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(1) DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 89651; November 10, 1989

FACTS:
The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in
Mindanao and Palawan, scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act
No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao." These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and
Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No.
6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional .

Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in
Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region
which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution.

RULING:
It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of administrative
regions, which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes.
Administrative regions are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly
provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the
President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments.
There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the
constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because
the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities,
municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Those who petition this Court to
declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a
declaration. Otherwise, the petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to
challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Supreme Court finds that petitioners have
failed to overcome the presumption.

Petitions were dismissed for lack of merit.

(2) ARSADI M. DISOMANGCOP vs THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT


OFPUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
G.R. No. 149848 November 25, 2004

FACTS:
(3) JAMES M. IMBONG vs HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

FACTS:

(4) DR. LAMPA I. PANDI vs THE COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 116850 April 11, 2002

FACTS:
In her capacity as Regional Director and as Secretary of DOH of the ARMM, Mamcacua, issued
a Memorandum designating Pandi, who was then DOH-ARMM Assistant Regional Secretary, as
Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. In the same Memorandum, Macacua
detailed Dr. Mamasao Sani, then the provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del
Sur, to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City.

On September 15, 1993, Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan issued Office
Order No. 07 designating Saber also as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.

On August 12, 1993, Sani filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur,
Branch 10, Marawi City challenging the August 9, 1993 Memorandum transferring him to the
DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City, alleging that he is the holder of a permanent
appointment as provincial health officer of the IPHOAPGH, Lanao del Sur.

On October 29, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 133
transferring the powers and functions of the Department of Health in the region to the Regional
Government of the ARMM. On November 6, 1993, Macacua, again in her capacity as DOH-
ARMM Secretary-Designate, issued a Memorandum reiterating Pandi’s designation as Officer-
in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, as well as Sani’s detail to the Regional Office of
the DOH-ARMM in Cotabato City.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that saber is the legally designated officer-in-
charge of the iPHO-APGH, Lanao del sur, pursuant to section 478 of the 1991 LGU code
making mandatory for provincial governments the appointment of a health officer, and
vesting in Governor Mahid Mutilan of Lanao del sur the power and authority to appoint
the provincial health officer;
2. Whether or not the court of appeals erred in not holding that the organic act of 1989 is an
exception to the 1991 LGU code and that the former prevails over the latter;

RULING:

RE ISSUE #1:

Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan designated Saber as Officer-in-Charge of
the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, on September 15, 1993. On this date the provincial health
officer of Lanao del Sur was still a national government official paid entirely from national
funds. The provincial health officer was still appointed by the national Secretary of Health to a
region and not to a province. The Secretary of Health exercised supervision and control over the
provincial health officer. The Secretary of Health was also the official authorized by law to
assign the provincial health officer to any province within the region. Indisputably, on September
15, 1993, Provincial Governor Mutilan had no power to designate Saber as Officer-in-Charge of
IPHOAPGH, Lanao del Sur. Consequently, the designation of Saber as such Officer-in-Charge is
void.

The provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur became a provincial government official only after
the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, which was enacted by the Regional Assembly on
January 25, 1994 and approved by the Regional Governor on March 3, 1994. Prior to the ARMM
Local Code but after the issuance of Executive Order No. 133, the Regional Governor appointed
the provincial health officer while the Regional Secretary of Health could assign the provincial
health officer to any province within the ARMM. The Provincial Governor had no power to
appoint or even designate the Officer-in-Charge of the provincial health office.

The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code as Provincial Governor
Mutilan’s authority to appoint Saber is misplaced. Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code, which
provides that "[T]he appointment of a health officer shall be mandatory for provincial, city and
municipal governments," is not a grant of power to governors and mayors to appoint local health
officers. It is simply a directive that those empowered to appoint local health officers are
mandated to do so. In short, the appointment of local health officers, being essential for public
services, is a mandatory obligation on the part of those vested by law with the power to appoint
them. Moreover, as explained earlier, the 1991 LGU Code did not amend the Organic Act of
1989.

RE ISSUE #2:
The 1991 LGU Code, however, although a later law like the Revised Administrative Code of
1987, did not amend the Organic Act of 1989 because the Organic Act could only be amended
through the ratification process laid out in the Organic Act itself. Section 526 of the 1991 LGU
Code provides that:
"Section 526. Application of this Code to Local Government Units in the Autonomous Regions.
This Code shall apply to all provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays in the autonomous
regions until such time as the regional government concerned shall have enacted its own local
government code."

(5) SPOUSES LEONOR and ROSA BADUA vs CORDILLERA BODONG


ADMINISTRATION
G.R. No. 92649 February 14, 1991

FACTS:
In 1966, Quema, as the owner of two parcels of land in Lucaga, Lumaba, Villaviciosa, Abra,
evidenced by Tax Declarations Nos. 4997 and 4998 mortgaged said parcels of land for P6,000 to
Dra. Erotida Valera. He was able to redeem the land twenty-two (22) years later, on August 14,
1988, long after the mortgagee had already died. He allegedly paid the redemption price of
P10,000 to the mortgagee's heir, Jessie Macaraeg.
On the other hand, Rosa Badua, alleged that the land was sold to her by Dra. Erotida Valera
when she was still alive. However, Rosa could not produce the deed of sale because it is
allegedly in the possession of Vice-Governor Benesa.

As Quema was prevented by Rosa Badua from cultivating the land, he filed a case before the
Barangay Council, but it failed to settle the dispute, a certain Judge Cacho advised Quema to file
his complaint in the provincial level courts. Instead, Quema filed it in the tribal court of the
Maeng Tribe.

ISSUE:
Whether Maeng Tribal Court can render a valid and executory decision in a land dispute.

RULING:
No. Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into legal existence, the Maeng
Tribal Court was not constituted into an indigenous or special court under R.A. No. 6766.
Hence, the Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs and
traditions of an indigenous cultural community.

Such tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the Supreme
Court and the lower courts which have been established by law. They do not possess judicial
power.  Like the pangkats or conciliation panels created by P.D. No. 1508 in the barangays, they
are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal objective to bring together the parties to a
dispute and persuade them to make peace settle, and compromise.

(6) CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION vs COMMISSION ON AUDIT


G.R. No. 79956 January 29, 1990

FACTS: