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ATS ACTION:
ATA ACTIONS:
Does 1-254, each of whom alleges the loss of a family member from war crimes perpetrated
by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (the “FARC”), previously sought imposition of
a constructive trust against blocked United States-based FARC-related assets frozen by the Office
of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”). A portion of these assets were recently recovered by Anti-
terrorism Act (“ATA”) Plaintiffs Stansell and Pescatore in the execution of default judgments
obtained against the FARC in parallel lawsuits lodged in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida and the United States District Court for the District of Colombia.
Case 0:08-md-01916-KAM Document 2715 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/19/2020 Page 2 of 5
Finding no basis for the requested equitable relief over the assets of an alleged non-party
joint tortfeasor, the Court denied the motion. [DE 2684]. The Doe Plaintiffs now move for
reconsideration of that ruling [DE 2688]. They also contemporaneously move for leave to file a
Second Amended Complaint adding the FARC as a party defendant to their lawsuit [DE 2689].
The Stansell and Pescatore Plaintiffs have filed a joint Opposition to the motions [DE 2695].
Defendant Chiquita takes no position on the motion for reconsideration [DE 2698], while
opposing the motion to amend as untimely [DE 2696]. Does 1-254 have filed their Reply [DE
Upon consideration of the motion for reconsideration, the Court finds no justification for
revisiting its prior ruling on the constructive trust issue and denies the motion.1 As to the motion
to add new parties to this lawsuit – filed nine years into this suit – the Court denies the motion as
plainly untimely and unsupported by adequate cause. Plaintiffs do not adequately address the
opposing parties’ contention that the proposed amendment would be futile, vis a vis statute of
1
Plaintiffs suggest, among other things, that comparative fault precepts would allow a non-party Fabre tortfeasor
(such as FARC) to be included on the verdict form in a future trial for an allocation of fault between all tortfeasors,
and, from here, posit that the FARC need not be a named party to suit in order to support the imposition of a
constructive trust against U.S.- based assets traceable to it. The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ Fabre- based theory that the
Court need not have FARC joined as a party to the action in order to award relief against its assets.
As a threshold matter, only Colombian law claims remain for adjudication in this case, and there is no record support
for the proposition that Colombian law follows the equivalent of a Florida law, Fabre tortfeasor-comparative fault
allocation. And, even if it did, while the Fabre rule generally allows determinations on the comparable fault of a non-
party to be determined in a negligence case without that party being joined in the action, such comparative fault
determinations cannot be made where the “action comprehending one or more negligent torts actually has at its core
an intentional tort by someone.” Merrill Crossings Associates v. McDonald, 705 So.2d 560, 563 (Fla. 1997). Such is
the case here.
Finally, even if apportioning of fault could be applied in the context of intentional torts, a finding of comparable fault
on the part of a non-party would not permit the Court to award affirmative relief against that party or execution against
its assets in the absence of that party’s joinder.
In short, Plaintiffs’ Fabre-arguments have no bearing on the relevant legal requirements for imposition of a
constructive trust and do not support the prejudgment, constructive trust claim it advances here against the non-party
FARC.
2
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limitation impediments, nor do they overcome the suggestion of jurisdictional impediments which
they themselves raised by way of explaining their initial strategical decision not to sue the FARC
in this litigation.
On the latter point, Plaintiffs earlier complained, in their initial motion seeking imposition
of a constructive trust over FARC assets, that the United States District Courts for the Middle
District of Florida and District of Colombia (the fora in which default judgments against the FARC
were issued on behalf of the Pescatore and Stansell Plaintiffs) lacked jurisdiction over the FARC,
under established U.S. Supreme Court authority and other controlling precedent, and that the
judgments entered by the district courts in those cases were therefore null and void. Going further,
Does 1-254 contended that Rule 11 prohibited the filing of those claims against the FARC by the
Pescatore and Stansell Plaintiffs, representing that “[n]o attorney could prosecute these kinds of
claims in good faith in the face of such clear Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit precedent.” [DE
2667, pp. 16-17]. They further explained, “Does 1-144 and Does 1-254 didn’t sue the FARC
directly because they are (sic) an unincorporated foreign terrorist organization,” and instead
determined to pursue claims against Chiquita only as a public corporation secondarily liable for
Having previously asserted that no United States’ court could legitimately exercise
jurisdiction over the FARC; that it may have been unethical for the Stansell and Pescatore
Plaintiffs to pursue claims against the FARC in the United States district courts in light of that
jurisdictional impediment; and that Does 1-254 made a deliberate decision not to sue the FARC
at the outset of this case due to perceived jurisdictional or other legal impediments to such claims,
it is incumbent on the Doe Plaintiffs to explain the abandonment of their earlier, polar positions
3
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on the FARC’s amenability to suit in this MDL. Their failure to do so militates against the
suggestion that the interests of justice would be furthered by permitting the proposed amendment.
Given Plaintiffs’ failure to address the suggestion of futility posed by the proposed
amendment, in addition to the advanced stage of this litigation, the prejudice to other parties likely
to stem from further motion practice and delays attending the addition of new parties, and the
absence of any justification for Plaintiffs’ delay in bringing the motion, the Court denies the
motion. Hester v. Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, 941 F.2d 1574, 1579 (11th Cir.
1991) (no abuse of discretion in refusing to allow amendment of claims under Rule 15 standard
two years after notice of deficiencies, given long history of case and inexplicable delay in seeking
to amend); Smith v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 5 F.3d 488, 494 (11th Cir. 1993) (upholding disallowance
As a concluding note, the Court addresses the issue of extant deadlines for amendment to the
pleadings and joinder of new parties in the cases subsumed within this MDL. In advance of the
Court’s Original Global Scheduling Order, the Court solicited the parties’ proposals for pretrial
scheduling. In response, on February 1, 2017, the parties submitted a joint proposed scheduling
order [DE 1264] which included a March 10, 2017 cut-off date for joinder of additional parties
and amendment of pleadings [DE 1264, p. 1]. Mr. Wolf expressly joined in that agreed proposal
[DE 1264, p. 8]. When the Court entered its Original Global Scheduling Order on April 11, 2017,
largely tracking the parties suggestions and adjusting prospective dates as appropriate, it saw no
need to include the proposed cutoff date for amending the pleadings and joining parties because
the agreed-upon date had already passed by the time the Court entered its Order.
It was the Court’s intent to track and adopt the parties’ agreed cut-off date for those deadlines,
and to the extent there is any confusion or ambiguity on this point, the Court now applies that
4
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MARCH 10, 2017 deadline which was proposed and agreed to by the parties as the operative cut-
off date. Therefore, going forward the Rule 16 standard shall apply to any future requests for
To be clear, in its disposition of the current motion to amend, the Court nevertheless applied
the more liberal Rule 15 standard to conclude that the interests of justice do not support the
requested relief and denied the motion due to Plaintiff’s unwarranted delay in bringing the motion,
in addition to the other factors outlined above. All future motions to amend will be governed under
1. Plaintiffs’ (Does 1-254) Motion for Reconsideration of the September 8, 2020 Order
denying imposition of a constructive trust over United States-based FARC assets [DE
1268] is DENIED.
2. Plaintiffs’ (Does 1-254) Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint adding
3. The Global Scheduling Order(s) in this case are clarified to identify MARCH 17, 2017
as the operative cut-off date for amendment of pleadings and joinder of parties per
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Florida this 19th day of
October, 2020.
KENNETH A. MARRA
United States District Judge