The Australian Journal of Anthropology (2012) 23, 84–100 doi:10.1111/j.1757-6547.2012.00166.

Defensive or offensive dining? Halal dining

practices among Malay Muslim Singapore-
ans and their effects on integration
Gabriele Marranci1,2
1
National University of Singapore; 2Cardiff University

Anthropologists and sociologists have, in recent years, paid attention to different aspects of
halal food production and consumption. However, very few studies have focussed on the
impact that halal food, its certification and halal dining practice have on socialisation,
particularly for Muslims living in multicultural societies in Southeast Asia. Nasir and Pereira’s
study (2008) is one of these exceptions. They studied the attitudes of Singaporean Malay
Muslims towards halal food as well as the strategies they adopt when forced to share nonhalal
dining environments. These authors have described such strategies as ‘defensive dining’ and
have argued that, through them, Muslims in Singapore are able to fully partake in the
multicultural life of the city state as well as integrate within the mainstream, mainly Chinese,
society. This article discusses how my observations and fieldwork raise some questions about
such overtly positive conclusions. Indeed, I suggest that to understand the impact that such
‘dining strategies’ may have on the integration of Singaporean Malay Muslims, we should
not only observe the Malay Muslims’ viewpoint but also consider the impact such practices
have on non-Muslims, in particular the Chinese majority, as well as the role that stereotypes
have in Singapore.

INTRODUCTION
Recently, an increasing number of studies have focussed on the expanding halal
food industry in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries (Ahmed 2008; Bonne
et al. 2007).1 These studies mainly explore the religious concept of halal food (Riaz
& Chaudry 2004), its production, distribution and relevance for Muslim migrants
in non-Muslim places (Fischer 2008, 2009), the protests against halal slaughtering
practice (Smith 2007) and, more rarely, the consumption of halal food (James
2004). However, very few studies (Fischer 2009; Nasir et al. 2010) have paid atten-
tion to the impact that the industrialisation and branding process of halal food,
with its increasingly standardised certification, has had on socialisation processes,
particularly in multicultural and cosmopolitan sociopolitical environments. In this
article, I shall address this topic within the context of Singapore, a state in which
multiculturalism and multireligious harmony is essential to the very existence of the
city state. As we shall see, two recent studies have highlighted the centrality of halal
certified food to the local Malay Muslim community’s religious identity and their

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expression of personal piety (Nasir & Pereira 2008; Nasir et al. 2010; see also Tong
& Turner 2008). Nasir and Pereira, for instance, have suggested that Malay Muslims
in Singapore adopt what they define as ‘defensive dining’ to maintain their halal
practices within nonhalal contexts. Nasir et al. (2010) argues that Malay Muslims in
Singapore, by practising ‘defensive dining’, are able to partake fully in Singaporean
multicultural social life. Nonetheless, as I shall explain, my observations and field-
work raise some questions about such overtly positive conclusions. I contend that
the certification of halal food, although aimed at facilitating the integration of Mus-
lims in Singapore within mainstream society, affects socialisation in some cases.
Indeed, while Nasir and Pereira (2008) have focussed on Singaporean Malay Mus-
lims’ views, this article adds an important variable: the viewpoints of non-Muslims.
As this study aims to understand the impact of halal dining strategies on integration
in a multicultural space such as Singapore, we need to pay attention to the existing
dynamics as well as the different interpretations, effect and activation of stereotypes
existing among the different communities.

SINGAPORE MULTICULTURALISM AND RELIGIOUS HARMONY

Paradoxically, the Singaporean secular government manages, through specific legis-
lation, various aspects of religious life and ethnic relationships (Case 2002; Nasir et
al. 2010; Chua 2003, 2007a).2 In Singapore, Muslims are a minority, accounting in
2010 for about fourteen per cent of the overall population (see also Tan, C. 2008;
Tan, K. 2008; Nasir et al. 2010). They are overwhelmingly ethnically Malay and are
consequently recognised in the Singaporean constitution, which acknowledges the
Malays as the indigenous population. Other citizens, the majority of the population,
are either of Chinese3 or Indian4 origin. The rest are classified as ‘Others’.5 The
so-called Maria Hertogh Riots in 1950 and the Prophet Muhammad Birthday Riots
in 1964 remain, up until today, a painful reminder to all Singaporeans of the risks
of religious and ethnic conflict within the city state. Such historical memory has
shaped the understanding of multiculturalism in Singapore (Aljunied 2010). The
government has linked the survival of the city state to the level of ‘tolerance’
achieved among its ethnic components. Yet Singaporean scholars, such as Chua
(2003), have suggested that Singapore’s vision of multiculturalism6 translates into a
powerful instrument of social control because it helps to maintain ‘a major political
administrative and everyday obsession that casts a long repressive restraint on the
politicisation of difference, including class differences’ (Chua 2007b: 925).
Indeed, to guarantee equality to the different ethnic and religious communities
without advantaging the Chinese Buddhist majority, the Singaporean State advo-
cates meritocracy as a guiding principle (Tan, C. 2008; Tan, K. 2008) while simulta-
neously guaranteeing the preservation of different cultural traditions. In fact,
specific policies preserve cultural and religious social identities and avoid the
assimilation of the minorities within the overwhelming Chinese majority. However,
such processes inevitably institutionalise ethnicity, real or imagined as it may be.

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Therefore, the so-called Chinese, Malay, Indian and Others (CMIO) social–political
administrative identities (they are marked on ID cards) mark the individual Singap-
orean from birth until death. Developed from the legacy of the British colonial per-
iod, the bureaucratisation of ‘race’, which is inherited through the paternal line, has
been reengineered to serve the ‘hard multiculturalism’ model under which Singa-
pore flourished after its dramatic split with Malaysia in 1965 (Vasu 2008). For
instance, on Racial Harmony Day (21 July) students in Singaporean schools are
encouraged to dress, present food and dance according to the community identifier
recorded on their ID card (which may or may not represent their ‘own’ identity).
The CMIO, to which Daniel Goh refers as a ‘racial grid of state multiculturalism’
(Goh et al. 2009: 217), is so embedded in the social–political structure of Singapore
that ethnicity also marks some aspects of social welfare. Each recognised ethnic ⁄ reli-
gious group has its own self-help organisation: the Chinese Development Assistance
Council (CDAC), Mendaki for the Malays and the Singapore Indian Development
Agency (SINDA).
Notwithstanding the social–political stability that ‘multiracialism’ contributes to
the security and economic growth of the nation, such a rigid structure inevitably
produces social side effects. As Vasu has emphasised, although the CMIO division
aimed to achieve racial harmony, such a strong emphasis on race as social identity
nonetheless facilitates the perpetuation of racial stereotypes, because ‘creating a cate-
gory requires that it be filled with content’ (Vasu 2008: 29). Goh et al. also
observed, when comparing the Singaporean bureaucracy of race with the similar
bureaucracy in Malaysia, that in Singapore ‘the racial grid achieves ever deeper
inscriptions on the lived reality of the citizens, producing cultural contradictions as
racial governmentality meets hybridising globalisation.’ (Goh et al. 2009: 215).
Therefore, as we shall see, stereotypes about race and religion, although often not
openly declared, are widespread. The stereotypes affecting the Malay community
can be traced to colonial times. Therefore, some of them are rooted in biological
bias (Kopnina 2004). Malays may be represented—and not just in popular par-
lance—as ‘endowed with traits of complacency, indolence, apathy, infused with a
love of leisure and an absence of motivation and discipline’ (Rahim 1998: 49). Such
stereotypes facilitate the simplistic idea that Malays are predisposed towards drug
addiction, criminality, teenage pregnancy and family dysfunction and are conse-
quently unable to perform as well as other racial groups, particularly when
compared to the majority Chinese.
Since the foundation of modern Singapore, political leaders have questioned,
more than once, Malay Muslims’ loyalty to the country and have questioned their
integration within mainstream society. For at least the first decade after the founda-
tion of the Singaporean Armed Forces, Malay Muslims could not serve in the army,
despite Singapore adopting a conscript army in which every young man had to
serve at least 2 years after finishing high school (Chua 2003). Today, although
Malay Muslims serve in the national army, some of them complain that high rank
military positions remain difficult to access. Lee Kuan Yew, prime minister of

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Singapore from 1950 to 1990 and Minster Mentor until 2011, justified such
discrimination as the result of an inevitable dilemma: ‘It would be very tricky busi-
ness for the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to put a Malay officer who was very
religious and who had family ties in Malaysia, in charge of a machine-gun unit’.7
Recently, Lee Kuan Yew observed in his book Hard Truths that, in Singapore,
all religions other than Islam were able to integrate and that ‘Muslims socially do
not cause any trouble, but they are distinct and separate’.8 Lee Kuan Yew has also
invited Muslims to be ‘less strict’; his comment referred in particular to the Malay
community’s observance of halal practices, such as the avoidance of pork, alcohol
and the fear of nonhalal food contamination. The statements surprised and
displeased many among the Malay Muslim population and community leaders.9
The aftermath of 9 ⁄ 11 and the failed terrorist plot in Singapore (Vasu 2008) has
increased the number of non-Muslims, particularly within the majority Chinese
community, who question the loyalty and integration of the Malay Muslim minor-
ity. While in the past the loyalty question had focussed on the ethnic identity of the
Singaporean Malays and their links with Malaysia, today it focuses more on their
identity as Muslims. As Ismail and Shaw have observed, ‘currently, Singapore
Malay-Muslims face unprecedented challenges in dealing with the global impact of
the interpretation, perception, manipulation and reaction towards their faith. Con-
currently, the community could not be expected to be immune to the impact of
global events with increasing demonisation of their religion and with it everything
they hold sacred’ (Ismail & Shaw 2006: 49). Although not openly acknowledged,
Lee Kuan Yew’s view on Singaporean Muslims has found considerable support. For
example, from behind the presumed anonymity of Internet forums and blogs, some
have clearly agreed with Mr Lee Kuan Yew and have provided examples of their
own negative experiences of trying to share food or dining occasions with Singapo-
rean Malays.10 I had occasion, myself, to observe similar complaints and arguments
during conversations among and interviews with the patrons of various hawker cen-
tres, whose views were often influenced by stereotypes and a lack of knowledge of
Islamic requirements. However, I also noticed that a majority of those who shared
similar views to those expressed by Lee Kuan Yew had formed them through their
experiences of interacting with Malays during dinner occasions, home parties, work
meetings or sharing tables in food courts. In these cases, defensive dining appeared
to lack the desired outcome. In a certain sense, it had backfired.

HALAL FOOD AND HALAL STRATEGIES IN SINGAPORE

As Mintz and Du Bois (2002) have discussed, ethnographers and anthropologists
have shown interest in food and human behaviour related to it since the nineteenth
century, as can be observed from works such as Mallery’s Manners and Meals
(1888) or Smith’s Lectures on the Religion of the Semites (1889), or the detailed
account of Boas’s Kwakiutl salmon recipes (Boas 1921). Other, more recent studies,
such those offered by Levi-Strauss (1965) and Douglas (1966), have observed that

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the theoretical and symbolic analysis of social constructs and human behaviour may
be derived from observing the consumption and manipulation, among other
aspects, of food. Other contemporary studies have provided analysis of food as an
expression of ethnic, racial or national identity as well as individual and group
interactions (Caplan 1997: 1–31). Yet it is interesting to note that no study, as far
as I know, has focussed on the impact that the certification of it may have on a par-
ticular community, while, as we have seen earlier, very few, and often unpublished
(e.g. McKinley 2003; in the case of Malaysia), studies specifically deal with the
impact that halal food practices among Muslims may have on socialisation. None,
other than Nasir and Pereira (2008) and Nasir et al. (2010) have discussed Singa-
pore, where Muslims are a native minority.
With approximately 6000 eating establishments in 2009 and an industry employ-
ing some 86,800 workers,11 food in Singapore is not only a lucrative business, but
also a symbol of its multicultural lifestyle. Certainly, some of the most visible and
traditional aspects of food in Singapore are the hawker centres (Ohtsuka & Marumo
2008; Lai 2009a) which, with their coffee shops and communal tables, have become
important multicultural spaces. The majority (eighty-five per cent) of people in Sin-
gapore live in public housing estates (known as HDB estates because they were built
by the Housing and Development Board). One of the main characteristics of HDB
estates is their communal spaces and their very accessible food courts. Dining out,
rather than cooking at home, is a very common practice among the local popu-
lation because of the low cost of the food provided (Lai 2009b). Among the 6000
food establishments, 2600 hold a Halal Certificate from Maglis Ugama Islam
Singapura (Islamic Religious Council of Singapore).12 I shall not describe in detail
what halal food consists of (for an extensive discussion see Riaz & Chaudry 2004),
or the rules behind halal certification in Singapore, because they have been thor-
oughly discussed elsewhere (Nasir et al. 2010) and are furthermore clearly explained
on the MUIS website.13 For our present discussion, we need only remember that
Muslims are required to avoid pork and alcohol in all forms and derivations and
eat only meat that has been ritually slaughtered.
The majority of Muslims will also carefully avoid cross-contamination with non-
halal food, for instance, during preparation. In Southeast Asia, most Malay Muslims
follow the Shafi’i tradition and place a strong emphasis on ‘purity’ and the avoid-
ance of contamination as part of their piety. In an environment such as Singapore,
where pork is widely used in several traditional Chinese dishes and drinking beer is
a part of everyday social life among the majority Chinese population, halal food
and halal practices acquire not only a religious but also a strong ethnic significance
for the Malay minority.
Food is not only nutrition but also socialisation into commensality (Beardsworth
& Keil 1997; Mintz & Du Bois 2002) and in Singapore this is especially true. Hence,
observing and studying the dynamics14 of halal dining among Malay Muslims is
relevant for understanding the effects that it might have on socialisation within the
mainstream society.

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Notwithstanding the interesting topic of the impact halal practices may have on
integration, little research has been conducted, the most recent exception being part
of ‘The Social Distance Project’.15 This project aimed to understand how Muslims
in Singapore embody acts of piety within public life and the impact that those acts
may have on integration within a mainly non-Muslim society. As part of this pro-
ject, Nasir and Pereira led a research team who focussed on the halal practices
among Malay Muslims. Nasir and Pereira published the results in an article titled
‘Defensive dining: Notes on the public dining experiences in Singapore’ (Nasir and
Pereira 2008, the article has also been republished with few changes in Nasir et al.
2010: 56–69). The researchers interviewed thirty tertiary-educated, middle-class
Muslims who described themselves as ‘pious’. They were equally divided between
the genders. To this, as a kind of control sample, they added ten working-class
‘pious’ Muslims. Each respondent answered open-ended questions for an average of
ninety minutes (Nasir et al. 2010: 55). The authors explained that they focussed on
middle-class Malay Muslims because they ‘felt that the education attainment of the
middle-class person would allow him or her to be more reflective and articulate
about his or her attitudes and ideas on various issues’ (ibid.) but they also emphas-
ised that they did not find any relevant difference in views between the middle-class
and the working-class Muslims.
During the interviews, they found that all respondents displayed a strong ‘halal
consciousness’, preferring to abstain from eating if they held even the slightest
doubt about the halal status or certification of a particular food. They also indicated
a preference for Muslim cooks and kitchen staff and many, out of a fear of con-
tamination, demonstrated a desire to avoid sitting too close to people who were not
eating halal food. The study highlighted the Malay Muslims’ overall preference for
‘halal environments’. When this was not possible, Nasir and Pereira’s respondents
employed avoidance strategies, such as refraining from touching tables that had
been cleaned with a wet cloth which may have been in contact with nonhalal
products. Some of their respondents described the smell of pork as ‘contaminating’
and there was a general support for separated halal spaces.
Yet most of the respondents emphasised that, thanks to the above precaution,
they felt comfortable to eat in environments that were not fully halal (as the major-
ity in Singapore indeed are) as long as certified halal food was available. Nasir and
Pereira have described these strategies as ‘defensive dining’:
while (Malay Muslims) tried to remain true to the teachings of their religion, they
were also pragmatic to accept that they could achieve their religious expectations with
regards to public dining if they took a few additional safeguards (...) Thus, it can be
concluded that their personal preference for a total halal environment is a wish for
convenience—where they need not be on high defensive alert all the time—rather than
exclusivity. (Nasir & Pereira 2008: 72)

In other words, the research concluded that Malay Muslims in Singapore would
not exclude themselves from the mainstream because of their piety and dietary

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requirements. Rather, the halal certification contributes to the integration process

because it facilitates the adoption of ‘defensive dining’. Furthermore, as Nasir and
Pereira have observed, non-Muslims are free to patronise halal environments and
eat halal food.
There are many similarities between the conclusions of the above study and my
own results. Yet there exist also some fundamental differences. It is likely that the
different methodologies and approaches employed may be the most significant rea-
son for such discrepancies. Nasir and Pereira’s study developed from single, short
interviews with a small sample of Malay Muslims, who were selected mainly for
their self-defined religiosity. My research, instead, is based on 2 years of fieldwork
conducted between 2009 and 2011, which consisted of interviews, casual conversa-
tions and observations of the dining strategies of my informants during invitations
to non-Muslim homes and events. Furthermore, in this study, I did not focus solely
on the Malay Muslim minority but rather I also observed the reactions and percep-
tions of the non-Muslim majority, particularly those of Chinese ethnicity. Indeed, it
is my contention that we need to observe the dynamics involving halal practice and
habitus to fully understand the impact on integration.

IDENTITY, PURITY AND GREEN LOGOS

‘Why do that? I mean, Mark (my son) can go and play at his Malay friend’s home,
but his friend cannot come to play at my home, even though my son would like to
share the Playstation with him. The reason, you see, is his mother. She is worried
about food. I told her that I know about halal food and I will be careful, but it seems
there is nothing I can do. I felt very bad about it. It is as if they told us that we are
dirty’.

Adeline16 is a Chinese Christian mother and her son is 8 years old. The Malay
mother of her son’s friend has prevented her son from visiting Adeline’s home. The
reason is fear of contamination. Despite the fact that Adeline has made an effort to
inform herself about halal food and procedures, the Malay mother still feels that
Adeline cannot be trusted. She argues that Mark can play at her home, because
halal food is fine for non-Muslims. This is only one of several examples with very
similar dynamics. There is a particular concern among many Malay mothers that
their children may be exposed to nonhalal food or that their food may be otherwise
contaminated, mainly by pork residues on objects or utensils. Many of these Malay
parents, in my study, came from the ‘working class’, yet similar opinions may be
found among some educated professionals, as Nasir and Pereira (2008) have
argued.
Other examples of ‘dining strategies’ which I have witnessed include bringing
one’s own food to parties and dinners despite efforts to provide halal or nonpork
and alcohol-free products by the host; abstaining from food altogether; refusing,
even in the case of the same gender,17 to shake hands for fear of contamination;

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refusing to drink from glasses at the homes of non-Muslims or requiring plastic dis-
posable utensils. All these ‘strategies’ may be classified within what Nasir and Pere-
ira (2008) have defined as ‘defensive dining’. This practice is not only common in
Singapore, where Malay Muslims are a minority, but also in neighbouring Malaysia,
where Muslims are the majority and the Chinese or Indian population the minority.
For instance, McKinley (2003) has analysed the frequent decision of Malay Muslims
in Malaysia to reject non-Malay Muslims’ social invitations as part of a power
struggle in which non-Muslims are forced into an unequal host-guest relationship
and where non-Muslims will be always guests (limited powers) rather than hosts.
Although I can agree that there are some similarities between Malaysia and
Singapore with regard to halal dinner practice and ‘defensive dining’ strategies,
I have to note that in Singapore the Muslims are a minority and, as we have seen,
the ‘racial grid of state multiculturalism’ (Goh et al. 2009: 217) is deeply different.
Hence, I suggest that we need to understand the Singaporean case as part of a
dynamic based on relationships instead of a singularity of cultural struggle and
power. Therefore, I also interviewed some university students about their experi-
ences of attending high school. Some schools, like Raffles Girls’ School, while com-
prised mostly of an ethnically Chinese student body, have a fair representation of
minority students from both the Malay and Indian communities. Again, Malay
students adopted similar strategies to the ones discussed earlier. One of the Chinese
respondents emphasised that despite the school promoting mutual understanding
among students of different faiths, including having teachers explain the religious
requirements of Malay Muslims to non-Muslim students, sometimes the Chinese
and Indian students felt frustrated by such requirements or perceived them to be
‘illogical’ or sectarian. Grace reported an anecdote from her high school days:
We were on a school trip and we had to do everything by ourselves, like washing our
clothes and cooking our food. We were mixed—Chinese, Malay and Indians. I recall
how frustrated we felt when the Malay students insisted that we had to buy new forks
and spoons which had to be used only by them. Some pointed out that the utensils
could have been washed carefully, but the Malay students insisted that washing does
not clean the contamination of non-halal food. Yet Indians have requirements too, but
they never really complain and they seemed more accommodating to us. Also, because
of their special diet, often the Malay girls used to eat together in a group isolated from
the others; this was not really welcomed by the other members of the group. We felt
that there was no need to eat separately, but we tolerated it. These kinds of things
make you wonder how they can be part of any group other than their own. (Grace,
24, university student, Chinese)

In the context of food courts, some Malay Muslims may adopt other strategies,
such as opting to order food from halal stalls as take-away if the food court is not
an exclusively halal environment, sitting on the other side of the table if eating with
a group of non-Muslims and directly or indirectly trying to convince the non-Mus-
lim members of the group to select halal food. Certainly not all Malay Muslims

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adopt all, or even some of these ‘defensive dining’ strategies, and there are certainly
levels of flexibility—however, in Singapore, they are employed by a relevant
number.
Although I tend to agree with Nasir and Pereira’s observation (Nasir & Pereira
2008) that both working class and more highly educated Malay Muslims adopt
defensive dining, I have noticed that those with a higher income and educational
background try actively to avoid non-Muslims misreading their defensive dining as
a criticism of non-Muslims or, even worse, as a racist act: ‘I do my best to avoid
that my Chinese colleagues can think that I dislike them when my intention is only
to respect my religion and protect myself from sins’ (Muhammad, 32 years old,
engineer). Do Malay Muslims from different economic and educational
backgrounds understand the threat of pollution and contamination from nonhalal
environments differently? An in-depth answer to such a question would require
extensive quantitative and quanlitative research. Notwithstanding, my 2 years of
interviews and observations during dining interactions tend to confirm a certain
discrepancy in attitudes between Muslims of different backgrounds. On the one
hand, less educated Malay Muslims ascribe the risk of contamination to the
non-Muslims themselves, in particular to the Chinese majority. In this case, it is
the Chinese person, with his or her non-Muslim behaviour, who is considered to be
the cause of contamination. When I asked why the ‘person’ and not just ‘the food’
was contaminating, I was reminded that ‘people are made of what they eat’. On the
other hand, secular18 educated Malay Muslims seem, as we have seen earlier, to
mainly address the religious obligation and to be careful that others perceive the
rejection as exclusively aimed towards food. The impurity in this case is ‘metaphysi-
cal’, i.e. because of the ‘Islamic’ context of one’s life, rather the ‘ontological’, i.e.
because of the impurity of a particular group.
To explain the discrepancy between the two attitudes, we have to look not only
at education but also at the different experience that middle-class and working-class
Malay Muslims have of ‘multiculturalism’ in Singapore. The majority of low and
medium income families live in HDB housing, where people are forced19 to share
multiethnic spaces. Although at first glance, the racial relationship may appear
smooth, a certain level of tension is undeniable and is often expressed through
racial comments and jokes. This tension is particularly visible among youth and
young children where, as Lai has observed, ‘ethnic expletives and derogative lan-
guage are frequently used. Common ethnic swear words used by Malay youths on
Chinese youths are Cina kui (Chinese devil), syaitan (Satan), Cina babi (Chinese
pig), babi syaitan (Satanic pig)’ (Lai 2009b: 8).
For the purposes of this article, we may notice how pig and syaitan (devil) have
been linked and how this may reinforce the relationship between pork and the
‘threat’ to one’s own spirituality. The perception that dietary differences may trans-
form an ethnic or religious group into an overall polluting threat is not new (Doug-
las 1966). We can even trace theological debates within traditional schools of Islam
on the very same subject (see the case of the Maliki school, Safran 2003). We need

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to consider that the perception of halal environments as ‘protection’ against the

influences of seemingly polluted and threatening surroundings are, in the case of
Malay Muslim Singaporeans living in HDB estates, cognate with their status as a
minority. Although acknowledged as the ‘native’ population in the Singaporean
constitution, Malay Muslims remain, for historical and social–political reasons, eco-
nomically behind and affected by social problems when compared to the Chinese
majority.20 In these cases, halal food represents something more than a religious
obligation. It is transformed into an ‘act’ of identity, a marker which allows not
only a fully controlled space, but also an emotional one. Indeed, while the state has
provided regulations and limitations21 on other religious matters such as the tudung
(Islamic scarf), halal food remains the only sphere in which the Malay Muslims are
fully in control and the state—as well as other ethnic groups—are required to
accommodate the minority’s requests.
During my research, I also noticed that some Chinese Singaporean respondents
compared and contrasted the two main minorities, Malays and Indians, emphasising
how they perceived the latter as more ‘accommodating’ than the former. It is
through these types of simplistic comparisons that stereotypes about the Malay
Muslim community are reinforced. The current world debate on Islam also has an
impact, despite the fact that the Singaporean government (which controls all the
national mass media) is extremely careful to moderate the style in which news is
presented to the public, particularly when it concerns Islam (Lee 2010). Therefore,
the impact of stereotypes and bias on the Malay Muslim minority should be taken
into consideration when evaluating the effect that defensive dining may have on
overall integrative dynamics. Indeed, it is important to emphasise here that ‘integra-
tion’ is not a general and mono-directional process. People integrate not just into
an overall ‘social fabric’ but also into the ‘ordinary’ context of everyday life, some-
thing which consists of a quite limited number of actors and places. Nobody—
despite the term’s common usage—’integrates’ into a state or even into a relatively
small city, such as Singapore. Rather, people integrate within correlational contexts
that are marked by the dynamics of interactions (or lack of them). As we have seen,
Nasir and Pereira (2008) have missed such dynamics and have instead focussed only
on the Malay Muslims’ views.

DEFENSIVE OR OFFENSIVE DINING? TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN

Nasir and Pereira (2008) have concluded that the ‘defensive dining strategies’ that
many Malay Muslims adopt in Singapore have actually facilitated their integration
within a mainly non-Muslim society. I do not dispute that the centralised MUIS
halal certification and other similar strategies may facilitate, from the viewpoint of
some Malay Muslims, their participation in activities organised in nonhalal environ-
ments. Nonetheless, I argue that the authors have overlooked the other side of the
coin: ‘defensive dining’ strategies foster and reinforce existing stereotypes among the
non-Muslim population, particularly among the Chinese majority. Integration is a

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dual process and individual actions, or nonactions, of a group are not enough by
themselves to achieve such a social state. My research suggests that some non-Mus-
lim Singaporeans may misunderstand the practice of defensive dining as antisocial
at best or, at worst, ‘offensive’. The supposed advantages of adopting such a strategy
would, in the latter case, backfire. One of the main reasons for these results may
stem from the fact that a considerable number of Singaporeans harbour stereotypes
about the various ‘racial’ and ‘religious’ communities. Indeed, although the Singa-
porean government, as we have seen earlier, places a strong emphasis on racial and
religious harmony, many Singaporeans perceive stereotypes to be ‘innocent’ charac-
teristics of ethnic ⁄ religious groups. An interesting aspect of my research is that
several of my respondents highlighted that religious harmony refers to the ‘religion’
itself and not to the members of the religion or ethnic group: ‘we are not allowed
to make fun of others’ religion, I mean, even jokes are not tolerated so easily in
Singapore. You cannot say that ‘Islam’ is the religion of the devil or Christianity a
stupid religion and so on. But of course, nobody will say anything if one of us says
that—just to give you an example—Malays are lazy or Chinese Singaporeans are
greedy, or that Muslims are too strict’ (Joseph, 22 years, university student, Chinese
Singaporean).
In Singapore, people use ethnic and religious categories as maps to orient them-
selves within their inevitable multicultural social interactions. Although stereotypes
have often been understood as cultural tools, recent studies in both psychology and
neuroscience have suggested universal dynamics that may explain, in our case, their
existence within a society like Singapore, which has made a strong and conscious
effort, in the name of state multiculturalism, to eradicate them. Indeed, Macrae
et al. (1994): 37 have suggested that stereotypes ‘serve to simplify perception, judge-
ment and action. As energy saving devices, they spare perceivers the ordeal of
responding to an almost incomprehensibly complex social world’. In such condi-
tions, the more or less conscious cognitive mapping of social interactions as belong-
ing to either an in-group or out-group is facilitated. Research (e.g. Ellemers et al.
2002) has suggested that the mere process of categorising people into groups elicits
intergroup biases and if for any reason one group (or part of such group) perceives
the out-group as a possible source of threat, any pre-existing bias would be rein-
forced (Branscombe et al. 1999). Some scholars, such as Devine (1989) (see also
Dovidio et al. 1986; Gaertner & McLaughlin 1983), have argued that there exists a
certain cognitive automatism for bias and stereotyping towards out-groups,
although recent studies (Livingston & Brewer 2002) have shown some limitations to
such automatism. Social neuroscientific studies, based on fMRI methodology
(Cunningham et al. 2004; Phelps et al. 2000; Wheeler & Fiske 2005), have impli-
cated the amygdala—a region of the brain implicated in visceral states and disgust
that operates at an automatic and unconscious level—in the automatism of bias
and stereotypes. Such cognitive and neuroscientific studies reveal an interesting
aspect of stereotyping and out-group bias that is very relevant to Singapore, which
has strict legislation protecting religious harmony and severely limits actions (or

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 Defensive or offensive dining?

even the expression of opinions) that may displease one of the main religious com-
munities.22
In their studies, Wyer et al. (1998) found that under conditions in which
deploying stereotypes and bias may provoke strong social disapproval or, as in the
case of Singapore, where they are legislatively discouraged, people may try to sup-
press them. However, the study revealed a strong rebound effect. In other words,
people tend to experience an increase in stereotype use following attempts to sup-
press such usage (see also Zhang & Hunt 2008). This rebound effect may help to
explain the widespread diffusion of stereotypes about members of the various reli-
gions and ethnic groups existing in Singapore, particularly Malay Muslims. Indeed,
as many of my respondents reported during interviews and conversations, because
of the fear induced by the Singaporean legislation designed to protect religious
harmony, great care is taken by a majority of Singaporeans to avoid stereotypes or
negative representations of religions. Yet I can plausibly suggest that such efforts
may, in some cases, result in a strong rebound effect so that religious stereotypes, as
we have seen, affect community members instead of their religions.
It is within these dynamics that we have to understand the impact that the halal
logo and the defensive dining strategies have on both Muslims and non-Muslims.
Clearly, the halal practices are inscribed within a commodification and commerciali-
sation that go far beyond the spiritual personal domain to become, as we have seen,
a social (often fossilised) norm. Therefore, in Nasir and Pereira (2008) also Nasir
et al. 2010) reading of Muslim dining strategies, we can observe a lack of under-
standing of the relationship between eating etiquette within the wider social practice
of Singapore, stereotypes and piety, which prevents the authors from seeing how
those ‘defensive’ practices may become ‘offensive’.

CONCLUSIONS
Although there are some studies focussing on halal food (see in particular Fischer
2008, 2009), in-depth studies on related halal practices and Muslim strategies are
almost nonexistent, with the exception of the work of Nasir and Pereira concerning
Malay Muslims in Singapore (Nasir & Pereira 2008; see also the re-worked version
in Nasir et al. 2010). Singapore is a vibrant multicultural and multifaith society, yet
inter-religious and ethnic tension exists. In this article, I have discussed some of
these tensions and the ways in which they are also affected by the social–political
structure of Singapore and its often unique legislation. Nasir and Pereira (2008)
and Nasir et al. (2010) have shown the centrality of halal food and halal practice to
the local Muslim community. Their research has focussed exclusively on the percep-
tions and views of middle class, educated, Malay Muslims. They concluded that
Malay Muslims in Singapore are enabled to partake fully in the multicultural life of
Singapore, despite their strict adherence to halal dietary and environmental require-
ments by adopting ‘defensive dining’ strategies. In other words, the authors have
presented ‘defensive dining’ as a positive integration strategy.

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G. Marranci

However, when Malay Muslims’ halal practices are read within everyday con-
texts and interactions with the non-Muslim majority, particularly the Singaporean
Chinese population, defensive dining strategies can be seen as less effective and, in
some cases, clearly divisive. As we have discussed, MUIS has certainly attempted,
through the centralised certification of halal food, to provide a protected meta-space
in which Singaporean Malay Muslims can feel reassured and free to interact with
non-Muslims without concerns about nonhalal food contamination—fear which
surely would prevent, in many instances, sharing dining spaces and activities. Yet
MUIS can only provide the instruments and the system; how people then use them,
together with the meaning that they may ascribe to them, is beyond the Muslim
organisation’s control. Furthermore, when one pays attention to how the non-Mus-
lim majority ‘read’ the Malay Muslims’ defensive dining practices, Nasir and Pereira
(2008) (also Nasir et al. 2010) conclusions appear overly positive and, in many
instances, distant from the reality.
Stereotyping is particularly prevalent within Singaporean society (Lai 2009a,b)
and some recent studies have shown, as we have discussed, that the conscious effort
to suppress bias and prejudice against out-groups may, in reality, facilitate the
development of other unconscious and automatic stereotypes. Hence, existing
stereotypes and personal bias, sometimes based on personal experiences, may easily
create situations in which a Malay Muslim can perceive his or her ‘defensive dining’
as a compromise which allows participation in multicultural spaces, while a Chinese
Christian may interpret it as a rather ‘offensive’ antisocial practice.
It is clear, from observations and interviews, that many Muslims in Singapore
unquestioningly follow certain halal practices as defined by unwritten (and unoffi-
cial) practices and halal logos, instead of applying acquired Islamic knowledge avail-
able on the subject. Younger generations in particular are becoming so used to the
green halal logo, and to some local practices (as described by Nasir and Pereira’s
defensive dining), that they are not able, for instance, to implement strategies used
by Muslims living in western countries which are still within the realm of Islamic
orthodoxy.23 In other words, their capacity to discern what may or may not be halal
has decreased to the extent that, in some cases, the only reliable means of discerning
what is ‘halal’ is the halal logo on products or the halal certificate at food stalls and
restaurants. This lack of knowledge magnifies the fear of contamination and creates
confusion regarding where the limits of halal permissibility lie. Hence, as we have
seen, there are cases in which some Malay Muslim mothers refuse to let their
children play at the homes of their non-Muslim friends.
Integration, as I have discussed, is not a mono-directional process. Furthermore,
people do not integrate within abstract ideas, but rather in everyday contexts. As we
have seen, food and dining have a particular significance within socialisation pro-
cesses in Singapore. Singaporean Malay Muslims have adopted strategies which
allow them to interact with the mainly non-Muslim environment. In many circum-
stances, these strategies are effective. However, cases of defensive dining and the use
of halal logos as the only ‘safe option’ among the many available—that to Muslims

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 Defensive or offensive dining?

of other communities would be considered Islamically permissible—have, in some

cases, backfired. Some non-Muslim individuals who have interacted with Muslims
adopting the above strategies did not see those defensive dining practices as such,
but rather, because of automatic stereotyping, as a form of distancing, a form of
rejection and a lack of integration; or, as Lee Kuan Yew himself argued, ‘too strict’.
Different perceptions and interpretations of the same practice do not facilitate
integration and communication. Surely, more understanding would be possible if
the non-Muslim majority were fully aware of the reasons behind such defensive din-
ing practices. Yet, at the same time, a full and widespread awareness and knowledge
of Islamic halal requirements among the general Singaporean Malay Muslim
community might increase flexibility in choices of food and premises beyond the
commercially driven halal logos.

Please send correspondence to Gabriele Marranci: g.marranci@gmail.com

NOTES
1 See also Othman et al. 2009; Nasir & Pereira 2008.
2 See, for instance, The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, The formation of the
Muslim council of Singapore (MUIS), or the 2002 ‘New Malay Identity’ project (Tan, C.
2008; Tan, K. 2008)
3 Ethnic Chinese comprise seventy-seven per cent of the population and are largely Bud-
dhists, followed by Taoists and Christians.
4 Indians are seven per cent of the population and are largely Hindu, followed by Muslims
and a minority of Christians.
5 Statistical data is derived from Department of Statistics, Singapore: http://www.singstat.
gov.sg/stats/themes/people/demo.html
6 The Singaporean government officially uses the term ‘multiracial society’.
7 Straits Times, 8 February 2001; see also Chua 2003.
8 Cited in the Straits Times, 26 January 2011.
9 See, for instance, the AMP (Association Muslim Professionals): http://www.amp.org.sg/
main.asp.
10 See, for instance, ‘Lee Kuan Yew urges Muslims to be less strict’, forum thread at ‘Sam’s
Alfresco Heaven: Celebrating Singapore’s Golden Period’, http://tinyurl.com/4ze8vw9.
11 For further statistical data see ‘Economic Surveys Series’, Department of Statistics, Singa-
pore: http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/themes/economy/biz/fnb.pdf.
12 Maglis Ugama Islam Singapura (Islamic Religious Council of Singapore): http://
www.muis.gov.sg/cms/services/hal.aspx?id=1714.
13 http://www.muis.gov.sg/cms/services/hal.aspx?id=458.
14 As I have mentioned above, some of the conceptualisations of halal and halal ritualisa-
tion are specific to the region rather than shared by all Muslims.
15 Conducted by Asia Research Institute, Religion Cluster, principal investigators Turner
and Pereira.
16 All names have been changed to respect anonymity.
17 A great number of Muslims prefer not to shake hands with the opposite gender.

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G. Marranci

18 In Singapore the education system acknowledges, although through strict regulation,

religious schools or madrasahs. For further information see Mokhtar (2010).
19 By specific legislation. For more information see Sin (2002); Soh and Yuen (2011).
20 Singapore emphasises meritocracy (Moore 2000). Races are often compared to measure
their economic and social development.
21 For instance, schoolgirls cannot wear the tudung, or head-covering, at national secular
schools (Kam-Yee 2003).
22 See, for instance, the case of the prominent Christian Evangelical Pastor Rony Tan (Goh
2010: 32).
23 E.g. some products, because of their ingredients are halal by default even if the halal
logo is not present. Another example is the idea, sometimes expressed by both Nasir and
Pereira (2008) respondents and mine, that one’s halal food can be contaminated by the
smell of pork or by tiny particles of the non-halal food of nearby diners; while no such
cases are mentioned in traditional orthodox Islamic teachings. Indeed, it may be
concluded that many of the ‘defensive strategies’ adopted by some of my respondents do
not find confirmation in ordinary Islamic orthodox halal practices.

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