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Lochgelly Iron & Coal v.

M'Mullan [1934] AC 1
Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Co
Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562
Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman
Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd
Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146
Goldman v Hargrave
Carmarthenshire CC v Lewis
Topp v London Country Bus (South West) Ltd
Stansbie v Troman
Jebson v Ministry of Defence
Attorney General v Hartwell (British Virgin Islands) [2004]
Moy -v- Pettman Smith (a firm) and another; HL 3-Feb-2005
Hall v Simons (2000) HL
Al-Kandari V J R Brown & Co
McKay v Essex AHA (1982) CA
McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board [2000]
Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust 2001
Rees -v- Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust; HL 16-Oct-2003
Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence (1996) CA
Vowles v Evans [2003] EWCA Civ 318 (11 March 2003)
Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92
Palsgraf v Long Island Railway Co (1928) New York Appeals
Haley v London Electricity Board
Urbanski v Patel
Goodwill -v- British Pregnancy Advisory Service [1996]
Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks (1856) Exch
Glasgow Corporation v Muir (1943),
Willsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988]
Phillips v William Whiteley Ltd [1938] KBD
Shakoor v. Situ (t/a Eternal Health Co) [2000] 4 All ER 181
Nettleship v Weston [1971] 3 WLR 370
Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority
Whitehouse v. Jordan [1981] 1 All ER 267:
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 583
Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority [1997] 3 WLR 1151
Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors
Rogers v. Whitaker. Australia
Mullin v Richards [1998] 1 WLR 1304
Blake v Galloway [2004] 3 All ER 315
Mansfield v Weetabix [1997] EWCA Civ 1352
Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850
Latimer v AEC [1953] AC 643
Paris v Stepney [1951] AC 367
Watt v Hertfordshire [1954] 1 WLR 835
Read v Lyons [1947] AC 156
Roe v Minister of Health [1954] CA
Jones v Boyce (1816)
Luxmoore-May v Messenger May Baverstock (a firm) (1990) CA
Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Haynes [1959]
Scott v London and St Katherine Docks (1865) 3 H & C 596
Ng Chun Pui v Lee Chuen Tat [1988] RTR 298.
Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital [1969] 1 QB 428
Horsley v. MacLaren aka the ogopogo case 1971 (Canada)
McWilliams v Arrol [1962] HL
Chester v Afshar [2004] 3 WLR 927 House of Lords
Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] AC 750 House of Lords
Gregg v Scott
Chaplin v Hicks
Spring v. Guardian Assurance PLC.
Allied Maples v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 4 All ER 907
Cutler v Vauxhall Motors
Dillon v Twin State Gas & Electric Co (1932), 85 NH 449, 163 A 111.
Cook v Lewis, [1951] SCR 830
Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC 467
Jobling v Associated Dairies [1982] AC 794 House of Lords
Fairchild v Glenhaven [2002] 3 WLR 89 House of Lords
McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1 House of Lords
Barker v Corus, [2006] 3 All ER 785
Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613 House of Lords
Page v Smith [1996] 1 AC 155 House of Lord
Re Polemis & Furness Withy & Company Ltd. [1921] 3 KB 560
The Wagon Mound no 1 [1961] AC 388 House of Lords
Tremain v Pike [1969] 1 WLR 1556
Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837 House of Lords
Jolley v Sutton [2000] 1 WLR 1082
Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Company [1964] 1 QB 518
Smith v Leech Brain [1962] 2 QB 405
Robinson v Post Office [1974] CA
Lamb v Camden LBC [1981] 2 All ER 408 Court of Appeal
Perl (Exporters) Ltd v Camden London Borough Council (1984),
Knightley v Johns & Ors [1982] 1 WLR 349 Court of Appeal
Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360 House of Lords
McKew v Holland [1969] 3 All ER 1621
Weiland v Cyril Lord Carpets Ltd (1969)
Kirkham v CC Greater Manchester Police [1990] 2 QB 283 Court of Appeal
Pigney V Pointers Transport Services Ltd (1957)
Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd (2008) UKHL)
Carslogie Steamship Co v. Royal Norwegian Government
Prendergast v Sam & Dee Ltd., Kosary, and Miller in 1989
Jobling v Associated Dairies [1982] AC 794 House of Lords
Derry v Peek (1889) 5 T.L.R. 625
Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465
Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd
Ross v Caunters [1979] ChDiv Megarry VC
Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] HL
Simpson & Co v Thomson (1877)
Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co
Chaudhry v Prabhakar [1988] 3 All ER 718
Henderson v Merrett Syndicates [1994] HL
Lennon v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
MLC v Evatt (1968) 12 CLR 556
Esso Petroleum v Mardon [1976] QB 801
James McNaughton Paper Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co
Smith v Eric Bush [1990] 1 AC 831
White v Jones 1995
Ministry of Housing and Local Government v Sharp
Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel & Co Ltd and others
Law Society v KPMG Peat Marwick and Others
Yianni v Edwin Evans (1982) QB 438
Stevenson v Nationwide Building Society (1984) 272 EG 663
JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks, Bloom & Co [1981] 3 All ER 289
Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd (1998).
Junior Books v Veitchi (1983) HL
Muirhead v Industrial Tank Specialties Ltd and Others
Simaan General Contracting Co v Pilkington Glass Ltd
Dulieu v White [1901] 2 KB 669
McFarlane v. E.E. Caledonian Limited [1994] 2 All ER 1
White V Chief Constable Of Yorkshire Police
McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1983] 1 AC 410
Alcock v. The Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310
Greatorex v Greatorex and Others [2000] The Times LR May 5, QBD
Dooley -v- Cammell Laird and Co Ltd; 1951
Hunter v. British Coal Corporation [1998] 2 All E.R. 97
Attia v British Gas plc
Walters v North Glamorgan NHS Trust ([2002] All ER (D)7 (Dec) CA)
W v Essex County Council (1998) HL
Ferguson v John Dawson & Partners (Contractors) Ltd
Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison v. McDonald 1952
Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968]
Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Coggins & Griffiths (Liverpool) Ltd. 1947
Ormrod v. Crossville Motor Service 1953
Morgans v. Launchbury 1973 House of Lords
Century Insurance v. Northern Ireland Road Transport Board 1942 House of Lords
Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co. 1862
Warren v Henley's Ltd (1948)
Heasemans v. Clarity Cleaning 1987 Court of Appeal
Harrison v Michelin Tyre Co Ltd [1985] 1 All ER 918.
Storey v. Ashton 1869
Rose v. Plenty 1976 Court of Appeal
Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22
Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Ltd. 1957
Jones v Livox Quarries [1952] 2 QB 608 Court of Appeal
Dann v Hamilton [1939] 1 KB 509
Froom v Butcher [1976] 1 QB 286
Owens v Brimmell [1977] QBD
Harrison v British Railways Board (1981)
Moriarty v Brookes [1834] EWHC Exch J79
Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Shatwell [1965] AC 656 House of Lords
Revill v Newbery [1996] 2 WLR 239 Court of Appeal
Vellino v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2002] 1 WLR 218 Court of Appeal
Ogwo v Taylor [1987] 3 WLR 1145 House of Lords
Cunningham v Reading FC [1991] Times LR 153
Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2003] 3 WLR 705 House of Lords
Keown v Coventry Healthcare NHS Trust, CA (Civ Div) 2/2/2006
Wheat v Lacon [1966] AC 552
Holden v White [1982] 2 All ER 328 Court of Appeal
Edwards v Railways Executive [1952] AC 737 House of Lords
Lowery v Walker [1911] AC 10 House of Lords
Ferguson v Welsh [1987] 1 WLR 1553 House of Lords
Phipps v Rochester Corporation [1955] 1 QB 450
Roles v Nathan [1963] 1 WLR 1117 Court of Appeal
Salmon v Seafarer Restaurants [1983] 1WLR 1264
AMF International Ltd v Magnet Bowling Ltd (1968)
Woodward v Mayor of Hastings
Haseldine v Daw
Gwilliam v West Hertfordshire Hospital NHS Trust [2002] EWCA Civ 1041 Court of Appeal
Ashdown v Samuel Williams & Sons Ltd (1957)
Addie v Dumbreck [1929] AC 358 House of Lords
British Railways Board v Herrington [1972] AC 877 House of Lords
Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English
Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures (1934) CA
Smith v ADVFN Plc (CA)
South Hetton Coal Company vs North Eastern News Association Limited (1984).
Steel & Morris v McDonalds: Steel & Morris v United Kingdom
Goldsmith v Bhoyrul ( 1998)
Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd and others
Sim v. Stretch [1936]
Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818
Thorley v Lord Kerry
Berkoff v. Burchill
Lewis -v- Daily Telegraph Ltd [1963] 1 QB 340
Tolley v Fry
Cassidy v Daily Mirror [1929] 2 KB 331
Norman v Future Publishing
Charleston v News Group Newspapers [1995] 2 AC 65
E .Hutton and Co V Jones (1910) AC 20
Newstead v London Express Newspapers (1940)
Morgan -v- Odhams Press Ltd; HL 1971
Knupffer v London Express Newspapers [1944] AC 116,
Riches -v- News Group Newspapers Ltd [1986]
Huth v Huth [1915] 3 KB 32
Theaker v Richardson [1962] 1 WLR 151,
Slipper v British Broadcasting Corporation [1991] 1 QB 283
McManus v Beckham 2002
Alexander v North Eastern Railway (1865) 6 B&S 340
Plato Films -v- Speidel [1961]
London Artists v Littler [1962] 2 QB 375
Kemsley -v- Foot [1951] 2 KB 34
Merivale -v- Carson (1887) 20 QBD 275
Thomas v Bradbury, Agnew and Co Ltd and another [1906]
Watt v. Longsdon
Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd
Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd
Rylands v Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1 House of Lords
Rylands v Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1 House of Lords
Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan *1940+ AC 880 House of Lords
A-G v P.Y.A. Quarries Ltd. (1957)
Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264 House of Lords
The Wagon Mound no 1 [1961] AC 388 House of Lords
Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 2 AC 1 House of Lords
Hunter v Canary Wharf [1998] 1 WLR 434 House of Lords
Malone v Laskey 1907 2 KB 141
St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping *1865+ UKHL J81 House of Lords
Sturges v Bridgman [1879] 11 Ch D 852 Court of Appeal
Adams v Ursell [1913] 1 Ch 269
Miller v Jackson [1977]3 WLR 20 Court of Appeal
Heath v Mayor Brighton (1908)
Robinson v Kilvert (1889)
McKinnon Industries v Walker [1951] WN 401 Privy Council
Christie v Davey (1893) 1 Ch 316
Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468
Bradford Corporation v Pickles [1895] HL
St Anne’s Well Brewery Co v Roberts 1929
Leakey & Ors v National Trust [1980] QB 485 Court of Appeal
Tetley v Chitty 1986 1 All ER 663
Hussain v Lancaster City Council [1999] 2 WLR 1142 Court of Appeal
Lippiatt and Febry -v- South Gloucestershire County Council; CA 31-Mar-1999
Allen v Gulf Oil Refinery [1981] AC 1001 House of Lords
Bliss v Hall [1838] 4 Bing NC 183
Thorpe v Brumfitt ((1872 – 73) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 650, CA (Eng))
Giles v Walker (1890) 24 QBD 656
Rainham Chemical Works v Belvedere Fish Guano
Attorney General v Corke [1993]
Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263 Privy Council
Box v Jubb LR 4 EX Div 76
Perry v Kendricks Transport [1956] WLR 85 Court of Appeal
Nichols v Marsland (1876) 2 ExD 1
Greenock Corporation v Caledonian Railway [1917] AC 556
Tate & Lyle v Greater London Council [1983] 2 AC 509
Barker v Saint Gobain Pipelines [2004] EWCA Civ 545 Court of Apeal
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Lochgelly Iron & Coal v. M'Mullan A miner was killed when part of the coal mine that he was working in fell on top
[1934] AC 1 of him. The man's family successfully sued for damages under the Coal Mines
Act 1911 (c 50) s 49 (repealed), which required that an employer must ensure
that the roof of every coal mine is made secure and not order an employee to
work there if it is not. The coal mine owners appealed the decision, but their
appeal was dismissed as it was held that the initial action was competent as
their negligence had been proved.

Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Facts


Co Doughty was injured in his work at a factory owned by Turner when a cover
over a cauldron of molten hot liquid fell in and caused an explosion, propelling
the liquid toward him. It was not known that the cover would explode when it
fell in the liquid. Turner was found liable at trial and damages awarded, which
they appealed.

Issue
Was the specific cause of injury foreseeable?

Decision
Appeal allowed.

Reasons
Diplock states that in this case the ratio of Wagon Mound must be applied.
Although this is similar to Hughes, there is a crucial difference. In that case the
boy was injured as a result of the defendants' negligently leaving the manhole
uncovered. Although the specific injury was unforeseeable, the negligent act
directly led to it. In this case, the only duty owed to Doughty was to ensure that
he would not be injured if the top fell in the molten liquid and splashed some
over the side. This was prevented – the only reason he was injured was
because of the unforeseeable explosion. Turner did not have a duty to protect
Doughty from this, as they could not have foreseen it.

Ratio
If there is no duty owed to the plaintiff in regard to the initial action that led
consequentially to the injury, then the defendants are not liable for damages.
Anns v Merton London Borough The claimants were tenants in a block of flats. The flats suffered from
Council [1978] AC 728 structural defects due to inadequate foundations which were 2ft 6in deep
instead of 3ft deep as required. The defendant Council was responsible for
inspecting the foundations during the construction of the flats. The House of
Lords held that the defendant did owe a duty of care to ensure the foundations
were of the correct depth. Lord Wilberforce introduced a two stage test for
imposing a duty of care. This has since been overruled by Caparo v Dickman.

Lord Wilberforce's two stage test:

"in order to establish that a duty of care arises in a particular situation, it is not
necessary to bring the facts of that situation within those of previous situations
in which a duty of care has been held to exist. Rather the question has to be
approached in two stages. First one has to ask whether, as between the
alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a
sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the
reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be likely
to cause damage to the latter—in which case a prima facie duty of care arises.
Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to
consider whether there are any considerations which ought to negative, or to
reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed
or the damages to which a breach of it may give rise."

Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC Mrs Donoghue went to a cafe with a friend. The friend brought her a bottle of
562 ginger beer and an ice cream. The ginger beer came in an opaque bottle so
that the contents could not be seen. Mrs Donoghue poured half the contents of
the bottle over her ice cream and also drank some from the bottle. After eating
part of the ice cream, she then poured the remaining contents of the bottle
over the ice cream and a decomposed snail emerged from the bottle. Mrs
Donoghue suffered personal injury as a result. She commenced a claim
against the manufacturer of the ginger beer.

Held:

Her claim was successful. This case established the modern law of negligence
and established the neighbour test.

Lord Aitken:
"The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law you must not
injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question " Who is my neighbour ?"
receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or
omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your
neighbour. Who then in law is my neighbour ? The answer seems to be
persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought
reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am
directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question."
Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman Facts
A company called Fidelity plc, manufacturers of electrical equipments, was the
target of a takeover by Caparo Industries plc. Fidelity was not doing well. In
March 1984 Fidelity had issued a profit warning, which had halved its share
price. In May 1984 Fidelity's directors made a preliminary announcement in its
annual profits for the year up to March confirming the negative outlook. The
share price fell again. At this point Caparo had begun buying up shares in large
numbers. In June 1984 the annual accounts, which were done with the help of
the accountant Dickman, were issued to the shareholders, which now included
Caparo. Caparo reached a shareholding of 29.9% of the company, at which
point it made a general offer for the remaining shares, as the City Code's rules
on takeovers required. Once it had control, Caparo found that Fidelity's
accounts were in an even worse state than had been revealed by the directors
or the auditors. It sued Dickman for negligence in preparing the accounts and
sought to recover its losses.

Issue
What test should be employed in determining negligence?

Decision
The majority of the Court of Appeal (Bingham LJ and Taylor LJ, O'Connor LJ
dissenting) held that a duty was owed by the auditor to shareholders
individually, and although it was not necessary to decide that in this case and
the judgment was obiter, that a duty would not be owed to an outside investor
who had no shareholding. Bingham LJ held that, for a duty owed to
shareholders directly, the very purpose of publishing accounts was to inform
investors so that they could make choices within a company about how to use
their shares. But for outside investors, a relationship of proximity would be
"tenuous" at best, and that it would certainly not be "fair, just and reasonable".
Appeal allowed.

Reasons
Bridge of Harwich, writing for a unanimous court, states that the two part test
Smith v Littlewoods Organisation he defendant owned a disused cinema which they purchased with the intention
Ltd of demolishing it and replacing it with a supermarket. The cinema was last
used on 29th May 1976. Littlewoods acquired the building on 31st May 1976.
Contractors were present at the cinema until 21st June and thereafter the
cinema was empty until the incident on 5th July 1976. The contractors had left
the building secure, however, vandals had broke into the building. Littlewoods
had not been informed of this and so the building remained unsecured. There
was evidence to suggest that further entry by vandals had occurred over the
couple of weeks. The fittings inside the building were damaged and debris was
thrown. On one occasion a sink had been removed and thrown onto the roof of
a billiard hall. There were also two small incidents involving fire. None of this
was reported to the police or Littlewoods. On July 5th the vandals broke into
the cinema and set fire to it. The fire spread and caused damage to
neighbouring properties. The owners of the properties brought an action in
negligence claiming that Littlewoods owed them a duty of care to prevent the
actions of the vandals.

Held:

Littlewoods were not liable. Whilst they did owe a duty of care they were not in
breach of duty. They were not required to provide 24 hour surveillance and
were unaware of the previous incidents. The law is unwilling to impose liability
for the deliberate act of a third party see Lamb v Camden London Borough
Council [1981] QB 625 but will do so in appropriate cases (Dorset Yacht v
Home Office [1970] AC 1004). The general rule relating to omissions is that no
liability arises for a pure omissions but there exist exceptions to this where
there is a special relationship, an assumption of responsibility, where the
defendant is in control of a 3rd party that causes the damage, where the
defendant is in control of land or dangerous thing.

Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Some young offenders were doing some supervised work on Brown Sea Island
Ltd under the Borstal regime. One night the Borstal officers retired for the evening
leaving the boys unsupervised. Seven of them escaped and stole a boat which
collided with a Yacht owned by the claimant.

Held:

The Home Office owed a duty of care for their omission as they were in a
position of control over the 3rd party who caused the damage and it was
foreseeable that harm would result from their inaction.
Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB The Defendant left a horse-drawn van unattended in a crowded street. The
146 horses
bolted when a boy threw a stone at them. A police officer tried to stop the
horses to save a woman and children who were in the path of the bolting
horses. The police officer was injured. It was held that the Defendant owed a
duty of care as he had created a source of danger by leaving his horses
unattended in a busy street
Goldman v Hargrave A 100 foot red gum tree on the defendant‘s land was struck by lightning and
caught fire. The following morning the defendant contacted a tree feller to cut
down the tree saw it into sections. The wood was still smouldering and the
defendant failed to douse it with water to eliminate the risk of fire. Over the next
few days the weather became very hot and reignited the fire which spread to
neighbouring property.

Held:
The defendant was liable for the naturally occurring danger that arose on his
land as he was aware of the danger and failed to act with reasonable prudence
to remove the hazard.
Carmarthenshire CC v Lewis [Tort – negligence - duty of care - public policy – duty owed in operational
matters]
D a Local Authority employed a teacher who left a 4-year-old child alone for
about ten minutes while she did other things. The child left the classroom onto
a busy road, where he caused a lorry driver to swerve and collide with a
telegraph pole. The lorry driver was killed and his widow sued the education
authority.

Held: The education authority had taken charge of the child and had a duty to
take reasonable care to prevent him from causing harm to others.

C won.

Topp v London Country Bus [Tort - negligence - duty of care - omissions - actions of third parties]
(South West) Ltd
D, a bus company left a mini-bus parked in a public place with the keys in the
ignition, the bus was stolen, and, in the course of the theft, was involved in an
accident in which a woman cyclist was killed. C, her husband (and daughter)
brought an action against the bus company for negligence. The vehicle was left
at a changeover point that normally took 8 minutes, on this occasion it rested
there for nine hours.

Held: The bus company may have been negligent to leave the bus with the
keys in, in an easily accessible place, they could not be held responsible for
the accident as it had occurred through the voluntary act of a third party over
whom they had no control

C lost
Stansbie v Troman [Tort - negligence - duty of care - created by contract]
D decorator was left alone on the premises by the householder's wife. During
her absence, he left the house to obtain wall-paper. He failed to secure the
behind him. During the his absence a thief entered the house and stole
property.

Held:

1. A duty of care was created by the contractual relationship.


2. It was a breach of that duty to leave the front door insecure
3. As a direct result of that breach of duty that the theft occurred.

C won
Jebson v Ministry of Defence The claimant, a soldier, suffered severe injuries after a night out drinking
organised by the MOD. The claimant was transported with 19 other soldiers in
the back of an army vehicle with a canvass roof. On the return journey the
claimant and other soldiers were very drunk. The senior officer travelled in the
front of the vehicle and was unable to see what was going on in the back of the
vehicle. The claimant climbed on to the tailgate and attempted to climb on to
the roof. He fell and was struck by a lorry. The trial judge held that whilst it was
foreseeable that an injury may occur by high spirits and stumbling inside the
vehicle it was not foreseeable the claimant would attempt to climb on the roof
and therefore the damage was too remote as it had not occurred in a
foreseeable manner.

Held:

It was foreseeable that injury (whether slight or serious) would occur as a result
of the drunken and rowdy behaviour of the passengers, including the danger
that someone would fall from the vehicle as a result, such wider risk being apt
to include within its description the accident which actually happened.

Attorney General v Hartwell


(British Virgin Islands) [2004] PC Laurent was the sole police officer stationed on the island of Jost Van
Dyke,a small island with a population of about 135 people in the British Virgin
Islands. Laurent was still on probation and was subject to daily supervisory
visits by a police sergeant from a nearby larger island. As the sole officer, PC
Laurent had a key to the police station's strongbox which contained a gun. One
night he took the gun and went to a restaurant where his wife was associating
with another man (the Claimant). He then fired four shots injuring the two in
addition to a tourist in the restaurant. The claimant brought an action against
the police for allowing a probationary officer to have access to a gun.

Held:

A duty of care is owed by the police authorities in entrusting officers with guns.

Lord Nicholls:
"In the view of their Lordships the appropriate analysis is that when entrusting a
police officer with a gun the police authorities owe to the public at large a duty
to take reasonable care to see the officer is a suitable person to be entrusted
with such a dangerous weapon lest by any misuse of it he inflicts personal
injury, whether accidentally or intentionally, on other persons. For this purpose
no distinction is to be drawn between personal injuries inflicted in the course of
police duties and personal injuries inflicted by a police officer using a police
gun for his own ends. If this duty seems far-reaching in its scope it must be
remembered that guns are dangerous weapons. The wide reach of the duty is
proportionate to the gravity of the risks."
Moy -v- Pettman Smith (a firm) Damages were claimed against a barrister for advice on a settlement given at
and another; HL 3-Feb-2005 the door of the court. After substantial litigation, made considerably more
difficult by the negligence of the solicitors, the barrister had not advised the
claimant at the door of the court to accept an offer. The claimant was not
advised as to potential difficulties in having essential evidence admitted, and
the evidence was not admitted, and a much lower sum was received. The
court of appeal had found the advice itself not to be negligent, but that she
should have given the client more detailed advice.

Held: The question whether her advice was negligent has to be judged in the
light of the choices that were available in the light of her assessment. She had
to balance the possibility of her client‘s desire to achieve a full settlement
against the loss of a chance to sue the solicitors for negligence. ‗it is the
substance of the advice, not the precise wording used to convey it, that needs
to be examined in order to judge whether it was negligent. The significance of
Miss Perry‘s failure to tell Mr Moy that the prospects of getting the evidence in
were 50/50 has to be measured against what she did tell him, which was that
she was hopeful that the judge would admit the evidence‘. The court of appeal
had been wrong to disturb the finding that the barrister had not been negligent:
‗it was not incumbent upon the appellant to spell out all her reasoning, so she
was not in breach of her duty of care to the claimant in the advice which she
gave. ‗ As to the right of the solictors to appeal: ‗section 1(5) of the 1978 Act
should be so construed as not to bar an appeal in a case such as the present.
This could be done in either or both of two ways. One could construe the word
‗judgment‘ as referring to a final judgment after any appeals have been
determined, rather than the judgment at first instance of the trial judge; or one
could confine the operation of the subsection to actions for contribution
subsequently brought, so excluding further proceedings by way of appeal in the
original action. Whichever construction one adopts, I consider that the
solicitors‘ right of appeal to the Court of Appeal was not barred by the operation
of section 1(5)‘

Hall v Simons (2000) HL ^[Tort - negligence – duty – no duty situations - breach - professionals
immunity – advocates – not a special case]
One of several cases (conjoined cases) on similar issues, where claimants had
done less well than they would but for negligence of their legal advisers.

Held: It was no longer in the public interest that advocates should enjoy
immunity from being sued for negligent acts concerned with the conduct of
litigation whether in civil or criminal proceedings.

Change of rule on lawyers‘ immunity

Al-Kandari V J R Brown & Co Recognized the duty of a lawyer towards 3rd arty only because the lawyers
byundertaking to keep the Client's passport with them had assumed the
responsibility to make sure that harm did not come to the 3rd party. Since the
client had somehow obtained the passport the lawyers had breached this
assumed duty towards the 3rd party
McKay v Essex AHA (1982) CA ^[Tort - negligence - duty of care - public policy - wrongful birth creates no
cause of action]
DD, the doctors who did not advise a mother to have an abortion. C was born
disabled as a result of an infection of rubella (German measles) suffered by
her mother while the child was in her womb.

The child claimed damages on the ground that she had been "suffered entry
into a life in which her injuries are highly debilitating," and for distress, loss and
damage.

Held: There is no claim in law which allows a child born alive with deformities
to claim damages for negligence against doctors in allowing it to be born alive.

The doctor was under no legal obligation under the Abortion Act 1967 to the
foetus to terminate its life, and the child's claim was contrary to public policy as
a violation of the sanctity of human life, and a claim which could not be
recognised since the court could not evaluate damages for the denial of non-
existence

The effect of the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 was that no
child born after the passing of the Act could have a cause of action based on
the loss of a chance to die.

C lost

McFarlane v. Tayside Health A father, wishing to limit the size of his family to six children, underwent a
Board [2000] vasectomy. Months later his surgeon confirmed the success of the operation
and that he need not use contraception. The man subsequently made his wife
pregnant and the family sought damages from the Health Board for the costs
of raising the child. Held, the vasectomy was intended to stop pregnancy and
therefore the mother could claim for costs in that regard only. However, the
costs around raising the child could not be recovered as it would not be fair just
or reasonable to impose such a burden on a liability for financial loss on a
doctor.
(This is a case where a healthy child was born due to failed sterilization)

Parkinson v St James and (This is a case where a disabled child was born as a result of a failed
Seacroft University Hospital NHS sterilization)
Trust 2001 FACTS:-
The Claimant underwent a sterilisation procedure, but this was unsuccessful
and she conceived a fifth child, with severe learning difficulties. She brought a
claim against the health authority and the matter came before the Court of
Appeal.
JUDGMENT:-
The courts awarded her "all costs that she would incur which were attributable
to the child‘s disabilities." A healthy mother who gave birth to a severely
disabled child after a negligently performed sterilisation could not claim the
whole cost of bringing up the child but that she could recover the additional
costs resulting from the child‘s disability.
Rees -v- Darlington Memorial The claimant was disabled, and sought sterilisation because she feared the
Hospital NHS Trust; HL 16-Oct- additional difficulties she would face as a mother. The sterilisation failed. She
2003 sought damages.
Held: Any disabled woman who gives birth to a normal, healthy child after a
negligently performed sterilisation operation is not entitled to sue for the extra
childcare costs she incurs because of her disability, the House of Lords ruled
last week. However there should be a standardised award, set at £15.000. No
damages should be awarded for the extra costs of parenthood arising from a
mother‘s own disability.
Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence [Tort – negligence - duty of care - no duty situations - just fair and reasonable -
(1996) CA public policy – employers‘ liability]
D, responsible for the army and therefore its soldiers, employed a gun
commander during the Gulf War. C an artilleryman sustained damage to his
hearing when a howitzer was fired accidentally.

Held: A serviceman owes no duty of care to his fellow servicemen in battle


conditions, since as a matter of common sense and public policy it would not
be fair, just and reasonable to impose such a duty. For the same reason the
Ministry of Defence as C‘s employer does not have a duty to provide a safe
system of work in those circumstances.

C lost
Vowles v Evans [2003] EWCA Civ A referee of an adult rugby match was held liable for injuries suffered by
318 (11 March 2003) players during the course of the match. The court found that Rugby was a
dangerous game and found that the safety of the players relied on the due
enforcement of the rules. The referee owed a duty of care to all players in the
match. The referee had failed to comply with particular rules and this was
found to be the cause of the Defendant‘s injuries,.
Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92 The claimant was a pregnant fishwife. She got off a tram and as she reached
to get her basket off the tram, the defendant drove his motorcycle past the
tram at excessive speed and collided with a car 50 feet away from where the
claimant was standing. The defendant was killed by the impact. The claimant
heard the collusion but did not see it. A short time later, the claimant walked
past where the incident occurred. The body had been removed but there was a
lot of blood on the road. The claimant went into shock and her baby was still
born. She brought a negligence claim against the defendant's estate.

Held:

No duty of care was owed by the defendant to the claimant. There was not
sufficient proximity between the claimant and defendant when the incident
occurred.

Palsgraf v Long Island Railway Co [Tort – negligence - duty of care – to whom owed - foreseeability of damage]
(1928) New York Appeals D employed a railway worker who carelessly knocked a box to the ground.
Unknown to him it contained fireworks which exploded on impact; the blast
knocked a weighing machine onto C standing some distance away.

Held: injury to C was not foreseeable from the mere dropping of a box, and D
was not liable for C‘s injuries.

C lost
Haley v London Electricity Board Some workmen were digging a trench in a pavement. They went off to lunch.
They had nothing to fence of the trench so they left a shovel and pick at one
end and a punner at the other end to warn pedestrians. The claimant, a blind
man, tripped on the punner and fell hitting his head. As a result of the fall he
became deaf. The defendant argued they had done all that was necessary to
warn an ordinary person of the danger and there was no need to take extra
precautions for blind persons as it was not foreseeable that a blind person
would be walking unaided down that street.

Held:

The defendant was in breach of duty. It was foreseeable that a blind person
might walk down the street and they should be given appropriate protection

Urbanski v Patel Facts


Patel, a surgeon, removed the only kidney of Shirley Firman believing that it
was an ovarian cyst. As a result, she had to be placed on dialysis until she
could find a kidney. Urbanski, Shirley's father, tried to donate his kidney to her,
but it was rejected. Urbanski brought an action for the losses he experienced
from the removal of his kidney.

Issue
Is donating a kidney a reasonable action attempting to protect his daughter
from the harms of the doctor's negligence?

Decision
Judgment for the plaintiffs.

Reasons
Wilson found that in the medical world, the donating of a kidney is accepted as
a usual solution to a problem of this type. As a result, Urbanski was acting
perfectly reasonably. This case, therefore, follows the ratio of Haynes v
Harwood and Urbanski was entitled to recover.
Goodwill -v- British Pregnancy Professional Negligence, Health Professions
Advisory Service [1996] The doctor executed a vasectomy, and advised the plaintiff that he need no
longer take contraceptive precautions. Held: No duty fell on a doctor to advise
on the possibility of the failure of a vasectomy toward possible future sexual
partners of the subject of the operation. The law could not extend a duty to a
possible future partner. That was a tenuous relationship.

Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Defendants had installed water mains along the street with hydrants located at
(1856) Exch various points. One of the hydrants across from Plaintiff‘s house developed a
leak as a result of exceedingly cold temperatures and caused water damage to
the house. Plaintiff sued for negligence.

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided


upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do. The defendants might have been liable for negligence, if,
unintentionally, they omitted to do that which a reasonable person would have
done, or did that which a person taking reasonable precautions would not have
done.
Glasgow Corporation v Muir A group of children were having a day out with their Sunday school. They were
(1943), meant to be having a picnic, but the rain had ruined it. The leader of the trip
asked the manager of a tearoom, run by Glasgow Corporation, if she would
allow the children to have their picnic on their premises. She agreed and the
group entered. In the tearoom there was a tuck shop, the window to which was
located midway along a corridor. The children had all started to line up along
the corridor to buy sweets at the tuck shop. At this time a large tea urn was
being carried along the corridor by two adults, to the main room of the tearoom.
Somehow, and it is still unknown how, the tea urn overturned and scalded a
young girl (Muir).
The parents of the girl sued Glasgow Corporation, claiming that they owed the
child a duty of care and that they had breached this.

The court held that the manageress in charge owed a duty of care, generally,
to everyone in the tearoom. However, she did not owe a duty of care to the
Sunday school, to take additional precautions to prevent their being injured as
a result of her allowing them to enter. So long as the tearoom was run in the
same manner as it was day to day, and to the same safety standards, she was
not required to take extra steps to prevent the incident which occurred. It was
not reasonably foreseeable that allowing the children to come into the
premises would result in one of them being scalded. As such, the incident was
put down as an accident which could not have been prevented. The
reasonable man is presumed to be free both from over-apprehension and from
over-confidence, i.e., The reasonable man has been described as ‗the ―man on
the street‖ or ―the man on the Clapham omnibus‖

Willsher v Essex Area Health A premature baby was given too much oxygen by a junior doctor. The baby
Authority [1988] suffered from a condition affecting his retina which left him totally blind in one
eye and partially sighted in the other. The condition could have been caused by
the excess oxygen he had been exposed to or it could have been caused by
four other factors unrelated to the oxygen, but related to the premature birth.
The trial judge found the Health Athority liable. He applied McGhee v NCB but
stated that McGhee had reversed the burden of proof where there was more
than one possible causes. The Health Authority appealed.

Held:

Appeal allowed.
The defendant was in breach of duty. A junior doctor owes the same standard
of care as a qualified doctor. McGhee did not reverse the burden of proof
which always remains on the claimant.

Phillips v William Whiteley Ltd ^[Tort – negligence - breach - standards of professionals]


[1938] KBD D (a jeweller), employed a man to pierce C‘s ears, two weeks later she
developed an infection that caused an abscess on her neck that required
surgical draining.

Held: A jeweller is not bound to take the same precautions as a surgeon would
take, and D had taken all reasonable precautions. C was unable to prove that
the operation was negligently performed, and that the abscess which formed in
her neck was due to the negligence.

C lost
Shakoor v. Situ (t/a Eternal Health Mr Abdul Shakoor went to a Nottingham based Chinese herbalist, which traded
Co) [2000] 4 All ER 181 as the "Eternal Health Co."[1] Mr Kang Situ, who ran the herbalist had trained
for five years in China, gaining both a traditional "medicine" and "modern"
medical qualifications. His grade was "excellent". He had no British
professional medical qualifications. In November 1994, Mr Situ prescribed a
course of Chinese herbal remedies for Mr Shakoor's benign lipomata, a skin
condition, which produces fatty tissue that lies just below the skin, but causes
no risk to health. There is no treatment in the UK, except surgical removal. Mr
Shakoor was given a mix of twelve herbs in ten sachets which were to be
taken on alternate days after a meal. After nine doses Mr Shakoor got ill,
nauseous, his eyes went yellow and he suffered heartburn. He vomited, and
had abdominal pain. He went to hospital, and was diagnosed as having
"probably hepatitis A". His liver failed, he had hepatic necrosis. He had an
operation, but he died in January 1995. In the post-mortem, his liver was found
to contain Bai Xian Pi, or dictamnus dasycarpus, which some evidence
suggested could be hepatotoxic.

A practitioner of traditional Chinese herbal medicine did not have to meet the
standard of skill and care of a reasonably competent practitioner of orthodox
medicine, but he did have to take account of relevant reports in orthodox
medical journals. In this case the prescription had not been inappropriate for a
reasonable herbalist, and accordingly Mr Situ of the Eternal Health Co. was not
liable for the death of Mr Shakoor.

Nettleship v Weston [1971] 3 The defendant was a learner driver. She was taking lessons from a friend. The
WLR 370 friend checked that the defendant's insurance covered her for passengers
before agreeing to go out with her. On one of the lessons Mrs Weston turned a
bend, Mr Nettleship told her to straighten the wheel but Mrs Weston panicked
and failed to straighten the wheel. She approached the pavement and Mr
Nettleship grabbed the handbrake and tried to straighten the wheel but it was
too late. She mounted the pavement and hit a lamp post. Mr Nettleship
fractured his knee. The defendant argued that the standard of care should be
lowered for learner drivers and she also raised the defence of volenti non fit
injuria in that in agreeing to get in the car knowing she was a learner, he had
voluntarily accepted the risk.

Held:

A learner driver is expected to meet the same standard as a reasonable


qualified competent driver. Volenti did not apply as he had checked the
insurance cover which demonstrated he did not waive any rights to
compensation. His damages were reduced by 50% under the Law Reform
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 to reflect the degree to which he was also
at fault.
Maynard v West Midlands The patient presented with symptoms of tuberculosis but both the consultant
Regional Health Authority physician and the consultant surgeon took the view that Hodgkin's disease,
carcinoma, and sarcoidosis were also possibilities, the first of which if present
would have required remedial steps to be taken in its early stages. Instead of
waiting for the results of the sputum tests, the consultants carried out a
mediastinoscopy to get a biopsy. The inherent risk of damage was to the left
laryngeal recurrent nerve, even if the operation was properly done. In the
event, only tuberculosis was confirmed. Unfortunately, the risk became a
reality and the patient suffered a paralysis of the left vocal cord. The decision
of the physician and the surgeon to proceed was said by their expert peers to
be reasonable in all the circumstances. A court may prefer one body of opinion
to the other but that is no basis for a conclusion of negligence.

Whitehouse v. Jordan [1981] 1 All The claimant was a baby who suffered severe brain damage after a difficult
ER 267: birth. The defendant, a senior hospital registrar, was supervising delivery in a
high-risk pregnancy. After the mother had been in labour for 22 hours, the
defendant used forceps to assist the delivery. The Lords found that the doctor's
standard of care did not fall below that of a reasonable doctor in the
circumstances and so the baby was awarded no compensation.

Bolam v Friern Hospital The claimant was undergoing electro convulsive therapy as treatment for his
Management Committee [1957] 1 mental illness. The doctor did not give any relaxant drugs and the claimant
WLR 583 suffered a serious fracture. There was divided opinion amongst professionals
as to whether relaxant drugs should be given. If they are given there is a very
small risk of death, if they are not given there is a small risk of fractures. The
claimant argued that the doctor was in breach of duty by not using the relaxant
drug.

Held:
The doctor was not in breach of duty. The House of Lords formulated the
Bolam test:

"a medical professional is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in


accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of
medical men skilled in that particular art . . . Putting it the other way round, a
man is not negligent, if he is acting in accordance with such a practice, merely
because there is a body of opinion who would take a contrary view."

Bolitho v City & Hackney Health A 2 year old child was admitted to hospital suffering from breathing difficulties.
Authority [1997] 3 WLR 1151 A doctor was summoned but did not attend as her bleep was not working due
to low battery. The child died. The child's mother brought an action claiming
that the doctor should have attended and intubated the child which would have
saved the child's life. The doctor gave evidence that had she attended she
would not have intubated. Another doctor gave evidence that they would not
have intubated. The trial judge applied the Bolam test and held that there was
no breach of duty. The claimant appealed.

Held:
In applying the Bolam test where evidence is given that other practitioners
would have adopted the method employed by the defendant, it must be
demonstrated that the method was based on logic and was defensible.
Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital The claimant suffered from pain in her neck, right shoulder, and arms. Her
Governors neurosurgeon took her consent for cervical cord decompression, but did not
include in his explanation the fact that in less than 1% of the cases, the said
decompression caused paraplegia. She developed paraplegia after the spinal
operation. Rejecting her claim for damages, the court held that consent did not
require an elaborate explanation of remote side effects. In dissent, Lord
Scarman said that the Bolam test should not apply to the issue of informed
consent and that a doctor should have a duty to tell the patient of the inherent
and material risk of the treatment proposed.

Rogers v. Whitaker. Australia The High Court of Australia affirmed the Supreme Court of New South Wales'
determination that a doctor has a duty to warn a patient of any material risk
involved in a proposed treatment. A risk is considered material if a reasonable
person in similar circumstances would attach significance to the risk, or if the
doctor is, or should be, cognizant that the particular patient would express
concern about the risk. The trial court overruled the precept that a doctor could
not be found negligent in warning a patient if the doctor acted within the
purview of common practice, even though other practitioners may follow
different procedures and regardless of the particular patient's concerns. In this
case, Maree Whitaker became essentially blind after an unsucessful operation
on her right eye caused sympathetic ophthalmia in her left eye. Although there
was no question that the surgery had been performed with the requisite skill
and care, Ms. Whitaker petitioned the court for relief due to the failure of the
ophthalmologist, Dr. Christopher Rogers, to warn her of the possibility
(approximately 1 in 14,000) that the sympathetic ophthalmia condition could
develop. The trial court's award of damages was affirmed because, in spite of
Ms. Whitaker's expressed specific concern that her "good eye" not be harmed,
Dr. Rogers did not inform her of the potential risks associated with the surgery.

Mullin v Richards [1998] 1 WLR Two 15 year old school girls were fighting with plastic rulers. A ruler snapped
1304 and a splinter went into one of the girls eyes causing blindness. The girl
brought an action against the other girl for her negligent action.

Held:
The girl was only expected to meet the standard of a reasonable 15 year old
school girl not that of a reasonable man. She was found not to be in breach of
duty.
Blake v Galloway [2004] 3 All ER The claimant, a 15 year old boy, was out with four of his friends including the
315 defendant. The boys started throwing pieces of bark chippings and twigs at
each other. The claimant did not join in at first but then threw a piece of bark
chipping at the defendant hitting him in the leg. The defendant picked it up and
threw it back at the claimant. The piece of bark struck the claimant's eye
resulting in serious injury. The claimant brought an action contending that the
injury was caused by the battery and or negligence of the defendant. The
defendant raised volenti non fit injuria. The trial judge rejected the defence of
volenti but held that the damages should be reduced by 50% under the Law
Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. The defendant appealed
contending that there was no breach of duty and that the judge was wrong to
reject the defence of volenti.

Held:
Appeal allowed. In the context of 'horseplay' there is a breach of the duty of
care only where the defendant's conduct amounts to recklessness or a very
high degree of carelessness. The defendant had consented to the risk of injury
occurring within the conventions and understanding of the game.

Lord Justice Dyson:


"If the defendant in the present case had departed from the tacit
understandings or conventions of the play and, for example, had thrown a
stone at the claimant, or deliberately aimed the piece of bark at the claimant's
head, then there might have been a breach of the duty of care. But what
happened here was, at its highest, "an error of judgment or lapse of skill" (to
quote from Diplock LJ), and that is not sufficient to amount to a failure to take
reasonable care in the circumstances of horseplay such as that in which these
youths were engaged. In my view, the defendant's conduct came nowhere
near recklessness or a very high degree of carelessness."

The game was played on the basis that the objects were thrown at no
particular part of the body. It follows that an object thrown in the general
Mansfield v Weetabix [1997] direction of a participant,
The defendant without
drove his lorry intonegligence and without
a shop owned intent to cause
by the claimant. injury,
At the time of
EWCA Civ 1352 the incident the defendant was had a malignant insulinoma which resulted in
him being in a hyperglycaemic state although he was unaware of this. On the
day of the crash he had also been involved in two minor incidents.

Held:
The defendant was not in breach of duty

Leggatt LJ
"In my judgment the standard of care that Mr Tarleton was obliged to show in
these circumstances was that which is to be expected of a reasonably
competent driver unaware that he is or may be suffering from a condition that
impairs his ability to drive. To apply an objective standard in a way that did not
take account of Mr Tarleton‘s condition would be to impose strict liability. But
that is not the law."
Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850 Miss Stone was injured when she was struck by a cricket ball outside her
home. She brought an action against the cricket club in nuisance and
negligence. The cricket field was surrounded by a 7 foot fence. The pitch was
sunk ten feet below ground so the fence was 17 feet above the cricket pitch.
The distance from the striker to the fence was about 78 yards and just under
100 yards from where the claimant was standing. A witness who lived in the
same road as the claimant but close to pitch said that five or six times during
the last 30 years he had known balls hit his house or come into the yard. Two
members of the Club, of over 30 years' standing, agreed that the hit was
altogether exceptional to anything previously seen on that ground.

Held:
No breach of duty. The likelihood of harm was low the defendant had taken all
practical precautions in the circumstances. The cricket ground had been there
for 90 years without injury and provided a useful service for the community.

Latimer v AEC [1953] AC 643 The claimant worked in the defendant's factory and slipped up on the factory
floor. The factory had become flooded due to adverse weather conditions. The
defendant's had put up warning signs mopped up and placed sawdust in the
most used places to make it as safe as possible. The trial judge held that there
had been a breach of duty as the defendants should have closed the factory if
it was unnsafe. However, no argument had been advanced on this.

Held:
There was no breach of duty. There was no duty to close the factory. The
defendant only had to take reasonable precautions to minimise the risk which
they had done. There was no need to go to great expense to eliminate any
possible risk and thus no obligation to close the factory.

Paris v Stepney [1951] AC 367 The claimant only had sight in one eye due to in injury sustained in the war.
During the course of his employment as a garage hand, a splinter of metal
went into his sighted eye causing him to become completely blind. The
employer did not provide safety goggles to workers engaged in the type of
work the claimant was undertaking. The defendant argued there was no
breach of duty as they did not provide goggles to workers with vision in both
eyes and it was not standard practice to do so. There was therefore no
obligation to provide the claimant with goggles.

Held:
There was a breach of duty. The employer should have provided goggles to
the claimant because the seriousness of harm to him would have been greater
than that experienced by workers with sight in both eyes. The duty is owed to
the particular claimant not to a class of persons of reasonable workers.
Watt v Hertfordshire [1954] 1 The claimant was a fireman. A woman had been involved in a traffic accident
WLR 835 and was trapped underneath a lorry. This was 200-300 yards away from the
fire station. The fire services were called to release the woman. They needed
to transport a heavy lorry jack to the scene of the accident. The jack could not
go on the fire engine and the normal vehicle for carrying the jack was not
available. The fire chief ordered the claimant and other firemen to lift the jack
on to the back of a truck. There was no means for securing the jack on the
truck and the firemen were instructed to hold it on the short journey. In the
event the truck braked and the jack fell onto the claimant's leg causing severe
injuries.

Held:
There was no breach of duty. The emergency of the situation and utility of the
defendant's conduct in saving a life outweighed the need to take precautions.

Read v Lyons [1947] AC 156 The claimant was employed by the defendant in their factory which made
explosives for the Ministry of Supply. During the course of her employment an
explosion occurred which killed a man and injured others including the
claimant. There was no evidence that negligence had caused the explosion. At
trial the judge held that the case was governed by the rule in Rylands v
Fletcher and liability was therefore strict. The Court of Appeal reversed this
decision as the rule in Rylands v Fletcher required an escape of the hazardous
matter. The claimant appealed. The House of Lords dismissed the appeal. In
the absence of any proof of negligence on behalf of the defendant or an
escape of dangerous thing, there was no cause of action on which the claimant
could succeed.

Roe v Minister of Health [1954] [Tort – negligence - duty of care - foreseeability of harm]
CA A spinal anaesthetic had become contaminated through invisible cracks in the
glass vial, when used, paralysed two patients.

Held: The cracks were not foreseeable given the scientific knowledge of the
time, The foreseeability of harm is clearly a major factor in determining how a
reasonable person would act, and although actual foresight by D is generally
irrelevant, a reasonable person would not have taken precautions against a
risk of which reasonable people in that profession were not aware.

D not liable.

Jones v Boyce (1816) The plaintiffs was a passenger on the top of the defendant's coach. Due to the
breaking of a defective rein the coach was in danger of overturning. The
plaintiff therefore jumped from the coach and broke his leg. In the event the
coach was not upset.

Held The plaintiff was successful i claiming for his injuries caused by the
negligence of the defendant who allowed the defective rein t be used. The
plaintiff was said to have acted as a reasonable and prudent person although
he had selected the more dangerous of the two alternatives i.e. to jump form
the coach instead of staying where he was. He was entitled to do so in the
agony of the moment and was able to recover damages.

Luxmoore-May v Messenger May D valued two Stubbs paintings at £30; they eventually sold at auction for
Baverstock (a firm) (1990) CA £88,000. Valuation of a picture of was not an exact science and in deciding
not to attribute the picture to a particular artist a valuer was not necessarily
guilty of professional negligence
Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd v a thirty-eight year old who had been a moulder all his working life was casting
Haynes [1959] moulding boxes, the ladle of molten metal which he was holding slipped, and
some of the metal splashed on to his left foot and, as he was not wearing
protective spats or special boots, his foot was injured. He lost because he was
experienced and should have guarded against the danger.

Scott v London and St Katherine This was an appeal against the decision of the Court of Exchequer in making
Docks (1865) 3 H & C 596 absolute a rule to set aside the verdict for the defendants and for a new trial.
The defendants were in possession of a warehouse, and were operating a
certain crane or machine for lowering goods at the time of the accident. The
Defendants and their servants were lowering the crane or machine, with bags
of sugar onto the stone pavement in the Docks at St Katherines at the time of
the accident.
The Claimant, an officer of the Customs could not find who he was looking for,
so made inquiries and was told he was in a warehouse, which was pointed out
to him. When passing lawfully from the doorway of one warehouse to the
other, he fell to the ground as six bags of sugar which were being lowered to
the ground from the upper part of the warehouse by the crane fell on him. The
Claimant said that he had no warning, and there was no fence or barrier to
show persons that the place was dangerous, and nobody called out to him to
stop him from going through the door or under the hoist. He also said that
instantly before the bags fell he ―heard the rattling of a chain
The Defendant‘s pleaded not guilty.
The learned Judge found that there was not sufficient evidence of negligence
on the part of the Defendants to entitle him to leave the case to the jury. His
Lordship then directed the jury to find verdict for the Defendants.

Erle , C. J held that the majority of the Court came to the following conclusions.
―There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But where the thing is
shown to be under the management of the Defendant or his servants, and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from
want of care.‖
The judges all agreed to the principles laid down in the cases cited for the
Defendants although the judgment turned on the construction to be put on the
Judge‘s notes. Erle CJ and Mellor found that they could not find reasonable
evidence of negligence which has been apparent to the rest of the Court.
The judgment of the Court was affirmed, and the case was ordered to go to a
Ng Chun Pui v Lee Chuen Tat The first defendant was driving a coach owned by the second defendant
[1988] RTR 298. westwards in the outer lane of a dual carriageway in Hong Kong. Suddenly the
coach crossed the central reservation and collided with a public light bus
travelling in the inner lane of the eastbound carriageway. One passenger in the
bus was killed, and the driver and three other passengers were injured. The
plaintiffs, who were those injured and the personal representatives of the
deceased, commenced against the defendants an action claiming damages for
negligence. At the trial the plaintiffs did not call oral evidence and relied on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, contending that the fact of the accident alone was
sufficient evidence of negligence by the first defendant. The defendants called
evidence which established that an untraced car being driven in the inner lane
of the westbound carriageway had cut into the outer lane in front of the coach,
and to avoid hitting the car the first defendant had braked and swerved to the
right whereupon the coach had skidded across colliding with the bus. The
judge gave judgment for the plaintiffs on liability holding that the defendants
had failed to discharge the burden of disproving negligence. On appeal the
Court of Appeal of Hong Kong reversed that decision and found that the
plaintiffs had failed to prove negligence. On appeal to the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council:

Held, that it was misleading to talk of the burden of proof shifting to the
defendant in a res ipsa loquitur situation because the burden of proving
negligence rested throughout the case on the plaintiff (p 300L); that in an
appropriate case the plaintiff established a prima facie case by relying upon the
fact of the accident and if the defendant adduced no evidence there was
nothing to rebut the inference of negligence and the plaintiff would have proved
his case, but if the defendant did adduce evidence that evidence had to be
evaluated to see if it was still reasonable to draw the inference of negligence
from the mere fact of the accident (p 301D); that the judge had mislead himself
by assuming that there was a legal burden on the defendants to disprove
negligence and he had also failed to give effect to those authorities which
established that a defendant placed in a position of peril and emergency had
Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington not to be judged
Mr Barnett byhospital
went to too critical a standardofwhen
complaining hestomach
severe acted onpains
the spur
andof the
vomiting.
Hospital [1969] 1 QB 428 He was seen by a nurse who telephoned the doctor on duty. The doctor told
her to send him home and contact his GP in the morning. Mr Barnett died five
hours later from arsenic poisoning. Had the doctor examined Mr Barnett at the
time there would have been nothing the doctor could have done to save him.

Held:

The hospital was not liable as the doctor's failure to examine the patient did not
cause his death.

Introduced the 'but for' test ie would the result have occurred but for the act or
omission of the defendant? If yes, the defendant is not liable.
Horsley v. MacLaren aka the MacLaren was the owner and captain of a boat called the "Ogopogo". He
ogopogo case 1971 (Canada) invited several friends out on his boat including Mr. Matthews, Mr. Horsley, and
Mr. and Mrs. Jones. During their cruise, Matthews fell overboard into the icy
water which caused him to have a heart attack and die. MacLaren backed the
boat up to rescue Matthews not knowing if he was alive. Horsley jumped into
the water to save Matthews but he was also overcome by the cold water. Mrs.
Jones then jumped in to help them both. Mr. MacLaren moved the boat into a
better position to rescue the three. In all, Mr. Matthews and Mr.Horsley were
killed.

The Court held that "encouragement by the common law of the rescue of
persons in danger would ... go beyond reasonable bounds if it involved liability
of one rescuer to a succeeding one where the former has not been guilty of
any fault which could be said to have induced a second rescue attempt." The
Donoghue v Stevenson case doesn't touch this principle, because it says that
you have a duty to avoid causing harm, not a duty to help someone else. In the
Court of Appeal for Ontario decision [1970] 2 O.R. 487, 11 D.L.R. (3d) 277,
Arthur Jessup J said the Well-Known Quotes: "So, despite the moral outrage
of the text writers, it appears presently the law that one can, with immunity,
smoke a cigarette on the beach while one‘s neighbour drowns and, without a
word of warning watch a child or blind person walk into certain danger".

McWilliams v Arrol [1962] HL [Tort – negligence - duty of care - causation]


D a building firm had not provided a safety belt to a steel erector who fell 70
feet to his death. C the widow. D was in breach of its statutory duty to provide
a safety belt (but not to insist that it be worn) but, there was evidence to show
that the man would probably not have worn a belt even had it been provided.

Held: The firm's negligence and breach of statutory duty were not the cause of
his death.

C lost
Chester v Afshar [2004] 3 WLR The claimant had suffered back pain for 6 years. This became quite severe
927 House of Lords and at times she was unable to walk or control her bladder. An MRI scan
revealed that there was disc protrusion into her spinal column and she was
advised to have surgery. The surgery carried a 1-2% risk that even if it was
performed without negligence the operation could worsen rather than improve
her condition. Her consultant neurosurgeon Mr Afshar was under a duty to
warn her of this risk although he failed to do so. The claimant had the
operation and unfortunately it worsened her condition. The trial judge found
that the surgeon had not been negligent in performing the operation but his
failure to warn her of the risk was a breach of duty. The claimant argued that if
she had been warned she would not have taken the decision to have the
operation straight away but would have taken time to consider other options
and discuss the risks with her family and would thus not have had the surgery
on the day which she did have it. She did not say she would never have had
the operation. The judge held that if she had the operation on another occasion
it may have been successful. He therefore found for the claimant. The
defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the
defendant appealed to the House of Lords on the grounds of causation in that
she was likely to have consented to the operation and that even if it had been
on a different occassion it carried the same risk.

Held:

3:2 decision (Lord Bingham & Lord Hoffman dissenting) appeal dismissed.

Lord Hope:

"To leave the patient who would find the decision difficult without a remedy, as
the normal approach to causation would indicate, would render the duty
useless in the cases where it may be needed most. This would discriminate
against those who cannot honestly say that they would have declined the
operation once and for all if they had been warned. I would find that result
Hotson v East Berkshire Area unacceptable.
The claimant asThe function
a school boyof fell
theout
lawofisatotree
enable
fromrights to be
a height of vindicated
12 foot. Heand to
Health Authority [1987] AC 750 suffered a fracture to his hip and was taken to hospital. The hospital failed to
House of Lords diagnose his fracture and sent him home. He was in severe pain so he was
taken back to hospital 5 days later where an X ray revealed his injury. He was
treated and suffered an avascular necrosis which resulted in him having a
permanent disability and a virtual certainty that he would develop osteoarthritis.
According to medical evidence, had he been correctly diagnosed initially there
was a 75% chance that he would have still developed this condition, but there
was a 25% chance that he would have made a full recovery. The trial judge
awarded damages of £11,500 based of 25% of £46,000 which was what would
have been awarded if the claimant had shown that the defendant's conduct
had caused the avascular necrosis of the hip.

Held:

The claimant had failed to establish on the balance of probabilities that the
defendant's breach of duty had caused the necrosis since there was a 75%
chance that it was caused by the fall. Therefore the claimant was not entitled to
receive anything in respect of the necrosis.
Gregg v Scott The defendant, Dr Scott, misdiagnosed negligently the plaintiff's malignant
cancer, stating it to be benign. This had the effect of delaying Mr Gregg's
treatment by nine months, reducing his chances of surviving ten years from
42% to 25%.[1]
Under the earlier decision of Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority,
the view taken at first instance, and by the Court of Appeal, the claimant could
not establish the defendant had prevented him being cured, as his original
chance of a cure was below 50%. The plaintiff argued that he was entitled to
recover for the loss of the 17% chance the defendant had deprived him of.On
appeal to the Lords, the majority upheld the earlier decision of Hotson, though
Lord Nicholls (joined by Lord Hope) dissented in arguing that loss of a chance
should be actionable:

Chaplin v Hicks Chaplin, along with 6,000 others, entered a nation wide beauty contest and got
through to the final stage where only 50 contestants were left. Hicks was to
select the twelve winners from these remaining contestants. The winners were
to be given theatrical engagement by him for three years at £5 per week.
Hicks, in breach of his contract with Chaplin, prevented her from taking part in
the final selection stage. The judge and jury awarded her damages of £100 for
the opportunity she lost in being prevented from taking part in the final
selection stage.

Where by contract a man has a right to belong to a limited class of competitors


for a prize, a breach of that contract by reason of which he is prevented from
continuing a member of the class and is thereby deprived of his chance of
obtaining the prize is a breach in respect of which he may be entitled to recover
substantial, and not merely nominal, damages.
The existence of a contingency which is dependent on the volition of a third
person does not necessarily render the damages for a breach of contract
incapable of assessment.

Spring v. Guardian Assurance In this case the claimant had been employed by an insurance firm and when it
PLC. was discovered that he was planning to leave and join a rival firm he was
dismissed. When the rival firm asked for a reference, the former employer
stated that the employee had deliberately mis-sold insurance policies to clients,
had acted dishonestly and had creamed off the most profitable business for
himself, and had been dismissed as a result. Due to this unfavourable and
inaccurate reference the employee was not only unable to get a job for several
years but was also struck off the insurance industry register. Initially the Court
of Appeal overruled the precedent set in Lawton, but the case was then
appealed again to the House of Lords which took a very different view.
Allied Maples v Simmons & The defendant solicitors were acting for the claimant in a takeover of the Gillow
Simmons [1995] 4 All ER 907 group of companies. The defendant's failed to warn the claimant of potential
liability that may arise under the transaction. The transaction was completed
and risk of liability became a reality leaving the claimant liable to pay
substantial sums. The claimant sought to recover some of this from the
defendant arguing that if they had been advised correctly there was a chance
that they would have been able to negotiate out of the liability.

Held:

The claimant was entitled to recover a sum to reflect their loss of a chance of
negotiating out of liability.

Where the result depends on what a third party would have done in a
hypothetical situation, the claimant only has to demonstrate that there was a
more than speculative chance rather than on the balance of probabilities. The
assessment of the chance will be reflected in the damages.

Cutler v Vauxhall Motors the claimant grazed his right ankle in an accident caused by the defendants.
The injury caused an ulcer to form and, because the claimant had been
suffering for some time from varicose veins in both legs, an immediate
operation was necessary. He claimed damages from the defendants for the
pain and discomfort of the operation but the Court of Appeal held that since the
claimant would very probably have needed a similar operation within five years
in any case, the defendant‘s negligence could not be regarded as the cause of
the operation.
Dillon v Twin State Gas & Electric Facts:
Co (1932), 85 NH 449, 163 A 111. Defendant maintained wires to carry electric current over a large public bridge.
Wires ran across bridge a foot above the horizontal girders. Wires were
insulated for weather protection but not against contact. Deceased and other
boys had played on the bridge for many years. Deceased, sitting on a
horizontal girder, lost balance and instinctively grabbed the wires to save
himself from falling. He was electrocuted

Issue(s):
What is the extent of the defendant‘s liability in causing the plaintiff‘s loss?

Ratio:
If a defendant would have died but for the negligence of the tortfeasor, the
tortfeasor will not be liable. (If the defendant would have been seriously injured,
the damages awarded will be decreased)

Analysis:
The deceased, in falling from bridge was entitled to no protection from the
defendant to keep from falling. Liability is only in exposing deceased to the
danger of charged wires. But for the current, the deceased would have been
killed or seriously injured from the fall. Therefore, the defendant deprived him,
not of a life of normal expectancy, but of one too short to result in any
economic loss.
Cook v Lewis, [1951] SCR 830 All of the parties were hunting. Lewis was hiding in a bush, and his brother tried
to warn Cook and his companions of this but it was misunderstood. A few
grouses flew out of the bush, and Cook and his companions fired shots. Lewis
was hit in the face, and lost an eye. Cook and his companions gave statements
claiming that they could not have shot Lewis. The jury found that it was one of
their shots that hit him, but they could not decide whose shot it was. The Court
of Appeal ordered a new trial, which Cook appealed.

When there are two parties, and it is proven that one of their actions caused
harm, but it cannot be proven which one it was, who, if anyone, is liable?

The decision in the lower court was based upon the general Canadian rule that
stated that when it is certain that one of two individuals committed the offence,
but it is uncertain which one was the guilty agent, then neither of them can be
convicted. Appeal dismissed. When there are two parties, and it is proven that
one of them caused harm in their actions but it cannot be proven which party
actually did it, then both of them are liable for the resulting damages.

Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC The claimant suffered an injury to his leg when the defendant ran into him in
467 his car. He suffered pain and loss of amenity and had to take a lower paid job.
He tried various different employments some of which he had to discontinue
because of his injury. He was employed sorting through scrap metal when he
sustained a further injury to his leg. He was on his own when two men came in
and demanded money. When he refused they shot him in his injured leg. As a
result of the shooting, the claimant had to have his leg amputated. The
defendant argued that the second injury removed the very limb from which the
earlier disability had stemmed, and that
therefore no loss suffered thereafter can be attributed to the defendant's
negligence. Arguing that the second injury submerged or obliterated the effect
of the first and that all loss thereafter must be attributed to the second injury.
The trial judge rejected this argument which he said was more ingenious than
attractive. But it was accepted by the Court of Appeal.

House of Lords held:

The defendant remained liable for the loss of amenity and lower earning
capacity even after the amputation.
Jobling v Associated Dairies Mr Jobling, a butcher, slipped on the floor at his place of work due to his
[1982] AC 794 House of Lords employer's negligence. He injured his back which caused him to reduce his
earning capacity to 50% of what it was. He then developed an independent
back condition which was unrelated to the injury which left him unable to work.
The trial judge applied Baker v Willoughby and held that the claimant was
entitled to recover damages beyond the onset to the back condition. The
employer appealed.

Held:

The House of Lords distinguished Baker v Willoughby and stated where the
victim is overtaken before trial by a wholly unconnected and disabling illness,
the decision had no application. The House of Lords were critical of the
decision in Baker v Willoughby but stopped short of overruling it.

Fairchild v Glenhaven [2002] 3 This was a conjoined appeal involving three claimants who contracted
WLR 89 House of Lords mesothelioma, a form of lung cancer contracted by exposure to asbestos.
Mesothelioma can be caused by a single fibre of asbestos. The condition does
not get worse the greater the exposure. Once the fibre has embedded into the
lung it can lay dormant for 30-40 years before giving rise to a tumour which can
then take 10 years to kill. It will be only the last 1-2 years where a person may
experience symptoms. By this time it is too late to treat. Each of the claimants
had been exposed to asbestos by a number of different employers. They were
unable to demonstrate, and medical science was unable to detect, which
employer exposed each of them to the one fatal fibre.

Held:

If the claimants could demonstrate that one employer had materially increased
the risk of contracting mesothelioma they were entitled to claim full
compensation from that one employer
McGhee v National Coal Board The claimant worked at the defendant's brick works. His normal duties did not
[1973] 1 WLR 1 House of Lords expose him to much dust but he was then asked to work on the brick kilns in a
hot a dusty environment. The defendant was in breach of duty in not providing
washing and showering facilities. The claimant thus had to cycle home still
covered in the brick dust. The claimant contracted dermatitis. There were two
possible causes: the brick dust he was exposed to during the course of his
employment which was not attributable to a breach of duty and the brick dust
he was exposed to on his journey home which was attributable to a breach.
The defendant sought to distinguish Wardlaw's case by arguing that it was
proved that every particle of dust inhaled played its part in causing the onset of
the disease whereas in this case it is not proved that every minor abrasion
played its part.

Held:

The claimant only had to demonstrate that the dust attributable to the breach of
duty materially increased the risk of him contract dermatitis.

Lord Salmon:
My Lords, I would suggest that the true view is that, as a rule, when it is
proved, on a balance of probabilities, that an employer has been negligent and
that his negligence has materially increased the risk of his employee
contracting an industrial disease, then he is liable in damages to that employee
if he contracts the disease notwithstanding that the employer is not responsible
for other factors which have materially contributed to the disease.

Barker v Corus, [2006] 3 All ER Barker was exposed to asbestos in his course of employment with several
785 employers, but also in the course of self-employment. He developed
mesothelioma and sued for damages. He was unsuccessful at the lower courts
and appealed to the House of Lords.

Does it matter that the plaintiff was one of the parties that might have
contributed to the injury?

Hoffman, in the majority, states that the purpose of Fairchild can be applied
here. He states that it does not matter that Barker was one of the parties that
helped cause the injury - the liability of the other two parties depends only on
their own actions and not on those of other parties. Therefore, the other two
parties are still liable – however the damages are divided according to the
probability of each respondant causing the harm.
In the dissent, Rodger of Earlsferry states that Fairchild cannot apply here
because it tips the scales too far in favour of Barker. It is essentially stating that
in cases exactly like this a plaintiff recovers unconditionally, however if the
case only differs a little bit then plaintiffs cannot recover for suffering the
increased risk of an injury. He also talks about how dividing damages is bad,
because claimants often end up with only a small proportion of the damages
that they deserve. Appeal allowed.

Fairchild applies even if the plaintiff himself is one of the causes of the injury,
but the damages are divided up based on the probability of each party‘s
actions causing the harm.
Bonnington Castings Ltd v The claimant contracted pneumoconiosis by inhaling air which contained
Wardlaw [1956] AC 613 House of minute
Lords particles of silica during the course of his employment. The defendant was in
breach of a statutory duty in failing to provide an extractor fan. Had they
installed an extractor fan the number of particles of silica that the claimant was
exposed to would have been reduced, however, there would still be some
particles present. There were thus two possible causes: the guilty dust, which
should not have been in the working environment and the innocent dust, which
would have been present in any event. The trial judge held that where the duty
arose by statute then it was for the defendant to show that his breach of duty
(the guilty dust) did not cause the disease. As the defendant was unable to do
this they were liable. The defendant appealed contending the burden of proof
rests on the claimant.

Held:

The burden of proof remains on the claimant. However, the claimant only had
to demonstrate that the guilty dust had made a material contribution to the
disease. He did not have to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that
the guilty dust was the sole cause of the disease

Page v Smith [1996] 1 AC 155 The claimant had suffered from ME over a period of time and was in recovery
House of Lord when he was involved in a minor car accident due to the defendant's
negligence. The claimant was not physically injured in the collision but the
incident triggered his ME and had become chronic and permanent so that he
was unable to return to his job as a teacher. He was successful at his trial and
awarded £162,000 in damages.

Held:

Provided some kind of personal injury was foreseeable it did not matter
whether the injury was physical or psychiatric. There was thus no need to
establish that psychiatric injury was foreseeable. Also the fact that an ordinary
person would not have suffered the injury incurred by the claimant was
irrelevant as the defendant must take his victim as he finds him under the thin
skull rule.
Re Polemis & Furness Withy & Some Stevedores carelessly dropped a plank of wood into the hold of a ship.
Company Ltd. [1921] 3 KB 560 The plank struck something as it was falling which caused a spark. The spark
was ignited by petrol vapours resulting in the destruction of the ship. The
arbitrator held that the causing of the spark could not have been anticipated
and therefore no liability arose. The claimant appealed.

Held:

There was no requirement that the damage was foreseeable. The defendant
was liable for all the direct consequences of their action.

NB This was overruled in Wagon Mound No 1


The Wagon Mound no 1 [1961] The defendant's vessel, The Wagon Mound, leaked furnace oil at a Wharf in
AC 388 House of Lords Sydney Harbour. Some cotton debris became embroiled in the oil and sparks
from some welding works ignited the oil. The fire spread rapidly causing
destruction of some boats and the wharf.

Held:

Re Polemis should no longer be regarded as good law. A test of remoteness of


damage was substituted for the direct consequence test. The test is whether
the damage is of a kind that was foreseeable. If a foreseeable type of damage
is present, the defendant is liable for the full extent of the damage, no matter
whether the extent of damage was foreseeable.

Tremain v Pike [1969] 1 WLR The farm labourer contracted leptosporosis from handling materials on which
1556 rats had urinated.

Held:

The defendant was not liable. It was not known at the time that leptosporosis
could be transmitted in this way. Whilst it was foreseeable he may contract the
disease by a rat bite the way he contracted the disease was not foreseeable.

Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] Two boys aged 8 and 10 went exploring an unattended man hole. The man
AC 837 House of Lords hole had been left by workmen taking a break. It was surrounded by a tent and
some paraffin lamps were left to warn road users of the danger. The boys took
a lamp down the hole. One of them dropped the lamp and an unforeseeable
explosion occurred resulting in extensive burns.

Held:

The damage was not too remote it was foreseeable that the boys may suffer a
burn from the lamp. The fact that the burn resulted from an unforeseeable
explosion did not prevent the type of damage being foreseeable.
Jolley v Sutton [2000] 1 WLR Two 14 year old boys found an abandoned boat on land owned by the council
1082 and decided to do it up. The boat was in a thoroughly rotten condition and
represented a danger. The council had stuck a notice on the boat warning not
to touch the boat and that if the owner did not claim the boat within 7 days it
would be taken away. The council never took it away. The boys had been
working on the boat for 6-7 weeks when one of them suffered severe spinal
injuries, resulting in paraplegia, when the boat fell on top of him. The boys had
jacked the boat up to work on the underside and the jack went through the
rotten wood. The claimant brought an action under the Occupiers Liability Act
1984. The trial judge found for the claimant. The Court of Appeal reversed the
decision, holding that whilst it was foreseeable that younger children may play
on the boat and suffer an injury by falling through the rotten wood, it was not
foreseeable that older boys would try to do the boat up. The claimant appealed.

House of Lords held:

The claimant's appeal was allowed. The risk was that children would "meddle
with the boat at the risk of some physical injury" The actual injury fell within that
description.

Lord Steyn:
"The scope of the two modifiers - the precise manner in which the injury came
about and its extent - is not definitively answered by either The Wagon Mound
(No. 1) or Hughes v. Lord Advocate. It requires determination in the context of
an intense focus on the circumstances of each case."

Doughty v Turner Manufacturing An asbestos lid was accidentally knocked into a cauldron of molten liquid. A
Company [1964] 1 QB 518 few moments later an explosion occurred. The claimant was standing close by
and suffered burns from the explosion. The explosion occurred as a result of
the asbestos reacting with the chemicals in the liquid in the high temperature.
At the time of the incident it was not known that the asbestos could react in that
way.

Held:

The damage was too remote. It was not foreseeable that an explosion would
occur. Whilst it may be foreseeable the lid may have caused a splash resulting
in a scold, it was not foreseeable that an explosion would occur resulting in
burns
Smith v Leech Brain [1962] 2 QB A widow brought a claim against the defendant under the Fatal Accidents Act
405 for the death of her husband. The defendant employed the husband. As a
result of their negligence he incurred a burn to his lip. The lip contained pre-
cancerous cells which were triggered by the injury sustained. He died three
years later from cancer.

Held:

The burn was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligence and


this resulted in the death. The defendant was liable for his death. It was not
necessary to show that death by cancer was foreseeable, nor that an ordinary
person would not have died from the injury. The egg shell skull rule applies and
the defendant must take his victim as he finds him.
Robinson v Post Office [1974] CA [Civil Process – negligence standard of proof – chain or causation]
D employed C who slipped on a ladder at work because of oil on the step. C
suffered a minor injury. At hospital, he was given an anti-tetanus injection. He
contracted encephalitis due to an allergy of which he was previously unaware.

Held: The hospital was negligent but not liable, since even the proper
procedure would not have revealed the allergy. C's employers, on the other
hand, were legally responsible for the encephalitis as well as for the minor
injury: if a wrongdoer ought to foresee that as a result of his wrongful act the
victim may require medical treatment then he is liable for the consequences of
the treatment applied although he could not reasonably foresee those
consequences.

Lamb v Camden LBC [1981] 2 All The defendant council negligently fractured a water pipe outside the claimant's
ER 408 Court of Appeal house. This caused extensive damage and the property had to be vacated.
One year later the council had not undertaken the repairs. Squatters had also
moved in and caused further damage. The claimant arranged for repairs to be
done herself and submitted a bill to the council for the repairs and damage
caused by the squatters.

Held:

The local authority was not liable for the acts of the squatters. It was not
foreseeable that squatters would move into an empty house in Camden and
cause damage despite the prevalence of such behaviour in Camden at the
time.
Perl (Exporters) Ltd v Camden the defendant council owned adjoining premises. Number 142 was let to the
London Borough Council (1984), claimant, and #144 was divided into flats. There was no lock on #144, and
thieves entered #142 by knocking a hole through the adjoining wall. The Court
of Appeal held that the defendants were not liable, mere foreseeability was not
sufficient to establish a duty. Policy factors are at work here; the claimant
would be insured against this type of loss.
Knightley v Johns & Ors [1982] 1 As a result of Mr John's negligent driving his car overturned in a tunnel. Two
WLR 349 Court of Appeal police officers on motorcycles arrived at the scene. The senior officer
instructed them both to ride their motorcycles to the other side of the tunnel
and close the entrance to the tunnel as he had forgotten to close it earlier.
They took the decision of driving on through the tunnel on the wrong side of the
road on a blind bend rather than going the long way round. Unfortunately one
of the officers, Mr Knightly, was involved in a head on collision with an
oncoming vehicle driven by Mr Cotton and sustained serious injuries. He
brought an action against Mr Cotton, Mr John, the senior officer and the Chief
Constable of West Midlands. The main contentious point was whether Mr.
John remained liable or whether the actions of the other defendant's and the
claimant amounted to a novus actus interveniens.

Held:

The senior officer's instructions and failure to close the entrance to the tunnel
were negligent and broke the chain of causation. The claimant's decision in
going through the tunnel was not negligent. Thus the claimant was entitled to
full damages from the senior officer and Mr John was not liable
Reeves v Commissioner of Police Martin Lynch committed suicide whilst in a police cell. He had attempted
of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360 suicide earlier that day in the cells at the magistrates. He had also attempted
House of Lords suicide on previous occasions. He had been seen by a doctor at the police
station on arrival who reported that he was not schizophrenic or depressed but
was a suicide risk. The custody officer checked him at 1.57 pm and left the
hatch open. He was found at 2.05 pm having used his shirt as a ligature
secured by the open hatch. He was unable to be resuscitated and died a week
later. The defendant argued that as Lynch was of sound mind his voluntary and
informed act of suicide broke the chain of causation.

Held:

The act of suicide was the very thing that the police were under a duty to
prevent to treat this as a novus actus interveniens would deprive the duty of
any substance. Therefore the defendant was liable, however damages were
reduced by 50% under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.

McKew v Holland [1969] 3 All ER The claimant sustained an injury at work due to his employer's breach of duty.
1621 He strained his back and hips and his leg was prone to giving way. Whilst in
this state he attempted to climb down a steep concrete staircase without a
handrail unaided. He got part way down and felt his leg give way so he jumped
10 steps to the bottom. He suffered a fractured right ankle and was also left
with a permanent disability. The defendant accepted liability for the injury
sustained during his employment but disputed liability for the second injuries
resulting from the claimant's action in jumping down the stairs.

Held:

The claimant's action amounted to a novus actus interveniens because his


action in attempting to climb the steps unaided knowing that his leg might give
way was unreasonable. The defendant was therefore not liable for the injuries
resulting from the incident on the stairs.

Weiland v Cyril Lord Carpets Ltd where the claimant was unable to adjust her bifocals as a result of a neck
(1969) injury caused by the defendant‘s negligence. She was worried about catching
public transport in such a condition and went to her son‘s office to ask for a lift
home. On the way into the office she fell down a flight of stairs and was injured.
The claimant was held to have been acting reasonably; the defendant was
liable for those injuries.
Kirkham v CC Greater Mr Kirkham was an alcoholic and suffered from depression. He had made a
Manchester Police [1990] 2 QB two suicide attempts on 6th Jan 1980. He was admitted to hospital but
283 Court of Appeal discharged himself the following day. When he arrived home his wife
prevented him from drinking and he became violent and started smashing
furniture. The police were called and arrested him. His wife informed them of
his suicide attempts and discharging himself from hospital and it was agreed
that he should be remanded in custody for his own safety. However, the police
failed inform the prison authorities that Mr Kirkham was a suicide risk. He
committed suicide whilst on remand at Risley Remand Centre. His wife
brought an action based on the negligence of the police in failing to pass on
the information. The Police raised the defences of volenti non fit injuria and ex
turpi causa.

Held:

The claimant was successful. The defence of volenti non fit injuria, although
normally would apply where a person of sound mind were to take their own life,
had no application where a person of unsound mind took their life. The
defence of ex turpi causa was not limited to illegal acts but extended also to
immoral acts. The court applied the public conscience test and concluded that
to allow the claimant to succeed would not affront the public conscience, or
shock the ordinary citizen.
Pigney V Pointers Transport The claimant injured his head at work due to the Defendant's negligence.
Services Ltd (1957) Some years later he hanged himself as he was suffering from acute anxiety
and depression caused by the original injury.

Held. COA. original injury was still operating, and anxiety/depression are a
common cause of damage to the head.
Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd (2008) Mr Corr was a maintenance engineer who became severely disfigured after he
UKHL) was struck on the head by a machine at work. He underwent extensive
reconstructive surgery but remained disfigured. He suffered from flashbacks
and post traumatic stress disorder and lapsed into a deep depression from
which he never recovered. Six years after the accident he committed suicide.
At the time of his death, Mr Corr had begun proceedings against his former
employers for damages for the physical and psychological damage he had
suffered. After his death, his widow was substituted as the claimant. However,
she also sought to sue for the loss attributable to the death by suicide under
section 1 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. While IBC Vehicles accepted that
the accident was a breach of the duty owed to Mr Corr to take reasonable care
to avoid causing him personal injury, including psychological injury, they
refused to admit liability for his suicide, arguing that it (1) fell outside the duty of
care owed to him by the company; (2) was not an act which was reasonably
foreseeable and therefore not one for which they should be held liable; (3)
broke the chain of causation and constituted a novus actus interveniens; (4)
was an unreasonable act which broke the chain of causation; (5) was the
voluntary act of the deceased, and so precluded by the principle volenti non fit
injuria; (6) amounted to contributory negligence.

The company‘s appeal to the House of Lords was dismissed. The Lords held
that the appellant owed Mr Corr a duty to avoid not only physical but also
psychological injury and that the deceased had acted in a way that he would
not have done had it not been for the breach by the appellant. In addition,
suicide was found to be foreseeable. Although it was not a usual manifestation
of severe depression, it was not uncommon. In these particular circumstances
it was reasonably foreseeable by the appellant if one considered the possible
effect of such an accident on a hypothetical employee. The appellant‘s other
arguments were rejected.

Carslogie Steamship Co v. Royal On 26 November 1949 the vessel Heimgar, while under time charter to the
Norwegian Government Ministry of Transport, suffered damage in a collision with the Carslogie. It was
admitted that the Carslogie was solely to blame. The Heimgar had temporary
repairs done in a port in England before proceeding to a port in the United
States where permanent repairs could be carried out. During the voyage
across the Atlantic, the ship sustained heavy weather damage, which
necessitated immediate repair. The ship remained in dock for fifty days during
which the repairs due to the collision and those due to the weather damage
were carried out concurrently. It had been agreed that ten days would be
allocated to the collision repair and thirty days for the weather damage. The
owners of the Heimgar claimed damages for the ten days attributable to the
collision damage while at port.

The owners of the Carslogie were only liable for such loss of profit suffered by
the Heimgar as resulted from the Carslogie‘s wrongful act. During the time that
the Heimgar was detained in dock she had ceased to be a profit-earning
machine because the heavy weather damage had rendered her unseaworthy.
Therefore, the respondents had sustained no damage by reason of the fact
that for ten days the vessel was undergoing repairs in respect of the collision
damage, as the heavy weather damage was the sole reason the Heimgar had
to dock for repairs before reaching its destination.
Prendergast v Sam & Dee Ltd., The case is the classic example of transcription error. In this case, a
Kosary, and Miller in 1989 reasonably legible hand-written prescription for Amoxil was misread by the
dispensing chemist and a toxic dose of glibenclamide was dispensed three
times daily" a dose some fifty times the maximum daily dose of 15 mg. Dr
Miller was found liable for 25% of the damages in the above case due to the
apparent illegibility of his handwriting (I find it quite legible).

Jobling v Associated Dairies Mr Jobling, a butcher, slipped on the floor at his place of work due to his
[1982] AC 794 House of Lords employer's negligence. He injured his back which caused him to reduce his
earning capacity to 50% of what it was. He then developed an independent
back condition which was unrelated to the injury which left him unable to work.
The trial judge applied Baker v Willoughby and held that the claimant was
entitled to recover damages beyond the onset to the back condition. The
employer appealed.

Held:
The House of Lords distinguished Baker v Willoughby and stated where the
victim is overtaken before trial by a wholly unconnected and disabling illness,
the decision had no application. The House of Lords were critical of the
decision in Baker v Willoughby but stopped short of overruling it.

Derry v Peek (1889) 5 T.L.R. 625 In a company prospectus the defendant stated the company had the right to
use steam powered trams as oppose to horse powered trams. However, at the
time the right to use steam powered trams was subject of approval of the
Board of Trade, which was later refused. The claimant purchased shares in the
company in reliance of the statement made and brought a claim based on the
alleged fraudulent representation of the defendant.

Held:

The statement was not fraudulent but made in the honest belief that approval
was forthcoming.

Lord Herschell defined fraudulent misrepresentation as a statement which is


made either:

i) knowing it to be false,
ii) without belief in its truth, or
iii) recklessly, careless as to whether it be true or false.
Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Issue
Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 Whether and under what conditions a person can recover damages for loss
suffered by reason of his having relied on an innocent but negligent
misrepresentation.

^[Tort - negligence - duty of care - extent of the duty depends on the courts
assessment of demands of society]
D, a bank gave a reference to C (another bank) regarding the financial
responsibility of a customer, expecting the bank to act on it. The reference
was given "without responsibility."

The second bank acted on the reference and suffered financial loss as a
result. They sued D in negligence.

Held: The law will imply a duty of care when a party seeking information from a
party possessed of a special skill trusts him to exercise due care, and that
party knew or ought to have known that reliance was being placed on his skill
and judgment.

However, since here there was an express disclaimer of responsibility, no such


duty was, in any event, implied. C lost

This case modified pure economic loss in negligence. The effect of Hedley
Byrne makes possible the recovery of compensation for financial damage
through reliance by the plaintiff according to statements made negligently by
the defendant but only where there exists a ‗special relationship' between the
parties.
The term ―special relationship‖ which must be between plaintiff and defendant
before there can be liability was not fully defined but for its existence seems to
be:

A, a reliance by the claimant on the defendants specialist skill and judgment;


B, reasonable expectation of knowledge on the part of the defendant, that the
Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Spartan Steel and Alloys Ltd had a stainless steel factory in Birmingham, which
Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd obtained its electricity by a direct cable from the power station. Martin & Co Ltd
were doing work on the ground with an excavator and negligently damaged
that cable. As a consequence, the factory was deprived of electricity for 15
hours which has caused physical damage to the factory‘s furnaces and metal,
lost profit on the damaged metal and lost profit on the metal that was not
melted during the time the electricity was off. Spartan Steel claimed all the
three heads of damage.

The Court of Appeal, consisting of Lord Denning MR, Edmund-Davies LJ and


Lawton LJ delivered a majority judgment (Edmund-Davies LJ dissenting), that
the Spartan Steel could only recover the damages to their furnaces, the metal
they had to discard and the profit lost on the discarded metal. They could not
recover the profits lost due to the factory not being operational for 15 hours.
Their main reasoning for this was that while the damage to the metal was
"physical damage" and the lost profits on the metal was "directly
consequential" upon it, the profits lost due to the blackout constituted "pure
economic loss".
Although the majority seemed to agree that Martin & Co Ltd owed the Spartan
Steel a duty of care and the damage was not too remote since it was
foreseeable, they declined to allow the recovery of pure economic loss for
policy reasons outlined by Lord Denning in his leading judgment:
Statutory utility providers are never liable for damages caused by their
negligence.
A blackout is a common hazard and a risk which everyone can be expected to
tolerate from time to time.
If claims for pure economic loss in such cases were allowed, it might lead to
countless claims, some of which may be spurious (the "floodgates" argument).
It would be unfair to place the entire weight of many comparatively small losses
upon the shoulders of one person in such cases.
The law does not leave the claimant without remedy by allowing him to recover
the economic losses that are directly consequential upon physical damage.
Ross v Caunters [1979] ChDiv [Solicitors – duty to their clients]
Megarry VC D a solicitor prepared a will for a client and sent it to him for signature. D failed
to warn the client that his signature should not be witnessed by the spouse of a
beneficiary, and subsequently did not notice that this had actually happened.

Held: D liable to pay damages to the disappointed beneficiary.


Murphy v Brentwood District [Tort – negligence - duty of care - general principles - the nature of negligence -
Council [1991] HL duty of care - proving fault]
D, local authority negligently approved plans for the footings (a concrete raft) of
a house that subsided. C the house owner could not afford repairs and sold
the house at a loss.

C alleged that he and his family had suffered an imminent risk to health and
safety because gas and soil pipes had broken and there was a risk of further
breaks.

Held: The damage suffered by C was not material or physical damage. D was
not liable for pure economic loss of the cost of remedying defects

To permit C to recover his economic loss would logically lead to an


unacceptably wide category of claims in respect of buildings or chattels which
were defective in quality, and would in effect introduce product liability and
transmissible warranties of quality into the law of tort by means of judicial
legislation.

C lost
Per curiam. It is unrealistic to regard a building or chattel which has been
wholly erected or manufactured and equipped by the same contractor as a
complex structure in which one part of the structure or chattel is regarded as
having caused damage to other property when it causes damage to another
part of the same structure or chattel, since the reality is that the structural
elements in a building or chattel form a single indivisible unit of which the
different parts are essentially interdependent and to the extent that there is a
defect in one part of the structure or chattel it must to a greater or lesser
degree necessarily affect all other parts of the structure. However, defects in
ancillary equipment, manufactured by different contractors, such as central
heating boilers or electrical installations may give rise to liability under ordinary
principles of negligence.
Simpson & Co v Thomson (1877) The claimant insured T‘s property against being damaged. The property was
damaged as a result of the defendant‘s fault with the result that the claimant
had to pay out on the insurance policy with T. Held: claimant could not sue the
defendant.
Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co Donald Ogilvie was the director of a company called Trevaunance Hydraulic
Tin Mines Ltd, which mined tin in Cornwall. He needed more capital, so he put
an advertisement in The Times on July 8, 1946, which said,
"£10,000. Established Tin Mine (low capitalization) in Cornwall seeks further
capital. Instal additional milling plant. Directorship and active participation open
to suitable applicant - Apply"
Mr Candler responded, saying he was interested in investing £2000, if he could
see the company's accounts. Mr Ogilvie instructed Crane, Christmas & Co, a
firm of auditors, to prepare the company‘s accounts and balance sheet. The
draft accounts were shown to Mr Candler in the presence of Crane, Christmas
& Co‘s clerk. Mr Candler relied on their accuracy and subscribed for £2,000
worth of shares in the company. But the company was actually in a very bad
state. Ogilvie used the investment on himself and then went bankrupt. Mr
Candler lost all the money he invested. He brought an action against the
accountants, Crane, Christmas & Co. for negligently misrepresenting the state
of the company. As there was no contractual relationship between the parties,
the action was brought in tort law for pure economic loss.

The majority of the Court of Appeal (Sir Lionel Cohen and Sir Cyril Asquith)
relied on the case of Derry v Peek to refuse a remedy to the plaintiff, holding
that loss resulting from negligent misstatement was not actionable in the
absence of any contractual or fiduciary relationship between the parties.

Chaudhry v Prabhakar [1988] 3 the court of appeal held that the duty of care will arise on the defendant who
All ER 718 are the friend of plaintiff that give a negligent advice to the plaintiff to selection
of a second car. The defendant will liable on it, although defendant not as a
professional in the mechanic area. This is an exception existed the duty of care
in a social relationship. Because the Court of Appeal clearly measure that the
case above was an unusual case, the judgment in this case was made in a
special facts.
Henderson v Merrett Syndicates [Civil Process - C can claim in tort or contract]
[1994] HL C and other Lloyds "names" sued their underwriting agents for negligent
mismanagement of their affairs.

Held: C‘s claims in tort should go for trial. A claimant, who has remedies
available in tort and in contract, is free to choose whichever appears to him to
be the most advantageous so long as the contract does not expressly preclude
this.
Lennon v Commissioner of Police The claimant, an officer with the Metropolitan Police, successfully applied to
of the Metropolis join the police service of Northern Ireland. He sought advice about his transfer
from a police personnel executive officer in London. In reply to his specific
enquiry he was informed that his housing allowance entitlement would not be
affected by his taking time off work during the course of his transfer. He in fact
took three weeks off work which resulted in a break in his continuity of service,
and on taking up his new position he permanently lost entitlement to a monthly
housing allowance of £134. The Court of Appeal upheld his claim in negligence
against the commissioner arising from the manner in which his transfer was
handled and upheld the award of some £44,000 damages. The general
principles governing the existence of a duty of care not to cause pure
economic loss to another by careless acts or omissions are well established,
and the commissioner was wrong in suggesting that the decision broke new
ground involving a radical departure from the existing law. Although there was
no contract of employment between the police commissioner and the claimant,
the relationship between them was analogous to that created by such a
contract; it was fair, just and reasonable to impose on the police commissioner
a general duty of care to give advice to the claimant to protect him from
economic loss.

MLC v Evatt (1968) 12 CLR 556 Established that a professional adviser owed a duty of care to clients to whom
they supplied information.
Esso Petroleum v Mardon [1976] Mr Mardon entered a tenancy agreement with Esso Petroleum in respect of a
QB 801 new Petrol station. Esso's experts had estimated that the petrol station would
sell 200,000 gallons of petrol. This estimate was based on figures which were
prepared prior to planning application. The planning permission changed the
prominence of the petrol station which would have an adverse affect on the
sales rate. Esso made no amendments to the estimate. The rent under the
tenancy was also based on the erroneous estimate. Consequently it became
impossible for Mr Mardon to run the petrol station profitably. In fact, despite his
best endeavours the petrol station only sold 78,000 gallons in the first year and
made a loss of £5,800.

The Court of Appeal held that there was no action for misrepresentation as the
statement was an estimate of future sales rather than a statement of fact.
However, the claimant was entitled to damages based on either negligent
misstatement at common law or breach of warranty of a collateral contract.
James McNaughton Paper Group During negotiations in 1982 between the plaintiff and MK Ltd concerning a
Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co possible takeover of MK by the plaintiff, the defendants, MK's accountants,
were instructed by MK to prepare accounts for it as quickly as possible. Draft
accounts, which showed a net loss for the year ended 30 June 1982 of
£48,094, were made available to the plaintiff's chairman. At a subsequent
meeting a member of the defendants' firm, P, answering a question from the
chairman, asserted that MK was 'breaking even or doing marginally worse'.
After the takeover the plaintiff discovered errors in the accounts. It claimed
from the defendants damages in negligence in respect of the accounts and of
P's assertion. The judge decided the defendants were negligent in relation to
both matters and both had to a material extent induced the plaintiff to continue
with the takeover; he awarded the plaintiffs £75,000 damages.
The defendants appealed.
Nicholas Padfield and Monique Allan (instructed by Herbert Smith) for the
defendants. Quintin Iwi (instructed by Cameron Markby Hewitt) for the plaintiff.
Neill LJ said that it became necessary, in the absence of some general
principle, to examine each individual case in the light of the concepts of
foreseeability, proximity and fairness. The last of those concepts, however,
was elusive and might be only one of the criteria by which proximity was to be
judged. It was sufficient to underline that in every case the court had not only to
consider the forseeability of the damage and whether the relationship between
the parties was sufficiently proximate but also to enquire whether in the
particular situation it was fair, just and reasonable that the law should impose
on the defendant a duty of the scope suggested for the benefit of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff had argued that the judge had been fully entitled to conclude that a
duty of care existed. However, his Lordship had concluded that, applying the
tests established in recent authorities, the existence of a duty of care had not
been made out.
Nourse and Balcombe LJJ delivered concurring judgments.
Appeal allowed.

Smith v Eric Bush [1990] 1 AC A survey report of the claimant‘s house carried out by the defendant failed to
831 advise on some structural damage to the property which resulted in the
chimney breast collapsing. There was no contractual relationship between the
claimant and defendant as the mortgage company arranged the survey and the
claimant made payment to the mortgage company. The contract between the
claimant and the mortgage company contained a clause exempting the
surveyor from liability. In considering if such a clause was reasonable under
the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 the court took into account the fact that it
was a modest house to be used as the family home and concluded that it was
an unreasonable clause and therefore ineffective. The House of Lords held
that it might be reasonable for a surveyor to exclude liability if the property was
of higher value or to be used for investment or business purposes.
White v Jones 1995 Facts
Two daughters of 78 year old Mr White sued Mr Jones for failing to follow their
father's instructions when drawing up his will. Mr White and his daughters had
fallen out briefly and he asked the solicitor to cut them out of the will. Before he
died they resolved their problems. He asked Mr Jones to change the will again
so that £9000 would be given to his daughters. After he died, with the will still
the same, the family would not agree to have the settlement changed. The
question was whether Mr Jones could be sued instead.

Judgment
Lord Goff held with a majority of three to two in the House of Lords that the
daughters would be able to claim. Influenced by the idea that solicitors may
escape the consequences of not doing their job properly, he said that a special
relationship existed between the daughters and the solicitor and that Mr Jones
had assumed responsibility towards them. This was so even though there was
no contract or fiduciary relationship between them.

Ministry of Housing and Local An employee of the authority failed to exercise reasonable skill and care in
Government v Sharp searching for entries in the local land charges register. The search certificate
prepared by the clerk negligently failed to record a charge of £1,828 11s. 5d. in
favour of the Ministry.

Lord Denning MR held the local authority was liable to the Ministry for the
employee's incompetence. At 268 he rejected that a duty of care only arose
when there was a voluntary assumption of responsibility, rather "from the fact
that the person making it knows, or ought to know, that others, being his
neighbours in this regard, would act on the faith of the statement being
accurate."
Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill The plaintiffs took over another company and later brought an action against
Samuel & Co Ltd and others the advisers, accountants and directors alleging breach of a duty of care by
negligent misrepresentation in financial statements published prior to the bid
and in defence documents sent to shareholders and served on the plaintiffs'
advisers after the bid on which the plaintiffs had relied in making and
increasing their offer and whereby they had suffered loss. After the decision of
the House of Lords in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 WLR 358 the
plaintiffs sought to amend their pleading by restricting it to representations
made in the course of the bid when their relationship as identified bidders was
sufficiently proximate to create a duty of care owed to them by the defendants,
but including the previously issued financial statements as 'continuing
representations' never withdrawn or qualified. The plaintiffs further alleged that
a particular purpose of the representations was to persuade them to offer
better terms. On a summons for leave to amend Hoffman J refused leave
holding that despite the amendments the case could not be distinguished from
Caparo and was bound to fail because of the absence of a duty of care.
The plaintiffs appealed.
Jonathan Sumption QC, Stephen Suttle and John Nicholls (instructed by
Herbert Smith) for the plaintiffs. Gordon Langley QC and Michael Brindle
(instructed by Berwin Leighton) for the first defendants. Nicolas Bratza QC and
Ian Croxford (instructed by Barlow Lyde & Gilbert) for the second defendants.
Leslie Kosmin (instructed by Reynolds Porter Chamberlain) for the third
defendant. Nigel Davis (instructed by McKenna & Co) for the fourth and fifth
defendants. Michael McLaren (instructed by Allison & Humphreys) for the sixth,
seventh and eighth defendants.
Slade LJ said on the assumed facts pleaded the defendants intended that the
plaintiffs would rely on the representations in deciding whether or not to make
an increased bid and that the plaintiffs had so relied and that it was therefore
plainly arguable that there was a relationship of proximity between the plaintiffs
and the defendants sufficient to give rise to a duty of care and the case should
go to trial.
Appeal allowed.
Law Society v KPMG Peat The defendant accountants prepared annual accounts reports for a firm of
Marwick and Others solicitors which the solicitors then provided to the Law Society in accordance
with s.34 of the Solicitors Act 1974. Following the discovery of fraud by two
partners in the solicitors' firm, substantial payments were made from the
compensation fund maintained by the Law Society. The Law Society, as
trustee of the fund, commenced proceedings against the defendants, claiming
damages on the ground that the defendants had negligently prepared the
accounts reports and, as a result, it had not exercised its powers of
intervention into the firm which would have reduced the amount paid out of the
fund. On a preliminary issue, Sir Richard Scott V-C ([2000] 1 All ER 515) held
that the defendants had owed the Law Society, as trustee of the fund, a duty of
care when preparing the accounts reports. The defendants appealed.
Gordon Pollock QC and Rhodri Davies QC (instructed by Herbert Smith) for
the defendants. Lord Goldsmith QC and Matthew Collings (instructed by
Wright Son & Pepper) for the Law Society.
Held, dismissing the appeal, that the question of whether a duty of care was
owed by the accountants to the Law Society as trustee of the compensation
fund had to be examined against the test laid down in Caparo Industries Plc v
Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, namely, reasonable foreseeability of damage,
proximity and whether it was fair, just and reasonable to impose such a duty;
that the intervention by the Law Society, which an adverse accounts report
could trigger, protected both the public and the compensation fund; that it was
made clear to the accountants that the reports were required so that protective
steps could be taken and it was obvious that if protective action was not taken
because a report did not draw attention to non-compliance with the account
rules that could have adverse consequences on the fund; that there was no
reason why there should not be a private law duty owed to the Law Society, the
performance of which would assist it to perform its public or regulatory duty;
and that, accordingly, the defendants had owed a duty of care to the Law
Society.

Yianni v Edwin Evans (1982) QB Mr Yianni applied to a building society for a mortgage advance of £12,000 for
438 the purchase of a property. The building society appointed an independent
surveyor to undertake a valuation of the property. The surveyor reported that
the property was adequate security for the mortgage. Mr Yianni did not see a
copy of the report although he paid the fee for the valuation. The building
society made the required mortgage advance and the purchase went ahead. It
subsequently came to light that the surveyor had failed to detect serious
structural defects that rendered the property virtually worthless. Mr Yianni sued
the surveyor directly. The judge found the surveyor liable, even though the
building society, and not the purchaser, had employed him. The surveyor
knew, however, that the advance would be granted only if his report were
favourable and that it was unlikely the purchaser would obtain his own survey.
The surveyor was therefore held to have a duty to both Yianni and to the
building society. Since this decision, lenders have made valuation surveys
available to prospective purchasers, thus widening the liability of surveyors. -
Stevenson v Nationwide Building The purchaser bought a property spanning a small river. The lender‘s valuer
Society (1984) 272 EG 663 disclaimed any liabillity to the buyer, and a structural report was offered for an
additional charge. The property was not sound.
Held: The valuation was negligent, and the defendant lender would be
vicariously liable unless liability had been excluded. In the absence of some
other estoppel, the exclusion term had to pass the test of reasonableness
under the Act. Given that the purchaser was himself an estate agent and
properly experienced in such matters, the exclusion clause was reasonable.
Similar to Smith V Bush. But buyer was estate agent and was held by the court
to have 'trade knowledge'. Therefore the disclaimer used by the cheaper
surveyor they chose to use was held to be reasonable

JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks, in this case, a firm of accountant, who carelessly made a financial statement of
Bloom & Co [1981] 3 All ER 289 Y company, and the plaintiff relied on it. The court held that, the firm of
accountant imposes the duty of care to plaintiff because the defendant fully
aware that the plaintiff will investing in or taking over Y company thus,
defendant will knew that the plaintiff will rely on the published accounts.

Williams v Natural Life Health The claimants were interested in opening a health food shop in Bristol. They
Foods Ltd (1998). went to a health food company for advice as to how successful such a shop
might be. They received a report, that had been prepared by the defendant,
which said that the shop the claimants were proposing to open should be very
successful. This was incorrect, and the defendant should have known that. On
the strength of the report, the claimants invested a lot of money in opening a
health food shop in Bristol and lost their investment. Held: the claimants could
not sue the defendant for compensation for the money they lost relying on his
overly optimistic projections as to how well their shop would do.

Junior Books v Veitchi (1983) HL [Tort – negligence - duty of care - development and scope - damage –
remoteness - economic loss]
D, specialist-flooring contractors negligently laid a floor in C‘s factory.
D as specialist flooring contractors knew what products were required and
were alone responsible for the composition and construction of the floor. C
suffered loss and damages, such as the cost of removal of machinery and loss
of profits while the floor was being re-laid.

Held: Te scope of the duty of care extended to a duty to avoid causing pure
economic loss consequential on defects in the work.

D lost
Muirhead v Industrial Tank The third defendant manufactured motors for pumps which were incorporated
Specialties Ltd and Others in a tank for the storage of lobsters which was installed at the plaintiff's fish
farm. The motors, being unsuited to UK voltages, cut out and the plaintiff's
entire lobster stock died from lack of oxygen. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia,
damages from the third defendant in negligence for the loss of the lobsters and
the economic loss, including loss of profit, resulting therefrom. The trial judge
held that the third defendant was liable to the plaintiff in respect of the pure
economic loss. The third defendant appealed.
Piers Ashworth QC and G W Lowe (instructed by Hadaway & Hadaway,
Newcastle-upon-Tyne) for the third defendant. Robin Stewart QC and Michael
Heywood (instructed by Crutes, Newcastle-upon-Tyne) for the plaintiff.
Robert Goff LJ, having considered Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1
AC 520, said that damages in negligence for pure economic loss could be
recovered only if there were such a very close proximity of relationship
between the parties and reliance by the plaintiff on the defendant that the
defendant was to be taken voluntarily to have assumed direct responsibility to
the plaintiff. The ultimate purchaser of goods supplied unde a chain of ordinary
sale contracts could recover such damages only from his immediate vendor,
since such proximity and reliance would not arise between him and the
manufacturer, and accordingly the plaintiff could not recover his economic loss
from the third defendant. Nourse LJ, occurring , said that in the absence of
close proximity and reliance, the court was bound by Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd
v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] QB 27 not to award damages for pure
economic loss.
O'Connor LJ, concurring, said that Spartan Steel could not be distinguished,
and had not been overruled by implication in Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd.
Appealed allowed in part with one-half costs. Leave to appeal refused.
Simaan General Contracting Co v The plaintiffs, the main contractors under a contract for a new building in Abu
Pilkington Glass Ltd Dhabi, sub-contracted the supply and erecton of curtain walling. The
defendants contracted to supply green glass units for incorporation in the
curtain walling. They were not in contractual relationship with the plaintiffs. The
units were alleged by the building owner to be defective in their colouring. The
plaintiffs eventually rejected them and instructed the sub-contractors to replace
them with approved panels. The plaintiffs claimed against the defendants
damages for negligence in respect of the loss they had suffered as a result of
the supply of the defective units. The question whether the defendants, as
specified suppliers of the units, owed to the plaintiffs, as the main contractors,
a duty to take reasonable care to avoid defects in the units which had caused
them loss was tried as a preliminary issue. Judge Newey answered it in favour
of the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed.
David M Harris (instructed by C R Bayley, Pilkington legal departmen, St
Helens) for the defendants. Romie Tager (instructed by Michael Conn & Co)
for the defendants.
Bingham LJ said that a claim might lie in negligence for recovery of economic
loss alone. The defendants owed the plaintiffs a conventional duty of care to
avoid physical injury or damage to person or property. The planitiffs could not
be said to have relied on the defendants. Where a specialist sub-contractor
was nominated by a building owner it might be possible to conclude that the
specialist had assumed a direct responsibility to the building owner. There was
no basis on which the defendants could be said to have assumed a
responsibility to the plaintiffs. Junior Books v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520
had been interpreted as arising from physical damage. That interpretation was
binding on the court. The authorities did not establish a general rule that claims
in negligence might succeed on proof of foreseeable economic loss even
where no damage to property and no proprietary or possessory interest had
been shown. It was a type of claim against which the law had consistently set
its face. If the units could be regarded as damaged at all, the damage occurred
at the time of manufacture, and the plaintiffs had not shown any interest in
them at that tme.
Dulieu v White [1901] 2 KB 669 Lord
By her Donaldson
statementofofLymington MR and
claim A. alleged Dillon
that LJshe
while agreed.
was sitting behind the bar
of her husband's public-house (she then being pregnant) B.'s servant
negligently drove a pair-horse van belonging to B. into the public-house. A. in
consequence sustained a severe shock which made her seriously ill and led to
her suffering a miscarriage. (She gave premature birth to a child. In
consequence of the shock sustained by the plaintiff the said child was born an
idiot.)

Held, that the statement of claim disclosed a good cause of action against B.
Per Kennedy, J.: Mere fright not followed by consequent physical damage will
not support an action, but if it is followed by consequent physical damage,
then, if the fright was the natural result of the defendants' negligence, an action
lies, and the physical damage is not too remote to support it.
McFarlane v. E.E. Caledonian An oil worker, the claimant, claimed damages for psychiatric injury, after
Limited [1994] 2 All ER 1 witnessing the destruction caused by a fire on an oil rig from his workplace on
a support boat 100 metres away. The fire killed 164 men although the
claimant was uninjured. It was held that the claimant was owed a duty of care
on the ground that he was a participant in an event and had reasonable been
in fear for his life and safety and the impact of the events had caused shock.
The defendants appealed. Held, that the claimant was entitled to damages
because he was more than a mere bystander to the event.

White V Chief Constable Of This case also relates to the Hillsborough disaster. In this instance police
Yorkshire Police officers were seeking compensation on the basis that they had suffered
psychiatric illness as a result of rescuing victims after the crush. They claimed
that because they were rescuers they should be treated as ‗primary victims'.
The distinction between primary victim and secondary victim was made in the
Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, where all claimants were
secondary victims. In Page v Smith this distinction was further developed.

The Court of Appeal in Frost v Chief Constable of Yorkshire Police [1997] 3


WLR 1194 (by a majority) had held that the police officers who were allowed to
recover for their psychiatric illness as a result of carrying out their professional
duties as rescuers and/or employees at the disastrous Hillsborough football
stadium stampede were classifiable as primary victims.

The House of Lords however, held that for the purposes of distinction between
primary and secondary victims, that rescuers were not in a special position in
the law. They could only recover if they were exposed to physical danger as
primary victims. Since they were not endangered in the discharge of their
service or in rescuing, as employees and/or rescuers, the police officers were
only secondary victims. As secondary victims they, like the bystanders or
spectators, were not entitled to recover damages for their psychiatric illness.

McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1983] 1 A mother received news that her family had been involved in a car accident.
AC 410 On hearing the news she rushed to the hospital to find her injured family and
be told that her son had been killed. The mother suffered severe shock,
depression and personality change. The defendant admitted negligence. The
issue was whether the mother could succeed in her claim because she had not
been present at the accident or it aftermath. Held, she could succeed at it was
reasonably foreseeable

Alcock v. The Chief Constable of Relatives of those killed or injured at a football stadium claimed damages
South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310 against the police for causing them nervous shock resulting in psychiatric
illness. The relatives saw and heard the tragedy via live television or radio
broadcasts. The police admitted liability in negligence but denied any duty of
care to the plaintiffs. The issue was whether the relatives were entitled in law to
damages. The House of Lords held that a claimant for damages for psychiatric
injury must pass two tests.
The injury must be reasonably foreseeable (shown by a close tie of love and
affection between the individuals). Second, the claimant must have been
proximate to the incident or its aftermath at the time the incident occurred and
the shock must have resulted from seeing or hearing the incident or its
aftermath.
Greatorex v Greatorex and On 11 April 1996 the First Defendant had been drinking with a friend, who is
Others [2000] The Times LR May the Part 20 Defendant in the proceedings. The First Defendant was driving a
5, QBD car belonging to the Part 20 Defendant, who had given him permission to drive
the car and was a passenger in it. Whilst overtaking on a blind brow the First
Defendant negligently drove over on the wrong side of the road and was hit by
an oncoming vehicle. The Part 20 Defendant was uninjured. The First
Defendants head was injured and he was unconscious for about an hour.
Initially he was trapped inside the car. The police, ambulance and fire services
attended the scene of the accident.
Among the fire officers who attended the scene was the First Defendants
father, the Claimant. At the time of the accident he was employed as a Leading
Fire Officer. He was nowhere near the scene of the accident when it
happened. He went there in the course of his employment. Having been
informed that his son has been injured, he attended to him. The Claimant was
later diagnosed as suffering long- term post traumatic stress disorder as a
result of the accident.
The First Defendant was subsequently convicted of driving a motor vehicle
without due care and attention, driving without insurance, and failing to provide
a specimen.
The Claimant brought proceedings claiming damages against the First
Defendant, his son. Since the First Defendant was uninsured at the time of the
accident, the Motor Insurers Bureau was joined as a Second Defendant. The
Second Defendant in turn brought proceedings against the Part 20 Defendant
seeking an indemnity against him.
There was no duty of care owed by a victim of self-inflicted injuries towards a
secondary party who suffered only psychiatric illness as a result of having
witnessed the event causing the injuries or its aftermath.
The policy considerations against there being such a duty owed clearly
outweighed the arguments in favour, since to impose liability for causing
psychiatric harm in such circumstances, particularly where the parties were
members of the same family, would be potentially productive of acute family
strife.
Dooley -v- Cammell Laird and Co The plaintiff was a crane driver whose load of timber, drums of paint, and bags
Ltd; 1951 of bolts etc, and without any fault on his part, fell into the hold of a ship as they
were being lowered along with scaffolding. No one was actually injured but the
plaintiff knew that fellow workers were then in the hold, and he suffered
nervous shock. He sued his employers saying that the sling was either
overloaded or defective in breach of shipbuilding regulations and the common
law duties to provide safe plant and a safe system.
Held: The plaintiff was entitled to recover in those circumstances. Cammell
Laird were in breach of the regulations. one of which was made as a protection
against the risk of bodily injury which included injury to the nerves, the nerves
being a part of the body.
Donovan J said: ―I suppose I may reasonably infer that his fellow workmen
down the hold were his friends,‖ Mr Dooley was the unwitting agent of the
defendant‘s negligence. He was the crane driver who, without any fault, was
party to an accident which could have killed his fellow workers. It was his
activity in operating the crane which caused the actual and potential damage. It
was that activity which brought him into the category of persons for whom the
defendants owed a duty of care, not really any question of relationships of
friendships.
Hunter v. British Coal Corporation An employee, Mr. Hunter, hit a high pressure water hydrant with the vehicle he
[1998] 2 All E.R. 97 was driving at the time, fracturing the hydrant and thereby threatening to flood
the mine. One of his fellow employees, Mr. Carter, attempted to help him shut
off the valve. They did not succeed and Mr. Hunter went to fetch further
assistance. When he was 30 yards away the hydrant exploded, killing Mr.
Carter. Mr. Hunter initially assumed that Mr. Carter was unharmed, but when
he was informed of the death 15 minutes later he blamed himself and suffered
a shock which triggered a two-year depressive illness. The trial judge found as
a fact that the accident (and the death) had been caused by the fault of the
defendant employer, which had failed to observe the relevant regulations about
the siting of the hydrant, and had not been caused or contributed to by Mr.
Hunter in any way. Could Mr. Hunter recover damages from his employer for
the shock which he suffered on hearing about a death which he did not witness
but for which he felt himself to be responsible? The trial judge held not and the
majority of the Court of Appeal agreed, but their reasoning demonstrates some
of the confusion surrounding this topic. It was accepted by all members of the
Court of Appeal that if Mr. Hunter was classified as a secondary victim he
would fail in his claim for nervous shock since he lacked, amongst other things,
the necessary physical proximity required by the House of Lords in Alcock: he
had witnessed neither the accident itself nor its aftermath. The only way in
which he could recover was if he could bring himself within some other
category, either (i) because he could be regarded as a primary victim or (ii)
purely on the basis of the contractual duty of care which the defendant owed
him as his employer.

Attia v British Gas plc The plaintiff brought an action for damages from the defendants for nervous
shock. She alleged that she had suffered a psychiatric illness caused by
witnessing the destruction of her home by a fire caused by the defendants'
negligence while installing central heating to her home. The judge decided as a
preliminary issue on assumed facts that the plaintiff could not recover
damages and dismissed the action.
The plaintiff appealed.
David Tucker (instructed by Fremont & Co) for the plaintiff. Janet Turner
(instructed by the solicitor, British Gas plc (North Thames)) for the defendants.
Dillon LJ said that the issues at trial, assuming the facts pleaded including the
psychiatric illness were proved, would have been (a) causation and (b)
foreseeability of the damage as a question of remoteness. If the plaintiff could
surmount those two hurdles there was no good reason why the law should
refuse to allow her to recover damages for nervous shock. His Lordship was
not prepared to hold that the fact that the shock which caused the plaintiff's
psychiatric illness was caused by damage to property must preclude her from
recovering damages for nervous shock, even if it was reasonably foreseeable
that she might suffer psychiatric illness as a consequence of the defendants'
negligence in causing the fire in her house. Whether the plaintiff's assumed
illness caused by the shock was or was not a foreseeable consequence of the
defendants' negligence must depend on the actual evidence given at the trial.
His Lordship would set aside the judge's order and allow the action to proceed
to trial.
Woolf and Bingham LJJ delivered judgments concurring with Dillon LJ.
Appeal allowed.
Walters v North Glamorgan NHS The claimant‘s 10-month-old son was in hospital suffering from liver failure
Trust ([2002] All ER (D)7 (Dec) which was the result of the defendant‘s admitted negligence in failing to
CA) diagnose his condition. The claimant was with her son when he had an
epileptic seizure which the defendant‘s doctors told her was very unlikely to
have caused any serious damage. The child‘s condition deteriorated and he
was taken by ambulance to another hospital for a liver transplant, followed by
the claimant in her car. On arrival she was told that her son had in fact suffered
severe brain damage, which she was told on the following day was so severe
that he would have no quality of life. She agreed to his life support system
being turned off and he died. It was agreed that the claimant had suffered
shock and a recognised psychiatric illness, namely pathological grief reaction,
as a result of what she had witnessed and experienced over a period of some
36 hours between her son‘s seizure and his death. Could this be categorised
as injury by shock – that is ‗sudden appreciation by sight or sound of a
horrifying event, which violently agitates the mind‘? Yes, held the Court of
Appeal. A realistic view should be taken of what constitutes the necessary
‗event‘. In this case there was a seamless tale with an obvious beginning and
an equally obvious end. It was played out over a period of 36 hours, which for
the claimant was undoubtedly one drawn-out experience. Accordingly, the 36-
hour period constituted one entire event, albeit made up of discreet events. It
was a short step for the Court to find that such a step was ‗horrifying‘

W v Essex County Council (1998) [Tort – negligence - duty of care –no duty situations - statutory duty - duty of
HL care, to whom]
D, the council placed a known sex offender with foster parents C. C‘s children
were abused. C made it clear that they were anxious not to put their children
at risk by having a known sex abuser in their home, the social worker and D
knew that and also knew that the boy placed had already committed an act or
acts of sex abuse. The risk was obvious and the abuse happened.

Held: It was plainly arguable that there was a duty of care owed to the parents
and a breach of that duty by the defendants.

C won.
Ferguson v John Dawson & Ferguson was employed by John Dawson & Partners 'on the lump' [a device,
Partners (Contractors) Ltd now prohibited by statute, for avoiding the payment of national insurance and
income tax]. Whilst working on the roof of a building Ferguson fell 15 feet and
was seriously injured. He claimed damages from John Dawson & Partners for
his injuries. In order to be able to claim damages from John Dawson &
Partners he had to show that he was an employee of theirs; they claimed that
he was self employed and that, therefore, they were not liable for his injuries.

The issue before the court was what terms governed the contract between
Ferguson and John Dawson & Partners.

In my judgment, on the tests laid down in the authorities, all of this indicates
beyond doubt that the reality of the relationship was employer and employee: a
contract of service...

My own view would have been that a declaration by the parties, even if it be
incorporated in the contract, that the workman is to be, or is to be deemed to
be, self-employed, an independent contractor, ought to be wholly disregarded -
not merely treated as not being conclusive - if the remainder of the contractual
terms, governing the realities of the relationship, show the relationship of
employer and employee...

Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison Contract of service; employer-employee-relationship: the employer says what
v. McDonald 1952 and how to do it.
Contract of services: the employer says what to do; independent contractor.
'Business integration test'.
Problem: is the person fully integrated or only an accessory?
Lord Denning brought up this question, but he was not the only one who found
it relevant.

Ready Mixed Concrete (South RMC is in the business of selling concrete, previously they had hired a
East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions contractor to deliever the concrete to the customers, but had terminated his
and National Insurance [1968] contract and decided to offer the jobs to RMC's current staffs. Mr Latimer
signed up for the hire-purchase agreement for the lorry and started to deliever
concrete for RMC. The employer RMC argued that because Mr Latimer was an
independent contractor they needed not pay for his national insurance.

MacKenna J reversed the finding of the lower court and held that Mr Latimer
was in fact a "small business man" and concluded that the contract was not of
service, but of carriage.
Test for contract of service:

Is the worker subject to a right of control?


Did the worker provide personal service in return for remuneration?
Are the other provisions of the contract consistent with a contract of service?
MacKenna J also placed significant emphasis on the existence of
wages/remuneration, the absence of which there would not be consideration,
hence a contract would not have been formed.
Mersey Docks and Harbour Board The appellants hired out a crane to the respondents for the purpose of
v. Coggins & Griffiths (Liverpool) unloading a ship; they also provided a driver for this crane upon the terms that
Ltd. 1947 he should be for the duration of the contract 'the servant of the hirers'.
In fact although the respondents supervised this man's work, they had no
power of control over his actual management of the machine.
Through negligent handling of it he injured someone.

The defendant was liable.

The right of ultimate control over the driver's management of the crane was
theirs.
It lies upon the general employer to establish that the vicarious responsibility
has been shifted from his shoulders to those of the special employer.
Principle: in the case that one employer lends a servant to another it depends
on whichever of the two had the right of control over the servant's activities at
the time the injury was caused.

Ormrod v. Crossville Motor A car should be transported to Monte Carlo by an agent.


Service 1953 The driver's negligence caused an accident.

The principal was responsible for this accident in the course of a principal-
agent-relationship.

Even if it was partly for the agent's benefit.


Morgans v. Launchbury 1973 A husband used his wife's car; it was ensured by the wife.
House of Lords The wife said, 'If you get drunk, get a friend to drive you'.
He asked his friend, his friend did not want to.
So he drove the car himself and had an accident, both he and his friend were
killed and some people were injured.

The man was not an agent.

He did not do something specific for his wife.


It would be the same if he had used it for work (only if he was doing something
specific his wife asked him to do).
Husband and wife are not necessarily agent and principal.
Century Insurance v. Northern A patrol lorry driver smoked a cigarette while driving, which caused an
Ireland Road Transport Board explosion.
1942 House of Lords Is the smoking of a cigarette in the course of employment or not?

It was not too far from the employment, the driver did act as an employee.
Limpus v. London General A bus driver racing to a stop to collect passengers deliberately obstructed the
Omnibus Co. 1862 driver of a bus of a rival company, overturning the latter's vehicle.
The bus driver had been given instructions against obstructing other buses.

The defendants were liable.

The driver was acting within the course of his employment at the time; it was
immaterial whether his act was forbidden.
Profit for the company when the bus is first (more passengers).
Otherwise, companies could exculpate themselves simply by prohibiting their
servants from committing any torts during their service.

Warren v Henley's Ltd (1948) Employer not held liable for the assault of the employee because this was an
act of personal vengeance and so was outside the course of employment.

Heasemans v. Clarity Cleaning The defendant was an office cleaning company which had a contract to clean
1987 Court of Appeal the plaintiff's office.
One of the women cleaning the office used the telephone (bill: L 1,411).
Has she done this in course of her employment?

The employers were not responsible.

It was not part of her job.


There must be a line where the employers are protected.
The courts have become more strict in holding employees liable.
This case was a change of attitude towards vicarious liability.
Harrison v Michelin Tyre Co Ltd The plaintiff employee was working on the duck-board of his machine. The
[1985] 1 All ER 918. fellow employee (let us call him the joker) was pushing a hand-truck along a
passageway marked by chalk lines. In order to startle the plaintiff the joker
turned his truck slightly towards the plaintiff and overstepped the chalk lines by
some two inches. The truck caught the edge of the duck-board, tipped it
upwards and caused the plaintiff to be thrown off. He suffered injuries

The joker had been authorised to push the truck and was in the course of so
doing when the urge to play the practical joke overcame him. The matter was
quite simple; was the joker acting in the course of his employment, or had he
embarked, in the words of Parke B in Joel v Morrison (1834) 6 C & P 501, on a
frolic of his own? Comyn J took the view that the employer was vicariously
liable for the act of the employee-joker. The task was admitted to be difficult,
but it is, with respect, suggested that, whatever the reasoning or the difficulty,
the result was correct.

Storey v. Ashton 1869 A driver took a different route to make a frolic of his own.
On this way he caused an accident because of his negligence.
No liability of the company.
Though this was just a little detour, the driver was carrying out his own
business.
Rose v. Plenty 1976 Court of Children were helping the milk men.
Appeal A boy was injured.
The company was responsible.
They had a benefit out of the boy's work (the milk comes earlier).
Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] Hesley Hall was a boarding house for students with severe emotional
UKHL 22 problems, the warden Mr Graine had supervision of the pupils at Hesley Hall
and their daily routine. It transpired during the early 90s that Mr Graine had
sexually abused these children and they have suffered psychiatric injuries.
Hesley Hall was sued in all sorts of tort from battery to negligence.

If the court was to uphold the Salmond test which required:


The wrongful act must be authorised by the employer; or
The wrongful mode was authorised.
This draconian rule meant that an employee engaging in a criminal act (such
as the current case) will never be acting in the course of employment, would
therefore in the context of the current case cause significant injustice. In the
Court of Appeal the judges followed the case of Trotman and held that Hesley
Hall is not liable.
When the case went up to the House of Lords, the Law Lords unanimously
held that vicarious liability is established, hence overruling Trotman. The
House of Lords found:

The purpose of the warden's duty was to develop trust with the children, that
trust gave him access to the boys and allowed the abuse;
There was geographical and temporal proximity to the employment, as the
abused occured on the premise of his employment and during the time which
he should be carrying out his employment duties;
There is an inherent risk of sexual abuse in these types of occupations, for the
courts to find Hesley Hall liable could potentially be a deterrent to potential
abusers.
Lord Steyn whose judgment is the most often cited said that the warden's
criminal acts are inextricably interwoven with his duties, hence it is closely
connect to his work therefore Hesley Hall is liable under vicarious liability.
Lord Hobhouse on the otherhand reject the whole notion of vicarious liability,
and argued that Hesley Hall owned a direct duty to the children, therefore they
are directly liable in tort for systemic negligence.
Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold A father directed his son parking a lorry, but by negligence of the son, the
Storage Ltd. 1957 father was injured.
The son was the employee of the company.
The company sued the son for the full money they had to pay in damages.

They succeded.
Mostly employers do not sue their employees but it can be done.
Jones v Livox Quarries [1952] 2 The claimant worked in the defendant‘s quarry. One lunch break he hitched a
QB 608 Court of Appeal lift back to the canteen by standing on the tow bar of a traxcavator. The driver
of the traxcavator was unaware that the claimant had jumped on the back and
it was against company rules to stand on the back of the traxcavators.
Unfortunately a dumper truck, driven recklessly by another employee, crashed
into the back of the traxcavator crushing the claimant‘s legs. Consequently the
claimant had to have his legs amputated.

Held:

The defendant was liable but the claimant was held to be 1/5 to blame under
the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. He had acted against
orders and exposed himself to danger.

―Just as actionable negligence requires the foreseeability of harm to others, so


contributory negligence requires the foreseeability of harm to oneself. A person
is guilty of contributory negligence if he ought reasonably to have foreseen that,
if he did not act as a reasonable, prudent man, he might be hurt himself: and in
his reckonings he must take into account the possibility of others being
careless.‖

Dann v Hamilton [1939] 1 KB 509 The Claimant was injured when she was a willing passenger in the car driven
by the Mr Hamilton. He had been drinking and the car was involved in a
serious crash which killed him. In a claim for damages the Defendant raised
the defence of volenti non fit injuria in that in accepting the lift knowing of his
drunken condition she had voluntarily accepted the risk.

Held:
The defence was unsuccessful. The claimant was entitled to damages.

Asquith J:
"There may be cases in which the drunkenness of the driver at the material
time is so extreme and so glaring that to accept a lift from him is like engaging
in an intrinsically and obviously dangerous occupation, intermeddling with an
unexploded bomb or walking on the edge of an unfenced cliff. It is not
necessary to decide whether in such a case the maxim 'volenti non fit injuria'
would apply, for in the present case I find as a fact that the driver's degree of
intoxication fell short of this degree".

Froom v Butcher [1976] 1 QB 286 The Claimant was injured in a car accident due to the negligence of the
Defendant. The Claimant was not wearing a seat belt. There was
disagreement as to the apportionment of loss under the Law Reform
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. Lord Denning set out guidance as to
apportionment of damages in such cases.
Owens v Brimmell [1977] QBD Remedies - contributory negligence - 20% deduction for not wearing a seat belt
and allowing himself to be carried by drunken driver]
C and D together in D's car drank considerable amounts of beer in a pub.
Whilst driving home C did not wear a seat belt. D negligently caused an
accident, whereby C was injured.

Held: The principle was recognised that a passenger can be held to have been
contributorily negligent if he rides with a driver who he knows has consumer
alcohol in such quantity as is likely to impair to a dangerous degree that
driver's capacity to drive properly and safely.

On the facts, the passenger was found guilty of 20% contributory negligence.

Harrison v British Railways Board The court said that an injured rescuer could sue the person who created the
(1981) danger. The rescuer was found to be contributory negligent for not following
established work procedures.
Moriarty v Brookes [1834] EWHC The defendant was a publican. He argued with a customer over a disputed
Exch J79 payment and struck him causing a cut below his eye. The publican argued he
had asked the customer to leave and he had refused to do so and the force
was lawfully applied in ejecting him from the pub.

Held:
The defendant had used excessive force. The Lord Lyndhurst CB set the
definition of a wound as
"The definition of a wound in criminal cases is an injury to the person, by which
the skin is broken. If the skin is broken, and there was a bleeding, that is a
wound"
Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v The claimants were brothers who were qualified shotfirers employed by the
Shatwell [1965] AC 656 House of defendant. They were injured as a result of an explosion at the defendant's
Lords quarry caused by the brothers' negligence. They had insufficient wire to test a
circuit to allow them to test from a shelter. Another worker had gone to fetch
more wire but the brothers decided to go ahead and test with the shorter wire.
Each brother claimed against the defendant based on their employer's
vicarious liability for the negligence and breach of statutory duty of the other
brother. The defendant raised the defence of volenti non fit injuria in that the
brothers the brothers had full knowledge of the risk and were acting against
express instructions. At trial the judge held that the defence of volenti could not
apply where there was breach of a statutory duty. This was upheld in the Court
of Appeal.

Held:

The appeal was allowed. The brothers had deliberately acted in defiance of the
employer's express instructions in full knowledge of the risks. The workers
were under the statutory duty not the employer. The employer had been
instrumental in bringing in the statutory regulations and ensured all workers
were aware of them. They had also previously dismissed a worker for flouting
the regulations.
Revill v Newbery [1996] 2 WLR Mr Newbery was a 76 year old man. He owned an allotment which had a shed
239 Court of Appeal in which he kept various valuable items. The shed was subject to frequent
break ins and vandalism. Mr Newbery had taken to sleeping in his shed armed
with a 12 bore shot gun.

Mr Revill was a 21 year old man who on the night in question, accompanied by
a Mr Grainger, went to the shed at 2.00 am in order to break in. Mr Newbery
awoke, picked up the shot gun and fired it through a small hole in the door to
the shed. The shot hit Mr Revill in the arm. It passed right through the arm and
entered his chest. Both parties were prosecuted for the criminal offences
committed. Mr Revill pleaded guilty and was sentenced. Mr Newbery was
acquitted of wounding. Mr Revill brought a civil action against Mr Newbery for
the injuries he suffered. Mr Newbery raised the defence of ex turpi causa,
accident, self-defence and contributory negligence.

Held:
The Claimants action was successful but his damages were reduced by 2/3
under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 to reflect his
responsibility for his own injuries. An occupier cannot treat a burglar as an
outlaw

Vellino v Chief Constable of The Claimant was a known offender and had a string of convictions. He was
Greater Manchester [2002] 1 seriously injured when he jumped out of a second floor window having just
WLR 218 Court of Appeal been arrested. The police were aware that he was likely to escape and had
done so on several previous occasions. They were also aware that such
activity was dangerous but did nothing to prevent him from jumping. The
Claimant suffered a fractured skull, brain damage and tetraplegia which
rendered him totally dependent on others for support. He brought an action
against the police arguing that having arrested him, they owed him a duty of
care to prevent him injuring himself. The Defendant denied owing a duty of
care and also raised the defence of ex turpi causa in that it was a criminal
offence for an arrested person to abscond. The trial judge held that ex turpi
causa excluded the imposition of a duty of care. The Claimant appealed.

Held:

2:1 The appeal was dismissed.

Sir Murray Stuart-Smith identified four principles relating to the maxim ex turpi
causa:
1. The operation of the principle arises where the claimant's claim is founded
upon his own criminal or immoral act. The facts which give rise to the claim
must be inextricably linked with the criminal activity. It is not sufficient if the
criminal activity merely gives occasion for tortious conduct of the Defendant.

2. The principle is one of public policy; it is not for the benefit of the Defendant.
Since if the principle applies, the cause of action does not arise, the
Defendant's conduct is irrelevant. There is no question of proportionality
between the conduct of the Claimant and Defendant.

3. In the case of criminal conduct this has to be sufficiently serious to merit the
application of the principle. Generally speaking a crime punishable with
imprisonment could be expected to qualify. If the offence is criminal, but
relatively trivial, it is in any event difficult to see how it could be integral to the
Ogwo v Taylor [1987] 3 WLR The Defendant attempted to burn off paint from the fascia boards beneath the
1145 House of Lords eaves of his house with a blow lamp and in so doing set fire to the premises.
The fire brigade were called and the Claimant, an acting leading fireman, and a
colleague entered the house wearing breathing apparatus and the usual
fireman's protective clothing and armed with a hose. The two firemen were
able, with the aid of a step- ladder, to squeeze through a small hatch to get into
the roof space. The heat within the roof space was intense. The Claimant
suffered serious burn injuries to his upper body and face from scalding steam
which must have penetrated his protective clothing.

Held:
A duty of care was owed to a professional fireman. There was no requirement
that the risk be exceptional. The defence of volenti had no application.

Lord Bridge:
"The duty of professional firemen is to use their best endeavours to extinguish
fires and it is obvious that, even making full use of all their skills, training and
specialist equipment, they will sometimes be exposed to unavoidable risks of
injury, whether the fire is described as "ordinary" or "exceptional." If they are
not to be met by the doctrine of volenti, which would be utterly repugnant to our
contemporary notions of justice, I can see no reason whatever why they should
be held at a disadvantage as compared to the layman entitled to invoke the
principle of the so-called "rescue" cases."

Cunningham v Reading FC [1991] D liable to police injured by concrete loosened from terraces. D neglected to
Times LR 153 take precautions against clearly foreseeable acts of violent supporters.
Tomlinson v Congleton Borough The defendant owned Brereton Heath Country Park. It had previously been a
Council [2003] 3 WLR 705 House sand quarry and they transformed it in to a country park and opened it up for
of Lords public use. The defendants had created a lake on the park which was
surrounded by sandy banks. In the hot weather many visitors came to the park.
Swimming was not permitted in the lake and notices were posted at the
entrance saying ―Dangerous water. No swimming‖. However despite this,
many people did use the lake for swimming. Rangers were employed and on
occasions sought to prevent swimming but some of the visitors would be rude
to the rangers‘ attempts to prevent them and many continued to swim. The
claimant was injured when he dived into shallow water and broke his neck. At
the Court of Appeal it was held that he was a trespasser despite the repeated
trespass and inadequate steps to prevent him swimming. They also stated that
the warning signs may have acted as an allurement to macho young men. The
Court of Appeal was of the opinion that since the introduction of the Occupiers
Liability Act 1984, the courts should not strain to imply a licence. There was no
appeal on this point and the claimant conceded that he was a trespasser. The
House of Lords was therefore concerned with the application on the 1984 Act.
The Court of Appeal had held that the council were liable but reduced the
damages by 2/3 under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.
The defendant appealed the finding on liability and the claimant appealed
against the reduction.

House of Lords held:

The Council were not liable.

No risk arose from the state of the premises as required under s.1(1)(a)
Occupiers Liability Act 1984. The risk arose from the claimant‘s own action. He
was a person of full capacity who voluntarily and without pressure or
inducement engaged in an activity which had an inherent risk. Even if there
was a risk form the state of the premises, the risk was not one against which
the council would reasonably be expected to offer the claimant some protection
Keown v Coventry Healthcare No Occupiers‘
under Liability
s.1(3)(C). – Claimant
In reaching put himself
this conclusion at risk
Lord by indulging
Hoffman looked in
at athe
NHS Trust, CA (Civ Div) 2/2/2006 dangerous activity. An 11-year-old child who had climbed the outside of a fire
escape was not at risk of suffering injury by reason of any danger due to the
state of the premises within the Occupiers Liability Act 1984 s.1(1)(a) but had
put himself at risk through his own choice to indulge in a dangerous activity. If
there was a danger attributable to the state of the premises, thus giving rise to
a potential duty, the content of the duty might vary according to whether the
trespasser was a child or an adult, but until that point was reached, then in the
general run of cases, the age of the trespasser was not relevant.
Wheat v Lacon [1966] AC 552 The claimant and her family stayed at a public house, The Golfer‘s Arms in
Great Yarmouth, for a holiday. Unfortunately her husband died when he fell
down the stairs and hit his head. The stairs were steep and narrow. The
handrail stopped two steps from the bottom of the stairs and there was no bulb
in the light. The claimant brought an action under the Occupiers Liability Act
1957 against the Brewery company, Lacon, which owned the freehold of The
Golfer‘s Arms and against the Managers of the Pub, Mr & Mrs Richardson,
who occupied the pub as a licensee.

Held:
Both the Richardsons and Lacon were occupiers for the purposes of the
Occupiers Liability Act 1957 and therefore both owed the common duty of care.
It is possible to have more than one occupier. The question of whether a
particular person is an occupier under the Act is whether they have
occupational control. Lacon had only granted a license to the Richardsons and
had retained the right to repair which gave them a sufficient degree of control.
There is no requirement of physical occupation. However, it was found that
Lacon was not in breach of duty since the provision of light bulbs would have
been part of the day to day management duties of the Richardsons. Since the
Richardsons were not party to the appeal the claimant‘s action failed.

Holden v White [1982] 2 All ER The claimant, a milkman, was injured on the defendant‘s land by a manhole
328 Court of Appeal cover which broke when he stepped on it. At the time he was delivering milk to
the house of a third party who had a right of way across the defendant‘s land. It
was held that he was not entitled to claim against the defendant since he was
exercising a right of way and was not therefore a lawful visitor of the defendant.

Edwards v Railways Executive A particular spot on a railway was used as a short cut on a regular basis. The
[1952] AC 737 House of Lords fence was repaired on several occasions and whenever it was reported to have
been interfered with. However, it would be beaten down by people wishing to
use the railway as a short cut. Witness testimony was to the effect that the
fence was in good repair the morning of the incident.

Held:
No licence was implied. The Defendant had taken reasonable steps to prevent
people coming onto the railway.

Lord Goddard:
"Repeated trespass of itself confers no licence"

Lowery v Walker [1911] AC 10 The Claimant was injured by a horse when using a short cut across the
House of Lords defendant‘s field. The land had been habitually used as a short cut by
members of the public for many years and the defendant had taken no steps to
prevent people coming on to the land. The defendant was aware that the horse
was dangerous.

Held:
The defendant was liable. Whilst the claimant did not have express permission
to be on the land, a licence was implied through repeated trespass and the
defendant‘s acquiescence.
Ferguson v Welsh [1987] 1 WLR Sedgefield District Council, in pursuance of a development plan to build
1553 House of Lords sheltered accommodation, engaged the services of Mr Spence to demolish a
building. It was a term of the contract that the work was not to be sub-
contracted out. In breach of this term, Mr Spence engaged the services of the
Welsh brothers to carry out the demolition who in turn engaged the services of
Mr Ferguson to assist. Mr Ferguson suffered serious injury resulting in
permanent paralysis when a wall he was standing on collapsed due to the
unsafe practices operated by the Welsh brothers. He brought an action against
the Council, Mr Spence and the Welsh brothers. The trial judge held that the
Welsh Brothers were liable but that Mr Spence and the Council were not liable.
Mr Ferguson appealed against the finding against the Council since the Welsh
Brothers (or Mr Spence) had the funds or insurance to meet liability.

Held:
The appeal was dismissed.
Mr Ferguson was a lawful visitor despite the clause forbidding sub-contracting
since Mr Spence would have apparent or ostensible authority to invite him on
to the land. However, the danger arose from the unsafe system of work
adopted by the Welsh Brothers not the state of the premises. Whilst there was
evidence that Mr Spence had sub-contracted demolition work to those
executing unsafe practices on previous occasions, there was no evidence that
the Council were aware of this.

Phipps v Rochester Corporation A 5 year old boy was walking across some open ground with his 7 year old
[1955] 1 QB 450 sister. He was not accompanied by an adult. He was injured when he fell into a
trench. The Corporation were not held liable as an occupier is entitled to
assume that prudent parents would not allow their children to go
unaccompanied to places where it is unsafe.

Devlin J on duty owed to children


―The law recognises a sharp difference between children and adults. But there
might well I think, be an equally marked distinction between ‗big children‘ and
‗little children‘. …The occupier is not entitled to assume that all children will,
unless they are allured, behave like adults; but he is entitled to assume that
normally little children will be accompanied by a responsible person. …The
responsibility for the safety of little children must rest primarily upon the
parents; it is their duty to see that such children are not allowed to wander
about by themselves, or at least to satisfy themselves that the places to which
they do allow their children to go unaccompanied are safe. It would not be
socially desirable if parents were, as a matter of course, able to shift the
burden of looking after their children from their own shoulders to those persons
who happen to have accessible pieces of land.‖
Roles v Nathan [1963] 1 WLR Two brothers, Donald and Joseph Roles were engaged by Mr Nathan as
1117 Court of Appeal chimney sweeps to clean the flues in in a central heating system at
Manchester Assembly Rooms. The flues had become dangerous due to
carbon monoxide emissions. A heating engineer had warned them of the
danger, however, the brothers told him they knew of the dangers and had been
flue inspectors for many years. The engineer monitored the situation
throughout the day and at one point ordered everybody out of the building due
to the levels of carbon monoxide. The brothers ignored this advice and
continued with their work. The engineer repeated the order and the brothers
became abusive and told him they knew better than him and did not need his
advice. The engineer forcibly removed them from the building. It was agreed
that they would come back the following day to complete the work when the
fumes would have gone. They were also told they should not do the work whilst
the fires were lighted. However, the next day the brothers were found dead in
the basement having returned the previous evening to complete the work when
the fires were lit. Their widows brought an action under the Occupiers Liability
Act 1957.

Held:
The defendant was not liable. The dangers were special risks ordinarily
incident to their calling. The warnings issued were clear and the brothers would
have been safe had they heeded the warnings.

Salmon v Seafarer Restaurants The defendant owned a fish and chip shop. One night he left the chip fryer on
[1983] 1WLR 1264 and closed the shop for the night. This caused a fire and the fire services were
called to put out the fire. The claimant was a fire man injured in an explosion
whilst fighting the fire. He had been thrown to the ground whilst footing a ladder
on a flat roof. The defendant sought to escape liability by invoking s.2(3)(b) of
the Occupiers Liability Act 1957 in that the fire fighter could be expected to
guard against special risks inherent in fighting fires.

Held:
The defendant was liable. Where it can be foreseen that the fire which is
negligently started is of the type which could require firemen to attend to
extinguish that fire, and where, because of the very nature of the fire, when
they attend they will be at risk even if they exercise all the skill of their calling,
there is no reason why a fireman should be at any disadvantage in claiming
compensation. The duty owed to a fireman was not limited to the exceptional
risks associated with fighting fire but extended to ordinary risks.

AMF International Ltd v Magnet The contractor was to provide and install valuable timber and other specialised
Bowling Ltd (1968) bowling alley equipment. On July 21, 1964 an exceptionally heavy rainstorm
flooded the building and the timber for the building work was seriously
damaged. The court held that the contractor and the building owner were both
occupiers of the building.
Woodward v Mayor of Hastings The defendant school hired cleaners to defrost the ice on the staircase, the
claimant was badly injured after slipping on ice on the staircase.

The court found that this case was different from Haseldine v Daw because
defrosting the stairs did not entail any technical knowledge, it was something
that the school could have done themselves, and therefore ensuring that the
cleaners had done their jobs properly was not unreasonable to expect of the
school authority.
Haseldine v Daw The claimant in this case was injured by a faulty lift, which was just surveyed by
a group of technicians a week before the accident. The claimant purported to
sue the owner of the building.

The court held that the technical and specialist nature of lift mantainance
meant that the qualifty of the survey was not something that the occupiers
could reasonably be expected to verify. Hence the occupiers were not liable.
Rule to exempt liability on the basis of contracting:

The injury must have been caused by the work carried out by the contractor
which they were contracted to do;
It was reasonable for the occupier to employ independant contractor;
The occupier must be reasonably satisfied that the contractor was competent.

Gwilliam v West Hertfordshire The claimant, a 63 year old woman, was injured at a summer fair hosted by
Hospital NHS Trust [2002] EWCA West Hertfordshire Hopsital. She was injured whilst using a ‗splat wall‘
Civ 1041 Court of Appeal whereby participants would bounce off a trampette against a wall and become
attached to the wall by means of Velcro material. The injury occurred as a
result of negligent set up of the equipment. The equipment was provided by a
business called ‗Club Entertainments‘ who were an independent contractor
engaged by the Hospital. Club Entertainment‘s public liability insurance had
expired four days before the incidence and thus they had no cover for the
injury. They agreed to settle her claim for £5,000. Mrs Gwilliam brought an
action against the hospital based on their failure to ensure that the
entertainment arranged was covered by public liability insurance. She claimed
the difference between the £5,000 and what she would have received had they
been covered by insurance.

Held:
The Hospital owed a duty of care Under the Occupiers‘ Liability Act 1957 this
duty did extend to checking whether the independent contractor had insurance
cover since this would be relevant to whether they were competent. However,
there was no breach of duty since the Hospital had enquired and had been told
by Club Entertainment that they had insurance cover. There was no duty to
inspect the insurance documents to ensure that cover was adequate.

Ashdown v Samuel Williams & Held that it is sufficient for an occupier to post a ―clear and unequivocal notice‖
Sons Ltd (1957) at the point of entry excluding liability with respect to non-contractual entrants.
Addie v Dumbreck [1929] AC 358 The defendant owned View Park Colliery which was situated in a field adjacent
House of Lords to a road. There was a fence around the perimeter of the field although there
were large gaps in the fence. The field was frequently used as a short cut to a
railway station and children would use it as a playground. The defendant would
often warn people off the land but the attempts were not effective and no real
attempt was made to ensure that people did not come onto the land. A child
came on to the land and was killed when he climbed onto a piece of haulage
apparatus.

Held:
No duty of care was owed to trespassers to ensure that they were safe when
coming onto the land. The only duty was not to inflict harm wilfully.

Viscount Dunedin:
"In the present case, had the child been a licensee, I would have held the
defenders liable; secus if the complainer had been an adult. But, if the person
is a trespasser, then the only duty the proprietor has towards him is not
maliciously to injure him; he may not shoot him; he may not set a spring gun,
for that is just to arrange to shoot him without personally firing the shot. Other
illustrations of what he may not do might be found, but they all come under the
same head—injury either directly malicious or an acting so reckless as to be
tantamount to malicious acting."

British Railways Board v A six year old boy was electrocuted and suffered severe burns when he
Herrington [1972] AC 877 House wondered from a play park onto a live railway line. The railway line was
of Lords surrounded by a fence however, part of the fence had been pushed down and
the gap created had been used frequently as a short cut to the park. The
defendant was aware of the gap in the fence which had been present for
several months, but had failed to do anything about it. Under existing authority
of Addie v Dumbreck no duty of care was owed to trespassers. However, the
House of Lords departed from their previous decision using the 1966 Practice
Statement and held that the defendant railway company did owe a duty of
common humanity to trespassers.

Lord Pearson:

"It seems to me that the rule in Addie v. Dumbreck has been rendered
obsolete by changes in physical and social conditions and has become an
incumbrance impeding the proper development of the law. With the increase of
the population and the larger proportion living in cities and towns and the
extensive substitution of blocks of flats for rows of houses with gardens or
back yards and quiet streets, there is less playing space for children and so a
greater temptation to trespass. There is less supervision of children, so that
they are more likely to trespass. Also with the progress of technology there are
more and greater dangers for them to encounter by reason of the increased
use of, for instance, electricity, gas, fast moving vehicles, heavy machinery and
poisonous chemicals. There is considerably more need than there used to be
for occupiers to take reasonable steps with a view to deterring persons,
especially children, from trespassing in places that are dangerous for them.

In my opinion the Addie v. Dumbreck formulation of the duly of occupier to


trespasser is plainly inadequate for modern conditions, and its rigid and
restrictive character has impeded the proper development of the common law
in this field. It has become an anomaly and should be discarded."
Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd v Mr English was employed at Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd‘s colliery at
English Glencraig from 27 March 1933. He was repairing an airway leading off the
Mine Jigger Brae, a main haulage road. Between 1:30pm and 2pm he was
going to the pit bottom and the haulage plan was put in motion. He tried to
escape through one of the manholes, but was caught by a rake of hutches and
crushed between it and the side of the road. His family claimed damages. The
company claimed that Mr English‘s own negligence contributed to his death,
because he should have told the person in charge of the machinery, or taken
an alternative route.

House of Lords held unanimously that an employer has a non delegable duty
to create a safe system of work. Even if an employer gives that duty to another
person, they still remain responsible for workplace safety.

Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures [Law and morality - morality shifting over time]
(1934) CA C complained that she could be identified with the character Princess Natasha
in the film 'Rasputin, the Mad Monk'. The princess claimed damages on the
basis that the film suggested that, by reason of her identification with 'Princess
Natasha', she had been seduced by Rasputin.

Held: The princess was awarded £25,000 damages.


It was contended that if the film indicated any relations between Rasputin and
'Natasha' it indicated a rape of Natasha and not a seduction.
Slesser LJ considered the film defamatory whether it suggested rape or
seduction:
―I, for myself, cannot see that from the plaintiff‘s point of view it matters in the
least whether this libel suggests that she has been seduced or ravished. The
question whether she is or is not the more or the less moral seems to me
immaterial in considering this question whether she has been defamed, and for
this reason, that, as has been frequently pointed out in libel, not only is the
matter defamatory if it brings the plaintiff into hatred, ridicule, or contempt by
reason of some moral discredit on her part, but also if it tends to make the
plaintiff be shunned and avoided and that without any moral discredit on her
part. It is for that reason that persons who have been alleged to have been
insane, or to be suffering from certain disease, and other cases where no
direct moral responsibility could be placed upon them, have been held to be
entitled to bring an action to protect their reputation and their honour. One may,
I think, take judicial notice of the fact that a lady of whom it has been said that
she has been ravished, albeit against her will, has suffered in social reputation
and in opportunities of receiving respectable consideration from the world.‖
Later he added:
'When this woman is defamed in her sexual purity I do not think that the
precise manner in which she has been despoiled of her innocence and virginity
is a matter which a jury can properly be asked to consider.
Smith v ADVFN Plc (CA) S took part in postings on a bulletin board on a financial services website
maintained by ADVFN. He claimed to have been defamed by hundreds of
postings published by users under cover of pseudonyms. He wished to know
their IP addresses in order to obtain their names and addresses from their
internet service providers. Gray J had made an order for the disclosure of the
registered IP addresses of users responsible for over 100 postings in April
2007, but in most cases that information did not enable S to discover the
identities of those responsible. He applied to the judge for disclosure of the IP
addresses of the users at the times when their postings were made (an order
which was not opposed in principle since disclosure of the identity of the users
had already been ordered by Gray J), and for the disclosure of the IP
addresses of those responsible for a further 150 postings. He appealed from
the decision of Mackay J not to order disclosure in respect of the further 150
postings.

Whether the judge had wrongly refused to make an order for disclosure of the
identities of the users responsible for the further postings.

Dismissing the appeal:


(1) It was unreasonable to expect the judge, in the short time available, to
assess without proper guidance each and every alleged instance of
defamation, given the volume and incoherence of the material which he had
been expected to consider. Accordingly, he had been entitled to refuse to
make the order sought.

(2) The Appellant‘s inability to pay the Respondent‘s costs would be a factor
which could properly be taken into account against him if he made a further
application.

South Hetton Coal Company vs The newspaper in that case had published an article that was strongly critical
North Eastern News Association of the way the plaintiff – a colliery owner – housed its workers.
Limited (1984). The company, when suing for libel, had neither stated nor sought to prove that
it had suffered any actual damage. It was argued by the paper that a company
could have no personal character and that the article had not related to the
business of the company. This argument was unanimously rejected.
The Court held that, "It is not necessary to prove any particular damage. The
jury may give such damages as they think fit, having regard to the conduct of
the parties, respectively, and to all the circumstances of the case."
Steel & Morris v McDonalds: Steel The applicants were sued by McDonalds after handing out a six-page leaflet
& Morris v United Kingdom containing allegations damaging allegations about the company, entitled
"What's Wrong with McDonalds". At trial (the longest in English legal history, at
313 days), Mr Justice Bell found for McDonalds and awarded them £60,000 in
damages (reduced to £40,000 on appeal), although he did find some of the
allegations made by the Defendants to be true. The applicants appealed to the
ECHR.

(1) Whether the unavailability of legal aid for defamation meant that the
applicants had been denied their rights to a fair trial under Art 6; (2) Whether
the proceedings and their outcome infringed Art 10.

Finding violations of Art 6 and Art 10: (1) Denial of legal aid deprived the
applicants of the opportunity to present their case effectively before the court -
central to the concept of a fair trial. States are free to decide how litigants are
guaranteed this right. Legal aid is one means. Whether it is necessary
depends on the facts of the individual case. The applicants were defending
their right to freedom of expression, the financial consequences to them were
great and the case was highly complex, both factually and legally. The disparity
of legal assistance gave rise to unfairness. (2) The allegations constituted
‗political expression‘, requiring a high level of protection. It was not
incompatible with Art 10 to allow companies to sue for defamation. Nor was the
incidence of the burden of proof itself an infringement. However, balancing the
procedural unfairness, inequality of arms and the means of the applicants, the
damages award was a disproportionate infringement of Art 10.

Goldsmith v Bhoyrul ( 1998) Political parties also do not have the right to bring an action for defamation as
they should always be open to criticism in a democratic system. Individual
candidates for elected office can make claims for defamation and political
parties can be sued if they publish defamatory statements.

Derbyshire County Council v The council brought an action for libel against a newspaper in respect of
Times Newspapers Ltd and articles alleging impropriety in the administration of its superannuation fund.
others The defendants' application to strike out the statement of claim, on the ground
that a local authority could not maintain an action in libel for words reflecting on
its governmental and administrative functions, was dismissed. The Court of
Appeal allowed the defendants' appeal.
The council appealed.
Charles Gray QC and Heather Rogers (instructed by Kingsford Stacey for
solicitor, Derbyshire County Council) for the council. Anthony Lester QC and
Desmond Browne QC (instructed by Biddle & Co) for the defendants.
Lord Keith of Kinkel said that it was of the highest public importance that a
democratically elected governmental body, or indeed any governmental body,
should be open to uninhibited public criticism. The threat of a civil action for
defamation had inevitably to have an inhibiting effect on freedom of speech
and it was therefore contrary to the public interest for organs of government,
whether central or local, to sue for libel. A local authority did not have the right
under the common law of England to maintain an action for damages for
defamation.
Lord Griffiths, Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Woolf
agreed.
Appeal dismissed. (WLR)
Sim v. Stretch [1936] a defamatory statement is one which tends to lower a person, "in the
estimation of right-thinking members of society." It is not that the statement be
made to the person in regard, it must be communicated to another. Tort law
protects one's interest in preserving his/her reputation. In Canada, the law of
defamation permits actions for Libel and Slander against those who seek to
damage the another‘s reputation.
Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818 The Defendants owned a golf club where illegal gambling machines were kept.
Someone told the police and they were removed. Shortly after a piece of paper
appeared on one of the walls saying but 'he who gave the game away, may he
byrnn in hell and rue the day'. Did these words defame the claimant in the
sense that he was guilty of underhand disloyalty to his fellow club members by
telling the police about the machines. The Court of Appeal held that even
though some people may consider that the fruit machines were so trivial that
they weren't really criminal, the right-thinking man cannot ever view the
reporting of crime as defamation. To report crime, however trivial, cannot be a
source of scorn or ridicule in the eyes of the law

Thorley v Lord Kerry Was an action on a libel published in a letter which the bearer, who had no
authority to do so, happened to open, and that case shows that a man is
responsible for the publication which has arisen through the curiosity of a
person into whose hands the letter happens to pass. Belief that a third person
might open it is evidence to go to the jury of intended publication: Delacroix v
Thevenot; Gomersall v Davies. A letter not sealed or fastened up is analogous
to a post-card, and a post-card is a publication to every one through whose
hands it passes.
Berkoff v. Burchill A libel civil action which he brought against Sunday Times journalist Julie
Burchill, after she published comments suggesting that he was "hideously
ugly"; the judge ruled for Berkoff, finding that Burchill's actions "held him to
ridicule and contempt
Lewis -v- Daily Telegraph Ltd The court considered a request from jurors when assessing damages in a A
[1963] 1 QB 340 police investigation into a company that produced plastics were leaked to a
newspaper. The front page of the newspaper copied the document which said
that an investigation was going on by the fraud squad after criticisms of the
chairman's accounts by a shareholder. The company was later absolved of any
wrongdoing and they sued for defamation alleging that the newspaper had
intended that readers assume the company was fraudulent. The action wasn't
based on what the words said themselves, but on a secondary meaning which
may have been inferred by the reader: the innuendo meaning. The House of
Lords held that the right-minded person would not infer guilt just from the
article and the case was dismissed.
Tolley v Fry Tolley was a well-known amateur golfer. During the 1920s if an amateur golfer
entered into a commercial contract for benefit, that could harm the reputation
and status of the golfer. Fry, without the consent of Tolley, had used a
caricature of Tolley in several advertisements in order to promote chocolates.

At first instance the judge held that this was capable of being libellous leaving
the actual decision to a jury. This body found in favour of the claimant and
awarded damages. The Court of Appeal found that the advertisement was not
capable of producing libellous effects. To their mind, the case should not have
been brought before a jury. They reversed the judge‘s decision and dismissed
the action.

The House of Lords, in a decision of four against one, restored the original
decision in favour of the claimant but ordered a new trial concerning the level
of compensation.

Viscount Hailsham delivered the major opinion: An action of libel would


succeed if the publication complained of produced at least some of the
meanings attributed to it in the innuendo, and those meanings were
defamatory. Libel is a possible remedy against unwanted character advertising,
if some further element of an individual‘s reputation, such as status as an
amateur golfer, were endangered. The case also shows the limits of this action
as mere vulgarities are non-actionable.

Cassidy v Daily Mirror [1929] 2 KB The Defendants took a photograph of Mr Cassidy (a racehorse owner) with a
331 woman who was not his wife. Mr Cassidy, who often used a different name,
told a reporter that he was going to marry her and the image had a caption
saying they were engaged, using his alternative name. Mrs Cassidy, the lawful
wife, brought an action for defamation. Although they lived separately, Mr
Cassidy sometimes came to visit her. She alleged that people would see him
arriving at her house thinking he is the man from the photo (where his
alternative name was used) and assume that they were living together
immorally and only pretending to be his wife. The Court of Appeal said that
words published about one person can sometimes defame another person and
that Mrs Cassidy had in fact been defamed. By people seeing this man coming
to her house who is supposed to be marrying another woman, she looks like
she was simply pretending to be his wife. The blame here was on the
newspaper but arguably, the fact that a lawful wife existed may have been
difficult to discover.
Norman v Future Publishing The operatic diva, Jessye Norman, sued for libel over the attribution to her in
Classic CD music magazine of a joke which involved her getting stuck, being
advised to exit sideways from the situation and responding with the line
"Honey, I ain't got no sideways". She put various defamatory interpretations on
this story. Her claim was struck out by Buckley J on the grounds that the words
could not carry a defamatory meaning. She appealed.

Whether the attribution of this joke was capable of conveying a meaning


defamatory of the claimant.

Dismissing the appeal: (1) Where words were alleged to be defamatory


because they exposed a claimant to ridicule a line had to be drawn between
insults and ridicule; in doing so the perceived intention of the writer could be
relevant. (2) The article was generally sympathetic and favourable, and did not
disclose an intention to ridicule. (3) The words could not bear any of the
defamatory meanings advanced.

Charleston v News Group Two popular characters from the tv show Neighbours were portrayed on the
Newspapers [1995] 2 AC 65 front cover of a newspaper naked except for black leather engaged in sexual
intercourse. The title read "Strewth! What's Harold up to with out Madge? Porn
shocker for Neighbours stars" however the captions on the pictures made clear
that the images were false. The image was taken from a sordid computer
game which had computer-generated the images. The rest of the article
condemned the game in a tone which can be contrasted with the prominence
given to the image. The House of Lords accepted that the image must have
deeply offensive but said that it was not defamatory since a publication has to
be read as a whole. Even though the image and headline were libellous the
remainder of the article had a neutralising effect.

E .Hutton and Co V Jones (1910) It was held the intention is irrelevant, the use of a fictious character is no
AC 20 defence. It need not answer 100% description of the plaintiff before it can be
said to refer to them. The plaintiff was a barrister and the article referred to a
church warden it was held a person charged of libel cannot defend himself by
saying that he didn‘t intend to defame the plaintiff. Thus there need not be
express neither is it necessary for any key or pointer in the statement to
indicate the claimant the test is whether the ordinary sensible reader in the light
of the special facts would understand the words as referring to the claimant.
He/she is entitled to rely on a subsequent publication to prove it was him
referred to.
Newstead v London Express A newspaper report of a trial referred to Harold Newstead, a 30 year old
Newspapers (1940) Camberwell man, as a bigamist. The claimant, who had the same name, lived
in Camberwell and was unmarried, successfully sued for libel.
Morgan -v- Odhams Press Ltd; The plaintiff claimed in defamation. The defence was that the words did not
HL 1971 refer to the plaintiff and could not be understood to refer to him.
Held: The question as to what meaning words are capable of bearing has been
described as a question of law, but only in the sense that the decision thereon
is reserved to the judge rather than to the jury: ―It is not a question of law in the
true sense.‖
The ordinary reasonable reader is a layman, not a lawyer, and his capacity for
implication is much greater than that of the lawyer.
Lord Morris said: ―The question for the Judge at the end of the plaintiff‘s case
was whether there was evidence upon which the jury could (not would) decide
in favour of the plaintiff. That in turn raised the question whether the jury could
decide that some readers (having knowledge of certain circumstances) would
reasonably understand the words as referring to the plaintiff. If no reasonable
reader could have understood the words as referring to the plaintiff, then there
would be nothing to be left to the jury.‖
Lord Reid said that ―some people may think that the law has gone too far‖ in
holding a publisher liable for a reference innuendo, if the statement concerned
―applies to someone the publisher has never heard of.‖

Knupffer v London Express Some articles published during the second world war referred to a political
Newspapers [1944] AC 116, group of Russian exiles as people who wanted to work with Hitler to make
Russia facist. The Claimant was the head of the group in the UK and claimed
that the words could reasonably be understood as imputing him. The global
membership was 2000 but the UK membership was only 24. The House of
Lords said that there could be no general rule preventing a lawsuit as long as
the statement can be understood as referring to individual members in the
party, which they did not do in the present case.

Riches -v- News Group The defendant published serious defamatory allegations against several
Newspapers Ltd [1986] plaintiff police officers. The defendant newspaper appealed against an award
of £250,000 exemplary damages for their defamation of the respondent police
officers. Held: Damages for defamation might be increased where a
newspaper advertised the story complained of. Nevertheless, a retrial was
ordered. The jury should be asked to make one award of exemplary damages
which should then be divided between the plaintiffs. The award of exemplary
damages was proper because there was evidence that the defendant had
calculated the risk of damages against the benefit of increased sales.

Huth v Huth [1915] 3 KB 32 A man sent a letter to his wife which defamed her and their children. It was
opened and read by the butler. An action was brought by the children (as a wife
could not sue her husband at the time). The Court of Appeal dismissed the
case saying that it was not the butler's job to open letters and he only did so
out of curiosity. There cannot, therefore, be a publication to a third party where
it is not natural and probable that that third party would hear the information.

Theaker v Richardson [1962] 1 A husband opened a letter which defamed his wife. It was held that the
WLR 151, defamation had been published to the husband as it natural and probable that
the husband would open it.
Slipper v British Broadcasting The Claimant was a retired police officer was the subject of a film about trying
Corporation [1991] 1 QB 283 to capture some men who had committed the Great Train Robbery. The
Claimant alleged that the film showed him as a complete idiot. The film had
been shown to some journalists before its release to the public and those
journalists had published reviews contained the defamatory sting of the film i.e.
that he was an incompetent police officer. The Claimant sued not only for the
release to the public but the repetitions in the journalists' reviews. The
defendants argued that the repetitions are only actionable where the defendant
has authorised them. The court rejected this argument and said that the
Defendant can be liable for any re-publication of the defamatory material as
long as it was reasonably foreseeable.

McManus v Beckham 2002 Whilst visiting the claimants' autograph shop the defendant allegedly claimed
that a signed photograph of her husband, David Beckham, was not genuine.
The shop sought to rely on the subsequent publication in the media of the
defendant's alleged claims in support of its claim for damages. The judge at
first instance struck out the shop's plea in this respect.

Whether the shop could rely at trial on an allegation that the claimant was
responsible for subsequent press coverage of her visit to the shop.

The plea would be reinstated to go to the jury at trial, who would be directed to
consider the questions of whether the defendant knew that what she had
allegedly said was likely to be reported and that if she slandered someone that
slander was likely to be repeated or a reasonable person in the position of the
defendant should have appreciated that there was a signficant risk that what
she had allegedly said would be repeated.

Alexander v North Eastern The Defendants published a notice at their train station saying the Claimant
Railway (1865) 6 B&S 340 had been caught riding on a train without a ticket and was sentenced to £1 fine
or three weeks imprisonment. In actual fact it was 14 days imprisonment if he
failed to pay the fine. The Claimant complained that the overstatement made it
appear as if the offence he had committed was worse than it was. The jury
found for the Defendants.
Plato Films -v- Speidel [1961] The plaintiff had been the Supreme Commander of the Axis Land Forces in
Central Europe, and brought an action claiming that he had been defamed in a
film showing him privy to the murders of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and M.
Barthou in 1934, and as having betrayed Field-Marshal Rommel in 1944. The
trial had not yet occurred. The defendants sought to rely on the fact that the
plaintiff chose to sue on certain parts of the film, and not on others which were
also defamatory of the plaintiff, as a ground for mitigating damages. Held: This
was vigorously rejected: "[The defendants] plead that the respondent has been
depicted in the film as having been 'guilty of the conduct hereinafter set out the
truth of which the plaintiff . . does not deny'. It surprises me that it should be
considered a proper matter for pleading that a plaintiff has not thought fit to
include in his action every libellous statement made about him by a defendant.
It is, in my opinion, wholly improper.‖ and ―If it is said that other parts of the
entire film constitute 'circumstances in which the alleged libel was published'
(in themselves a recognised head of mitigation), I think that is a highly artificial
meaning to attribute to the phrase. The real purport of this portion of paragraph
5 of the defence seems to be to make the point that the plaintiff must be taken
to have admitted the truth of such accompanying derogatory statements as he
is not challenged in his libel claim. That is not a matter for pleading. If it
amounts to anything at all, it is a matter for comment. As a proposition of law
designed to set up some sort of estoppel, I think that it has no foundation.‖

London Artists v Littler [1962] 2 The Defendant wrote a letter to some actors in a play who had all given notice
QB 375 to quit at the same time accusing them of a plot to force the end of a
successful play. So many actors giving notice at the same time was apparently
an almost unheard of event. They sued him. He pleaded justification and then
withdrew it as it became clear that the actors had withdrawn for different
reasons and not in order to end the play. The Defendant also argued fair
comment on a matter in the public interest. The Court laid down this test:
• Was the comment made on a matter of public interest,
• Was the statement an expression of fact or opinion,
• If opinion, are the underlying facts true and contained in the article,
• Would a fair man make the same comment.
Regarding (1), they held that whenever a matter affects people at large it can
be held to be in the public interest.
Kemsley -v- Foot [1951] 2 KB 34 The plaintiff complained that the defendant had defamed him with a headline to
an article 'Lower than Hemsley' which otherwise had no connection with the
plaintiff. He said it suggested that he was a byword for poor journalism. Held:
Criticism of a newspaper owner as to the presentation of news by the paper
was to be treated on a par with criticism of a book or play. The critic is not
prevented from relying upon fair comment as a defence only because he does
not particularise the conduct of which he complains. He need only state plainly
the subject-matter of the complaint.
Birkett LJ said: "It is clear, therefore, and indeed it was not contended
otherwise, that ALL the facts need not be stated, but when the matter is
submitted to the judgment of a jury particulars of the facts relied on must be
supplied"
and "I do not think it is possible to lay down any rule of universal application. If,
for example, a defamatory statement is made about a private individual who is
quite unknown to the general public, and he has never taken any part in public
affairs, and the statement takes the form of comment only and is capable of
being construed as comment and no facts of any kind are given, while it is
conceivable that the comment may be made on a matter of public interest,
nevertheless the defence of fair comment might not be open to a defendant in
that case. It is almost certain that a naked comment of that kind in those
circumstances would be decided to be a question of fact and could be justified
as such if that defence were pleaded. But if the matter is before the public, as
in the case of a book, a play, a film, or a newspaper, then I think different
considerations apply. Comment may then be made without setting out the facts
on which the comment is based if the subject-matter of the comment is plainly
stated. This seems to me to accord with good sense and the true public
interest."
Somervell LJ identified two cases where a publisher may not be obliged to set
out the factual basis of his comment in detail: where the subject matter was a
work of art placed before the public for comment, and where the subject was a
public figure subject in any event to vigorous discussion and where a detailed
recital of the facts would be unwelcome. In contradistinction: "At the other end
of the scale one may imagine a comment reflecting on the integrity of a
Merivale -v- Carson (1887) 20 A published criticism of a play made reference to one of the characters being
QBD 275 "a naughty wife", though in fact there was no adulterous wife in the play. Held:
The defence of fair comment is open to a commentator however prejudiced he
might be, and however exaggerated or obstinate his views.
Bowen LJ said: "Still there is another class of cases in which, as it seems to
me, the writer would be travelling out of the region of fair criticism - I mean if he
imputes to the author that he has written something which in fact he has not
written.
That would be a misdescription of the work. There is all the difference in the
world between saying that you disapprove of the character of a work, and that
you think it has an evil tendency, and saying that a work treats adultery
cavalierly, when in fact there is no adultery at all in the story. A jury would have
a right to consider the latter beyond the limits of fair criticism."
After citing Campbell, Lord Esher MR asked what was meant by 'fair comment'
and answered: "What is the meaning of a 'fair comment'? I think the meaning
is this: is the article in the opinion of the jury beyond that which any fair man,
however prejudiced or however strong his opinion may be, would say of the
work in question? Every latitude must be given to opinion and to prejudice, and
then an ordinary set of men with ordinary judgment must say whether any fair
man would have made such a comment on the work . . Mere exaggeration, or
even gross exaggeration, would not make the comment unfair. However wrong
the opinion expressed may be in point of truth, or however prejudiced the
writer, it may still be within the prescribed limit. The question which the jury
must consider is this – would any fair man, however prejudiced he may be,
however exaggerated or obstinate his views, have said that which this criticism
has said of the work which is criticised? If it goes beyond that, then you must
find for the plaintiff; if you are not satisfied that it does, then it falls within the
allowed limit, and there is no libel at all."

Thomas v Bradbury, Agnew and The court held that evidence that the defendant was actuated by malice would
Co Ltd and another [1906] defeat the defence of fair comment, notwithstanding that in all other aspects
the comment may be considered fair. It is for the claimant to adduce such
evidence.
Watt v. Longsdon Browne sent a letter to D, who worked as a liquidator for the firm. The letter
alleged that a maid had been P‘s mistress and that he was conducting orgies
in his flat. D shared this letter with his boss, and P‘s wife. Trial court gave
judgment to D on the grounds that they were privileged, court of appeals
reversed.

Did D have a duty to inform, thus shielding him from liability? Holding: D‘s
publication was privileged as to his disclosure to his boss, but not to P‘s wife. In
my view on these facts there was a duty, both from a moral and a material
point of view, on Longsdon to communicate the letter to Singer, the chairman
of his company, who, apart from questions of present employment, might be
asked by Watt for a testimonial to a future employer. However, using the best
judgment I can in this difficult matter, I have come to the conclusion that there
was not a moral or social duty in Longsdon to make this communication to Mrs.
Watt such as to make the occasion privileged.

Privilege arises when:

A duty to communicate information believed to be true to a person who has a


material interest in receiving the information, or

An interest in the speaker to be protected by communicating information, if


true, relevant to that interest, to a person honestly believed to have a duty to
protect that interest, or

A common interest in and reciprocal duty in respect of the subject matter of the
communication between speaker and recipient.

The information came from a very doubtful source, and in my judgment no


reasonably right minded person could think it his duty, without obtaining some
corroboration of the story, and without first communicating with the plaintiff, to
pass on these outrageous charges of marital infidelity of a gross kind, and
drunkenness and dishonesty, to the plaintiff‘s wife
Reynolds v Times Newspapers The Plaintiff, a prominent public figure in Ireland, began proceedings for
Ltd defamation against the Defendants, the publishers of an article contained in
the British mainland edition of a national newspaper. The publication related to
the political crisis in Ireland in 1994 culiminating in the Plaintiff's resignation as
Taoiseach and the collapse of the Irish government. The Plaintiff claimed that
the words bore the meaning that he had deliberately lied to mislead the Dial
and his cabinet colleagues. The Defendants pleaded, inter alia, qualified
privilege at common law. At the trial the jury returned a verdict in the Plaintiff's
favour and awarded the sum of 1p by way of damages. The Court of Appeal
set aside the jury's verdict and ordered a retrial on the grounds of misdirections
to the jury. The Court also ruled that the defence of qualified privilege was not
available. The Defendants appealed.

Whether the courts should recognise a generic qualified privilege


encompassing the publication by a newspaper of political matters affecting the
people of the United Kingdom.

The common law should not develop a new subject matter category of
qualified privilege whereby the publication of all political information would
attract qualified privilege whatever the circumstances, since that would fail to
provide adequate protection for reputation, and it would be unsound in principle
to distinguish political information from other matters of public concern; but that
qualified privilege was available in respect of political information upon
application of the established common law test of whether there had been a
duty to publish the material to the intended recipients and whether they had
had an interest in receiving it, taking into account all the circumstances of the
publication including the nature, status and source of the material.

Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd P sued D, an Internet Service Provider, over a newsgroup posting made
available from D's newsgroup servers in this jurisdiction. D sought permission
to amend its defence to rely, in mitigation of damages, on numerous allegedly
provocative postings previously made by P, including to other newsgroups
apart from that in which the posting complained of appeared. P resisted the
amendment on the ground that it offended against the rule in Scott v Sampson
(1882) 8 Q.B.D 491 as bringing in inadmissible evidence of particular acts of
misconduct on the part of the P.

Whether the amendments should be permitted.

The amendments should be permitted. The other postings were relevant and
admissible in support of D's case that the action was not brought bona fide, but
as part of a cynical practice by P of provoking people into overstepping the
mark so that he could then bring vexatious libel actions against them. They
were 'introduced to establish that the Plaintiff should only receive derisory or
small damages because of his bad conduct which is causally connected to the
libel sued upon. In my judgment the Plaintiff's postings are germane to the
defamatory posting the subject of his claim.'
Rylands v Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1 The defendant owned a mill and constructed a reservoir on their land. The
House of Lords reservoir was placed over a disused mine. Water from the reservoir filtered
through to the disused mine shafts and then spread to a working mine owned
by the claimant causing extensive damage.

Held:
The defendants were strictly liable for the damage caused by a non- natural
use of land.

Lord Cranworth:
―If a person brings, or accumulates, on his land anything which, if it should
escape, may cause damage to his neighbour, he does so at his peril. If it does
escape, and cause damage, he is responsible, however careful he may have
been, and whatever precautions he may have taken to prevent the damage.‖

Sedleigh-Denfield v O‘Callaghan The council undertook some work on the defendant‘s land at the request of a
[1940] AC 880 House of Lords neighbouring landowner. They had placed a culvert in a ditch to allow the water
to drain away, however, they had negligently placed a grate in the wrong place
which rendered the grate useless and the culvert became prone to blockages.
The defendant‘s workers had cleaned the culvert periodically over a three year
period to prevent blockages. However, a heavy rain storm caused a blockage
and the ditch became flooded. The flood spread to neighbouring property
owned by the claimant and caused substantial damage. The claimant brought
an action in nuisance for the damage caused. The defendant argued that he
had neither consented to nor had knowledge of the existence of the culvert.

Held:
The defendant was liable. An occupier may be liable for the acts of a
trespasser if they adopt or continue the nuisance.

Lord Maugham:
―My Lords, in the present case I am of opinion that the Respondents both
continued and adopted the nuisance. After the lapse of nearly three years they
must be taken to have suffered the nuisance to continue; for they neglected to
take the very simple step of placing a grid in the proper place which would
have removed the danger to their neighbour s land. They adopted the nuisance
for they continued during all that time to use the artificial contrivance of the
conduit for the purpose of getting rid of water from their property without taking
the proper means for rendering it safe.‖

A-G v P.Y.A. Quarries Ltd. (1957) held that ―…any nuisance is public which materially affects the reasonable
comfort and convenience of life of a class of Her Majesty‘s subjects.‖
Cambridge Water v Eastern The defendant owned a leather tanning business. Spillages of small quantities
Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC of solvents occurred over a long period of time which seeped through the floor
264 House of Lords of the building into the soil below. These solvents made their way to the
borehole owned by the Claimant water company. The borehole was used for
supplying water to local residents. The water was contaminated at a level
beyond that which was considered safe and Cambridge Water had to cease
using the borehole. Cambridge Water brought actions based on negligence,
nuisance and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.

Held:

Eastern Counties Leather were not liable as the damage was too remote. It
was not reasonably foreseeable that the spillages would result in the closing of
the borehole. The foreseeability of the type of damage is a pre-requisite of
liability in actions of nuisance and claims based on the rule in Rylands v
Fletcher in the same way as it applies to claims based in negligence. The
Wagon Mound No 1 case applies to determine remoteness of damage.

The Wagon Mound no 1 [1961] The defendant's vessel, The Wagon Mound, leaked furnace oil at a Wharf in
AC 388 House of Lords Sydney Harbour. Some cotton debris became embroiled in the oil and sparks
from some welding works ignited the oil. The fire spread rapidly causing
destruction of some boats and the wharf.

Held:
Re Polemis should no longer be regarded as good law. A test of remoteness of
damage was substituted for the direct consequence test. The test is whether
the damage is of a kind that was foreseeable. If a foreseeable type of damage
is present, the defendant is liable for the full extent of the damage, no matter
whether the extent of damage was foreseeable.

Transco plc v Stockport The defendant council were responsible for the maintenance of the pipe work
Metropolitan Borough Council supplying water to a block of flats. A leak developed which was undetected for
[2004] 2 AC 1 House of Lords some time. The water collected at an embankment which housed the
claimant‘s high pressure gas main. The water caused the embankment to
collapse and left the gas main exposed and unsupported. This was a serious
and immediate risk and the claimant took action to avoid the potential danger.
They then sought to recover the cost of the remedial works under the principle
established in Rylands v Fletcher.

Held:
The defendant was not liable. The council‘s use of land was not a non-natural
use.

Lord Bingham:
―I think it clear that ordinary user is a preferable test to natural user, making it
clear that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is engaged only where the defendant's
use is shown to be extraordinary and unusual. This is not a test to be inflexibly
applied: a use may be extraordinary and unusual at one time or in one place
but not so at another time or in another place.‖
Hunter v Canary Wharf [1998] 1 690 claims were made against Canary Wharf ltd. The claimants lived in the Isle
WLR 434 House of Lords of Dogs and complained that the erection of the Canary Wharf Tower
interfered with their television reception. In addition, a second action against
London Docklands Development Corporation involved 513 claims for damages
in respect of excessive amounts of dust created during the construction of the
tower. Some of the claimants were owners or tenants of properties, but many
of the claimants had no proprietary interest in lane at all. Some were children
living with parents, some were relations or lodgers with use of a room and
some were spouses of the tenant or owner of the property.
The two issues the House of Lords were required to consider were:
1. Whether interference with television reception was capable of giving rise
to an actionable nuisance
2. Whether an interest in property was required to bring an action in

Held:
1. There is no right of action in nuisance for interference with the television
reception.
2. An interest in property is required to bring an action in nuisance.
Khorasanjian v Bush overruled in so far as it holds that a mere licensee can
sue in private nuisance.

Malone v Laskey 1907 2 KB 141 The claimant was injured when vibrations from an engine on an adjoining
property caused a bracket to come loose and the cistern to fall on her in the
lavatory. She was unsuccessful in her claim as she did not have a proprietary
interest in the house. Her husband was a mere licensee through his
employment as a manager.
St Helen‘s Smelting Co v Tipping The claimant owned a manor house with 1300 acres of land which was
[1865] UKHL J81 House of Lords situated a short distance from the defendant‘s copper smelting business. He
brought a nuisance action against the defendant in respect of damage caused
by the smelting works to their crops, trees and foliage. There were several
industrial businesses in the locality including and alkali works. The defendant
argued that the use of property was reasonable given the locality and the
smelting works existed before the claimant purchased the property.

Held
Where there is physical damage to property, the locality principle has no
relevance. It is no defence that the claimant came to the nuisance

Sturges v Bridgman [1879] 11 Ch The defendant ran a confectionary shop which operated a noisy pestle and
D 852 Court of Appeal mortar. It had done so for over 20 years but had no neighbouring property so
there were no complaints as to its use. The claimant then built a consulting
room for his practice as a physician adjacent to the defendant‘s noisy shop.
The claimant brought an action in nuisance to obtain an injunction to prevent
the continuance of the noise. The defendant, relying on the Prescription Act,
argued that he had obtained the right to be noisy by operating the noisy pestle
for over twenty years.

Held:
The use of land prior to the construction of the consulting room was not
preventable or actionable and therefore it was not capable of founding a
prescription right.
Adams v Ursell [1913] 1 Ch 269 D was in the trade of selling fried fish. The shop was located in the residential
part of a street. Faced with a claim for an injunction, he argued that his
business benefited the public, especially the poor and therefore the smell
produced by his trade was justified.
Held: Court rejected the defense as P‘s comfort and convenience also had to
be considered
Miller v Jackson [1977]3 WLR 20 The defendants were members of the Lintz Cricket Club. Cricket had been
Court of Appeal played at Lintz cricket ground for over 70 years. The land was owned by the
National Coal Board (NCB) who also owned some fields surrounding the
grounds. Four years prior to the action, the NCB sold one of the fields and a
development of Wimpey homes was put up in close proximity to the cricket
ground. Mrs Miller purchased one of the houses and brought an action against
the cricket club seeking an injunction to prevent them playing cricket at the
ground. Initially quite a number of balls were hit over the houses. However, in
1976 the cricket club erected a higher fence and the number of balls hit out
was reduced to nine over a two year period. There had been no personal
injuries resulting from the balls but some property damage had been caused
which the cricket club had paid for. Mrs Miller complained that she could not
use her garden during matches and would often stay out of the house
altogether.

Held:

The defendants were liable in both negligence and nuisance (Lord Denning
dissenting)

However, Cumming Bruce LJ refused the injunction on the grounds that it


would be inequitable to grant an injunction given that the cricket ground had
been used for so long and would be a loss to the community and Mrs Miller
received the benefit of being adjacent to an open space.

Lord Lane would have granted the injunction stating that the decision in
Sturges v Bridgeman involves the assumption that it is no defence for the
defendant to show that they came to the nuisance.

Heath v Mayor Brighton (1908) A church claimed that the noise form an electric power station was a nuisance.
However the noise did not interfere with the services and so the claim was
unsuccessful.
Robinson v Kilvert (1889) Brown paper kept by the plaintiff was damaged by the heat from the
defendant's paper box manufacturing process carried on next door to the
plaintiff's store room. The plaintiff was unsuccessful as the brown paper was
exceptionally sensitive.
McKinnon Industries v Walker The defendant manufactured steel and iron products 600 feet from the
[1951] WN 401 Privy Council claimant‘s property. The claimant had a dwelling house and also a commercial
florists and nursery. As part of his business he specialised in growing orchids
which are known for their particular sensitivity. The claimant brought an action
in relation to noxious fumes and smuts which had deposited over his shrubs,
trees, hedges and flowers causing them to die.

Held:
The defendant‘s actions constituted an unlawful nuisance and therefore the
claimant was entitled to recover damages in respect of the orchids despite the
sensitive nature of the flowers.
Christie v Davey (1893) 1 Ch 316 The claimant was a music teacher. She gave private lessons at her home and
her family also enjoyed playing music. She lived in a semi-detached house
which adjoined the defendant‘s property. The defendant had complained of the
noise on many occasions to no avail. He took to banging on the walls and
beating trays and shouting in retaliation.

Held:
The defendant‘s actions were motivated by malice and therefore did constitute
a nuisance. An injunction was granted to restrain his actions.
Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v The claimant bred silver foxes for their fur. Silver foxes are particularly timid
Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468 and if disturbed when pregnant they are prone to miscarry. If alarmed when
they have young they may devour them. The defendant was the claimant‘s
neighbour. He objected to the fox farm and fired a gun on his own land close to
the breeding pens with the intention to scare the foxes and impede breeding.
The claimant brought an action in nuisance.

Held:
The defendant was liable despite the abnormal sensitivity of the foxes because
he was motivated by malice.

Bradford Corporation v Pickles [Tort – negligence - duty of care - proving fault - malice not normally relevant]
[1895] HL D owned land containing underground streams which fed C's (Bradford
Corporation) waterworks. D began to sink shafts for the alleged purpose of
draining certain beds of stone. The effect of D‘s operations was to affect
seriously the supply of water to appellant‘s springs. The corporation alleged
that defendant was not acting in good faith, but to compel them to purchase his
land.

Held: D has the right to divert or appropriate the water within his own land so
as to deprive his neighbour of it. His right is the same whatever his motive may
be, whether genuinely to improve his own land, or maliciously to injure his
neighbour, or to induce his neighbour to buy him out.
No use of property which would be legal if due to a proper motive can become
illegal if it is prompted by a motive which is improper or even malicious.

St Anne‘s Well Brewery Co v Where the nuisance existed before the occupier acquired the property he will
Roberts 1929 be liable if it can be proved that he knew or ought to have known of its
existence
Leakey & Ors v National Trust The claimants‘ land had been damaged by falls of soil and other debris from
[1980] QB 485 Court of Appeal the defendant‘s land known as Burrow Mump. The falls were caused entirely
by nature there was no human activity involved that would have caused the fall.
The defendants were aware of the risks since 1968. They had taken legal
advice and were told that they would not be liable for naturally occurring slides
and consequently did nothing to prevent such slides. Following the
exceptionally hot dry summer of 1976 and unusually heavy rainfall in the
autumn, Mrs Leaky noticed a big crack appear in the bank above her house.
She informed the National Trust and offered to pay half the cost of making it
safe. Her offer was rejected. A few weeks later there was a large fall. She
joined forces with other neighbours to bring an action in nuisance.

Held:
The National Trust were liable following the Privy Council decision in Goldman
v Hargrave. A defendant is liable for a naturally occurring hazard on the land if
they are aware of the danger and failed to act with reasonable prudence to
remove the hazard.

Tetley v Chitty 1986 1 All ER 663 A council allowed a go-kart club to use their land for a race track. Nearby
residents brought an action in nuisance. The council were held liable for
authorising the activities of the go-kart club. The noise was an ordinary and
necessary incident to go-kart racing which was the purpose for which the
permission to use the land was granted.
Hussain v Lancaster City Council The claimants own a shop and residential property which is situated on a
[1999] 2 WLR 1142 Court of housing estate owned by the defendant. The claimants suffered severe
Appeal harassment, including racial harassment which was predominantly from
tenants and their families from the housing estate. The harassment took the
form of congregating outside the shop, intimidation, shouting abuse and
threats, throwing bricks, stones and balls, smashing windows, burning objects
put through the door. The defendant was aware of the harassment from 1991.
The council had sent letters to the perpetrators threatening them with eviction
if they continued to harass the claimants, however, this was ineffective and the
council did not in fact take possession proceedings against any of the
perpetrators. The Council had the power to evict them for causing a nuisance
under the tenancy agreements and under the Housing Act 1985. The claimants
brought an action against the council for their failure to prevent the nuisance
when it was in their power to do so. The defendant Council applied for a strike
out which was refused. The council appealed.

Held:
The appeal was allowed and the claim struck out. The case was outside the
scope of nuisance since the acts of the perpetrators did not involve the tenants‘
use of the tenants‘ land. Furthermore the Council had neither authorised nor
adopted the nuisance.

Lippiatt and Febry -v- South The defendant had failed to remove travellers who had encamped on its land
Gloucestershire County Council; and caused nuisances against neighbouring farmers.
CA 31-Mar-1999 Held: The court refused to strike out a claim in nuisance by neighbouring land
owners. It was arguable that a land owner can be liable for repeated acts
constituting nuisance committed from its land by those it knew were in
occupation, and where no steps were taken to evict them. It was its own land
from which a continuing nuisance emanated.
Allen v Gulf Oil Refinery [1981] The claimant brought an action in nuisance for the smell, noise and vibration
AC 1001 House of Lords created by an oil refinery which had been constructed by the defendant on their
land. The defendant‘s action in constructing the oil refinery was authorised by
an Act of Parliament.

Held:
The defendant was not liable as it had a defence of statutory authority.
Bliss v Hall [1838] 4 Bing NC 183 D managed a factory for 3 years and during this time smoke, smell and other
remittance came from the factory. P moved into a house near the factory.
Held: A defence that an activity has been going on before an action brought to
halt the activity is inapplicable as P had his rights too, one of which is clean air.

Thorpe v Brumfitt ((1872 – 73) M had granted P a right of way over a passage ‘for all purposes‘ over his land
L.R. 8 Ch. App. 650, CA (Eng)) for the purpose of getting to and from P‘s Inn. M‘s tenants obstructed the
passage so that potential customers could not get to the Inn operated by P‘s
tenant. An injunction was granted against all of the parties causing the
obstruction. There was an argument that the words ‘for all purposes‘ meant
that the claimed easement did not benefit any specific land and so was invalid.
This argument was rejected: the words clearly meant ‗for all purposes
connected with the use of P‘s land.‘
Giles v Walker (1890) 24 QBD Seeds from some thistles on the defendant‘s land blew into neighbouring land
656 owned by the claimant and damaged his crops. The defendant was not liable
as he had not brought the thistles onto his land and there can not be liability
under Rylands v Fletcher for a thing which naturally accumulates on land.

Rainham Chemical Works v F: X and Y set up a company Z Ltd. The function of Z Ltd was to perform a
Belvedere Fish Guano contract entered into both X and Y, with another party, to manufacture
explosives. Z Ltd was to manufacture the explosives on X and Y‘s land. So Z
Ltd was a licensee. An explosion occurred, damaging neighbouring property.

H:The House of Lords found Z Ltd liable as the licensee which had
accumulated the thing. X and Y, as occupiers and landowners were also liable
for the escape of the thing accumulated by their licensee as the accumulation
was a discharge of X and Y‘s contractual duty to another party.

Attorney General v Corke [1993] The Defendant allowed people onto his land to live in caravans. These people
engaged in anti social activities which took place off Defendant's land. The
court held that these people were 'dangerous' within the meaning of Rylands v
Fletcher.
Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263 The claimant ran a business from the second floor of a building. The defendant
Privy Council owned the building and leased different parts to other business tenants. An
unknown person had blocked all the sinks in the lavatory on the fourth floor
and turned on all the taps in order to cause a flood. This damaged the
claimant‘s stock and the claimant brought an action based on the principle set
out in Rylands v Fletcher.

Held:

The defendants were not liable. The act which caused the damage was a
wrongful act by a third party and there was no non-natural use of land.
Box v Jubb LR 4 EX Div 76 The defendant had a reservoir on their land. There was another reservoir
situated at a higher level than the defendant‘s. The owner of this other
reservoir emptied it through a drain connected to the defendant‘s reservoir
causing the defendant‘s reservoir to overflow and damage the claimant‘s land.
The claimant brought an action under Rylands v Fletcher contending that there
was a non natural user of the land and that there had been an escape of water
that caused damage.

Held:
The defendant was not liable for the damage as it was caused by the act of a
third party over which the defendant had no control.
Perry v Kendricks Transport The defendant kept an old coach that needed repair on their land adjoining a
[1956] WLR 85 Court of Appeal piece of wasteland. The claimant, a young boy of 10 approached two other
boys on the wasteland close to the coach. As he got close, the boys lit a match
and threw it into the petrol tank of the coach causing an explosion which left
the claimant with severe burns. The claimant brought an action under the
principle set out in Rylands v Fletcher.

Held:
The defendant was not liable as the escape was caused by the deliberate
action of a third party.

Nichols v Marsland (1876) 2 ExD The defendant diverted a natural stream on his land to create ornamental
1 lakes. Exceptionally heavy rain caused the artificial lakes and waterways to be
flooded and damage adjoining land. The defendant was held not liable under
Rylands v Fletcher as the cause of the flood was an act of God.

Mellish LJ:

―Now the jury have distinctly found, not only that there was no negligence in the
construction or the maintenance of the reservoirs, but that the flood was so
great that it could not reasonably have been anticipated, although, if it had
been anticipated, the effect might have been prevented; and this seems to us
in substance a finding that the escape of the water was owing to the act of
God. However great the flood had been, if it had not been greater than floods
that had happened before and might be expected to occur again, the
defendant might not have made out that she was free from fault; but we think
she ought not to be held liable because she did not prevent the effect of an
extraordinary act of nature, which she could not anticipate.‖

Greenock Corporation v The corp. constructed a concrete paddling pool for children in the bed of a
Caledonian Railway [1917] AC stream and obstructed the natural flow of the stream. Owing to a rainfall of
556 extraordinary violence the stream overflowed at the pond and damaged the
property of the plaintiffs. Held that the extraordinary rainfall did not absolve the
corp. from responsibility and that they were liable in damages.
Tate & Lyle v Greater London Tate & Lyle operated a sugar refinery on the bank of the river Thames. They
Council [1983] 2 AC 509 had a jetty from which raw sugar would be offloaded from barges and refined
sugar would be taken. The sugar would be taken be larger vessels and then
transferred to smaller barges to enable them to get to through the shallow
waters. As part of development Tate & Lyle wished to construct a new jetty and
dredge the water to accommodate the larger vessels. At the same time the
GLC was constructing new ferry terminals. The design of the ferry terminals
was such that that it caused siltation of the channels. After using the channels
for a short while, Tate & Lyles‘ larger vessels were no longer able to use them.
Further dredging at the cost of £540,000 was required to make the channel
and jetties usable by the vessels. Tate & Lyle brought an action in negligence
and nuisance to recover the cost of te extra dredging.

Held:

The claim in negligence and private nuisance failed since they did not possess
any private rights which enabled them to insist on any particular depth of water.
The claim succeeded in public nuisance since the interference caused by the
ferry terminals affected public navigation rights. Tate & Lyle suffered particular
damage as a result of this interference.

Barker v Saint Gobain Pipelines Mr Barker contracted mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos. He worked for
[2004] EWCA Civ 545 Court of the defendant between 1960-68. He worked for a different employer for 6
Apeal weeks where he was also exposed to asbestos. After 1968 he became self-
employed as a plasterer for 20 years. Whilst self employed he was exposed to
asbestos on three occasions. The defendant argued that his exposure to
asbestos whilst self-employed prevented him from being able to rely on the
causation principle established in Fairchild v Glenhaven whereby the claimant
is able to demonstrate that the defendant's breach of duty materially increased
the risk of contracting the disease.

Held:
Fairchild did apply and the claimant was thus successful in establishing
causation. His damages would be reduced under the Law Reform
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 to reflect the periods where he exposed
himself to risk during the course of his self-employment.
Adams v Ursell [1913] 1 Ch 269 D was in the trade of selling fried fish. The shop was located in the residential part of a
street. Faced with a claim for an injunction, he argued that his business benefited the
public, especially the poor and therefore the smell produced by his trade was justified.
Held: Court rejected the defense as P‘s comfort and convenience also had to be
considered

Addie v Dumbreck [1929] AC 358 The defendant owned View Park Colliery which was situated in a field adjacent to a
House of Lords road. There was a fence around the perimeter of the field although there were large
gaps in the fence. The field was frequently used as a short cut to a railway station and
children would use it as a playground. The defendant would often warn people off the
land but the attempts were not effective and no real attempt was made to ensure that
people did not come onto the land. A child came on to the land and was killed when
he climbed onto a piece of haulage apparatus.

Held:
No duty of care was owed to trespassers to ensure that they were safe when coming
onto the land. The only duty was not to inflict harm wilfully.

Viscount Dunedin:
"In the present case, had the child been a licensee, I would have held the defenders
liable; secus if the complainer had been an adult. But, if the person is a trespasser,
then the only duty the proprietor has towards him is not maliciously to injure him; he
may not shoot him; he may not set a spring gun, for that is just to arrange to shoot him
without personally firing the shot. Other illustrations of what he may not do might be
found, but they all come under the same head—injury either directly malicious or an
acting so reckless as to be tantamount to malicious acting."

A-G v P.Y.A. Quarries Ltd. (1957) held that ―…any nuisance is public which materially affects the reasonable comfort
and convenience of life of a class of Her Majesty‘s subjects.‖
Alcock v. The Chief Constable of Relatives of those killed or injured at a football stadium claimed damages against the
South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310 police for causing them nervous shock resulting in psychiatric illness. The relatives
saw and heard the tragedy via live television or radio broadcasts. The police admitted
liability in negligence but denied any duty of care to the plaintiffs. The issue was
whether the relatives were entitled in law to damages. The House of Lords held that a
claimant for damages for psychiatric injury must pass two tests.
The injury must be reasonably foreseeable (shown by a close tie of love and affection
between the individuals). Second, the claimant must have been proximate to the
incident or its aftermath at the time the incident occurred and the shock must have
resulted from seeing or hearing the incident or its aftermath.

Alexander v North Eastern The Defendants published a notice at their train station saying the Claimant had been
Railway (1865) 6 B&S 340 caught riding on a train without a ticket and was sentenced to £1 fine or three weeks
imprisonment. In actual fact it was 14 days imprisonment if he failed to pay the fine.
The Claimant complained that the overstatement made it appear as if the offence he
had committed was worse than it was. The jury found for the Defendants.

Al-Kandari V J R Brown & Co Recognized the duty of a lawyer towards 3rd arty only because the lawyers
byundertaking to keep the Client's passport with them had assumed the responsibility
to make sure that harm did not come to the 3rd party. Since the client had somehow
obtained the passport the lawyers had breached this assumed duty towards the 3rd
party
Allen v Gulf Oil Refinery [1981] The claimant brought an action in nuisance for the smell, noise and vibration created
AC 1001 House of Lords by an oil refinery which had been constructed by the defendant on their land. The
defendant‘s action in constructing the oil refinery was authorised by an Act of
Parliament.

Held:
The defendant was not liable as it had a defence of statutory authority.
Allied Maples v Simmons & The defendant solicitors were acting for the claimant in a takeover of the Gillow group
Simmons [1995] 4 All ER 907 of companies. The defendant's failed to warn the claimant of potential liability that may
arise under the transaction. The transaction was completed and risk of liability
became a reality leaving the claimant liable to pay substantial sums. The claimant
sought to recover some of this from the defendant arguing that if they had been
advised correctly there was a chance that they would have been able to negotiate out
of the liability.

Held:

The claimant was entitled to recover a sum to reflect their loss of a chance of
negotiating out of liability.

Where the result depends on what a third party would have done in a hypothetical
situation, the claimant only has to demonstrate that there was a more than speculative
chance rather than on the balance of probabilities. The assessment of the chance will
be reflected in the damages.
AMF International Ltd v Magnet The contractor was to provide and install valuable timber and other specialised
Bowling Ltd (1968) bowling alley equipment. On July 21, 1964 an exceptionally heavy rainstorm flooded
the building and the timber for the building work was seriously damaged. The court
held that the contractor and the building owner were both occupiers of the building.

Anns v Merton London Borough The claimants were tenants in a block of flats. The flats suffered from structural
Council [1978] AC 728 defects due to inadequate foundations which were 2ft 6in deep instead of 3ft deep as
required. The defendant Council was responsible for inspecting the foundations during
the construction of the flats. The House of Lords held that the defendant did owe a
duty of care to ensure the foundations were of the correct depth. Lord Wilberforce
introduced a two stage test for imposing a duty of care. This has since been overruled
by Caparo v Dickman.

Lord Wilberforce's two stage test:

"in order to establish that a duty of care arises in a particular situation, it is not
necessary to bring the facts of that situation within those of previous situations in
which a duty of care has been held to exist. Rather the question has to be approached
in two stages. First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and
the person who has suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of proximity or
neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness
on his part may be likely to cause damage to the latter—in which case a prima facie
duty of care arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is
necessary to consider whether there are any considerations which ought to negative,
or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed or
the damages to which a breach of it may give rise."

Ashdown v Samuel Williams & Held that it is sufficient for an occupier to post a ―clear and unequivocal notice‖ at the
Sons Ltd (1957) point of entry excluding liability with respect to non-contractual entrants.
Attia v British Gas plc The plaintiff brought an action for damages from the defendants for nervous shock.
She alleged that she had suffered a psychiatric illness caused by witnessing the
destruction of her home by a fire caused by the defendants' negligence while installing
central heating to her home. The judge decided as a preliminary issue on assumed
facts that the plaintiff could not recover damages and dismissed the action.
The plaintiff appealed.
David Tucker (instructed by Fremont & Co) for the plaintiff. Janet Turner (instructed by
the solicitor, British Gas plc (North Thames)) for the defendants.
Dillon LJ said that the issues at trial, assuming the facts pleaded including the
psychiatric illness were proved, would have been (a) causation and (b) foreseeability
of the damage as a question of remoteness. If the plaintiff could surmount those two
hurdles there was no good reason why the law should refuse to allow her to recover
damages for nervous shock. His Lordship was not prepared to hold that the fact that
the shock which caused the plaintiff's psychiatric illness was caused by damage to
property must preclude her from recovering damages for nervous shock, even if it was
reasonably foreseeable that she might suffer psychiatric illness as a consequence of
the defendants' negligence in causing the fire in her house. Whether the plaintiff's
assumed illness caused by the shock was or was not a foreseeable consequence of
the defendants' negligence must depend on the actual evidence given at the trial. His
Lordship would set aside the judge's order and allow the action to proceed to trial.
Woolf and Bingham LJJ delivered judgments concurring with Dillon LJ.
Appeal allowed.

Attorney General v Corke [1993] The Defendant allowed people onto his land to live in caravans. These people
engaged in anti social activities which took place off Defendant's land. The court held
that these people were 'dangerous' within the meaning of Rylands v Fletcher.

Attorney General v Hartwell


(British Virgin Islands) [2004] PC Laurent was the sole police officer stationed on the island of Jost Van Dyke,a
small island with a population of about 135 people in the British Virgin Islands. Laurent
was still on probation and was subject to daily supervisory visits by a police sergeant
from a nearby larger island. As the sole officer, PC Laurent had a key to the police
station's strongbox which contained a gun. One night he took the gun and went to a
restaurant where his wife was associating with another man (the Claimant). He then
fired four shots injuring the two in addition to a tourist in the restaurant. The claimant
brought an action against the police for allowing a probationary officer to have access
to a gun.

Held:

A duty of care is owed by the police authorities in entrusting officers with guns.

Lord Nicholls:
"In the view of their Lordships the appropriate analysis is that when entrusting a police
officer with a gun the police authorities owe to the public at large a duty to take
reasonable care to see the officer is a suitable person to be entrusted with such a
dangerous weapon lest by any misuse of it he inflicts personal injury, whether
accidentally or intentionally, on other persons. For this purpose no distinction is to be
drawn between personal injuries inflicted in the course of police duties and personal
injuries inflicted by a police officer using a police gun for his own ends. If this duty
seems far-reaching in its scope it must be remembered that guns are dangerous
weapons. The wide reach of the duty is proportionate to the gravity of the risks."
Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC The claimant suffered an injury to his leg when the defendant ran into him in his car.
467 He suffered pain and loss of amenity and had to take a lower paid job. He tried
various different employments some of which he had to discontinue because of his
injury. He was employed sorting through scrap metal when he sustained a further
injury to his leg. He was on his own when two men came in and demanded money.
When he refused they shot him in his injured leg. As a result of the shooting, the
claimant had to have his leg amputated. The defendant argued that the second injury
removed the very limb from which the earlier disability had stemmed, and that
therefore no loss suffered thereafter can be attributed to the defendant's negligence.
Arguing that the second injury submerged or obliterated the effect of the first and that
all loss thereafter must be attributed to the second injury. The trial judge rejected this
argument which he said was more ingenious than attractive. But it was accepted by
the Court of Appeal.

House of Lords held:

The defendant remained liable for the loss of amenity and lower earning capacity even
after the amputation.

Barker v Corus, [2006] 3 All ER Barker was exposed to asbestos in his course of employment with several employers,
785 but also in the course of self-employment. He developed mesothelioma and sued for
damages. He was unsuccessful at the lower courts and appealed to the House of
Lords.

Does it matter that the plaintiff was one of the parties that might have contributed to
the injury?

Hoffman, in the majority, states that the purpose of Fairchild can be applied here. He
states that it does not matter that Barker was one of the parties that helped cause the
injury - the liability of the other two parties depends only on their own actions and not
on those of other parties. Therefore, the other two parties are still liable – however the
damages are divided according to the probability of each respondant causing the
harm.
In the dissent, Rodger of Earlsferry states that Fairchild cannot apply here because it
tips the scales too far in favour of Barker. It is essentially stating that in cases exactly
like this a plaintiff recovers unconditionally, however if the case only differs a little bit
then plaintiffs cannot recover for suffering the increased risk of an injury. He also talks
about how dividing damages is bad, because claimants often end up with only a small
proportion of the damages that they deserve. Appeal allowed.

Fairchild applies even if the plaintiff himself is one of the causes of the injury, but the
damages are divided up based on the probability of each party‘s actions causing the
harm.
Barker v Saint Gobain Pipelines Mr Barker contracted mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos. He worked for the
[2004] EWCA Civ 545 Court of defendant between 1960-68. He worked for a different employer for 6 weeks where he
Apeal was also exposed to asbestos. After 1968 he became self-employed as a plasterer for
20 years. Whilst self employed he was exposed to asbestos on three occasions. The
defendant argued that his exposure to asbestos whilst self-employed prevented him
from being able to rely on the causation principle established in Fairchild v Glenhaven
whereby the claimant is able to demonstrate that the defendant's breach of duty
materially increased the risk of contracting the disease.

Held:
Fairchild did apply and the claimant was thus successful in establishing causation. His
damages would be reduced under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act
1945 to reflect the periods where he exposed himself to risk during the course of his
self-employment.

Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Mr Barnett went to hospital complaining of severe stomach pains and vomiting. He
Hospital [1969] 1 QB 428 was seen by a nurse who telephoned the doctor on duty. The doctor told her to send
him home and contact his GP in the morning. Mr Barnett died five hours later from
arsenic poisoning. Had the doctor examined Mr Barnett at the time there would have
been nothing the doctor could have done to save him.

Held:

The hospital was not liable as the doctor's failure to examine the patient did not cause
his death.

Introduced the 'but for' test ie would the result have occurred but for the act or
omission of the defendant? If yes, the defendant is not liable.
Berkoff v. Burchill A libel civil action which he brought against Sunday Times journalist Julie Burchill,
after she published comments suggesting that he was "hideously ugly"; the judge
ruled for Berkoff, finding that Burchill's actions "held him to ridicule and contempt
Blake v Galloway [2004] 3 All ER The claimant, a 15 year old boy, was out with four of his friends including the
315 defendant. The boys started throwing pieces of bark chippings and twigs at each
other. The claimant did not join in at first but then threw a piece of bark chipping at the
defendant hitting him in the leg. The defendant picked it up and threw it back at the
claimant. The piece of bark struck the claimant's eye resulting in serious injury. The
claimant brought an action contending that the injury was caused by the battery and or
negligence of the defendant. The defendant raised volenti non fit injuria. The trial
judge rejected the defence of volenti but held that the damages should be reduced by
50% under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. The defendant
appealed contending that there was no breach of duty and that the judge was wrong
to reject the defence of volenti.

Held:
Appeal allowed. In the context of 'horseplay' there is a breach of the duty of care only
where the defendant's conduct amounts to recklessness or a very high degree of
carelessness. The defendant had consented to the risk of injury occurring within the
conventions and understanding of the game.

Lord Justice Dyson:


"If the defendant in the present case had departed from the tacit understandings or
conventions of the play and, for example, had thrown a stone at the claimant, or
deliberately aimed the piece of bark at the claimant's head, then there might have
been a breach of the duty of care. But what happened here was, at its highest, "an
error of judgment or lapse of skill" (to quote from Diplock LJ), and that is not sufficient
to amount to a failure to take reasonable care in the circumstances of horseplay such
as that in which these youths were engaged. In my view, the defendant's conduct
came nowhere near recklessness or a very high degree of carelessness."

The game was played on the basis that the objects were thrown at no particular part
of the body. It follows that an object thrown in the general direction of a participant,
without negligence and without intent to cause injury, but which happened to hit him in
the face, was being thrown in accordance with the understandings and conventions of
themanaged
Bliss v Hall [1838] 4 Bing NC 183 D game, and in a manner
a factory to which
for 3 years andthe participants
during this timehad consented.
smoke, smell and other
remittance came from the factory. P moved into a house near the factory.
Held: A defence that an activity has been going on before an action brought to halt the
activity is inapplicable as P had his rights too, one of which is clean air.

Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Defendants had installed water mains along the street with hydrants located at various
(1856) Exch points. One of the hydrants across from Plaintiff‘s house developed a leak as a result
of exceedingly cold temperatures and caused water damage to the house. Plaintiff
sued for negligence.

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon


those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do,
or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The
defendants might have been liable for negligence, if, unintentionally, they omitted to
do that which a reasonable person would have done, or did that which a person taking
reasonable precautions would not have done.
Bolam v Friern Hospital The claimant was undergoing electro convulsive therapy as treatment for his mental
Management Committee [1957] 1 illness. The doctor did not give any relaxant drugs and the claimant suffered a serious
WLR 583 fracture. There was divided opinion amongst professionals as to whether relaxant
drugs should be given. If they are given there is a very small risk of death, if they are
not given there is a small risk of fractures. The claimant argued that the doctor was in
breach of duty by not using the relaxant drug.

Held:
The doctor was not in breach of duty. The House of Lords formulated the Bolam test:

"a medical professional is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a
practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that
particular art . . . Putting it the other way round, a man is not negligent, if he is acting
in accordance with such a practice, merely because there is a body of opinion who
would take a contrary view."

Bolitho v City & Hackney Health A 2 year old child was admitted to hospital suffering from breathing difficulties. A
Authority [1997] 3 WLR 1151 doctor was summoned but did not attend as her bleep was not working due to low
battery. The child died. The child's mother brought an action claiming that the doctor
should have attended and intubated the child which would have saved the child's life.
The doctor gave evidence that had she attended she would not have intubated.
Another doctor gave evidence that they would not have intubated. The trial judge
applied the Bolam test and held that there was no breach of duty. The claimant
appealed.

Held:
In applying the Bolam test where evidence is given that other practitioners would have
adopted the method employed by the defendant, it must be demonstrated that the
method was based on logic and was defensible.
Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850 Miss Stone was injured when she was struck by a cricket ball outside her home. She
brought an action against the cricket club in nuisance and negligence. The cricket field
was surrounded by a 7 foot fence. The pitch was sunk ten feet below ground so the
fence was 17 feet above the cricket pitch. The distance from the striker to the fence
was about 78 yards and just under 100 yards from where the claimant was standing.
A witness who lived in the same road as the claimant but close to pitch said that five
or six times during the last 30 years he had known balls hit his house or come into the
yard. Two members of the Club, of over 30 years' standing, agreed that the hit was
altogether exceptional to anything previously seen on that ground.

Held:
No breach of duty. The likelihood of harm was low the defendant had taken all
practical precautions in the circumstances. The cricket ground had been there for 90
years without injury and provided a useful service for the community.
Bonnington Castings Ltd v The claimant contracted pneumoconiosis by inhaling air which contained minute
Wardlaw [1956] AC 613 House of particles of silica during the course of his employment. The defendant was in breach
Lords of a statutory duty in failing to provide an extractor fan. Had they installed an extractor
fan the number of particles of silica that the claimant was exposed to would have been
reduced, however, there would still be some particles present. There were thus two
possible causes: the guilty dust, which should not have been in the working
environment and the innocent dust, which would have been present in any event. The
trial judge held that where the duty arose by statute then it was for the defendant to
show that his breach of duty (the guilty dust) did not cause the disease. As the
defendant was unable to do this they were liable. The defendant appealed contending
the burden of proof rests on the claimant.

Held:

The burden of proof remains on the claimant. However, the claimant only had to
demonstrate that the guilty dust had made a material contribution to the disease. He
did not have to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that the guilty dust was the
sole cause of the disease

Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92 The claimant was a pregnant fishwife. She got off a tram and as she reached to get
her basket off the tram, the defendant drove his motorcycle past the tram at excessive
speed and collided with a car 50 feet away from where the claimant was standing. The
defendant was killed by the impact. The claimant heard the collusion but did not see it.
A short time later, the claimant walked past where the incident occurred. The body
had been removed but there was a lot of blood on the road. The claimant went into
shock and her baby was still born. She brought a negligence claim against the
defendant's estate.

Held:

No duty of care was owed by the defendant to the claimant. There was not sufficient
proximity between the claimant and defendant when the incident occurred.

Box v Jubb LR 4 EX Div 76 The defendant had a reservoir on their land. There was another reservoir situated at a
higher level than the defendant‘s. The owner of this other reservoir emptied it through
a drain connected to the defendant‘s reservoir causing the defendant‘s reservoir to
overflow and damage the claimant‘s land. The claimant brought an action under
Rylands v Fletcher contending that there was a non natural user of the land and that
there had been an escape of water that caused damage.

Held:
The defendant was not liable for the damage as it was caused by the act of a third
party over which the defendant had no control.
Bradford Corporation v Pickles [Tort – negligence - duty of care - proving fault - malice not normally relevant]
[1895] HL D owned land containing underground streams which fed C's (Bradford Corporation)
waterworks. D began to sink shafts for the alleged purpose of draining certain beds of
stone. The effect of D‘s operations was to affect seriously the supply of water to
appellant‘s springs. The corporation alleged that defendant was not acting in good
faith, but to compel them to purchase his land.

Held: D has the right to divert or appropriate the water within his own land so as to
deprive his neighbour of it. His right is the same whatever his motive may be, whether
genuinely to improve his own land, or maliciously to injure his neighbour, or to induce
his neighbour to buy him out.
No use of property which would be legal if due to a proper motive can become illegal if
it is prompted by a motive which is improper or even malicious.

British Railways Board v A six year old boy was electrocuted and suffered severe burns when he wondered
Herrington [1972] AC 877 House from a play park onto a live railway line. The railway line was surrounded by a fence
of Lords however, part of the fence had been pushed down and the gap created had been
used frequently as a short cut to the park. The defendant was aware of the gap in the
fence which had been present for several months, but had failed to do anything about
it. Under existing authority of Addie v Dumbreck no duty of care was owed to
trespassers. However, the House of Lords departed from their previous decision using
the 1966 Practice Statement and held that the defendant railway company did owe a
duty of common humanity to trespassers.

Lord Pearson:

"It seems to me that the rule in Addie v. Dumbreck has been rendered obsolete by
changes in physical and social conditions and has become an incumbrance impeding
the proper development of the law. With the increase of the population and the larger
proportion living in cities and towns and the extensive substitution of blocks of flats for
rows of houses with gardens or back yards and quiet streets, there is less playing
space for children and so a greater temptation to trespass. There is less supervision
of children, so that they are more likely to trespass. Also with the progress of
technology there are more and greater dangers for them to encounter by reason of
the increased use of, for instance, electricity, gas, fast moving vehicles, heavy
machinery and poisonous chemicals. There is considerably more need than there
used to be for occupiers to take reasonable steps with a view to deterring persons,
especially children, from trespassing in places that are dangerous for them.

In my opinion the Addie v. Dumbreck formulation of the duly of occupier to trespasser


is plainly inadequate for modern conditions, and its rigid and restrictive character has
impeded the proper development of the common law in this field. It has become an
anomaly and should be discarded."

Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818 The Defendants owned a golf club where illegal gambling machines were kept.
Someone told the police and they were removed. Shortly after a piece of paper
appeared on one of the walls saying but 'he who gave the game away, may he byrnn
in hell and rue the day'. Did these words defame the claimant in the sense that he was
guilty of underhand disloyalty to his fellow club members by telling the police about the
machines. The Court of Appeal held that even though some people may consider that
the fruit machines were so trivial that they weren't really criminal, the right-thinking
man cannot ever view the reporting of crime as defamation. To report crime, however
trivial, cannot be a source of scorn or ridicule in the eyes of the law
Cambridge Water v Eastern The defendant owned a leather tanning business. Spillages of small quantities of
Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC solvents occurred over a long period of time which seeped through the floor of the
264 House of Lords building into the soil below. These solvents made their way to the borehole owned by
the Claimant water company. The borehole was used for supplying water to local
residents. The water was contaminated at a level beyond that which was considered
safe and Cambridge Water had to cease using the borehole. Cambridge Water
brought actions based on negligence, nuisance and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.

Held:

Eastern Counties Leather were not liable as the damage was too remote. It was not
reasonably foreseeable that the spillages would result in the closing of the borehole.
The foreseeability of the type of damage is a pre-requisite of liability in actions of
nuisance and claims based on the rule in Rylands v Fletcher in the same way as it
applies to claims based in negligence. The Wagon Mound No 1 case applies to
determine remoteness of damage.

Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co Donald Ogilvie was the director of a company called Trevaunance Hydraulic Tin Mines
Ltd, which mined tin in Cornwall. He needed more capital, so he put an advertisement
in The Times on July 8, 1946, which said,
"£10,000. Established Tin Mine (low capitalization) in Cornwall seeks further capital.
Instal additional milling plant. Directorship and active participation open to suitable
applicant - Apply"
Mr Candler responded, saying he was interested in investing £2000, if he could see
the company's accounts. Mr Ogilvie instructed Crane, Christmas & Co, a firm of
auditors, to prepare the company‘s accounts and balance sheet. The draft accounts
were shown to Mr Candler in the presence of Crane, Christmas & Co‘s clerk. Mr
Candler relied on their accuracy and subscribed for £2,000 worth of shares in the
company. But the company was actually in a very bad state. Ogilvie used the
investment on himself and then went bankrupt. Mr Candler lost all the money he
invested. He brought an action against the accountants, Crane, Christmas & Co. for
negligently misrepresenting the state of the company. As there was no contractual
relationship between the parties, the action was brought in tort law for pure economic
loss.

The majority of the Court of Appeal (Sir Lionel Cohen and Sir Cyril Asquith) relied on
the case of Derry v Peek to refuse a remedy to the plaintiff, holding that loss resulting
from negligent misstatement was not actionable in the absence of any contractual or
fiduciary relationship between the parties.
Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman Facts
A company called Fidelity plc, manufacturers of electrical equipments, was the target
of a takeover by Caparo Industries plc. Fidelity was not doing well. In March 1984
Fidelity had issued a profit warning, which had halved its share price. In May 1984
Fidelity's directors made a preliminary announcement in its annual profits for the year
up to March confirming the negative outlook. The share price fell again. At this point
Caparo had begun buying up shares in large numbers. In June 1984 the annual
accounts, which were done with the help of the accountant Dickman, were issued to
the shareholders, which now included Caparo. Caparo reached a shareholding of
29.9% of the company, at which point it made a general offer for the remaining
shares, as the City Code's rules on takeovers required. Once it had control, Caparo
found that Fidelity's accounts were in an even worse state than had been revealed by
the directors or the auditors. It sued Dickman for negligence in preparing the accounts
and sought to recover its losses.

Issue
What test should be employed in determining negligence?

Decision
The majority of the Court of Appeal (Bingham LJ and Taylor LJ, O'Connor LJ
dissenting) held that a duty was owed by the auditor to shareholders individually, and
although it was not necessary to decide that in this case and the judgment was obiter,
that a duty would not be owed to an outside investor who had no shareholding.
Bingham LJ held that, for a duty owed to shareholders directly, the very purpose of
publishing accounts was to inform investors so that they could make choices within a
company about how to use their shares. But for outside investors, a relationship of
proximity would be "tenuous" at best, and that it would certainly not be "fair, just and
reasonable".
Appeal allowed.

Reasons
Bridge of Harwich, writing for a unanimous court, states that the two part test
Carmarthenshire CC v Lewis [Tort – negligence
employed in Dobson- duty of care
should - public
not be used, policy – duty owed itinhas
and subsequently operational matters] in
been abandoned
D a Local Authority employed a teacher who left a 4-year-old child alone for about ten
minutes while she did other things. The child left the classroom onto a busy road,
where he caused a lorry driver to swerve and collide with a telegraph pole. The lorry
driver was killed and his widow sued the education authority.

Held: The education authority had taken charge of the child and had a duty to take
reasonable care to prevent him from causing harm to others.

C won.
Carslogie Steamship Co v. Royal On 26 November 1949 the vessel Heimgar, while under time charter to the Ministry of
Norwegian Government Transport, suffered damage in a collision with the Carslogie. It was admitted that the
Carslogie was solely to blame. The Heimgar had temporary repairs done in a port in
England before proceeding to a port in the United States where permanent repairs
could be carried out. During the voyage across the Atlantic, the ship sustained heavy
weather damage, which necessitated immediate repair. The ship remained in dock for
fifty days during which the repairs due to the collision and those due to the weather
damage were carried out concurrently. It had been agreed that ten days would be
allocated to the collision repair and thirty days for the weather damage. The owners of
the Heimgar claimed damages for the ten days attributable to the collision damage
while at port.

The owners of the Carslogie were only liable for such loss of profit suffered by the
Heimgar as resulted from the Carslogie‘s wrongful act. During the time that the
Heimgar was detained in dock she had ceased to be a profit-earning machine
because the heavy weather damage had rendered her unseaworthy. Therefore, the
respondents had sustained no damage by reason of the fact that for ten days the
vessel was undergoing repairs in respect of the collision damage, as the heavy
weather damage was the sole reason the Heimgar had to dock for repairs before
reaching its destination.

Cassidy v Daily Mirror [1929] 2 KB The Defendants took a photograph of Mr Cassidy (a racehorse owner) with a woman
331 who was not his wife. Mr Cassidy, who often used a different name, told a reporter
that he was going to marry her and the image had a caption saying they were
engaged, using his alternative name. Mrs Cassidy, the lawful wife, brought an action
for defamation. Although they lived separately, Mr Cassidy sometimes came to visit
her. She alleged that people would see him arriving at her house thinking he is the
man from the photo (where his alternative name was used) and assume that they
were living together immorally and only pretending to be his wife. The Court of Appeal
said that words published about one person can sometimes defame another person
and that Mrs Cassidy had in fact been defamed. By people seeing this man coming to
her house who is supposed to be marrying another woman, she looks like she was
simply pretending to be his wife. The blame here was on the newspaper but arguably,
the fact that a lawful wife existed may have been difficult to discover.

Century Insurance v. Northern A patrol lorry driver smoked a cigarette while driving, which caused an explosion.
Ireland Road Transport Board Is the smoking of a cigarette in the course of employment or not?
1942 House of Lords
It was not too far from the employment, the driver did act as an employee.

Chaplin v Hicks Chaplin, along with 6,000 others, entered a nation wide beauty contest and got
through to the final stage where only 50 contestants were left. Hicks was to select the
twelve winners from these remaining contestants. The winners were to be given
theatrical engagement by him for three years at £5 per week. Hicks, in breach of his
contract with Chaplin, prevented her from taking part in the final selection stage. The
judge and jury awarded her damages of £100 for the opportunity she lost in being
prevented from taking part in the final selection stage.

Where by contract a man has a right to belong to a limited class of competitors for a
prize, a breach of that contract by reason of which he is prevented from continuing a
member of the class and is thereby deprived of his chance of obtaining the prize is a
breach in respect of which he may be entitled to recover substantial, and not merely
nominal, damages.
The existence of a contingency which is dependent on the volition of a third person
does not necessarily render the damages for a breach of contract incapable of
assessment.
Charleston v News Group Two popular characters from the tv show Neighbours were portrayed on the front
Newspapers [1995] 2 AC 65 cover of a newspaper naked except for black leather engaged in sexual intercourse.
The title read "Strewth! What's Harold up to with out Madge? Porn shocker for
Neighbours stars" however the captions on the pictures made clear that the images
were false. The image was taken from a sordid computer game which had computer-
generated the images. The rest of the article condemned the game in a tone which
can be contrasted with the prominence given to the image. The House of Lords
accepted that the image must have deeply offensive but said that it was not
defamatory since a publication has to be read as a whole. Even though the image and
headline were libellous the remainder of the article had a neutralising effect.

Chaudhry v Prabhakar [1988] 3 the court of appeal held that the duty of care will arise on the defendant who are the
All ER 718 friend of plaintiff that give a negligent advice to the plaintiff to selection of a second
car. The defendant will liable on it, although defendant not as a professional in the
mechanic area. This is an exception existed the duty of care in a social relationship.
Because the Court of Appeal clearly measure that the case above was an unusual
case, the judgment in this case was made in a special facts.

Chester v Afshar [2004] 3 WLR The claimant had suffered back pain for 6 years. This became quite severe and at
927 House of Lords times she was unable to walk or control her bladder. An MRI scan revealed that there
was disc protrusion into her spinal column and she was advised to have surgery. The
surgery carried a 1-2% risk that even if it was performed without negligence the
operation could worsen rather than improve her condition. Her consultant
neurosurgeon Mr Afshar was under a duty to warn her of this risk although he failed to
do so. The claimant had the operation and unfortunately it worsened her condition.
The trial judge found that the surgeon had not been negligent in performing the
operation but his failure to warn her of the risk was a breach of duty. The claimant
argued that if she had been warned she would not have taken the decision to have the
operation straight away but would have taken time to consider other options and
discuss the risks with her family and would thus not have had the surgery on the day
which she did have it. She did not say she would never have had the operation. The
judge held that if she had the operation on another occasion it may have been
successful. He therefore found for the claimant. The defendant appealed. The Court
of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the defendant appealed to the House of Lords on
the grounds of causation in that she was likely to have consented to the operation and
that even if it had been on a different occassion it carried the same risk.

Held:

3:2 decision (Lord Bingham & Lord Hoffman dissenting) appeal dismissed.

Lord Hope:

"To leave the patient who would find the decision difficult without a remedy, as the
normal approach to causation would indicate, would render the duty useless in the
cases where it may be needed most. This would discriminate against those who
cannot honestly say that they would have declined the operation once and for all if
they had been warned. I would find that result unacceptable. The function of the law is
to enable rights to be vindicated and to provide remedies when duties have been
breached. Unless this is done the duty is a hollow one, stripped of all practical force
and devoid of all content. It will have lost its ability to protect the patient and thus to
Christie v Davey (1893) 1 Ch 316 The claimant was a music teacher. She gave private lessons at her home and her
family also enjoyed playing music. She lived in a semi-detached house which adjoined
the defendant‘s property. The defendant had complained of the noise on many
occasions to no avail. He took to banging on the walls and beating trays and shouting
in retaliation.

Held:
The defendant‘s actions were motivated by malice and therefore did constitute a
nuisance. An injunction was granted to restrain his actions.
Cook v Lewis, [1951] SCR 830 All of the parties were hunting. Lewis was hiding in a bush, and his brother tried to
warn Cook and his companions of this but it was misunderstood. A few grouses flew
out of the bush, and Cook and his companions fired shots. Lewis was hit in the face,
and lost an eye. Cook and his companions gave statements claiming that they could
not have shot Lewis. The jury found that it was one of their shots that hit him, but they
could not decide whose shot it was. The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, which
Cook appealed.

When there are two parties, and it is proven that one of their actions caused harm, but
it cannot be proven which one it was, who, if anyone, is liable?

The decision in the lower court was based upon the general Canadian rule that stated
that when it is certain that one of two individuals committed the offence, but it is
uncertain which one was the guilty agent, then neither of them can be convicted.
Appeal dismissed. When there are two parties, and it is proven that one of them
caused harm in their actions but it cannot be proven which party actually did it, then
both of them are liable for the resulting damages.
Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd (2008) Mr Corr was a maintenance engineer who became severely disfigured after he was
UKHL) struck on the head by a machine at work. He underwent extensive reconstructive
surgery but remained disfigured. He suffered from flashbacks and post traumatic
stress disorder and lapsed into a deep depression from which he never recovered. Six
years after the accident he committed suicide. At the time of his death, Mr Corr had
begun proceedings against his former employers for damages for the physical and
psychological damage he had suffered. After his death, his widow was substituted as
the claimant. However, she also sought to sue for the loss attributable to the death by
suicide under section 1 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. While IBC Vehicles accepted
that the accident was a breach of the duty owed to Mr Corr to take reasonable care to
avoid causing him personal injury, including psychological injury, they refused to admit
liability for his suicide, arguing that it (1) fell outside the duty of care owed to him by
the company; (2) was not an act which was reasonably foreseeable and therefore not
one for which they should be held liable; (3) broke the chain of causation and
constituted a novus actus interveniens; (4) was an unreasonable act which broke the
chain of causation; (5) was the voluntary act of the deceased, and so precluded by the
principle volenti non fit injuria; (6) amounted to contributory negligence.

The company‘s appeal to the House of Lords was dismissed. The Lords held that the
appellant owed Mr Corr a duty to avoid not only physical but also psychological injury
and that the deceased had acted in a way that he would not have done had it not been
for the breach by the appellant. In addition, suicide was found to be foreseeable.
Although it was not a usual manifestation of severe depression, it was not uncommon.
In these particular circumstances it was reasonably foreseeable by the appellant if one
considered the possible effect of such an accident on a hypothetical employee. The
appellant‘s other arguments were rejected.

Cunningham v Reading FC [1991] D liable to police injured by concrete loosened from terraces. D neglected to take
Times LR 153 precautions against clearly foreseeable acts of violent supporters.
Cutler v Vauxhall Motors the claimant grazed his right ankle in an accident caused by the defendants. The
injury caused an ulcer to form and, because the claimant had been suffering for some
time from varicose veins in both legs, an immediate operation was necessary. He
claimed damages from the defendants for the pain and discomfort of the operation but
the Court of Appeal held that since the claimant would very probably have needed a
similar operation within five years in any case, the defendant‘s negligence could not
be regarded as the cause of the operation.

Dann v Hamilton [1939] 1 KB 509 The Claimant was injured when she was a willing passenger in the car driven by the
Mr Hamilton. He had been drinking and the car was involved in a serious crash which
killed him. In a claim for damages the Defendant raised the defence of volenti non fit
injuria in that in accepting the lift knowing of his drunken condition she had voluntarily
accepted the risk.

Held:
The defence was unsuccessful. The claimant was entitled to damages.

Asquith J:
"There may be cases in which the drunkenness of the driver at the material time is so
extreme and so glaring that to accept a lift from him is like engaging in an intrinsically
and obviously dangerous occupation, intermeddling with an unexploded bomb or
walking on the edge of an unfenced cliff. It is not necessary to decide whether in such
a case the maxim 'volenti non fit injuria' would apply, for in the present case I find as a
fact that the driver's degree of intoxication fell short of this degree".

Derbyshire County Council v The council brought an action for libel against a newspaper in respect of articles
Times Newspapers Ltd and alleging impropriety in the administration of its superannuation fund. The defendants'
others application to strike out the statement of claim, on the ground that a local authority
could not maintain an action in libel for words reflecting on its governmental and
administrative functions, was dismissed. The Court of Appeal allowed the defendants'
appeal.
The council appealed.
Charles Gray QC and Heather Rogers (instructed by Kingsford Stacey for solicitor,
Derbyshire County Council) for the council. Anthony Lester QC and Desmond Browne
QC (instructed by Biddle & Co) for the defendants.
Lord Keith of Kinkel said that it was of the highest public importance that a
democratically elected governmental body, or indeed any governmental body, should
be open to uninhibited public criticism. The threat of a civil action for defamation had
inevitably to have an inhibiting effect on freedom of speech and it was therefore
contrary to the public interest for organs of government, whether central or local, to
sue for libel. A local authority did not have the right under the common law of England
to maintain an action for damages for defamation.
Lord Griffiths, Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Woolf agreed.
Appeal dismissed. (WLR)
Derry v Peek (1889) 5 T.L.R. 625 In a company prospectus the defendant stated the company had the right to use
steam powered trams as oppose to horse powered trams. However, at the time the
right to use steam powered trams was subject of approval of the Board of Trade,
which was later refused. The claimant purchased shares in the company in reliance of
the statement made and brought a claim based on the alleged fraudulent
representation of the defendant.

Held:

The statement was not fraudulent but made in the honest belief that approval was
forthcoming.

Lord Herschell defined fraudulent misrepresentation as a statement which is made


either:

i) knowing it to be false,
ii) without belief in its truth, or
iii) recklessly, careless as to whether it be true or false.
Dillon v Twin State Gas & Electric Facts:
Co (1932), 85 NH 449, 163 A 111. Defendant maintained wires to carry electric current over a large public bridge. Wires
ran across bridge a foot above the horizontal girders. Wires were insulated for
weather protection but not against contact. Deceased and other boys had played on
the bridge for many years. Deceased, sitting on a horizontal girder, lost balance and
instinctively grabbed the wires to save himself from falling. He was electrocuted

Issue(s):
What is the extent of the defendant‘s liability in causing the plaintiff‘s loss?

Ratio:
If a defendant would have died but for the negligence of the tortfeasor, the tortfeasor
will not be liable. (If the defendant would have been seriously injured, the damages
awarded will be decreased)

Analysis:
The deceased, in falling from bridge was entitled to no protection from the defendant
to keep from falling. Liability is only in exposing deceased to the danger of charged
wires. But for the current, the deceased would have been killed or seriously injured
from the fall. Therefore, the defendant deprived him, not of a life of normal
expectancy, but of one too short to result in any economic loss.
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC Mrs Donoghue went to a cafe with a friend. The friend brought her a bottle of ginger
562 beer and an ice cream. The ginger beer came in an opaque bottle so that the contents
could not be seen. Mrs Donoghue poured half the contents of the bottle over her ice
cream and also drank some from the bottle. After eating part of the ice cream, she
then poured the remaining contents of the bottle over the ice cream and a
decomposed snail emerged from the bottle. Mrs Donoghue suffered personal injury as
a result. She commenced a claim against the manufacturer of the ginger beer.

Held:

Her claim was successful. This case established the modern law of negligence and
established the neighbour test.

Lord Aitken:
"The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law you must not injure your
neighbour; and the lawyer's question " Who is my neighbour ?" receives a restricted
reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then in law is my
neighbour ? The answer seems to be persons who are so closely and directly affected
by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected
when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question."

Dooley -v- Cammell Laird and Co The plaintiff was a crane driver whose load of timber, drums of paint, and bags of
Ltd; 1951 bolts etc, and without any fault on his part, fell into the hold of a ship as they were
being lowered along with scaffolding. No one was actually injured but the plaintiff knew
that fellow workers were then in the hold, and he suffered nervous shock. He sued his
employers saying that the sling was either overloaded or defective in breach of
shipbuilding regulations and the common law duties to provide safe plant and a safe
system.
Held: The plaintiff was entitled to recover in those circumstances. Cammell Laird were
in breach of the regulations. one of which was made as a protection against the risk of
bodily injury which included injury to the nerves, the nerves being a part of the body.
Donovan J said: ―I suppose I may reasonably infer that his fellow workmen down the
hold were his friends,‖ Mr Dooley was the unwitting agent of the defendant‘s
negligence. He was the crane driver who, without any fault, was party to an accident
which could have killed his fellow workers. It was his activity in operating the crane
which caused the actual and potential damage. It was that activity which brought him
into the category of persons for whom the defendants owed a duty of care, not really
any question of relationships of friendships.
Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Facts
Co Doughty was injured in his work at a factory owned by Turner when a cover over a
cauldron of molten hot liquid fell in and caused an explosion, propelling the liquid
toward him. It was not known that the cover would explode when it fell in the liquid.
Turner was found liable at trial and damages awarded, which they appealed.

Issue
Was the specific cause of injury foreseeable?

Decision
Appeal allowed.

Reasons
Diplock states that in this case the ratio of Wagon Mound must be applied. Although
this is similar to Hughes, there is a crucial difference. In that case the boy was injured
as a result of the defendants' negligently leaving the manhole uncovered. Although the
specific injury was unforeseeable, the negligent act directly led to it. In this case, the
only duty owed to Doughty was to ensure that he would not be injured if the top fell in
the molten liquid and splashed some over the side. This was prevented – the only
reason he was injured was because of the unforeseeable explosion. Turner did not
have a duty to protect Doughty from this, as they could not have foreseen it.

Ratio
If there is no duty owed to the plaintiff in regard to the initial action that led
consequentially to the injury, then the defendants are not liable for damages.

Doughty v Turner Manufacturing An asbestos lid was accidentally knocked into a cauldron of molten liquid. A few
Company [1964] 1 QB 518 moments later an explosion occurred. The claimant was standing close by and
suffered burns from the explosion. The explosion occurred as a result of the asbestos
reacting with the chemicals in the liquid in the high temperature. At the time of the
incident it was not known that the asbestos could react in that way.

Held:

The damage was too remote. It was not foreseeable that an explosion would occur.
Whilst it may be foreseeable the lid may have caused a splash resulting in a scold, it
was not foreseeable that an explosion would occur resulting in burns

Dulieu v White [1901] 2 KB 669 By her statement of claim A. alleged that while she was sitting behind the bar of her
husband's public-house (she then being pregnant) B.'s servant negligently drove a
pair-horse van belonging to B. into the public-house. A. in consequence sustained a
severe shock which made her seriously ill and led to her suffering a miscarriage. (She
gave premature birth to a child. In consequence of the shock sustained by the plaintiff
the said child was born an idiot.)

Held, that the statement of claim disclosed a good cause of action against B.
Per Kennedy, J.: Mere fright not followed by consequent physical damage will not
support an action, but if it is followed by consequent physical damage, then, if the
fright was the natural result of the defendants' negligence, an action lies, and the
physical damage is not too remote to support it.
E .Hutton and Co V Jones (1910) It was held the intention is irrelevant, the use of a fictious character is no defence. It
AC 20 need not answer 100% description of the plaintiff before it can be said to refer to
them. The plaintiff was a barrister and the article referred to a church warden it was
held a person charged of libel cannot defend himself by saying that he didn‘t intend to
defame the plaintiff. Thus there need not be express neither is it necessary for any
key or pointer in the statement to indicate the claimant the test is whether the ordinary
sensible reader in the light of the special facts would understand the words as
referring to the claimant. He/she is entitled to rely on a subsequent publication to
prove it was him referred to.

Edwards v Railways Executive A particular spot on a railway was used as a short cut on a regular basis. The fence
[1952] AC 737 House of Lords was repaired on several occasions and whenever it was reported to have been
interfered with. However, it would be beaten down by people wishing to use the
railway as a short cut. Witness testimony was to the effect that the fence was in good
repair the morning of the incident.

Held:
No licence was implied. The Defendant had taken reasonable steps to prevent people
coming onto the railway.

Lord Goddard:
"Repeated trespass of itself confers no licence"
Esso Petroleum v Mardon [1976] Mr Mardon entered a tenancy agreement with Esso Petroleum in respect of a new
QB 801 Petrol station. Esso's experts had estimated that the petrol station would sell 200,000
gallons of petrol. This estimate was based on figures which were prepared prior to
planning application. The planning permission changed the prominence of the petrol
station which would have an adverse affect on the sales rate. Esso made no
amendments to the estimate. The rent under the tenancy was also based on the
erroneous estimate. Consequently it became impossible for Mr Mardon to run the
petrol station profitably. In fact, despite his best endeavours the petrol station only sold
78,000 gallons in the first year and made a loss of £5,800.

The Court of Appeal held that there was no action for misrepresentation as the
statement was an estimate of future sales rather than a statement of fact. However,
the claimant was entitled to damages based on either negligent misstatement at
common law or breach of warranty of a collateral contract.

Fairchild v Glenhaven [2002] 3 This was a conjoined appeal involving three claimants who contracted mesothelioma,
WLR 89 House of Lords a form of lung cancer contracted by exposure to asbestos. Mesothelioma can be
caused by a single fibre of asbestos. The condition does not get worse the greater the
exposure. Once the fibre has embedded into the lung it can lay dormant for 30-40
years before giving rise to a tumour which can then take 10 years to kill. It will be only
the last 1-2 years where a person may experience symptoms. By this time it is too late
to treat. Each of the claimants had been exposed to asbestos by a number of different
employers. They were unable to demonstrate, and medical science was unable to
detect, which employer exposed each of them to the one fatal fibre.

Held:

If the claimants could demonstrate that one employer had materially increased the risk
of contracting mesothelioma they were entitled to claim full compensation from that
one employer
Ferguson v John Dawson & Ferguson was employed by John Dawson & Partners 'on the lump' [a device, now
Partners (Contractors) Ltd prohibited by statute, for avoiding the payment of national insurance and income tax].
Whilst working on the roof of a building Ferguson fell 15 feet and was seriously
injured. He claimed damages from John Dawson & Partners for his injuries. In order
to be able to claim damages from John Dawson & Partners he had to show that he
was an employee of theirs; they claimed that he was self employed and that,
therefore, they were not liable for his injuries.

The issue before the court was what terms governed the contract between Ferguson
and John Dawson & Partners.

In my judgment, on the tests laid down in the authorities, all of this indicates beyond
doubt that the reality of the relationship was employer and employee: a contract of
service...

My own view would have been that a declaration by the parties, even if it be
incorporated in the contract, that the workman is to be, or is to be deemed to be, self-
employed, an independent contractor, ought to be wholly disregarded - not merely
treated as not being conclusive - if the remainder of the contractual terms, governing
the realities of the relationship, show the relationship of employer and employee...

Ferguson v Welsh [1987] 1 WLR Sedgefield District Council, in pursuance of a development plan to build sheltered
1553 House of Lords accommodation, engaged the services of Mr Spence to demolish a building. It was a
term of the contract that the work was not to be sub-contracted out. In breach of this
term, Mr Spence engaged the services of the Welsh brothers to carry out the
demolition who in turn engaged the services of Mr Ferguson to assist. Mr Ferguson
suffered serious injury resulting in permanent paralysis when a wall he was standing
on collapsed due to the unsafe practices operated by the Welsh brothers. He brought
an action against the Council, Mr Spence and the Welsh brothers. The trial judge held
that the Welsh Brothers were liable but that Mr Spence and the Council were not
liable. Mr Ferguson appealed against the finding against the Council since the Welsh
Brothers (or Mr Spence) had the funds or insurance to meet liability.

Held:
The appeal was dismissed.
Mr Ferguson was a lawful visitor despite the clause forbidding sub-contracting since
Mr Spence would have apparent or ostensible authority to invite him on to the land.
However, the danger arose from the unsafe system of work adopted by the Welsh
Brothers not the state of the premises. Whilst there was evidence that Mr Spence had
sub-contracted demolition work to those executing unsafe practices on previous
occasions, there was no evidence that the Council were aware of this.

Froom v Butcher [1976] 1 QB 286 The Claimant was injured in a car accident due to the negligence of the Defendant.
The Claimant was not wearing a seat belt. There was disagreement as to the
apportionment of loss under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.
Lord Denning set out guidance as to apportionment of damages in such cases.

Giles v Walker (1890) 24 QBD Seeds from some thistles on the defendant‘s land blew into neighbouring land owned
656 by the claimant and damaged his crops. The defendant was not liable as he had not
brought the thistles onto his land and there can not be liability under Rylands v
Fletcher for a thing which naturally accumulates on land.
Glasgow Corporation v Muir A group of children were having a day out with their Sunday school. They were meant
(1943), to be having a picnic, but the rain had ruined it. The leader of the trip asked the
manager of a tearoom, run by Glasgow Corporation, if she would allow the children to
have their picnic on their premises. She agreed and the group entered. In the tearoom
there was a tuck shop, the window to which was located midway along a corridor. The
children had all started to line up along the corridor to buy sweets at the tuck shop. At
this time a large tea urn was being carried along the corridor by two adults, to the
main room of the tearoom. Somehow, and it is still unknown how, the tea urn
overturned and scalded a young girl (Muir).
The parents of the girl sued Glasgow Corporation, claiming that they owed the child a
duty of care and that they had breached this.

The court held that the manageress in charge owed a duty of care, generally, to
everyone in the tearoom. However, she did not owe a duty of care to the Sunday
school, to take additional precautions to prevent their being injured as a result of her
allowing them to enter. So long as the tearoom was run in the same manner as it was
day to day, and to the same safety standards, she was not required to take extra
steps to prevent the incident which occurred. It was not reasonably foreseeable that
allowing the children to come into the premises would result in one of them being
scalded. As such, the incident was put down as an accident which could not have
been prevented. The reasonable man is presumed to be free both from over-
apprehension and from over-confidence, i.e., The reasonable man has been
described as ‗the ―man on the street‖ or ―the man on the Clapham omnibus‖

Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd P sued D, an Internet Service Provider, over a newsgroup posting made available
from D's newsgroup servers in this jurisdiction. D sought permission to amend its
defence to rely, in mitigation of damages, on numerous allegedly provocative postings
previously made by P, including to other newsgroups apart from that in which the
posting complained of appeared. P resisted the amendment on the ground that it
offended against the rule in Scott v Sampson (1882) 8 Q.B.D 491 as bringing in
inadmissible evidence of particular acts of misconduct on the part of the P.

Whether the amendments should be permitted.

The amendments should be permitted. The other postings were relevant and
admissible in support of D's case that the action was not brought bona fide, but as
part of a cynical practice by P of provoking people into overstepping the mark so that
he could then bring vexatious libel actions against them. They were 'introduced to
establish that the Plaintiff should only receive derisory or small damages because of
his bad conduct which is causally connected to the libel sued upon. In my judgment
the Plaintiff's postings are germane to the defamatory posting the subject of his claim.'

Goldman v Hargrave A 100 foot red gum tree on the defendant‘s land was struck by lightning and caught
fire. The following morning the defendant contacted a tree feller to cut down the tree
saw it into sections. The wood was still smouldering and the defendant failed to douse
it with water to eliminate the risk of fire. Over the next few days the weather became
very hot and reignited the fire which spread to neighbouring property.

Held:
The defendant was liable for the naturally occurring danger that arose on his land as
he was aware of the danger and failed to act with reasonable prudence to remove the
hazard.
Goldsmith v Bhoyrul ( 1998) Political parties also do not have the right to bring an action for defamation as they
should always be open to criticism in a democratic system. Individual candidates for
elected office can make claims for defamation and political parties can be sued if they
publish defamatory statements.
Goodwill -v- British Pregnancy Professional Negligence, Health Professions
Advisory Service [1996] The doctor executed a vasectomy, and advised the plaintiff that he need no longer
take contraceptive precautions. Held: No duty fell on a doctor to advise on the
possibility of the failure of a vasectomy toward possible future sexual partners of the
subject of the operation. The law could not extend a duty to a possible future partner.
That was a tenuous relationship.
Greatorex v Greatorex and On 11 April 1996 the First Defendant had been drinking with a friend, who is the Part
Others [2000] The Times LR May 20 Defendant in the proceedings. The First Defendant was driving a car belonging to
5, QBD the Part 20 Defendant, who had given him permission to drive the car and was a
passenger in it. Whilst overtaking on a blind brow the First Defendant negligently
drove over on the wrong side of the road and was hit by an oncoming vehicle. The
Part 20 Defendant was uninjured. The First Defendants head was injured and he was
unconscious for about an hour. Initially he was trapped inside the car. The police,
ambulance and fire services attended the scene of the accident.
Among the fire officers who attended the scene was the First Defendants father, the
Claimant. At the time of the accident he was employed as a Leading Fire Officer. He
was nowhere near the scene of the accident when it happened. He went there in the
course of his employment. Having been informed that his son has been injured, he
attended to him. The Claimant was later diagnosed as suffering long- term post
traumatic stress disorder as a result of the accident.
The First Defendant was subsequently convicted of driving a motor vehicle without
due care and attention, driving without insurance, and failing to provide a specimen.
The Claimant brought proceedings claiming damages against the First Defendant, his
son. Since the First Defendant was uninsured at the time of the accident, the Motor
Insurers Bureau was joined as a Second Defendant. The Second Defendant in turn
brought proceedings against the Part 20 Defendant seeking an indemnity against him.
There was no duty of care owed by a victim of self-inflicted injuries towards a
secondary party who suffered only psychiatric illness as a result of having witnessed
the event causing the injuries or its aftermath.
The policy considerations against there being such a duty owed clearly outweighed
the arguments in favour, since to impose liability for causing psychiatric harm in such
circumstances, particularly where the parties were members of the same family,
would be potentially productive of acute family strife.

Greenock Corporation v The corp. constructed a concrete paddling pool for children in the bed of a stream and
Caledonian Railway [1917] AC obstructed the natural flow of the stream. Owing to a rainfall of extraordinary violence
556 the stream overflowed at the pond and damaged the property of the plaintiffs. Held
that the extraordinary rainfall did not absolve the corp. from responsibility and that they
were liable in damages.
Gregg v Scott The defendant, Dr Scott, misdiagnosed negligently the plaintiff's malignant cancer,
stating it to be benign. This had the effect of delaying Mr Gregg's treatment by nine
months, reducing his chances of surviving ten years from 42% to 25%.[1]
Under the earlier decision of Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority, the view
taken at first instance, and by the Court of Appeal, the claimant could not establish the
defendant had prevented him being cured, as his original chance of a cure was below
50%. The plaintiff argued that he was entitled to recover for the loss of the 17%
chance the defendant had deprived him of.On appeal to the Lords, the majority upheld
the earlier decision of Hotson, though Lord Nicholls (joined by Lord Hope) dissented in
arguing that loss of a chance should be actionable:

Gwilliam v West Hertfordshire The claimant, a 63 year old woman, was injured at a summer fair hosted by West
Hospital NHS Trust [2002] EWCA Hertfordshire Hopsital. She was injured whilst using a ‗splat wall‘ whereby participants
Civ 1041 Court of Appeal would bounce off a trampette against a wall and become attached to the wall by
means of Velcro material. The injury occurred as a result of negligent set up of the
equipment. The equipment was provided by a business called ‗Club Entertainments‘
who were an independent contractor engaged by the Hospital. Club Entertainment‘s
public liability insurance had expired four days before the incidence and thus they had
no cover for the injury. They agreed to settle her claim for £5,000. Mrs Gwilliam
brought an action against the hospital based on their failure to ensure that the
entertainment arranged was covered by public liability insurance. She claimed the
difference between the £5,000 and what she would have received had they been
covered by insurance.

Held:
The Hospital owed a duty of care Under the Occupiers‘ Liability Act 1957 this duty did
extend to checking whether the independent contractor had insurance cover since this
would be relevant to whether they were competent. However, there was no breach of
duty since the Hospital had enquired and had been told by Club Entertainment that
they had insurance cover. There was no duty to inspect the insurance documents to
ensure that cover was adequate.

Haley v London Electricity Board Some workmen were digging a trench in a pavement. They went off to lunch. They
had nothing to fence of the trench so they left a shovel and pick at one end and a
punner at the other end to warn pedestrians. The claimant, a blind man, tripped on the
punner and fell hitting his head. As a result of the fall he became deaf. The defendant
argued they had done all that was necessary to warn an ordinary person of the danger
and there was no need to take extra precautions for blind persons as it was not
foreseeable that a blind person would be walking unaided down that street.

Held:

The defendant was in breach of duty. It was foreseeable that a blind person might
walk down the street and they should be given appropriate protection

Hall v Simons (2000) HL ^[Tort - negligence – duty – no duty situations - breach - professionals immunity –
advocates – not a special case]
One of several cases (conjoined cases) on similar issues, where claimants had done
less well than they would but for negligence of their legal advisers.

Held: It was no longer in the public interest that advocates should enjoy immunity from
being sued for negligent acts concerned with the conduct of litigation whether in civil
or criminal proceedings.

Change of rule on lawyers‘ immunity


Harrison v British Railways Board The court said that an injured rescuer could sue the person who created the danger.
(1981) The rescuer was found to be contributory negligent for not following established work
procedures.
Harrison v Michelin Tyre Co Ltd The plaintiff employee was working on the duck-board of his machine. The fellow
[1985] 1 All ER 918. employee (let us call him the joker) was pushing a hand-truck along a passageway
marked by chalk lines. In order to startle the plaintiff the joker turned his truck slightly
towards the plaintiff and overstepped the chalk lines by some two inches. The truck
caught the edge of the duck-board, tipped it upwards and caused the plaintiff to be
thrown off. He suffered injuries

The joker had been authorised to push the truck and was in the course of so doing
when the urge to play the practical joke overcame him. The matter was quite simple;
was the joker acting in the course of his employment, or had he embarked, in the
words of Parke B in Joel v Morrison (1834) 6 C & P 501, on a frolic of his own?
Comyn J took the view that the employer was vicariously liable for the act of the
employee-joker. The task was admitted to be difficult, but it is, with respect, suggested
that, whatever the reasoning or the difficulty, the result was correct.

Haseldine v Daw The claimant in this case was injured by a faulty lift, which was just surveyed by a
group of technicians a week before the accident. The claimant purported to sue the
owner of the building.

The court held that the technical and specialist nature of lift mantainance meant that
the qualifty of the survey was not something that the occupiers could reasonably be
expected to verify. Hence the occupiers were not liable. Rule to exempt liability on the
basis of contracting:

The injury must have been caused by the work carried out by the contractor which
they were contracted to do;
It was reasonable for the occupier to employ independant contractor;
The occupier must be reasonably satisfied that the contractor was competent.
Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB The Defendant left a horse-drawn van unattended in a crowded street. The horses
146 bolted when a boy threw a stone at them. A police officer tried to stop the horses to
save a woman and children who were in the path of the bolting horses. The police
officer was injured. It was held that the Defendant owed a duty of care as he had
created a source of danger by leaving his horses unattended in a busy street

Heasemans v. Clarity Cleaning The defendant was an office cleaning company which had a contract to clean the
1987 Court of Appeal plaintiff's office.
One of the women cleaning the office used the telephone (bill: L 1,411).
Has she done this in course of her employment?

The employers were not responsible.

It was not part of her job.


There must be a line where the employers are protected.
The courts have become more strict in holding employees liable.
This case was a change of attitude towards vicarious liability.
Heath v Mayor Brighton (1908) A church claimed that the noise form an electric power station was a nuisance.
However the noise did not interfere with the services and so the claim was
unsuccessful.
Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Issue
Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 Whether and under what conditions a person can recover damages for loss suffered
by reason of his having relied on an innocent but negligent misrepresentation.

^[Tort - negligence - duty of care - extent of the duty depends on the courts
assessment of demands of society]
D, a bank gave a reference to C (another bank) regarding the financial responsibility
of a customer, expecting the bank to act on it. The reference was given "without
responsibility."

The second bank acted on the reference and suffered financial loss as a result. They
sued D in negligence.

Held: The law will imply a duty of care when a party seeking information from a party
possessed of a special skill trusts him to exercise due care, and that party knew or
ought to have known that reliance was being placed on his skill and judgment.

However, since here there was an express disclaimer of responsibility, no such duty
was, in any event, implied. C lost

This case modified pure economic loss in negligence. The effect of Hedley Byrne
makes possible the recovery of compensation for financial damage through reliance
by the plaintiff according to statements made negligently by the defendant but only
where there exists a ‗special relationship' between the parties.
The term ―special relationship‖ which must be between plaintiff and defendant before
there can be liability was not fully defined but for its existence seems to be:

A, a reliance by the claimant on the defendants specialist skill and judgment;


B, reasonable expectation of knowledge on the part of the defendant, that the
claimant would be relying on that statement;
C, it was reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on the defendant;
D, there had to be an assumption, either explicit or implicit, of responsibility on behalf
Henderson v Merrett Syndicates of theProcess
[Civil defendant.
- C can claim in tort or contract]
[1994] HL C and other Lloyds "names" sued their underwriting agents for negligent
mismanagement of their affairs.

Held: C‘s claims in tort should go for trial. A claimant, who has remedies available in
tort and in contract, is free to choose whichever appears to him to be the most
advantageous so long as the contract does not expressly preclude this.

Holden v White [1982] 2 All ER The claimant, a milkman, was injured on the defendant‘s land by a manhole cover
328 Court of Appeal which broke when he stepped on it. At the time he was delivering milk to the house of
a third party who had a right of way across the defendant‘s land. It was held that he
was not entitled to claim against the defendant since he was exercising a right of way
and was not therefore a lawful visitor of the defendant.
Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v The claimant bred silver foxes for their fur. Silver foxes are particularly timid and if
Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468 disturbed when pregnant they are prone to miscarry. If alarmed when they have young
they may devour them. The defendant was the claimant‘s neighbour. He objected to
the fox farm and fired a gun on his own land close to the breeding pens with the
intention to scare the foxes and impede breeding. The claimant brought an action in
nuisance.

Held:
The defendant was liable despite the abnormal sensitivity of the foxes because he
was motivated by malice.
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Some young offenders were doing some supervised work on Brown Sea Island under
Ltd the Borstal regime. One night the Borstal officers retired for the evening leaving the
boys unsupervised. Seven of them escaped and stole a boat which collided with a
Yacht owned by the claimant.

Held:

The Home Office owed a duty of care for their omission as they were in a position of
control over the 3rd party who caused the damage and it was foreseeable that harm
would result from their inaction.
Horsley v. MacLaren aka the MacLaren was the owner and captain of a boat called the "Ogopogo". He invited
ogopogo case 1971 (Canada) several friends out on his boat including Mr. Matthews, Mr. Horsley, and Mr. and Mrs.
Jones. During their cruise, Matthews fell overboard into the icy water which caused
him to have a heart attack and die. MacLaren backed the boat up to rescue Matthews
not knowing if he was alive. Horsley jumped into the water to save Matthews but he
was also overcome by the cold water. Mrs. Jones then jumped in to help them both.
Mr. MacLaren moved the boat into a better position to rescue the three. In all, Mr.
Matthews and Mr.Horsley were killed.

The Court held that "encouragement by the common law of the rescue of persons in
danger would ... go beyond reasonable bounds if it involved liability of one rescuer to a
succeeding one where the former has not been guilty of any fault which could be said
to have induced a second rescue attempt." The Donoghue v Stevenson case doesn't
touch this principle, because it says that you have a duty to avoid causing harm, not a
duty to help someone else. In the Court of Appeal for Ontario decision [1970] 2 O.R.
487, 11 D.L.R. (3d) 277, Arthur Jessup J said the Well-Known Quotes: "So, despite
the moral outrage of the text writers, it appears presently the law that one can, with
immunity, smoke a cigarette on the beach while one‘s neighbour drowns and, without
a word of warning watch a child or blind person walk into certain danger".

Hotson v East Berkshire Area The claimant as a school boy fell out of a tree from a height of 12 foot. He suffered a
Health Authority [1987] AC 750 fracture to his hip and was taken to hospital. The hospital failed to diagnose his
House of Lords fracture and sent him home. He was in severe pain so he was taken back to hospital 5
days later where an X ray revealed his injury. He was treated and suffered an
avascular necrosis which resulted in him having a permanent disability and a virtual
certainty that he would develop osteoarthritis. According to medical evidence, had he
been correctly diagnosed initially there was a 75% chance that he would have still
developed this condition, but there was a 25% chance that he would have made a full
recovery. The trial judge awarded damages of £11,500 based of 25% of £46,000
which was what would have been awarded if the claimant had shown that the
defendant's conduct had caused the avascular necrosis of the hip.

Held:

The claimant had failed to establish on the balance of probabilities that the
defendant's breach of duty had caused the necrosis since there was a 75% chance
that it was caused by the fall. Therefore the claimant was not entitled to receive
anything in respect of the necrosis.
Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] Two boys aged 8 and 10 went exploring an unattended man hole. The man hole had
AC 837 House of Lords been left by workmen taking a break. It was surrounded by a tent and some paraffin
lamps were left to warn road users of the danger. The boys took a lamp down the
hole. One of them dropped the lamp and an unforeseeable explosion occurred
resulting in extensive burns.

Held:

The damage was not too remote it was foreseeable that the boys may suffer a burn
from the lamp. The fact that the burn resulted from an unforeseeable explosion did not
prevent the type of damage being foreseeable.
Hunter v Canary Wharf [1998] 1 690 claims were made against Canary Wharf ltd. The claimants lived in the Isle of
WLR 434 House of Lords Dogs and complained that the erection of the Canary Wharf Tower interfered with
their television reception. In addition, a second action against London Docklands
Development Corporation involved 513 claims for damages in respect of excessive
amounts of dust created during the construction of the tower. Some of the claimants
were owners or tenants of properties, but many of the claimants had no proprietary
interest in lane at all. Some were children living with parents, some were relations or
lodgers with use of a room and some were spouses of the tenant or owner of the
property.
The two issues the House of Lords were required to consider were:
1. Whether interference with television reception was capable of giving rise to an
actionable nuisance
2. Whether an interest in property was required to bring an action in

Held:
1. There is no right of action in nuisance for interference with the television
reception.
2. An interest in property is required to bring an action in nuisance. Khorasanjian v
Bush overruled in so far as it holds that a mere licensee can sue in private nuisance.

Hunter v. British Coal Corporation An employee, Mr. Hunter, hit a high pressure water hydrant with the vehicle he was
[1998] 2 All E.R. 97 driving at the time, fracturing the hydrant and thereby threatening to flood the mine.
One of his fellow employees, Mr. Carter, attempted to help him shut off the valve.
They did not succeed and Mr. Hunter went to fetch further assistance. When he was
30 yards away the hydrant exploded, killing Mr. Carter. Mr. Hunter initially assumed
that Mr. Carter was unharmed, but when he was informed of the death 15 minutes
later he blamed himself and suffered a shock which triggered a two-year depressive
illness. The trial judge found as a fact that the accident (and the death) had been
caused by the fault of the defendant employer, which had failed to observe the
relevant regulations about the siting of the hydrant, and had not been caused or
contributed to by Mr. Hunter in any way. Could Mr. Hunter recover damages from his
employer for the shock which he suffered on hearing about a death which he did not
witness but for which he felt himself to be responsible? The trial judge held not and
the majority of the Court of Appeal agreed, but their reasoning demonstrates some of
the confusion surrounding this topic. It was accepted by all members of the Court of
Appeal that if Mr. Hunter was classified as a secondary victim he would fail in his
claim for nervous shock since he lacked, amongst other things, the necessary
physical proximity required by the House of Lords in Alcock: he had witnessed neither
the accident itself nor its aftermath. The only way in which he could recover was if he
could bring himself within some other category, either (i) because he could be
regarded as a primary victim or (ii) purely on the basis of the contractual duty of care
which the defendant owed him as his employer.
Hussain v Lancaster City Council The claimants own a shop and residential property which is situated on a housing
[1999] 2 WLR 1142 Court of estate owned by the defendant. The claimants suffered severe harassment, including
Appeal racial harassment which was predominantly from tenants and their families from the
housing estate. The harassment took the form of congregating outside the shop,
intimidation, shouting abuse and threats, throwing bricks, stones and balls, smashing
windows, burning objects put through the door. The defendant was aware of the
harassment from 1991. The council had sent letters to the perpetrators threatening
them with eviction if they continued to harass the claimants, however, this was
ineffective and the council did not in fact take possession proceedings against any of
the perpetrators. The Council had the power to evict them for causing a nuisance
under the tenancy agreements and under the Housing Act 1985. The claimants
brought an action against the council for their failure to prevent the nuisance when it
was in their power to do so. The defendant Council applied for a strike out which was
refused. The council appealed.

Held:
The appeal was allowed and the claim struck out. The case was outside the scope of
nuisance since the acts of the perpetrators did not involve the tenants‘ use of the
tenants‘ land. Furthermore the Council had neither authorised nor adopted the
nuisance.

Huth v Huth [1915] 3 KB 32 A man sent a letter to his wife which defamed her and their children. It was opened
and read by the butler. An action was brought by the children (as a wife could not sue
her husband at the time). The Court of Appeal dismissed the case saying that it was
not the butler's job to open letters and he only did so out of curiosity. There cannot,
therefore, be a publication to a third party where it is not natural and probable that that
third party would hear the information.

Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v The claimants were brothers who were qualified shotfirers employed by the defendant.
Shatwell [1965] AC 656 House of They were injured as a result of an explosion at the defendant's quarry caused by the
Lords brothers' negligence. They had insufficient wire to test a circuit to allow them to test
from a shelter. Another worker had gone to fetch more wire but the brothers decided
to go ahead and test with the shorter wire. Each brother claimed against the
defendant based on their employer's vicarious liability for the negligence and breach
of statutory duty of the other brother. The defendant raised the defence of volenti non
fit injuria in that the brothers the brothers had full knowledge of the risk and were
acting against express instructions. At trial the judge held that the defence of volenti
could not apply where there was breach of a statutory duty. This was upheld in the
Court of Appeal.

Held:

The appeal was allowed. The brothers had deliberately acted in defiance of the
employer's express instructions in full knowledge of the risks. The workers were under
the statutory duty not the employer. The employer had been instrumental in bringing in
the statutory regulations and ensured all workers were aware of them. They had also
previously dismissed a worker for flouting the regulations.
James McNaughton Paper Group During negotiations in 1982 between the plaintiff and MK Ltd concerning a possible
Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co takeover of MK by the plaintiff, the defendants, MK's accountants, were instructed by
MK to prepare accounts for it as quickly as possible. Draft accounts, which showed a
net loss for the year ended 30 June 1982 of £48,094, were made available to the
plaintiff's chairman. At a subsequent meeting a member of the defendants' firm, P,
answering a question from the chairman, asserted that MK was 'breaking even or
doing marginally worse'. After the takeover the plaintiff discovered errors in the
accounts. It claimed from the defendants damages in negligence in respect of the
accounts and of P's assertion. The judge decided the defendants were negligent in
relation to both matters and both had to a material extent induced the plaintiff to
continue with the takeover; he awarded the plaintiffs £75,000 damages.
The defendants appealed.
Nicholas Padfield and Monique Allan (instructed by Herbert Smith) for the defendants.
Quintin Iwi (instructed by Cameron Markby Hewitt) for the plaintiff.
Neill LJ said that it became necessary, in the absence of some general principle, to
examine each individual case in the light of the concepts of foreseeability, proximity
and fairness. The last of those concepts, however, was elusive and might be only one
of the criteria by which proximity was to be judged. It was sufficient to underline that in
every case the court had not only to consider the forseeability of the damage and
whether the relationship between the parties was sufficiently proximate but also to
enquire whether in the particular situation it was fair, just and reasonable that the law
should impose on the defendant a duty of the scope suggested for the benefit of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff had argued that the judge had been fully entitled to conclude that
a duty of care existed. However, his Lordship had concluded that, applying the tests
established in recent authorities, the existence of a duty of care had not been made
out.
Nourse and Balcombe LJJ delivered concurring judgments.
Appeal allowed.

JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks, in this case, a firm of accountant, who carelessly made a financial statement of Y
Bloom & Co [1981] 3 All ER 289 company, and the plaintiff relied on it. The court held that, the firm of accountant
imposes the duty of care to plaintiff because the defendant fully aware that the plaintiff
will investing in or taking over Y company thus, defendant will knew that the plaintiff
will rely on the published accounts.
Jebson v Ministry of Defence The claimant, a soldier, suffered severe injuries after a night out drinking organised by
the MOD. The claimant was transported with 19 other soldiers in the back of an army
vehicle with a canvass roof. On the return journey the claimant and other soldiers
were very drunk. The senior officer travelled in the front of the vehicle and was unable
to see what was going on in the back of the vehicle. The claimant climbed on to the
tailgate and attempted to climb on to the roof. He fell and was struck by a lorry. The
trial judge held that whilst it was foreseeable that an injury may occur by high spirits
and stumbling inside the vehicle it was not foreseeable the claimant would attempt to
climb on the roof and therefore the damage was too remote as it had not occurred in a
foreseeable manner.

Held:

It was foreseeable that injury (whether slight or serious) would occur as a result of the
drunken and rowdy behaviour of the passengers, including the danger that someone
would fall from the vehicle as a result, such wider risk being apt to include within its
description the accident which actually happened.
Jobling v Associated Dairies Mr Jobling, a butcher, slipped on the floor at his place of work due to his employer's
[1982] AC 794 House of Lords negligence. He injured his back which caused him to reduce his earning capacity to
50% of what it was. He then developed an independent back condition which was
unrelated to the injury which left him unable to work. The trial judge applied Baker v
Willoughby and held that the claimant was entitled to recover damages beyond the
onset to the back condition. The employer appealed.

Held:

The House of Lords distinguished Baker v Willoughby and stated where the victim is
overtaken before trial by a wholly unconnected and disabling illness, the decision had
no application. The House of Lords were critical of the decision in Baker v Willoughby
but stopped short of overruling it.

Jobling v Associated Dairies Mr Jobling, a butcher, slipped on the floor at his place of work due to his employer's
[1982] AC 794 House of Lords negligence. He injured his back which caused him to reduce his earning capacity to
50% of what it was. He then developed an independent back condition which was
unrelated to the injury which left him unable to work. The trial judge applied Baker v
Willoughby and held that the claimant was entitled to recover damages beyond the
onset to the back condition. The employer appealed.

Held:
The House of Lords distinguished Baker v Willoughby and stated where the victim is
overtaken before trial by a wholly unconnected and disabling illness, the decision had
no application. The House of Lords were critical of the decision in Baker v Willoughby
but stopped short of overruling it.

Jolley v Sutton [2000] 1 WLR Two 14 year old boys found an abandoned boat on land owned by the council and
1082 decided to do it up. The boat was in a thoroughly rotten condition and represented a
danger. The council had stuck a notice on the boat warning not to touch the boat and
that if the owner did not claim the boat within 7 days it would be taken away. The
council never took it away. The boys had been working on the boat for 6-7 weeks
when one of them suffered severe spinal injuries, resulting in paraplegia, when the
boat fell on top of him. The boys had jacked the boat up to work on the underside and
the jack went through the rotten wood. The claimant brought an action under the
Occupiers Liability Act 1984. The trial judge found for the claimant. The Court of
Appeal reversed the decision, holding that whilst it was foreseeable that younger
children may play on the boat and suffer an injury by falling through the rotten wood, it
was not foreseeable that older boys would try to do the boat up. The claimant
appealed.

House of Lords held:

The claimant's appeal was allowed. The risk was that children would "meddle with the
boat at the risk of some physical injury" The actual injury fell within that description.

Lord Steyn:
"The scope of the two modifiers - the precise manner in which the injury came about
and its extent - is not definitively answered by either The Wagon Mound (No. 1) or
Hughes v. Lord Advocate. It requires determination in the context of an intense focus
on the circumstances of each case."
Jones v Boyce (1816) The plaintiffs was a passenger on the top of the defendant's coach. Due to the
breaking of a defective rein the coach was in danger of overturning. The plaintiff
therefore jumped from the coach and broke his leg. In the event the coach was not
upset.

Held The plaintiff was successful i claiming for his injuries caused by the negligence of
the defendant who allowed the defective rein t be used. The plaintiff was said to have
acted as a reasonable and prudent person although he had selected the more
dangerous of the two alternatives i.e. to jump form the coach instead of staying where
he was. He was entitled to do so in the agony of the moment and was able to recover
damages.
Jones v Livox Quarries [1952] 2 The claimant worked in the defendant‘s quarry. One lunch break he hitched a lift back
QB 608 Court of Appeal to the canteen by standing on the tow bar of a traxcavator. The driver of the
traxcavator was unaware that the claimant had jumped on the back and it was against
company rules to stand on the back of the traxcavators. Unfortunately a dumper truck,
driven recklessly by another employee, crashed into the back of the traxcavator
crushing the claimant‘s legs. Consequently the claimant had to have his legs
amputated.

Held:

The defendant was liable but the claimant was held to be 1/5 to blame under the Law
Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. He had acted against orders and
exposed himself to danger.

―Just as actionable negligence requires the foreseeability of harm to others, so


contributory negligence requires the foreseeability of harm to oneself. A person is
guilty of contributory negligence if he ought reasonably to have foreseen that, if he did
not act as a reasonable, prudent man, he might be hurt himself: and in his reckonings
he must take into account the possibility of others being careless.‖

Junior Books v Veitchi (1983) HL [Tort – negligence - duty of care - development and scope - damage – remoteness -
economic loss]
D, specialist-flooring contractors negligently laid a floor in C‘s factory.
D as specialist flooring contractors knew what products were required and were alone
responsible for the composition and construction of the floor. C suffered loss and
damages, such as the cost of removal of machinery and loss of profits while the floor
was being re-laid.

Held: Te scope of the duty of care extended to a duty to avoid causing pure economic
loss consequential on defects in the work.

D lost
Kemsley -v- Foot [1951] 2 KB 34 The plaintiff complained that the defendant had defamed him with a headline to an
article 'Lower than Hemsley' which otherwise had no connection with the plaintiff. He
said it suggested that he was a byword for poor journalism. Held: Criticism of a
newspaper owner as to the presentation of news by the paper was to be treated on a
par with criticism of a book or play. The critic is not prevented from relying upon fair
comment as a defence only because he does not particularise the conduct of which
he complains. He need only state plainly the subject-matter of the complaint.
Birkett LJ said: "It is clear, therefore, and indeed it was not contended otherwise, that
ALL the facts need not be stated, but when the matter is submitted to the judgment of
a jury particulars of the facts relied on must be supplied"
and "I do not think it is possible to lay down any rule of universal application. If, for
example, a defamatory statement is made about a private individual who is quite
unknown to the general public, and he has never taken any part in public affairs, and
the statement takes the form of comment only and is capable of being construed as
comment and no facts of any kind are given, while it is conceivable that the comment
may be made on a matter of public interest, nevertheless the defence of fair comment
might not be open to a defendant in that case. It is almost certain that a naked
comment of that kind in those circumstances would be decided to be a question of
fact and could be justified as such if that defence were pleaded. But if the matter is
before the public, as in the case of a book, a play, a film, or a newspaper, then I think
different considerations apply. Comment may then be made without setting out the
facts on which the comment is based if the subject-matter of the comment is plainly
stated. This seems to me to accord with good sense and the true public interest."
Somervell LJ identified two cases where a publisher may not be obliged to set out the
factual basis of his comment in detail: where the subject matter was a work of art
placed before the public for comment, and where the subject was a public figure
subject in any event to vigorous discussion and where a detailed recital of the facts
would be unwelcome. In contradistinction: "At the other end of the scale one may
imagine a comment reflecting on the integrity of a subordinate official, whose activities
had so far received no publicity, where it might be held that the defence was not
available unless the facts relied on were substantially set out or indicated."

Keown v Coventry Healthcare No Occupiers‘ Liability – Claimant put himself at risk by indulging in a dangerous
NHS Trust, CA (Civ Div) 2/2/2006 activity. An 11-year-old child who had climbed the outside of a fire escape was not at
risk of suffering injury by reason of any danger due to the state of the premises within
the Occupiers Liability Act 1984 s.1(1)(a) but had put himself at risk through his own
choice to indulge in a dangerous activity. If there was a danger attributable to the state
of the premises, thus giving rise to a potential duty, the content of the duty might vary
according to whether the trespasser was a child or an adult, but until that point was
reached, then in the general run of cases, the age of the trespasser was not relevant.
Kirkham v CC Greater Mr Kirkham was an alcoholic and suffered from depression. He had made a two
Manchester Police [1990] 2 QB suicide attempts on 6th Jan 1980. He was admitted to hospital but discharged himself
283 Court of Appeal the following day. When he arrived home his wife prevented him from drinking and he
became violent and started smashing furniture. The police were called and arrested
him. His wife informed them of his suicide attempts and discharging himself from
hospital and it was agreed that he should be remanded in custody for his own safety.
However, the police failed inform the prison authorities that Mr Kirkham was a suicide
risk. He committed suicide whilst on remand at Risley Remand Centre. His wife
brought an action based on the negligence of the police in failing to pass on the
information. The Police raised the defences of volenti non fit injuria and ex turpi
causa.

Held:

The claimant was successful. The defence of volenti non fit injuria, although normally
would apply where a person of sound mind were to take their own life, had no
application where a person of unsound mind took their life. The defence of ex turpi
causa was not limited to illegal acts but extended also to immoral acts. The court
applied the public conscience test and concluded that to allow the claimant to succeed
would not affront the public conscience, or shock the ordinary citizen.

Knightley v Johns & Ors [1982] 1 As a result of Mr John's negligent driving his car overturned in a tunnel. Two police
WLR 349 Court of Appeal officers on motorcycles arrived at the scene. The senior officer instructed them both to
ride their motorcycles to the other side of the tunnel and close the entrance to the
tunnel as he had forgotten to close it earlier. They took the decision of driving on
through the tunnel on the wrong side of the road on a blind bend rather than going the
long way round. Unfortunately one of the officers, Mr Knightly, was involved in a head
on collision with an oncoming vehicle driven by Mr Cotton and sustained serious
injuries. He brought an action against Mr Cotton, Mr John, the senior officer and the
Chief Constable of West Midlands. The main contentious point was whether Mr. John
remained liable or whether the actions of the other defendant's and the claimant
amounted to a novus actus interveniens.

Held:

The senior officer's instructions and failure to close the entrance to the tunnel were
negligent and broke the chain of causation. The claimant's decision in going through
the tunnel was not negligent. Thus the claimant was entitled to full damages from the
senior officer and Mr John was not liable

Knupffer v London Express Some articles published during the second world war referred to a political group of
Newspapers [1944] AC 116, Russian exiles as people who wanted to work with Hitler to make Russia facist. The
Claimant was the head of the group in the UK and claimed that the words could
reasonably be understood as imputing him. The global membership was 2000 but the
UK membership was only 24. The House of Lords said that there could be no general
rule preventing a lawsuit as long as the statement can be understood as referring to
individual members in the party, which they did not do in the present case.
Lamb v Camden LBC [1981] 2 All The defendant council negligently fractured a water pipe outside the claimant's house.
ER 408 Court of Appeal This caused extensive damage and the property had to be vacated. One year later the
council had not undertaken the repairs. Squatters had also moved in and caused
further damage. The claimant arranged for repairs to be done herself and submitted a
bill to the council for the repairs and damage caused by the squatters.

Held:

The local authority was not liable for the acts of the squatters. It was not foreseeable
that squatters would move into an empty house in Camden and cause damage
despite the prevalence of such behaviour in Camden at the time.

Latimer v AEC [1953] AC 643 The claimant worked in the defendant's factory and slipped up on the factory floor.
The factory had become flooded due to adverse weather conditions. The defendant's
had put up warning signs mopped up and placed sawdust in the most used places to
make it as safe as possible. The trial judge held that there had been a breach of duty
as the defendants should have closed the factory if it was unnsafe. However, no
argument had been advanced on this.

Held:
There was no breach of duty. There was no duty to close the factory. The defendant
only had to take reasonable precautions to minimise the risk which they had done.
There was no need to go to great expense to eliminate any possible risk and thus no
obligation to close the factory.
Law Society v KPMG Peat The defendant accountants prepared annual accounts reports for a firm of solicitors
Marwick and Others which the solicitors then provided to the Law Society in accordance with s.34 of the
Solicitors Act 1974. Following the discovery of fraud by two partners in the solicitors'
firm, substantial payments were made from the compensation fund maintained by the
Law Society. The Law Society, as trustee of the fund, commenced proceedings
against the defendants, claiming damages on the ground that the defendants had
negligently prepared the accounts reports and, as a result, it had not exercised its
powers of intervention into the firm which would have reduced the amount paid out of
the fund. On a preliminary issue, Sir Richard Scott V-C ([2000] 1 All ER 515) held that
the defendants had owed the Law Society, as trustee of the fund, a duty of care when
preparing the accounts reports. The defendants appealed.
Gordon Pollock QC and Rhodri Davies QC (instructed by Herbert Smith) for the
defendants. Lord Goldsmith QC and Matthew Collings (instructed by Wright Son &
Pepper) for the Law Society.
Held, dismissing the appeal, that the question of whether a duty of care was owed by
the accountants to the Law Society as trustee of the compensation fund had to be
examined against the test laid down in Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC
605, namely, reasonable foreseeability of damage, proximity and whether it was fair,
just and reasonable to impose such a duty; that the intervention by the Law Society,
which an adverse accounts report could trigger, protected both the public and the
compensation fund; that it was made clear to the accountants that the reports were
required so that protective steps could be taken and it was obvious that if protective
action was not taken because a report did not draw attention to non-compliance with
the account rules that could have adverse consequences on the fund; that there was
no reason why there should not be a private law duty owed to the Law Society, the
performance of which would assist it to perform its public or regulatory duty; and that,
accordingly, the defendants had owed a duty of care to the Law Society.
Leakey & Ors v National Trust The claimants‘ land had been damaged by falls of soil and other debris from the
[1980] QB 485 Court of Appeal defendant‘s land known as Burrow Mump. The falls were caused entirely by nature
there was no human activity involved that would have caused the fall. The defendants
were aware of the risks since 1968. They had taken legal advice and were told that
they would not be liable for naturally occurring slides and consequently did nothing to
prevent such slides. Following the exceptionally hot dry summer of 1976 and
unusually heavy rainfall in the autumn, Mrs Leaky noticed a big crack appear in the
bank above her house. She informed the National Trust and offered to pay half the
cost of making it safe. Her offer was rejected. A few weeks later there was a large fall.
She joined forces with other neighbours to bring an action in nuisance.

Held:
The National Trust were liable following the Privy Council decision in Goldman v
Hargrave. A defendant is liable for a naturally occurring hazard on the land if they are
aware of the danger and failed to act with reasonable prudence to remove the hazard.

Lennon v Commissioner of Police The claimant, an officer with the Metropolitan Police, successfully applied to join the
of the Metropolis police service of Northern Ireland. He sought advice about his transfer from a police
personnel executive officer in London. In reply to his specific enquiry he was informed
that his housing allowance entitlement would not be affected by his taking time off
work during the course of his transfer. He in fact took three weeks off work which
resulted in a break in his continuity of service, and on taking up his new position he
permanently lost entitlement to a monthly housing allowance of £134. The Court of
Appeal upheld his claim in negligence against the commissioner arising from the
manner in which his transfer was handled and upheld the award of some £44,000
damages. The general principles governing the existence of a duty of care not to
cause pure economic loss to another by careless acts or omissions are well
established, and the commissioner was wrong in suggesting that the decision broke
new ground involving a radical departure from the existing law. Although there was no
contract of employment between the police commissioner and the claimant, the
relationship between them was analogous to that created by such a contract; it was
fair, just and reasonable to impose on the police commissioner a general duty of care
to give advice to the claimant to protect him from economic loss.

Lewis -v- Daily Telegraph Ltd The court considered a request from jurors when assessing damages in a A police
[1963] 1 QB 340 investigation into a company that produced plastics were leaked to a newspaper. The
front page of the newspaper copied the document which said that an investigation was
going on by the fraud squad after criticisms of the chairman's accounts by a
shareholder. The company was later absolved of any wrongdoing and they sued for
defamation alleging that the newspaper had intended that readers assume the
company was fraudulent. The action wasn't based on what the words said
themselves, but on a secondary meaning which may have been inferred by the
reader: the innuendo meaning. The House of Lords held that the right-minded person
would not infer guilt just from the article and the case was dismissed.

Limpus v. London General A bus driver racing to a stop to collect passengers deliberately obstructed the driver of
Omnibus Co. 1862 a bus of a rival company, overturning the latter's vehicle.
The bus driver had been given instructions against obstructing other buses.

The defendants were liable.

The driver was acting within the course of his employment at the time; it was
immaterial whether his act was forbidden.
Profit for the company when the bus is first (more passengers).
Otherwise, companies could exculpate themselves simply by prohibiting their servants
from committing any torts during their service.
Lippiatt and Febry -v- South The defendant had failed to remove travellers who had encamped on its land and
Gloucestershire County Council; caused nuisances against neighbouring farmers.
CA 31-Mar-1999 Held: The court refused to strike out a claim in nuisance by neighbouring land owners.
It was arguable that a land owner can be liable for repeated acts constituting nuisance
committed from its land by those it knew were in occupation, and where no steps were
taken to evict them. It was its own land from which a continuing nuisance emanated.

Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] Hesley Hall was a boarding house for students with severe emotional problems, the
UKHL 22 warden Mr Graine had supervision of the pupils at Hesley Hall and their daily routine.
It transpired during the early 90s that Mr Graine had sexually abused these children
and they have suffered psychiatric injuries. Hesley Hall was sued in all sorts of tort
from battery to negligence.

If the court was to uphold the Salmond test which required:


The wrongful act must be authorised by the employer; or
The wrongful mode was authorised.
This draconian rule meant that an employee engaging in a criminal act (such as the
current case) will never be acting in the course of employment, would therefore in the
context of the current case cause significant injustice. In the Court of Appeal the
judges followed the case of Trotman and held that Hesley Hall is not liable.
When the case went up to the House of Lords, the Law Lords unanimously held that
vicarious liability is established, hence overruling Trotman. The House of Lords found:

The purpose of the warden's duty was to develop trust with the children, that trust
gave him access to the boys and allowed the abuse;
There was geographical and temporal proximity to the employment, as the abused
occured on the premise of his employment and during the time which he should be
carrying out his employment duties;
There is an inherent risk of sexual abuse in these types of occupations, for the courts
to find Hesley Hall liable could potentially be a deterrent to potential abusers.
Lord Steyn whose judgment is the most often cited said that the warden's criminal
acts are inextricably interwoven with his duties, hence it is closely connect to his work
therefore Hesley Hall is liable under vicarious liability.
Lord Hobhouse on the otherhand reject the whole notion of vicarious liability, and
argued that Hesley Hall owned a direct duty to the children, therefore they are directly
liable in tort for systemic negligence.

Lord Millett preferred a wider approach than Bazley, i.e. any risk that are incidental to
employment will give raise to vicarious liability. This approach is based on enterprise
Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold theory
A fatherindirected
criminology.
his son parking a lorry, but by negligence of the son, the father was
Storage Ltd. 1957 injured.
The son was the employee of the company.
The company sued the son for the full money they had to pay in damages.

They succeded.
Mostly employers do not sue their employees but it can be done.
Lochgelly Iron & Coal v. M'Mullan A miner was killed when part of the coal mine that he was working in fell on top of him.
[1934] AC 1 The man's family successfully sued for damages under the Coal Mines Act 1911 (c
50) s 49 (repealed), which required that an employer must ensure that the roof of
every coal mine is made secure and not order an employee to work there if it is not.
The coal mine owners appealed the decision, but their appeal was dismissed as it was
held that the initial action was competent as their negligence had been proved.
London Artists v Littler [1962] 2 The Defendant wrote a letter to some actors in a play who had all given notice to quit
QB 375 at the same time accusing them of a plot to force the end of a successful play. So
many actors giving notice at the same time was apparently an almost unheard of
event. They sued him. He pleaded justification and then withdrew it as it became clear
that the actors had withdrawn for different reasons and not in order to end the play.
The Defendant also argued fair comment on a matter in the public interest. The Court
laid down this test:
• Was the comment made on a matter of public interest,
• Was the statement an expression of fact or opinion,
• If opinion, are the underlying facts true and contained in the article,
• Would a fair man make the same comment.
Regarding (1), they held that whenever a matter affects people at large it can be held
to be in the public interest.

Lowery v Walker [1911] AC 10 The Claimant was injured by a horse when using a short cut across the defendant‘s
House of Lords field. The land had been habitually used as a short cut by members of the public for
many years and the defendant had taken no steps to prevent people coming on to the
land. The defendant was aware that the horse was dangerous.

Held:
The defendant was liable. Whilst the claimant did not have express permission to be
on the land, a licence was implied through repeated trespass and the defendant‘s
acquiescence.

Luxmoore-May v Messenger May D valued two Stubbs paintings at £30; they eventually sold at auction for £88,000.
Baverstock (a firm) (1990) CA Valuation of a picture of was not an exact science and in deciding not to attribute the
picture to a particular artist a valuer was not necessarily guilty of professional
negligence
Malone v Laskey 1907 2 KB 141 The claimant was injured when vibrations from an engine on an adjoining property
caused a bracket to come loose and the cistern to fall on her in the lavatory. She was
unsuccessful in her claim as she did not have a proprietary interest in the house. Her
husband was a mere licensee through his employment as a manager.

Mansfield v Weetabix [1997] The defendant drove his lorry into a shop owned by the claimant. At the time of the
EWCA Civ 1352 incident the defendant was had a malignant insulinoma which resulted in him being in
a hyperglycaemic state although he was unaware of this. On the day of the crash he
had also been involved in two minor incidents.

Held:
The defendant was not in breach of duty

Leggatt LJ
"In my judgment the standard of care that Mr Tarleton was obliged to show in these
circumstances was that which is to be expected of a reasonably competent driver
unaware that he is or may be suffering from a condition that impairs his ability to drive.
To apply an objective standard in a way that did not take account of Mr Tarleton‘s
condition would be to impose strict liability. But that is not the law."
Maynard v West Midlands The patient presented with symptoms of tuberculosis but both the consultant physician
Regional Health Authority and the consultant surgeon took the view that Hodgkin's disease, carcinoma, and
sarcoidosis were also possibilities, the first of which if present would have required
remedial steps to be taken in its early stages. Instead of waiting for the results of the
sputum tests, the consultants carried out a mediastinoscopy to get a biopsy. The
inherent risk of damage was to the left laryngeal recurrent nerve, even if the operation
was properly done. In the event, only tuberculosis was confirmed. Unfortunately, the
risk became a reality and the patient suffered a paralysis of the left vocal cord. The
decision of the physician and the surgeon to proceed was said by their expert peers to
be reasonable in all the circumstances. A court may prefer one body of opinion to the
other but that is no basis for a conclusion of negligence.

McFarlane v. E.E. Caledonian An oil worker, the claimant, claimed damages for psychiatric injury, after witnessing
Limited [1994] 2 All ER 1 the destruction caused by a fire on an oil rig from his workplace on a support boat 100
metres away. The fire killed 164 men although the claimant was uninjured. It was
held that the claimant was owed a duty of care on the ground that he was a participant
in an event and had reasonable been in fear for his life and safety and the impact of
the events had caused shock. The defendants appealed. Held, that the claimant was
entitled to damages because he was more than a mere bystander to the event.

McFarlane v. Tayside Health A father, wishing to limit the size of his family to six children, underwent a vasectomy.
Board [2000] Months later his surgeon confirmed the success of the operation and that he need not
use contraception. The man subsequently made his wife pregnant and the family
sought damages from the Health Board for the costs of raising the child. Held, the
vasectomy was intended to stop pregnancy and therefore the mother could claim for
costs in that regard only. However, the costs around raising the child could not be
recovered as it would not be fair just or reasonable to impose such a burden on a
liability for financial loss on a doctor.
(This is a case where a healthy child was born due to failed sterilization)

McGhee v National Coal Board The claimant worked at the defendant's brick works. His normal duties did not expose
[1973] 1 WLR 1 House of Lords him to much dust but he was then asked to work on the brick kilns in a hot a dusty
environment. The defendant was in breach of duty in not providing washing and
showering facilities. The claimant thus had to cycle home still covered in the brick
dust. The claimant contracted dermatitis. There were two possible causes: the brick
dust he was exposed to during the course of his employment which was not
attributable to a breach of duty and the brick dust he was exposed to on his journey
home which was attributable to a breach. The defendant sought to distinguish
Wardlaw's case by arguing that it was proved that every particle of dust inhaled played
its part in causing the onset of the disease whereas in this case it is not proved that
every minor abrasion played its part.

Held:

The claimant only had to demonstrate that the dust attributable to the breach of duty
materially increased the risk of him contract dermatitis.

Lord Salmon:
My Lords, I would suggest that the true view is that, as a rule, when it is proved, on a
balance of probabilities, that an employer has been negligent and that his negligence
has materially increased the risk of his employee contracting an industrial disease,
then he is liable in damages to that employee if he contracts the disease
notwithstanding that the employer is not responsible for other factors which have
materially contributed to the disease.
McKay v Essex AHA (1982) CA ^[Tort - negligence - duty of care - public policy - wrongful birth creates no cause of
action]
DD, the doctors who did not advise a mother to have an abortion. C was born
disabled as a result of an infection of rubella (German measles) suffered by her
mother while the child was in her womb.

The child claimed damages on the ground that she had been "suffered entry into a life
in which her injuries are highly debilitating," and for distress, loss and damage.

Held: There is no claim in law which allows a child born alive with deformities to claim
damages for negligence against doctors in allowing it to be born alive.

The doctor was under no legal obligation under the Abortion Act 1967 to the foetus to
terminate its life, and the child's claim was contrary to public policy as a violation of the
sanctity of human life, and a claim which could not be recognised since the court
could not evaluate damages for the denial of non-existence

The effect of the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 was that no child born
after the passing of the Act could have a cause of action based on the loss of a
chance to die.

C lost

McKew v Holland [1969] 3 All ER The claimant sustained an injury at work due to his employer's breach of duty. He
1621 strained his back and hips and his leg was prone to giving way. Whilst in this state he
attempted to climb down a steep concrete staircase without a handrail unaided. He
got part way down and felt his leg give way so he jumped 10 steps to the bottom. He
suffered a fractured right ankle and was also left with a permanent disability. The
defendant accepted liability for the injury sustained during his employment but
disputed liability for the second injuries resulting from the claimant's action in jumping
down the stairs.

Held:

The claimant's action amounted to a novus actus interveniens because his action in
attempting to climb the steps unaided knowing that his leg might give way was
unreasonable. The defendant was therefore not liable for the injuries resulting from
the incident on the stairs.
McKinnon Industries v Walker The defendant manufactured steel and iron products 600 feet from the claimant‘s
[1951] WN 401 Privy Council property. The claimant had a dwelling house and also a commercial florists and
nursery. As part of his business he specialised in growing orchids which are known for
their particular sensitivity. The claimant brought an action in relation to noxious fumes
and smuts which had deposited over his shrubs, trees, hedges and flowers causing
them to die.

Held:
The defendant‘s actions constituted an unlawful nuisance and therefore the claimant
was entitled to recover damages in respect of the orchids despite the sensitive nature
of the flowers.
McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1983] 1 A mother received news that her family had been involved in a car accident. On
AC 410 hearing the news she rushed to the hospital to find her injured family and be told that
her son had been killed. The mother suffered severe shock, depression and
personality change. The defendant admitted negligence. The issue was whether the
mother could succeed in her claim because she had not been present at the accident
or it aftermath. Held, she could succeed at it was reasonably foreseeable
McManus v Beckham 2002 Whilst visiting the claimants' autograph shop the defendant allegedly claimed that a
signed photograph of her husband, David Beckham, was not genuine. The shop
sought to rely on the subsequent publication in the media of the defendant's alleged
claims in support of its claim for damages. The judge at first instance struck out the
shop's plea in this respect.

Whether the shop could rely at trial on an allegation that the claimant was responsible
for subsequent press coverage of her visit to the shop.

The plea would be reinstated to go to the jury at trial, who would be directed to
consider the questions of whether the defendant knew that what she had allegedly
said was likely to be reported and that if she slandered someone that slander was
likely to be repeated or a reasonable person in the position of the defendant should
have appreciated that there was a signficant risk that what she had allegedly said
would be repeated.
McWilliams v Arrol [1962] HL [Tort – negligence - duty of care - causation]
D a building firm had not provided a safety belt to a steel erector who fell 70 feet to his
death. C the widow. D was in breach of its statutory duty to provide a safety belt (but
not to insist that it be worn) but, there was evidence to show that the man would
probably not have worn a belt even had it been provided.

Held: The firm's negligence and breach of statutory duty were not the cause of his
death.

C lost
Merivale -v- Carson (1887) 20 A published criticism of a play made reference to one of the characters being "a
QBD 275 naughty wife", though in fact there was no adulterous wife in the play. Held: The
defence of fair comment is open to a commentator however prejudiced he might be,
and however exaggerated or obstinate his views.
Bowen LJ said: "Still there is another class of cases in which, as it seems to me, the
writer would be travelling out of the region of fair criticism - I mean if he imputes to the
author that he has written something which in fact he has not written.
That would be a misdescription of the work. There is all the difference in the world
between saying that you disapprove of the character of a work, and that you think it
has an evil tendency, and saying that a work treats adultery cavalierly, when in fact
there is no adultery at all in the story. A jury would have a right to consider the latter
beyond the limits of fair criticism."
After citing Campbell, Lord Esher MR asked what was meant by 'fair comment' and
answered: "What is the meaning of a 'fair comment'? I think the meaning is this: is the
article in the opinion of the jury beyond that which any fair man, however prejudiced or
however strong his opinion may be, would say of the work in question? Every latitude
must be given to opinion and to prejudice, and then an ordinary set of men with
ordinary judgment must say whether any fair man would have made such a comment
on the work . . Mere exaggeration, or even gross exaggeration, would not make the
comment unfair. However wrong the opinion expressed may be in point of truth, or
however prejudiced the writer, it may still be within the prescribed limit. The question
which the jury must consider is this – would any fair man, however prejudiced he may
be, however exaggerated or obstinate his views, have said that which this criticism
has said of the work which is criticised? If it goes beyond that, then you must find for
the plaintiff; if you are not satisfied that it does, then it falls within the allowed limit, and
there is no libel at all."
Mersey Docks and Harbour Board The appellants hired out a crane to the respondents for the purpose of unloading a
v. Coggins & Griffiths (Liverpool) ship; they also provided a driver for this crane upon the terms that he should be for the
Ltd. 1947 duration of the contract 'the servant of the hirers'.
In fact although the respondents supervised this man's work, they had no power of
control over his actual management of the machine.
Through negligent handling of it he injured someone.

The defendant was liable.

The right of ultimate control over the driver's management of the crane was theirs.
It lies upon the general employer to establish that the vicarious responsibility has been
shifted from his shoulders to those of the special employer.
Principle: in the case that one employer lends a servant to another it depends on
whichever of the two had the right of control over the servant's activities at the time the
injury was caused.

Miller v Jackson [1977]3 WLR 20 The defendants were members of the Lintz Cricket Club. Cricket had been played at
Court of Appeal Lintz cricket ground for over 70 years. The land was owned by the National Coal
Board (NCB) who also owned some fields surrounding the grounds. Four years prior
to the action, the NCB sold one of the fields and a development of Wimpey homes
was put up in close proximity to the cricket ground. Mrs Miller purchased one of the
houses and brought an action against the cricket club seeking an injunction to prevent
them playing cricket at the ground. Initially quite a number of balls were hit over the
houses. However, in 1976 the cricket club erected a higher fence and the number of
balls hit out was reduced to nine over a two year period. There had been no personal
injuries resulting from the balls but some property damage had been caused which
the cricket club had paid for. Mrs Miller complained that she could not use her garden
during matches and would often stay out of the house altogether.

Held:

The defendants were liable in both negligence and nuisance (Lord Denning
dissenting)

However, Cumming Bruce LJ refused the injunction on the grounds that it would be
inequitable to grant an injunction given that the cricket ground had been used for so
long and would be a loss to the community and Mrs Miller received the benefit of
being adjacent to an open space.

Lord Lane would have granted the injunction stating that the decision in Sturges v
Bridgeman involves the assumption that it is no defence for the defendant to show
that they came to the nuisance.

Ministry of Housing and Local An employee of the authority failed to exercise reasonable skill and care in searching
Government v Sharp for entries in the local land charges register. The search certificate prepared by the
clerk negligently failed to record a charge of £1,828 11s. 5d. in favour of the Ministry.

Lord Denning MR held the local authority was liable to the Ministry for the employee's
incompetence. At 268 he rejected that a duty of care only arose when there was a
voluntary assumption of responsibility, rather "from the fact that the person making it
knows, or ought to know, that others, being his neighbours in this regard, would act on
the faith of the statement being accurate."

MLC v Evatt (1968) 12 CLR 556 Established that a professional adviser owed a duty of care to clients to whom they
supplied information.
Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill The plaintiffs took over another company and later brought an action against the
Samuel & Co Ltd and others advisers, accountants and directors alleging breach of a duty of care by negligent
misrepresentation in financial statements published prior to the bid and in defence
documents sent to shareholders and served on the plaintiffs' advisers after the bid on
which the plaintiffs had relied in making and increasing their offer and whereby they
had suffered loss. After the decision of the House of Lords in Caparo Industries plc v
Dickman [1990] 2 WLR 358 the plaintiffs sought to amend their pleading by restricting
it to representations made in the course of the bid when their relationship as identified
bidders was sufficiently proximate to create a duty of care owed to them by the
defendants, but including the previously issued financial statements as 'continuing
representations' never withdrawn or qualified. The plaintiffs further alleged that a
particular purpose of the representations was to persuade them to offer better terms.
On a summons for leave to amend Hoffman J refused leave holding that despite the
amendments the case could not be distinguished from Caparo and was bound to fail
because of the absence of a duty of care.
The plaintiffs appealed.
Jonathan Sumption QC, Stephen Suttle and John Nicholls (instructed by Herbert
Smith) for the plaintiffs. Gordon Langley QC and Michael Brindle (instructed by Berwin
Leighton) for the first defendants. Nicolas Bratza QC and Ian Croxford (instructed by
Barlow Lyde & Gilbert) for the second defendants. Leslie Kosmin (instructed by
Reynolds Porter Chamberlain) for the third defendant. Nigel Davis (instructed by
McKenna & Co) for the fourth and fifth defendants. Michael McLaren (instructed by
Allison & Humphreys) for the sixth, seventh and eighth defendants.
Slade LJ said on the assumed facts pleaded the defendants intended that the
plaintiffs would rely on the representations in deciding whether or not to make an
increased bid and that the plaintiffs had so relied and that it was therefore plainly
arguable that there was a relationship of proximity between the plaintiffs and the
defendants sufficient to give rise to a duty of care and the case should go to trial.
Appeal allowed.

Morgan -v- Odhams Press Ltd; The plaintiff claimed in defamation. The defence was that the words did not refer to
HL 1971 the plaintiff and could not be understood to refer to him.
Held: The question as to what meaning words are capable of bearing has been
described as a question of law, but only in the sense that the decision thereon is
reserved to the judge rather than to the jury: ―It is not a question of law in the true
sense.‖
The ordinary reasonable reader is a layman, not a lawyer, and his capacity for
implication is much greater than that of the lawyer.
Lord Morris said: ―The question for the Judge at the end of the plaintiff‘s case was
whether there was evidence upon which the jury could (not would) decide in favour of
the plaintiff. That in turn raised the question whether the jury could decide that some
readers (having knowledge of certain circumstances) would reasonably understand
the words as referring to the plaintiff. If no reasonable reader could have understood
the words as referring to the plaintiff, then there would be nothing to be left to the jury.‖
Lord Reid said that ―some people may think that the law has gone too far‖ in holding a
publisher liable for a reference innuendo, if the statement concerned ―applies to
someone the publisher has never heard of.‖
Morgans v. Launchbury 1973 A husband used his wife's car; it was ensured by the wife.
House of Lords The wife said, 'If you get drunk, get a friend to drive you'.
He asked his friend, his friend did not want to.
So he drove the car himself and had an accident, both he and his friend were killed
and some people were injured.

The man was not an agent.

He did not do something specific for his wife.


It would be the same if he had used it for work (only if he was doing something
specific his wife asked him to do).
Husband and wife are not necessarily agent and principal.
Moriarty v Brookes [1834] EWHC The defendant was a publican. He argued with a customer over a disputed payment
Exch J79 and struck him causing a cut below his eye. The publican argued he had asked the
customer to leave and he had refused to do so and the force was lawfully applied in
ejecting him from the pub.

Held:
The defendant had used excessive force. The Lord Lyndhurst CB set the definition of
a wound as
"The definition of a wound in criminal cases is an injury to the person, by which the
skin is broken. If the skin is broken, and there was a bleeding, that is a wound"

Moy -v- Pettman Smith (a firm) Damages were claimed against a barrister for advice on a settlement given at the
and another; HL 3-Feb-2005 door of the court. After substantial litigation, made considerably more difficult by the
negligence of the solicitors, the barrister had not advised the claimant at the door of
the court to accept an offer. The claimant was not advised as to potential difficulties in
having essential evidence admitted, and the evidence was not admitted, and a much
lower sum was received. The court of appeal had found the advice itself not to be
negligent, but that she should have given the client more detailed advice.

Held: The question whether her advice was negligent has to be judged in the light of
the choices that were available in the light of her assessment. She had to balance the
possibility of her client‘s desire to achieve a full settlement against the loss of a
chance to sue the solicitors for negligence. ‗it is the substance of the advice, not the
precise wording used to convey it, that needs to be examined in order to judge
whether it was negligent. The significance of Miss Perry‘s failure to tell Mr Moy that the
prospects of getting the evidence in were 50/50 has to be measured against what she
did tell him, which was that she was hopeful that the judge would admit the evidence‘.
The court of appeal had been wrong to disturb the finding that the barrister had not
been negligent: ‗it was not incumbent upon the appellant to spell out all her reasoning,
so she was not in breach of her duty of care to the claimant in the advice which she
gave. ‗ As to the right of the solictors to appeal: ‗section 1(5) of the 1978 Act should be
so construed as not to bar an appeal in a case such as the present. This could be
done in either or both of two ways. One could construe the word ‗judgment‘ as
referring to a final judgment after any appeals have been determined, rather than the
judgment at first instance of the trial judge; or one could confine the operation of the
subsection to actions for contribution subsequently brought, so excluding further
proceedings by way of appeal in the original action. Whichever construction one
adopts, I consider that the solicitors‘ right of appeal to the Court of Appeal was not
barred by the operation of section 1(5)‘
Muirhead v Industrial Tank The third defendant manufactured motors for pumps which were incorporated in a
Specialties Ltd and Others tank for the storage of lobsters which was installed at the plaintiff's fish farm. The
motors, being unsuited to UK voltages, cut out and the plaintiff's entire lobster stock
died from lack of oxygen. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, damages from the third
defendant in negligence for the loss of the lobsters and the economic loss, including
loss of profit, resulting therefrom. The trial judge held that the third defendant was
liable to the plaintiff in respect of the pure economic loss. The third defendant
appealed.
Piers Ashworth QC and G W Lowe (instructed by Hadaway & Hadaway, Newcastle-
upon-Tyne) for the third defendant. Robin Stewart QC and Michael Heywood
(instructed by Crutes, Newcastle-upon-Tyne) for the plaintiff.
Robert Goff LJ, having considered Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520,
said that damages in negligence for pure economic loss could be recovered only if
there were such a very close proximity of relationship between the parties and reliance
by the plaintiff on the defendant that the defendant was to be taken voluntarily to have
assumed direct responsibility to the plaintiff. The ultimate purchaser of goods supplied
unde a chain of ordinary sale contracts could recover such damages only from his
immediate vendor, since such proximity and reliance would not arise between him and
the manufacturer, and accordingly the plaintiff could not recover his economic loss
from the third defendant. Nourse LJ, occurring , said that in the absence of close
proximity and reliance, the court was bound by Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin &
Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] QB 27 not to award damages for pure economic loss.
O'Connor LJ, concurring, said that Spartan Steel could not be distinguished, and had
not been overruled by implication in Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd.
Appealed allowed in part with one-half costs. Leave to appeal refused.

Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence [Tort – negligence - duty of care - no duty situations - just fair and reasonable - public
(1996) CA policy – employers‘ liability]
D, responsible for the army and therefore its soldiers, employed a gun commander
during the Gulf War. C an artilleryman sustained damage to his hearing when a
howitzer was fired accidentally.

Held: A serviceman owes no duty of care to his fellow servicemen in battle conditions,
since as a matter of common sense and public policy it would not be fair, just and
reasonable to impose such a duty. For the same reason the Ministry of Defence as
C‘s employer does not have a duty to provide a safe system of work in those
circumstances.

C lost
Mullin v Richards [1998] 1 WLR Two 15 year old school girls were fighting with plastic rulers. A ruler snapped and a
1304 splinter went into one of the girls eyes causing blindness. The girl brought an action
against the other girl for her negligent action.

Held:
The girl was only expected to meet the standard of a reasonable 15 year old school
girl not that of a reasonable man. She was found not to be in breach of duty.
Murphy v Brentwood District [Tort – negligence - duty of care - general principles - the nature of negligence - duty
Council [1991] HL of care - proving fault]
D, local authority negligently approved plans for the footings (a concrete raft) of a
house that subsided. C the house owner could not afford repairs and sold the house
at a loss.

C alleged that he and his family had suffered an imminent risk to health and safety
because gas and soil pipes had broken and there was a risk of further breaks.

Held: The damage suffered by C was not material or physical damage. D was not
liable for pure economic loss of the cost of remedying defects

To permit C to recover his economic loss would logically lead to an unacceptably wide
category of claims in respect of buildings or chattels which were defective in quality,
and would in effect introduce product liability and transmissible warranties of quality
into the law of tort by means of judicial legislation.

C lost
Per curiam. It is unrealistic to regard a building or chattel which has been wholly
erected or manufactured and equipped by the same contractor as a complex structure
in which one part of the structure or chattel is regarded as having caused damage to
other property when it causes damage to another part of the same structure or chattel,
since the reality is that the structural elements in a building or chattel form a single
indivisible unit of which the different parts are essentially interdependent and to the
extent that there is a defect in one part of the structure or chattel it must to a greater
or lesser degree necessarily affect all other parts of the structure. However, defects in
ancillary equipment, manufactured by different contractors, such as central heating
boilers or electrical installations may give rise to liability under ordinary principles of
negligence.

Nettleship v Weston [1971] 3 The defendant was a learner driver. She was taking lessons from a friend. The friend
WLR 370 checked that the defendant's insurance covered her for passengers before agreeing
to go out with her. On one of the lessons Mrs Weston turned a bend, Mr Nettleship
told her to straighten the wheel but Mrs Weston panicked and failed to straighten the
wheel. She approached the pavement and Mr Nettleship grabbed the handbrake and
tried to straighten the wheel but it was too late. She mounted the pavement and hit a
lamp post. Mr Nettleship fractured his knee. The defendant argued that the standard
of care should be lowered for learner drivers and she also raised the defence of
volenti non fit injuria in that in agreeing to get in the car knowing she was a learner, he
had voluntarily accepted the risk.

Held:

A learner driver is expected to meet the same standard as a reasonable qualified


competent driver. Volenti did not apply as he had checked the insurance cover which
demonstrated he did not waive any rights to compensation. His damages were
reduced by 50% under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 to reflect
the degree to which he was also at fault.

Newstead v London Express A newspaper report of a trial referred to Harold Newstead, a 30 year old Camberwell
Newspapers (1940) man, as a bigamist. The claimant, who had the same name, lived in Camberwell and
was unmarried, successfully sued for libel.
Ng Chun Pui v Lee Chuen Tat The first defendant was driving a coach owned by the second defendant westwards in
[1988] RTR 298. the outer lane of a dual carriageway in Hong Kong. Suddenly the coach crossed the
central reservation and collided with a public light bus travelling in the inner lane of the
eastbound carriageway. One passenger in the bus was killed, and the driver and three
other passengers were injured. The plaintiffs, who were those injured and the
personal representatives of the deceased, commenced against the defendants an
action claiming damages for negligence. At the trial the plaintiffs did not call oral
evidence and relied on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, contending that the fact of the
accident alone was sufficient evidence of negligence by the first defendant. The
defendants called evidence which established that an untraced car being driven in the
inner lane of the westbound carriageway had cut into the outer lane in front of the
coach, and to avoid hitting the car the first defendant had braked and swerved to the
right whereupon the coach had skidded across colliding with the bus. The judge gave
judgment for the plaintiffs on liability holding that the defendants had failed to
discharge the burden of disproving negligence. On appeal the Court of Appeal of
Hong Kong reversed that decision and found that the plaintiffs had failed to prove
negligence. On appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council:

Held, that it was misleading to talk of the burden of proof shifting to the defendant in a
res ipsa loquitur situation because the burden of proving negligence rested throughout
the case on the plaintiff (p 300L); that in an appropriate case the plaintiff established a
prima facie case by relying upon the fact of the accident and if the defendant adduced
no evidence there was nothing to rebut the inference of negligence and the plaintiff
would have proved his case, but if the defendant did adduce evidence that evidence
had to be evaluated to see if it was still reasonable to draw the inference of negligence
from the mere fact of the accident (p 301D); that the judge had mislead himself by
assuming that there was a legal burden on the defendants to disprove negligence and
he had also failed to give effect to those authorities which established that a defendant
placed in a position of peril and emergency had not to be judged by too critical a
standard when he acted on the spur of the moment to avoid an accident (p 302D);
that in attempting to extricate himself, his coach and his passengers from a situation
which appeared to him as one of extreme danger, the first defendant had acted with
the alertness,
Nichols v Marsland (1876) 2 ExD The defendantskill and judgment
diverted a natural which
streamcould reasonably
on his haveornamental
land to create been expected in the
lakes.
1 Exceptionally heavy rain caused the artificial lakes and waterways to be flooded and
damage adjoining land. The defendant was held not liable under Rylands v Fletcher
as the cause of the flood was an act of God.

Mellish LJ:

―Now the jury have distinctly found, not only that there was no negligence in the
construction or the maintenance of the reservoirs, but that the flood was so great that
it could not reasonably have been anticipated, although, if it had been anticipated, the
effect might have been prevented; and this seems to us in substance a finding that the
escape of the water was owing to the act of God. However great the flood had been, if
it had not been greater than floods that had happened before and might be expected
to occur again, the defendant might not have made out that she was free from fault;
but we think she ought not to be held liable because she did not prevent the effect of
an extraordinary act of nature, which she could not anticipate.‖
Norman v Future Publishing The operatic diva, Jessye Norman, sued for libel over the attribution to her in Classic
CD music magazine of a joke which involved her getting stuck, being advised to exit
sideways from the situation and responding with the line "Honey, I ain't got no
sideways". She put various defamatory interpretations on this story. Her claim was
struck out by Buckley J on the grounds that the words could not carry a defamatory
meaning. She appealed.

Whether the attribution of this joke was capable of conveying a meaning defamatory
of the claimant.

Dismissing the appeal: (1) Where words were alleged to be defamatory because they
exposed a claimant to ridicule a line had to be drawn between insults and ridicule; in
doing so the perceived intention of the writer could be relevant. (2) The article was
generally sympathetic and favourable, and did not disclose an intention to ridicule. (3)
The words could not bear any of the defamatory meanings advanced.

Ogwo v Taylor [1987] 3 WLR The Defendant attempted to burn off paint from the fascia boards beneath the eaves
1145 House of Lords of his house with a blow lamp and in so doing set fire to the premises. The fire brigade
were called and the Claimant, an acting leading fireman, and a colleague entered the
house wearing breathing apparatus and the usual fireman's protective clothing and
armed with a hose. The two firemen were able, with the aid of a step- ladder, to
squeeze through a small hatch to get into the roof space. The heat within the roof
space was intense. The Claimant suffered serious burn injuries to his upper body and
face from scalding steam which must have penetrated his protective clothing.

Held:
A duty of care was owed to a professional fireman. There was no requirement that the
risk be exceptional. The defence of volenti had no application.

Lord Bridge:
"The duty of professional firemen is to use their best endeavours to extinguish fires
and it is obvious that, even making full use of all their skills, training and specialist
equipment, they will sometimes be exposed to unavoidable risks of injury, whether the
fire is described as "ordinary" or "exceptional." If they are not to be met by the doctrine
of volenti, which would be utterly repugnant to our contemporary notions of justice, I
can see no reason whatever why they should be held at a disadvantage as compared
to the layman entitled to invoke the principle of the so-called "rescue" cases."

Ormrod v. Crossville Motor A car should be transported to Monte Carlo by an agent.


Service 1953 The driver's negligence caused an accident.

The principal was responsible for this accident in the course of a principal-agent-
relationship.

Even if it was partly for the agent's benefit.


Owens v Brimmell [1977] QBD Remedies - contributory negligence - 20% deduction for not wearing a seat belt and
allowing himself to be carried by drunken driver]
C and D together in D's car drank considerable amounts of beer in a pub. Whilst
driving home C did not wear a seat belt. D negligently caused an accident, whereby C
was injured.

Held: The principle was recognised that a passenger can be held to have been
contributorily negligent if he rides with a driver who he knows has consumer alcohol in
such quantity as is likely to impair to a dangerous degree that driver's capacity to drive
properly and safely.

On the facts, the passenger was found guilty of 20% contributory negligence.
Page v Smith [1996] 1 AC 155 The claimant had suffered from ME over a period of time and was in recovery when
House of Lord he was involved in a minor car accident due to the defendant's negligence. The
claimant was not physically injured in the collision but the incident triggered his ME
and had become chronic and permanent so that he was unable to return to his job as
a teacher. He was successful at his trial and awarded £162,000 in damages.

Held:

Provided some kind of personal injury was foreseeable it did not matter whether the
injury was physical or psychiatric. There was thus no need to establish that psychiatric
injury was foreseeable. Also the fact that an ordinary person would not have suffered
the injury incurred by the claimant was irrelevant as the defendant must take his victim
as he finds him under the thin skull rule.

Palsgraf v Long Island Railway Co [Tort – negligence - duty of care – to whom owed - foreseeability of damage]
(1928) New York Appeals D employed a railway worker who carelessly knocked a box to the ground. Unknown
to him it contained fireworks which exploded on impact; the blast knocked a weighing
machine onto C standing some distance away.

Held: injury to C was not foreseeable from the mere dropping of a box, and D was not
liable for C‘s injuries.

C lost
Paris v Stepney [1951] AC 367 The claimant only had sight in one eye due to in injury sustained in the war. During the
course of his employment as a garage hand, a splinter of metal went into his sighted
eye causing him to become completely blind. The employer did not provide safety
goggles to workers engaged in the type of work the claimant was undertaking. The
defendant argued there was no breach of duty as they did not provide goggles to
workers with vision in both eyes and it was not standard practice to do so. There was
therefore no obligation to provide the claimant with goggles.

Held:
There was a breach of duty. The employer should have provided goggles to the
claimant because the seriousness of harm to him would have been greater than that
experienced by workers with sight in both eyes. The duty is owed to the particular
claimant not to a class of persons of reasonable workers.

Parkinson v St James and (This is a case where a disabled child was born as a result of a failed sterilization)
Seacroft University Hospital NHS FACTS:-
Trust 2001 The Claimant underwent a sterilisation procedure, but this was unsuccessful and she
conceived a fifth child, with severe learning difficulties. She brought a claim against
the health authority and the matter came before the Court of Appeal.
JUDGMENT:-
The courts awarded her "all costs that she would incur which were attributable to the
child‘s disabilities." A healthy mother who gave birth to a severely disabled child after
a negligently performed sterilisation could not claim the whole cost of bringing up the
child but that she could recover the additional costs resulting from the child‘s disability.

Perl (Exporters) Ltd v Camden the defendant council owned adjoining premises. Number 142 was let to the claimant,
London Borough Council (1984), and #144 was divided into flats. There was no lock on #144, and thieves entered #142
by knocking a hole through the adjoining wall. The Court of Appeal held that the
defendants were not liable, mere foreseeability was not sufficient to establish a duty.
Policy factors are at work here; the claimant would be insured against this type of loss.
Perry v Kendricks Transport The defendant kept an old coach that needed repair on their land adjoining a piece of
[1956] WLR 85 Court of Appeal wasteland. The claimant, a young boy of 10 approached two other boys on the
wasteland close to the coach. As he got close, the boys lit a match and threw it into
the petrol tank of the coach causing an explosion which left the claimant with severe
burns. The claimant brought an action under the principle set out in Rylands v
Fletcher.

Held:
The defendant was not liable as the escape was caused by the deliberate action of a
third party.
Phillips v William Whiteley Ltd ^[Tort – negligence - breach - standards of professionals]
[1938] KBD D (a jeweller), employed a man to pierce C‘s ears, two weeks later she developed an
infection that caused an abscess on her neck that required surgical draining.

Held: A jeweller is not bound to take the same precautions as a surgeon would take,
and D had taken all reasonable precautions. C was unable to prove that the operation
was negligently performed, and that the abscess which formed in her neck was due to
the negligence.

C lost

Phipps v Rochester Corporation A 5 year old boy was walking across some open ground with his 7 year old sister. He
[1955] 1 QB 450 was not accompanied by an adult. He was injured when he fell into a trench. The
Corporation were not held liable as an occupier is entitled to assume that prudent
parents would not allow their children to go unaccompanied to places where it is
unsafe.

Devlin J on duty owed to children


―The law recognises a sharp difference between children and adults. But there might
well I think, be an equally marked distinction between ‗big children‘ and ‗little children‘.
…The occupier is not entitled to assume that all children will, unless they are allured,
behave like adults; but he is entitled to assume that normally little children will be
accompanied by a responsible person. …The responsibility for the safety of little
children must rest primarily upon the parents; it is their duty to see that such children
are not allowed to wander about by themselves, or at least to satisfy themselves that
the places to which they do allow their children to go unaccompanied are safe. It
would not be socially desirable if parents were, as a matter of course, able to shift the
burden of looking after their children from their own shoulders to those persons who
happen to have accessible pieces of land.‖

Pigney V Pointers Transport The claimant injured his head at work due to the Defendant's negligence. Some years
Services Ltd (1957) later he hanged himself as he was suffering from acute anxiety and depression
caused by the original injury.

Held. COA. original injury was still operating, and anxiety/depression are a common
cause of damage to the head.
Plato Films -v- Speidel [1961] The plaintiff had been the Supreme Commander of the Axis Land Forces in Central
Europe, and brought an action claiming that he had been defamed in a film showing
him privy to the murders of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and M. Barthou in 1934, and
as having betrayed Field-Marshal Rommel in 1944. The trial had not yet occurred. The
defendants sought to rely on the fact that the plaintiff chose to sue on certain parts of
the film, and not on others which were also defamatory of the plaintiff, as a ground for
mitigating damages. Held: This was vigorously rejected: "[The defendants] plead that
the respondent has been depicted in the film as having been 'guilty of the conduct
hereinafter set out the truth of which the plaintiff . . does not deny'. It surprises me that
it should be considered a proper matter for pleading that a plaintiff has not thought fit
to include in his action every libellous statement made about him by a defendant. It is,
in my opinion, wholly improper.‖ and ―If it is said that other parts of the entire film
constitute 'circumstances in which the alleged libel was published' (in themselves a
recognised head of mitigation), I think that is a highly artificial meaning to attribute to
the phrase. The real purport of this portion of paragraph 5 of the defence seems to be
to make the point that the plaintiff must be taken to have admitted the truth of such
accompanying derogatory statements as he is not challenged in his libel claim. That is
not a matter for pleading. If it amounts to anything at all, it is a matter for comment. As
a proposition of law designed to set up some sort of estoppel, I think that it has no
foundation.‖

Prendergast v Sam & Dee Ltd., The case is the classic example of transcription error. In this case, a reasonably
Kosary, and Miller in 1989 legible hand-written prescription for Amoxil was misread by the dispensing chemist
and a toxic dose of glibenclamide was dispensed three times daily" a dose some fifty
times the maximum daily dose of 15 mg. Dr Miller was found liable for 25% of the
damages in the above case due to the apparent illegibility of his handwriting (I find it
quite legible).
Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd v a thirty-eight year old who had been a moulder all his working life was casting
Haynes [1959] moulding boxes, the ladle of molten metal which he was holding slipped, and some of
the metal splashed on to his left foot and, as he was not wearing protective spats or
special boots, his foot was injured. He lost because he was experienced and should
have guarded against the danger.
Rainham Chemical Works v F: X and Y set up a company Z Ltd. The function of Z Ltd was to perform a contract
Belvedere Fish Guano entered into both X and Y, with another party, to manufacture explosives. Z Ltd was to
manufacture the explosives on X and Y‘s land. So Z Ltd was a licensee. An explosion
occurred, damaging neighbouring property.

H:The House of Lords found Z Ltd liable as the licensee which had accumulated the
thing. X and Y, as occupiers and landowners were also liable for the escape of the
thing accumulated by their licensee as the accumulation was a discharge of X and Y‘s
contractual duty to another party.
Re Polemis & Furness Withy & Some Stevedores carelessly dropped a plank of wood into the hold of a ship. The
Company Ltd. [1921] 3 KB 560 plank struck something as it was falling which caused a spark. The spark was ignited
by petrol vapours resulting in the destruction of the ship. The arbitrator held that the
causing of the spark could not have been anticipated and therefore no liability arose.
The claimant appealed.

Held:

There was no requirement that the damage was foreseeable. The defendant was
liable for all the direct consequences of their action.

NB This was overruled in Wagon Mound No 1


Read v Lyons [1947] AC 156 The claimant was employed by the defendant in their factory which made explosives
for the Ministry of Supply. During the course of her employment an explosion occurred
which killed a man and injured others including the claimant. There was no evidence
that negligence had caused the explosion. At trial the judge held that the case was
governed by the rule in Rylands v Fletcher and liability was therefore strict. The Court
of Appeal reversed this decision as the rule in Rylands v Fletcher required an escape
of the hazardous matter. The claimant appealed. The House of Lords dismissed the
appeal. In the absence of any proof of negligence on behalf of the defendant or an
escape of dangerous thing, there was no cause of action on which the claimant could
succeed.

Ready Mixed Concrete (South RMC is in the business of selling concrete, previously they had hired a contractor to
East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions deliever the concrete to the customers, but had terminated his contract and decided to
and National Insurance [1968] offer the jobs to RMC's current staffs. Mr Latimer signed up for the hire-purchase
agreement for the lorry and started to deliever concrete for RMC. The employer RMC
argued that because Mr Latimer was an independent contractor they needed not pay
for his national insurance.

MacKenna J reversed the finding of the lower court and held that Mr Latimer was in
fact a "small business man" and concluded that the contract was not of service, but of
carriage.
Test for contract of service:

Is the worker subject to a right of control?


Did the worker provide personal service in return for remuneration?
Are the other provisions of the contract consistent with a contract of service?
MacKenna J also placed significant emphasis on the existence of
wages/remuneration, the absence of which there would not be consideration, hence a
contract would not have been formed.
Rees -v- Darlington Memorial The claimant was disabled, and sought sterilisation because she feared the additional
Hospital NHS Trust; HL 16-Oct- difficulties she would face as a mother. The sterilisation failed. She sought damages.
2003 Held: Any disabled woman who gives birth to a normal, healthy child after a
negligently performed sterilisation operation is not entitled to sue for the extra
childcare costs she incurs because of her disability, the House of Lords ruled last
week. However there should be a standardised award, set at £15.000. No damages
should be awarded for the extra costs of parenthood arising from a mother‘s own
disability.

Reeves v Commissioner of Police Martin Lynch committed suicide whilst in a police cell. He had attempted suicide
of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360 earlier that day in the cells at the magistrates. He had also attempted suicide on
House of Lords previous occasions. He had been seen by a doctor at the police station on arrival who
reported that he was not schizophrenic or depressed but was a suicide risk. The
custody officer checked him at 1.57 pm and left the hatch open. He was found at 2.05
pm having used his shirt as a ligature secured by the open hatch. He was unable to
be resuscitated and died a week later. The defendant argued that as Lynch was of
sound mind his voluntary and informed act of suicide broke the chain of causation.

Held:

The act of suicide was the very thing that the police were under a duty to prevent to
treat this as a novus actus interveniens would deprive the duty of any substance.
Therefore the defendant was liable, however damages were reduced by 50% under
the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.
Revill v Newbery [1996] 2 WLR Mr Newbery was a 76 year old man. He owned an allotment which had a shed in
239 Court of Appeal which he kept various valuable items. The shed was subject to frequent break ins and
vandalism. Mr Newbery had taken to sleeping in his shed armed with a 12 bore shot
gun.

Mr Revill was a 21 year old man who on the night in question, accompanied by a Mr
Grainger, went to the shed at 2.00 am in order to break in. Mr Newbery awoke, picked
up the shot gun and fired it through a small hole in the door to the shed. The shot hit
Mr Revill in the arm. It passed right through the arm and entered his chest. Both
parties were prosecuted for the criminal offences committed. Mr Revill pleaded guilty
and was sentenced. Mr Newbery was acquitted of wounding. Mr Revill brought a civil
action against Mr Newbery for the injuries he suffered. Mr Newbery raised the defence
of ex turpi causa, accident, self-defence and contributory negligence.

Held:
The Claimants action was successful but his damages were reduced by 2/3 under the
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 to reflect his responsibility for his own
injuries. An occupier cannot treat a burglar as an outlaw

Reynolds v Times Newspapers The Plaintiff, a prominent public figure in Ireland, began proceedings for defamation
Ltd against the Defendants, the publishers of an article contained in the British mainland
edition of a national newspaper. The publication related to the political crisis in Ireland
in 1994 culiminating in the Plaintiff's resignation as Taoiseach and the collapse of the
Irish government. The Plaintiff claimed that the words bore the meaning that he had
deliberately lied to mislead the Dial and his cabinet colleagues. The Defendants
pleaded, inter alia, qualified privilege at common law. At the trial the jury returned a
verdict in the Plaintiff's favour and awarded the sum of 1p by way of damages. The
Court of Appeal set aside the jury's verdict and ordered a retrial on the grounds of
misdirections to the jury. The Court also ruled that the defence of qualified privilege
was not available. The Defendants appealed.

Whether the courts should recognise a generic qualified privilege encompassing the
publication by a newspaper of political matters affecting the people of the United
Kingdom.

The common law should not develop a new subject matter category of qualified
privilege whereby the publication of all political information would attract qualified
privilege whatever the circumstances, since that would fail to provide adequate
protection for reputation, and it would be unsound in principle to distinguish political
information from other matters of public concern; but that qualified privilege was
available in respect of political information upon application of the established
common law test of whether there had been a duty to publish the material to the
intended recipients and whether they had had an interest in receiving it, taking into
account all the circumstances of the publication including the nature, status and
source of the material.

Riches -v- News Group The defendant published serious defamatory allegations against several plaintiff police
Newspapers Ltd [1986] officers. The defendant newspaper appealed against an award of £250,000 exemplary
damages for their defamation of the respondent police officers. Held: Damages for
defamation might be increased where a newspaper advertised the story complained
of. Nevertheless, a retrial was ordered. The jury should be asked to make one award
of exemplary damages which should then be divided between the plaintiffs. The award
of exemplary damages was proper because there was evidence that the defendant
had calculated the risk of damages against the benefit of increased sales.
Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263 The claimant ran a business from the second floor of a building. The defendant owned
Privy Council the building and leased different parts to other business tenants. An unknown person
had blocked all the sinks in the lavatory on the fourth floor and turned on all the taps in
order to cause a flood. This damaged the claimant‘s stock and the claimant brought
an action based on the principle set out in Rylands v Fletcher.

Held:

The defendants were not liable. The act which caused the damage was a wrongful act
by a third party and there was no non-natural use of land.

Robinson v Kilvert (1889) Brown paper kept by the plaintiff was damaged by the heat from the defendant's
paper box manufacturing process carried on next door to the plaintiff's store room.
The plaintiff was unsuccessful as the brown paper was exceptionally sensitive.

Robinson v Post Office [1974] CA [Civil Process – negligence standard of proof – chain or causation]
D employed C who slipped on a ladder at work because of oil on the step. C suffered
a minor injury. At hospital, he was given an anti-tetanus injection. He contracted
encephalitis due to an allergy of which he was previously unaware.

Held: The hospital was negligent but not liable, since even the proper procedure would
not have revealed the allergy. C's employers, on the other hand, were legally
responsible for the encephalitis as well as for the minor injury: if a wrongdoer ought to
foresee that as a result of his wrongful act the victim may require medical treatment
then he is liable for the consequences of the treatment applied although he could not
reasonably foresee those consequences.

Roe v Minister of Health [1954] [Tort – negligence - duty of care - foreseeability of harm]
CA A spinal anaesthetic had become contaminated through invisible cracks in the glass
vial, when used, paralysed two patients.

Held: The cracks were not foreseeable given the scientific knowledge of the time, The
foreseeability of harm is clearly a major factor in determining how a reasonable
person would act, and although actual foresight by D is generally irrelevant, a
reasonable person would not have taken precautions against a risk of which
reasonable people in that profession were not aware.

D not liable.
Rogers v. Whitaker. Australia The High Court of Australia affirmed the Supreme Court of New South Wales'
determination that a doctor has a duty to warn a patient of any material risk involved in
a proposed treatment. A risk is considered material if a reasonable person in similar
circumstances would attach significance to the risk, or if the doctor is, or should be,
cognizant that the particular patient would express concern about the risk. The trial
court overruled the precept that a doctor could not be found negligent in warning a
patient if the doctor acted within the purview of common practice, even though other
practitioners may follow different procedures and regardless of the particular patient's
concerns. In this case, Maree Whitaker became essentially blind after an unsucessful
operation on her right eye caused sympathetic ophthalmia in her left eye. Although
there was no question that the surgery had been performed with the requisite skill and
care, Ms. Whitaker petitioned the court for relief due to the failure of the
ophthalmologist, Dr. Christopher Rogers, to warn her of the possibility (approximately
1 in 14,000) that the sympathetic ophthalmia condition could develop. The trial court's
award of damages was affirmed because, in spite of Ms. Whitaker's expressed
specific concern that her "good eye" not be harmed, Dr. Rogers did not inform her of
the potential risks associated with the surgery.
Roles v Nathan [1963] 1 WLR Two brothers, Donald and Joseph Roles were engaged by Mr Nathan as chimney
1117 Court of Appeal sweeps to clean the flues in in a central heating system at Manchester Assembly
Rooms. The flues had become dangerous due to carbon monoxide emissions. A
heating engineer had warned them of the danger, however, the brothers told him they
knew of the dangers and had been flue inspectors for many years. The engineer
monitored the situation throughout the day and at one point ordered everybody out of
the building due to the levels of carbon monoxide. The brothers ignored this advice
and continued with their work. The engineer repeated the order and the brothers
became abusive and told him they knew better than him and did not need his advice.
The engineer forcibly removed them from the building. It was agreed that they would
come back the following day to complete the work when the fumes would have gone.
They were also told they should not do the work whilst the fires were lighted. However,
the next day the brothers were found dead in the basement having returned the
previous evening to complete the work when the fires were lit. Their widows brought
an action under the Occupiers Liability Act 1957.

Held:
The defendant was not liable. The dangers were special risks ordinarily incident to
their calling. The warnings issued were clear and the brothers would have been safe
had they heeded the warnings.

Rose v. Plenty 1976 Court of Children were helping the milk men.
Appeal A boy was injured.
The company was responsible.
They had a benefit out of the boy's work (the milk comes earlier).
Ross v Caunters [1979] ChDiv [Solicitors – duty to their clients]
Megarry VC D a solicitor prepared a will for a client and sent it to him for signature. D failed to warn
the client that his signature should not be witnessed by the spouse of a beneficiary,
and subsequently did not notice that this had actually happened.

Held: D liable to pay damages to the disappointed beneficiary.


Rylands v Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1 The defendant owned a mill and constructed a reservoir on their land. The reservoir
House of Lords was placed over a disused mine. Water from the reservoir filtered through to the
disused mine shafts and then spread to a working mine owned by the claimant
causing extensive damage.

Held:
The defendants were strictly liable for the damage caused by a non- natural use of
land.

Lord Cranworth:
―If a person brings, or accumulates, on his land anything which, if it should escape,
may cause damage to his neighbour, he does so at his peril. If it does escape, and
cause damage, he is responsible, however careful he may have been, and whatever
precautions he may have taken to prevent the damage.‖
Salmon v Seafarer Restaurants The defendant owned a fish and chip shop. One night he left the chip fryer on and
[1983] 1WLR 1264 closed the shop for the night. This caused a fire and the fire services were called to
put out the fire. The claimant was a fire man injured in an explosion whilst fighting the
fire. He had been thrown to the ground whilst footing a ladder on a flat roof. The
defendant sought to escape liability by invoking s.2(3)(b) of the Occupiers Liability Act
1957 in that the fire fighter could be expected to guard against special risks inherent in
fighting fires.

Held:
The defendant was liable. Where it can be foreseen that the fire which is negligently
started is of the type which could require firemen to attend to extinguish that fire, and
where, because of the very nature of the fire, when they attend they will be at risk
even if they exercise all the skill of their calling, there is no reason why a fireman
should be at any disadvantage in claiming compensation. The duty owed to a fireman
was not limited to the exceptional risks associated with fighting fire but extended to
ordinary risks.
Scott v London and St Katherine This was an appeal against the decision of the Court of Exchequer in making absolute
Docks (1865) 3 H & C 596 a rule to set aside the verdict for the defendants and for a new trial.
The defendants were in possession of a warehouse, and were operating a certain
crane or machine for lowering goods at the time of the accident. The Defendants and
their servants were lowering the crane or machine, with bags of sugar onto the stone
pavement in the Docks at St Katherines at the time of the accident.
The Claimant, an officer of the Customs could not find who he was looking for, so
made inquiries and was told he was in a warehouse, which was pointed out to him.
When passing lawfully from the doorway of one warehouse to the other, he fell to the
ground as six bags of sugar which were being lowered to the ground from the upper
part of the warehouse by the crane fell on him. The Claimant said that he had no
warning, and there was no fence or barrier to show persons that the place was
dangerous, and nobody called out to him to stop him from going through the door or
under the hoist. He also said that instantly before the bags fell he ―heard the rattling of
a chain
The Defendant‘s pleaded not guilty.
The learned Judge found that there was not sufficient evidence of negligence on the
part of the Defendants to entitle him to leave the case to the jury. His Lordship then
directed the jury to find verdict for the Defendants.

Erle , C. J held that the majority of the Court came to the following conclusions.
―There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But where the thing is shown to
be under the management of the Defendant or his servants, and the accident is such
as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care.‖
The judges all agreed to the principles laid down in the cases cited for the Defendants
although the judgment turned on the construction to be put on the Judge‘s notes. Erle
CJ and Mellor found that they could not find reasonable evidence of negligence which
has been apparent to the rest of the Court.
The judgment of the Court was affirmed, and the case was ordered to go to a new
trial, when the effect of the evidence will in all probability be more correctly
ascertained.
Sedleigh-Denfield v O‘Callaghan The council undertook some work on the defendant‘s land at the request of a
[1940] AC 880 House of Lords neighbouring landowner. They had placed a culvert in a ditch to allow the water to
drain away, however, they had negligently placed a grate in the wrong place which
rendered the grate useless and the culvert became prone to blockages. The
defendant‘s workers had cleaned the culvert periodically over a three year period to
prevent blockages. However, a heavy rain storm caused a blockage and the ditch
became flooded. The flood spread to neighbouring property owned by the claimant
and caused substantial damage. The claimant brought an action in nuisance for the
damage caused. The defendant argued that he had neither consented to nor had
knowledge of the existence of the culvert.

Held:
The defendant was liable. An occupier may be liable for the acts of a trespasser if they
adopt or continue the nuisance.

Lord Maugham:
―My Lords, in the present case I am of opinion that the Respondents both continued
and adopted the nuisance. After the lapse of nearly three years they must be taken to
have suffered the nuisance to continue; for they neglected to take the very simple step
of placing a grid in the proper place which would have removed the danger to their
neighbour s land. They adopted the nuisance for they continued during all that time to
use the artificial contrivance of the conduit for the purpose of getting rid of water from
their property without taking the proper means for rendering it safe.‖

Shakoor v. Situ (t/a Eternal Health Mr Abdul Shakoor went to a Nottingham based Chinese herbalist, which traded as the
Co) [2000] 4 All ER 181 "Eternal Health Co."[1] Mr Kang Situ, who ran the herbalist had trained for five years in
China, gaining both a traditional "medicine" and "modern" medical qualifications. His
grade was "excellent". He had no British professional medical qualifications. In
November 1994, Mr Situ prescribed a course of Chinese herbal remedies for Mr
Shakoor's benign lipomata, a skin condition, which produces fatty tissue that lies just
below the skin, but causes no risk to health. There is no treatment in the UK, except
surgical removal. Mr Shakoor was given a mix of twelve herbs in ten sachets which
were to be taken on alternate days after a meal. After nine doses Mr Shakoor got ill,
nauseous, his eyes went yellow and he suffered heartburn. He vomited, and had
abdominal pain. He went to hospital, and was diagnosed as having "probably hepatitis
A". His liver failed, he had hepatic necrosis. He had an operation, but he died in
January 1995. In the post-mortem, his liver was found to contain Bai Xian Pi, or
dictamnus dasycarpus, which some evidence suggested could be hepatotoxic.

A practitioner of traditional Chinese herbal medicine did not have to meet the standard
of skill and care of a reasonably competent practitioner of orthodox medicine, but he
did have to take account of relevant reports in orthodox medical journals. In this case
the prescription had not been inappropriate for a reasonable herbalist, and accordingly
Mr Situ of the Eternal Health Co. was not liable for the death of Mr Shakoor.

Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital The claimant suffered from pain in her neck, right shoulder, and arms. Her
Governors neurosurgeon took her consent for cervical cord decompression, but did not include in
his explanation the fact that in less than 1% of the cases, the said decompression
caused paraplegia. She developed paraplegia after the spinal operation. Rejecting her
claim for damages, the court held that consent did not require an elaborate
explanation of remote side effects. In dissent, Lord Scarman said that the Bolam test
should not apply to the issue of informed consent and that a doctor should have a duty
to tell the patient of the inherent and material risk of the treatment proposed.
Sim v. Stretch [1936] a defamatory statement is one which tends to lower a person, "in the estimation of
right-thinking members of society." It is not that the statement be made to the person
in regard, it must be communicated to another. Tort law protects one's interest in
preserving his/her reputation. In Canada, the law of defamation permits actions for
Libel and Slander against those who seek to damage the another‘s reputation.

Simaan General Contracting Co v The plaintiffs, the main contractors under a contract for a new building in Abu Dhabi,
Pilkington Glass Ltd sub-contracted the supply and erecton of curtain walling. The defendants contracted
to supply green glass units for incorporation in the curtain walling. They were not in
contractual relationship with the plaintiffs. The units were alleged by the building
owner to be defective in their colouring. The plaintiffs eventually rejected them and
instructed the sub-contractors to replace them with approved panels. The plaintiffs
claimed against the defendants damages for negligence in respect of the loss they
had suffered as a result of the supply of the defective units. The question whether the
defendants, as specified suppliers of the units, owed to the plaintiffs, as the main
contractors, a duty to take reasonable care to avoid defects in the units which had
caused them loss was tried as a preliminary issue. Judge Newey answered it in favour
of the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed.
David M Harris (instructed by C R Bayley, Pilkington legal departmen, St Helens) for
the defendants. Romie Tager (instructed by Michael Conn & Co) for the defendants.
Bingham LJ said that a claim might lie in negligence for recovery of economic loss
alone. The defendants owed the plaintiffs a conventional duty of care to avoid physical
injury or damage to person or property. The planitiffs could not be said to have relied
on the defendants. Where a specialist sub-contractor was nominated by a building
owner it might be possible to conclude that the specialist had assumed a direct
responsibility to the building owner. There was no basis on which the defendants
could be said to have assumed a responsibility to the plaintiffs. Junior Books v Veitchi
Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520 had been interpreted as arising from physical damage. That
interpretation was binding on the court. The authorities did not establish a general rule
that claims in negligence might succeed on proof of foreseeable economic loss even
where no damage to property and no proprietary or possessory interest had been
shown. It was a type of claim against which the law had consistently set its face. If the
units could be regarded as damaged at all, the damage occurred at the time of
manufacture, and the plaintiffs had not shown any interest in them at that tme.
Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR and Dillon LJ agreed.
Appeal allowed.

Simpson & Co v Thomson (1877) The claimant insured T‘s property against being damaged. The property was
damaged as a result of the defendant‘s fault with the result that the claimant had to
pay out on the insurance policy with T. Held: claimant could not sue the defendant.

Slipper v British Broadcasting The Claimant was a retired police officer was the subject of a film about trying to
Corporation [1991] 1 QB 283 capture some men who had committed the Great Train Robbery. The Claimant
alleged that the film showed him as a complete idiot. The film had been shown to
some journalists before its release to the public and those journalists had published
reviews contained the defamatory sting of the film i.e. that he was an incompetent
police officer. The Claimant sued not only for the release to the public but the
repetitions in the journalists' reviews. The defendants argued that the repetitions are
only actionable where the defendant has authorised them. The court rejected this
argument and said that the Defendant can be liable for any re-publication of the
defamatory material as long as it was reasonably foreseeable.
Smith v ADVFN Plc (CA) S took part in postings on a bulletin board on a financial services website maintained
by ADVFN. He claimed to have been defamed by hundreds of postings published by
users under cover of pseudonyms. He wished to know their IP addresses in order to
obtain their names and addresses from their internet service providers. Gray J had
made an order for the disclosure of the registered IP addresses of users responsible
for over 100 postings in April 2007, but in most cases that information did not enable
S to discover the identities of those responsible. He applied to the judge for disclosure
of the IP addresses of the users at the times when their postings were made (an order
which was not opposed in principle since disclosure of the identity of the users had
already been ordered by Gray J), and for the disclosure of the IP addresses of those
responsible for a further 150 postings. He appealed from the decision of Mackay J not
to order disclosure in respect of the further 150 postings.

Whether the judge had wrongly refused to make an order for disclosure of the
identities of the users responsible for the further postings.

Dismissing the appeal:


(1) It was unreasonable to expect the judge, in the short time available, to assess
without proper guidance each and every alleged instance of defamation, given the
volume and incoherence of the material which he had been expected to consider.
Accordingly, he had been entitled to refuse to make the order sought.

(2) The Appellant‘s inability to pay the Respondent‘s costs would be a factor which
could properly be taken into account against him if he made a further application.

Smith v Eric Bush [1990] 1 AC A survey report of the claimant‘s house carried out by the defendant failed to advise
831 on some structural damage to the property which resulted in the chimney breast
collapsing. There was no contractual relationship between the claimant and defendant
as the mortgage company arranged the survey and the claimant made payment to the
mortgage company. The contract between the claimant and the mortgage company
contained a clause exempting the surveyor from liability. In considering if such a
clause was reasonable under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 the court took into
account the fact that it was a modest house to be used as the family home and
concluded that it was an unreasonable clause and therefore ineffective. The House of
Lords held that it might be reasonable for a surveyor to exclude liability if the property
was of higher value or to be used for investment or business purposes.

Smith v Leech Brain [1962] 2 QB A widow brought a claim against the defendant under the Fatal Accidents Act for the
405 death of her husband. The defendant employed the husband. As a result of their
negligence he incurred a burn to his lip. The lip contained pre-cancerous cells which
were triggered by the injury sustained. He died three years later from cancer.

Held:

The burn was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligence and this
resulted in the death. The defendant was liable for his death. It was not necessary to
show that death by cancer was foreseeable, nor that an ordinary person would not
have died from the injury. The egg shell skull rule applies and the defendant must take
his victim as he finds him.
Smith v Littlewoods Organisation he defendant owned a disused cinema which they purchased with the intention of
Ltd demolishing it and replacing it with a supermarket. The cinema was last used on 29th
May 1976. Littlewoods acquired the building on 31st May 1976. Contractors were
present at the cinema until 21st June and thereafter the cinema was empty until the
incident on 5th July 1976. The contractors had left the building secure, however,
vandals had broke into the building. Littlewoods had not been informed of this and so
the building remained unsecured. There was evidence to suggest that further entry by
vandals had occurred over the couple of weeks. The fittings inside the building were
damaged and debris was thrown. On one occasion a sink had been removed and
thrown onto the roof of a billiard hall. There were also two small incidents involving
fire. None of this was reported to the police or Littlewoods. On July 5th the vandals
broke into the cinema and set fire to it. The fire spread and caused damage to
neighbouring properties. The owners of the properties brought an action in negligence
claiming that Littlewoods owed them a duty of care to prevent the actions of the
vandals.

Held:

Littlewoods were not liable. Whilst they did owe a duty of care they were not in breach
of duty. They were not required to provide 24 hour surveillance and were unaware of
the previous incidents. The law is unwilling to impose liability for the deliberate act of a
third party see Lamb v Camden London Borough Council [1981] QB 625 but will do so
in appropriate cases (Dorset Yacht v Home Office [1970] AC 1004). The general rule
relating to omissions is that no liability arises for a pure omissions but there exist
exceptions to this where there is a special relationship, an assumption of
responsibility, where the defendant is in control of a 3rd party that causes the damage,
where the defendant is in control of land or dangerous thing.

South Hetton Coal Company vs The newspaper in that case had published an article that was strongly critical of the
North Eastern News Association way the plaintiff – a colliery owner – housed its workers.
Limited (1984). The company, when suing for libel, had neither stated nor sought to prove that it had
suffered any actual damage. It was argued by the paper that a company could have
no personal character and that the article had not related to the business of the
company. This argument was unanimously rejected.
The Court held that, "It is not necessary to prove any particular damage. The jury may
give such damages as they think fit, having regard to the conduct of the parties,
respectively, and to all the circumstances of the case."
Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Spartan Steel and Alloys Ltd had a stainless steel factory in Birmingham, which
Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd obtained its electricity by a direct cable from the power station. Martin & Co Ltd were
doing work on the ground with an excavator and negligently damaged that cable. As a
consequence, the factory was deprived of electricity for 15 hours which has caused
physical damage to the factory‘s furnaces and metal, lost profit on the damaged metal
and lost profit on the metal that was not melted during the time the electricity was off.
Spartan Steel claimed all the three heads of damage.

The Court of Appeal, consisting of Lord Denning MR, Edmund-Davies LJ and Lawton
LJ delivered a majority judgment (Edmund-Davies LJ dissenting), that the Spartan
Steel could only recover the damages to their furnaces, the metal they had to discard
and the profit lost on the discarded metal. They could not recover the profits lost due
to the factory not being operational for 15 hours. Their main reasoning for this was
that while the damage to the metal was "physical damage" and the lost profits on the
metal was "directly consequential" upon it, the profits lost due to the blackout
constituted "pure economic loss".
Although the majority seemed to agree that Martin & Co Ltd owed the Spartan Steel a
duty of care and the damage was not too remote since it was foreseeable, they
declined to allow the recovery of pure economic loss for policy reasons outlined by
Lord Denning in his leading judgment:
Statutory utility providers are never liable for damages caused by their negligence.
A blackout is a common hazard and a risk which everyone can be expected to tolerate
from time to time.
If claims for pure economic loss in such cases were allowed, it might lead to countless
claims, some of which may be spurious (the "floodgates" argument).
It would be unfair to place the entire weight of many comparatively small losses upon
the shoulders of one person in such cases.
The law does not leave the claimant without remedy by allowing him to recover the
economic losses that are directly consequential upon physical damage.

Spring v. Guardian Assurance In this case the claimant had been employed by an insurance firm and when it was
PLC. discovered that he was planning to leave and join a rival firm he was dismissed. When
the rival firm asked for a reference, the former employer stated that the employee had
deliberately mis-sold insurance policies to clients, had acted dishonestly and had
creamed off the most profitable business for himself, and had been dismissed as a
result. Due to this unfavourable and inaccurate reference the employee was not only
unable to get a job for several years but was also struck off the insurance industry
register. Initially the Court of Appeal overruled the precedent set in Lawton, but the
case was then appealed again to the House of Lords which took a very different view.

St Anne‘s Well Brewery Co v Where the nuisance existed before the occupier acquired the property he will be liable
Roberts 1929 if it can be proved that he knew or ought to have known of its existence

St Helen‘s Smelting Co v Tipping The claimant owned a manor house with 1300 acres of land which was situated a
[1865] UKHL J81 House of Lords short distance from the defendant‘s copper smelting business. He brought a nuisance
action against the defendant in respect of damage caused by the smelting works to
their crops, trees and foliage. There were several industrial businesses in the locality
including and alkali works. The defendant argued that the use of property was
reasonable given the locality and the smelting works existed before the claimant
purchased the property.

Held
Where there is physical damage to property, the locality principle has no relevance. It
is no defence that the claimant came to the nuisance
Stansbie v Troman [Tort - negligence - duty of care - created by contract]
D decorator was left alone on the premises by the householder's wife. During her
absence, he left the house to obtain wall-paper. He failed to secure the behind him.
During the his absence a thief entered the house and stole property.

Held:

1. A duty of care was created by the contractual relationship.


2. It was a breach of that duty to leave the front door insecure
3. As a direct result of that breach of duty that the theft occurred.

C won

Steel & Morris v McDonalds: Steel The applicants were sued by McDonalds after handing out a six-page leaflet
& Morris v United Kingdom containing allegations damaging allegations about the company, entitled "What's
Wrong with McDonalds". At trial (the longest in English legal history, at 313 days), Mr
Justice Bell found for McDonalds and awarded them £60,000 in damages (reduced to
£40,000 on appeal), although he did find some of the allegations made by the
Defendants to be true. The applicants appealed to the ECHR.

(1) Whether the unavailability of legal aid for defamation meant that the applicants had
been denied their rights to a fair trial under Art 6; (2) Whether the proceedings and
their outcome infringed Art 10.

Finding violations of Art 6 and Art 10: (1) Denial of legal aid deprived the applicants of
the opportunity to present their case effectively before the court - central to the
concept of a fair trial. States are free to decide how litigants are guaranteed this right.
Legal aid is one means. Whether it is necessary depends on the facts of the individual
case. The applicants were defending their right to freedom of expression, the financial
consequences to them were great and the case was highly complex, both factually
and legally. The disparity of legal assistance gave rise to unfairness. (2) The
allegations constituted ‗political expression‘, requiring a high level of protection. It was
not incompatible with Art 10 to allow companies to sue for defamation. Nor was the
incidence of the burden of proof itself an infringement. However, balancing the
procedural unfairness, inequality of arms and the means of the applicants, the
damages award was a disproportionate infringement of Art 10.

Stevenson v Nationwide Building The purchaser bought a property spanning a small river. The lender‘s valuer
Society (1984) 272 EG 663 disclaimed any liabillity to the buyer, and a structural report was offered for an
additional charge. The property was not sound.
Held: The valuation was negligent, and the defendant lender would be vicariously
liable unless liability had been excluded. In the absence of some other estoppel, the
exclusion term had to pass the test of reasonableness under the Act. Given that the
purchaser was himself an estate agent and properly experienced in such matters, the
exclusion clause was reasonable. Similar to Smith V Bush. But buyer was estate
agent and was held by the court to have 'trade knowledge'. Therefore the disclaimer
used by the cheaper surveyor they chose to use was held to be reasonable

Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison Contract of service; employer-employee-relationship: the employer says what and how
v. McDonald 1952 to do it.
Contract of services: the employer says what to do; independent contractor.
'Business integration test'.
Problem: is the person fully integrated or only an accessory?
Lord Denning brought up this question, but he was not the only one who found it
relevant.
Storey v. Ashton 1869 A driver took a different route to make a frolic of his own.
On this way he caused an accident because of his negligence.
No liability of the company.
Though this was just a little detour, the driver was carrying out his own business.

Sturges v Bridgman [1879] 11 Ch The defendant ran a confectionary shop which operated a noisy pestle and mortar. It
D 852 Court of Appeal had done so for over 20 years but had no neighbouring property so there were no
complaints as to its use. The claimant then built a consulting room for his practice as
a physician adjacent to the defendant‘s noisy shop. The claimant brought an action in
nuisance to obtain an injunction to prevent the continuance of the noise. The
defendant, relying on the Prescription Act, argued that he had obtained the right to be
noisy by operating the noisy pestle for over twenty years.

Held:
The use of land prior to the construction of the consulting room was not preventable or
actionable and therefore it was not capable of founding a prescription right.

Tate & Lyle v Greater London Tate & Lyle operated a sugar refinery on the bank of the river Thames. They had a
Council [1983] 2 AC 509 jetty from which raw sugar would be offloaded from barges and refined sugar would
be taken. The sugar would be taken be larger vessels and then transferred to smaller
barges to enable them to get to through the shallow waters. As part of development
Tate & Lyle wished to construct a new jetty and dredge the water to accommodate the
larger vessels. At the same time the GLC was constructing new ferry terminals. The
design of the ferry terminals was such that that it caused siltation of the channels.
After using the channels for a short while, Tate & Lyles‘ larger vessels were no longer
able to use them. Further dredging at the cost of £540,000 was required to make the
channel and jetties usable by the vessels. Tate & Lyle brought an action in negligence
and nuisance to recover the cost of te extra dredging.

Held:

The claim in negligence and private nuisance failed since they did not possess any
private rights which enabled them to insist on any particular depth of water. The claim
succeeded in public nuisance since the interference caused by the ferry terminals
affected public navigation rights. Tate & Lyle suffered particular damage as a result of
this interference.

Tetley v Chitty 1986 1 All ER 663 A council allowed a go-kart club to use their land for a race track. Nearby residents
brought an action in nuisance. The council were held liable for authorising the
activities of the go-kart club. The noise was an ordinary and necessary incident to go-
kart racing which was the purpose for which the permission to use the land was
granted.
The Wagon Mound no 1 [1961] The defendant's vessel, The Wagon Mound, leaked furnace oil at a Wharf in Sydney
AC 388 House of Lords Harbour. Some cotton debris became embroiled in the oil and sparks from some
welding works ignited the oil. The fire spread rapidly causing destruction of some
boats and the wharf.

Held:

Re Polemis should no longer be regarded as good law. A test of remoteness of


damage was substituted for the direct consequence test. The test is whether the
damage is of a kind that was foreseeable. If a foreseeable type of damage is present,
the defendant is liable for the full extent of the damage, no matter whether the extent
of damage was foreseeable.
The Wagon Mound no 1 [1961] The defendant's vessel, The Wagon Mound, leaked furnace oil at a Wharf in Sydney
AC 388 House of Lords Harbour. Some cotton debris became embroiled in the oil and sparks from some
welding works ignited the oil. The fire spread rapidly causing destruction of some
boats and the wharf.

Held:
Re Polemis should no longer be regarded as good law. A test of remoteness of
damage was substituted for the direct consequence test. The test is whether the
damage is of a kind that was foreseeable. If a foreseeable type of damage is present,
the defendant is liable for the full extent of the damage, no matter whether the extent
of damage was foreseeable.
Theaker v Richardson [1962] 1 A husband opened a letter which defamed his wife. It was held that the defamation
WLR 151, had been published to the husband as it natural and probable that the husband would
open it.
Thomas v Bradbury, Agnew and The court held that evidence that the defendant was actuated by malice would defeat
Co Ltd and another [1906] the defence of fair comment, notwithstanding that in all other aspects the comment
may be considered fair. It is for the claimant to adduce such evidence.

Thorley v Lord Kerry Was an action on a libel published in a letter which the bearer, who had no authority to
do so, happened to open, and that case shows that a man is responsible for the
publication which has arisen through the curiosity of a person into whose hands the
letter happens to pass. Belief that a third person might open it is evidence to go to the
jury of intended publication: Delacroix v Thevenot; Gomersall v Davies. A letter not
sealed or fastened up is analogous to a post-card, and a post-card is a publication to
every one through whose hands it passes.

Thorpe v Brumfitt ((1872 – 73) M had granted P a right of way over a passage ‘for all purposes‘ over his land for the
L.R. 8 Ch. App. 650, CA (Eng)) purpose of getting to and from P‘s Inn. M‘s tenants obstructed the passage so that
potential customers could not get to the Inn operated by P‘s tenant. An injunction was
granted against all of the parties causing the obstruction. There was an argument that
the words ‘for all purposes‘ meant that the claimed easement did not benefit any
specific land and so was invalid. This argument was rejected: the words clearly meant
‗for all purposes connected with the use of P‘s land.‘

Tolley v Fry Tolley was a well-known amateur golfer. During the 1920s if an amateur golfer
entered into a commercial contract for benefit, that could harm the reputation and
status of the golfer. Fry, without the consent of Tolley, had used a caricature of Tolley
in several advertisements in order to promote chocolates.

At first instance the judge held that this was capable of being libellous leaving the
actual decision to a jury. This body found in favour of the claimant and awarded
damages. The Court of Appeal found that the advertisement was not capable of
producing libellous effects. To their mind, the case should not have been brought
before a jury. They reversed the judge‘s decision and dismissed the action.

The House of Lords, in a decision of four against one, restored the original decision in
favour of the claimant but ordered a new trial concerning the level of compensation.

Viscount Hailsham delivered the major opinion: An action of libel would succeed if the
publication complained of produced at least some of the meanings attributed to it in
the innuendo, and those meanings were defamatory. Libel is a possible remedy
against unwanted character advertising, if some further element of an individual‘s
reputation, such as status as an amateur golfer, were endangered. The case also
shows the limits of this action as mere vulgarities are non-actionable.
Tomlinson v Congleton Borough The defendant owned Brereton Heath Country Park. It had previously been a sand
Council [2003] 3 WLR 705 House quarry and they transformed it in to a country park and opened it up for public use.
of Lords The defendants had created a lake on the park which was surrounded by sandy
banks. In the hot weather many visitors came to the park. Swimming was not
permitted in the lake and notices were posted at the entrance saying ―Dangerous
water. No swimming‖. However despite this, many people did use the lake for
swimming. Rangers were employed and on occasions sought to prevent swimming
but some of the visitors would be rude to the rangers‘ attempts to prevent them and
many continued to swim. The claimant was injured when he dived into shallow water
and broke his neck. At the Court of Appeal it was held that he was a trespasser
despite the repeated trespass and inadequate steps to prevent him swimming. They
also stated that the warning signs may have acted as an allurement to macho young
men. The Court of Appeal was of the opinion that since the introduction of the
Occupiers Liability Act 1984, the courts should not strain to imply a licence. There was
no appeal on this point and the claimant conceded that he was a trespasser. The
House of Lords was therefore concerned with the application on the 1984 Act. The
Court of Appeal had held that the council were liable but reduced the damages by 2/3
under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. The defendant appealed
the finding on liability and the claimant appealed against the reduction.

House of Lords held:

The Council were not liable.

No risk arose from the state of the premises as required under s.1(1)(a) Occupiers
Liability Act 1984. The risk arose from the claimant‘s own action. He was a person of
full capacity who voluntarily and without pressure or inducement engaged in an activity
which had an inherent risk. Even if there was a risk form the state of the premises, the
risk was not one against which the council would reasonably be expected to offer the
claimant some protection under s.1(3)(C). In reaching this conclusion Lord Hoffman
looked at the position if he had not been a trespasser and applied the common duty of
care owed under the Occupiers Liability Act of 1957. He was of the opinion that there
Topp v London Country Bus was no
[Tort duty to warn
- negligence or take
- duty steps
of care to prevent-the
- omissions claimant
actions from
of third diving as the dangers
parties]
(South West) Ltd
D, a bus company left a mini-bus parked in a public place with the keys in the ignition,
the bus was stolen, and, in the course of the theft, was involved in an accident in
which a woman cyclist was killed. C, her husband (and daughter) brought an action
against the bus company for negligence. The vehicle was left at a changeover point
that normally took 8 minutes, on this occasion it rested there for nine hours.

Held: The bus company may have been negligent to leave the bus with the keys in, in
an easily accessible place, they could not be held responsible for the accident as it
had occurred through the voluntary act of a third party over whom they had no control

C lost
Transco plc v Stockport The defendant council were responsible for the maintenance of the pipe work
Metropolitan Borough Council supplying water to a block of flats. A leak developed which was undetected for some
[2004] 2 AC 1 House of Lords time. The water collected at an embankment which housed the claimant‘s high
pressure gas main. The water caused the embankment to collapse and left the gas
main exposed and unsupported. This was a serious and immediate risk and the
claimant took action to avoid the potential danger. They then sought to recover the
cost of the remedial works under the principle established in Rylands v Fletcher.

Held:
The defendant was not liable. The council‘s use of land was not a non-natural use.

Lord Bingham:
―I think it clear that ordinary user is a preferable test to natural user, making it clear
that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is engaged only where the defendant's use is
shown to be extraordinary and unusual. This is not a test to be inflexibly applied: a use
may be extraordinary and unusual at one time or in one place but not so at another
time or in another place.‖

Tremain v Pike [1969] 1 WLR The farm labourer contracted leptosporosis from handling materials on which rats had
1556 urinated.

Held:

The defendant was not liable. It was not known at the time that leptosporosis could be
transmitted in this way. Whilst it was foreseeable he may contract the disease by a rat
bite the way he contracted the disease was not foreseeable.

Urbanski v Patel Facts


Patel, a surgeon, removed the only kidney of Shirley Firman believing that it was an
ovarian cyst. As a result, she had to be placed on dialysis until she could find a kidney.
Urbanski, Shirley's father, tried to donate his kidney to her, but it was rejected.
Urbanski brought an action for the losses he experienced from the removal of his
kidney.

Issue
Is donating a kidney a reasonable action attempting to protect his daughter from the
harms of the doctor's negligence?

Decision
Judgment for the plaintiffs.

Reasons
Wilson found that in the medical world, the donating of a kidney is accepted as a
usual solution to a problem of this type. As a result, Urbanski was acting perfectly
reasonably. This case, therefore, follows the ratio of Haynes v Harwood and Urbanski
was entitled to recover.
Vellino v Chief Constable of The Claimant was a known offender and had a string of convictions. He was seriously
Greater Manchester [2002] 1 injured when he jumped out of a second floor window having just been arrested. The
WLR 218 Court of Appeal police were aware that he was likely to escape and had done so on several previous
occasions. They were also aware that such activity was dangerous but did nothing to
prevent him from jumping. The Claimant suffered a fractured skull, brain damage and
tetraplegia which rendered him totally dependent on others for support. He brought an
action against the police arguing that having arrested him, they owed him a duty of
care to prevent him injuring himself. The Defendant denied owing a duty of care and
also raised the defence of ex turpi causa in that it was a criminal offence for an
arrested person to abscond. The trial judge held that ex turpi causa excluded the
imposition of a duty of care. The Claimant appealed.

Held:

2:1 The appeal was dismissed.

Sir Murray Stuart-Smith identified four principles relating to the maxim ex turpi causa:
1. The operation of the principle arises where the claimant's claim is founded upon his
own criminal or immoral act. The facts which give rise to the claim must be
inextricably linked with the criminal activity. It is not sufficient if the criminal activity
merely gives occasion for tortious conduct of the Defendant.

2. The principle is one of public policy; it is not for the benefit of the Defendant. Since
if the principle applies, the cause of action does not arise, the Defendant's conduct is
irrelevant. There is no question of proportionality between the conduct of the Claimant
and Defendant.

3. In the case of criminal conduct this has to be sufficiently serious to merit the
application of the principle. Generally speaking a crime punishable with imprisonment
could be expected to qualify. If the offence is criminal, but relatively trivial, it is in any
event difficult to see how it could be integral to the claim.

Vowles v Evans [2003] EWCA Civ A4. referee


The Law ofReform
an adult(Contributory
rugby matchNegligence) Actfor
was held liable 1945 is notsuffered
injuries applicable where the
by players
318 (11 March 2003) during the course of the match. The court found that Rugby was a dangerous game
and found that the safety of the players relied on the due enforcement of the rules.
The referee owed a duty of care to all players in the match. The referee had failed to
comply with particular rules and this was found to be the cause of the Defendant‘s
injuries,.
W v Essex County Council (1998) [Tort – negligence - duty of care –no duty situations - statutory duty - duty of care, to
HL whom]
D, the council placed a known sex offender with foster parents C. C‘s children were
abused. C made it clear that they were anxious not to put their children at risk by
having a known sex abuser in their home, the social worker and D knew that and also
knew that the boy placed had already committed an act or acts of sex abuse. The risk
was obvious and the abuse happened.

Held: It was plainly arguable that there was a duty of care owed to the parents and a
breach of that duty by the defendants.

C won.
Walters v North Glamorgan NHS The claimant‘s 10-month-old son was in hospital suffering from liver failure which was
Trust ([2002] All ER (D)7 (Dec) the result of the defendant‘s admitted negligence in failing to diagnose his condition.
CA) The claimant was with her son when he had an epileptic seizure which the defendant‘s
doctors told her was very unlikely to have caused any serious damage. The child‘s
condition deteriorated and he was taken by ambulance to another hospital for a liver
transplant, followed by the claimant in her car. On arrival she was told that her son
had in fact suffered severe brain damage, which she was told on the following day
was so severe that he would have no quality of life. She agreed to his life support
system being turned off and he died. It was agreed that the claimant had suffered
shock and a recognised psychiatric illness, namely pathological grief reaction, as a
result of what she had witnessed and experienced over a period of some 36 hours
between her son‘s seizure and his death. Could this be categorised as injury by shock
– that is ‗sudden appreciation by sight or sound of a horrifying event, which violently
agitates the mind‘? Yes, held the Court of Appeal. A realistic view should be taken of
what constitutes the necessary ‗event‘. In this case there was a seamless tale with an
obvious beginning and an equally obvious end. It was played out over a period of 36
hours, which for the claimant was undoubtedly one drawn-out experience.
Accordingly, the 36-hour period constituted one entire event, albeit made up of
discreet events. It was a short step for the Court to find that such a step was
‗horrifying‘

Warren v Henley's Ltd (1948) Employer not held liable for the assault of the employee because this was an act of
personal vengeance and so was outside the course of employment.
Watt v Hertfordshire [1954] 1 The claimant was a fireman. A woman had been involved in a traffic accident and was
WLR 835 trapped underneath a lorry. This was 200-300 yards away from the fire station. The
fire services were called to release the woman. They needed to transport a heavy lorry
jack to the scene of the accident. The jack could not go on the fire engine and the
normal vehicle for carrying the jack was not available. The fire chief ordered the
claimant and other firemen to lift the jack on to the back of a truck. There was no
means for securing the jack on the truck and the firemen were instructed to hold it on
the short journey. In the event the truck braked and the jack fell onto the claimant's leg
causing severe injuries.

Held:
There was no breach of duty. The emergency of the situation and utility of the
defendant's conduct in saving a life outweighed the need to take precautions.
Watt v. Longsdon Browne sent a letter to D, who worked as a liquidator for the firm. The letter alleged
that a maid had been P‘s mistress and that he was conducting orgies in his flat. D
shared this letter with his boss, and P‘s wife. Trial court gave judgment to D on the
grounds that they were privileged, court of appeals reversed.

Did D have a duty to inform, thus shielding him from liability? Holding: D‘s publication
was privileged as to his disclosure to his boss, but not to P‘s wife. In my view on these
facts there was a duty, both from a moral and a material point of view, on Longsdon to
communicate the letter to Singer, the chairman of his company, who, apart from
questions of present employment, might be asked by Watt for a testimonial to a future
employer. However, using the best judgment I can in this difficult matter, I have come
to the conclusion that there was not a moral or social duty in Longsdon to make this
communication to Mrs. Watt such as to make the occasion privileged.

Privilege arises when:

A duty to communicate information believed to be true to a person who has a material


interest in receiving the information, or

An interest in the speaker to be protected by communicating information, if true,


relevant to that interest, to a person honestly believed to have a duty to protect that
interest, or

A common interest in and reciprocal duty in respect of the subject matter of the
communication between speaker and recipient.

The information came from a very doubtful source, and in my judgment no reasonably
right minded person could think it his duty, without obtaining some corroboration of the
story, and without first communicating with the plaintiff, to pass on these outrageous
charges of marital infidelity of a gross kind, and drunkenness and dishonesty, to the
plaintiff‘s wife

Weiland v Cyril Lord Carpets Ltd where the claimant was unable to adjust her bifocals as a result of a neck injury
(1969) caused by the defendant‘s negligence. She was worried about catching public
transport in such a condition and went to her son‘s office to ask for a lift home. On the
way into the office she fell down a flight of stairs and was injured. The claimant was
held to have been acting reasonably; the defendant was liable for those injuries.

Wheat v Lacon [1966] AC 552 The claimant and her family stayed at a public house, The Golfer‘s Arms in Great
Yarmouth, for a holiday. Unfortunately her husband died when he fell down the stairs
and hit his head. The stairs were steep and narrow. The handrail stopped two steps
from the bottom of the stairs and there was no bulb in the light. The claimant brought
an action under the Occupiers Liability Act 1957 against the Brewery company, Lacon,
which owned the freehold of The Golfer‘s Arms and against the Managers of the Pub,
Mr & Mrs Richardson, who occupied the pub as a licensee.

Held:
Both the Richardsons and Lacon were occupiers for the purposes of the Occupiers
Liability Act 1957 and therefore both owed the common duty of care. It is possible to
have more than one occupier. The question of whether a particular person is an
occupier under the Act is whether they have occupational control. Lacon had only
granted a license to the Richardsons and had retained the right to repair which gave
them a sufficient degree of control. There is no requirement of physical occupation.
However, it was found that Lacon was not in breach of duty since the provision of light
bulbs would have been part of the day to day management duties of the Richardsons.
Since the Richardsons were not party to the appeal the claimant‘s action failed.
White V Chief Constable Of This case also relates to the Hillsborough disaster. In this instance police officers were
Yorkshire Police seeking compensation on the basis that they had suffered psychiatric illness as a
result of rescuing victims after the crush. They claimed that because they were
rescuers they should be treated as ‗primary victims'. The distinction between primary
victim and secondary victim was made in the Alcock v Chief Constable of South
Yorkshire Police, where all claimants were secondary victims. In Page v Smith this
distinction was further developed.

The Court of Appeal in Frost v Chief Constable of Yorkshire Police [1997] 3 WLR
1194 (by a majority) had held that the police officers who were allowed to recover for
their psychiatric illness as a result of carrying out their professional duties as rescuers
and/or employees at the disastrous Hillsborough football stadium stampede were
classifiable as primary victims.

The House of Lords however, held that for the purposes of distinction between
primary and secondary victims, that rescuers were not in a special position in the law.
They could only recover if they were exposed to physical danger as primary victims.
Since they were not endangered in the discharge of their service or in rescuing, as
employees and/or rescuers, the police officers were only secondary victims. As
secondary victims they, like the bystanders or spectators, were not entitled to recover
damages for their psychiatric illness.

White v Jones 1995 Facts


Two daughters of 78 year old Mr White sued Mr Jones for failing to follow their father's
instructions when drawing up his will. Mr White and his daughters had fallen out briefly
and he asked the solicitor to cut them out of the will. Before he died they resolved their
problems. He asked Mr Jones to change the will again so that £9000 would be given
to his daughters. After he died, with the will still the same, the family would not agree
to have the settlement changed. The question was whether Mr Jones could be sued
instead.

Judgment
Lord Goff held with a majority of three to two in the House of Lords that the daughters
would be able to claim. Influenced by the idea that solicitors may escape the
consequences of not doing their job properly, he said that a special relationship
existed between the daughters and the solicitor and that Mr Jones had assumed
responsibility towards them. This was so even though there was no contract or
fiduciary relationship between them.
Whitehouse v. Jordan [1981] 1 All The claimant was a baby who suffered severe brain damage after a difficult birth. The
ER 267: defendant, a senior hospital registrar, was supervising delivery in a high-risk
pregnancy. After the mother had been in labour for 22 hours, the defendant used
forceps to assist the delivery. The Lords found that the doctor's standard of care did
not fall below that of a reasonable doctor in the circumstances and so the baby was
awarded no compensation.
Williams v Natural Life Health The claimants were interested in opening a health food shop in Bristol. They went to a
Foods Ltd (1998). health food company for advice as to how successful such a shop might be. They
received a report, that had been prepared by the defendant, which said that the shop
the claimants were proposing to open should be very successful. This was incorrect,
and the defendant should have known that. On the strength of the report, the
claimants invested a lot of money in opening a health food shop in Bristol and lost
their investment. Held: the claimants could not sue the defendant for compensation
for the money they lost relying on his overly optimistic projections as to how well their
shop would do.
Willsher v Essex Area Health A premature baby was given too much oxygen by a junior doctor. The baby suffered
Authority [1988] from a condition affecting his retina which left him totally blind in one eye and partially
sighted in the other. The condition could have been caused by the excess oxygen he
had been exposed to or it could have been caused by four other factors unrelated to
the oxygen, but related to the premature birth. The trial judge found the Health Athority
liable. He applied McGhee v NCB but stated that McGhee had reversed the burden of
proof where there was more than one possible causes. The Health Authority
appealed.

Held:

Appeal allowed.
The defendant was in breach of duty. A junior doctor owes the same standard of care
as a qualified doctor. McGhee did not reverse the burden of proof which always
remains on the claimant.
Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd v Mr English was employed at Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd‘s colliery at Glencraig from
English 27 March 1933. He was repairing an airway leading off the Mine Jigger Brae, a main
haulage road. Between 1:30pm and 2pm he was going to the pit bottom and the
haulage plan was put in motion. He tried to escape through one of the manholes, but
was caught by a rake of hutches and crushed between it and the side of the road. His
family claimed damages. The company claimed that Mr English‘s own negligence
contributed to his death, because he should have told the person in charge of the
machinery, or taken an alternative route.

House of Lords held unanimously that an employer has a non delegable duty to create
a safe system of work. Even if an employer gives that duty to another person, they still
remain responsible for workplace safety.

Woodward v Mayor of Hastings The defendant school hired cleaners to defrost the ice on the staircase, the claimant
was badly injured after slipping on ice on the staircase.

The court found that this case was different from Haseldine v Daw because defrosting
the stairs did not entail any technical knowledge, it was something that the school
could have done themselves, and therefore ensuring that the cleaners had done their
jobs properly was not unreasonable to expect of the school authority.

Yianni v Edwin Evans (1982) QB Mr Yianni applied to a building society for a mortgage advance of £12,000 for the
438 purchase of a property. The building society appointed an independent surveyor to
undertake a valuation of the property. The surveyor reported that the property was
adequate security for the mortgage. Mr Yianni did not see a copy of the report
although he paid the fee for the valuation. The building society made the required
mortgage advance and the purchase went ahead. It subsequently came to light that
the surveyor had failed to detect serious structural defects that rendered the property
virtually worthless. Mr Yianni sued the surveyor directly. The judge found the surveyor
liable, even though the building society, and not the purchaser, had employed him.
The surveyor knew, however, that the advance would be granted only if his report
were favourable and that it was unlikely the purchaser would obtain his own survey.
The surveyor was therefore held to have a duty to both Yianni and to the building
society. Since this decision, lenders have made valuation surveys available to
prospective purchasers, thus widening the liability of surveyors. -
Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures [Law and morality - morality shifting over time]
(1934) CA C complained that she could be identified with the character Princess Natasha in the
film 'Rasputin, the Mad Monk'. The princess claimed damages on the basis that the
film suggested that, by reason of her identification with 'Princess Natasha', she had
been seduced by Rasputin.

Held: The princess was awarded £25,000 damages.


It was contended that if the film indicated any relations between Rasputin and
'Natasha' it indicated a rape of Natasha and not a seduction.
Slesser LJ considered the film defamatory whether it suggested rape or seduction:
―I, for myself, cannot see that from the plaintiff‘s point of view it matters in the least
whether this libel suggests that she has been seduced or ravished. The question
whether she is or is not the more or the less moral seems to me immaterial in
considering this question whether she has been defamed, and for this reason, that, as
has been frequently pointed out in libel, not only is the matter defamatory if it brings
the plaintiff into hatred, ridicule, or contempt by reason of some moral discredit on her
part, but also if it tends to make the plaintiff be shunned and avoided and that without
any moral discredit on her part. It is for that reason that persons who have been
alleged to have been insane, or to be suffering from certain disease, and other cases
where no direct moral responsibility could be placed upon them, have been held to be
entitled to bring an action to protect their reputation and their honour. One may, I
think, take judicial notice of the fact that a lady of whom it has been said that she has
been ravished, albeit against her will, has suffered in social reputation and in
opportunities of receiving respectable consideration from the world.‖
Later he added:
'When this woman is defamed in her sexual purity I do not think that the precise
manner in which she has been despoiled of her innocence and virginity is a matter
which a jury can properly be asked to consider.
http://sixthformlaw.info/02_cases/mod3a/aqa/_cases_tort_1duty.htm#Hall%20v%20Simons%2
0%282000%29%20HL
http://www.e-lawresources.co.uk/Tort-law.php
Adams v Ursell [1913] 1 Ch 269
Addie v Dumbreck [1929] AC 358 House of Lords
A-G v P.Y.A. Quarries Ltd. (1957)
Alcock v. The Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310
Alexander v North Eastern Railway (1865) 6 B&S 340
Al-Kandari V J R Brown & Co
Allen v Gulf Oil Refinery [1981] AC 1001 House of Lords
Allied Maples v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 4 All ER 907
AMF International Ltd v Magnet Bowling Ltd (1968)
Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728
Ashdown v Samuel Williams & Sons Ltd (1957)
Attia v British Gas plc
Attorney General v Corke [1993]
Attorney General v Hartwell (British Virgin Islands) [2004]
Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC 467
Barker v Corus, [2006] 3 All ER 785
Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital [1969] 1 QB 428
Berkoff v. Burchill
Blake v Galloway [2004] 3 All ER 315
Bliss v Hall [1838] 4 Bing NC 183
Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks (1856) Exch
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 583
Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority [1997] 3 WLR 1151
Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850
Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613 House of Lords
Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92
Box v Jubb LR 4 EX Div 76
Bradford Corporation v Pickles [1895] HL
British Railways Board v Herrington [1972] AC 877 House of Lords
Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818
Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264 House of Lords
Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co
Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman
Carmarthenshire CC v Lewis
Carslogie Steamship Co v. Royal Norwegian Government
Cassidy v Daily Mirror [1929] 2 KB 331
Century Insurance v. Northern Ireland Road Transport Board 1942 House of Lords
Chaplin v Hicks
Charleston v News Group Newspapers [1995] 2 AC 65
Chaudhry v Prabhakar [1988] 3 All ER 718
Chester v Afshar [2004] 3 WLR 927 House of Lords
Christie v Davey (1893) 1 Ch 316
Cook v Lewis, [1951] SCR 830
Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd (2008) UKHL)
Cunningham v Reading FC [1991] Times LR 153
Cutler v Vauxhall Motors
Dann v Hamilton [1939] 1 KB 509
Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd and others
Derry v Peek (1889) 5 T.L.R. 625
Dillon v Twin State Gas & Electric Co (1932), 85 NH 449, 163 A 111.
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562
Dooley -v- Cammell Laird and Co Ltd; 1951
Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Co
Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Company [1964] 1 QB 518
Dulieu v White [1901] 2 KB 669
E .Hutton and Co V Jones (1910) AC 20
Edwards v Railways Executive [1952] AC 737 House of Lords
Esso Petroleum v Mardon [1976] QB 801
Fairchild v Glenhaven [2002] 3 WLR 89 House of Lords
Ferguson v John Dawson & Partners (Contractors) Ltd
Ferguson v Welsh [1987] 1 WLR 1553 House of Lords
Froom v Butcher [1976] 1 QB 286
Giles v Walker (1890) 24 QBD 656
Glasgow Corporation v Muir (1943),
Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd
Goldman v Hargrave
Goldsmith v Bhoyrul ( 1998)
Goodwill -v- British Pregnancy Advisory Service [1996]
Greatorex v Greatorex and Others [2000] The Times LR May 5, QBD
Greenock Corporation v Caledonian Railway [1917] AC 556
Gregg v Scott
Gwilliam v West Hertfordshire Hospital NHS Trust [2002] EWCA Civ 1041 Court of Appeal
Haley v London Electricity Board
Hall v Simons (2000) HL
Harrison v British Railways Board (1981)
Harrison v Michelin Tyre Co Ltd [1985] 1 All ER 918.
Haseldine v Daw
Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146
Heasemans v. Clarity Cleaning 1987 Court of Appeal
Heath v Mayor Brighton (1908)
Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465
Henderson v Merrett Syndicates [1994] HL
Holden v White [1982] 2 All ER 328 Court of Appeal
Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd
Horsley v. MacLaren aka the ogopogo case 1971 (Canada)
Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] AC 750 House of Lords
Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837 House of Lords
Hunter v Canary Wharf [1998] 1 WLR 434 House of Lords
Hunter v. British Coal Corporation [1998] 2 All E.R. 97
Hussain v Lancaster City Council [1999] 2 WLR 1142 Court of Appeal
Huth v Huth [1915] 3 KB 32
Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Shatwell [1965] AC 656 House of Lords
James McNaughton Paper Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co
JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks, Bloom & Co [1981] 3 All ER 289
Jebson v Ministry of Defence
Jobling v Associated Dairies [1982] AC 794 House of Lords
Jobling v Associated Dairies [1982] AC 794 House of Lords
Jolley v Sutton [2000] 1 WLR 1082
Jones v Boyce (1816)
Jones v Livox Quarries [1952] 2 QB 608 Court of Appeal
Junior Books v Veitchi (1983) HL
Kemsley -v- Foot [1951] 2 KB 34
Keown v Coventry Healthcare NHS Trust, CA (Civ Div) 2/2/2006
Kirkham v CC Greater Manchester Police [1990] 2 QB 283 Court of Appeal
Knightley v Johns & Ors [1982] 1 WLR 349 Court of Appeal
Knupffer v London Express Newspapers [1944] AC 116,
Lamb v Camden LBC [1981] 2 All ER 408 Court of Appeal
Latimer v AEC [1953] AC 643
Law Society v KPMG Peat Marwick and Others
Leakey & Ors v National Trust [1980] QB 485 Court of Appeal
Lennon v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
Lewis -v- Daily Telegraph Ltd [1963] 1 QB 340
Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co. 1862
Lippiatt and Febry -v- South Gloucestershire County Council; CA 31-Mar-1999
Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22
Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Ltd. 1957
Lochgelly Iron & Coal v. M'Mullan [1934] AC 1
London Artists v Littler [1962] 2 QB 375
Lowery v Walker [1911] AC 10 House of Lords
Luxmoore-May v Messenger May Baverstock (a firm) (1990) CA
Malone v Laskey 1907 2 KB 141
Mansfield v Weetabix [1997] EWCA Civ 1352
Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority
McFarlane v. E.E. Caledonian Limited [1994] 2 All ER 1
McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board [2000]
McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1 House of Lords
McKay v Essex AHA (1982) CA
McKew v Holland [1969] 3 All ER 1621
McKinnon Industries v Walker [1951] WN 401 Privy Council
McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1983] 1 AC 410
McManus v Beckham 2002
McWilliams v Arrol [1962] HL
Merivale -v- Carson (1887) 20 QBD 275
Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Coggins & Griffiths (Liverpool) Ltd. 1947
Miller v Jackson [1977]3 WLR 20 Court of Appeal
Ministry of Housing and Local Government v Sharp
MLC v Evatt (1968) 12 CLR 556
Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel & Co Ltd and others
Morgan -v- Odhams Press Ltd; HL 1971
Morgans v. Launchbury 1973 House of Lords
Moriarty v Brookes [1834] EWHC Exch J79
Moy -v- Pettman Smith (a firm) and another; HL 3-Feb-2005
Muirhead v Industrial Tank Specialties Ltd and Others
Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence (1996) CA
Mullin v Richards [1998] 1 WLR 1304
Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] HL
Nettleship v Weston [1971] 3 WLR 370
Newstead v London Express Newspapers (1940)
Ng Chun Pui v Lee Chuen Tat [1988] RTR 298.
Nichols v Marsland (1876) 2 ExD 1
Norman v Future Publishing
Ogwo v Taylor [1987] 3 WLR 1145 House of Lords
Ormrod v. Crossville Motor Service 1953
Owens v Brimmell [1977] QBD
Page v Smith [1996] 1 AC 155 House of Lord
Palsgraf v Long Island Railway Co (1928) New York Appeals
Paris v Stepney [1951] AC 367
Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust 2001
Perl (Exporters) Ltd v Camden London Borough Council (1984),
Perry v Kendricks Transport [1956] WLR 85 Court of Appeal
Phillips v William Whiteley Ltd [1938] KBD
Phipps v Rochester Corporation [1955] 1 QB 450
Pigney V Pointers Transport Services Ltd (1957)
Plato Films -v- Speidel [1961]
Prendergast v Sam & Dee Ltd., Kosary, and Miller in 1989
Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Haynes [1959]
Rainham Chemical Works v Belvedere Fish Guano
Re Polemis & Furness Withy & Company Ltd. [1921] 3 KB 560
Read v Lyons [1947] AC 156
Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968]
Rees -v- Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust; HL 16-Oct-2003
Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360 House of Lords
Revill v Newbery [1996] 2 WLR 239 Court of Appeal
Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd
Riches -v- News Group Newspapers Ltd [1986]
Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263 Privy Council
Robinson v Kilvert (1889)
Robinson v Post Office [1974] CA
Roe v Minister of Health [1954] CA
Rogers v. Whitaker. Australia
Roles v Nathan [1963] 1 WLR 1117 Court of Appeal
Rose v. Plenty 1976 Court of Appeal
Ross v Caunters [1979] ChDiv Megarry VC
Rylands v Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1 House of Lords
Rylands v Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1 House of Lords
Salmon v Seafarer Restaurants [1983] 1WLR 1264
Scott v London and St Katherine Docks (1865) 3 H & C 596
Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan *1940+ AC 880 House of Lords
Shakoor v. Situ (t/a Eternal Health Co) [2000] 4 All ER 181
Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors
Sim v. Stretch [1936]
Simaan General Contracting Co v Pilkington Glass Ltd
Simpson & Co v Thomson (1877)
Slipper v British Broadcasting Corporation [1991] 1 QB 283
Smith v ADVFN Plc (CA)
Smith v Eric Bush [1990] 1 AC 831
Smith v Leech Brain [1962] 2 QB 405
Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd
South Hetton Coal Company vs North Eastern News Association Limited (1984).
Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd
Spring v. Guardian Assurance PLC.
St Anne’s Well Brewery Co v Roberts 1929
St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping *1865+ UKHL J81 House of Lords
Stansbie v Troman
Steel & Morris v McDonalds: Steel & Morris v United Kingdom
Stevenson v Nationwide Building Society (1984) 272 EG 663
Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison v. McDonald 1952
Storey v. Ashton 1869
Sturges v Bridgman [1879] 11 Ch D 852 Court of Appeal
Tate & Lyle v Greater London Council [1983] 2 AC 509
Tetley v Chitty 1986 1 All ER 663
The Wagon Mound no 1 [1961] AC 388 House of Lords
The Wagon Mound no 1 [1961] AC 388 House of Lords
Theaker v Richardson [1962] 1 WLR 151,
Thomas v Bradbury, Agnew and Co Ltd and another [1906]
Thorley v Lord Kerry
Thorpe v Brumfitt ((1872 – 73) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 650, CA (Eng))
Tolley v Fry
Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2003] 3 WLR 705 House of Lords
Topp v London Country Bus (South West) Ltd
Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 2 AC 1 House of Lords
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Urbanski v Patel
Vellino v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2002] 1 WLR 218 Court of Appeal
Vowles v Evans [2003] EWCA Civ 318 (11 March 2003)
W v Essex County Council (1998) HL
Walters v North Glamorgan NHS Trust ([2002] All ER (D)7 (Dec) CA)
Warren v Henley's Ltd (1948)
Watt v Hertfordshire [1954] 1 WLR 835
Watt v. Longsdon
Weiland v Cyril Lord Carpets Ltd (1969)
Wheat v Lacon [1966] AC 552
White V Chief Constable Of Yorkshire Police
White v Jones 1995
Whitehouse v. Jordan [1981] 1 All ER 267:
Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd (1998).
Willsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988]
Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English
Woodward v Mayor of Hastings
Yianni v Edwin Evans (1982) QB 438
Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures (1934) CA