[G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA,

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA, Petitioners, v. JOSE
DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of

Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific
taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.

Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this

suit against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano,
the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill
was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on
September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain
amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference
committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House
and Senate versions of the bill.

The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8

a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel
Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver
his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio
Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo
moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the
motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy
Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. 1 Rep. Arroyo
appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a
vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.

Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the

order, following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep.
Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced
that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end
of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the
following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of
Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of
December 5 and 6, 1996: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the
conference committee report.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?

MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.

(Gavel)

MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to
know what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader
for approval of the report, and the Chair called for the motion.

MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.

(It was 3:01 p.m.)

(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o’clock, Wednesday,
next week.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o’clock,
Wednesday, next week.

(It was 3:40 p.m.)

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally
passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21,
1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on
November 22, 1996.

Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the
transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation: (1) the transcript of
audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately
after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which
petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from the operators of the sound
system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of
November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on
November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the
proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified
by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also
obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version abovequoted.
According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in
the audio-sound recording the word "approved," which appears on line 13 in
the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on
November 21, 1996 the word "no" on line 17 appears only once, while in the
other versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published version does
not contain the sentence" (Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will
raise the question of the quorum," which appears in the other versions.

Petitioners’ allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However,

there is no need to discuss this point as petitioners have announced that, in
order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without
conceding, the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the respondents.
Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the word "approved"
appears in the transcripts.

Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference

committee report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners’ principal
argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the
"constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) that "each House may determine
the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House
rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the
certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false
and spurious.

More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, §35 and
Rule XVII, §103 of the rules of the House, 2 the Chair, in submitting the
conference committee report to the House, did not call for the yeas or nays,
but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner
Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule
XIX, §112, 3 the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo’s question, "What is
that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano’s motion to approve or
ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, §97, 4 the Chair refused to recognize Rep.
Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano’s motion and afterward
declared the report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, §§121-122,
Rule XXI, §123, and Rule XVIII, §109, 5 the Chair suspended the session
without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo’s question which, it is alleged, is a point of
order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo’s query should
have been resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28,
1996, because the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment
remained upon the resumption of the session.

Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on
November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to
prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a
quorum and asking for a reconsideration.

Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker
of the House that the law had been properly passed, considering the Court’s
power under Art. VIII, §1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by
the other departments of the government, and they ask for a reexamination
of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 6 which affirmed the conclusiveness of
an enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of the Court.

The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition,

respondent De Venecia filed a supplemental comment. Respondents’ defense
is anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill
doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no justification for
reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in
Art. VI, §16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings,
enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as
they implement constitutional requirements such as that relating to three
readings on separate days before a bill may be passed. At all events,
respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240,
the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of
conference committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.

In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his

certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends that under the
journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred.
Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering the sessions
of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that "On Motion of Mr. Albano, there
being no objection, the Body approved the Conference Committee Report on
House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996 over
the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman. 8

After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for
holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A.
No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.

First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been
violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of
procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there
was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the
rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning
the presence of a quorum. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the
constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" 9 and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To
begin with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided
cases, 10 the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the
rules of its proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not successfully,
precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct
its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the
provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny
to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a
House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of
showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of
private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, 11 it was held: "At any rate,
courts have declared that ‘the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them.’ And it has been said that ‘Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may
be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.’ Consequently, ‘mere failure
to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure.’"

In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 12 the rule was stated thus: "The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It
may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or
method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to
the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say
that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is
no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed
and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which
once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be
exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal." cralaw virtua1aw library

In Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held: "The provision that each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a
mere formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in
ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints,
and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority
extends to a determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is
taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power, in the
transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty conferred upon
it by the Constitution."
cralaw virtua1aw library

In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 14 the Supreme Court of
Ohio stated: "The provision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution
and is therefore entirely within the control of the General Assembly. Having
made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the
subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last
resort of many states, and also by the United States Supreme Court, that a
legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with rules." cralaw virtua1aw library

In State v. Savings Bank, 15 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

declared itself as follows: "The Constitution declares that each house shall
determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers
necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state.
Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to its
authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House has acted in a
matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the
independence of the legislative department for the court to set aside such
action as void because it may think that the House has misconstrued or
departed from its own rules of procedure." cralaw virtua1aw library

In McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it

appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain
whether the two houses have or have not complied strictly with their own
rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final
passage. The presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We think no
court has ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-compliance with
the rules of procedure made by itself , or the respective branches thereof,
and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If there are any such
adjudications, we decline to follow them." cralaw virtua1aw library

Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893

Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three readings on separate days before a
bill may be passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in
case of an emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend
the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of
violation of a law punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the
gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature because the
suspension of the rule on three readings had not been approved by the
requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme
Court of Oklahoma held: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read

a bill in any particular manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as
it sees fit, either in accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or
without making any rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a
statutory provision for the direction of the legislature in its action upon
proposed measures. It receives its entire force from legislative sanction, and
it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the legislature to properly
weigh and consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty
manner, might be reasons for the governor withholding his signature thereto;
but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a rule which the
legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could be no reason for
the court’s refusing its enforcement after it was actually passed by a majority
of each branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The courts
cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account of noncompliance
with rules of procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v.
State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 187;
State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15
S.W. 18.

We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former
Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress
to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not
have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject, however,
to this qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects
persons other than members of the legislative body the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case
where private rights are involved. 18

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a
member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the
dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our
shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.

Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our

government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade without
upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due
regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere comity,
compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged
violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation
to exercise our power.

Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion’s

sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII,
§1, "nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the
government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial
review." 19 Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is
an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case
and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, §5 and, therefore, to the
requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate
constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign
relations. For while Art. VIII, §1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry
into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those
relating to national security, 20 it has not altogether done away with political
questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. As we
have already held, under Art. VIII, §1, this Court’s function is merely [to]
check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond
the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different
view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks
is apparent error. 21

If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the
legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure
made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in
which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits
of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, §1 power.
chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was
"railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the
Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano’s motion approved.

What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval
and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for
objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: "There being none,
approved." At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo
was asking, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were
talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to
the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee
report had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its
banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep.
Albano’s motion for the approval of the conference committee report should
have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members
should have been taken. They say that the method used in this case is a
legislator’s nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the fact was that
one or some legislators opposed the report.

No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically

requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference
committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce
or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed
out, the manner in which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198
was approved was by no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative
practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the bills which
became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee
report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.

In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the
House. The point was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and
his answer became the ruling of the Chair. Mr. Tolentino said:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of
the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a
precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure
in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the
debate, then the voting comes in.

x       x       x

Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I
wonder what his attitude is now on his point of order. I should just like to
state that I believe that we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules.
The Rule invoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutional
requirement, and a substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When
the Chair announces the vote by saying "Is there any objection?" and nobody
objects, then the Chair announces "The bill is approved on second reading." If
there was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to divide would have been
proper. So, if that motion is not presented, we assume that the House
approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance here, and
if anybody wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the
Chair can announce how many are in favor and how many are against. 22

Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way

would be better, more accurate and even more just. 23 The advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for
judicial consideration. 24 In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals,
"this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure.
Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly tendered to
individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution
as a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be allowed
to manage its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of
the problem."25 cralaw:red
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members
be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following
instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, 26 at the request of one-
fifth of the Members present, 27 and in repassing a bill over the veto of the
President. 28 Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original
bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays had already been taken, it
would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.

Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration

allegedly as a result of the precipitate suspension and subsequent
adjournment of the session. 29 It would appear, however, that the session
was suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it
resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore.
While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m.
of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected
if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not.
The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION

On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the
session adjourned until four o’clock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November
27, 1996.

It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (Emphasis added)

This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one objected to

its approval except Rep. Lagman.

It is thus apparent that petitioners’ predicament was largely of their own

making. Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon,
petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo’s question as an obstacle
to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo’s question was not, in form or
substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence.
30 And even if Rep. Arroyo’s question were so, Rep. Albano’s motion to
adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end to any further
consideration of the question. 31

Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in
signing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the
House acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase "grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled
meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi
judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion
himself said in explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts by
Art. VIII, §1 extends to cases where "a branch of the government or any of
its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction." 32

Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the

House with which the Court should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is
not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier
motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll
call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be
raised repeatedly — especially when the quorum is obviously present — for
the purpose of delaying the business of the House. 33 Rep. Arroyo waived his
objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in
effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum. 34

At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier
found to be present on November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e. petitioners in
this case, are questioning the manner by which the conference committee
report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that day. No one except Rep. Arroyo,
appears to have objected to the manner by which the report was approved.
Rep. John Henry Osmeña did not participate in the bicameral conference
committee proceedings. 35 Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora objected to the
report 36 but not to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if
voting had been conducted, Rep. Tañada would have voted in favor of the
conference committee report. 37

Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the
Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by
the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November
21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is
devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to
disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the
decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the
enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case 38 we "went
behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether
certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will
respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has
been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims
that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the
Constitution had not been obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or
resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts." 39 This Court
quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies
good, if old-fashioned democratic theory: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to
check at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by
the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a second and
higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a
faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to
improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend
casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do
impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with
competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the
statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.
40

This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent
to the President contained provisions which had been "surreptitiously"
inserted in the conference committee: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills
have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the
Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it
had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy
of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to
disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government. 41

It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the
last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI, §26(2) of the Constitution that
"upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." 42

In other cases, 43 this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was
otherwise than as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of
Congress.

The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited

with approval by text writers here and abroad. 44 The enrolled bill rule rests
on the following considerations: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by

Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having
the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the
President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on
its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of
the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to
coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act
upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the
question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity
with the Constitution. 45

To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the

massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.

Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from

the rule, except to say that, with a change in the membership of the Court,
the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind on the
question of the enrolled bill rule. Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano,
Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.,) have departed from the Court since our decision in
the EVAT cases and their places have since been taken by four new members
(Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.,) Petitioners are thus
simply banking on the change in the membership of the Court.

Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is

confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows
that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No.
8240, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by
the Constitution. Art. VI, §16(4) provides: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect
national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request
of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are

required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. 46 With respect to other
matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also
been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons, 47 this Court
spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as "public
memorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They should be public,
because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that
rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall
not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts
resting only in the memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill which
became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has
been duly proven.

x       x       x

It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal

department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void
because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of
procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch
in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that
department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission
to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It
would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave
abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case 48
may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment
of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of
anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House
thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its
rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
49 cdtech

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

CASE DIGEST

FACTS: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which

amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives,
charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate

approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference
committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the
House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee
submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep.
Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum.
But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The
interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the
sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair
called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared:
“There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying
this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair
and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep.
Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already been
declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill
was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was

passed in violation of the rules of the House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character.
They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure
of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived
or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if
the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure.
But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given
to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body,
the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its
validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those
of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to
transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of

the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is
not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s
earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The
question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the
quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business
of the House.