Title:Cagayan Valley Drug Corp. v. CIR, G.R. No.

151413, February 13, 2008

Original Plaintiff: Cagayan Valley Drug Corp.

Original Defendant: CIR

Facts: Petitioner, Mercury Drug, alleged that in 1995, it granted 20% sales discounts to qualified senior citizens on purchases of
medicine pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 74323. In compliance with Revenue Regulation No. (RR) 2-94, petitioner treated the
20% sales as deductions from the gross sales in order to arrive at the net sales, instead of treating them as tax credit as provided by
Section 4 of RA 7432. Petitioner filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) a claim for tax refund/tax credit of the full amount of
the 20% sales discount it granted to senior citizens for the year 1995, allegedly totaling to PhP 123,083 in accordance with Sec. 4 of
RA 7432. The BIR's inaction on petitioner's claim for refund/tax credit compelled petitioner to file on a Petition for Review before the
CTA in order to forestall the two-year prescriptive period provided under Sec. 2304 of the 1977 Tax Code.

RTC/CTA Ruling: The CTA rendered a Decision dismissing the Petition for Review for lack of merit. The CTA sustained petitioner's
contention that pursuant to Sec. 4 of RA 7432, the 20% sales discounts petitioner extended to qualified senior citizens in 1995
should be treated as tax credit and not as deductions. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied through the
appellate tax court's June 30, 2000 Resolution.

CA Ruling: The CA issued the assailed Resolution dismissing the petition on procedural grounds. The CA held that the person who
signed the verification and certification of absence of forum shopping failed to adduce proof that he was duly authorized by the
board of directors to do so. The CA found no sufficient proof to show that Concepcion was duly authorized by the Board of Directors
of petitioner.

Issue: Whether petitioner's president can sign the subject verification and certification sans the approval of its Board of Directors.
Whether the CTA committed error in denying Cagayan’s action for refund or tax credit.

SC Ruling: Yes, the president can sign the verification and certification. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, we
recognized the authority of a general manager or acting general manager to sign the verification and certificate against forum
shopping. In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification
without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General
Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.

CTA Decision shows that the appellate tax court correctly ruled that the 20% sales discounts Cagayan granted to qualified senior
citizens should be deducted from its income tax due and not from its gross sales as erroneously provided in RR 2-94. However, the
CTA erred in denying the tax credit to Cagayan on the ground that Cagayan had suffered net loss in 1995, and ruling that the tax
credit is unavailing.

The fact that the taxpayer incurred “net loss” in a taxable year, this does not preclude him from availing of its statutory right to a tax
credit for the 20% sales discounts it granted to qualified senior citizens. It is thus clear that petitioner is entitled to a tax credit for the
full 20% sales discounts it extended to qualified senior citizens for taxable year 1995.

Title: United Overseas Bank vs. Ros, et al., G.R. No. 171532, August 7, 2007
Original Plaintiff: United Overseas Bank
Original Defendant: Ros
Topic/Rule Number/Section: Jurisdiction

Facts: On 5 August 1998, private respondent filed an action for damages, accounting, release of the balance of the loan and
machinery and annulment of foreclosure sale against petitioner before the RTC of Manila. Private respondent alleged that it
obtained a loan of P80,000,000.00 in order to raise the needed capital for the importation of machineries necessary for its
operation,which was secured by two Real Estate Mortgage Contracts. The arrangement agreed to by the parties was for the
petitioner to handle on behalf of the private respondent the amount of P50,000,000.00 while the loan balance of P30,000,000.00 will
be released as a revolving credit line. Petitioner, however, allegedly mishandled the proceeds of the loan causing serious financial
injury to private respondent. Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss the private respondent's complaint on the ground of
improper venue since the said complaint included the prayer for the nullification of the foreclosure of real estate mortgage. The RTC
of Manila issued an Omnibus Resolution denying the same for lack of merit. Petitioner interposed a Motion for Reconsideration but it
was also denied by the lower court. Private respondent filed another action for Injunction with Damages before the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan. The petitioner filed a second Motion to Dismiss on the ground of forum shopping. The Manila RTC denied the second
Motion to Dismiss for lack or merit. A third Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 98-90089 was filed by the petitioner with the Manila
RTC this time raising the issue of jurisdiction. The Manila RTC denied petitioner's third Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
petitioner was already estopped to raise the issue. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, alleging that
the Manila RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Orders.

Issues: Whether or not the court of appeals erred in denying the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner.
Whether or not the petitioner is barred by laches from questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction

Held: After carefully examining the Order in light of the prevailing circumstances surrounding its issuance, we find nothing which
would support petitioner's contention that the lower court abused its discretion in denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss or that the
assailed Order was patently erroneous. In its Order, the lower court even recognized the validity of petitioner's claim of lack of
jurisdiction had it timely raised the issue. It bears to stress that the non-payment of the docket fees by private respondent and the
supposed lack of jurisdiction of the Manila RTC over Civil Case No. 98-90089 was raised by the petitioner only five years after
institution of the instant case and after one of the private respondent's witnesses was directly examined in open court. It is
incumbent upon the petitioner to file a Motion to Dismiss at the earliest opportune time to raise the issue of the court's lack of
jurisdiction, more so, that this issue is susceptible to laches. Petitioner's failure to seasonably raise the question of jurisdiction leads
us to the inevitable conclusion that it is now barred by laches to assail the Manila RTC's jurisdiction over the case.

In the case at bar, it was not shown that the private respondent, in failing to state the exact amount of damages it was claiming in its
Second Amended Complaint intended to defraud the court of the docket fees due. Upon filing of the original Complaint, the private
respondent paid docket fees in the amount of P42,000.00. With respect to petitioner's contention that the lower court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the amended complaint increasing the amount of damages, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the lower court
acquired jurisdiction over the case when private respondent paid the docket fee corresponding to its claim in its original complaint.
Its failure to fee the docket fee corresponding to its increased claim for damages under the amended complaint should not be
considered as having curtailed the lower court's jurisdiction. Pursuant to the ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion,
the unpaid docket fee should be considered as a lien on the judgment even though private respondent specified the amount of
P600,000.00 as its claim for damages in its amended complaint. Based on the foregoing, it is but proper that this case should be
allowed to continue until judgment, and the private respondent's unpaid docket fee should be considered as a lien on any monetary
judgment in its favor.

Title: Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. vs. RTC Negros Occidental, G.R. No. 179878 December 24, 2008
Original Plaintiff: Negros Oriental Planters Association
Original Defendant: RTC Negros Occidental
Topic/Rule Number/Section: Jurisdiction
Facts: On 17 March 1999, Campos filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract with Damages against NOPA before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City. Campos and NOPA entered into two separate contracts denominated as Molasses
Sales Agreement. Campos allegedly paid the consideration of the Molasses Sales Agreement in full, but was only able to receive a
partial delivery of the molasses because of a disagreement as to the quality of the products being delivered. More than six years
after NOPA filed its Answer, NOPA filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of an alleged failure of Campos to file the correct filing
fee. The RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 30 June 2006 Order.
Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order denying NOPA's Motion for Reconsideration. NOPA filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued the first assailed Resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari on the following
grounds:
1. Failure of the Petitioner to state in its Verification that the allegations in the petition are "based on authentic records", in
violation of Section 4, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC (May 1, 2000)
2. Failure of the petitioner to append to the petition relevant pleadings and documents, which would aid in the resolution of
the instant petition, in violation of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
3. Failure of petitioner's counsel to indicate in the petition his current IBP Official Receipt Number, in violation of Bar Matter
No. 1132 and/or A.M. No. 287
NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Resolution, attaching thereto an Amended Petition for Certiorari in
compliance with the requirements of the Court of Appeals deemed to have been violated by NOPA.
Issues: Whether or not the public respondent CA committed reversible error when it ruled that there was no substantial compliance
with the procedural requirements when petitioner failed to allege in its verification that the allegations therein are true and correct of
his personal knowledge or based on authentic records and failure to attach the necessary documents on its pleadings as required
by Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Held: No. NOPA claims that this Court has in several cases allowed pleadings with a Verification that contains the allegation "to the
best of my knowledge" and the allegation "are true and correct," without the words "of his own knowledge," citing Decano v. Edu and
Quimpo v. De la Victoria. NOPA is mistaken. NOPA cited cases promulgated before 1 May 2000, when Section 4 of Rule 7 was
amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10, which now reads “and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.” The amendment was introduced in order to make the verification requirement stricter, such that the
party cannot now merely state under oath that he believes the statements made in the pleading. Section 4 of Rule 7, as amended,
states that the effect of the failure to properly verify a pleading is that the pleading shall be treated as unsigned. A pleading,
therefore, wherein the Verification is merely based on the party's knowledge and belief produces no legal effect, subject to the
discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be remedied.
In the case at bar, NOPA alleges that Campos deliberately omitted a claim for unrealized profit of P100,000.00 and an excess
amount of storage fee in the amount of P502,875.98 in its prayer and, hence, the amount that should have been considered in the
payment of docket fees is P11,502,875.98. The amount allegedly deliberately omitted was therefore only P602,875.98 out of
P11,502,875.98, or merely 5.2% of said alleged total. Campos's pleadings furthermore evince his willingness to abide by the rules
by paying the additional docket fees when required by the Court. Since the circumstances of this case clearly show that there was
no deliberate intent to defraud the Court in the payment of docket fees, the case of Sun should be applied, and the Motion to
Dismiss by NOPA should be denied.

Title: San Miguel Corp. v. Monasterio, G.R. No. 151037, June 23, 2005
Original Plaintiff: San Miguel Corp
Original Defendant: Monasterio

Facts: On August 1, 1993, petitioner SMC entered into an Exclusive Warehouse Agreement (EWA) with SMB Warehousing
Services (SMB). SMB undertook to provide land, physical structures, equipment and personnel for storage, warehousing and related
services such as, but not limited to, segregation of empty bottles, stock handling, and receiving SMC products for its route
operations at Sorsogon, Sorsogon and Daet, Camarines Norte. Monasterio claimed ₱900,600 for unpaid cashiering fees. He alleged
that from September 1993 to September 1997 and May 1995 to November 1997, aside from rendering service as warehouseman,
he was given the additional task of cashiering in SMC’s Sorsogon and Camarines Norte sales offices for which he was promised a
separate fee. Monasterio demanded ₱82,959.32 for warehousing fees, ₱11,400 for cashiering fees for the month of September,
1998, as well as exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱500,000 and ₱300,000, respectively. SMC filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. SMC contended that respondent’s money claim for alleged unpaid cashiering
services arose from respondent’s function as warehouse contractor thus the EWA should be followed and thus, the exclusive venue
of courts of Makati or Pasig, Metro Manila is the proper venue as provided under paragraph 26(b) of the Exclusive Warehouse
Agreement. Respondent filed an Opposition contending that the cashiering service he rendered for the petitioner was separate and
distinct from the services under the EWA.

RTC Ruling: Regional Trial Court, of Naga City, Branch 20 issued an Order denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The court held
that the services agreed upon in said contract is limited to warehousing services and the claim of plaintiff in his suit pertains to the
cashiering services rendered to the defendant, a relationship which was not documented, and is certainly a contract separate and
independent from the exclusive warehousing agreements.

CA Ruling: The Court of Appeals found respondent’s claim for cashiering services inseparable from his claim for warehousing
services, thus, the venue stipulated in the EWA is the proper venue. However, the Court of Appeals noted that prior to the filing of
SMC’s petition, respondent Monasterio filed an amended complaint to which SMC filed an answer. Thus, the Court of Appeals
dismissed San Miguel’s petition for certiorari, stating that the case was already moot and academic.

Issue: W/N the filing of the case before RTC Naga was proper?

SC Ruling: Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a contract restricts or confines parties thereto when the suit relates to breach of
the said contract. Venue stipulation should be deemed merely permissive, and that interpretation should be adopted which most
serves the parties’ convenience. Accordingly, since the present case for the collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent is
a personal action, we find no compelling reason why it could not be instituted in the RTC of Naga City, the place where plaintiff
resides. It is hereby ruled that no reversible error was committed by the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 20, in denying
petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Said RTC is the proper venue of the amended complaint for a sum of money filed by respondent
against petitioner San Miguel Corporation, in connection with his cashiering services.