The Climate Risks We Face

The Climate Risks We Face in the 21st Century
Report by the Global Change Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, for the Daily
Maverick
8 October 2020
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Summary
The Global Change Institute at the University of the Witwatersrand was asked to list and describe the
top climate change-related risks faced by South Africa and the southern African region in the first half
of the 21st Century. After providing contextual information and explanations of how risk is evaluated,
they generated a long list of potential risk elements. The list was collectively scored by 12 experts from
various disciplines in terms of the likelihood that they would materialise, and the consequences if they
did occur. The first round of scoring reduced the top risks to 13, which were then re-scored by the
experts, and clustered into five groups of inter-related climate risks. The five top risk groupings include
climate risks linked to the security of energy, water, food, health and nature. Each of these risk clusters
is then described in some detail, including their evolution over both the medium (to 2030) and longer
term (2030 to 2050). The full list of risks considered, and details on the risk assessment process, are
included as appendices.
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Table of Contents
Summary ......................................................................................................................... 2
Background ...................................................................................................................... 4
Climate change in context................................................................................................ 5
Is it just me, or is it getting hotter?..................................................................................... 6
Getting to the heart of the matter: What makes climate risk a risk? ..................................... 8
Identifying climate risks in southern Africa. ......................................................................... 9
Top five emerging climate risks .......................................................................................12
Appendix 1: A Compendium of the emerging climate risks facing Southern Africa.................28
Appendix 2: The Typology of risks used in this study ........................................................39
Appendix 3: Terminology used for the risk assessment ....................................................40
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Background
The Global Change Institute (GCI) at the University of the Witwatersrand was commissioned by the
Daily Maverick to identify and assess the key risks, in relation to climate change, that pose the most
significant threats in South Africa and the southern African region. The resulting list will identify those
themes where climate journalism can make a deep and lasting impact. The analysis was informed by
the ensemble of most recent climate models, specifically downscaled for southern Africa, and the
domain expertise offered by the large group of climate change specialists associated with the GCI. It
took into account the developing nation status of countries in the region, where poverty and inequality
render the state vulnerable to various forms of failure. The politics and economics of the geopolitical
climate debate, of various forms of energy supply, and the prospects for new technologies, also
featured.
Some parallels have been drawn between the responses to COVID-19 and climate change by some
African countries. A recent study indicated that for some African countries (Liberia, Sierra Leone and
Guinea) COVID-19, is not yet being treated as a significant risk factor – because it does not seem to be
as urgent compared to the current issues people are facing. Compared to the effects of Ebola, for
instance, COVID-19 seems like a mild cold. The same mindset may prevail for climate risk, it is just not
that urgent yet compared to the myriad of economic and development challenges many African
countries face, but this may be because most people do not how pervasive climate risks are, as well as
the magnitude of the risk in the long term.
Visualising a hierarchy of threats in 2020. Source: Laurie Garrett,

https://twitter.com/Laurie_Garrett/status/1273317566002405378/photo/1 . Adapted from Graeme
MacKay, The Hamilton Spectator, March 11, 2020 https://mackaycartoons.net/tag/recession/
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Climate change in context
Climate change is a concern to many people, both globally and locally, but in between sporadic climate
crises, the daily challenges of life in Southern Africa, including access to safe water and electricity, jobs,
and nutritious food, crime and failures of governance tend to dominate our attention. Most recently,
the Covid-19 pandemic has overshadowed all other issues, but has also revealed the underlying fragility
of parts of our society, and the surprising resilience of others. These everyday struggles will continue,
affecting all sectors of society, and will only intensify if we don’t address the additional, and inexorable,
burden of climate change-related risks with the urgency it requires. Climate change is not a problem of
the future, but a problem of the present that becomes insoluble in the future if we do not take decisive
actions now.
Climate change does not happen in a vacuum. It acts as an additional stressor and threat multiplier to
existing problems. In other words it makes current threats that much worse, and exacerbates pre-
existing systemic and structural issues. The wider context within which the climate crisis is unfolding
also determines how well we can adapt to the growing challenges. Will we bounce back, or indeed leap
forward, under the spur of climate change?
Africans, especially those living under conditions of poverty, will carry an unfair share of the
consequences of climate change. African countries have collectively contributed the least to global
greenhouse gas emissions (less than 5%). South Africa, the biggest emitter on the continent, with a per-
capita emission rate higher than many developed countries, accounts for about 1% of global emissions.
This is because South Africa depends on coal to generate electricity, and has historically used its
relatively inexpensive electricity to develop an energy-intensive economy. South Africa is approximately
the 15th largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world (the exact ranking fluctuates somewhat from
year to year).
South Africa, like other southern African countries, has high levels of poverty, unemployment, low
development outcomes and pervasive social and income inequalities1. Before Covid-19, approximately
half (49%) of the adult population in South Africa lived in poverty 2, and unemployment stood at about
30%. That translates into roughly 7 million people without jobs or formal income. In both cases black
women, caring for families and heading households are most impacted3. Despite these alarming
statistics, South Africa and Botswana are better off in comparison to other countries in the region.
Poverty rates range from 19% in Botswana to 70% in Zimbabwe4.
South Africa has the strongest economy in the region and is a destination for labour migrants, looking
for jobs to support families in their home countries. Rural South Africans and people from neighbouring
countries, are flocking to towns and cities. Nearly two-thirds of people in South Africa (64%) live in cities
and this is expected to increase to 77% by 2050 5. There is already competition for resources and access
1 UNDP (2019) Human Development Report 2019. http://report.hdr.undp.org

2 StatsSA (2019) http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=12075
3 http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=12075
4 http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-6-multidimensional-poverty-index-developing-countries
5 UNDESA (2014). Revision of the World Urbanisation Prospects.
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to public services between people already in urban areas and the new arrivals, whether they are South
African or foreign nationals. Given the climate, economic and governance fragility of the southern
African region, it is plausible that the additional stresses of climate change will accelerate these trends.
Climate refugees are almost certainly already with us, even if that is not how the migrants think of their
reasons for moving, which invariably involve many factors.
Governments, civil society, Non-Governmental Organisations and private sector companies in the
region prioritise economic growth. Often this is couched in terms of sustainable development, including
climate action. At the same time corruption, lack of skills, lack of finance, weak economies and
ineffective institutions are rampant in the region. These issues retard development gains and also
curtail the capacity of southern African societies to effectively combat climate risks and adapt to the
climate changes that are now unavoidable. These factors also restrict, in some cases, access to
international climate finance, such as that offered by the World Bank and the Green Climate Fund. Only
3% of global green climate finance has been channelled into African countries to help them and their
citizens combat climate change6. South Africa has been relatively successful, among African countries,
in accessing these funds which offer grants or favourable-term loans to help the shift to a less climate-
damaging development path.
These economic and social development challenges in southern Africa are interlinked in many ways,
and have many points of vulnerability to climate change. This is why the ‘top risks’ identified in this
report are all clusters of related issues, which tend to fail as a crisis involving several factors. Resolving
the challenges often involves trade-offs: from households, to companies and governments; between
and within economic sectors; and between present wants and future needs. Making wise trade-offs
requires that value and importance be assigned (‘establishing materiality’) to the various threats and
responses. This is what guides climate action pathways, implicitly or explicitly. Questions about
inclusivity, consultation, representation and politics quickly become apparent in this process. Who
decides, and who is consulted, often determines the end result.
Is it just me, or is it getting hotter?

Southern Africa is a climate change hotspot7. This means that warming projected8 for southern Africa
is substantially greater than that projected for most other parts of the world. With this increase in
temperature comes abnormally large changes in other climate factors as well, such as drought and the
likelihood of severe storms.
Climate models present simplified versions of reality. Although these models are based on the best
science available right now, there is still some uncertainty on the projections they provide regarding
6 UNU-INRA (2020) https://i.unu.edu/media/inra.unu.edu/event/5423/DIscussion-paper-Africas-Development-in-the-age-

of-stranded-Assets_INRAReport2019-WEB.pdf
7 IPCC SR 1.5 (2018) Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5C https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/
8 Climate scientists always say project rather than predict, to underline the fact that the scenarios include some things that
simply cannot be predicted in a deterministic way – such as changes in human behaviour
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future climate change. For this risk assessment we were guided by the IPCC RCP8.59 scenario. This set
of assumptions about the future most closely corresponds to the pathway on which the world is
currently on. In that sense, it is close to a ‘worst case scenario’, although it does include ongoing
improvements in energy efficiency and reductions in the greenhouse gas emissions per unit of energy
generated – because they make economic sense, rather than because of concerted climate action. If
the world (not just South Africa) were to adopt a much more ambitious climate change mitigation
strategy – for instance, one consistent with the agreements reached in Paris in 2015 – the general
pattern of climate change in southern Africa would be much the same up until 2050, just delayed by a
few years. After 2050, the different development pathways make a dramatic difference – possibly
between survivable change and irreversible, deeply damaging change.
In the RCP 8.5 future, the ‘ensemble’ of climate change models10 project that there will be less rainfall,
on average, over most of southern Africa. It will fall more erratically, with the consequences of a greater
likelihood of multi-year droughts. At the same time, it will become significantly hotter. Southern African
countries are most likely to be hotter by 4-6C in the coming decades11,12. This is because the region is
warming at about twice the global rate of temperature increase13. In simple terms this means that if
the world reaches 3C of global warming by 2100, most Southern African countries will actually be 6C
hotter than they were at the beginning of the century. The global target of keeping warming below 2C
has already been exceeded in parts of southern Africa; and in the unlikely event that the world does
succeed in this goal (we are currently on track for over 3C), southern Africa will experience at least 4C
of warming.
South Africa is already 1-1.5C warmer today on average than it was at the beginning of the 20 th
Century. The coastal areas warm more slowly than the inland areas, which means that many parts of
the interior are already more than 2C warmer than in the past. In everyday life for South Africans this
has translated to more intense heat waves and more extremely hot days in the past decade than ever
before14. It is certain that this will only get worse as global warming continues and average
temperatures continue to rise.
Heavy storms and tropical cyclones are becoming more frequent. This increases the likelihoods of
floods15 and humanitarian disasters resulting from high winds. The recent devastating effects of the
Tropical Cyclone Idai in Mozambique is a good example. Perversely, chronic droughts are also highly
9 RCP stands for ‘Representative Concentration Pathway’, and the 8.5 refers to the Watts per square meter of additional
global warming in the year 2100
10 The mean result of many independent climate models is a more reliable guide to the future than picking just one. The
ensemble we analyse at GCI include the more than 30 models that contribute to the most recent assessment, called
CMIP6.
11 IPCC SR 1.5 (2018)
12Engelbrecht et al., (2015) Projections of rapidly rising surface temperatures over Africa under low mitigation.
https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/10/8/085004/meta
13 IPCC SR 1.5 (2018)
14 Engelbrecht et al (2015); IPCC (2018)
15 IPCC SR 1.5 (2018)
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likely to become more frequent in southern Africa16, increasing the possibility of water scarcity and
shortages for farmers, industry, animals and people.
Together, the combination of these changing physical climate conditions increases the risk of exceeding
critical thresholds (‘tipping points’), beyond which our systems for providing water, food and energy to
people are no longer viable, and to which southern African ecosystems are not adapted. For example
temperature increases of over 4C, combined with the higher likelihood of droughts lasting two or more
years could exceed the long term sustainability of the cattle and maize farming industries17.
Most people think of ‘climate risk’ purely in terms of the physical impacts of climate change – heat
waves, floods and droughts. However, in the modern world, humans are an important part of the
climate system, just like the atmosphere, the oceans and the ice-bodies. Therefore ‘risk’ also has social,
economic and political dimensions. The impact of climate risks differs depending on whose perspective
is used. For instance, the cattle and maize industries are key to the economies of many southern African
countries, for food security and also for trade. The effects are felt not only by agribusinesses and
consumers, but also by smallholder farmers, many of whom are women, for their livelihoods.
So how does one begin to frame climate risks?
Getting to the heart of the matter: What makes climate risk a risk?
‘Risk’ is part of the vocabulary of governments and the private sector in these volatile times. Risks are
uncertainties, which if they happen, affect the achievement of specific objectives18.
Climate risks are often discussed in relation to specific objectives and the broader consideration of what
is “at risk”. These objectives could be sustainable development, enterprise profitability, operational
stability, jobs, food or water security or human health. This means that the understanding of climate
risks and “what is at risk” will differ depending on who the audience is and their objectives (the ‘lens’
used).
The GCI took a broad view of climate risk in this assessment. It prioritised climate risks in terms of their
potential impacts on sustainable development and society, as this objective is cross-cutting. It impacts
business, government and the average person trying to live and work in Southern Africa. If the risk
assessment had used a purely government or private-sector lens, then whilst the emerging climate
themes may have been the same, the description of impacts or vulnerability dimensions relative to
“what is at risk” may have had a different nuance.
16 IPCC SR 1.5 (2018)

17 https://www.wits.ac.za/news/latest-news/research-news/2019/2019-08/southern-africa-heading-towards-climate-
tipping-points.html
18 https://www.who.int/management/general/risk/WhenRiskNotRisk.pdf
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Box 1. Important climate risk concepts to understand
Climate change poses risks to society in a number of ways. In terms of a hazard or climate threat (e.g.
drought, extreme flood, heat wave), climate is what scientists term the ‘external risk and exposure’
element that needs to be considered when managing climate risk.
The story does not end there. The same climate hazard or threat may have different ‘internal’ or
vulnerability dimensions across different sectors of society. Vulnerability dimensions relate to how a
person, business, community, and ecosystem is able to withstand and respond to climate stresses. This
is also frequently somewhat within our control, and therefore critical to understand and manage.
For example, a small-scale farmer is exposed to the climate hazard of drought. Her ability to adapt is
affected by lack of access to finance, livelihood considerations such as trying to make ends meet each
month; and limited access to markets and infrastructure.
In another example, urban residents may be exposed to flooding, but the impact it has depends on the
internal dimensions (where one lives, the structure and safety of homes, schools, hospitals, location
and quality of local infrastructure).
These two vulnerability dimensions (the external or exposure dimension and internal or vulnerability
dimension) have to be considered together.
Identifying climate risks in southern Africa.

Climate risk can be separated into physical and transition risks19. Physical risks arise from the potential
physical impacts of climate change on people, communities, infrastructure, the environment, economic
activity and social development. Physical risks are driven by either by “acute” climate hazards, relatively
short-duration events like floods, fires, tropical cyclones or mudslides, or by “chronic” hazards, which
are long-term, persistent changes, for instance in rainfall patterns, temperatures and sea level.
Transition risks, on the other hand, are the uncertainties and impacts on people, companies,
government, environment and economies that are associated with global decarbonisation, that is,
reducing the use of fossil fuels (in the context of southern Africa, particularly coal) for energy. The
drivers of transition risks include policy and regulatory changes to enforce decarbonisation, all the way
from the global (the Paris Agreement, or carbon dis-investment campaigns) to the national or local
(such as the Carbon Tax Act in South Africa). There are also risks associated with the introduction of
new energy technologies, and market risks associated with changes in the behaviour of energy
consumers, for example, less demand for power from Eskom as more people, municipalities, and
companies invest in stand-alone, small-scale renewable energy systems and try and produce their own
electricity to meet their needs. The final driver is reputational risk. For example, many commercial and
development banks have stopped investing money in fossil fuels due to stakeholder concerns. The
19TFCD (2017) Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures. https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-2017-TCFD-Report-11052018.pdf
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Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure TCFD expand on these
categories.
Physical and transition risks interact with the pre-existing structural environmental, social and
economic developmental challenges in southern Africa, as described above, with the result that the
impacts differ between countries and economic sectors, and the vulnerabilities vary across peoples,
locations and contexts.
We used a combination of the TCFD and IPCC risk categories and our many years of experience in
climate risks evaluation in southern Africa to generate a list of climate risks relevant to the region20. We
reviewed the published, peer-reviewed scientific literature, but also the ‘grey literature’, the many
reports produced by the government, private sector and NGOs.
Approach to calculating risk

Most people have an instinctive understanding of the notion of risk, which makes it a powerful shared
currency for communicating diverse threats, but are poor at quantifying it accurately when it comes to
comparing for instance, high probability, low-impact risks with low-probability, high impact risks.
Humans tend to prioritise imminent risks over more consequential longer-term risk. For these reasons,
risk assessment, including by the climate change assessment community, generally follows a fairly
formal process involving 1) identifying the elements of potential risk, 2) evaluating the likelihood that
they will be experienced in a given period and place, 3) estimating the consequences if they do, and 4)
determining the degree to which the risk can be mitigated by adaptive action. This process is most
robust when it is performed by groups of knowledgeable people, drawn from a range of disciplines, in
an iterative way, rather than by single ‘experts’ doing a once-off brain dump. To improve the level of
shared understanding of what is meant by particular categories of likelihood or consequence, an agreed
set of definitions is used for both likelihood and consequence.
Some climate risk definitions:

‘Risk’ is conceptually defined and calculated, in this project and most others, as the product between
the likelihood or probability of an event occurring, over the target region and in the defined time-frame,
and its consequence if it does occur.
For this analysis, we define ‘probability’ as number of occurrences per decade during the period of
analysis, over the same geographical scope as is defined for the impact. Since we are evaluating the risk
of elements of climate change rather than the natural variability of climate itself, the likelihood is judged
relative to the risk for the same phenomenon in the absence of climate change. For this purpose we
use the ‘climate normal’ period, 1961-1990, since this is within quantitative records and human
memory. It is acknowledged that some climate change was already experienced during this reference
20 See Appendix 1 for a description of the typology used
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period, but its magnitude was small relative to the impending changes in the 21 st century. The likelihood
classes are defined according to a logarithmic scale, because they potentially span a very large range
(Appendix 2).
We judge ‘consequence’ (also called impact) according to one of three metrics, since they represent
different viewpoints which cannot easily (or ethically) be compared. The first metric is financial loss
incurred (expressed in ZAR 2020). The loss can also take a negative values, in other words, a net benefit.
This metric is used for impacts primarily in the economic sector. The second metric reflects the impact
on the lives of people, formally defined as the loss of disability-adjusted life years (DALY). DALY takes
into account not only reduction in life expectancy, but the degradation of quality of life, for instance by
illness. The third metric is a purely qualitative scheme, where neither of the above metrics can be
evaluated. As in the likelihood scoring, the class limits form a logarithmic progression. The impact is
judged as a ‘change of impact’ relative to the 1961 to 1990 ‘normal’ period (Appendix 2).
The tables summarising the scales used to assess and quantify probability or likelihood and
consequence or impact are in Appendix 2.
Emerging Climate Risks in southern Africa

The GCI experts identified an initial list of about 50 very specific climate risk elements. Each of these
were assessed and scored by two experts per risk, using the process discussed above. The top quartile
formed the 13 highest scoring climate risks.
The top 13 emerging climate risks clustered naturally into five broad climate risk themes:
1. Risks related to food insecurity and the agricultural sector: inadequate household and
community nutrition due to local, regional or global failures in crop and livestock production or
inability to access enough food, and the viability of agriculture-based activities, both
subsistence and commercial.
2. Risks related to water insecurity: shortages of suitable water for domestic, industrial and
agricultural use
3. Risks related to the energy system: transition risks to future social and economic development
4. Risks to human health and wellbeing, principally as result of heat stress and at home and work.
5. Risk of loss of ecosystem services and biodiversity, such as pollination, nature-based tourism
and ecological stability.
In describing the five climate risk clusters, we related “what is at risk” to the ability of the average
person in southern Africa to access their basic needs.
In the Compendium of top 17 Climate Risk Elements we briefly present and discuss the different
component risk dimensions that contribute in many cases to these broad climate risk themes, or in
other cases are stand-alone. They may be very important to particular sectors, areas or individuals.
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Top five emerging climate risks
Risk 1. Food insecurity and the viability of the agricultural sector:

Increased food insecurity: Likelihood: Expected [4]; Consequence: Severe to Catastrophic [6.3]; Risk
score [25.3]
Failures in the agricultural sector: Likelihood: Frequent to Expected [3.3]; Consequence: Severe [6]; Risk
Score [20]
This is two related risks. The first is of inadequate household and community nutrition due to local,
regional or global failures in crop and livestock production or inability to access enough food. The
second is of non-viability of regionally-important agriculture-based activities, both subsistence and
commercial.
Hot, empty skies and rumbling stomachs

It is the summer of 2030 in rural Limpopo. A mother walks into the garden to collect vegetables for
dinner, but they have wilted beyond saving, yet again. Another heat wave. Her stomach rumbles.
Climate change is already leading to the kinds of heat waves and droughts that destroy crops and leave
cattle dying from hunger or thirst21.
The problem has many contributing factors, linked to health, water security, biodiversity, pollination,
land use, energy and the economy at large.
At least 5.6 million southern Africans are undernourished, without even considering the impact of
COVID-1922 or future climate change. This number includes the effects of an inherently marginal and
varying climate, the climate change experienced already, land degradation, governance failures and
other socio-economic malfunctions. This number is set to almost double by 2030 if we don’t change
our ways.
Food availability
Food availability is the most obvious aspect of food security. It relates to food production (in other
words, the viability of the farming enterprises), but also to food trade, at all scales. Since we expect
rainfall to decline and become more variable, and temperatures in southern Africa to increase at double
the global rate, the once-suitable regions for farming will shift or even disappear23. This will then mean
less local food supply, that will drive up food prices. South Africa has moved from being a significant
net food exporter, more-or less self-sufficient for all its needs, with some to spare, to being a net food
importer. Some of the local, national or regional shortfall could be compensated by increased imports,
21 https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/146015/drought-threatens-millions-in-southern-africa
22 http://www.fao.org/publications/sofi/en/
23 https://oxfordre.com/environmentalscience/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199389414.001.0001/acrefore-
9780199389414-e-292
12
within the region or from other parts of the world; but this assumes that the food recipients can afford
such purchases (in other words, there is an economic surplus in other sectors), and that food is available
from trade partners. In the case of global food shortages, which seem likely, entities prioritise their own
needs over trade.
In a 2011 study24, scientists anticipated that for each day that the temperature goes above 30 °C during
the growing season, losses in maize yields amount to 1%. Without adaptation and mitigation efforts,
this might be devastating for southern Africa, as maize makes up 85-95% of the staple food25.
Food stability
The stability of food supply is another key issue. Extreme climate events, such as floods and droughts,
dramatically affect productivity over a single season. Even though there may not be a long-term trend,
seasonal shortages induce both hunger and farm enterprise failure, and the effects can be cumulative.
Short-term climate fluctuations will become more intense and more frequent.
For example, the recent tropical cyclone Idai destroyed more than 700 000 hectares of crop across
Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi.
During the 2016-2017 growing season, drought-induced water shortages forced farmers to plant 50%
less onions and 80% less potatoes in the Western Cape region of South Africa. This translated into a
R40-million loss in seasonal worker wages. At that same time Western Cape farmers sold 30 000 cattle
as they could not feed the animals26.
Access to food
An aspect of food security that is often neglected is food accessibility. Most of us are not farmers, we
buy our food in shops and markets. Overall, most southern African countries grow enough food to feed
most of their people, most of the time. The reason that so many people go hungry is because they
cannot get that food. As the food supply dwindles, food that becomes more and more expensive.
Rumbling stomachs in many households across the southern African region forces the heads of those
households, often women earning minimum wage or less, to spend and increasing fraction of their
money on food. A basket of bread, maize meal, rice and potatoes cost the average South African family
nearly 30%27 more in 2016 than in 2015, and we can expect such wild price increases to happen more
often as rainfall patterns shift and become more and more unpredictable. That price hike for staples
came as a direct result of a severe drought in 2015/2016 which caused the poorest farm harvests seen
24https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/333/6042/616.full.pdf?casa_token=qp7FhYn0yzgAAAAA:C5tYdPPU9J4aUgrT
uqVZW9T2FzY-ZynRCScX0a6Y0L2r6OaKucr7KjXGUtppvrvppFPsG-kBoKSukiLg
25https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/african-maize-market
26 https://doi.org/10.4102/ jamba.v11i1.562
27Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy (BFAP). 2016a. Policy brief on the 2015/2016 drought. Bureau for Food and
Agricultural Policy and Integrated Value Information System: University of Pretoria, University of Stellenbosch and Western
Cape Department of Agriculture.52pp. [www] https://www.bfap.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/BFAP_Drought-
Policy-Brief_5-February-2016.pdf. Accessed 03.06.2020
13
in many years. This period had the lowest rainfall since 1904, and South Africa was forced to import
food as maize production fell by almost 25% compared to the previous year 28.
Even if production is sufficient, the effects of climate change on the cost of food (which in a globalized
world, is often driven by international commodity prices and is closely linked to the price of oil) will
force many to go hungry or to settle for food with lower nutritional value.
How we use food

Food use embraces the nutritional and social value of food 29. Many people have access to some food
products but these are not necessarily nutritious, or may not be what they prefer. The nutritional
quality of food is often neglected in our rush to fill bellies. In South Africa, malnutrition is the main cause
of death for younger children30.
Given that the diets of millions of people in southern Africa are dominated by a small set of
carbohydrate-rich but protein- and vitamin-poor staple foodstuffs, there is a huge concern regarding
both undernutrition and obesity.
South Africa is a meat-eating country, and the production of meat is one of the few economic activities
that can take place in those areas of the country too dry for crop farming. The greenhouse gas emissions
from livestock are high, but are not really new or net human-caused. Over the past two centuries the
domestic livestock simply replaced indigenous grazers, which also emit greenhouse gases. However, an
increasing fraction of our meat and dairy products do not come from free-ranging animals, but from
feedlots. There we use maize and soybeans to fatten the animals before slaughter. This actually reduces
(to a small degree, and not always) the methane emitted per kilogram of meat produced, but is a
wasteful process in terms of converting what could have been food for people into meat, which
eventually feeds people. This is the basis of the argument that shifting toward a more plant-based diet
simultaneously reduces climate change and makes more food available to people. This is true, up to a
point, but strongly depends on the circumstances. You can’t simply apply the analyses developed for
Europe or North America, for instance, to range-fed animals in southern Africa.
Shockingly, a third of South Africa’s produce ends up in a landfill31 or wasted in some other way.
Solutions towards zero hunger

Food keeps us alive - one cannot build a prosperous society if people don’t have fair and adequate
access to food. In the final analysis, hunger and thirst are among the most important human drivers.
Nutritional security should be prioritised as the center of our societal existence.
Governments, businesses and individuals need to understand the risks of climate change to food
security and the viability of the agricultural sector, and make a serious commitment to avoiding the
28https://www.daff.gov.za/Daffweb3/Portals/0/Statistics%20and%20Economic%20Analysis/Statistical%20Information/Tre
nds%20in%20the%20Agricultural%20Sector%202016.pdf
29 DOI 10.1007/s10113-015-0761-x
30 Statistics South Africa General Household Survey 2017
31 World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 2017 report, “Food Loss and Waste: Facts and Figures
14
most serious consequences. This will require integrated policies and actions along the entire food
supply chain. Although small-scale farmers provide a small portion of the overall food budget, they are
indispensable sources of nutrition and livelihoods, and are especially vulnerable. More must be done
to equip and sustain them with knowledge, finance, suitable land and tools.
Investment in affordable and adaptive agricultural production, post-harvest storage, and transportation
and distribution processes will be key in achieving the sustainable development goal of zero hunger, in
the face of deteriorating agricultural conditions due to climate change. Producing more, on the same
land area or less, with fewer climate and other negative environmental impacts will require sustained
investment in science.
Minimising food waste is a strategy with many benefits and few down-sides. If we could imagine global
food waste as a country, it would rank right after the US and China as the highest greenhouse gas
emitters. From creating a market for that “not-so-perfect” fruit, to watching what we scrape into the
bin after dinner, we can all play our part.
Risks to farming and the agriculturally-dependent sectors

Climate change is forcing farmers to change what crops they grow, when they plant and harvest, where
they farm and the way they irrigate. All of this ultimately affects your pocket in the grocery shop. While
southern African farmers have proven themselves to be very adaptive and innovative, there are some
limits beyond which farming is no longer viable, and that affects all of us.
Some areas may no longer remain climatically suitable for growing current crops in the future, and we
may see changes in the very nature of farming in sub-Saharan Africa. Since the 1960’s, rainfall across
Southern Africa has already been more variable, becoming more unreliable. In general, changes to
rainfall patterns have reduced the length of growing seasons, and daily rainfall has become more
concentrated into brief, stormy events32. This reduces the amount of water that can be absorbed by
the soil. The runoff causes erosion, contaminates rivers, and fills dams. More frequent, longer lasting
and more severe droughts are anticipated over the Southern African region33.
Maize production is especially vulnerable to reduced rainfall. Most countries in southern Africa, have
seen less maize produced since 2011. The 2015/2016 drought saw declines of between -1%
(Mozambique) to -75% (Botswana), negatively affecting between 638 000 (Swaziland) and 14 300 000
(South Africa) people34.
Less obvious, but often more important, is the effect of high temperatures. Most of southern Africa is
already above the optimum growing season daytime temperature for producing crops like wheat and
maize, and especially cold-dependent crops like grapes and deciduous fruit. This impacts on the
‘reproductive stages’ of plant growth are most severe. Heat affects pollen production and viability,
fertilisation, and ultimately, the amount of grain or fruit that is produced. Maize and sugarcane
32 https://www.ajol.info/index.php/wsa/article/view/155179
33 https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00704-018-2693-0
34https://www.mdpi.com/2077-0472/9/2/30
15
productivity has been already found to be particularly sensitive to this combined rainfall-temperature
effect35. Livestock and poultry, and especially dairy production, declines sharply when the temperatures
exceed 30C.
Under scenarios of continued, unmitigated climate change these important southern African farming
subsectors become economically unviable.
The declines in important cereal crops in both summer and winter rainfall areas, wine production and
fruit crops and livestock have been modelled under climate change36. Beans, maize and bananas are all
expected show have large changes to their current growing areas across sub-Saharan Africa by 2050,
requiring a possible re-think of crop choices for many farmers37.
Why don’t we just water the crops more?

The effects of hotter temperatures on plant growth is also more serious when they are water stressed38.
As changes in temperature and rainfall shortens growing seasons, more irrigation may be required to
maintain yields. Some models predict farms may require 10% more irrigation under a ‘worst case’
climate change scenario39. Given that ~96%40 of cultivated area in southern Africa is rainfed, and already
being farmed under difficult circumstances, these combined climatic changes may be potentially
devastating to the sector. Southern Africa has very few opportunities to expand irrigation –there is
limited freshwater available to begin with41.
How farmers are adapting

To continue to farm in their current locations, farmers are being forced to switch to crops that require
less water and can survive hotter temperatures. They may also switch to more profitable export-
oriented varieties (such as tropical fruits), that can be sold at higher prices on international markets.
Farmers adjust their planting and harvesting dates all the time.
As water becomes more expensive in the future, increasing the ‘irrigation footprint’ is likely not realistic.
Increased investment into water efficient irrigation technologies, for example drip irrigation or only
using irrigation during certain growth stages that are particularly water sensitive (for example, plant
reproductive stages) may offer the sector a possible way forward. Covering exposed soil with crop
‘leftovers’ – a practice known as mulching –helps keep moisture remains in the soil. Mulching may
reduce the need for irrigation by up to 20%. It has benefits to erosion control and the storage of carbon
in the soil as well. In recent years, a huge fraction of commercial crop farmers in South Africa have
shifted to ‘conservation agriculture’, for all these reasons, but also because it makes commercial sense
and gives them greater resilience in drought years42. But this option is typically not available to small
35 https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00704-017-2327-y
36 https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/implications_climatechange_foragriculture.pdf
37 https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate2947
38https://acsess.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.2134/agronj2010.0303?casa_token=TgRNHxlYSdUAAAAA:fVYFdZ7tJEQ
o7aXFd7xoSmQPQHaTMY5dAFKY4BftEqTd9O99C9g0IdCnuMZ7l5ztK4XHlbUzL4YrGWjH
40 http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/foodclimate/information/Water-Infosheet-En.pdf
41 http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0038-23532009000100022
16
farmers. Smaller farms are increasingly absorbed by larger farms, or retreat from the sector altogether,
as it becomes more difficult for them to maintain profits. Owing to higher operational costs and greater
risks, emerging farmer find it difficult to participate in the sector43.
Increased carbon dioxide could potentially help some crops44, and increases in temperature are
beneficial in some places currently too cold, or frost-prone, for particular crops45. Sorghum and millet
are well suited to growing under hotter temperatures. Being able to take advantage of these benefits
require that other factors that also limit growth are first addressed, such as poor soil and limited overall
water availability. These are conditions that many farms already face. The potential areas where wheat
yields may improve in South Africa are the same areas considered marginal for cropping at all46.
More research into breeding of drought and heat stress tolerant crops may also offer solutions for a
hotter and drier growing climate. Traditional and indigenous crop breeds may be very useful in this
respect – as they are already well suited to growing and surviving in a hot, dry Africa47.
Opportunities for visuals

Pictures showing dying crops or livestock, people suffering from undernutrition. Photos of crops under
water stress, farmers and their irrigation systems. Photos from the recent Eastern Cape drought.
Data visualisation ideas

Maps of how productive farming areas are expected to shift with changing rainfall patterns
A good table that showing the maize declines across different southern African countries48. What an
extra 30% spend on a grocery slip / basket would look like – or alternatively a grocery basket with that
‘cost’ removed from the products.
Risk 2: Shortages of clean water

Likelihood: Expected [4]; Consequence: Substantial to Severe [5.6]; Risk Score [22.6]
This risk relates to the inadequate supply of water of suitable quality for domestic, industrial and
agricultural purposes; either on average or during crisis periods.
Living in a dry land, getting drier

Southern Africa, already a dry and warm region identified as ‘water scarce’, is projected to become
drastically warmer and likely also drier, as a consequence of global warming. This is somewhat unusual,
since most of the world will get wetter as it gets warmer. Southern Africa is located in the semi-arid
subtropics, where a strengthening Hadley circulation in a warmer world supresses the thunderstorm
activity that brings rainfall to the interior of the subcontinent. It also reduces rainfall in the southern
43 http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0038-23532009000100022
https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate2947
45 https://www.hindawi.com/journals/amete/2016/9586150/
47 https://www.mdpi.com/2077-0472/9/2/30
https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/implications_climatechange_foragriculture.pdf
48 https://www.mdpi.com/2077-0472/9/2/30
17
and western Cape, where the moisture comes in the form of frontal systems that sweep over the region
from the Southern Ocean to the south, or Atlantic Ocean to the west, particularly in winter.
Winter rainfall areas

In a warmer world, frontal systems are displaced towards the South Pole, with resulting decreases in
frontal rainfall over South Africa. Clear trends of decreasing rainfall can already be observed over South
Africa’s winter rainfall region. The Cape Town “day zero” water shortages of 2015-2017 were a
consequence of the frontal systems being displaced southward for three consecutive years. Such
droughts are already three times more likely to occur than would be the case “natural” conditions, as
a consequence of human forcing of the climate system.
The risk of such multi-year droughts in the Western Cape will continue to increase for a long as the
planet continues to warm. It is clear that the projected rainfall, even with water storage in dams, will
not be sufficient to sustain growth in water consumption of the city of Cape Town. The City thus need
to adapt. The key options include desalination plants, increased use of ground water (both as a source,
and a way to store water without evaporation) and the long-distance transport of water from elsewhere
in South Africa.
Summer rainfall areas

Over South Africa’s summer rainfall region, negative trends in rainfall have been detected over the
eastern escarpment and northwards into the Limpopo Province, with clear increases in the frequency
of occurrence of dry spells in summer. This includes many of the areas that act as the regional water
sources, such as the highlands of Lesotho. In general the, the magnitude of the rainfall reductions are
not as great those detected over the winter rainfall region. As the planet continues to warm, rainfall
reductions over the summer rainfall region are expected to become more pronounced, and the rising
temperature drives rising evaporation. Therefore the ‘water balance’ is more strongly negative than
the decline in rainfall alone. The hydrological cycle acts as an ‘amplifier’ of climate change. A
10%percent climatic drying results in about a 30% reduction in river flow (and conversely, an increase
in wetness leads to a disproportionate increase in river flow). Levels of global warming of 2 °C or higher
are associated with substantial increases in drought risk in the summer rainfall parts of southern Africa.
Dealing with persistent drought

The rainfall in southern Africa has always been very variable, year to year. To some extent the farming
systems, the ecosystems and the water-supply systems are already adapted to the occasional very dry
year. But when several dry years – multi-season droughts – follow directly on one another, their coping
capacity is exceeded.
A particular concern is the potential increase in the frequency of strong El Niño events, a global
circulation phenomenon associated with drought in southern Africa. For example, the 2015/16 El Niño
was the strongest in the historical record, and brought wide-spread drought to southern Africa. In fact,
2015/16’s summer was the 3rd consecutive summer of below normal rainfall over South Africa’s
summer rainfall region, and the level of the Vaal Dam dropped to less than 25% before the drought was
broken late in 2016.
Under climate change such multi-year droughts are likely to occur more frequently over the summer
rainfall region. This implies increasing water security risks to eastern South Africa, and in particular to
18
the Gauteng Province. This province, the industrial heartland of South Africa, is dependent on the
eastern ‘mega dams’, and inter-basin transfers (including across national boundaries) for its water
security. Under climate change, multi-year droughts may bring a ‘day zero’ type drought to the Gauteng
Province, with far-reaching socio-economic implications
It is not about going thirsty

Water engineers point out that we never actually run out of water. After all, the sea is full of water. Our
water supplies just become less and less fit for use. Municipal and district water sources could run dry,
leaving insufficient water to support basic domestic needs for drinking washing and sewage disposal,
industrial production (especially water dependent industries such as iron and steel, coal-burning
thermal power stations, and petrochemicals) and irrigated agriculture. The impacts of water scarcity
on electrical power are felt throughout the region (for example, hydroelectric power from the Kariba
and Caborra Bassa dams on the Zambezi are already affected), but disproportionately affect urban
populations, particularly those on low-income households and neighbourhoods who may not afford
alternatives such as solar power or additional point-of-use water treatments. Sanitation becomes a
major issue. Reduced availability of water has a disproportionately greater impact on women.
A current reality, with known solutions

Water scarcity is already a reality in southern Africa. Climate change makes it much worse, and sooner.
The adaptive solutions involve reducing water demand, eliminating wastage and increased recycling.
Inevitably, water will need to be diverted from irrigated agriculture, which currently consumes nearly
two thirds of the water supply, to industrial and domestic use. The South African Water Law of 1996 is
internationally admired, because it creates a legal framework that allows us to use our water resources
sensibly, if we can overcome inertia, vested interests and water management incompetence.
Risk 3: A badly-handled transition to low-carbon energy.

Likelihood: Expected [4]; Consequence: Substantial to Severe [5.5]; Risk score [22.1]
This risk relates to the loss of employment and economic costs associated with changing the southern
African energy economy from one based on coal, burned in large, centralised thermal power stations,
to one based on renewable energy such as wind, solar and hydro power, often generated in a
decentralised way. It includes impacts on the coal mining sector, and the petrochemical industries
(Sasol) based on coal. The South African economy as a whole, and all the people it supports, faces great
risks in not transitioning away from coal as well, and the new, greener economy that could replace coal
offers substantial benefits.
“Coal is all I know; when the mines and power stations close where will I find new work and money to
feed my family?”
This is a question many workers and small business owners in towns and communities around coal
mines and power plants may be asking themselves as large coal companies begin to close or sell coal
mines, and Eskom decommissions coal power plants, largely because they have come to the end of
their lives. South Africa is transforming its electricity sector in line with Paris Agreement to increase
19
the use of renewable energy like wind and solar power and reduce the dependence on coal. Currently
coal accounts for about 73% of South Africa’s electricity generation capacity. The goal is to reduce it to
50% by 2030 and progressively less beyond that49.
At the beginning of 2020, over 7 million people were unemployed in South Africa50. A further 3 million
people, mostly women, have lost their jobs because of COVID-1951.
It has thus never been more important to plan for the transition away from coal, in a way that minimises
job losses and protects incomes and livelihoods in South Africa and the region. This is what is meant by
a ‘just transition’: fair not only to those immediately negatively impacted, but also to the rest of the
economy and workforce, now and in the future, and to the health of the planet.
This is happening already, and not just because of climate change

Large coal mining companies, like Exarro, Anglo American and South32, have already begun to close or
sell-off their coal mines as they transition out of the coal sector in response to increasing risks and
global pressures52,53. Some of this is driven by the increasing difficulty in obtaining finance or insurance
for coal-based industries. International and local development and commercial banks are no longer
investing in coal-related ventures unless they use high efficiency, low emissions (HELE) coal burning
technologies. This has cast doubts on Eskom’s ability to complete the Kusile and Medupi power
stations54. Remaining sources of finance are expensive. These costs end up being passed on to already
strained households and businesses through higher electricity tariffs
The global market for coal exports will shrink significantly over the next twenty years 55. South Africa
could lose up to US $83,7 billion or R1,2 trillion 56 between 2018-2035 from declining coal exports alone,
as demand in Europe, China and India continues to fall in line with their current policies 57. Coal is
currently South Africa’s largest single export by value. In many ways, we face economic risks similar to
those faced by Middle Eastern countries with respect to oil. As Eskom begins to decommission old coal
power plants in South Africa over the next decade, in line with the IRP 2019 and climate targets, national
demand for coal will also fall58. Six of the older coal plants and probably the coal mines supplying them
49 DOE (2019) IRP 2019 http://www.energy.gov.za/IRP/2019/IRP-2019.pdf

50 STatsSA (2020) link
51 http://www.nids.uct.ac.za/about/nids-cram/nids-cram
52 https://www.exxaro.com/assets/files/climate-change-position-statement.pdf
53UNU-INRA (2020) https://i.unu.edu/media/inra.unu.edu/event/5423/DIscussion-paper-Africas-Development-in-the-age-
of-stranded-Assets_INRAReport2019-WEB.pdf
54 DOE (2019) IRP 2019
55 https://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/South_Africa_Coal_Exports_Outlook_Sept-2019.pdf
56 At the exchange rate calculated by the authors of this report in January 2019.
57 This is based on existing climate change policies by these countries in 2018. CPI (2019). Understanding the impact of a
low carbon transition on South Africa. https://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CPI-Energy-

Finance-Understanding-the-impact-of-a-low-carbon-transition-on-South-Africa-March-2019.pdf
20
in Mpumalanga will be shut down by 2030 59.The coal sectors in South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique
and Zimbabwe are likely to shrink resulting in losses of jobs. Money that helps fund governments and
the services they deliver, through tax and foreign currency earnings, will decline. Will it be compensated
by growth in other sectors of the economy, and will this happen in time to offset these losses?
People working and living in the communities around the coal power plants and coal mines face
retrenchments. This will happen at a local scale regardless of climate change, because that is the nature
of mining industries – the resource runs out, and the opportunities move elsewhere. Unfortunately, it
is the low-paid, low- and semi-skilled coal and power plant workers, poorly-equipped to absorb
unemployment shocks who will be most likely lose their jobs and incomes over the next decade60.
Knock-on risks to informal industries and small businesses in towns and communities around coal mines
and power plants also increase. Related risk faces support industries including logistics, railways, port
and shipping companies61. In 2018 the coal sector alone employed about 85 000 people and supported
other industries through procurement of goods and services to the value of $4,1 billion62 - but to keep
this in perspective, this is just over 1 % of the economy.
It is not all bad news

Renewable energy brings new job opportunities, environmental benefits, potentially cheaper electricity
and lower emissions. But a poorly planned and executed transition to low-carbon energy could result
in negative economic and social impacts on many poor and not so poor people in South Africa, at least
in the medium term. These impacts are likely to extend beyond the coal and electricity sector.
Renewable energy could be the new “goldrush” in South Africa. Opportunities abound, but all care must
be taken to ensure that entry and access to this new industry is transparent and just 63. Although new
wind and solar power plants will create jobs, industries and livelihood opportunities for South Africans,
it is not a direct trade-off with the jobs lost in the fossil fuel sector. Most of the green energy jobs will
require higher-skilled workers, with higher education levels and experience with the technologies 64.
These jobs will also most likely be located in the Northern Cape and North Western Province, where
many of the new wind and solar power plants will be located 65. For the worker who has lost their job in
Mpumalanga, this means that they will need to acquire new technical skills and knowledge, and move
themselves and their families across the country to access new opportunities. For many of these
59 ibid
61https://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CPI-Energy-Finance-Understanding-the-impact-of-a-
low-carbon-transition-on-South-Africa-March-2019.pdf
62https://i.unu.edu/media/inra.unu.edu/event/5423/DIscussion-paper-Africas-Development-in-the-age-of-stranded-
Assets_INRAReport2019-WEB.pdf
63 SANEA (2020) South African Energy Risk Report 2020.
64 SANEA (2020) South African Energy Risk Report https://sanea.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/SANEA-Annual-Risk-
Report-2020-FINAL.pdf
65 Bohlmann et al.(2019) Regional employment and economic growth effects of South Africa’s transition to low-carbon
energy supply mix. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.01.065
21
relatively low-income households, this may simply not be feasible and may push them into poverty.
This will be a diminishing problem as the workers progressively retire out of the system.
As coal-related jobs dry up in Mpumalanga, it is expected that former workers will migrate to nearby
Gauteng, the Northern Cape and the North West in search of new opportunities66. The pattern we have
seen many times in the past is that the incoming migrants overwhelm the housing, health care and
other public services, placing strain on cities and municipalities. Many will end up in informal
settlements. This migration over the next decade can be anticipated and planned for by the local,
provincial and national governments.
What is to be done?
A transition to low-coal, low-carbon electricity is inevitable at this stage, since the drivers are also
economic: it is now cheaper to deliver electricity from renewable sources than from newly-built coal-
fired stations. The drivers of this transition are largely beyond the control of governments, let alone the
average person in South Africa. Nevertheless, it is within our power to ensure that the low-carbon
transition happens in such a way that vulnerable workers and low-income households are not unfairly
impacted, and the benefits to overall economy are maximised.
Eskom, government, coal mining companies and social actors, including trade unions and
environmental NGOs need to collaborate, rather than confront each other, if we are to navigate this
enormous shift in a way best for everyone. This includes making money available to finance the
transition and implement post-closure plans. Government, industry, labour and the education sector
must identify and deliver the skills needed for a successful green energy-fuelled economy.
Data visualisation idea:

A map of southern Africa showing where the mine closures are going to have the most impact and
which areas are most vulnerable to job and community livelihoods losses.
Potential sources to interview for further information:

Ms. Tasneem Essop, NPC Commissioner in charge of the NPC and work on the Just Transition.
Prof. Rod Crompton- Africa Energy Leadership Centre, Wits University
Ms. Wendy Poulton, SANEA
Mr Steve Nicols, National Business Initiative
The Department of Mineral Resources & Energy
Mineral Resources Council of South Africa
Eskom
Sasol
Risk 4.Heat stress is a killer.

Likelihood: Expected [4]; Consequence: Substantial [5]; Risk Score [20]
66 Bohlmann et al (2019)
22
This risk relates to the increased frequency of days in which the air temperature is above the optimum,
and may even be lethal, for warm-blooded animals, including humans, livestock, birds and wildlife.
"It's too hot to work today!"
For many of us, an exclamation like this is a way of giving vent to our annoyance at the inconveniences
of the hottest days of the year. For millions of workers in hot places across the world, it is a sign of
distress. For many workers in southern Africa this is a looming threat to their productivity. Outdoor
workers involved in physical activity, like agricultural and construction workers, waste collectors, repair
workers, miners and even athletes, are unproductive in the heat, and may harm their health or even
die. Death rates spike when the temperature rises above 35C for several days in a row. Physical labour
capacity halves for every 2C rise in temperature .
Heat stress is increasingly an obstacle to economic activity. Businesses struggle to operate during the
hottest hours of the day. The Global Change Institute at Wits has identified heat stress as one of the
biggest future threats to living and working in southern Africa.
Adapting to these new and threatening conditions is costly. Even if it does prove possible to limit global
warming by the end of the century to 1.5C above preindustrial levels, the accumulated global financial
loss due to heat stress is expected to reach US$2,400 billion by 2030. If nothing is done now to mitigate
climate change, these costs will be much higher as global temperatures increase even further towards
the end of the century.
When it is hotter than our bodies can tolerate, we suffer "heat stress". All warm-bodied organisms have
a core body temperature of around 37C, and there is apparently no way to change this reality. As the
air temperature approaches this number, we find it harder and harder to stay cool – especially if the
air is humid and windless, we are in the sun, and if we are short of clean water to replace our
perspiration. Heat stress mainly affects two groups of people: those who do physical work outdoors;
and the elderly (often with other disabilities), particularly if they live in poorly-insulated homes. In other
words, the health of millions of people in southern Africa is at stake on days of extreme heat.
Even when high temperatures do not led to death, they reduce productivity. Older workers, in
particular, have lower physiological resistance at high heat levels. By 2030, the equivalent of more than
2% of the world's total working hours are expected to be lost each year, either because it is too hot to
work or because workers have to work at a slower pace for health reasons.
In Southern Asia and Southern Africa, the resulting productivity loss may even reach 5 %. Exposure to
heat stress is made worse by other challenges, such as the absence of good employment conditions,
including social protection and high rates of employment informality (‘working poverty’).
Excessive heat levels aggravate inequality between rich and poor countries, and between population
groups within the same country in the region. Eswatini is projected to be one of the most affected
countries in the region, with 0.3 percent of working hours lost due to heat stress in 1995 and 0.5
23
percent more expected in 2030. In contrast, the impact of heat stress on productivity of work in Lesotho
is practically zero (Table 1).
Table 1. Working hours lost to heat stress, by sector and country, Southern Africa, 1995 and 2030
(projections)
Country 1995 2030

(in
(in
Construction in
Total (thousand
Construction in
Total (thousand
full-time jobs)
full-time jobs)
Industry (%)
Industry (%)
Services (%)
Services (%)
Agriculture
Agriculture
shade) (%)
shade) (%)
Shade (%)
Shade (%)
Total (%)
Total (%)
Botswana 0.26 0.06 0.26 0 0.09 0 0.63 0.20 0.63 0.01 0.21 2
Eswatini 0.71 0.29 0.71 0.04 0.26 1 1.35 0.61 1.35 0.12 0.49 2
Lesotho 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Namibia 0.15 0.04 0.15 0 0.07 0 0.37 0.11 0.37 0.01 0.13 1
South Africa 0.14 0.04 0.14 0 0.04 5 0.29 0.11 0.29 0.01 0.07 13
Southern 0.14 0.05 0.14 0 0.05 6 0.35 0.11 0.35 0.02 0.09 18
Africa
Source: ILO estimates based on data from the ILOSTAT database and the HadGEM2 and GFDL-ESM2M climate models. Work
in agriculture and construction is assumed to be carried out in the shade. The heat stress index for work in the afternoon sun
adds around 2–3°C to the in-shade wet-bulb global temperature (WBGT). The data are based on historical observations and on
estimates obtained using the RCP2.6 climate change pathway, which envisages a global average temperature rise of 1.5°C by
the end of the century.
Researchers are still trying to understand the full impact of heat on health in Southern Africa. The poor
and those living in miserable conditions suffer the most from heat stress. Many countries in Southern
Africa are already experiencing heat-related problems. High ambient temperatures have led to
increased mortality in the region, in both rural and urban areas. The elderly and infants and particularly
at risk, partly because they are unable to help themselves.
Livestock, including cattle, sheep and poultry, are also sensitive to excessive heat. The first thing to
decline is milk production, followed by meat production, and then fertility. Finally, the animal dies. Even
our heat-adapted wildlife is not immune, unless they can find shade and water.
Shall we just sweat it out?

Solutions do exist. Structural transformation of rural economies can lead to fewer workers exposed to
high temperatures. At the workplace level, enhanced information about on-site weather conditions,
the adaptation of workwear and equipment, and technological improvements (including air
conditioning) can make it easier for workers and their employers to cope with higher temperatures.
Employers and workers should discuss together how to adjust working hours and adopting other
occupational safety and health measures. Cooler living environments can be created by insulating the
24
housing, and planting green spaces in urban areas. Early warning to people to stay out of the sun, drink
fluids and refrain from exertion during heatwaves is important, with special care for the elderly.
Risk 5: Disrupted ecosystems and loss of biodiversity

Likelihood: Frequent [3]; Consequence: Severe [6.06]; Risk score [18.18]
This risk relates to ‘nature’ in southern Africa, not just for its own sake, but also because we depend on
it.
South Africa is one of about ten ‘megadiverse’ countries in the world, with a number of species quite
disproportionate to our land area. This is a treasured benefit and source of pride and income, but also
a global responsibility. Plants and animals have survived enormous climate changes in the distant past,
but human-caused climate change over the past two centuries, and especially as projected for this
century, is just too rapid for them to adapt. This is especially true when we block their movements and
subject them to all sorts of other threats, like overharvesting, pollution and the invasion of organisms
from other parts of the world.
All species have ‘climatic niches’: the environmental conditions that they find suitable for their day-to-
day biology. Indeed, some of the earliest evidence that human influence in climate change is altering
the planet comes from studying these so-called ‘fingerprints’ of how species are changing their normal
distribution ranges as a consequence of changes in their climate niches (ref). As the climate becomes
increasingly different, species either need to move to suitable areas or adapt to the new climate. At the
same time, all the other species are trying to adapt, at different rates. It’s like trying to put a key into a
lock that keeps on moving. As the species get out of step with one another, the ecosystem starts to fall
apart. This opens gaps for ‘weedy’ species to move in. The stability of the ecosystem, and the stream
of benefits it provides to humans is compromised. Examples of these benefits are the provision of food
and clean water (described above), the regulation of pests and diseases, the regulation of the climate
system itself, and the cultural and psychological benefits we derive from a much-loved and familiar
natural landscape.
We develop two concrete examples, out of many, below.
Is it too late for bees or are the bees too late?

Well, both. Bees are certainly dying in droves, in part due to climate change. A lesser known threat is
just as worrying: changing temperatures in southern Africa are causing plants, including food crops, to
flower at different times, which throws bees off of their regular pollinating schedule. What is often
missed is the sheer scale of the industry of pollinators, and just how much they contribute to our well-
being. Every third bite of your food was produced by the activities of pollinators. Out of 115 food crops
studied in a global assessment, 87 depend to some degree upon animal pollination and 13 are entirely
reliant upon animal pollinators. Estimates suggest that pollination by insects underpins US$361 billion
in crop production worldwide. The deciduous fruit industry in the Western Cape alone is worth R9 800
million per year and is heavily reliant on pollination services from managed honeybees).
25
Pollinators have been found to be declining globally. Bee colonies undergo Colony Collapse Disorder,
when the majority of worker bees in a honeybee colony disappear. The causes can be multiple, and
include habitat change pesticides, climate change and pathogens – and very likely, the interactions
among them.
Pollinators also play a critical role in natural ecosystems. By moving from one flower to the next in
search of nectar and pollen, they fertilize subsequent generations of plants and keep the gene pool
healthy. There are many kinds of bees and they form part of a veritable army of mainly insect pollinators
that are active across the globe.
Part of the solution may lie in citizen science, where members of the public collect scientifically useful
data. Some of the best evidence we have that pollinators are thrown off their regular pollination timing
comes from records collected by amateur enthusiasts, measuring when plants flower and when
butterflies start flying, each season over the years. Citizens can monitor the extent of the issue, as
scientists simply do not have the capacity to do so comprehensively.
The bio-economy
Which part of the Southern African economy has been growing strongly over the past decades, as
industry and mining wilts? You probably have not even heard of it, and the economic statistics don’t
recognize it as a sector, even though it adds up to a large slice of the economic pie. It is the ‘bio-
economy’, that part of the economy that depends directly on nature. Some depends on the harvest of
natural products, such as fish, venison or wild flowers. Other parts derive value from the genetic
richness of our country itself – the search for new medicines, or genes to make crops more climate
resilient. Another part is nature-based tourism. Most foreign tourists, and a large fraction of domestic
tourists are in search of natural beauty, clean beaches and exciting wildlife. All of these depend
fundamentally on well-functioning ecosystems, whose future is threatened by rapid, human-induced
climate change.
A very large fraction of South Africa’s biological diversity cannot persist in its current locations under a
different climate. Often our protected areas are too small, and too surrounded by biodiversity-
unfriendly land uses, to allow them to move by their own devices. The result is die-back, unviable
populations, and a fraying of the web of life. Apart from the loss of some of its star attractions, nature-
based tourism is also threatened by an increasing reluctance by long-distance visitors to incur the
carbon cost of travel, and by an increasingly hot and dangerous climate in some key destinations.
The fisheries of the west coast of southern Africa have thus far remained mostly productive, while
fisheries all around the world are collapsing due to overfishing. They have changed in location and
dominant species, and climate change is one of the contributing factors. As a result, the fishing
infrastructure is in the wrong places, and the bird populations – like the iconic African penguin - that
also depend on these fish stocks are struggling.
26
Our biological riches are one of southern Africa’s natural endowments, and unlike minerals, they never
run out if properly managed. Part of that management is protecting them from climate change, and
helping them to adapt to the changes that cannot be avoided.
Opportunities for visuals

Photos of iconic ecosystems and organisms of southern Africa eg Aloe dichotoma
Figures on the role of pollinators in farming and their economic impacts can help readers understand
the extent of their role, and the potential impacts of their loss.
Potential sources to interview for further information

Subject experts:
• Dr. Colleen L. Seymour, SANBI
• Prof Steven Johnson, UKZN
• Dr Lynn Dicks, University of Cambridge
• Prof Anton Pauw, Stellenbosch University
• Dr Wendy Foden, SANParks
Interested and affected parties:
• Beekeepers (South African Bee Industry Organization https://www.sabio.org.za/)
• Farmers, especially in the Western Cape
27
Appendix 1: A Compendium of the emerging climate risks facing
Southern Africa
Food insecurity: Generally drier and hotter conditions combined with increasing frequency droughts
and extreme events like intense storms and floods could cause sudden or temporary losses in crop
production and yields.
Likelihood : Expected [4]; Consequences: Severe [6.34]; Risk Score [25.34]
The South Western Cape is likely to get drier. Fruits (including wine) account for up to 40% of
agricultural export annually in South Africa. Deciduous fruit (apples, pears, peaches) are primarily
grown in the Western and Eastern Cape. Tropical fruits such as pineapple, banana, avocado and citrus
are also farmed across South Africa, including Mpumalanga and Limpopo. Yields of commercial grains
and cereals (e.g. maize, wheat, sorghum, rice, millet, sunflower seeds) will likely be impacted. This is
important because these represent the bulk of crops cultivated in southern Africa and are dietary
staples as well as livestock feed. These crops support small-scale subsistence farmers as well as
commercial farms for regional and international exports.
The result will be food insecurity as sharp drops in yield mean households may not have enough to eat
but also that commercial agricultural yields are not enough for food exports to other southern African
countries. These events will probably impact the entire southern African region at various scales but
are likely to be most severe in rural areas where people are directly dependent on the land and
ecosystem services to provide food. The elderly, women and child-headed households will likely be
most affected, although macro-economic effects on agricultural imports and exports may also be
impacted substantially.
Key Sources: IPCC (2018); Mbow et al. 2019; Schmidhuber & Tubiello 2007; Zwane 2019; DEA 2013;
IPBES Africa Report
Energy transition risk: As banks and investors stop lending money for coal and fossil fuels, southern
African governments may not be able to provide enough or affordable electricity for households and
industry. Continued investment in fossil fuel-based energy infrastructure comes with the risk of
stranded assets. Old coal power stations are breaking down or being phased out but the availability of
electricity supply from new, centralised renewable energy build projects may still lag behind demand.
Likelihood: Expected [4] ; Consequences: Severe [6.3]; Risk Score: [25.3]
In the 21st Century access to electricity is critical for social and economic development. In response to
stakeholder pressure and reputational risks, international and South African banks and financial
development institutions are no longer lending money to governments, state-owned enterprises or
private sector companies to build new or refurbish old coal and fossil fuel based infrastructure projects.
On the local front this includes Nedbank, Standard Bank and the International Development
Corporation. This is an important step to stimulate the low-carbon energy transition, restructure the
global energy sector and reduce carbon emissions.
28
The risk is can southern African countries build enough large-scale wind and solar power plants to
generate enough electricity to ensure universal household access to electricity, as well as to power
industrial growth in the immediate future? Large scale renewable energy projects may be cheaper and
quicker to build than coal plants but they are still time and capital intensive, requiring finances and skills
which may be beyond the capability of resource-strapped southern African governments. Only 3% of
global green climate finance that could be used to do this has trickled down to Africa. South Africa,
Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia still rely on coal power to generate electricity to households and
industry, either through their own capacity or indirectly from Eskom through the Southern African
Power Pool. But power cuts and load-shedding have become the norm in South Africa and the region,
reaching up to 18 hours a day in Zimbabwe recently. This is due to ageing infrastructure and poor fleet
maintenance. Zimbabwe estimates that US$100 million may be needed to refurbish its power stations
in Hwange. Eskom is phasing out old coal power stations but has pegged future electricity supply on
completing the Medupi and Kusile power stations. Failure to raise capital or finance to do this, means
either they will be unable to complete or refurbish the stations or they are likely to secure expensive
funding at very high interest rates. Costs which are then passed on to consumers- households, small
businesses and industry.
The unintended impacts of this could include rising electricity costs or unstable power supply, leading
to blackouts and load shedding as old power stations breakdown and cannot be refurbished. Or, if they
are, they may become stranded assets as global pressures to divest from coal increase. The
consequence is that they cannot connect more households to electricity, or provide power for industry.
Key Sources: UNU-INRA (2020) Risk of stranded assets; CPI (2019); SANEA (2019); SANEA (2020)
Food insecurity: Erratic rainfalls and increasing droughts in the region may leave poor households and
subsistence (small-scale) more vulnerable to poverty and food insecurity.
Likelihood: Expected [4] ; Consequences: Substantial [5.6] ; Risk Score: [22.7]
Droughts have both immediate and long term effects. They destroy natural assets such as vegetation
and pastures which are critical for livestock production. Poor precipitation results in crop failures which
is particularly severe in southern Africa where most agricultural activity relies on rain. The land become
less productive in terms of food availability for household consumption as well as smalls scale
commercial production. High risk of crop failure and susceptibility to pests such as army worm etc. This
impacts the ability of southern African subsistence farmers to generate livelihoods and income from
the land.
Natural assets may be affected by droughts, for example, as land becomes arid there may be
biodiversity loss. Many southern African rural households depend on different species of plants and
animals (biodiversity) for food e.g. insects, wild fruit, and vegetables such as morogo, livestock feed,
construction material and firewood. This is a risk affecting a high proportion of people in southern
Africa, particularly those living in lower income countries. Amongst the southern African countries 3
are highly urbanised, namely, South Africa (66.3% ), Botswana (69.5%) and Angola (65,5%). Two are
moderately urbanised, namely, Namibia (50%) and Zambia (43.5%). The remainder are basically rural -
29
namely, Zimbabwe (32, 2%), Lesotho (28,2%), Swaziland (21,3%), Malawi (16,8%) and Mozambique
(35,9%).
Social assets may also be affected due to disruptions in social structures, for example in communities
where climate change is severe and people are forced to migrate to other parts of the country or
internationally.
Where agricultural yields are poor, there is also loss of income and widespread unemployment as
seasonal labour on commercial farms dries up, but also there may not be enough surplus crops for
subsistence farmers to sell at markets. There are also gendered aspects to this and this is also driven
by other expected physical climate hazards like erratic rainfall etc.
Water security risks: Changes in rainfall patterns combined with increasing temperatures, evaporation,
aridity and chronic droughts may reduce water reserves and availability in cities and towns. Combined
with rapidly growing populations and poor planning in cities this may strain water availability and
sanitation infrastructure risking access to clean and safe water by people and water intensive
industries.
Likelihood: Frequent [3.68]; Consequence: Substantial [5.7] ; Risk Score [21.8]
A concomitant increase in urban population and decrease in precipitation is likely to place a strain on
urban reserves in terms of the quantity and quality of water supply. The situation is predicted to be
particularly dire for the Western Cape and Limpopo Basin in South Africa where precipitation decreases
and temperature increases are predicted.
As a result municipal and district water sources could run dry. Insufficient water to support basic
domestic needs, industrial production (especially water dependent industries such as iron and steel,
fossil-fuel based power generation, agriculture). The impacts of water scarcity are likely to be felt across
cities and throughout the region, e.g. through reduced capacity for power generation. Importantly,
however, water scarcity will disproportionately affect urban populations, particularly those on low-
income households and neighbourhoods who may not afford alternatives (e.g. solar power in place of
electricity) or additional point-of-use water treatments able to eliminate higher pollutant loads.
Sanitation will become a major issue. Further, even in urban areas, but more in rural areas, reduced
availability of water will have a disproportionately greater impact on women. Water scarcity is already
a reality in South Africa and for the region, similar scenarios as what was seen in Cape Town may emerge
in the next 10 years as areas in the South West e.g. Namibia, experience higher temperatures and
reduced precipitation. Water stress, accompanied by prolonged dry spells, in Gauteng particularly
during and after COVID-19 will be a concern.
Key sources: DEA (2011)
30
Disruptions to the transport and logistics sector.
Likelihood: Frequent; Consequence: Substantial to Severe [5.5]; Risk Score [22]
Changes in extreme events expected as a consequence of climate change, such as increased flooding,
increased intensity of storms, sea level rise, extreme rainfall events and extreme heat conditions, may
stress existing transport infrastructure. These impacts may be direct, such as buckling of old and jointed
structures, increased heat stress to structure of physical damage. These impacts may also be indirect,
when extreme events make transport routes temporally non-navigable. Both will cause limited mobility
of private and public transport, cause economic costs due to damage and the need for maintenance
and repair of such infrastructure. While the economic consequences thereof is at this stage relatively
unknown, the potential for severe impacts is substantial. The disruptions caused by this risk may impact
on multiple sectors
Risks to long term viability of the agriculture sector: Potential decline of livestock agriculture: increased
heat stress may decrease overall production yield for livestock (cattle, broilers, pigs); dairy cattle are
most impacted by heat stress and likely to be most at risk.
Likelihood: Frequent [3.5]; Consequence: Severe [6]; Risk Score [21]
Climate change will increase the overall heat stress experienced by livestock, and decrease the
production yield for many kinds. Since water provisioning is also at risk in South Africa, livestock
practices that rely on water are particularly vulnerable such as dairy farming. The decline in productivity
may take the form of slower growth rates in livestock, increased capital investment required to shelter
animals, increased water provisioning required and an overall decreases in stocking rates. Shifts to
seasonal dairy production may be required.
Potentially catastrophic impacts to the livestock sector may be unavoidable, as meat substitutes are
not yet available. Adaptations to this risk are available but likely costly. These include greater utilization
of animal shelters, provisioning of out-of-season fodder, changing grazing regimes and potential
breeding more climate adaptable livestock. Citizen level adaption responses include a rapid transition
away from utilizing meat and dairy products, which in turn may further exasperate economic impacts
on the sector.
Mitigating this risk needs t timely intervention and planning from key stakeholders and decision makers,
i.e. government, commercial farmers, scientists and agri-business (and others) to invest in research
and development and appropriate climate change adaptation measures for this sector.
This risk is closely linked to the risks of household food insecurity and poor nutrition.
Key sources: IPCC (2007); DEA (2013)
Risks to long term viability of the agriculture sector: increased heat stress may decrease overall
production yield for livestock (cattle, broilers, pigs); dairy cattle are most impacted by heat stress and
likely to be most at risk.
31
Likelihood: Frequent [3.5]; Consequence: Severe [6]; Risk Score [21]
As a result agricultural productivity may declines and experience slower growth rates. For livestock and
dairy farmers adapting to higher temperatures and heat stress translates to a greater capital
investment into ventilation, water provision infrastructure and perhaps lower cattle stocking rates.
Other potential strategies could be shifting to seasonal dairy production or breeding of heat-tolerant
animals/ cross-breeding with more hardy livestock. However, all these adaptation or coping
mechanisms might reduce the productivity and profitability of the sector if capital and operational costs
increase. The impact severe and potentially catastrophic without timely intervention and planning from
key stakeholders and decision makers, i.e. government, commercial farmers and agri-business (and
others) to invest in research and development and appropriate climate change adaptation measures.
This risk is closely linked to the risks of household food insecurity and poor nutrition.
Key sources: IPCC (2007); DEA (2013)
Energy transition risk: Falling demand in global markets for fossil fuels may cause large declines in coal
and synthetic fuel exports and foreign currency earnings in South Africa, Mozambique, Botswana and
Zimbabwe over the next twenty years. Could be severe impacts if unplanned.
The global market for coal is expected to decline over the next 2 decades as countries begin to
restructure their energy sectors in line with the climate targets of the Paris Agreement. This is highly
dependent on how and whether India, China and the EU (and US) implement their climate policies to
cut their use of coal and increase the use of renewables and other cleaner energy sources.
This will probably lead to reductions in both the volume of coal sold and price placing at risk the large
amounts of foreign currency, profits and tax income South Africa, Mozambique, Botswana, Eswatini,
Zimbabwe and Zambia earn from coal exports every year.
In 2019 South Africa exported US$ 4.8 billion worth of coal, in terms of dollar value this was followed
by Mozambique (US$1 billion), Botswana (US$16.8 million), Eswatini (US$16.8 million) and Zimbabwe
US$ 4.2 million and Zambia (US$1.6 million)67. South Africa and Mozambique are in the top 10 global
exporters. The CPI report on the impacts of a low carbon transition on South Africa estimates that South
Africa could potentially lose US$ 83.7 billion in coal exports between 2018-2035. This is considered to
be the biggest transition risk to South Africa (in economic value).
As the global energy transition continues global demand for crude oil and liquid fuels may also decline.
This may place earnings from exports of SASOL Synthetic Fuel at risk if these markets shrink as
projected. Losses to SASOL (and South Africa) could be roughly US$ 8.3 billion between 2018-2035.
Crude oil exporting southern African countries like Angola may also face losses from falling global oil
demand and falling prices within the 2050 timeframe. Angola is estimated to have earned US$10 billion
from crude oil exports in 2019.
67 http://www.worldstopexports.com/coal-exports-country/
32
Key sources: CPI (2019) The impact of the low-carbon transition on South Africa; UNU-INRA (2020)
Report on Stranded Assets
Heat stress and human health: Extreme heat may have significant negative long-term impacts on
human health and productivity especially amongst the poor living in Southern African cities.
Southern Africa is likely to become significantly warmer in the coming decades, with expected
temperature increases between 4-6C, it is facing more intense and longer heat waves, and more
extremely hot days.
The most likely to be affected by increases in average temperatures and extreme events are workers
labouring outside (e.g. construction workers), the elderly and children, basically those living in poor
communities that do not have access to public health services, nor the resources to adapt to heat
extremes such as air-conditioning, open spaces, fans and trees etc. the impacts are particularly more
disastrous in urban settlements in cities of Southern African region. Environmental factors important
in vulnerability to heat include air pollution, number of open spaces, and tree cover. This is the case for
South Africa.
This risk is also driven by rapid urbanisation that is expected to occur in the region. Ways to adapt to
extreme heat are costly and out of the reach of poor households and those earning low incomes. These
include modifications to the designs of buildings and homes, using different construction materials and
the use of fans and air conditioners. Perversely, the widespread use of air conditioners could increase
national greenhouse gas emissions significantly.
There are few scientific health impacts of high temperatures on the Southern African population.
However, there is anecdotal evidence of direct health impacts due to extreme heat. Increases in
average temperatures and extreme events (such as heat waves) are projected to induce heat stress,
increase morbidity, and result in respiratory and cardiovascular diseases, diabetes and mental disorders
as are the poor and socially isolated. Vulnerability to heat stress depends on existing health status as
well as socio-economic and environmental factors.
Key sources: Ebi, KL; Hess, JJ, and Watkiss, P. (2017)68. Bank.; Davis, C.L. (2011)69.
Water risks and energy security: Electricity supply from Hydro-electric Power (HEP) stations may be
disrupted in the future. This would be linked to reduced river flow, erratic rainfall patterns, and more
frequent and prolonged droughts.
Likelihood: Expected [4]; Consequence: Substantial [5]; Risk Score: [20]
Droughts occur naturally in southern Africa. But under conditions of climate change they may become
more frequent and prolonged.
68 Ebi, KL; Hess, JJ, and Watkiss, P. (2017) 68. Health Risks & Costs of climate variability and Change. In Book: Disease Control
Priorities, Third Edition, Vol 7: Injury Prevention and Health, World Bank.
69 Davis, C.L. (2011). Climate Risk and Vulnerability: A Handbook for Southern Africa. Council for Scientific and Industrial
Research, Pretoria, South Africa, pp 92.
33
There is an increased risk that existing and planned Hydro-electric Power stations may not be able to
generate enough electricity to meet household and industry demands in the region70. This is as a
consequence of changes in water regimes, particularly that of river catchment runoff and increased
evapotranspiration from standing bodies of water, there may be alterations in timing, consistency and
longevity of HEP generation.
Disruptions in power generation often lead to costly power shortages, load-shedding and power cuts
with associated disruptions to life and economy. This may increase energy poverty in a region that
already has very low rates of electricity access, except South Africa. The effects of prolonged droughts
on HEP generation were already experienced in 2015 when the drought in Zambia caused widespread
power disruptions; in neighbouring Zimbabwe the low water levels in the Kariba Dam have also
impacted the country’s ability to generate enough electricity, resulting in rolling blackouts and load-
shedding over the past two years, sometimes up to 12-18 hours a day. HEP makes up about 15% of
South Africa’s national electricity supply mix.
Key source: Eskom (2017) CDP Climate Change Response to investors
Energy transition risk: Increased pricing of greenhouse gas emissions Energy prices may increase in
South Africa if the Carbon Tax and other market-focused climate policy instruments for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions in South Africa significantly increase the operating costs of energy sector
companies, including Eskom.
Carbon pricing and taxing mechanisms of greenhouse gasses (GHG) are globally increasing in use as a
means to regulate carbon emissions. The pricing of GHG emission due to the implementation of carbon
pricing mechanism, like the Carbon Tax Act in South Africa, means that operation cots of especially
energy sector combating will increase with regards to compliance costs.
Eskom estimates that these additional operating costs could be up to as much as R10 billion per annum
in the coming years 71. It is unclear to what extend this risk will directly impact on consumers, but it is
likely that it will increase energy costs. However, the risk may be more acutely felt by larger industries
reliant on substantive energy use.
On the other hand, the risk of high electricity costs combined with the current energy supply and
reliability crisis might encourage greater uptake of small-scale, clean and renewable energy
technologies as consumers who can afford to disconnect from the national grid.
70 Eskom 2017 CDP Response to investors on climate change

https://www.cdp.net/en/formatted_responses/pages?locale=en&organization_name=Eskom&organization_number=3044
0&program=Investor&project_year=2017&redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdp.net%2Fsites%2F2017%2F40%2F30440%2F
Climate+Change+2017%2FPages%2FDisclosureView.aspx
71 Eskom 2018 CDP Report: Annual Climate Change Response to Investors
https://www.cdp.net/en/formatted_responses/responses?campaign_id=66216852&discloser_id=826930&locale=en&orga
nization_name=Eskom&organization_number=30440&program=Investor&project_year=2019&redirect=https%3A%2F%2F
cdp.credit360.com%2Fsurveys%2F9hz110bc%2F41039&survey_id=65670419
34
Key source: Eskom (2017) CDP Climate Change Response to investors
Risks to the long term viability of the agriculture sector: Potential economic losses due to shifting and
unviable agricultural production as climate niches change alongside rising temperature, evaporation
rates, rainfall variability and higher risk of prolonged droughts.
Likelihood Frequent [3.3]; Consequence: Severe [6]; Risk Score [19.8]
The hotter temperatures and more variable rainfall expected for southern Africa under climate change
scenarios will likely have grave consequences for the productivity of existing agricultural systems,
associated with severe declines in profits for the sector. Changes to suitable growing areas for certain
crops are anticipated, with the changes to rainfall patterns and more frequented and longer droughts
potentially require increased irrigation more generally. Given that the majority of African agriculture is
rainfed (rather than formally irrigated) and there are few options to further expand irrigation solutions
owing to limited supply of suitable water sources, this may mean that entire agricultural systems are
no longer viable.
It is likely that the agriculture sector may be facing:
• declining crop performance (but this will be regionally and crop variable, i.e. maize likely to
have increases in yields, apples/pear/citrus/wine major declines/impacts; some evidence
suggesting declines >50% in crop production),
• crop 'switches' and switches for high value export goods with consequences for domestic
consumption,(smaller farmers retreat from sector/subsumed by commercial actors);
• increased deficits in staple crops across sub-region.
Given 95% of Africa’s agriculture is rainfed the likelihood is high with catastrophic consequences for the
region and sector, given whole agricultural industries may become potentially unviable, with no
possibility of solutions.
Key sources: IPBES Africa report; LTAS; Blignaut (work on maize;

http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0038-23532009000100022)
Risks to ecosystem services: Potential loss of ecosystem services and value from interlinked systems:
impacts on biodiversity, alien invasives, pest control, tourism and cultural value.
Likelihood: Frequent [3]; Consequence: Severe [6.1]; Risk Score [18.2]
From a climate change perspective this risk is driven by the risk that changing climate envelopes
(combinations of rainfall, temperature and other factors) will exceed the tolerance of certain species
(plants and animals) and how they will react to that. For example a loss of geographical range, change
in distribution; increased susceptibility to parasites or diseases etc. This could potentially impact
invasive species, change food availability for grazing species and interfere with ecosystems. This
includes the tourism sector if high-value tourism species of plants or animals are negatively impacted
e.g. gradual loss of fynbos in the western Cape.
This is a challenging risk to explain but we used the potential loss of bees and pollination as the risk
element to illustrate this due to its contribution to food security in the region.
35
Pollinators like bees are vital to fertilize many plants, including food crops such as deciduous fruits.
Because climate change may alter the activities of pollinators, it may compromise effective pollination
of food crops. The fruit industry in the Western Cape alone is worth ZAR9800 million per year and is
heavily reliant on pollination services from managed honeybees, and so decline in pollinators could
have significant impacts. However, there is still a lack of clear data on how strongly climate change
contributes to pollinators decline especially over longer time scales, as they are also impacted by other
drivers like diseases.
Key sources: See work by Midgley and others on climate envelopes and dispersal pathways; climate
velocity work. OPCC 2015 WG2 chap 4; Potts et al. 2010 TREE/ UN FAO Synthesis report/ IPBES; IPBES
Africa report, 2018; IPBES Pollination report, 2016; Steward, 2014
(https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/2048-7010-3-5); Melin et al, 2014:
http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0038-23532014000600009
Risks to sustainable development, livelihoods and wellbeing: There may be a higher risk of extreme
events and humanitarian disasters and emergencies in the region as tropical cyclones, heavy rains and
floods are likely to occur more frequently in southern Africa.
Likelihood: Frequent [3]; Consequence: Severe [6] ; Risk Score [18]
Flooding destroys infrastructure, crops, livestock and also disrupts livelihoods. Large scale floods, for
example those witnessed recently after Tropical Cyclone Idai in 2019 bring about the forced
displacement of people as refugees seeking shelter and safety.
Such events come at high costs to people and economies. Mozambique has experienced most of the
flooding, although Tropical Cyclone Idai caused flooding across Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi in
2019, affecting more than 3 million people and causing destruction of up to US$773 million 72 in
Mozambique alone and requiring up to US$2 billion to repair the damage across the region73.
People die and there is often damage and loss of household property, destruction of infrastructure as
roads and bridges are washed away and crops destroyed in the fields. These events disproportionately
impact poor people who live in rural sometimes remote areas, depend directly on the land, have lower
adaptive capacity and are therefore more vulnerable to these hazards.
Key sources: IPCC SR1.5 (2018)
Risks to the long-term viability of the agriculture sector: Declining Rainfall in the South-Western Cape
in South Africa
72 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-12/cyclone-damage-cost-southern-africa-2-billion-world-bank-says
73 Ibid
36
Likelihood: Expected [4]; Consequence: Moderate to Substantial [4.5] ; Risk Score: [18]
The 130000 km2 winter rainfall area, approximately associated with the Western Cape Province
(population 6 million, about 1/5 of national GDP), obtains most of its rainfall from low-pressure fronts
in the mid-latitudes, which sweep from west to east every few weeks. The zone affected by these fronts
moves southward in summer, and northward in winter, when they brush over the Cape: thus most of
the rain in the SW Cape falls in the winter months. With climate change, these cold fronts are forced
further south, and do not reach the Cape as frequently in spring and autumn. Overlaid on this are
climate system model-shifts that last for a few years at a time.
During a dry mode, the rainfall is not sufficient to keep the water storage systems, including the soil,
at sufficient capacity to ensure reliable satisfaction of the water demand, which is growing year-on-
year , and a water restrictions are necessary to avoid ‘day zero’. Adaptation options include water
efficiency improvements, water recycling and increased storage.
The SW Cape is an important economic powerhouse for South Africa due to its contribution to tourism
and the agriculture industry (wine and fruit exports to regional and international markets). However,
considering the consequence of the risks in western Cape to the wider geographical area and
populations in southern Africa resulted in a more moderate score.
Energy transition risks: If the coal sector shrinks rapidly in response to global and national energy
transition to clean and renewable energy this could trigger sector-wide job losses within the coal sector
as mines and support industries contract and/or close.
Likelihood: Expected [4]; Consequence: Moderate to Substantial [4.5]; Risk Score: [18]
The energy transition is an important step to reducing emissions and combating climate change and
global warming. South Africa in particular has committed to incorporate more renewable energy
technologies like solar and wind power and move away from coal for generating electricity. There are
many potential opportunities, environmental and social benefits.
But If the energy transition is not adequately planned for with alternatives put in place there could be
catastrophic consequences for southern Africa given the already high levels of unemployment and
poverty. Job losses will mainly affect low-earning, low-technical skilled workers leaving them
increasingly economic vulnerable. However, the actual number of jobs that will be lost from the coal
sector is relatively small, spread over some years and at the national level in South Africa will most likely
be compensated by growth of jobs elsewhere.
Key sources: NPC, (2018) NPC Just Transition Report; Work done by Naledi and Energy Research Centre
at UCT
Geopolitical and Water security risks: Water supply stresses linked to climate change could potentially
fuel transboundary political water tensions in southern Africa.
Likelihood: Frequent [3]; Consequence: Severe [6]; Likelihood:
37
A closer look at SADC’s geopolitics illustrates that water may redefine the region’s security
arrangements as demands for the resource approach the limits of available supplies 74. This risk is a
product of political and potential long term changes in rainfall and water availability. There are currently
no legally binding (sub)regional instrument regulating ownership, distribution and consumption of
water in SADC to mitigate tensions that might trigger water conflict. The 12 SADC members share 15
river basins amongst them within the southern African region. These water basins cover almost two-
thirds of the land area and nearly 50% of the population lives near and off river sources. Any decrease
in river and dam water volumes, as occurs during conditions of sustained and chronic drought, may
contribute to securitisation and politicisation of water sources. South Africa, amongst others, is poorly
endowed with freshwater resources. The threat of future water stress has knock-on impacts on water-
intensive economic industries such as the iron and steel industry, electricity production and agriculture,
not to mention provision of basic drinking water.
The best indicator of the likelihood of this risk is found in history and studying past behaviour of
countries in the region related to access to water and natural resources. To substantiate this claim,
perhaps a reader may retrace the historical trajectory of the crises in Darfur where the conflict was
linked in part to ‘desertification, ecological degradation and a scarcity of resources, foremost among
them water’ 75. Like many water wars, the physical and overt source of contestation may not be directly
about a particular river basin, but the benefits, which accrue from their shores. For instance, miners
pick diamonds and alluvial gold from river beds; usage of water for cleaning extracted metals, minerals
and precious stones; livelihood for fishermen; taxes from sea transport; irrigation for grazing lands and
rainfed crops.
74 Swatuk, L.A. (2015) ‘Water conflict and cooperation in Southern Africa’ 2(3) Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Water 215-
230
75 Ki Moon, B. (2007). ‘What I Saw in Darfur’. UN, New York. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/articles/2007-09-
14/what-i-saw-darfurn.
38
Appendix 2: The Typology of risks used in this study
Column name Description
Sectors and systems Broad categories of climate risk adapted from IPCC 1.5 C Report (section
3.4); this is a sectoral approach although the point is taken that a more
systems-based approach could also have been applied
Climate risk drivers This column captures the drivers and/or multipliers of climate risks and has
and multipliers: been included in order to open thinking beyond the biophysical drivers e.g.
drought, floods, heat extremes to also include drivers of transition risk like
changing market or consumer behaviour, changing laws/regulations, as well
as systemic social risk multipliers like weak governance, chronic poverty;
lack of access to infrastructure; inequalities etc.
Nature of Risks Short name of the actual climate risk
Risk or Impact A brief description of the risk and its impact at its most granular level
element
39
Appendix 3: Terminology used for the risk assessment
Table A2: The likelihood classes used in this study
Numerical probability Word class
Equal to or greater than But less than
0 0 No chance
0.001 0.01 Rare
0.01 0.1 Occasional
0.1 1 Frequent
1 10 Expected
Table A3: The classes of consequence used in this study. ‘Sigma’ refers to a statistical estimate of the
natural variability in the data. Thus a change of less than one sigma is indistinguishable from noise,
whereas 2 sigma meets the common scientific confidence limit of a less than one in twenty chance of
occurring by chance.
Qualitative Economic impact DALY impact
None: Less than natural <1 sigma or less than 0.02% of Less than the non-climate
variability sector value add, whichever is interannual variability (sigma)
larger
Negligible up to twice the ~0.05% of sector value add or Up to 2 x the normal non-
natural variability <2 sigma, whichever is larger climate interannual variability
Slight: statistically detectable, 0.05-0.1% of sector value add 0.05-0.1% loss

but not material
Small: requires a small 0.1-0.25% of sector value add 0.1-0.25% loss

adjustment
Moderate: cannot be ignored, 0.25-0.5% of sector value add 0.25-0.5% loss

needing adjustment well within
coping capacity
Substantial: consequences are 0.5-1% of sector value add 0.5-1% loss

highly material, requiring major
adjustment
Severe: Adjustments stretch 1-5% of sector value addition 1-5% loss

the coping capcity of the
impacted parties to the limit
40
Catastrophic: requires >5% of sector value addition >5% loss of DALY
emergency-level intervention
Note: for national-scale all-sector impacts, the 2019 GDP for South Africa (ZAR 320 billion) acts as a
reference for value . The DALY change refers to the population within the impact geography, not the
entire area of South Africa or the region.
Table A4. Description of confidence level language. The words used to describe how confident the
experts are in their assessment follow the language and principles adopted by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and other assessment bodies, such as the Intergovernmental Platform
on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES)
Word category Description How sure are

you? as a
percentage
Certain Accepted as already occurring 100
Very high confidence High agreement between experts and much 99

supporting data. This corresponds to the
‘beyond reasonable doubt’ criterion in criminal
law.
High confidence Either high agreement or much data, but 95

medium or low on other axis
Medium confidence Either low agreement or little data, but a 90

moderate level on the other axis
Low confidence Low agreement and little data, but some 66

reason to believe that the assessment is better
than chance. More or less the ‘more likely than
not’ or ‘on balance of probability’ criterion
applied in civil law.
None No better than a random guess (‘fifty-fifty’ in 50

everyday language)
41
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The Climate Risks We Face in the 21st Century

Visualising a hierarchy of threats in 2020. Source: Laurie Garrett,

1 UNDP (2019) Human Development Report 2019. http://report.hdr.undp.org

Is it just me, or is it getting hotter?

6 UNU-INRA (2020) https://i.unu.edu/media/inra.unu.edu/event/5423/DIscussion-paper-Africas-Development-in-the-age-

simply cannot be predicted in a deterministic way – such as changes in human behaviour

So how does one begin to frame climate risks?

16 IPCC SR 1.5 (2018)

Identifying climate risks in southern Africa.

Approach to calculating risk

Some climate risk definitions:

20 See Appendix 1 for a description of the typology used

Emerging Climate Risks in southern Africa

Risk 1. Food insecurity and the viability of the agricultural sector:

Hot, empty skies and rumbling stomachs

How we use food

Solutions towards zero hunger

Risks to farming and the agriculturally-dependent sectors

Why don’t we just water the crops more?

How farmers are adapting

Opportunities for visuals

Data visualisation ideas

Risk 2: Shortages of clean water

Living in a dry land, getting drier

Winter rainfall areas

Summer rainfall areas

Dealing with persistent drought

It is not about going thirsty

A current reality, with known solutions

Risk 3: A badly-handled transition to low-carbon energy.

This is happening already, and not just because of climate change

49 DOE (2019) IRP 2019 http://www.energy.gov.za/IRP/2019/IRP-2019.pdf

low carbon transition on South Africa. https://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CPI-Energy-

It is not all bad news

energy supply mix. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.01.065

Data visualisation idea:

Potential sources to interview for further information:

Risk 4.Heat stress is a killer.

"It's too hot to work today!"

Country 1995 2030

Shall we just sweat it out?

Risk 5: Disrupted ecosystems and loss of biodiversity

We develop two concrete examples, out of many, below.

Is it too late for bees or are the bees too late?

Opportunities for visuals

Potential sources to interview for further information

Key sources: DEA (2011)

Key sources: IPCC (2007); DEA (2013)

Key sources: IPCC (2007); DEA (2013)

Research, Pretoria, South Africa, pp 92.

Key source: Eskom (2017) CDP Climate Change Response to investors

70 Eskom 2017 CDP Response to investors on climate change

It is likely that the agriculture sector may be facing:

Key sources: IPBES Africa report; LTAS; Blignaut (work on maize;

Key sources: IPCC SR1.5 (2018)

Column name Description

Nature of Risks Short name of the actual climate risk

Numerical probability Word class

Equal to or greater than But less than

0.001 0.01 Rare

0.01 0.1 Occasional

Qualitative Economic impact DALY impact

Slight: statistically detectable, 0.05-0.1% of sector value add 0.05-0.1% loss

Small: requires a small 0.1-0.25% of sector value add 0.1-0.25% loss