CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs.

COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of eminent
domain. On May 18, 1989, Conrad L. Leviste filed with the Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte, a
complaint for collection of a sum of money and foreclosure of mortgage against Philippine Smelter
Corporation (PSC). For failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court declared PSC in default
and allowed plaintiff Leviste to present evidence ex-parte. When the decision became final and executory,
the trial court issued a writ of execution and respondent sheriff Eduardo R. Moreno levied upon two (2)
parcels of land covered issued by the Registrar of Deeds in the name of PSC. On April 24, 1990, the
parcels of land were sold at public auction in favor of Vines Realty Corporation (Vines Realty). On August
7, 1992, copy of the writ of possession was served on petitioner as owner of the power lines standing on
certain portions of the subject property. On August 12, 1992,Vines Realty filed an amended motion for an
order of demolition and removal of improvements on the subject land. Among the improvements for
removal were the power lines and electric posts belonging to petitioner. Petitioner opposed the motion
on the ground, among other reasons, that petitioner was not a party to the case and therefore not bound
by the judgment of the trial court and that it had subsisting right-of-way agreements over said property.
December 11, 1992, respondent Vines Realty cut down petitioners electric posts professedly using a
chainsaw and resulting in a loud blast affecting the area. On February 19, 1993, petitioners new counsel,
filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent Appearance And Motion To Admit Supplemental Petition. This
was a new petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a writ of mandatory
injunction. On March 15, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration as well as the
admission of the supplemental petition on the ground that the petition had been decided. Meanwhile, in
response to the public’s urgent basic need, petitioner re-constructed its power lines along the provincial
road leading to the Port of Osmea upon authority of the District Engineer of the Department of Public
Works and Highways [DPWH]. On April 23, 1993, however, petitioner received a letter dated April 10,
1993, stating that Vines Realty was the owner of the roadside and that petitioner could not construct
power lines therein without its permission. Petitioner promptly replied that the power lines were
constructed within the right of way of the provincial road leading to the port of Osmea as granted by the
District Engineer of DPWH. Hence, this petition.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power
of eminent domain

Ruling:

Yes. The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of eminent
domain. Such conclusion finds support in easements of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained
the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use. A simple right-of-way
easement transmits no rights, except the easement. Vines Realty retains full ownership and it is not
totally deprived of the use of the land. It can continue doing what it wants to do with the land, except
those that would result in contact with the wires. The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is not
gratis. Considering the nature and effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the
land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, Vines
Realty is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the money
equivalent of the property.

JUST COMPENSATION DEFINITION

Just compensation has been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss, which the
owner of the res expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The value of the land and its
character at the time it was taken by the Government are the criteria for determining just compensation.

Whether or not the petitioner was denied due process.

YES. The court finds that the petitioner was denied due process. Petitioner could have negated private
respondents claims by showing the absence of legal or factual basis therefor if only the trial court in the
exercise of justice and equity reset the hearing instead of proceeding with the trial and issuing an order of
demolition on the same day.

It is incumbent upon the trial court to receive evidence on petitioners right over the property to be
demolished.

The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an

opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Due process is equally applicable in a case involving public utilities, where a strict
application of the rules would bring about catastrophic inconveniences to the public. Hence, the act
would do more harm than good to the public, which the government seeks to protect. Damages and losses
of a considerable amount of time (about 8 years) could have been prevented if the trial court did not
gravely abuse its discretion on the matter.

Well aware that the counsel was not authorized, the trial court could have stretched its liberality a little
to ensure that it would serve the ends of justice well for the people of Camarines Norte. Petitioner must
be given the chance to prove its position.

Whereby, the PETITION is GRANTED.

Masikip vs. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006

Facts:

Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which the City of Pasig sought to
expropriate a portion thereof for the “sports development and recreational activities” of the residents of
Barangay Caniogan. This was in January 1994. Masikip refused. On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought
again to expropriate said portion of land for the alleged purpose that it was “in line with the program of
the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.”

Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. The Motion
to Dismiss filed by Masikip was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that there was genuine
necessity to expropriate the property. Case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed
petition for lack of merit.Hence, this petition.

Issue/s:

(1) WON there was a genuine necessity to expropriate the property.

(2) Whether or not the City if Pasig can exercise the power of expropriation

Ruling:

(1) NO. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the government. It delegates
the exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and public utility corporations,
subject only to Constitutional limitations. Local governments have no inherent power of eminent domain
and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. Section 19 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain
to local government units and lays down the parameters for its exercise, thus:

SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to
an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of
the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That, the power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That, the local government unit may immediately take possession of the
property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court
of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the
time of the taking of the property.

Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a
genuine necessity to expropriate petitioners property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the
Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council dated November 20, 1994, the basis for the
passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended
beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not
the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of
having their own private playground and recreational facility. Petitioners lot is the nearest vacant space
available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been
shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and
community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City,
including those of Caniogan.

LAGCAO V. LABRA

FACTS:

The case is about the validity of Ordinance No. 1843 authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate
expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of lot (1029) of petitioners Diosdado, Doroteo and Ursula
Lagcao.In 1964, Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu, one of which is the lot 1029. 1965,
petitioners purchased said lot on installment but in late 1925, these 210 lots reverted to the Province of
Cebu. The latter tried to annul sale which resulted to the filing of the case of the petitioners. RTC and CA
ruled in their favor and as such a deed of sale was executed and a TCT was issued in their favor. When
they tried to take possession of the land, they found out that it was occupied by squatters. Thus, they
instituted ejectment proceedings which was later on granted by the MTCC and affirmed by RTC. However,
Mayor Garcia wrote letters requesting the deferment of the demolition since the city was still looking for
a relocation site for the squatters; this was granted. During the suspension the Sang.Panlungsod of Cebu
passed a resolution and 2 ordinances (all about the lot 1029). Ord. No. 1843 likewise appropriated the
amount of 6, 881, 600 for the payment of subject land; this was approved by the Mayor.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the exercise of eminent domain is valid in the case at bar.

HELD:

NO, it is NOT VALID.

The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of
public character. Govt. may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be
expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners’ property was singled out for
expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection.
Ordinance no. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners’ property as the site of a socialized
housing project. Moreover, under RA 7279, private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of
socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings maybe resorted to only after the other
modes of acquisition are exhausted

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PHILIPPINE LONGDISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY

FACTS: The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its
own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT tenable government offices to
call private parties. Their subscription agreement prohibits the public use of the service furnished the
telephone subscriber for his private use. The Bureau has extended its services to the general public since
1948, using the same trunk lines owned by, and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau's)
own schedule of rates. On 7April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under
which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the
rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but
even to serve private persons or the general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT. Soon
after, it disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau. Republic commenced suit against the
defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying in its complaint for judgment commanding the
PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's
telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court might
consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant company to restrain
the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed.

ISSUE: Whether the courts may compel PLDT to execute a contract with the Republic.
 Whether or not the Bureau of Telecommunication has the right to demand interconnection
between the Gov't of the Philippines and that of PLDT

HELD: We agree with the court below that parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no
agreement is had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to
stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual system, and by express provision
of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation, or undue influence (Articles
1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of the Philippines).

But the court a quo has apparently overlooked that while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to
celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain,
require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that
of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just
compensation to be determined by the court. The court rules that services were embraced in the concept
of property subject to taking under the power of eminent domain.

Nominally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be
availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow inter-service connection
between both telephone systems is not much different. In either case private property is subjected to a
burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the
interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation,
there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest,
provided just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service
would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use

THE CITY OF MANILA vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL.

Facts:
On Dec. 11 1916 City of Manila presented a petition in the CFI of Manila praying that certain lands used
by the Chinese Community as their cemetery be expropriated for an extension of Rizal Avenue. The
Comunidad de Chinos de Manila alleged that if expropriation would take effect, it would disturb the
resting places of the dead, and would require a large sum of money to transfer the bodies; furthermore
,the expropriation was unnecessary as a public improvement. Plaintiff’s theory however is that once it
has established the fact, under the law, that it has authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any
land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the
land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisible purpose
of purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts
are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is
fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant or its value.

Issue:

Whether or not the City of Manila may expropriate the lands used as cemetery for extending Rizal
Avenue.

Ruling

Under Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the City of Manila), the city has the authority to
expropriate private lands for public purposes. However, said charter contains no procedure by which the
authority may be carried not effect, and how eminent domain may be exercised. The Court then opines
that the power of the court is not limited to determining WON a law exists permitting the plaintiff to
expropriate. The right of expropriation is not inherent in municipal corporations, and before it can
exercise such some law must exist to confer such power. When the courts determine the question, they
must find only that a law exists for such a reason, and that the right or authority being exercised is in
accordance with the law.

In the present case, there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila:
1, the land must be private, and 2,the purpose must be public. If the court upon trial finds that neither
exists or either fails, it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law. The
necessity for taking property under the right of eminent domain is not a judicial question. The legislature,
in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, may directly determine the necessity of
appropriating private property for a particular improvement for public use, and may select the exact
location of the improvement. The questions of utility of proposed improvement, the extent of public
necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of its location and the
necessity of taking the land for its site are all questions exclusive for the legislature to determine. The
taking of private property for any use which is not required by the necessities or convenience of the
inhabitants of the state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent domain,and beyond the power
of the legislature to delegate.WON the cemetery is private or public is immaterial. The Court opines that it
is difficult to believe that even the legislature would adopt a law providing expressly that such places
under such circumstances should be violated.

To disturb the mortal remains of those endeared to us in life becomes sometimes the sad duty of the
living, but except in cases of necessity or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave should be
maintained. In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in
question, the record shows no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The
record shows that the adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which
should answer every purpose of the plaintiff

Ayala de Roxas vs. City of Manila, 9 Phil 215

Facts:

Petitioner applied to the defendant city engineer for a license to construct a terrace over “the strip of land
3 meters in width between the main wall of her house and the edge of the said canal of Sibacon or San
Jacinto, which strip of land belongs exclusively to her”; but the defendant refused to grant the license or
authorize the plaintiff to build the terrace, because, as the plaintiff has been informed, the sole reason
wherefore the license was denied is because “the said defendants pretend to compel the plaintiff to leave
vacant and without any construction whatever thereon the said strip of 3 meters in width which is a
portion of the ground belonging to her, in order to use the same as the wharf or public way so that the
plaintiff will only be able to use the said strip in the same manner and for the same purposes as the public
in general, thus losing the enjoyment, use, and exclusive possession of the said strip of the property
which the plaintiff and the former owners thereof have enjoyed quietly and peacefully during more than
seventy years. Additionally, it was agreed between both parties that the strip above referred to had not
been expropriated in whole or in part by the municipality of Manila, and that neither had the latter
offered any compensation for the same to the owner thereof.
Issue:

Whether the non-issuance of a license to the petitioners is tantamount to a taking that requires just
compensation.

Ruling:

Yes, the imposition of an easement of a 3-meter strip of the plaintiff’s property was considered taking it
could not be legally done without just compensation. The refusal to grant a license or the enactment of an
ordinance whereby a person may be deprived of property or rights, or an attempt threat is made, without
previously indemnifying him therefor, is not, nor can it be, due process of law. What the defendants have
therefore done is to prevent the plaintiffs from continuing to enjoy, use, and freely dispose of such strip of
their ground, as they had been doing up to the time when they applied for a license to construct a terrace
over said strip, and the defendants prevented it with the intention of establishing a public easement
provided for in an ordinance of their own which they consider is pursuant to the provisions of the Law of
Waters and of the Civil Code in force.

PEOPLE V. FAJARDO (1958)

Facts

Aug. 15, 1950 - Juan Fajardo was the mayor of Baoo, Camarines Sur. During his term the municipal
council passed Ordinance No. 7 which prohibited the construction or repair of any building without a
written permit from the mayor prior to construction or repairing.

1954 - Fajardo and Babillonia (Fajardo’s son-in-law) applied for a permit to construct a building adjacent
to their gas station, still on Fajardo’s private land, separated from public plaza by a creek.

Jan. 16, 1954 – request denied because it would destroy the view of the public plaza.

o Applicants appealed but were turned down again on Jan. 18, 1954.

Fajardo and Babillonia proceeded to construct even without a permit because they claimed that they
needed a residence badly due to a typhoon destroying their previous place of residence
Feb. 26, 1954 – Fajardo et at., were charged and convicted by peace court of Baoo for violating Ordinance
no. 7

o CFI – Affirmed

o CA forwarded the case to the SC because “the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in
question.”

Issue:

Whether or not a municipal ordinance prohibiting a building which would impair the view of the plaza
from the highway was likewise “considered taking” in reference to the power of eminent domain

Held:

Yes. It was held that it amounts to taking of appellants’ property without just compensation hence, the
property owner is entitled to payment of just compensation.

The Ordinance in question was beyond the authority of said municipality to enact, and is therefore null
and void. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive
appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and
amounts to a taking of appellants’ property without just compensation.

The State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of
their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of
the community. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land,
regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would
interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be
constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited,
being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just
compensation and an opportunity to be heard.

Notes:

W/N Ordinance No. 7 is a valid exercise police power in its regulation of property. NO. Ordinance No. 7
went beyond the authority that the municipality could enact and is therefore null and void. Fajardo et al.,
acquitted.
Municipal government justified the ordinance under Revised Administrative Code – Sec. 2243 – C – that
municipal council shall have authority to exercise discretionary powers regarding establishing fire limits
in populous centers empowers municipal government to require construction/repair permits, to charge
fees for such permits

IN THIS CASE: there were no fire limits or safety regulations that the municipal council promulgated in
order to set a standard in the type of building that can be safely constructed in the public plaza

Republic of the Philippines vs. Vda. De Castellvi

Facts:

In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement
over a land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to terminate
the lease in 1956, the AFP refused because of the permanent installations and other facilities worth
almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property. She then instituted an
ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation
proceedings for the land in question. During the assessment of just compensation, the government
argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the
proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government
commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the “taking” of property
under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemn or upon the
private property for more than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as
to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the
property as lesse.

HELD:

No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more
than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or
otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.

In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the
property under a contract of lease.

The Republic urges that the "taking " of Castellvi's property should be deemed as of the year 1947 by
virtue of afore-quoted lease agreement. In American Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, 2nd edition, Section 157, on
the subject of "Eminent Domain, we read the definition of "taking" (in eminent domain) as follows:

Taking' under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as entering upon private property
for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a
public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially
to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.

Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for
purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the republic
commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof.

Requisite number 2 is not present according to the Supreme Court, “momentary” when applied to
possession or occupancy of real property should be construed to mean “a limited period” -- not indefinite
or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year.
The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the
Republic, through AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that
the entry into the lant was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by
consent of the owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the republic, as lessee,
undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the time the property was first
occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as
may be inferred from the construction of permanent improvements. But this “intention” cannot prevail
over the clear and express terms of the lease contract.

The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the instant case the entry of the Republic into the property and its
utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of
the property. Cstellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as
shown by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract
whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated.
Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was
bound to pay, and had been paing, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the
complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.

It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be
considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee
thereof, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi’s property should not be determined
on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error when it
held that the “taking” of the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in
this case.

Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be
expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta GR No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

Facts:

An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the regulation of establishment of private
cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial park
shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC.
Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property
restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the
owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police
power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the benefit of
the public.

Issue:

Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property
Ruling:

No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The ordinace is
actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who
are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a public cemeteries. State's
exercise of the power of expropriation requires payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance
without benefiting the owner of the property with just compensation or due process, would amount to
unjust taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be taken will be used for the public's
benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will come forward and not the police power of the
state.

Reyes vs. National Housing Authority (NHA) (January 20, 2003)

Facts:

National Housing Authority filed several expropriation complaints on the sugarland owned by the
petitioners Reyes. The land is located in Dasmarinas, Cavite. The purpose of the expropriation is for the
expansion of the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated
from Manila. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots with payment of
just compensation. It was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The petitioners Reyes alleged the failure of the
respondents to comply with the Supreme Court order, so they filed a complaint for forfeiture of their
rights before the RTC of Quezon City. They also said that NHA did not relocate squatters from Manila on
the expropriated lands which violate the reason for public purpose. The petitioners prayed that NHA be
enjoined from disposing and alienating the expropriated properties and that judgment be rendered
forfeiting all its rights and interests under the expropriation judgment. In the answer of NHA, they
already paid a substantial amount to the petitioners. Thus, several issues are already raised in the
expropriation court. The trial court dismissed the case. It held that NHA did not abandon the public
purpose because the relocation of squatters involves a long and tedious process. It also entered into a
contract with a developer for the construction of a low-cost housing to be sold to qualified low income
beneficiaries. The payment of just compensation is independent of the obligation of the petitioners to pay
capital gains tax. Lastly, the payment of just compensation is based on the value at the time the property
was taken. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the property expropriated is taking for public purpose.

Held:

The decision appealed is modified.

The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain over the
private properties upon payment of just compensation. Sec. 9, Article III states that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation. The constitutional restraints are public use and
just compensation.

The expropriation judgment declared that NHA has a lawful right to take petitioners properties “for the
public use or purpose of expanding the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project”.

The “public use” is synonymous with “public interest”, “public benefit”, “public welfare”, and “public
convenience”. The act of NHA in entering a contract with a real estate developer for the construction of
low cost housing cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated public purpose of their taking.

Expropriation of private lands for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if
the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service
companies and other private concerns.

The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is
in furtherance of the social justice provision under Section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution.

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise of
eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may
be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title
acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.
MANOSCA V. COURT OF APPEALS (1996)

Facts:

Petitioners inherited a piece of land. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been
the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the
land to be a national historical landmark.

In May 1989, the Republic, through the OSG, instituted a complaint for expropriation before RTC
Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI. At the same time, it filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order
to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. The motion was opposed by petitioners. The
trial court ruled in favor of the Republic.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation
was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public
funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary
to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the said parcel of land is for the purpose of public use

Ruling:

Yes.The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by
most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and
secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property
does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.

Notes:

As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just
noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use is.

Public Use: I. one is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to
individuals. II. the other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private
enterprise to the government.

It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use.
Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution

(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly,
for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES CHIONG

FACTS:

petitioner is a government owned and controlled corporation for the development of hydroelectric
power, pursuant to RA 6395. In order to carry out its purpose, NPC is authorized to exercise the power of
eminent domain. On Feb.19, 1998, NPC filed a complaint for eminent domain with the RTC of Iba,
Zambales, seeking the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way and certain portions of agricultural
lands owned by Igmedio and Liwayway Chiong and the Heirs of Agrifina Angeles to be used in its
Northwestern Luzon Transmission Line Project. Respondents averred that the fair market value is P1,100
/m². On Mar.9, 2000, Atty. Castillo and Ms.Ragadio submitted their report that the property have a fair
market value of P500/m². On May 5, 2000, Atty. Alog submitted his report recommending that NPC pay
an easement fee of P20,957.88 and P9,187.05 to heirs of Angeles and spouses Chiong, respectively.
Furthermore, Atty. Alog assessed the properties to have fair market value of P22.50/m² for Angeles and
P15.75/m² for Chiong.

ISSUE: whether or not NPC should be required to pay full market value as just compensation despite the
fact that the petitioner was only acquiring an easement of right-of-way

HELD: in eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the just compensation to
which the owner is entitled to is the market value, which is “the sum of money which a person desirous
but not compelled to buy, and an owner wiling but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be
given and received therefor.” When only a part of a property is expropriated, the owner is also entitled to
recover for the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property, from which value of
consequential benefits must be deducted. In fixing the valuation at P500/m², the CA noted that the trial
court had considered the reports of the commissioners and proofs submitted by the parties. The trial
court found that the land sought to be expropriated are agricultural land with minimal improvements. It
is the nature and character of the land at the time of the taking that is the principal criterion to determine
just compensation to the landowner. Without any showing that the valuation is exorbitant or otherwise
unjustified, factual finding of the CA is binding on the parties. The petition is denied for lack of merit. CA’s
decision is affirmed.

YES, the trial court directed petitioner to pay the full market value of the property instead of a mere
easement fee. A perusal of its complaint shows that petitioner also stated that it would erect structures
for its transmission lines on portions of the expropriated property. In other words, the expropriation was
not to be limited for the purpose of easement of right-of-way. In eminent domain or expropriation
proceedings, the general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner is entitled to is the market
value which is “the sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner wiling
but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor.” When only a part
of a property is expropriated, the owner is also entitled to recover for the consequential damage, if any, to
the remaining part of the property, from which value of consequential benefits must be deducted.

Bureau of Internal Revenu vs. Central Drug Corporation. G.R. No. 148512, June 26, 2006

Facts:

Central Luzon Drug Corporation has been a retailer of medicines.

For the period January 1995 to December 1995, in conformity to the mandate of Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No.
7432, petitioner granted a 20% discount on the sale of medicines to qualified senior citizens amounting
to P219,778.

Pursuant to Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 implementing R.A. No. 7432, which states that the discount
given to senior citizens shall be deducted by the establishment from its gross sales for value-added tax
and other percentage tax purposes, respondent deducted the total amount of P219,778 from its gross
income for the taxable year 1995.

Subsequently, on December 27, 1996, claiming that according to Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432, the amount of
P219,778 should be applied as a tax credit, respondent filed a claim for refund in the amount of P150,193.
Hence, the amount of P150,193 claimed as a refund represents the tax credit allegedly due to respondent
under R.A. No. 7432.

On May 31, 2001, the CA concluded that the 20% discount given to senior citizens which is treated as a
tax credit pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 is considered just compensation and, as such, may be
carried over to the next taxable period if there is no current tax liability.
Issue:

Whether the 20% sales discount granted by respondent to qualified senior citizens pursuant to Sec. 4(a)
of R.A. No. 7432 may be claimed as a tax credit or as a deduction from gross sales in accordance with Sec.
2(1) of Revenue Regulations No. 2-94.

Ruling:

The tax credit given to commercial establishments for the discount enjoyed by senior citizens pursuant to
R.A. 7432 (Senior Citizens Act) is a form of just compensation for private property taken by the State for
public use, since the privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but from
the private establishments concerned.

EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987]

Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing
Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development
Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands
were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation.
Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the
just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be
P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of
just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the
commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the
respondent from further hearing the case.
Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional.

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial

prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved
to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of
the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to
what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just
compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial
determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private
party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order
can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts
be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.

Belen v CAA

small portion of land measuring a hundred (100) square meters, more or less, belonging to the
ManotocServices, Inc. was leased to Pedro M. Belen. In the early part of 1978 part of the land came to be
occupied by Alfredo Juliano and his family without Belen’s consent. Belen and Juliano came to an
agreement that he would be allowed to stay temporarily by paying half of the rentals to Manotok
ServicesA fire razed their properties. Upon Juliano’s pleas, he was allowed to build another house in the
property for a period of 2 ½ years. However, after the stipulated period, he still refused to vacate and
thus a suit was filed against him wherein the court (MTC) ordered him to vacate the premises. In the
appeal to RTC, the decision was reversed. Belen appealed but this was dismissed upon the expropriation
of the said property by Presidential Decree No. 1670. His appeal with the CA was also denied. The
decision declared that by virtue of the decree, Manotok Realty, Inc. ceased to be the owner of the land,
including the lot leased to Belen, and could not interfere with the possession, administration, control and
disposition of the National Housing Authority (NHA); It also held that Manotok's lease contract with
Belen over the lot in question also ipso facto ended, as well as the sublease between Belen and Juliano.
Thus the appeal on certiorari with the SC
Issue: WON there was valid expropriation of the property

Held/Ratio:

No. PD No. 1670, together with a companion decree, numbered 1669 — which attempted to expropriate
by similar legislative fiat another property, the so-called "Tambunting Estate" — was struck down by this
Court as "unconstitutional and therefore, null and void.The Court found that both the decrees, being
"violative of the petitioners' (owners') right to due process of law," failed "the test of constitutionality,"
and that, additionally, they were tainted by another infirmity as regards "the determination of just
compensation."PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done in reliance thereon and in accordance
therewith must also be deemed void ab initio, including particularly the taking of possession of the
property by the National Housing Authority and its attempts to convert the same into a housing project
and the selection of the beneficiaries thereof.

MERALCO VS PINEDA (1992)

FACTS

Petitioner is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine Laws of thePhilippines

For the purpose of constructing a transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Pililia, Rizal, petitionerneeded
portions of land of the private respondents with an aggregate area of 237, 321 sqm;parties failed to reach
an agreement despite negotiations and offers to pay compensation

Petitioner then filed a complaint for eminent domain with the Court of First Instance of Rizal

Court authorized petitioner to take and enter property sought to be expropriated

Respondents filed for Motion for Withdrawal of deposit claiming they are entitled but weresubsequently
denied

Petitioner then sold to NAPOCOR its power plants and transmission lines including the one inquestions
pursuant to a government policy

The court then appointed commissioners for the appraisal of the land

Commissioners’ work was suspended when petitioner

filed a Motion to Dismiss because of theirsaid sale to NAPOCOR

Respondents filed another motion for payment and courts granted and another sum thereafter

Petitioner then filed for a Motion for Reconsideration and alleged that “at this stage” the

respondents are not yet entitled to payment of just compensation as there is no appraisal yetand that
court, upon awarding a fraction of sum, based it only on a witness of a credible realestate broker instead
of employing the assistance of three commissioners to determine justcompensation

ISSUE

Whether the court can dispense the employment of three commissioners in the ascertainmentof just
compensation

HELD

No
Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: the court shall appoint 3 commissioners toascertain just
compensation and render judgment based on their reports

2 stages of expropriation:1.

Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise power of eminent domain2.

Determination of the court of just compensation for the property sought done with theassistance of 3
commissioners

A trial before commissioners in a mandatory and substantive right, indispensable to allow theparties to
present evidence on the issue of just compensation

Reasons for court to disregard findings of commissioners:1.

Where the commissioners applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them2.

Where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence3.

Where the amount is either grossly inadequate and excessive

Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343

Facts:
P.D. No. 27, was promulgated on October 21, 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private
lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners.

On July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor
of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the
decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential
Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229,
providing the mechanics for its implementation.

Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative
power from the President and started its own deliberations. The result was the enactment of R.A. No.
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino
signed on June 10, 198.

The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that Section 18 of the Carp Law-Valuation and
Mode of Compensation is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of the expropriated
properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money, which is the only medium of payment
allowed.

Issue:

Whther or not Section 18 of the CARP Law is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of the
expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money, which is the only
medium of payment allowed.

Ruling:

No, it was held that in agrarian reform, payment is allowed to be made partly in bonds, because under the
CARP, "we do not deal with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain; we deal with a
revolutionary kind of expropriation". This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific
property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and
perhaps local purpose. Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be
tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws.
LAND Banks vs CA

FACTS

In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated principles be applied in its
resolution. Separatepetitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
and Land Bank of the following theadverse ruling by the Court of Appeals. Private respondents are
landowners whose landholdings were acquired by theDAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified
beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR
and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land, they sought
to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedingsto finally determine the
just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the
amountsrespectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents,
and to allow them towithdraw the same.DAR and Land Bank filed for petitions but it was dismissed and
they filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

II. ISSUES

Whether or not the opening of "trust accounts" is within the coverage of term "deposit.”

HELD

The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an expanded construction
that would

include the opening of "trust accounts" within the coverage of term "deposit.” Accordingly, we must
adhere to the well

-settled rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for
interpretation or construction, but only for application. The validity of constituting trust accounts for the
benefit of the rejecting landownersand withholding immediate payment to them is further premised on
the latter's refusal to accept the offered compensationthereby making it necessary that the amount
remains in the custody of the LBP for safekeeping and in trust for eventualpayment to the landowners. As
an exercise of police power, the expropriation of private property under the CARP putsthe landowner,
and not the government, in a situation where the odds are already stacked against his favor. He has
norecourse but to allow it. His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation
to be paid for theexpropriated property. Unduly burdening the property owners from the resulting flaws
in the implementation of the CARPwhich was supposed to have been a carefully crafted legislation is
plainly unfair and unacceptable.

National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 577

Facts:

In 1978, National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) took possession of a 21,995 square meter land which is
a portion of Lot 1 of the subdivision plan situated in Marawi City, owned by Mangondato.

NAPOCOR alleged that the subject land was until then possessed and administered by Marawi City so that
in exchange for the city’s waiver and quitclaim of any right over the property, NAPOCOR had paid the city
a financial assistance of P40.00 per square meter.

However, in 1979, when NAPOCOR started building its Agus I HE (Hydroelectric Plant) Project,
Mangondato (the real owner of the property) demanded compensation from NAPOCOR. NAPOCOR
refused to compensate insisting that the property is public land and that it had already paid financial
assistance to Marawi City in exchange for the rights over the property.

Thus, Mangondato prayed that should the lower court order the expropriation of the subject property,
that the just compensation for the land be reckoned from the time of the filing of the expropriation case.

On the other hand, NAPOCOR avers that the taking of the property should not be reckoned as of the year
1992 when NAPOCOR filed its Complaint for eminent domain but as of the year 1978 when it took
possession of the property, and that the just compensation, determined as it should be, on the basis of the
value of the property as of 1978, as P40.00 per square meter.

Issue:

Whether or not the value of the land subject of expropriation is computed at the date of the taking or the
date of the filing of the complaint for eminent domain?
Ruling:

Compensation is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, but where
the filing of the complaint occurs after the actual taking of the property and the owner would be given
undue incremental advantages arising from the use to which the government devotes the property
expropriated, just compensation is determined as of the date of the taking.

Side Issue: When is There Taking of Property?

A number of circumstances must be present in the taking of property for purposes of eminent domain:
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for
more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way to oust
the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Ruling:

The petitioner’s entrance in 1978 was without intent to expropriate or was not made under warrant or
color of legal authority, for it believed the property was public land covered by Proclamation No. 1354.
Only in 1992, after the private respondent sued to recover possession and petitioner filed its Complaint
to expropriate, did petitioner manifest its intention to exercise the power of eminent domain. Thus, the
petition is hereby DISMISSED and the judgment appealed from AFFIRMED.

Doctrine:

“Expropriation lies only when it is made necessary by the opposition of the owner to the sale or by the
lack of any agreement as to the price.”

CITY OF CEBU vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO and BLASA DEDAMO [G.R. No. 142971, May 7, 2002]

FACTS:

On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against
respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged therein that it needed the land
for a public purpose, i.e., for the construction of a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of
Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel
Roads in Cebu City.
 The lower court fixed the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. Petitioner alleged that
the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. The just
compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of
the expropriation proceedings. The petitioner did not convince the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
lower court’s decision in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint.

HELD:

No. In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the determination of just
compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall be
determined as of the time of actual taking. The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power
Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. We did not categorically rule in that case that just compensation should be
determined as of the filing of the complaint. We explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in
determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing
of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of
the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings."

Nepomuceno vs City of Surigao560 SCRA 41

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC for “Recovery of Real Property and/or its Market
Value” to recover a lot which was occupied, developed and used as a city road by the respondent without
permission nor expropriation proceedings for its acquisition. Notwithstanding proposal for amicable
settlement, the City Mayor refused to pay.RTC granted petitioner P3,260 as compensation for the land in
dispute. Not satisfied, the petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA entitled petitioner for moral damages but
affirmed the compensation awarded. Petitioner sought for the value at the time of actual payment
invoking CA decisions with the substantial factual similarity in this case, as well as Article 1250 of the
Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not payment of interest should be at the value of the property at the time of the taking.

HELD: NO, the payment of interest should not be at the value of the property at the time of the taking.
Petition denied. The value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling is for purposes of
compensation. We find no application for Article1250 because it pertains to contractual obligations.
Moreover, petitioner cannot properly insist on the application of the CA decisions. A ruling of the CA on
any question of law is not binding on this Court. Infact, the Court may review, modify or reverse such
ruling of the CA.

Petitioner has not presented any evidence to show that no public hearings were conducted prior to the
enactment of the ordinances in question. On the other hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong claims that
public hearings were indeed conducted before the subject ordinances were adopted, although it likewise
failed to submit any evidence to establish this allegation.

In accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality
should be upheld in the absence of evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not
observed in their enactment.

Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to petitioner’s cause of action
in the present case. Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the burden of proof. Since
petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to discharge
the burden of proving that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are
constrained to uphold their constitutionality or legality.

Republic ersus CA

Facts:

Petitioner Republic instituted expropriation proceedings in the RTC of Bulacan for the land situated along
MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of
radio transmitter facilities for the “Voice of the Philippines” project.RTC condemned the land and had it
expropriated upon the payment of just compensation by the Republic.The issue arose in relation 76,589-
square meter property previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents,
which forms part of the expropriated area. They allege that after the lapse of five years, the Republic
failed to pay them their just compensation for the expropriated area.During this period, Pres Estrada also
issued proclamation No. 22 which transferred 20 hectares of said property to Bulacan State University
and another 5 hectares was dedicated for the propagation of Philippine carabaos.Petitioner filed its
manifestation that it would be depositing the amount equivalent to the just compensation of the
property. Respondent filed a counter motion to raise the price of the property or an option to have the
property returned to them.RTC issued the assailed order of returning the property to the respondents. CA
affirmed this decision.

Issue: WON respondents are entitled to the return of the expropriated property for the failure of
petitioner to pay the just compensation for it.

Held/Ratio:

No,

The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to
appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purposeExpropriation
proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required
to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect
merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title
or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the
taking. In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the
fact that the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to
which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply After condemnation, the paramount title is in the
public under a new and independent title;] thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title,
condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than
may be obtained by voluntary conveyance. The court also cited Valedhueza v Republic, wherein it was
held that “both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations
upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots -
which are still devoted to the public use for whichthey were expropriated - but only to demand the fair
market value of the same.”The case cited by respondents which is Sorsogon v Vda de Villaroya, wherein
the court ordered the return of the property does not apply in the case at hand. That case involved the
municipal government ofSorsogon, to which the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but merely
delegated and of limited application.
Republic v Vicente Lim June 29, 2005SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Facts:The petitioner, Republic instituted expropriation proceedings with the CFI of Cebu for Lots 932 and
939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City owned by the Denzons, for the purpose of
establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. RTC ordered the land to be expropriated
upon payment of justcompensation.For failure of the petitioner to pay the just compensation, in 1961,
Valdehueza and Panerio, the successorin interest of the Denzons filed a suit for damages and recovery of
possession of the land against AFP. CFI ruled in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio but held that they were
not entitled to the return of the property because of the notation in the TCT which stated that, “subject to
the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon
previous payment of a reasonable market value.” They were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor the
Republic. In 1964, since the Republic still failed to pay the just compensation Valdehueza and Panerio
mortgaged the land to Vicente Lim, who later foreclosed the mortgage in 1976 for the former’s failure to
pay.In 1991, Lim instituted a suit for quieting of title against AFP and the Republic. The RTC held that Lim
wasthe absolute and exclusive owner of the property. This decision was sustained by the CA.A petition
for certiorari was filed with SC but the SC affirmed the CA decision. A second motion for reconsideration
was filed.

Issue: WON the Republic has retained ownership of the land despite its failure to pay respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest the just compensation.

Held/Ratio:As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the sum of P16, 248.40 as “reasonable market value of the two lots
in question.” Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this
Court’s mandate. Such prolonged obstinacy bespeaks of lack of respect to private rights and to the rule of
law, which we cannot countenance. It is tantamount to confiscation of private property. While it is true
that all private properties are subject to the need of government, and the government may take them
whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however, the Constitution guarantees
that when this governmental right of expropriation is exercised, it shall be attended by compensation.
From the taking of private property by the government under the power of eminent domain, there arises
an implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss.There are two stages in expropriation. The first
stage determines the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise
in the context of the facts involved in the suit. The second phase of the eminent domain action is
concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be
taken. It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been
completed.The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation, and that “non-payment of just
compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does not entitle the private landowners to recover
possession of the expropriated lots.” However, the facts of the present case do not justify its application.
It bears stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just compensation twice; the first was in the
expropriation proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57) years have passed since then.
We cannot but construe the Republic’s failure to pay just compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part.
Under such circumstance, recovery of possession is in order. In cases where the government failed to pay
just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in
consonance with the principle that “the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the
judgment.”

NPC vs CA GR No. 106804

FACTS: Antonio Pobre owns a land which he developed into a resort subdivision, beneath which is
thermal mineral water and steam. For one year, Pobre leased to NPC eleven lots from the approved
subdivision plan. To own the land for industrial purposes, NPC filed an expropriation case against Pobre,
during the pendency of which the former dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by the
parties. Then NPC filed its second expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an additional area of the
property. In his

motion to dismiss the complaint, Pobre prayed for just compensation of all the lots affected by NPC’s

actions and for the payment of damages. But NPC itself filed a motion to dismiss the second expropriation
case on the ground that NPC had found an alternative site and that NPC had already

abandoned in 1981 the project within the Property due to Pobre’s opposition.

The trial court ruled that because of the pollution generated by NPC’s geothermal plants NPC had
rendered Pobre’s entire Property useless as a resorsubdivision. The Property has become useful only to
NPC. NPC must therefore take Pobre’s entire Property and pay for it.

But NPC insists that it has the right to move for the automatic dismissal of its complaint, relying on
Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court (the Rules in effect at that time).
ISSUE: Whether or not NPC has the right to automatically dismiss complaint for eminent domain

HELD: In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff’s matter of right to

automatically dismiss the complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered
damages at the start of the taking. If the propriety of the taking of private property through eminent
domain is subject to judicial scrutiny, the dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry
because private rights may have suffered in the meantime. The dismissal, withdrawal or abandonment of
the expropriation case cannot be made arbitrarily. Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
no longer makes the dismissal of the complaint automatic. The right of the plaintiff to dismiss his action
before the defendant has filed his answer or asked for summary judgment must be first confirmed by the
court in an order issued by it.

(It is not Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court that is applicable to this case but Rule 67 of the
same Rules, as well as jurisprudence on expropriation cases. Rule 17 referred to dismissal of civil actions
in general while Rule 67 specifically governed eminent domain cases.)

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority

Vs.

Court of Appeals & Chiongban

G.R. No. 139495, November 27, 2000

Facts

Subject of the action is Lot 941 located in Lahug, Cebu City, adjoining the then Lahug Airport.

On April 16, 1952, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Civil Aeronautics
Administration, filed an expropriation proceeding on several parcels of land in Lahug, Cebu City, which
included Lot 941, for the expansion and improvement of Lahug Airport. In June 1953, appellee Virginia
Chiongbian purchased Lot 941 from its original owner, Antonina Faborada, the original defendant in the
expropriation case for P 8,000.00. Subsequently, a TCT was issued in her name. On December 29, 1961,
judgment was rendered in the expropriation case in favor of the Republic of the Philippines which was
made to pay Virginia Chiongbian the amount of P34,415.00 for Lot 941. She did not appeal therefrom.

Then, in 1990, the congress passed RA 6958 creating the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority to
which the assets of the Lahug Airport was transferred.

On July 24, 1995, Virginia Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of Lot 941 with the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 9, alleging that sometime in 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC)
ventured to expand the Cebu Lahug Airport. As a consequence, it sought to acquire by expropriation or
negotiated sale several parcels of lands adjoining the Lahug Airport, one of which was Lot 941 owned by
her. Since she and other landowners could not agree with the NAC’s offer for the compensation of their
lands, a suit for eminent domain was instituted on April 16, 1952, before the then Court of First Instance
of Cebu which was finally decided on December 29, 1961 in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

Some of the defendants-landowners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which rendered a
modified judgment allowing them to repurchase their expropriated properties. Virginia Chiongbian, on
the other hand, did not appeal and instead, accepted the compensation for the Lot upon the assurance of
the NAC that she or her heirs would be given the right of reconveyance for the same price once the land
would no longer be used as (sic) airport.

However, no expansion of the Lahug Airport was undertaken by MCIAA. In fact, when Mactan
International Airport was opened for commercial flights, the Lahug Airport was closed at the end of 1991.
Thus, the purpose for which Lot 941 was taken ceased to exist."3

On June 3, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent Virginia Chiongbian ordering
MCIAA to restore to plaintiff the possession and ownership of the property denominated as Lot No. 941
upon reimbursement of the expropriation price paid to plaintiff.

Petitioner MCIAA appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the RTC decision. Then
the Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not Chiongban has the right to repurchase the property?

Ruling

No, Chiongban doesn’t have the right to repurchase the property. The property was appropriated
by the Republic of the Philippines through expropriation proceedings. The terms of the judgement in the
expropriation proceedings is clear and unequivocal and grants title to lot no. 941 in fee simple to the
Republic of the Philippines. (Definition: Fee simple title – when the land has been acquired for public use
in fee simple title, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned or
the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any
reversion to the former owner) There was no condition imposed to the effect that the lot would return to
CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was
expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug airport.
Case Precedent

The court followed its decision in this case in ruling MCIAA versus CA and Chiongban

In Fery vs. Municipality of Cabanatuan11 , this Court had occasion to rule on the same issue as follows:

"The answer to that question depends upon the character of the title acquired by the expropriator,
whether it be the State, a province, a municipality, or a corporation which has the right to acquire
property under the power of eminent domain. If, for example, land is expropriated for a particular
purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to
its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner
reacquires the property so expropriated. If, for example, land is expropriated for a public street and the
expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it for a public street, then, of course,
when the city abandons its use as a public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some
statutory provision to the contrary. Many other similar examples might be given. If, upon the contrary,
however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land
becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or municipality,
and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation
proceedings.

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of
eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may
be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title
acquired, or any reversion to the former owner."12

Lopez vs. PIATCO, G.R. No. 15561, May 05, 2003

FACTS:

On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed the “Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-
and-Transfer Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III” (1997 Concession Agreement). The
Government granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the
concession period and to collect the fees, rentals and other charges in accordance with the rates or
schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession Agreement. The Agreement provided that the concession
period shall be for twenty-five (25) years commencing from the in-service date, and may be renewed at
the option of the Government for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At the end of the
concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the development facility to MIAA.
Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I and
II, had existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer international airline airport
services, such as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance
and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing, and other services, to several international airlines at
the NAIA.

On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming that they
would lose their job upon the implementation of the questioned agreements, filed a petition for
prohibition. Several employees of MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the legality of the various
agreements.

During the pendency of the cases, PGMA, on her speech, stated that she will not “honor (PIATCO)
contracts which the Executive Branch’s legal offices have concluded (as) null and void.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not PIATCO violated Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution which provides:

Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

RULING:

Yes. PIATCO violated Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution. PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual
stipulation, contravene the Constitutional provision on temporary government takeover and obligate the
government to pay “reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex.”

The above provision pertains to the right of the State in times of national emergency, and in the exercise
of its police power, to temporarily take over the operation of any business affected with public interest.
The duration of the emergency itself is the determining factor as to how long the temporary takeover by
the government would last. The temporary takeover by the government extends only to the operation of
the business and not to the ownership thereof. As such the government is not required to compensate the
private entity-owner of the said business as there is no transfer of ownership, whether permanent or
temporary. The private entity-owner affected by the temporary takeover cannot, likewise, claim just
compensation for the use of the said business and its properties as the temporary takeover by the
government is in exercise of its police power and not of its power of eminent domain.
Article XII, section 17 of the 1987 Constitution envisions a situation wherein the exigencies of the times
necessitate the government to “temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest.” It is the welfare and interest of the public which is
the paramount consideration in determining whether or not to temporarily take over a particular
business. Clearly, the State in effecting the temporary takeover is exercising its police power. Police
power is the “most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers.” Its exercise therefore must not be
unreasonably hampered nor its exercise be a source of obligation by the government in the absence of
damage due to arbitrariness of its exercise. Thus, requiring the government to pay reasonable
compensation for the reasonable use of the property pursuant to the operation of the business
contravenes the Constitution.