The Experience of Magic

Author(s): JASON LEDDINGTON

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism , SUMMER 2016, Vol. 74, No. 3
(SUMMER 2016), pp. 253-264
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics

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 JASON LEDDINGTON

The Experience of Magic

ABSTRACT

Despite its enduring popularity, theatrical magic remains all but ignored by art critics, art historians, and philos
is unfortunate, since magic offers a unique and distinctively intellectual aesthetic experience and raises a host of
philosophical questions. Thus, this article initiates a philosophical investigation of the experience of magic. Sectio
two widespread misconceptions about the nature of magic and discusses the sort of depiction it requires. Sec
"What cognitive attitude is involved in the experience of magic?" and criticizes three candidate replies; Secti
argues that Tamar Szabó Gendleťs notion of "belief-discordant alief" holds the key to a correct answer. Finally, S
develops an account of the experience of magic and explores some of its consequences. The result is a philosop
view of the experience of magic that opens new avenues for inquiry and is relevant to core issues in contemporary

Despite its enduring popularity, theatrical The Illusionists , sold 31,000 tickets for $3 mil-
magic
remains all but ignored by art critics, art lion his-
in nine days in Sydney and 42,000 tickets for
torians, and philosophers.1 It is easy to $2.2 under-
million in eight days in Mexico City. Since The
stand why. The world of magic has long had did this without any household names
Illusionists
an uneasy relationship with two thoroughly dis-
on the marquee, it is clear that the public was com-
reputable worlds: the world of the supposedly ing for a magic show, not some celebrity fan-fest
supernatural- the world of psychics, mediums, (Illusionists 2014). At the same time, two young
and other charlatans- and the world of the con- card magicians with a conceptual-artistic bent-
tile world of cheats, hustlers, and swindlers. More-Derek Delgaudio and Helder Guimarães- were
over, magic has undergone a tremendous declinebreaking box office records at the Geffen Play-
in the last century, thanks largely to the advent ofhouse in Los Angeles and the Pershing Square Sig-
film and television. Once among the most popu-nature Center in New York City with their show,
lar and profitable forms of public entertainment, Nothing to Hide. So, the perhaps surprising fact is
magic is now widely ridiculed as a sideshow artthat theatrical magic is an important contempo-
better suited to children's parties and the absur-rary art form that- it is fair to assume, given the
dity of the Las Vegas strip than to realms of "se- lack of critical attention- is badly understood.2
rious" art and culture. Lastly, it is quite rare to Second, recent historical scholarship has high-
witness a live performance by a skilled, theatri- lighted the importance of theatrical magic as a
cally polished, and thoughtful magician. (The ma- cultural force in Europe and the United States
jority of professional magicians do not meet thisthroughout the nineteenth century and the early
standard.) All of this points to an "art" deservingdecades of the twentieth.3 Not only were touring
dismissal. magicians the first "global" entertainment super-
Nevertheless, long-standing critical inattention stars, magic gained credibility as a sophisticated
to magic is unfortunate in at least four ways. First, theatrical art.4 Moreover, the public's interest in
public interest in live magic performance seems to magic was inseparable from its conflicted fasci-
be on the rise. In 2013, a large-scale touring show, nation with both science and the occult. Magic

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 74:3 Summer 2016

© 2016 The American Society for Aesthetics

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 254 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

performances were sometimes presented

sublime and Socratic along-
aporia. In other work, I argue
side-or even as- scientific demonstrations,
that reflection and
on magic yields a new twist on a tra-
magicians such as Johnditional
Neville Maskelyne
aesthetic paradox, the resolution ofmade
which
names for themselves by debunking
highlights magic's relevance to spiritualist
recent work in the
"humbugs" such as the psychology
Davenport brothers.5
of explanation Un-
as well as rich and un-
explored
derstanding magic is thus connections between
valuable magic, horror, and
for understand-
ing the social, intellectual, and
humor.7 aesthetic
Perhaps climate
unsurprisingly, magic does not fit of
an especially important neatly
recentinto ourhistorical
usual aesthetic categories,
period.which is
The third- and, forprecisely
my whypurposes,
it so rewards reflection.most
significant- reason thatThe
critical inattention
article is in four parts. Section 1 dispelsto
two widespread
magic is unfortunate is that misconceptions
it offers a about
uniquethe nature
and
of magic
distinctively intellectual and discusses the
aesthetic special sort of depic-On
experience.
tionthe
this point, here is one of it requires.
most Section 2 asks, "What cognitive
thoughtful and
attitude is involved
creative performers working today, in theTeller
experience ofofmagic?"
Penn
& Teller. and criticizes three candidate replies; Section 3
then argues that Tamar Szabó Gendler's notion of
[Y]ou experience magic as real and unreal at the same "belief-discordant alief" holds the key to a correct
time. It's a very, very odd form, compelling, uneasy, and answer (Gendler 2008, 641). On this basis, Section
rich in irony. A romantic novel can make you cry. A 4 develops an account of the cognitive dimension
horror movie can make you shiver. A symphony can of the experience of magic and explores some of its
carry you away on an emotional storm; it can go straight consequences. The result is a philosophically rich
to the heart or the feet. But magic goes straight to the account of the experience of magic that opens new
brain; its essence is intellectual. (Stromberg 2012) avenues for inquiry and is directly relevant to core
issues in contemporary aesthetics.
Following Teller's lead, the purpose of this arti-
cle is to initiate a philosophical investigation of I. WHAT IS MAGIC?

the experience of magic with a focus on its cogni-

tive dimension. This is a first step toward giving To begin, it is important to address two common
magic performance the proper critical attention misconceptions about theatrical magic.
it deserves. Moreover, since, as discussed below, First, it is widely believed that the magician's
the distinctive aim of theatrical magic is to pro- primary goal is to fool the audience. This may
duce an experience as of an impossible event, this be true of some professional performers that bill
article is also a first step toward a general aes- themselves as magicians, and it is clearly true of
thetics of the impossible, and so, of antinomic- many amateurs who do "magic tricks." However,
and not merely anomalous- experience. A more most magicians are interested in much more than
complete theory will address related (and simi- trickery: they regard deception merely as a means
larly neglected) phenomena such as drawings of to creating a certain type of theatrical event. Dar-
impossible figures (for example, Reutersvärd, Es- win Ortiz, a prominent magician who has written
cher), impossible sculptures (for example, Andrus, extensively on the theory of magic performance,
Tabary, Hamaekers), and even impossible music explains: "Magic is not simply about deceiving. It's
(for example, Shepard tones, Risset rhythms), as about creating an illusion, the illusion of impossi-
well as substantial connections to related aesthetic bility" (2006, 15). This is the sort of performance
domains. that interests me here- and that most deserves to
Finally, the fourth reason that magic deserves be called 'magic.'
critical attention is that it raises a host of interest- Second, there is the misconception that the ma-
ing philosophical and psychological questions that gician aims to convince the audience of the exis-
go well beyond the hypothesis that we can learn tence of supernatural powers. This is what leads
something about the mind by studying how ma- some people to respond to the threat of a magic
gicians fool us.6 In this article, I argue that magic performance by announcing, "I don't believe
involves a distinctive form of theatrical depiction in that stuff." But while some professional and
and that there are considerable parallels between amateur performers indisputably engage in this
the experience of magic and both the Kantian sort of charlatanry, most magicians do not claim

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 Leddington The Experience of Magic 255

to possess special powers.performance

In large depicts part, thisinis
events as happening the be-
cause they understand that theandbelief
actual present- that
so, in the world as it is. magic
On
is "real" actually thwarts their
this account, aesthetic
modal properties can figure in aaims.
per-
As discussed below, theformance's audience's active
depictive content. disbe-
This idea is contro-
lief is a critical ingredient in the
versial, presumably experience
because modal properties are of
magic. supposed to be of the wrong sort for depiction. On
So, if magic is neither charlatanry nor (mere) such a view, a performance cannot strictly speak-
deception, what is it? Here, again from Teller, is a ing depict an event as "really happening"; instead,
candidate definition: "Magic is a form of theater that we should so understand it is "implicated"
that depicts impossible events as though they were by the context of the performance- for instance,
really happening" (Stromberg 2012). Not charla- by the fact that the marquee says 'Magic Show'.8
tanry, but theater- and no mention of deception! However, for reasons that lie beyond the scope
In any case, Teller's definition deserves unpack- of this article, I think that we should reject the
ing. To this end, it is instructive to distinguish be- idea that the depictive content of a performance
tween:
(or film or picture) can be specified independently
of the occasion of its presentation.9 And absent a
1. Depicting events as though they wererepresentational "core" that can be thus specified,
happening I see no principled reason to suppose that modal
and properties cannot figure in depictive contents.
Still, there is more to performing magic than de-
2. Depicting events as though they were really picting impossible events as though they are really
happening. happening. A successful magic performance ap-
pears to present an impossible event, but it is possi-
Theater and film are well suited to depicting ble to depict an event as though it is really happen-
events as though they were happening, but de- ing without appearing to present it. In particular,
picting events as though they were really happen- a "really happening" depiction may be fictional in
ing is typical of neither. Macbeth is not (usually) Kendall Walton's sense of functioning as a prop
depicted as murdering Duncan now, here , in the in a game of make-believe (Walton 1990, chap. 1).
theater, and a screening of Casablanca does not Children playing at wizardry may make believe
depict the events in Rick's Café as unfolding now , that they are actually casting spells on the cat, and
whether in the cinema or in Morocco. To depict so, depict impossible events as though they are
an event as though it were really happening is nei- really happening. However, their act of depiction
ther to depict it as happening in some other pos- does not appear to present what it depicts: the chil-
sible world nor to depict it as happening at some dren do not actually appear to be casting spells!
other time. Instead, to depict an event as though By contrast, it is essential to a magic performance
it were really happening is to depict it as hap- that impossible events actually appear to happen.
pening now , in this world- usually wherever the So, it turns out that functioning as fiction- as a
act of depiction takes place. In this case, what is prop in a game of make-believe in which the spec-
depicted is depicted as actually happening right tator imagines that an impossible event is taking
in front of the audience, perhaps even to the au- place- is, at best, orthogonal to the intentions of
dience. Consequently, to depict events as though a magic performance. The spectator should not be
they are really happening is to break the theatrical called on to imagine that the impossible is hap-
"fourth wall" between the audience and the action pening because it should already appear so. In this
on stage. In this respect, the magician resembles respect, magical depiction is not fiction; rather, it
the stage actor less than the standup comic, who consists in the illusion that an impossible event is
speaks directly to the audience, and whose act, really happening.10 Thus, Teller's definition needs
even if scripted, often incorporates improvisatory modification: magic is a form of theater that not
and audience-interactive elements. merely depicts impossible events as though they
"Really happening" depictions are modally dis- are really happening, it appears to present them.
tinctive. It is one thing to depict events as hap- This, of course, is why it requires deception.
pening in a merely possible present- and so, in Still, in order for a given performance to be
the world as it might have been- but a magic "magical," yet a further condition must be met:

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256 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

tive and
the audience must believe affective
that what dimensions,
they and,are while
ap- they a
closely
parently witnessing is, in related,
fact, the cognitive side
impossible. It is
isprimary.
no
good if the depicted event is my focus here.13 The question
is impossible butis: "How do
the
audience believes otherwise. This is what makes magic affect cognitive states such as knowledg
it difficult to perform magic for young children: and belief?" Given that magic is a theatrical ar
they do not have a good grasp of the limits of the an obvious hypothesis is:
possible. Similarly, consider performing a mind-
reading routine for an audience that believes in(HI) The experience of magic essentially
psychic phenomena: they might marvel at your involves willing suspension of disbelief.
"powers," but they will not experience what you
In fact, as Ortiz notes, this hypothesis is widely
do as magical because they will not experience it as
impossible.11 This is why, as mentioned above, the accepted by practicing magicians;14 however, it
magician does not want you to believe that magic is clearly false. "Suspending disbelief" is playing
make-believe; so, the suspension of disbelief rele-
is real; rather, you should believe that it is impos-
sible, yet- as far as you can tell- it is happeninggates the theatrical event to the realm of fantasy.
anyway. This is the cognitive bind the magician And while it is surely true that occasional wit-
wants you in. nesses to a good magic performance will "play
If, as discussed above, modal properties canalong" and indulge in the fantasy that the magic is
real, this is not essential to- and actually interferes
figure in depictive contents, then these reflections
suggest that the impossibility of the depictedwith- the experience of magic. The whole force of
event is actually part of what a magic perfor- a magic performance consists in the fact that the
mance depicts. In this case, not only is the audience knows that what they are apparently wit-
nessing is, in fact, impossible. But if the impossible
depicted event in fact impossible, it is represented
as impossible. Thus, further updating Teller'sevent is relegated to the realm of fantasy via sus-
definition, I propose to define magic as a form pension of disbelief, then it is no longer apparently
of theater that apparently presents impossible witnessed at all. As discussed above, magic per-
events and at the same time represents them as formances are not fictions, not props in games of
impossible. In other words, magic apparently make-believe; they are illusions. To treat them as
presents impossibilities - as impossibilities. The invitations to fantasy is precisely to miss the point.
result, in Teller's words, is "a very, very odd To drive this point home, here is an example
form," in which events are represented "as real from Ortiz ([1995] 2011, 25). Compare a Broad-
and unreal at the same time." So, not only way is performance of Peter Pan to David Copper-
the magician's claim- say, to be able to make field's
a flying illusion. Suppose that you see the
coin vanish- essentially ironic (because it occurs wires holding Peter Pan aloft; does this interfere
within a performative context in which that very with your experience of the play? Not at all: you
act is recognized as impossible), the vanishing actcan still willingly suspend disbelief. By contrast,
suppose that you see wires moving David Copper-
itself has an ironic structure: it appears to be what
it simultaneously admits cannot be. And note thatfield through the air. This completely destroys the
treating the impossibility of the coin vanishing performance,
as and not because it interferes with
some fantasy of flight, but because you are no
ingredient in its depiction does not require that
the magician say or otherwise make explicit thatlonger
a witness to an apparently impossible event.
coin vanishing is impossible. That its impossibility Here, then, is a second hypothesis, due, again,
nevertheless figures in its depiction is suggested to Teller:

by the fact that someone who responds to the

performance by saying, "Oh come on, you can't(H2) The experience of magic essentially in-
really vanish coins," is correctly said not to "get" volves unwilling suspension of disbelief
what the magician is doing.12 (Stromberg 2012).

II. THREE HYPOTHESES What this hypothesis captures is the involuntary

nature of our response to a well-executed magic
We are now in a position to ask, "Whatperformance.
is involvedYou do not decide to respond to
Copperfield
in the experience of magic?" It has both cogni- as though he is really flying; rather,

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 Leddington The Experience of Magic 257

a successful performance somehow

III. ALIEVING IN MAGIC forces this
response from you. (Teller elsewhere describes
magic performance as a kindTo motivate of introducing
"theatrical rape";
the theoretical concept of
Swiss 1995, 492.15) Thus, alief, Szabó Gendler considers
if suspension the experience of
of disbelief
walking on
is important to the experience ofthemagic,
Grand Canyon
it isSkywalk.
not The Sky
walk is a transparent
willing suspension of disbelief. Still, for horseshoe-shaped
the rea-cantileve
sons I detailed above, focusing
bridge that on the
extends overnotion of
seventy feet beyond the
edge of the
suspension of disbelief misses the canyon
point.and hangs
Whethernearly one thou-
it is willing or unwilling,sandsuspension
feet in the air. Unsurprisingly,
of disbelief walking on
the Skywalk
relegates the impossible event to thecan be a harrowing
realm experience. Stil
of fan-
tasy and, so, prevents us thousands
from apparently witness-
of tourists do it every year, and presum-
ing it at all. To put the point
ably theyanother
know that theyway: active
are safe. Nevertheless,
normal personin
disbelief is an essential ingredient who walks
the out on the bridge for
theatrical
experience of magic; that the is,
firstthe
time is, in some measure,
audience shouldconflicted abou
actively disbelieve that what doing so.they
How shouldare we apparently
describe this conflict?
witnessing is possible.16 This Szabó Gendler
is why convincingly
it is a argues
signthat we
of a successful performance should understand
when it as a an
tension between be-
audience
member exclaims, "No way!" lief and a more
or, primitive,
"Impossible!"-nondoxastic, rep-
hardly appropriate responses resentationaltomental
mere statefantasy.
she calls alief She
In sum, then, the problem explains,
with
"A paradigmatic
giving alief
suspen-
is a mental state
sion of disbelief a central role in an account of with associatively linked content that is repre-
the experience of magic is that it cannot do jus- sentational, affective and behavioral, and that
tice to the cognitive dissonance this experience is activated- consciously or nonconsciously- by
involves. features of the subject's internal or ambient envi-
Focusing on the idea that cognitive dissonance ronment" (2008, 642). On her analysis of the Sky-
is essential to the experience of magic immediately walk, the visual stimulus induced by the transpar-
suggests the following hypothesis: ent bridge causes a mental state with the following
associatively linked contents:

(H3) The experience of magic essentially in-

volves conflict of belief
On this hypothesis, Copperfield is successful only
if he gets you to somehow believe and disbe- There are two points to note here. First, belief in-
lieve that he is flying. But presumably Copper-
field's audience does not typically come to believe
a contradiction, no matter how good his perfor-
mance. The experience of magic is an experience
neither of forced fantasy nor of inadvertent self-
contradiction. There is cognitive dissonance in it,
but not the sort that demands resolution on pain
of contradiction. The audience never really be-
lieves that Copperfield is flying- that magic is
real- any more than the frightened audience of
The Exorcist really believes that Regan is pos-
sessed by the demon Pazuzu.17 So, the right ac-
count of the experience of magic must include an
account of cognitive dissonance that is not a mat-
ter of conflicting beliefs. The next section suggests
that Szabó Gendler's notion of "belief-discordant
alief" might just do the trick.
- Representational: Really high up; no support !
- Affective: Unsafe !
- Behavioral: Get off!
volves endorsement of a representational content.
By contrast, in alief a representational content is
present in the subject's cognitive system, but it is
not endorsed. Still, it is associatively linked to af-
fective and behavioral contents, so it is not idle : it
makes you feel, and inclines you to act, in certain
ways. Second, alief is distinct from imagination.
While "we can (for the most part) imagine at will,
we do not seem to have the same sort of freedom
in alief" (Gendler 2008, 651). Moreover, there is
no cognitive conflict involved in imagining that
not-p while believing that p' or, as Szabó Gendler
puts it, in doing this, "I am violating no norms."
By contrast,
if I believe that P and alieve that not-P, something is
amiss. Learning that not-P may well not cause me to

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258 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

cease alieving that P- butmeantime,

if it however,
does the point of
not, a magic perfor-
then ... I am
mance
violating certain norms of is not simply to generate cognitivecoher-
cognitive-behavioral dis-
sonance by inducing
ence. No such criticism is possible in thean alief that an impossible
analogous case
event is651)
of imagining. (Gendler 2008, happening, but to maximize this disso-
nance. Only then does the spectator have a prop-
Here, then, we have a type of
erly "magical" cognitive
experience. conflict
The final section of this
that is passively incurred, article defends
has this claim and articulates
affective and some of
behav-
ioral consequences, and its consequences.
is not a matter of con-
flicting belief. The question is whether it can be
applied to yield a plausible account of the experi-
IV. THE EXPERIENCE OF MAGIC
ence of magic.
Consider the following passage from Ortiz:
The best way to understand the experience of
[Fļorget about creating willing magic is suspension
to consider whatof undermines
disbelief. it. Take
Get your audience to actually Copperfield's
believe flying
in illusion.
magic. If .you
. .see the wires,
[But
how] can you make a sophisticated, you cannot have an experience audience
modern of magic. But con-
believe in magic? You can't, cealing
if the wires is talking
you're not enough,about either, forin-if you
tellectual belief. I'm talking about emotional belief. Ancan-
so much as suspect that there are wires, you
anecdote from the 19th century not have an experience of
perfectly magic (no matter
captures the how
difference between intellectual and emotional belief. good the illusion). In general, suspecting that yo
Madam De Duffand was asked whether she believed know how a magic performance is accomplished is
enough to ruin it. And since, when witnessing th
in ghosts. She responded, "No. But I am afraid of them."
([1995] 2011, 25-26) apparent presentation of an impossibility, you typ
ically will have some ideas about possible meth-
Ortiz characterizes the cognitive dissonance at the ods, the magician has to do more than conceal the
heart of the experience of magic as a conflict be- actual method- namely, "cancel" all the method
tween "intellectual belief' and "emotional belief." that might reasonably occur to you.20 Only the
Intellectually, the audience knows that magic is are you likely to have the sort of experience th
impossible; but on a more primitive, emotionalmagician wants you to have. As Ortiz writes:
level, a good performance induces them to "be-
lieve" it is actually happening. This seems veryMagic can only be established by a process of elimi
much like the contrast between belief and alief. It nation. There is no way that you can directly appre-

is easy to imagine someone standing on the Sky-
walk saying, " Intellectually , I believe-/ know-
that I'm safe; but emotionally , I believe that I'm
in danger." So, my suggestion is that the same
theoretical tool that Szabó Gendler introduces to
hend that you're witnessing magic. You conclude that
it's magic because there is no alternative. Therefore, th
primary task in giving someone the experience of wit-
nessing magic is to eliminate every other possible cause
(2006, 37)21

handle the problem of our resistance to walking

out on the perfectly safe Skywalk can be used toIt is very helpful to consider a concrete exam-
give an account of the cognitive dissonance that isple. Consider again David Copperfield's flying il-
essential to the experience of magic: lusion, which, despite the schmaltzy theatrics, is
perhaps the best flying illusion ever performed.
(H4) The experience of magic essentially in-For each stage of the performance, we can see
volves a belief-discordant alief that an im- that Copperfield takes pains to cancel the various
possible event is happening.18 methods that might occur to a spectator.22

If this is correct- and it deserves much deeper Stage I. Lying face up, Copperfield rises stiffly
consideration- the question arises: "What are off the stage. A reasonably intelligent
the affective and behavioral contents of magical spectator thinks: "He must be lying on a
alief?" That is, how does such an alief make you board."
feel, and what does it make you want to do? I Stage II. Twenty feet in the air, Copperfield
take up these questions in other work.19 In the rotates into a vertical position. The

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 Leddington The Experience of Magic 259

spectator thinks: "So,methods- no board;he or she

but seesof
no way to rationalize.
course there are wires attached to his In Copperfield's performance, as described above,
back." this happens only at Stage V: only then does the
Stage III. Copperfield does a full somersault in spectator enjoy the experience of an apparent im-
midair. Spectator: "Ah, so the wires can't possibility absent any resources to explain it away.
be attached to his back; still, there must The experience of magic is, therefore, the result
be wires." of an "intellectual process" (Ortiz 2006, 36). With
Stage IV. Copperfield flies through a series of sleeves rolled up and hands shown empty, I bor-
spinning metal hoops. "Huh? How can row a coin and apparently pass it from my right
there be wires? Maybe they somehow hand to my left fist. After a magical gesture, I
rotate them to avoid the hoops?" open my fist: no coin! If well executed, this se-
Stage V. Copperfield flies into a glass box, is shut quence will occasion a belief-discordant alief that
inside, flies around inside the box, and the coin has vanished. Impressive, surprising- but
flies out when the cover is removed. not yet magical. An intelligent spectator will soon
"What the ... ? Clearly there can't belook to my other hand. Only when I also show it
wires. What else? Magnets? A fan? No. empty will he or she (perhaps) undergo the to-
None of that makes sense. I'm com- tal bafflement constitutive of the experience of
pletely baffled. This seems altogether magic.
impossible. And yet, it's happening. Second, I there is more to the experience of
don't know what to say." magic than not knowing how a trick is done.
The latter requires only being deceived as to its
At no point does the spectator come to believe method. For instance, in Copperfield's flying illu-
that Copperfield is flying. But even at Stage sion,I,atitno point does the audience know how the
certainly looks as though he is, and this suffices illusiontois produced. They are deceived through-
induce the corresponding belief-discordantout. However, only at Stage V, when they lose
alief.
Thus, the performance immediately produces their
cog-grip on how the illusion could be produced
nitive dissonance in the spectator, and, as by Linda
natural means, do they actually have the expe-
Zagzebski points out, the natural, immediate riencere- of magic. What was at first a "puzzle" to
sponse to such "psychic dissonance" is to try be solved
to ("How does he hook up the wires? Why
restore harmony.23 In this case, there arearen't three they visible?") comes, via the bafflement of
options. First, the spectator can try to dislodge the intellect, to "suggest the operation of some-
the alief that Copperfield is flying. But since thing
the outside of normal cause and effect" (LePaul
illusion is robust, the alief refuses to budge.24 1987, 129).25
Sec-
ond, the spectator can try to revise the belief Third, that in general, the greater the distance be-
it is impossible for Copperfield to fly. But this tween is performer and audience, the more difficult
rationally unacceptable- at least in part because it is to produce the experience of magic. Just as
it would generate more psychic dissonancegreater thandistances make it easier to create illusions
it would resolve. Third, if neither alief nor of belief
impossibility, they make it harder to cancel
methods effectively. Spectators are likely believe
will budge, the spectator can at least try to mitigate
their discord by devising a plausible explanation (usually correctly) that if they had a closer look,
for the appearance of impossibility. This is the theynat-
would see through the illusion. Thus, "stage
ural, immediate response to an effective magical magic" is almost always less powerful than "close-
illusion: the spectator struggles to minimize up cogni-
magic," which takes place right in front of the
tive dissonance by explaining away appearances. spectator and more easily leaves the impression
But the point of the strategy of canceling that meth- everything is open to view. (When Suzanne,
ods is precisely to thwart this attempt and, the so,onlyto woman to have won "Close-Up Magician
maximize the cognitive dissonance that spectators of the Year" from the Academy of Magical Arts,
experience by depriving them of any means to transforms a few blank pieces of paper
apparently
mitigate it. There are several things to noteinto a regular deck of playing cards right under
here.
First, the experience of magic occurs only your when nose, it can feel like there is no scene to look
the spectator has a belief-discordant alief behind- in theunlike, say, in Copperfield's flying illu-
impossible that- thanks to the cancelation of problem of distance is especially acute
sion.) The

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260 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

when showing magic on experience

TV, where of magic consists
effective per- i
tive failure.27
formance also requires ruling out the possibility
Fifth, it follows
of camera tricks and postproduction that
effects. spectat
Thus,
most contemporary TV cognitive
magic is aresources
variant onmaythe have
periences
sort of reality show pioneered by of the Blaine
David very same
in p
magician's
his 1997 special, Street Magic. Blaine'sjobprincipal
is to anticipate
in-
dience
novation was to feature the is likely
reactions of to consider an
ordinary
formance of
live spectators- their expressions that "cancels" them
incredulity,
their shouts of "No way!"- as a a
for, say, central
group of part of
engineers
the recorded show. This ent demands
brilliant than performing
stratagem serves
scientists.
to certify the authenticity In general, and,
of the performance the varie
thus, apparently cancels nations we are of
the possibility capable
camera of ima
tricks or postproduction illusion
editing. depends
The TV on our backg
specta-
Sixth, the idea
tors thus experience the performance of an aesthe
vicariously;
volving
in effect, Blaine enrolls the imaginative
live spectators failure
as epis-
manuel Kant's
temic guarantors and emotional guides conception
for the of
TV spectators, who learn sublime
what to (Kant
think 2000,
and 131-143
feel
about a performance in 260).
partOf bycourse,
seeing for the Kant,
live "t
audience react. Compare faculty whose role
how, according tois to synt
Noël
Carroll, in horror, "the foremotional
empirical reactions
cognition- of is qu
characters . . . provide what
a set usually goes under
of instructions the n
or,
rather, examples about theparallels
way in worthwhich exploring.
the au- On
dience is to respond to experience
the monsters of beauty
in the occurs
fic- w
presentsthe
tion" (1990, 17-18). Obviously, thehorror
object of audi-sensor
ence knows that the eventsunderstanding
depicted in the not,horroras is u
narrative are not reallybe thought under
happening, so they a determin
take
merely
only emotional , not epistemic as from
cues thinkable (102-10
the char-
acters. By contrast, it isThus,
criticalfor toKant,
the to experience
emotional
ful is to that
reactions of Blaine's TV audience experience it as intel
they implic-
that the
itly regard his live spectators experience of
as epistemically au-beauty
thoritative vis-à-vis the the harmony
experience of of the world
seeing him wi
live.26 In general, unlessulties.
a TVBy contrast,
viewer the experi
has reason
to distrust the live audience-
when you thatare is, sensorily
reason to pres
think that the performance was stooged-
that, despite your best herefforts,
re-
sponse will be guided by (Confronted
a principle such by a as:good perfor
"If the
common to as
live audience treats a performance hear spectators s
apparently
impossible, then, ceteris sense!")
paribus, Similarly,
I should, according
too."
ence of
(A structurally similar form ofemotional
the mathematically
and epis- s
temic authority is evidentyou in encounter
live competition something pro- that
grams such as America's literally
Got Talent makes no sense
, in which theto y
lime object
reactions of the [often skeptical] overwhelms
judges are a big the
part of the show.) fails in its attempt to make th
Fourth, it should nowempirical
be clear exactly
cognition. how This cog
negative
magic engages a spectator's moment in
imagination. the expe
While
fiction invites the audience to imagine
ematically sublime. the de-
Critically,
picted event- and the maina positive
point moment
of the fiction follows: u
is to help them in this- magic
object coerces the
empirically, you au-grasp i
of reason;
dience into trying to imagine how in the
so doing,
illusion you e
riority be
of the depicted event might of produced-
your rational and self o
the main point of the mal, empiricalis
performance nature
to pre- (140-14
vent them from succeeding.Arguably, the experience
So, while the expe- of
rience of fiction requiresstructure:
imaginative there is a moment
success, the

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 Leddington The Experience of Magic 261

interlocutorsby
that is nevertheless "contained" recoilthe
from knowledge
the experience of phi-
that "it's just a trick." In losophy, so, too, do some
this respect, people recoil
despite from the
being
experience
totally baffled, the spectator of magic. After
remains all, as Haydn
master overwrites:
the illusion.29 "This is a creative and disturbing place to be"
Seventh, the intellectual process that leads to (2009, 5). Still, of course, there is an important dif-
the experience of magic has a very clear philosoph- ference between philosophy and magic. The goal
ical parallel. A series of possible explanations is of philosophy is not aporia, but sophia : wisdom.33
discounted, leaving the spectator baffled, speech- On the other hand, those who love magic seek an
less. This is an aporetic process, and it directly mir- aporetic experience for its own sake. The question
rors the experience of an interlocutor in a Socratic is why. This, however, I leave for another time.34
dialogue. Consider, for instance, what happens in
the Euthyphro?0 A question is posed ("What is JASON LEDDINGTON

piety?" (5d)) and a series of accounts is then of- Department of Philosophy

fered, each of which is rejected on the basis of new Bucknell University
argument: Lewisburg, Pennsylvania 17837

internet: jason.leddington@bucknell.edu,
- "Piety is what I'm doing now" (5d-e)
www.jasonleddington.net
"But it can't be, because ..." (6d-e)
- "Piety is what is dear to the gods" (7a) REFERENCES

"But it can't be, because ..." (7a-8a)

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- Etc. Sa vaco, Ltd.
Barnum, P. T. 1866. The Humbugs of the World. New York:
Carleton.
Until, finally, Euthyphro reaches aporia , baffle-
Carroll, Noël. 1990. The Philosophy of Horror: Or, Paradoxes of
the Heart. New York: Routledge.
ment, and no longer knows what to say. Critically,
Christian, Magic. 2013. Johann Nepomuk Hofzinser: Non Plus
this does not mean that Euthyphro- or Socrates,
Ultra. Vol. 1, Magic of the 19th Century. Seattle: Hermetic
for that matter- thereby gives up on the idea Press.

that there is a correct account of piety. Rather,

Collingwood, R. G. 1938. The Principles of Art. Oxford: Claren-
don Press.
the proper aporetic attitude is: "Hiere must be
Currie, Gregory, and Ian Ravenscroft. 2003. Recreative Minds:
a correct account, but I have no idea how there Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford Univer-
could be. All the possibilities seem to have been
sity Press.
De Matos,
exhausted."31 Similarly, in the case of magic, the Luis. 2014. "The Illusionists 2.0." Genii: The Con-
jurors' Magazine 77: 74.
spectator does not give up on the idea that there is
During, Simon. 2002. Modern Enchantments: The Cultural Power
an explanation for the apparent impossibility; in-
of Secular Magic. Harvard University Press.
stead, the spectator's attitude is: "There mustbt anJames George. (1988) 2009. The Golden Bough: A Study
Frazer,
explanation, but I have no idea how there couldinbe.Magic and Religion. A New Abridgement from the Sec-
ond and Third Editions, edited by Robert Fraser. Oxford
All the possibilities seem to have been exhausted."
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(No wonder, then, that Socrates was sometimes
Freud, Sigmund. 1950. Totem and Taboo. Translated by James
called a "magician" by his contemporaries.)32 Strachey.
As New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
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Grice, H. P. 1975. "Logic and Conversation." In Syntax and Se-
The job of the magician is to trap the spectator in mantics,
this Vol. 3: Speech Acts , edited by Peter Cole and Jerry
L. Morgan, 41-58. New York: Academic Press.
logical conundrum. The result of this is a peculiar mental
Grimm, Stephen R. 2008. "Explanatory Inquiry and the Need for
excitation- a burr under the saddle of the mind. If the
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operation is performed correctly, the patient will not be 59: 481-497.

able to ignore the problem, but will keep coming back Haydn, Whit. 2009. The Chicago Surprise. Self-published.
Higginbotham, Adam. 2014. "The Unbelievable Skepticism
to it again and again. (2009, 6)
of the Amazing Randi." The New York Times. http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/11/09/magazine/the-unbelievable-
This could just as well describe the work Socrates skepticism-of-the-amazing-randi.html.
Houdini, Harry. 1924. A Magician Among the Spirits. New York:
performs in an aporetic dialogue: leaving the Harper and Brothers.
interlocutor with "a burr under the saddle Illusionists. 2014. "The Performers." http://www.theillusion-
of the mind." And just as some of Socrates's
istslive.com/theshow.html.

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 262 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

Walton,
Isherwood, Charles. 2013. "Playing Kendall
with a FullL. 1990.
Deck,Mimesis
and Youras Ma
Head." The New York Times ,Foundations
November of7, the Representational Ar
p. C1(L).
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Wollheim, Richard. 1998. "On Pictorial
James Randi Educational Foundation." http://web.randi.
org/about.html. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
Kant, Immanuel. 1900. Kritik der Urteilskraft. In KantsZagzebski,
gesam- Linda. 2012. Epistemic Authori
Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. Oxf
melte Schriften , Bd. 5. Edited by Königlichen Preußischen
(later Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin:
Georg Reimer (later Walter De Gruyter).
1. By 'theatrical magic' (or simply 'm
translated by Paul Guy er. Cambridge University Press.
Simon During calls "secular magic," an
Kuhn, Gustav, Alym A. Amlani, and Ronald A. Rensink. 2008.
of witches or Siberian shamans- not, i
"Towards a Science of Magic." TRENDS in Cognitive Sci-
ences 12: 349-54. one writer on the subject of the occult
LePaul, Paul. 1987. The Card Magic of LePaul. Brooklyn, NY:magic'- but rather the technically pr
D. Robbins and Co. juring shows" (2002: 1). Theatrical magic
the sorts of practices that anthropo
Levinson, Jerrold. 1998. "Wollheim on Pictorial Representa-
2009; Lévy-Bruhl 1985), psychologis
tion." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56: 227-
233. historians (Thomas 1971) have traditi
Lévy-Bruhl, Lucien. 1985. How Natives Think. TranslatedIt by is also not what R. G. Collingwood
Lilian A. Clare. Princeton University Press. namely, "art which . . . evokes of set p
Macknik, Stephen L., Mac King, James Randi, Apollo Rob- rather than others in order to discharge
bins, Raymond Teller, John Thompson, and Susana Martinez- of practical life" (1938: 69). Even if, as
Conde. 2008. "Attention and Awareness in Stage Magic: value of theatrical magic is that it aims
Turning Tricks Into Research." Nature Reviews Neuroscience that can bear on "practical life," magic
9: 871-879.
response for its practical significance.
2. On the follow-up to The Illusionist
Sleights of Mind: What the Neuroscience cessful debutof Magic
tour, seeReveals
De Matos (2014
About Our Everyday Deceptions. New York: Henry Holt and
tion of Nothing to Hide , see Isherwo
Company.
renewed interest in live performance,
Minch, Stephen. 1980. Secrets of a "Puerto Rican Gambler. " San
resurgence of magic on television. Am
Diego: The PR Press.
Murphie, Andrew. 2003. "The Enchantments of Cultural ples: Penn & Teller's Fool Us, whose f
History: A Review of Simon During's Modern Enchant- ran in the United Kingdom in 2011 an
second consecutive season on the U.S. cable network The
ments: The Cultural Power of Secular Magic."
CW in 2016; regular appearances by magicians on talent
Australian Humanities Review. http://www.australianhuman-
itiesreview.org/archive/Issue-October-2003/murphie.html.shows such as America's Got Talent (won by magician Mat
Franco in 2014); the incredibly successful award-winning
Nadis, Fred. 2005. Wonder Shows: Performing Science ; Magic,
and Religion in America. Rutgers University Press. U.K. show, Dynamo : Magician Impossible', and a 2013 ABC
Nelms, Henning. 1969. Magic and Showmanship: A Handbook primetime special, David Blaine: Real or Magic?, which
for Conjurers. Mineóla: Dover Publications. marked Blaine's return to magic performance after more
than a decade focused on endurance stunts. Even inde-
Nozick, Robert. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Harvard Uni-
versity Press. pendent film has gotten on board, with several feature-
Ortiz, Darwin. 2006. Designing Miracles. El Dorado Hills: length
A-l documentaries in recent years, including Make Be-
Magical Media. lieve (2010), Deceptive Practice: The Mysteries and Men-
tors of Ricky Jay (2012), and Magicians: The Documentary
and Greenberg. Reprint, Ortiz Publishing. Citations refer to
(2016). (For discussion of some of the aesthetic challenges
the reprint edition.
in presenting magic on TV and in film, see Section 4 of
Plato. 1997. Plato: Complete Works , edited by John M. Cooper
this article.) The question why magic is presently attracting
and D. S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis: Hackett.
significant public interest is, of course, difficult to answer.
Sankey, Jay. 2003. Beyond Secrets. Sankey Magic.
Arguably,
Stromberg, Joseph. 2012. "Teller Speaks on onethe factor is our waning
Enduring fascination with the ap-
Appeal
parently limitless potential of cinematic special effects. Even
of Magic." Smithsonian.com. http://www.smithsonianmag.
the best 3D CGI now seems pedestrian alongside wonders
com/arts-culture/teller-speaks-on-the-enduring-appeal-of-
magic-97842264/. apparently directly accomplished by actual human bodies.
Swiss, Jamy Ian. 1995. "Penn and 3.Teller Exposed:
See, especially, An Enchantments
During's Modern Ex- (2002),
clusive Interview." Genii: The Conjurors' Magazine
apparently "[t]he first major May,
academic work on secular
491-507.
magic" (Murphie 2003). See also Nadis (2005).
Tamariz, Juan. 2014. The Method of False Solutions and the Magic 4. On the "globalization" of theatrical magic in the latter
Way , edited by Gema Navarro. Translated by Rafael Benatar.
part of the nineteenth century, see During (2002, chaps. 4-
Seattle: Hermetic Press.
5). The cultural legitimation of magic as theatrical art was
Thomas, Keith. 1971. Religion and the Decline of Magic. London:
due in large part to performers such as Jean-Eugène Robert-
Penguin Books.
Houdin in Paris and Johann Nepomuk Hofzinser in Vienna.
Travis, Charles. 1985. "On What Is Strictly Speaking True."
On Robert-Houdin's enormous influence, see, for example,
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15: 187-229.
During (2002, chap. 4). On Hofzinser's famous Viennese
University Press. salon, see Christian (2013, chap. 5).

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 Leddington The Experience of Magic 263

5. P. T. Barnum's The Humbugs of

13. On thethe World
affective dimension,(1866)
see my "The fea-
Enjoyment
tures nine chapters debunking spiritualists
of Magic" (in progress). including the
Davenports and the Fox sisters. In become
14. "It's the fashionable
twentieth among thosecentury,
few magicians
the practice of debunking became who even an bother important part
to discuss showmanship of
to talk the
about get-
culture of theatrical magic thanks ting audiencesmainly to Harry
to 'willingly suspend Hou-
their disbelief" (Ortiz
dini (see Houdini 1924) and James "The
(1995) 2011, 25). Amazing"
The popularity of this view isRandi,
due in part to
whose "James Randi Educational Foundation was founded Henning Nelms, whose Magic and Showmanship: A Hand-
in 1996 to help people defend themselves from paranormal book for Conjurers (1969) is widely cited by magicians and
explicitly assimilates magic performance to theatrical fic-
and pseudoscientific claims ... [and] offers a still-unclaimed
million-dollar reward for anyone who can produce evidence tion requiring suspension of disbelief. For another example
of paranormal abilities under controlled conditions" (James of resistance to Nelms' view, see Sankey (2003, 89-90).
Randi Educational Foundation 2014). Randi's skepticism 15. This stunning phrase provides occasion to comment
is the focus of a recent New York Times Magazine profile on the glaring prevalence of white men in magic. Even today,
(Higginbotham 2014). non-white (especially black) or female magicians are diffi-
6. This is the rather narrow focus of recent work in the cult for audiences to accept. There are clearly strong implicit
"neuroscience of magic," which has received considerable biases at work here. What During writes of the latter half
attention in the popular press. See, for example, Macknik of the nineteenth century remains true: "[Eļnlightened con-
et al. (2008), Kuhn, Amlani, and Rensink (2008), and Mack- jurers were . . . associated, more or less subliminally, with
nik, Martinez-Conde, and Blakeslee (2010). occult or supernatural agency. . . . Magic [therefore] placed
7. See my "The Enjoyment of Magic" (in progress). them in a position of power and knowledge; but because
8. Compare Grice (1975). Jerrold Levinson recom- of its black and white color-coding, also associated them
mended such a view in his comments on my talk on the with the forces of darkness" (2002, 108). Contemporary au-
experience of magic at the 2015 annual meeting of the Amer- diences remain uncomfortable with women and non-white
ican Society for Aesthetics. In so doing, he was motivated men presented in ways that elicit such associations; so, per-
"partly" by "considerations developed by Richard Wollheim formers must find ways to comfort them. Thus, predictably,
in his discussion of limits on what states of affairs can be seen most female magicians embellish their performances with
in , and so potentially represented by , a picture" (personal "sex appeal," and black men standardly do "comedy
communication; see Levinson 1998; Wollheim 1998). magic."
9. More generally, we should follow Charles Travis and 16. Charles Isherwood picks up on this in his New York
reject the idea that the content of a representation can Times review of Nothing to Hide :
be specified independently of local pragmatic factors. As
Travis puts it, what a representation represents is always an Theater is often said to require the willing suspension of disbelief.
Without stating as much, Mr. DelGaudio and Mr. Guimarães chal-
occasion-sensitive matter. See, for example, his critique of
lenge you to bring all the disbelief you can muster to their show. And
Gricean semantics in Travis (1985), which is collected along-
then, with an insouciant air of doing nothing too impressive, they
side other relevant work in Travis (2008).
proceed to detonate the armor of cynicism that the most jaded New
10. Note that to deny that magic is fiction is not to deny Yorker could assemble, as easily as if they were blowing those wisps
that imagination plays a role in the experience of magic (on of white flower off a young dandelion. (2013)
the contrary: see Section 4 of this article). The point is just
that, unlike props in games of make-believe, magic perfor- 17. In other words, we should reject (H3) just as we
mances are not invitations to imagine a depicted event. You should reject a belief-based reply to the "paradox of fic-
might object that surely the magician is pretending to do tion," which challenges us to explain how audiences could
the impossible, and so, making believe. (Walton himself de- have genuine emotional responses to what they know to
fines pretense in terms of make-believe; 1990: 220.) Quite so. be fiction. The view that emotional responses to fiction are
However, that the magician makes believe does not mean explained by a (temporary) belief in the reality of the de-
the he or she invites the audience to do so. On the con- picted events is deeply implausible for the sorts of reasons
trary, the whole point of magic is that what is fiction for thediscussed in Carroll (1990, 63-68). That said, I think that
magician should be illusion for the audience. (For the con- the possibility of understanding the experience of magic as
trast between fiction and illusion, see Walton's discussion of
involving a kind of temporary belief in its reality (and so,
Kasimir Malevich's Suprematist Painting ; 1990, 54-57.) the corresponding cognitive dissonance as a kind of experi-
11. In Stephen Grimm's helpful terms, a magic per-
ence of contradiction) has considerably greater plausibility
formance must be sensitive to the audience's "proto-
than a belief-based response to the paradox of fiction. Jamy
Ian Swiss convinced me of this in conversation, and while I
understanding"- its "convictions about the sorts of possibil-
think the view is incorrect, I believe it deserves more serious
ities that are live or relevant, relative to the situation in ques-
tion" (2008, 491). Grimm describes proto-understanding "as consideration than I can give it here.
a further specification of Nozick's notion of a 'network of 18. In speaking of "alief that p," I am treating alief as a
possibility'; . . . something like a person's 'modal sense' two-place
of relation between a subject and a representational
the various alternatives that might have obtained, relativecontent rather than, as Szabó Gendler recommends, a four-
to the fact in question" (2008, 491; see Nozick 1981, 12). place relation between a subject and a "representational-
12. Compare someone who responds to a piece of fiction affective-behavioral content" (2008, 645). However, in so
or game of make-believe by saying, "Oh come on, bears doing, I am following her own 'loose' usage" (647). Nothing
can't really talk"- they don't get how fiction/make-believe
in my argument hangs on the difference.
works.
19. See "The Enjoyment of Magic" (in progress).

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 264 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

20. This use of the term 'canceling'

29. For more on the idea that
apparently
the experience of magic derives
from Stephen Minch's Secrets involves of
the "containment"
a "Puerto of a negativeRican
experience, seeGambler ,"
on the magic of Daryl Martinez. my "The Enjoyment Minchof Magic" (in writes:
progress).
30. All references to Plato's dialogues are to the Hackett
edition
Not far into this work you should be of his complete works
ready to (Plato 1997).
observe the workings of
the Second Rule of Darylism. He 31. Still, there
calls itis 'canceling.'
good reason to think thatThe
Euthyphro
formula runs
thus: "Each time you do something
himselfin
fails a routine,
to adopt try
the proper aporetic toAtfigure
attitude. the end out what
possible method a spectator might surmise
of the dialogue, he abandons for its explanation.
his conversation with Socrates Then
structure the next portion of the routine to knock over, or cancel , this
because he is "in a hurry" (15e), presumably to get on with
possibility in the audience's mind." (1980, 11)
prosecuting his father for murder because piety demands
it (4d5-5a2). That Euthyphro is apparently willing to pro-
21. Compare Juan Tamariz's closely
ceed with related
the prosecution suggests discussion
that he does not take his of
"the method of false solutions" and
aporetic experience "the
seriously. Instead,magic way" (2014,
like Socrates's other
3-19). Discussion of Tamariz's
"misologistic"rich
interlocutorstheory is
(for instance, Anytus beyond the
in Meno),
scope of this article. he seems willing to sacrifice virtue for what is practically
22. At the time of this article's publication,
expedient. (On "misology," see Phaedo 89d.) video of
Copperfield's performance 32.is available
For Plato at the
and Socrates, maintaining https://youtu.
belief that
be/70U2yybKhKg. there is a correct account of piety (or virtue, or justice, . . . )
23. Zagzebski (2012, especially
in the face of chap.
aporia is of 2) develops
paramount ethical importancea theory
on which rationality is the(see,expression
for instance, Meno 86b6-c2).of a there
Notably, natural
are many drive to
maintain psychic harmony.magicians (James Randi, Penn & Teller, and Jamy Ian Swiss,
24. Compare the Müller-Lyerfor instance)illusion,
who feel the same waywhich is "robust"
about the audience's
in the sense that knowledge of
belief that the
what they illusion
are witnessing has an explanationdoes and, not pre-
vent the lines from looking as
so, is though
"merely" a trick. That thethey
audience shouldare of different
preserve
lengths, and so, from generating a an
this belief is, for them, persistent
ethical matter. It is also, for alief
reasons to that
effect. I have discussed, an aesthetic one.
25. Thus Simon Aronson's oft-cited comment: "There
33. Not that all wisdom is non-aporetic: Socrates's "hu-
is a world of difference between a spectator's not know- man wisdom," which consists in his knowing only that he
ing how something's done versus his knowing that it can't does not know, is a form of sustained aporia (Apology 20d-
be done" (Aronson 1990, 171). See also Ortiz (2006,23b). This, I think, is a good clue to the value of magic.
32-33). 34. My thinking about magic owes a great deal to con-
26. On the nature of epistemic authority, see Zagzebski versations with Tyler Erickson and Jamy Ian Swiss, both
(2012). magnificent magicians and superb mentors in magic perfor-
27. An anonymous referee suggests that the two notions mance. For many more instructive and interesting comments
of imagination here are quite different, and even that the and conversations than I can possibly do justice to in this
experience of magic might not involve a failure of imagi- short article, I am grateful to audiences at the University
nation at all, but merely a failure to "figure out" how the of West Florida, the Society for Philosophy and Psychology,
trick is done. I am not convinced. First, I take it that our the British Society of Aesthetics, the American Society for
engagement with fiction often involves imagination in more Aesthetics, the London Aesthetics Forum, and the Univer-
than one sense, including both perception- and belief-like sity of Leeds as well as to students in my 2014 "Varieties
states. Second, I take it that when a magic spectator says, "I of Experience" seminar at Bucknell. I owe special thanks
can't imagine how that's done," this means something more to Jerrold Levinson for his insightful and extremely help-
than "I don't know how it's done"; it actually expresses ful comments on my presentation at the ASA and to the
a failure to imagine- whether in perception- or belief-like anonymous members of the 2015 Fisher Prize committee
manner- a possible method. (On varieties of imagination, for suggestions that markedly improved this article. I have
see Currie and Ravenscroft, 2003.) also learned from discussions with my dear friend and fel-
28. The most difficult audience is, naturally, a group of low philosopher-magician, Brian Hood. Finally, I am espe-
magicians, precisely because they are familiar with so many cially grateful to my friend and colleague, Sheila Lintott, for
ways in which illusions can be produced. The flip side of this first encouraging me to write about magic philosophically
is that learning how to perform magic makes the experience and for providing invaluable moral and intellectual support
of magic hard to come by. along the way.

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