four, a "workingagreement"is formed between A and B to settle the dispute
by violent means. More precisely, A makes a move which signals to B that A agrees
with B that violence should be the means used to settle the dispute. A's purpose for
CharacterContestsand ViolentCriminalConduct:A Critique 423

making this move is to avoid the appearanceof having a weak characterby backingdown
and losing honor and face. A makes one of three types of moves for this purpose. A may
simply continue making the earlier move which insulted B in the first place, may make
a provocative physical gesture toward B, or may make a "counter-challenge"to B (pp.
182-184).
In stage five, one or both persons make lethal or deadly moves. The effectiveness of
these moves determinesthe final outcome of the battle, which in turndetermineswho is
ultimately cast in the role of victim and offender in the transaction(pp. 184-185).

CRITIQUE
There are at least two importantthings which any theory of violent criminal behavior
must obviously do. One of these things is to adequately explain the nature of violent
criminalaction (see, Blumer, 1980; Denzin, 1982). In my opinion, there are two reasons
why the notion of charactercontest distortsthe true natureof most violent criminal acts.
The first reason is that the participantsin violent criminalacts typically do not agree that
violence should be used for resolving their disputes. An absolutely necessary condition
of all charactercontests which degenerateinto violence, however, is mutualconsent for
escalating the conflict to the point where violence must be resortedto (Goffman, 1967:
244-247). Unless both contestantsat least tacitly agree that violence is the appropriate
means for determiningwhose characteris ultimately the strongest, neither one of them
should resort to its use.
But on-the-spotagreementsbetween conflictingpartiesto use violence in orderto settle
theirdisputes are not formed in most violent criminalacts almost as a matterof definition.
In the case of forcible rape, victims do not agree to the use of violence in order to
determinewhether or not they will engage in sexual acts with their attackers. Similarly,
in the case of robbery, victims do not agree to the use of violence in orderto determine
whether or not they will hand over valuables to offenders. The same argumentcould
easily be extended to felony homicides where these or similar offenses are committed
(see, Dietz, 1983:131-162). Since all the offenses mentionedconstituteperhapsthe largest
portion of all the violent criminalacts committed, mutualconsent for the use of violence
is absent from most violent criminal acts.
Moreover, even in purely assaultiveviolent criminalacts, or violent criminalacts which
are not committed in conjunctionwith other crimes, on-the-spotagreementsbetween the
conflicting parties to use violence to settle disputes is not always present. In his study,
Luckenbill(1977: 181-182) actuallyfoundthat 14%of the criminalhomicide transactions
were completed before a "workingagreement"was ever reachedbetween the conflicting
parties to use violence to settle their disputes.3 There are several reasons why mutual
consent between the conflicting parties to use violence to settle a dispute is not always
present among even purely assaultive violent criminal acts. First, one party may decide
to use violence to settle a dispute precisely because he or she knows that the other party
does not want to or will not use it. This may especially be done when the successful use
of violence in a dispute is heavily stacked in one person's favor, as may occur in cases
where an armed person attacks an unarmedone, a large man attacks a smaller woman,
424 THESOCIOLOGICAL Vol. 26/No. 3/1985
QUARTERLY

an adult attacksa small child, or an adolescent attacksa senior citizen. Furthermore,one

party may sometimes purposely conceal his or her intentionsto use violence in order to
increase the odds of its successful use in his or her favor. Finally, one partymay become
so enraged during a dispute that he or she may decide to use violence even if he or she
knows the other party does not wish it to be used to settle the dispute.
Thus, neithermutualconsent nor even presumedmutualconsent among the conflicting
partiesto use violence to settle their disputes is a necessary condition or essential feature
of purely assaultive violent criminal acts. Two cases of aggravatedassault taken from a
study (Athens, 1980) based uponin-depthinterviewswith violent offendersandparticipant
observationof violent criminal acts ratherdramaticallyillustratethis point:

Case33 (aggravated
assault)
I was overat my partner'spaddrinkingwine andsmokingdopelateone night,and
I calleda taxi to takeme homesince I had wreckedmy car. The driverpulledup,
andI ranout. I openedthe doorto his taxi, andhe askedme whereI was going. I
told him to street in , and he said, "Well, that's over a ten mile
trip;you'llhaveto payme the farein advancebeforeI'll driveyou there."I got mad
as shit becauseI wantedto get home, andI didn'thave anycash to be payinghim
in advancewith.I said, "You'refuckingcrazy,old man;I've takena taxitheremany
timesat nightandneverhadto pay in advance;my dadwill pay you yourmoneyas
soon as we get there;here'smy wallet,you can look at my name."He said, "All
right,get in; don'tget shookup, I believeyou;I don'tneedto see yourwallet."
As soon as we took off, he startedtellingme aboutall the timesthathe had been
burntby peopletakinghis cab. I just saidto myself, "Whyis thisold bastardtelling
me all thisshit?I'm notgoingto riphimoff;I toldhimthatI was goingto payhim."
I just sat in the backof the taxi not sayinga word,andhe kepton tellingme about
how peoplewerealwaysrippinghim off, alongwith all the otherproblemsthathe
had. I thought,"Man,I've got fivetimesas manytroublesas he has;he mustreally
be a weak personto be telling someonethat he doesn'teven know all abouthis
personalproblems.I don'twantto hearthis bullshit."Finallyhis cryingto me set
my bloodboiling.The old fuckerwas reallyirkingme.
Whenhe drovethetaxidownthestreetthatmy housewason, I saidto myself, "This
old motherfucker handedme all thatshitbeforeI couldeven get in his taxi, andhe
hasbeensnivelingto me thewholefuckingtimeI've beenridingin it. Fuckings.o.b.,
I'm goingto cut his stinkingthroat."As soonas he stoppedthe cab, I openedup my
knifeandputthe bladeto him. (Athens,1980:25-26)

Case35 (aggravated
assault)
I wasjust cruisingaroundwith somefriendsof minedrinkingwine, smokingdope,
andeatinga few reds. We cameto an intersectionandsloweddownto makea turn
whenthisblackdudein a Thunderbird comingtheotherwaycutsus off in themiddle
whilehe madea turn.Thenhe droveby us witha big grinon his
of the intersection
face throwingthe bone. The friendof minewho was drivingjust turnedandstarted
goingthe otherway, butI suddenlysaidto myself"thatdirtyjive niggerflippingme
off andgrinning-nowhe thinkshe's one badnigger."ThenI grabbedthewheeland
CharacterContestsand ViolentCriminalConduct:A Critique 425

said,"TurnaroundandcatchthatniggerdrivingthatThunderbird." Westarted following

him, but afterhe madea coupleof turns,we lost him. He was too far aheadof us.
I said"Well,he's gotto be somewherein thisneighborhood, so let's justkeepdriving
aroundhereuntilwe spotthatThunderbird, becauseI'm out to bookthatnigger."I
couldstill see his big grinwhenhe shotus thebird,andit was drivingme up a wall.
Therewasjust no way thatI was goingto quitlookingfor thatmotherfucker. I was
outrightdetermined to havehis ass one way or another.
FinallyI spottedhis car in a drivewayin frontof a house, and I told X who was
drivingto pulloverandparkin frontof thehouse.ThenI snappedmyshotguntogether
andloadedit. One of my friendssaid, "HeyY, whatthe hell is yourtrip?"I said,
"It'sjust my trip"andjumpedoutof thecar.I didn'tcareaboutanythingbuthaving
that nigger'sass. All I thoughtwas, "I'mgoing to kill this punk."I walkedup to
the houseandknockedon the frontdoor.He answeredthe door,but as soon as he
saw it was me, he slammedit shutin my face. ThenI kickedthe doorwideopenand
saw him makingtracksout the back door. I ran throughthe house afterhim and
jammedhimas he wasclimbingoverthebackfence.I leveledthebarrelof myshotgun
at his headandsaid, "Nigger,get off thatfence."Afterhe did, I said, "Headback
into thathouse."I wantedto fuck him up in the houseso nobodywouldsee it, but
whenwe got to the backdoor,he stoppedandsaid, "Man,I haven'tdoneanything
to you, pleasedon'thurtme." His snivelingmademe madder.I shovedthe barrel
into his backandsaid, "Man,go intothathouse."He still wouldn'tgo in, butjust
keptbeggingme notto shoothim.Thispissedme off evenmore.I lostall my patience
and said "Fuckit" and shothim rightwherehe was standing.(Athens,1980:29-
30)

In both of the aggravated assault cases described above, the offenders assaulted their
victims even thoughthe victims had made perfectly clear thatthey never wantedto engage
in violence.
Although Luckenbill (1977: 181-183) found that in most of the criminal homicide
transactionswhich he studied the conflicting parties at least believed that there existed a
workingagreementto use violence to settletheirdispute,his findingshave been contradicted
by those of another study. Felson and Steadman (1983) recently conducted a study of
159 purely assaultive violent criminal acts in which they also examined the actions of
both the offendersand victims. They statedthattheir findings "cast doubton Luckenbill's
major conclusion that there is a working agreementamong participantsthat violence is
appropriate"(p. 71). Thus, mutualconsentamongthe conflictingpartiesfor using violence
to settle their disputes may not even be a typical feature of purely assaultive violent
criminal acts, much less a necessary stage which disputes must pass throughin order for
them to occur as this theory presumes.
There is also a second reason why the notion of charactercontest distorts the true
natureof most violent criminal acts: the meanings with which most violent criminal acts
are imbued are different from that of a charactercontest. A charactercontest presumes
thatpeople always commit violent criminalacts only in orderto display a strongcharacter
and maintainhonor and face or to avoid displaying a weak characterand losing honor
and face. However, this is not the meaning which the perpetratorsof violent criminal
426 THESOCIOLOGICAL Vol. 26/No. 3/1985
QUARTERLY

acts often attributeto their actions. This fact can be demonstratedeven in the case of
purely assaultive violent criminal acts to which the notion of charactercontest should,
by definition, be the most applicable.
Two very different kinds of purely assaultive violent criminal acts can be used to
demonstratethis. One kind is where A makes a move towardB or an intimateof B which
B interpretsas indicatingthat A is planningto physically attack or is alreadyphysically
attacking one or both of them. As a result, B attacks A. Here B does not physically
attack A in order to avoid losing a charactercontest, but ratherto protect his or her or
an intimate's physical safety. The emotion which B generates in him or herself from
defining A's move as physically threateningis fear ratherthan pride or shame. Thus, the
accent of meaning must be placed upon B's desire to prevent injury and not upon the
desire to display a strong character and maintain honor and face. Two cases which
Luckenbillconstructedfrom official documentsand presentedin his own article illustrate
this point perfectly:

Case23
The offender'swife movedtowardthe victim,andhit him in the backof the head
withan emptybeerbottlestating,"That'llteachyou to [molest]my boy. I oughtto
cut yourballsoff, you motherfucker."
She wentto the barto get anotherbottle.The
victimpushedhimselffromthe tableandrose. He thenreachedinto his pocketto
securesomethingwhichsomebystanders thoughtwasa weapon.Oneof thebystanders
gavetheoffenderanaxehandleandsuggestedthathe stopthevictimbeforethevictim
attackedhis wife. The offendermovedtowardthe victim.(1977: 184).

Case35
Duringa familyquarrelthe victimhadbrokenthe stereoandseveralotherhousehold
goods.Atonepoint,thevictimcutherhusband,theoffender,on thearm.Hedemanded
thatshe sit downandwatchtelevisionso thathe couldattendto his woundin peace.
On returningfromthe bathroomhe sat downandwatchedtelevision.Shortlyafter,
the victimrose fromher chair,grabbedan ashtray,andshouted,"Youbastard,I'm
goingto kill you."As she cametowardhim, the offenderreachedintothedrawerof
theendtable,secureda pistol,andshother.Onarrest,theoffendertoldpoliceofficers,
"Youknow how she gets whenshe's drunk?I hadto stop her, or she wouldhave
killedme. She's triedit before,that'show I got all thesescars,"pointingto several
areason his back.(Luckenbill,1977:181)

Another very differentkind of purely assaultive violent criminal act can also be used
to furtherdemonstratethe fact that the perpetratorsof such acts impute a meaningto their
actions different from that of a charactercontest. Take even the case where A makes a
move toward B or an intimateof B's which B interpretsas belittling or highly insulting.
On the basis of this move by A, B then draws the conclusion that A is an extremely evil
or malicious person and deserves to be physically harmed. Here, B attacks A in order
to express his or her contempt for the type of person A representsratherthan to display
a strong characterand maintainhonor and face. The emotion which B generates in him
or herself from defining A as extremely evil or malicious is hate or disgust ratherthan
CharacterContestsand ViolentCriminalConduct:A Critique 427

pride or shame. Thus, the accent of meaning must be placed upon the desire of B to
express his or her hatred and disgust for A and not upon B's desire to win a character
contest which may or may not have been going on between them. Again two cases which
Luckenbill(1977) constructedfrom public documentsandpublishedin his articleillustrate
this very point:

Case 10
Whenthe victimfinallycamehome,the offenderaskedherto sit down;theyhadto
talk. He askedher if she was "foolingaround"withothermen. She statedthatshe
had, andherboyfriendspleasedhermorethantheoffender.Theoffenderlaterstated
that"thiswas like a hot ironin my gut."He rippedherclothesoff andexaminedher
body, findingscarsandbruises.She saidthather boyfriendslikedto beather. His
angermagnified.(p. 180)

Case28
As the offenderenteredthe backdoorof the househis wife said to her lover, the
victim, "There's ." The victimjumpedto his feet and starteddressing
hurriedly.Theoffender,havingcalledto his wife withoutavail,enteredthebedroom.
He foundhis wife nudeandthe victimcladin underwear. Thestartledoffenderasked
the victim, "Why?"The victimreplied,"Haven'tyou ever been in love?We love
eachother."Theoffenderlaterstated,"Iftheyweredrunkor something,I couldsee
it. I mean,I've doneit myself.Butwhenhe saidtheylovedeachother,well thatdid
it." (p. 180)

A second importantthing which any theory of violent criminal behavior must do is

adequately explain why some people have a greater propensity to engage in violent
criminalacts thanothers. In the case of a theorybased upon charactercontests, this would
requireexplaining why only certaintype(s) of persons will push charactercontests to the
point where violence must be resortedto in orderto settle them. According to Goffman
(1967: 211-212, 267-268), the ideal candidates for pushing charactercontests to this
point are persons without any current stake in conventional institutions.4Since people
without a stake in conformityhave nothing to lose, they can easily affordto demonstrate
the strengthsof theircharactersandtherebyprotecttheirhonorsandfaces throughresorting
to violence, whereas persons with a stake in conformity cannot easily afford to do so.
Unfortunately, this explanation has three importantshortcomings. First, it is based
upon the dubious assumptionthat all persons would readily resortto the use of violence
to win charactercontests if it were not for the fact that they have a current stake in
conformity and something to lose. However, most people do not experience strong or
deeply felt desires to physically assault other people, even though they sometimes may
express such sentiments. Even if they did sometimes genuinely experience these desires,
most people do not believe thatresortingto violence usually demonstratesstrongcharacter
but ratherthatit demonstratesweak or defective character.Thus, the notionthateverybody
would always resort to violence to win charactercontests if only they did not have
something to lose is, at the very least, extremely dubious.
428 THESOCIOLOGICAL Vol. 26/No. 3/1985
QUARTERLY

Secondly, this explanationis also based upon the closely relatedand even more dubious
assumptionthatpersons eitherhave a stake in the conventionalsocial world or institutions
or have no stake in any social world at all. It does not take into accountthat some persons
may have a stake in social worlds other than a conventional one. The very desires and
perspectiveswhich are underminedby the stakeheld in one social world may be promoted
by the stake held in another.Of course, the kinds of social worlds in which people have
a stake may be related:the lack of a stake in the conventionalsocial world may sometimes
be an inducementto develop a stake in a non-conventionalone. Having a stake in a non-
conventional social world can often be predicatedupon not having one in conventional
ones and vice versa.
In any case, it simply may not be, as this explanationpresumes, that people refrain
from using violence to win charactercontests only because they have a stake in the
conventional social world or institutionsand have something to lose. Instead, it may be
that at the time a person does not have any stake in a violent social world and thereby
does not perceive any real need to, or benefitfrom, the resortto violence for this purpose.
Or more precisely speaking, a person may not at the time have a greatercommitmentto
a violent social world than to a non-violent one. Thus, resortingto violence duringface-
to-face conflicts can have more to do with the specific kinds of social worlds in which
people have their greatestcommitments, ratherthan simply whetheror not they do or do
not have any stakein one particularone--the conventionalsocial world (see, for example,
Horowitz and Schwartz, 1974).
A third and final shortcomingof this explanationis perhapsthe most importantone.
Even though people who have what appearto be "low" stakes in the conventional social
world may engage in violent criminal acts more often than those who appear to have
"high" stakes, many more persons who have low stakes do not engage in violent criminal
acts than do engage in them. Otherwise, there would probablybe very few persons with
low stakes alive, since they would soon annihilateeach other. Moreover, it is not as rare
as it was once believed for persons with high stakes to engage in criminal violence,
especially against women and childrenin the hidden confines of their own homes. Thus,
some other factor or factors, perhapsgrossly associated with, but not identical to, stake
in conformity, must make certain persons much more prone to violence than others.

DISCUSSION
The critical remarksjust made about Goffman's ideas of charactercontest and stake in
conformity not only point out the serious problems that emerge from using his ideas to
explain violent criminal behavior, but serves to point out the danger in using his ideas
to explain other kinds of behavior as well. Since Goffman's analyses of the microscopic
areasof social life are so amazinglyintricate,penetrating,and imaginative,they deceptively
appearto be completely authenticor "true to life" (see, Glaser and Strauss, 1967:137).
They particularlyappearso to people who do not have any real first-handknowledge of
the specific areaof social life to which Goffman's analyses are applied. Thus, Goffman's
ideas may be used as a foundationfor studies without the question ever being raised as
to whether or not his ideas actually fit the area of social life under study. The end result
CharacterContestsand ViolentCriminalConduct:A Critique 429

is that Goffman's ideas become reified:the social acts and actors being studied are made
to conform to the shape of his ideas ratherthan vice-versa. The fact that Goffman's
analyses have been criticizedin the past for distortingthe actualnatureof social interaction
underscoresthe importanceof pointing out the danger of reifying his ideas in empirical
studies (see, especially, Blumer, 1972; Denzin andKeller, 1981). All theoreticalanalyses,
including those admittedly as ingenious as Goffman's, must ultimately be empirically
grounded (see, Athens, 1984:263-65).

CONCLUSION
Any theory of violent criminalbehaviormust ultimatelyexplain the natureof both violent
criminal action and actorsratherthanjust one or the other. To its credit, Goffman's work
providedthe basis for a theory which explainedboth, but unfortunatelyexplained neither
one adequately. First, with respect to the violent criminal act, a much more diversified
conception is needed than thatwhich can be providedby the notion of a charactercontest.
A conception of violent criminalaction is needed which, at a minimum, can include both
purely assaultive violent criminal acts and violent criminal acts committed during the
course of other crimes. It must also take into account that neither all purely assaultive
violent criminal acts nor all those committed during the course of other crimes display
the same underlying patternof meaning. Thus, a much more refined differentiationof
violent criminal acts is needed than that which can be providedby this rathercrude two-
fold classification. At best, the notion of a charactercontest only provides the basis for
a potentially persuasiveexplanationof an extremely limited subclass of purely assaultive
violent criminal acts which closely approximate"duels" of a much earlier era.5 Such
violent acts are now probably extremely rare and primarily occur only during some
adolescent conflicts (see, Horowitz and Schwartz, 1974).
The theory provides an even weakerexplanationof the natureof violent criminalactors
than it does of violent criminal action. A much more complex conception of the violent
actor is needed than that which can be providedby the concept of "stake in conformity."
A conception of the violent actor is needed which takes into account the fact that violent
actors are not merely people without any currentstake in conformity, but instead, are
people with a greatercurrentcommitmentto a violent social world than to a non-violent
one. Thus, what is crucial is the relative strengthof the commitmentthat a person has
to a violent social world versus a non-violent one. Engaging in violence is not only a
matterof having nothing to lose, but also a matterof having something to gain. People
who have a greater commitment to a violent social world than to a non-violent one
perceive they have less to lose and more to gain by engaging in violence than do those
who have a greater commitment to a non-violent social world. The more committed a
person is to a violent social world than a non-violent one, the more violent he or she
will likely be.
Consequently,what is now needed is a much more inclusive, complexand exact theory
of violent criminalbehaviorthanthatwhich can be providedby Goffman'scomplementary
notions of charactercontest and stake in conformityor relatednotion of face-saving. The
foundationsof such a theory are alreadyprovidedin my work (Athens 1974, 1977, 1980,
430 THESOCIOLOGICAL Vol. 26/No. 3/1985
QUARTERLY

1985), which is based upon the quite different and much more generic idea of the
"generalized other" made famous by George HerbertMead (1934: 138, 309; Blumer,
1937: 180-185). Only the bare outlines of this theory can be describedhere.
Three types of violent criminal actors are distinguished in this interactionisttheory:
(1) "marginallyviolent" actorswho possess "non-violent"generalizedothers;(2) "violent"
actors who possess "mitigatedviolent" generalizedothers;and (3) "ultra-violent"actors
who possess "unmitigatedviolent" generalizedothers. In addition, four types of violent
criminalacts are distinguished:(1) "physicallydefensive,"(2) "frustrative,"(3) "malefic,"
and (4) "frustrative-malefic" violentcriminalacts. The firstand thirdtypes would constitute
purely assaultive violent criminal acts, but the second and fourth types could constitute
eitherviolent criminalacts committedduringthe courseof othercrimesor purelyassaultive
ones.
The relationshipis also identified in this theory between the types of violent criminal
actors and the types of violent criminal acts that they engage in. More specifically,
marginallyviolent people only engage in physically defensive violent acts; violent people
only engage in physically defensive or frustrative-maleficviolent acts; whereas ultra-
violent people engage in any of the four types of violent criminalacts mentionedabove.
Thus, the theory directly takes into account rather than ignores three obvious facts
aboutviolent criminalbehavior.The firstone is thatthere is more thanone type of violent
criminal. The second one is that there is more than one type of violent criminal act. The
third fact is that different types of violent criminals are capable of engaging in quite
differenttypes of violent criminal acts.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
An earlier version of this paper was presentedat "The Second National Family Violence
Research Conference" held at Durham, New Hampshire,August 1984. I would like to
thank Marilyn and Maureen O'Rourke Athens for their interest in this paper and Pete
Wales for his encouragement. Finally, I would also like to thank Norman Denzin for
pushing me to complete this paper which has been in the works for some time.

NOTES
1. Luckenbill (1977: 176-177) examined documents on seventy-one cases of criminal homicide which
representedall the criminal homicides committed over a ten year period in one California county, with the
importantexception of felony or contractmurders.
2. It should be pointed out that in his essay, Goffman (1967: 242-245) does delineate at least two stages
in charactercontests: he calls the first stage "provocation"and the second one "run-in." However, Goffman
does not clearly identify the additional stages which charactercontests must go through in order for them to
end in criminal violence. Nevertheless, the first two of the five stages describedby Luckenbillare virtuallythe
same as the provocation and run-in stages described by Goffman.
3. Unfortunately,Luckenbill did not recognize the critical implication of this importantnegative finding
for his study: At least 14 percentof the criminalhomicide transactionswhich he studiedcould not have resulted
from charactercontests.
CharacterContestsand ViolentCriminalConduct:A Critique 431

4. Of course, the more general idea that persons without a stake in conformity are much more prone to
engage in deviant behavior than those with a stake had been aroundfor some time priorto Goffman's writing
this essay (see, Toby, 1957).
5. In describing charactercontests, Goffman (1967: 207, 242, 247, 258) often refers to duels.

REFERENCES
Athens, L.
1974 "The self and the violent criminal act." UrbanLife and Culture3 (April): 98-112.
1977 "Violent crime: a symbolic interactioniststudy." Symbolic Interaction1 (Fall): 56-70.
1980 Violent Criminal Acts and Actors: A Symbolic InteractionistStudy. London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul.
1984 "Scientific criteria for evaluating qualitative studies." Pp. 259-268 in N. Denzin (ed.), Studies in
Symbolic Interaction,Vol. 5. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
1985 "Types of violent persons: towards the development of a symbolic interactionisttheory of violent
criminal behavior." Paper presentedat the annual meeting of the Society for the Study of Symbolic
Interaction,Washington, D.C.
Blumer, H.
1937 "Social psychology." Pp. 144-198 in E. Schmidt (ed.), Man and Society. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall.
1972 "Action vs. interaction."Transaction9 (April): 50-53.
1980 "Preface." Pp. ix-xii in L. Athens, Violent Criminal Acts and Actors: A Symbolic Interactionist
Study. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Denzin, N.
1982 "Notes on criminology and criminality."Pp. 115-130 in H. Pepinsky(ed.), RethinkingCriminology.
Beverly Hills: Sage.
Denzin, N., and C. Keller
1981 "Frame analysis reconsidered."ContemporarySociology 10: 52-60.
Dietz, M.
1983 Killing for Profit:The Social Organizationof Felony Homicide. Chicago: Nelson Hall.
Felson, R. and H. Steadman
1983 "Situationalfactors in disputes leading to criminal violence." Criminology 21 (February):59-74.
Felson, R.
1978 "Aggression as impression management."Social Psychology 41 (September):205-213.
1981 "An interactionistapproachto aggression."Pp. 181-199 in J. Tedeschi (ed.), ImpressionManagement
Theory and Social Psychological Research. New York:Academic Press.
Glaser, B. and A. Strauss
1967 The Discovery of GroundedTheory. Chicago: Aldine.
Goffman, E.
1967 InteractionRitual: Essays on Face-to-FaceBehavior. New York:Doubleday.
Hepburn,J.
1973 "Violent behavior in interpersonalrelationships."Sociological Quarterly14 (Summer):419-429.
Horowitz, R., and G. Schwartz
1974 "Honor, normative ambiguity and gang violence." American Sociological Review 39 (April): 238-
251.
Luckenbill, D.
1977 "Criminalhomicide as a situatedtransaction."Social Problems 25 (December): 176-186.
Mead, G. H.
1934 Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Toby, J.
1957 "Social disorganizationand stake in conformity:Complementaryfactors in the predatorybehaviorof
hoodlums." Journalof CriminalLaw, Criminology and Police Science 48 (May-June): 12-17.