6.

Enrolled his minor children of school age in any of the public or private
schools recognized by the Government where Philippine history, government and
civics are taught as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of
residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for
naturalization.

Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for naturalization 'must have enrolled

his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools
recognized by the Office of the Private Education of the Philippines, where Philippine
history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum
during the entire period of residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the
hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen. If an alien woman
has  minor  children  by a previous marriage to another alien before she marries a
Filipino, and such minor  children  had not been enrolled in Philippine schools
during her period of residence in the coun try, she cannot qualify
for  naturalization  under the interpretation of this Court.    The reason behind the
requirement that children should be enrolled in recog nized educational
institutions is that they follow the citizen ship of their father.  (Chan Ho Lay v.
Republic, G.R. No. L-5666, March 30, 1954; Tan Hi v. Republic, 88 Phil. 117
[1951]; Hao Lian Chu v. Republic, 87 Phil. 668 [1950]; Yap Chin v. Republic, G.R. No.
L-4177, May 29, 1953; Lim Lian Hong v. Republic, G.R. No. L-3575, Dec. 26,
1950).  Considering that said minor children by her first husband generally follow the
citizenship of their alien father, the basis for such requirement as applied to her does
not exist.  Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.

[ G.R. No. L-11931, October 22, 1958 ]

CHING LENG ALIAS CHING BAN LEE AND SO BUAN TY VS. HON. EMILIO L.
GALANG

Again, one of the qualifications for the naturalization of a person is that "he must have
enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools
recognized by the Office of Private Education of the Philippines, where Philippine
history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as part, of the school,
curriculum, during the entire period of the residence In the Philippines required of him
prior to the hearing of his  petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen." (Sec. 2,
subdivision /b/, Com, Act No, 473.)  The purpose of this provision is, among other
things, to see to It that said  children, "as prospective citizens", are prepared to
become an integral part of the nation and to assume their duties as such. (Tan Hi
vs. Republic, L-3354, January 25, 1951; Ang Yee Roe Sengkee vs. Republic, L-3863,
December 27, 1951; Chua vs. Republic, 48 Off. Gaz., 1780; Kiap vs. Republic, 48 Off.
Gaz., 3362; Yap Chin vs. Republic, L-4177, May 29, 1953; Ho Lay vs. Republic, L-5666,
March 30, 1954; and Ku E vs. Republic, L-11364, May 28, 1958.)  As stated in Bangon
Du v. Republic of the Philippines, L-3683 (decided on January 28, 1953):

This purpose would, be thwarted if children  devoid of such educational

1
background, be became citizens of the Philippines in consequence of adoption by a
naturalized citizen of the Philippines.  Worse still, appellants' theory, if accepted, would
leave the door wide open to a very simple means to circumvent the provisions of
our naturalization and immigration laws.

Lastly, if adoption by a natural born citizen of the Philippines does not vest our
nationality in the adopted children, we can not see how adoption by a naturalized citizen
of the Philippines could have been meant to have a more far reaching effect.

(G.R. No. L-11499, April 29, 1961 ]

IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GO BON LEE

In connection with the question of appellee's failure to enroll all his minor children of

school age in a public or private school recognized by the Office of Private Education of
the Philippines, etc.—which is mandatory, failure to comply with it constituting a valid
ground for the denial of the petition for citizenship (Tan vs. Republic, etc. 92 Phil., 915;
49 Off. Gaz., p. 1409) or for the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization already
issued—it appears that when Go filed his petition for naturalization in 1941 he had
five minor children of school age, four of whom were then living in China, where they
were born, and had never been enrolled in any recognized public or private school in
the Philippines. It has been held in this connection that the fact that
applicant's minor children were born and have lived since infancy in China does
not excuse him from complying with this particular requirement of the law (Lim vs.
Republic etc., G. R. No. L-3575, Dec. 26, 1950; Hao Lian Chu vs. Republic etc., 87
Phil., 668; 48 Off. Gaz., p. 1780). Go's claim that his failure to comply with this legal
requirement was due to different factors beyond his control, such as the
unsettled conditions in China and the strictness of Philippine Immigration Laws,
do not constitute valid excuses for non-compliance (Hao Lian Chu vs. Republic
etc., supra). Moreover, according to appellee's own testimony, in 1930 he took his
daughter Juanita—who was born in Cebu—to China where she remained until she was
brought back to the Philippines in 1938. No satisfactory proof has been presented to
show that Go had exerted efforts at that time to bring to the Philippines his other
four minor children.

It has been a settled in numerous cases decided by the Supreme Court that the
requirement of enrolling the minor children of the petitioner in recognized Philippine
schools is for strict compliance. Now, this begs the question: what if the petitioner does
not have parental authority over his children, would he still be required to bring them to
the Philippines and enroll them in the recognized school provided under the law?

2
Pertinent jurisprudence on this matter gears towards answering the above question in
the affirmative.

In the case of Hao Lian Chu v. Republic, 1 where the trial court granted petitioner’s
naturalization and excused petitioner’s failure to enroll his minor child in the
Philippines because she was absent and was not under her father’s paternal care,
and ruled that requirement on children’s education was substantially complied
with, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and denied petitioner’s naturalization.
Thus:

“x x x The trial judge declared that as petitioner could not enroll Magdalena in the
Philippines, because she was absent and was not under parental care, the requirement
of the law as to children's education may be deemed to have been substantially fulfilled.
This court believes that such requirement is important. The legislator evidently holds
that all the minor children of an applicant for citizenship must learn Philippine history,
government and civics, inasmuch as upon naturalization of their father they ipso facto
acquire the privilege of Philippine citizenship. To excuse the applicant from this
requirement it must be shown that there was physical impossibility for him to
bring Magdalena here — impossibility which has not been shown in this case.”

In another case, Tan Hoi v. Republic,2 where the petitioner failed to enroll his son in
the Philippines for the reason that his son has already been adopted by and placed
under the care and custody of his godfather, the Supreme Court likewise did not accept
this reason, calling it a flimsy pretext. The pertinent portion of the case is as follows:

“x x x If petitioner had been sincere in complying with the requirement of the law relative
to education, he should have taken steps to bring his child to the Philippines so that he
may be enrolled in a school recognized by our government. But this he failed to do
under the pretext that he was adopted by his godfather, which to us appears flimsy as
we will later point out. x x x

But it is contended that petitioner could not have brought his son Tan Nam to the
Philippines for the reason that he has already been adopted by his godfather who
was financially able to give him education and support with the logical result that
his (petitioner's) naturalization will not benefit him (his son) because under the
law he will follow the citizenship of his adoption father. In the first place, there is no
sufficient evidence to show that the child was in effect adopted as claimed it appearing
that the alleged adoption is merely supported by petitioner's affidavit. In the second
place, this Court has already held that the rights of a legitimate child given to an
adoption child, as stated in Article 341 of our Civil Code, do not include the acquisition
of the citizenship of the adopter (Cheng Ling vs. Galang, L-11931, October 27, 1958).
Even, therefore, if we assume that petitioner's son has been adopted as claimed,
the fact remains that he would still retain the citizenship of his natural father with
the result that he should eventually benefit from it should his father become a

1
G.R. No. L-3265, November 29, 1950.
2
G.R. No. L-15266, September 30, 1960.

3
naturalization Filipino. Hence, the alleged adoption cannot justify petitioner's
failure to educate his Tan Nam as required by Law.”

Similarly, in the case of Wilfredo Go Bon Lee v. Republic,3 petitioner who was married
in China had six children who were already married and were no longer under his
parental authority argued that he had exerted utmost efforts to bring his children to the
Philippines but due to circumstances beyond his control, he was not able to do so which
accounted for his failure to enroll them in a school recognized in this country. The
Supreme Court did not find merit in his contention. Thus –

“We find no merit in this contention. In the first place, the mere fact that his mother-in-
law allegedly objected to the sending of his children to the Philippines on the dubious
ground that they were sickly and the travel might endanger their health does not
constitute an insurmountable barrier to bring them to the Philippines. It should be
observed that petitioner, by his own admission went to China on five different
occasions. He made the trips successively in 1924, 1933, 1937, 1938 and 1947 and in
any of these trips particularly before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war there could
certainly have been an occasion where his children were not sickly and, therefore, could
have been taken to the Philippines had he wished them to come and live in this country.
This he failed to do, and no satisfactory explanation was given to justify his
failure.”

The Supreme Court has even held in the case of Chua Pieng v. Republic 4 that even
the subsequent death of petitioner’s children cannot operate as an excuse for non-
compliance with the requirement of the law during the time that his children were still
living. Thus –

“x x x It was not impossible then for the petitioner to bring them back to the
Philippines. From all these circumstances the least we can say is that petitioner
has failed to prove satisfactorily that he had always desired to enroll all his
children in the public or private school in the Philippines. He has also enrolled two
of his children in the Chinese Republican School in Manila, an exclusive Chinese
school. From this we conclude that he has failed to comply with the requirement
contained in paragraph 6, section 2, of the Revised Naturalization Law. x x x

The subsequent death of petitioner's children at the time of the pendency of the
proceedings for his naturalization can give no benefit nor serve purpose to the
petitioner. The requirement of the law is that he must send all his children to the
public schools or private schools in the Philippines which are recognized by the
Government and which are not limited to any race or nationality. The petitioner
undoubtedly failed to comply with this requirement while all his children were still
living; the death of two of them, who were not in the Philippines, cannot operate
as an excuse for non-compliance with the requirement of the law.”

3
G.R. No. L-21981, May 19, 1966.
4
G.R. No. L-4032, October 25, 1952.

4
Hence, by implication, it can be said that even if the person who seeks judicial
naturalization has no legal authority over his minor children under his national law, he is
still not exempt from the requirement under the law. He must still show that he had
taken steps to enroll his children in recognized Philippine schools as early as possible.
In case he fails to do so, he must show that it was by reason of physical impossibility.
The rationale behind this educational requirement is laid out in the case of Julio Chua
Lian Yan v. Republic:5

“Petitioner's excuse that his failure to enroll his son in the Philippines was
because he encountered difficulties in bringing him here from abroad, is
unavailing. The reason for the requirement just mentioned is that upon naturalization of
the father, his children ipso facto become Philippine citizens and "[i]t is the policy of the
Philippine Government to have prospective citizens, children of applicants for
naturalization, learn and imbibe the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos as
well as their democratic form of government." 4 And the learning process should
start "as early as possible, and the first formative years are the most important
for the purpose."

x x x Petitioner may not make a point by saying that after the Philippine Sun Yat Sen
schooling, the child was transferred, as aforesaid to the Paco Catholic School, and then
to the Far Eastern University. This change of attitude came too late. It was subsequent
to the filing of the petition for naturalization. He is still short of the requirement in Section
2, paragraph Sixth of the Revised Naturalization Law. For, that schooling was not
"during the entire period" of petitioner's residence in the Philippines "required of
him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen."

Jurisprudence has it that the requirement in paragraph Sixth, Section 2 of the Revised
Naturalization Law is mandatory and an absolute pre-requisite to naturalization;
and that non-compliance with this statutory requirement is fatal to the application
for naturalization. We do not propose to break away from the views just
expressed.”
Further, it has been held in the case of Yap Chun v. Republic 6 that the this
requirement to enroll the minor children constitutes as an evidence of petitioner’s intent
to assume the obligations of Filipino citizenship and if at any time during his stay in the
Philippines, he shows that he is unwilling to assume such obligations, his subsequent
application becomes untenable. In that case, the Supreme Court has held:

“We have elsewhere declared that compliance with the condition of enrolling his
children in our schools is required by law as evidence of petitioner's honest and
enduring intent to assume the duties and obligations of Filipino citizenship (Ng
Sin vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-7590, Sept. 20, 1955). Failure to comply with the
statutory condition operates, therefore, as a disqualification for citizenship, and
is fatal to the application for naturalization, as held in numerous cases. (See
previous decision in G.R. No. L-8642, 30 Jan. 1956.)

5
G.R. No. L-26416, April 25, 1969.
6
G.R. No. L-18516, January 30, 1964.

5
If the petitioner was thus disqualified, the fact that the child is now past school
age cannot cure the defect. The length of residence required of this applicant
becomes thus entirely irrelevant. If at any time during his stay in the Philippines
the applicant reveals his acts that he is not interested, or is unwilling to assume
the obligations of Filipino citizenship, his subsequent application becomes
untenable. To grant it becomes positively dangerous to the state.”

In conclusion, even if petitioner shows that under his national law, he no longer
exercises parental authority over his minor child at the time of filing his petition for
naturalization, he might still be questioned by the government why he did not enroll his
minor child when he still had such parental authority, keeping in mind that such
requirement has to be complied with during the entire period of residence provided
under the law, which is ten (10) years. Thus, unless petitioner can show that he failed to
enroll his child because it was physically impossible to bring his child to the country, his
failure to comply with the requirement will be fatal to his petition for naturalization.

[ G.R. No. L-27126, May 29, 1970 ]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF LOU C. LIM (LIM CHAT) TO BE ADMITTED
AS A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS LOU C. LIM (LIM CHAT), PETITIONER-
APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT.

To repeat, the petition was accomplished on the form prescribed under a law no longer

in force.  It thus failed to allege petitioner's good moral character, as well as his belief in
the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, both requisites not being found in
the former act.  Nor was there any allegation as to the  education in local
prescribed schools of petitioner's two elder  children, namely: Helen and Ben,
both surnamed Lou C. Lim, born on December 16, 1938 and June 12, 1936,
notwithstanding their being of school age during the entire period of petitioner's
residence in the country.  A defect, grave and fundamental in character, was
petitioner's failure to file a declaration of intention, a matter sufficient to call for a denial
of his application, again understandable but certainly not excusable as there was no
such requirement under the former law.

An even more fatal omission was the failure of such a petition to show that he was
possessed of one of the additional qualifications imposed by the
present Naturalization Act.  Thus: "He must have enrolled his minor children of school
age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of
Private Education, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in
the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as
Philippine citizen.

An even more insurmountable obstacle to any claim for exemption from the filing of the
declaration of intention was the fact manifest on the face of the petition that failed to
comply with the mandatory requirement that all his children be educated in the public

6
schools or private schools recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or
nationality. He mentioned six children but he alleged only four of them as having
been enrolled in a school duly recognized by the government, where Philippine
history, government and civics are taught.   As stated earlier, there was no
allegation as to the compliance with such requisite concerning the two
elder children, Helen and Ben.

[ G.R. No. L-15266, September 30, 1960 ]

TAN HOI, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.

The Office of the Solicitor General opposed petitioner's petition to take the oath of
allegiance on the ground that one of his children, Tan Nam, who was already of school
age at the time of the hearing, was in Hongkong and had never been in the Philippines,
which indicates that he has, failed to send him to a school recognized by the Office of
Private Education. And so he has committed an act "prejudicial to the interest of the
nation or contrary to any Government announced policies," as embodied in the
Revised Naturalization Law.

Section 2, paragraph 6 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires as one of the

qualifications of an applicant for naturalization that he must have enrolled
his minor children of school age in any of the public or private schools recognized by the
Office of Private Education where Philippine history, government and civics are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum during the entire period of the residence in the
Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization. The
importance of this requirement has been repeatedly emphasized by this Court in a
number of cases wherein it was intimated that such requirement is mandatory.
Thus, it was held that the fact that the  children of an applicant when they left the
Philippines for China in 1937 were not yet of school age and could not be brought
back to the Philippines when they were already of school age due to the civil war in
China, or that the applicant could not finance the return of his  minor children to the
Philippines in addition to the strictness of the Philippine immigration authorities,
was no valid excuse for non-compliance with this requirement. (Koe Sengkee vs.
Republic, 90 Phil., 595; Tan Hi vs. Republic, 88 Phil., 117). It was also held that the
last world war was no reason to dispense with the compliance with such
requirement as otherwise it would be to establish a dangerous precedent (Uy
Boco vs. Republic, 85 Phil., 320; 47 Off. Gaz., 3442, 3445, 3447). Likewise,
a petition for naturalization was denied where it was shown that one of
the minor children of petitioner Was in China since her infancy and was never given
a chance to study in the Philippines (Lian Chu vs. Republic, 87 Phil., 668; 48 Off. Gaz.,

7
1780). And since the effect of naturalization is to extend to the children of the applicant
the privilege of citizenship, this Court has emphasized that "It is the policy of the
Philippine Government to have prospective citizens, * * * learn and imbibe the customs,
traditions and ideals of the Filipinos as well as their democratic form of government," as
embodied in our Naturalization Law. (Koe Sengkee vs. Republic, supra; See also Du vs.
Republic, 92 Phil., 519.)

Now there is no dispute that one of the children of petitioner, named Tan Nam, was born
in Canton, China on October 10, 1949 and since then has never been in the Philippines
which shows that at the time of the hearing of the petition for naturalization more than
two years ago he was already seven years old. If petitioner had been sincere in complying
with the requirement of the law relative to education, he should have taken steps to
bring his child to the Philippines so that he may be enrolled in a school recognized
by our government. But this he failed to do under the pretext that he was adopted by his
godfather, which to us appears flimsy as we will later point out. It is true that this
question should have been raised by the government when the hearing of
the naturalization case came up and apparently it was passed up thru an oversight, but we
disagree with the opinion that it can no longer be entertained at this stage of the
proceeding for, as we have already pointed out, the educational requirement of the law is
one of the avowed policies of our government. And since one of the requirements of
Republic Act No. 530 is that the applicant should not commit, during the period of two
years, any "act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government
announced policies" (Section 1), the inescapable conclusion is that petitioner has failed to
comply with all the requirements to entitle him to take the oath of allegiance.

But it is contended that petitioner could not have brought his son Tan Nam to the
Philippines for the reason that he has already been adopted by his godfather who was
financially able to give him education and support with the logical result that his
(petitioner's) naturalization will not benefit him (his son) because under the law he will
follow the citizenship of his adopting father. In the first place, there is no sufficient
evidence to show that the child was in effect adopted as claimed it appearing that the
alleged adoption is merely supported by petitioner's affidavit. In the second place, this
Court has already held that the rights of a legitimate child given to an adopted child, as
stated in Article 341 of our Civil Code, do not include the acquisition of the citizenship of
the adopter (Cheng Ling vs. Galang, L-11931, October 27, 1958). Even, therefore, if we
assume that petitioner's son has been adopted as claimed, the fact remains that he would
still retain the citizenship of his natural father with the result that he should
eventually benefit from it should his father become a naturalized Filipino. Hence,
the alleged adoption cannot justify petitioner's failure to educate his son Tan Nam
as required by law.