DOMINGO V.

SANDIGANBAYAN

[G.R. No. 109376. January 20, 2000.]

Case Principle:

The fundamental test on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that the facts averred in the
information do not amount to an offense is whether the facts asseverated would establish the
essential elements of the crime defined in the law; Computation of prescriptive period when law
violated is a special law: if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period commences
on the day the crime was committed. However, if the violation of the special law is not known at the
time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof.

FACTS:

PNB filed a complaint against former Pres. Marcos and 2 other respondents, Domingo as past
President of PNB, was subpoenaed, but the same was returned unserved. He was impleaded and an
information for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended was filed against petitioner. The
information alleged that petitioner, being then the president of PNB, while in the performance of his
official functions and with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, conspired and confederated with
his co-accused in giving favorable loan accommodations to CDCP by facilitating the passage of PNB
Board Resolution No. 144 which caused undue injury and prejudice to PNB in the amount of US$29
Million. A petition for reinvestigation, treated as motion for reconsideration, was filed by petitioner.
The same was denied as well as his motion to quash the information. The motion was grounded on
prescription and that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an offense. Hence, the instant
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the information should be quashed (NO)

Whether the period of prescription have already lapsed (NO)

HELD:

A motion to quash on the ground that the allegations do not constitute the offense charged should be
resolved on the basis of the allegations alone whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. In
the case at bar, the facts alleged in the information constitute a violation of RA 3019 so the motion to
quash must fail.

Since the law alleged to have been violated, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the
applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Act No. 3326, as amended, which
provides that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run
on the day the crime was committed. However, if the violation of the special law is not known at the
time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof. In the case at
bar, since the anomalous transactions could only have been discovered after the EDSA revolution,
hence, the counting of the prescriptive period would commence from the date of discovery of the
offense, which could have been between February 1986 after the EDSA Revolution and 26 May 1987
when the initiatory complaint was filed. Whether the running of the prescriptive period was tolled
when DOMINGO was impleaded as an accused or when the information against him was filed with the
Sandiganbayan, is immaterial; for only about one or six years, respectively, has elapsed from the date
of the discovery of the alleged offense. Thus, the prescriptive period, whether ten years as provided in
R.A. No. 3019 or fifteen years as provided in the amendatory Act, has not yet lapsed. The motion to
quash on the ground of prescription was, therefore, correctly, denied.

Lastly, Domingo cannot validly claim that he was denied due process of law considering that one of
the principal reasons for the delay was precisely to afford him the opportunity to submit his counter-
affidavit since the first subpoena was returned unserved.