To ensure that justice is made available to all, the judicial system has been evolved in all

nations. It is extremely important and in fact necessary also that the Courts interpret the law
in such a manner that ensures ‘access to justice’ to the maximum. Interpretation means the art
of finding out the true sense of enactment by giving the words of the enactment their natural
and ordinary meaning. 1It is the process of ascertaining the true meaning of the words used in
a statute. The Court is not expected to interpret arbitrarily and therefore there have been
certain ‘Guiding Rules of Interpretation’ which help in the proper interpretation of statutes.

The Guiding Rules of the Interpretation of the statute are as follows:

1. Language of the statute should be read as it is –

It states that the intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the
language used. The words of a statute never should, in interpretation, be added to or
subtracted from without almost a necessity. It had the principals of avoiding addition
or substitution of words, casus omissus, avoiding rejection of words and departure
from the rule.
2. The rule of literal construction –
This rule speaks about the natural and grammatical meaning of the statutes,
explanation of the rule, exact meaning preferred to loose meaning and about technical
words in technical sense.
3. Rule regarding to subject and object –
It contains the Rule of Haydons case which states that when the material words are
capable of bearing two or more constructions, the most firmly established rule of
construction of such words “of all statutes in general”. It also talks about the mischief
rule.

In furtherance to the above guiding rules, there is the fourth rule.

4. Rule regarding the Consequences –

It states that it should be taken care that:
i. Hardship, inconvenience, injustice, absurdity and anomaly is to be avoided.
ii. Principles of sincerity, substantial justice and fairness are to be applied.
iii. Inconsistency and repugnancy are to be avoided.
iv. Harmonious construction should be aimed at.

1
Justice G.P. Singh, “PRINCIPALS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION”, Lexis Nexis, 14 th Edition, 2016,
pg. 1-2.
 v. Avoidance of uncertainty or friction in the system which the statute purports to
regulate.

Avoidance of Uncertainty or Friction in the System which the Statute Purports to

Regulate

This principle has been stated by Lord Shaw in Shannon Realties Ltd. v. St. Michel (Villa de)
where he quotes that –

“Where words of a statute are clear, they must, of course, be followed but in their Lordships’
opinion, where alternative constructions are equally open that alternative is to be chosen
which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to
be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction
or confusion into the working of the system.”2

Circumstances in which Avoidance of Uncertainty and Friction is Permissible

The above principle was accepted and the observations of Lord Shaw were quoted from
3
Maxwell by Subbarao J, in construing section 193 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and in
coming to the conclusion that the Chief Customs Authority was not an “Officer of Customs”.4

Same principle was applied in construing section 2(c) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic
in Women and Girls Act, 1956 5, which defines a Magistrate to mean “a District Magistrate,
a Sub-Divisional Magistrate of the First Class specially empowered by the State
Government”.6 In this case it was held that the empowering does not require the process of
selection or discrimination as regards an individual on whom the special power is conferred
and the adverb “specially” refers to the special purpose of empowerment. One of the reasons
2
Shannon Realties Ltd. v. St. Michel (Villa de), (1924) AC 185.
3
Section 193 of the Sea Custom Act 1878 states as follows:
“Enforcement of payment of penalty –
When a penalty or increased rate of duty is adjudged against any person under this Act by any officer of
Customs, such officer, if such penalty or creased rate be not paid, may levy the same by sale of any goods of the
said person which may be in. his charge, or in the charge of any other officer of Customs.
When an officer of Customs who has adjudged a penalty or increased rate of duty against any person under this
Act is unable to realize the unpaid amount thereof from such goods, such officer may notify in writing to any
Magistrate within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such person or any goods belonging to him may be, the
name and residence of the said person and the amount of penalty or increased rate of duty unrecovered ; and
such Magistrate shall thereupon proceed to enforce payment of the said amount in like manner as if such
penalty or increased rate had been a fine inflicted by himself.”
4
Collector of Customs v. Digvijaya Singhji Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. AIR 1961 SC 1549.
5
Section 2(c) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 defines Magistrate as “a
District Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, a Presidency Magistrate, or a Magistrate of the first class
specially empowered by the State Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to exercise jurisdiction
under this Act”
6
State of Gujarat v. Chaturbhuj Maganlal, AIR 1976 SC 1697.
given was that a contrary conclusion would impede the efficacy of the provision and
introduce inconvenience, friction, confusion and artificiality in the working of the provision. 7

Similar principle was applied by the Supreme Court in construing the fundamental right
under Article 22(1) & 22(2) of the Constitution 8; and it was held that the said Article applies
to give protection against such arrests as are effected otherwise than under a warrant issued
by a court on the allegation or accusation that the arrested person has committed some
criminal or quasi-criminal act and that the physical restraint put upon an abducted person in
process of recovering and taking into custody and delivery of the person to the custody of an
officer-in-charge of the nearest camp under section 4 of Abducted Persons (Recovery and
Restoration) Act, 1949, is not arrest and detention within the meaning of Article 22(1) &
22(2). 9

In holding so Justice S.R. Das observed, “If two constructions are possible then the court
must adopt that which will ensure smooth and harmonious working of the Constitution and
eschew the other which will lead to absurdity or give rise to practical inconvenience or make
well established provision of existing law nugatory.”10

And in construing Article 371-D of the Constitution, 11the Supreme Court held that the words
“civil service of the State” as used therein did not include the High Court staff and the
subordinate judiciary, although the same words used in Article 311 include these categories.
12
The narrower construction of these words in Article 371-D was adopted on the ground that a
wider construction would encroach upon the principle of independence of judiciary enshrined
in Articles 229 and 235 of the Constitution and the narrower construction ensures smooth
working of the Constitution and harmony amongst its various provisions. The court observed,
“Where two alternative constructions are possible, the court must choose the one which will
be in accord with the other parts of the statute and ensure its smooth, harmonious working
7
Ibid.
8
Article 22 of the Constitution of India read as follows –
“Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases
(1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the
grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of
his choice
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate
within a period of twenty four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place
of arrest to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period
without the authority of a magistrate”
9
State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh, AIR 1953 SC10
10
Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., AIR 1996 SC 1987.
11
Article 371-D of the Constitution of India states about the special provisions with respect to the state of
Andhra Pradesh.
12
Chief Justice of Andra Pradesh v. L.V.A. Dikhshitulu (1979) 2SCC 34.
and eschew the other which leads to absurdity, confusion or friction, contradiction and
conflict between its various provisions, or undermines or tends to defeat or destroy the basic
scheme and purpose of the enactment”.13

13
Ibid.