BENGSON vs.

HRET and CRUZ

G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of
Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to
the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An
Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or
Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by,
among other, “rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of
a foreign country.”
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was
erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service
in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA
2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who
Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the
Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over
petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the
HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of
the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring
Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can
still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in
the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation
from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship,
may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place
where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall
contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance
with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status
as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or
return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
 
LIMKAICHONG VS COMELEC
583 SCRA 1 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunals 
FACTS: Jocelyn Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros
Oriental. Olivia Paras, her rival, and some other concerned citizens filed
disqualification cases against Limkaichong. Limkaichong is allegedly not a natural
born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father was still a
Chinese and that her mom, though Filipino, lost her citizenship by virtue of her
marriage to Limkaichong’s dad. During the pendency of the case against
Limkaichong before the (Commission on Elections) COMELEC. Election day came
and votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras.
COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong as disqualified. About 2 days
after the counting of votes, COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified
candidate.
On the following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying
Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the
winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in compliance with Resolution
No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of
winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be
without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved
cases. Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the
COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras’ petition arguing that since she is now the
proclaimed winner, the COMELEC can no longer exercise jurisdiction over the
matter. It should be the HRET which should exercise jurisdiction from then on.
COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid.  
2. Whether or not COMELEC should still exercise jurisdiction over the matter.
HELD:
1. The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid.  The COMELEC Second Division
rendered its Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007.   On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong
timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as for
the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of
the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the May 17,
2007 Joint Resolution.  Since the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution
was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong
as the winner.  Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Sec. 2.   Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. –  A motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be filed within
five (5) days from the promulgation thereof.   Such motion, if not pro forma,
suspends the execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order and
ruling.
2. No. The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The
SC has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the lower
house, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins.   It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the
proclamation.   The party questioning his qualification should now present his case
in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to
hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with
respect to the latter’s election, returns and qualifications.     The use of the word
“sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC
underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election
contests relating to its members.

GAYO V. VERCELES
GR No. 150477
February 28, 2005

FACTS: When respondent migrated to the US w/ her family, she retained her
Filipino citizenship. In 1993, she returned to the Philippines for good. In 1995, she
registered herself as a voter. Between 1993 to 1997, she would travel to the US to
visit her children. In 1997, she abandoned her status as a lawful permanent US
resident for the purpose of filing her candidacy for mayor in the 1998 elections. She
subsequently surrendered her alien registration receipt card (“green card”) before
the Immigration & Naturalization Service of the American Embassy. She ran & won
as mayor in 1998. She was re-elected in2001. Petitioner, also a candidate during
the 2001 elections, filed a petition for quo warranto praying that respondent be
declared disqualified to hold the position of mayor &that he be proclaimed instead.
ISSUE: Whether respondent was able to meet the residency requirement for the
position of municipal mayor during the 2001 elections
HELD: Yes. Although respondent effectively abandoned her residency in the
Philippines by her acquisition of the status of a permanent US resident, she
nonetheless reacquired her residency in the Philippines even before the holding of
the 2001 elections. By her act of surrendering her green card to the US Embassy in
1998, her intention to abandon her US residency could not have been made
clearer. Moreover, when she decided to relocate to the Philippines for good in 1993,
she continue living here & only went to the US on periodic visits to her children who
were residing there. Moreover, she was elected mayor in the 1998 elections &
served as such for the duration of her term. Such acts are sufficient to establish
that respondent intended to stay in the Philippines indefinitely &,ultimately, that
she has once again made the Philippines her permanent resident. Considering the
purpose of the residency requirement, which is to ensure that the person elected is
familiar w/ the needs & problems of his constituency, there can be no doubt that
respondent is qualified having been served as mayor previous to her re-election.

COQUILLA VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 151914
31 July 2002 [Citizenship; Reacquisition]

FACTS: Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He
grew up and resided there until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a
U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and took
out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United
States.

Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was
approved. On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras,

Eastern Samar which was approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his
certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar
for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel
Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two
year residency in Oras was a material misrepresentation as he only resided therein
for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.
Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla
was proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition
and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at
least on year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in
his COC.

RULING: No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had

been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for “two years” at the time he filed such
certificate is not true. The question is whether the COMELEC was justified in
ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason. Petitioner
made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus
rendering such certificate liable to cancellation.  In the case at bar, what is involved
is a false statement concerning a candidate’s qualification for an office for which he
filed the certificate of candidacy.  This is a misrepresentation of a material fact
justifying the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.

DOMINO V. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 134015
JULY 19, 1995

FACTS: On March 25 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of
Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided in the
constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months
immediately preceding the election.
On March 30 1998, private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B. Java, Juan
P. Bayonito, Jr., Rosario Samson and Dionisio P. Lim, Sr., fied with the COMELEC a
Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. Private
respondents alleged that DOMINO, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of
candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of
Sarangani where he seeks election.
DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence requirement
and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997. In support of the
said contention, DOMINO presented before the COMELEC copy of the Contract of
Lease and other evidence of his transfer of residence from Balara Quezon City to
Alabel Sarangani.
On May 6 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring
DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone
district of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise
ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional
district for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections.

RULING: The term “residence,” as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for
suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as “domicile,” which imports
not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. “Domicile” denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some
other reasons, one intends to return. “Domicile” is a question of intention and
circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in
mind, namely:

that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere;

when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and

a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.

A person’s “domicile” once established is considered to continue and will not be

deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of
domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of
time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place
chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the

locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order
to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these
elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the
locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical
presence without intention.

The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not
adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative
of DOMINO’s intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of
permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile. The mere
absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without
the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus the
date of the contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province of
Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other
circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.
Domino’s lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further
strengthened by his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon
City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong
presumption of residence especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his
former barangay. Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate public
assertion of the fact of residence, and is said to have decided preponderance in a
doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his residence.
The fact that a party continuously voted in a particular locality is a strong factor in
assisting to determine the status of his domicile.

HELD: The Supreme Court dismiss the petition at bar.

PAPANDAYAN, JR. VS COMELEC

[381 SCRA 133]
(Municipal Corporation, Qualification of Elective Officials, Residence)

FACTS: In the May 14, 2001 elections, 3 candidates ran for the position of mayor
of Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, namely: petitioner Papandayan Jr., respondent Balt,
who was the incumbent mayor seeking reelection, and Bantuas. Respondent Balt
sought the disqualification of petitioner alleging that petitioner was not a resident of
Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur but a permanent resident of Bayang,
Lanao del Sur.

Petitioner claimed that he was a resident of Tangcal, Tubaran; that in 1990, he

transferred his domicile from Bayang to Tangcal and stayed there with his wife, a
native of Tangcal; that he managed an agricultural land in Tubaran; and that he
filed in 1998 his COC for the position of municipal mayor of Tubaran, which he later
withdraw.

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring him
disqualified in a resolution, on the ground that he is not a resident of Tubaran.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified to run as an elective official.

HELD: No. The petitioner has duly proven that, although he was formerly a
resident of Bayang, he later transferred residence to Tangcal, Tubaran as shown by
his actual and physical presence therein for 10 years prior to the May 14, 2001
elections.

Par. 39, Chapter 1, Title 2 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160) provides that
an elective official must be a “…resident therein (barangay, municipality, city or
province) for at least 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election…”

Domicile and residence are synonymous. The term residence as used in election
law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, couple with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, pleasure,
or for like reasons, one intends to return.

Requisites in order to acquire a new domicile by choice are: there must concur (1)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there,
and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.

BAUTISTA vs. COMELEC

296 SCRA 480, 1998

FACTS: Petitioner Cipriano “Efren” Bautista was a duly registered candidate for the
position of Mayor of Navotas, Metro Manila in the May 11, 1998 elections. A certain
Edwin “Efren” Bautista also filed a certificate of candidacy for the same position.
Petitioner filed a petitioner praying that Edwin Bautista be declared nuisance
candidate. Comelec, in a resolution dated April 30, 1998, declared Edwin Bautista
as a nuisance candidate and accordingly, his name was not included in the list of
candidates for mayor. Edwin Bautista filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
still pending at the date of election. During the counting of votes, separate tallies of
ballots on which were written “Efren Bautista”, “Efren”, “E. Bautista”, and “Bautista”
were made by the Board of Election Inspectors. The municipal board of canvassers
refused to canvass as part of the valid votes of petitioner theses separate tallies. 

ISSUE: Whether or not these votes should have been included to those cast for
petitioner. 

HELD: It must be emphasized that the instant case involves a ground for
disqualification which clearly affects the voters’ will and causes confusion that
frustrates the same. This is precisely what election laws are trying to protect. They
give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter. Thus, extreme caution
should be observed before any ballot is invalidated. Further, in the appreciation of
ballots, doubts are resolved in favor of their validity. 

A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention
of the voter. This is, however, not the situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it
has also been established that by virtue of newspaper releases and other forms of
notifications, the voters were informed of the Comelec’s decision to declare Edwin
Bautista as a nuisance candidate. 

It is improper and strained to limit petitioner’s votes to the ballots which only
indicate the name “Cipriano” when it is of public knowledge that petitioner is also
known by the appellation and nickname “Efren” which he in fact registered as his
nickname.
JAPSON VS. COMELEC

FACTS: Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S.
Ty (Ty) were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.

Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition[5] to
disqualify and/or cancel Ty's Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material
misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born
Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur,
Hernani Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter Samar)
to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino). 

Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen
thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his
Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he
was a resident of Barangay6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one
year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any
foreign country. 

While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he
never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as required
under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 

Inspite of having reacquisition in his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make

trips to the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20
January 2007.

Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he

continued to comport himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel
records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by
Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws.

Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty
from running for public office and the cancellation of the latter's Certificate of
Candidacy.

Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and
subsequently became a naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed, however, that
prior to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already performed the
following acts: (1) with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual
citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate General in
Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine
Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty applied for a Philippine
passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was at A.
Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Ty's
application was approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a Philippine
passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured and signed his Community
Tax Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur, in which he stated
that his address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar;
(5) thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct
0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured
another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his address as Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19
March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.

He had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American citizenship,
and he had been a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Therefore, Ty
sought the dismissal of Japzon's Petition in SPA No. 07-568.
Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers on 15 May 2007.

The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the requirements of
Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship,
to wit:

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public

office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure
that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our
people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.

Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz,

Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. on
October 2, 2005 and executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March 19,
2007 in compliance with R.A. [No.] 9225. Moreover, neither is Ty a candidate for or
occupying public office nor is in active service as commissioned or non-
commissioned officer in the armed forces in the country of which he was naturalized
citizen

Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in stating in his Certificate of

Candidacy that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, for at least one year before the elections on 14 May 2007. It
reasoned that: Although Ty has lost his domicile in [the] Philippines when he was
naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and
subsequent acts thereof proved that he has been a resident of Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year before the
elections held on 14 May 2007 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy.

The petition was denied and COMELEC was in favor of the defendant failing to
obtain a favorable resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to file the
instant Petition for Certiorari, that the COMELEC had committed grave abuse of
discretion and lack of discretion for dismissing the petition.

Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated 31 July
2007 and 28 September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and en banc,
respectively; to issue a new resolution denying due course to or canceling Ty's
Certificate of Candidacy; and to declare Japzon as the duly elected Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.

Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition. According to Ty, the COMELEC
already found sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local
elections. The Court cannot evaluate again the very same pieces of evidence
without violating the well-entrenched rule that findings of fact of the COMELEC are
binding on the Court.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the position that Ty
failed to meet the one-year residency requirement set by law to qualify him to run
as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections.The Court finds no
merit in the Petition at bar.

On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship

before a notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28
March 2007, he had already effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping
solely his Philippine citizenship.

The Court of Appeals set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court
of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondent's immigration to the United
States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. Being a green card holder, which was proof that he was a permanent
resident or immigrant of the United States, and in the absence of any waiver of his
status as such before he ran for election on January 18, 1988, respondent was held
to be disqualified under §68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881).

ISSUE: Whether or not the defedant has complied with the residency requirement
for elective positions.

RULING: Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency requirements for
elective position.
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a
natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain[17] his Philippine citizenship despite
acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such
circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all
touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its
provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of
such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of
the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats
citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the
general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship.

There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior
to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a resident
thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence from
residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other
than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence.
[24] The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other countries, Ty was
actually present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding the 14 May 2007 local
elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily determinative of
the fact of residence therein, it does strongly support and is only consistent with
Ty's avowed intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.

Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply
with the one-year residency requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty candidate
in the 14 May 2007 elections. In Aquino v. COMELEC,[25] the Court did not find
anything wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an elective
post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has
effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by
law. As this Court already found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial
evidence that he had established residence/domicile in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to the 14 May
2007 local elections, in which he ran as a candidate for the Office of the Mayor and
in which he garnered the most number of votes.

To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification, Japzon must clearly demonstrate

that Ty's ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles
that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the
people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions
and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and
promote. In this case, Japzon failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to
be Mayor of the Municipality, the instant Petition for Certiorari is dismiss. 
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
CIRILO ROY MONTEJO
G.R. No. 119976
September 18, 1995

FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for

the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that
her residence in the place was seven (7) months.
On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for
cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not
comply with the constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the
Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representative.

In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven

months to since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s

proclamation showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself
and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers.

ISSUE: Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte
to satisfy the one year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative.

HELD: Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of

legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.

Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the

concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose
of determining a candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained
residences in different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by
Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred.
It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of
law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was
ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual)
residence, not her domicile.

Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to

run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are
set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly
elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

AQUINO vs. COMELEC
(248 SCRA 400)

FACTS:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representativefor the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In
his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was aresident of the aforementio
ned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended 
the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days.

The Commission on Electionsdismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to
run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on amotion for reconsideration of 
the above dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an order suspending
the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the 
Commission on Electionsfound Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective 
office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.

ISSUE: Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domi
cile” to warrant thedisqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral distric
t.

HELD: The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,
” where he, no matterwhere he may be found at any given time, eventually intends 
to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that towhich the Constitution refers when 
it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The purpose is toexclude str
angers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community fr
om takingadvantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for elect
oral gain. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (1992) election indicates th
at he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose,Concepcion, Tarlac for more 
than 52 years prior to that election. Aquino’s connection to the Second District of M
akati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The inte
ntion not to establish apermanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a co
ndominium unit instead of buying one. The shortlength of time he claims to be a res
ident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other 
residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physica
l residence is not toacquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a can
didate for Representative of the Second Districtof Makati City. Aquino was thus righ
tfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.

Fernandez vs HRET
GR No 187478
December 21, 2009

FACTS: On the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner filed for candidacy as
Representative of the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna. In his
Certificate of Candidacy, he indicated that he is a resident of Sta. Rosa City,
Laguna.

Private respondent sought the cancellation of petitioner’s COC and the latter’s
disqualification as a candidate on the ground of an alleged material
misrepresentation in his COC regarding his place of residence, because during past
elections, he had declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan was
located in the Fourth Legislative District of the Province of Laguna. Private
respondent likewise claimed that petitioner maintained another house in Cabuyao,
Laguna, which was also outside the First District. The petition, however, was
dismissed by COMELEC for lack of merit.

On June 27, 2007, petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of
the First District of Laguna.
On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the
HRET praying that petitioner be declared ineligible to hold office as a Member of the
House of Representatives representing the First Legislative District of the Province
of Laguna, and that petitioner’s election and proclamation be annulled and declared
null and void. Private respondents claim that petitioner lacked the one-year
residency requirement provided under Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution. In support of his petition, private respondent argued that petitioner
falsely declared under oath: (1) his alleged Sta. Rosa residence; (2) the period of
his residence in the legislative district before May 14, 2007, which he indicated as
one year and two months; and (3) his eligibility for the office where he was seeking
to be elected. Private respondent also presented testimonies of several witnesses
attesting that petitioner is not a resident of Sta. Rosa.

In order to buttress his claim that he and his family actually resided in Sta. Rosa,
Laguna beginning at least in February 2006, petitioners evidence included, among
others: (a) original and extended lease contracts for a townhouse in Villa de Toledo,
Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna; (b) certification issued by the President of
the Villa de Toledo Homeowners Association, Inc, that petitioner has been a
resident of said Subdivision since February 2006; (c) affidavits of petitioners
neighbors in Villa de Toledo attesting that petitioner has been a resident of said
subdivision since February 2006; (d) certification of the barangay chairman of
Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna that petitioner is a resident of Villa de Toledo
within the said barangay; (e) certificates of attendance of petitioners children in
schools located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna since 2005; and (f) DTI certificates of business
issued in the name of petitioner and his wife to show that they own and operate
businesses in Sta. Rosa, Laguna since 2003.HRET ruled in favor of private
respondent

ISSUE: WON petitioner sufficiently complied with the one-year residency

requirement to be a Member of the House of Representatives, as provided in the
1987 Constitution.

HELD/RATIO: YES. The SC found the interpretation of the HRET of the residency
requirement under the Constitution to be overly restrictive and unwarranted under
the factual circumstances of this case.

SC find nothing wrong if petitioner sometimes transacted business or received

visitors in his Cabuyao house, instead of the alleged Sta. Rosa residence, as there
is nothing in the residency requirement for candidates that prohibits them from
owning property and exercising their rights of ownership thereto in other places
aside from the address they had indicated as their place of residence in their COC.
It also stated that there is nothing in the Constitution or our election laws which
require a congressional candidate to sell a previously acquired home in one district
and buy a new one in the place where he seeks to run in order to qualify for a
congressional seat in that other district.

Neither does the SC see the fact that petitioner was only leasing a residence in Sta.
Rosa at the time of his candidacy as a barrier for him to run in that district. It
stated that the Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a
property owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in
that district for at least a year prior to election day. To use ownership of property in
the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence
implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency
requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the
right to hold public office, which property requirement would be unconstitutional.

In the case at bar, there are real and substantial reasons for petitioner to establish
Sta. Rosa as his domicile of choice and abandon his domicile of origin and/or any
other previous domicile. To begin with, petitioner and his wife have owned and
operated businesses in Sta. Rosa since 2003. Their children have attended schools
in Sta. Rosa at least since 2005. Although ownership of property should never be
considered a requirement for any candidacy, petitioner had sufficiently confirmed
his intention to permanently reside in Sta. Rosa by purchasing residential properties
in that city even prior to the May 2007 election, as evidenced by certificates of title
issued in the name of petitioner and his wife.

In all, SC found that petitioner had adequately shown that his transfer of residence
to Sta. Rosa was bona fide and was not merely for complying with the residency
requirement under election laws.

CHAVEZ VS COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with

certain establishments to endorse their products. Pursuant to these agreements,
three billboards were set up showing petitioner promoting the products of said
establishments. 

On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Senator.

On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which

contained Section 32:

Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or

paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image, or name of a
person, and all advertisements  on  print, in radio or on television showing the
image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or
display thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be immediately removed
by said candidate and radio station,  print  media or television station within 3 days
after the effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio
station, print media or television station shall be presumed to have conducted
premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.

On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision by
the COMELEC's Law Department. He replied, by requesting the COMELEC that he be
informed as to how he may have violated the assailed provision. He sent another
letter, this time asking the COMELEC that he be exempted from the application of
Section 32, considering that the billboards adverted to are mere product
endorsements and cannot be construed as paraphernalia for premature
campaigning under the rules.

The COMELEC, however, ordered him to remove or cause the removal of

the billboards, or to cover them from public view pending the approval of his
request.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez filed a petition for prohibition with the SC,
asking that the COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing the assailed provision. He
urges the Court to declare the assailed provision unconstitutional as the same is
allegedly (1) a gross violation of the non-impairment clause; (2) an
invalid exerciseof police power; (3) in the nature of an ex-post facto law; (4)
contrary to the Fair Elections Act; and (5) invalid due to overbreadth.

ISSUE: Is Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 unconstitutional?

HELD:

Police power

Petitioner argues that the billboards, while they exhibit his name and image, do not
at all announce his candidacy for any public office nor solicit support for such
candidacy from the electorate. They are, he claims, mere product endorsements
and not election propaganda. Prohibiting, therefore, their exhibition to the public is
not within the scope of the powers of the COMELEC.

Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to prescribe

regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, or safety,
and the general welfare of the people. To determine the validity of a police
measure, two questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest of the public in
general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of
police power? and (2) Are the means employed reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals?

A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are
to prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of
public office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one
hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the
former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of
their resources and popularity. 

Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product

endorsements and do not announce nor solicit any support for his candidacy. Under
the Omnibus Election Code, election campaign or partisan political activity
is defined as an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates to a public office. It includes directly or indirectly soliciting
votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.

It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse
certain products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his
name and image to these products. However, when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and
image assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly promoted
his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers
when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of the subject billboards. If
the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates for public office whose name
and image are used to advertise commercial products would have more opportunity
to make themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other
candidates who do not have the same chance of lending their faces and names to
endorse popular commercial products as image models. Similarly, an individual
intending to run for public office within the next few months, could pay private
corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of familiarizing the
public with his name and image even before the start of the campaign period. This,
without a doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against premature
campaigning.

Non-impairment of contract

Section 32 is not a gross violation of the non-impairment clause. The non-

impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by
the Government. Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without
regard to the level of financial resources one may have at his disposal, is indeed of
vital interest to the public. The State has the duty to enact and implement rules to
safeguard this interest. Time and again, this Court has said that contracts affecting
public interest contain an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of
the existing legal order. This power can be activated at anytime to change the
provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or
protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the
impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.

Ex post facto law

Petitioner argued that the assailed provision makes an individual criminally liable
for an election offense for not removing such advertisement, even if at the time the
said advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal. Hence, it makes a
person, whose name or image is featured in any such advertisement, liable for
premature campaigning under the Omnibus Election Code.

Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes a
penalty for said offense. Laws of this nature must operate prospectively, except
when they are favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however, that the
offense defined in the assailed provision is not the putting up of propaganda
materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other
materials showing the picture, image or name of a person, and
all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or
mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display
thereof becomes a candidate for public office. Nor does it prohibit or consider an
offense the entering of contracts for such propaganda materials by an individual
who subsequently becomes a candidate for public office. One definitely does not
commit an offense by entering into a contract with private parties to use his name
and image to endorse certain products prior to his becoming a candidate for public
office. The offense, as expressly prescribed in the assailed provision, is the non-
removal of the described propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity
of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for public office fails to remove
such propaganda materials after the given period, he shall be liable under Section
80 of the Omnibus Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it
indicated in the assailed provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is,
therefore, no ex post facto law in this case. 

Fair Elections Act

Next, petitioner urges that Section 32 is a violation of the Fair Elections Act.
According to him, under this law, billboards are already permitted as lawful election
propaganda. He claims, therefore, that the COMELEC, in effectively prohibiting the
use of billboards as a form of election propaganda through the assailed provision,
violated the Fair Elections Act. Petitioners argument is not tenable. The Solicitor
General rightly points out that the assailed provision does not prohibit billboards as
lawful election propaganda. It only regulates their use to prevent premature
campaigning and to equalize, as much as practicable, the situation of all candidates
by preventing popular and rich candidates from gaining undue advantage in
exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. Moreover, by
regulating the use of such election propaganda materials, the COMELEC is merely
doing its duty under the law.

Overbreadth 

A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the

constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to State regulations may not be achieved by means that
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. 

The provision in question is limited in its operation both as to time and scope. It
only disallows the continued display of a persons propaganda materials and
advertisements after he has filed a certificate of candidacy and before the start of
the campaign period. Said materials and advertisements must also show his name
and image.

There is no blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and

advertisements. During the campaign period, these may be used subject only to
reasonable limitations necessary and incidental to achieving the purpose of
preventing premature campaigning and promoting equality of opportunities among
all candidates. The provision, therefore, is not invalid on the ground of
overbreadth. Chavez vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162777, Aug 31, 2004

LAZATIN VS HRET

FACTS: Lazatin filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC

to annul his proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and
discharged the duties of Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga. Lazatin
claims that the HRET and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election contests.
Buan, Jr., and Timbol (Lazatin’s opposition), alleged that the instant petition has
become moot and academic because the assailed COMELEC Resolution had already
become final and executory when the SC issued a TRO on October 6, 1987. In the
COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he alleges that the instant petition should be given due
course because the proclamation was valid. The Telex Order issued by the
COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim the winner if warranted under
Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code," was in effect a grant of authority by
the COMELEC to the canvassing board, to proclaim the winner. A Separate
Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging that the proclamation of Lazatin was
illegal and void because the board simply corrected the returns contested by
Lazatin without waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of candidates
Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin himself, against certain election returns.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRET’s jurisdiction.
 
HELD: The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due
course to the petition. The petition is impressed with merit because petitioner has
been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first district
of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties
as Congressman. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against
him would be to usurp the functions of the House Electoral Tribunal. The alleged
invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC
itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the
pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed,
considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

BONDOC V PINEDA

FACTS:
 Pineda, member of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Bondoc,
member of Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for Representative
for 4TH district of Pampanga.  Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a
protest at the House of Rep Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
 After review, HRET decided that Bondoc won by 107 votes.
 Cong. Camasura revealed to Cong. Cojuangco (LDP Sec. Gen) that he voted
for Bondoc because he was ‘consistent with truth, justice and self-respect’
 and that they would abide by the results of the recounted votes where
Bondoc was leading.
 Cong. Camasura was then expelled from his party (LDP) because it was a
complete betrayal to his party when he decided for Bondoc.
 HRET then ordered Camasura to withdraw and rescind his nomination from
the tribunal.
 Bondoc filed for petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to HRET
from its resolution.

ISSUE:  
1. WON the House of Representatives empowered to interfere with the
disposition of an election contest in the HRET by reorganizing the
representation in the tribunal of the majority party?
2. WON HRET resolution to order camasura to withdraw and rescind his
nomination is valid

HELD: No! Court said that it is impossible for any political party to control voting in
the tribunal . The tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction as judge to contests
relating to election, returns and qualifications of the mems of the house of rep.
HRET resolution is null and void.  Action of HRET is violative of constitutional
mandate because:
1.     It is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the HRET to be the
sole judge of the election contest bet. Pineda and Bondoc. To sanction interference
by the house of rep. Would reduce tribunal as tool for the aggrandizement of the
party in power (ldp)
2.     Members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. Camasura was discharging his
functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence. Disloyalty to
party and breach of party discipline -> not valid ground for expulsion of member of
the tribunal
3.     It violates camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of hret are entitled
to security of tenure. Membership may not be terminated w/o undue cause such as:
expiration of term of office, death, permanent disability, resignation from political
party, formal affiliation with another party. Disloyalty is not a valid cause!

VETERANS FEDERATION VS. COMELEC

FACTS: To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the

Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable
parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent (20%) allocation - the combined number of all party-
list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second,  the two percent (2%) threshold - only those parties garnering a
minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
“qualified” to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third,  the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of
votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
“qualifying” and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party
is entitled to shall be computed “in proportion to their total number of votes.”

14 party-list representatives proclaimed - (2%) threshold:

The Comelec en banc proclaimed 13 party-list representatives from twelve 12
parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed
representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5% of the votes.

The Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut

Planters’ Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered
186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the
party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed as
the 14th party-list representative.

Respondents dissent - to follow 20% allocation:

Subsequently, PAG-ASA (People’s Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the
Comelec a Petition asserting that the filling up of the twenty percent membership
of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the
Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the
two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat
this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short
of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House. Thereafter,
nine other party-list organizations filed their respective Motions for Intervention,
seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same
grounds. 

Comelec followed the 20% allocation while ignoring the 2% threshold:

Deciding on the petitioners’ side, the Comelec grants PAG-ASA's Petition. It
ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14
already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all
times, the total number of congressional seats must be filled up by eighty
(80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-
list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two
percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. 
Earlier proclaimed winners dissented - 2% threshold should be followed:
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed
winners objected to the proclamation and filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only
parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes for
the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and
(2) additional seats should be allocated to those which had garnered the two
percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties.

Ruling of the Comelec En Banc- follow the 20% allocation of party-list

representatives in order to comply with the constitutional mandate. Strict
application of the 2% threshold would limit the concentration of party
representatives.
Subsequently, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec “to
CEASE and DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers until
further orders from this Court.”

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the twenty percent (20%) allocation for party-list representatives
mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is mandatory or merely a
ceiling.  Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representative
be filled up completely and all the time.

2. Whether or not the two percent (2%) threshold requirement and the three-seat
limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional.

3. If the answer to Issue #2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of
a qualified party be determined?

RULING:

First Issue: Whether or not the twenty percent (20%) allocation for party-list
representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is
mandatory or merely a ceiling.  Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for
party-list representative be filled up completely and all the time.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution on the composition of the House of
Representatives reads as follows:
“Article VI, Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2)  The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum  of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list.  For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector.”

Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Representatives:

Party-list representatives comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives. The mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
------------------------------------------------- x 20% party-list representatives = No.
of seats for party-list
80% district representatives
This formulation means that any increase in the number of district
representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a
corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. 
To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to be
elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be
52, computed as follows:
208
-------- x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to
comprehend. The problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution
require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all
circumstances? Our short answer is “No.”
Twenty Percent (20%) Allocation a Mere Ceiling - not to the filled up
completely at all times:
The 20% allocation is a ceiling, not mandatory; the mechanics by which it is to
be filled up has been left to Congress. 
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA
7941. Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation"
in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would
benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and
coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total
votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those
garnering more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes.” Furthermore, no winning party, organization or
coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives. 

Second Issue: Whether or not the two percent (2%) threshold requirement and
the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional.

The Two Percent Threshold

In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only
those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. 
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers
of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation."
Legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure
meaningful local representation.

The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit

An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and
encourage a multiparty system of representation.
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set
the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or
coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent (2%) vote
threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-
representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large
its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.

Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats

The first step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and
coalitions to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes
as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then
determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have
an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those
garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes." 
 The problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing in
mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.

Formula in distributing additional seats proportionally

Step One. (a)The initial step is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they each received. (b) Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing
its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. (c)
All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one
seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of
additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall
thenceforth be referred to as the “first” party.
Step Two.  The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be
allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is
entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes. The second and
subsequent parties should be given less than that to which the first one is
entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats
than the first party for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the
first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) an arbitrary rounding off could
result in a violation of the 20% allocation and there is no such thing as a fraction of
a seat. A fractional membership cannot be converted into a whole membership
because that would deprive another party's fractional membership. 

Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party:

The formula for computing the number of seats to which the first party  is
entitled is as follows:
Number of votes
of first party  Proportion of votes of
---------------------------- = first party relative to
Total votes for total votes for party-list system
party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is
equal to:
(a) at least 6% of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then
the first party shall be entitled to 2 additional seats or a total of 3 seats.
(b) equal to or greater than 4%, but less than six percent, then the first party
shall have 1 additional or a total of 2 seats.
 (c) less than 4% then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional
seat.

Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes
cast, is entitled to 1 additional seat or a total of 2 seats.
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the
number of additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to
determine the number of additional seats of the other qualified parties because the
use of the same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation
parameter. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total
of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in
proportion to those of the first party.

Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties:

Step Three.  The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that
the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. 

Number of votes of
concerned party
Additional seats for a concerned party = ---------------------------------- x No. of
additional seats allocated to 1st party
No. of votes of 1st party
Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to
is computed as follows:
No. of votes of the Concerned party (ABA) 
----------------------------------------------------- x 1= No. of additional seats
allocated to the
No. of votes of first party (APEC) concerned party
 
Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:

321,646 (ABA)
------------------------- x 1 = .64 or 0 additional seat, since rounding off is not to be
applied
503,487 (APEC)
Incidentally, the above formula does not give an exact mathematical
representation of the number of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be
entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. Furthermore,
obtaining absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-
party limit to a maximum of two additional seats. 
 The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats
happily coincides with the present number of incumbents; namely, two for
the first party (APEC) and one each for the twelve other qualified
parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the incumbencies of their
nominees, albeit through the use of a different formula and methodology.
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that
the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are
each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of
RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional representation.