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RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL

5.1 SPEEDY

G.R. No. L-25769 December 10, 1974 Flores vs People

FRANCISCO FLORES and FRANCISCO ANGEL, petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Facts:

Petitioners Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel were accused of robbery .the case was filed back in December 31, 1951. .
On November 29, 1955 the trail rendered a decision which found them guilty of the crime charged. The notice of appeal was filed
on December 8, 1955.For a period of three years, until February 10, 1958, no action was taken by the Court of Appeals. On that day,
there was a resolution remanding the records of the case to the lower court for a rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness
deemed material for the disposition of the case. the case was returned to the lower court with the former decision set aside so that
the trial could be had, but nothing was done for about a year because the offended party failed to appear notwithstanding the six or
seven dates set for such hearing. Instead of rendering a new decision, the former one having been set aside as required by the Court
of Appeals, the lower court merely sent back the records to the appellate tribunal.At that stage, five more years having elapsed
without anything being done, petitioners sought the dismissal of the cases against them due to such inordinate delay in their
disposition, which covered the period of December 8, 1955 to May 10, 1965, a period of almost a decade; thus did they invoke their
constitutional right to a speedy trial. In its defense the CA raised that the case was not properly captioned, as the People of the
Philippines, against whom it is filed, is not a tribunal or an office exercising judicial functions and that without the Court of Appeals
being made a party to the petition, it cannot be said that it stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rights of the accused to a speedy trial was violated?

Ruling: Yes, in view of the facts presented the supreme court finds that the accused rights to the speedy disposition of the case was
violated.

The constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was noted in a recent decision, Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 9 "means one free from
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, ... ." 10 Thus, if the person accused were innocent, he may within the shortest time
possible be spared from anxiety and apprehension arising from a prosecution, and if culpable, he will not be kept long in suspense as
to the fate in store for him, within a period of course compatible with his opportunity to present any valid defense. As was also
pointed out in Sarmiento: "The remedy in the event of a non-observance of this right is by habeas corpus if the accused were
restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case."

In the first Supreme Court decision after the 1935 Constitution took effect, People v. Castañeda, 15 where it was shown that
the criminal case had been dragging on for almost five years and that when the trial did finally take place, it was tainted by
irregularities, this Court set aside the appealed decision of conviction and acquitted the accused. As was pointed out by the ponente,
Justice Laurel: "The Government should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice and it
is the moral and legal obligation of this court to see that the criminal proceedings against the accused come to an end and that they
be immediately discharged from the custody of the law."

As for the defense of CA, the court ruled that the "technicalities should give way to the realities of the situation.".what is
given more importance is the substance of the pleading not it’s form. The deficiency in the pleading of the accused was given less
weight as compared to the safeguard of the rights accorded to the accused.
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The criminal case is hereby dismissed.

G.R. No. 121764 September 9, 1999 People vs SESBREÑO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAUL H. SESBREÑO, accused-appellant.

Facts:

Raul H. Sesbreño accused appellant a practicing lawyer in Cebu is accused of the murder of LucianoAmparado a porter. One
evening while the victim was walking with a companion the accused fired at them. In his defense, he claims that it was not him who
fired at these men and that it was an unidentified man who shot the victim. He filed for bail but due to the strong evidence against
him it was not granted. The court rendered a decision sentencing him to reclusion perpetaua for the crime of murder qualified by
treachery. On appeal he claims that his rights to speedy and impartial trial was violated.

Issue: whether or not there was the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused to speedy and impartial trial.

Ruling: No, the trial court did not violate the rights of the accused to a speedy and impartial trial.

The records of this case reveal that bail hearings started on September 27, 1993, and terminated on November 8, 1993. He
was arraigned on January 11, 1994. The prosecution presented its first post-bail hearings witness on the same day. The defense
presented its first witness on June 7, 1994. The decision of the lower court was promulgated on August 15, 1995. With this
chronology, in our view, no undue delay could be imputed, much less persuasively shown, against appellee and the trial court.

The 90-day period in deciding a case applies only after the case is submitted for decision, not from the start of the trial.If the
trial appeared lengthy, it was largely due to the number of witnesses presented, 13 for the prosecution and 15 for the defense.
Appellant himself took the witness stand a total of 76 times, including 21 times on rebuttal alone. As observed by the trial court:

. . . The manner of presenting his defense, undertaken by himself alone without the proper advice of a defense
counsel, had contributed largely to the prolonged trial of the case.

Whether intentional or not, appellant's conduct of his own trial contributed to time-consuming tussles in the lower court. How could
the accused complain of delays, where he himself caused them?

As for his alleged partiality of the judge for its inhibition in truing a companion case is unfounded. The grounds for
disqualification or inhibition of judges provided for in Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court are as follows:

Sec. 1.Disqualification of judges — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he or his wife or
child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor, or otherwise or in which he is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according
to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above.

None of the grounds above was cited to support the trial judge's disqualification. None was applicable to him. Though the
Rule provides other just and valid grounds on which a judge may disqualify himself, they are addressed to his sound discretion, and
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there was no abuse of said discretion. We can only conclude that the trial judge, contrary to appellant's claim, did not err in refusing
to inhibit himself in the case at bar.

That the trial judge opted to believe the prosecution's evidence rather than that of the defense is not a sign of bias.

The accused is hereby found guilty of homicide for failure to prove the element of treachery.

RIGHT TO PERSONAL CONFRONTATION

6.1 ADMISSION OF HEARSAY VIOLATES RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION

G.R. No. L-59318 May 16, 1983 People vs Ramos

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN, defendant-appellant.

Facts: The Police Apprehended MALCON OLEVERE y NAPA for having in his possession leaves of marijuana. When asked as to
whom he had purchased them he declared that he had bought it from ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN. The following day the police
accompanied byOlevere proceeded to the residence of Ramos and arrested him.During the custodial investigation, suspect
MalconOlevere executed a written sworn statement implicating the accused-appellant Rogelio Ramos as the source of the marijuana
leaves. The accused, after having been duly apprised of his constitutional rights, verbally admitted before Lt. E. Mediavillo and Sgt.
A. Linga the commission of the offense charged. He likewise admitted that he sold to MalconOlevere the marijuana leaves for
P10.00. upon arraignment Ramos pleaded as not guilty. During trial only the police and the NBI officers were presented as witness
basing mainly their testimony on the sworn statement of Olevere. The trial court rendered judgement finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt basing it to his verbal admission and to the evidence presented during trial. He is sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right of the accused to meet the witness face to face and to cross examination has been violated.

Ruling: Yes, the right of the accused to meet the witness face to face and to cross examination was violated.

The lower court erred in admitting as evidence the written sworn affidavit of MalconOlevere. It can be gleaned from the
records that MalconOlevere executed the written sworn statement declaring that appellant Ramos sold to him the marijuana leaves
for P10.00. This piece of evidence is a mere scrap of paper because MalconOlevere was not produced in court for cross-examination.
An affidavit being taken ex-parte is often incomplete and inaccurate. Such kind of evidence is considered hearsay .

The constitutional right to meet witnesses face to face 15 in order not to deprive persons of their lives and properties
without due process of law is well-protected in our jurisprudence. Thus, in People vs. Toledo, We elucidated:

Testimony in open court in actual trial cannot be equated with any out-of-court declaration, even when the witness
has in fact been confronted already by the defendant. The direct relevance of the trial to the ultimate judgment as
to the guilt or innocence of the accused is not present in any other proceeding and is thus a factor that can
influence materially the conduct and demeanor of the witness as well as the respective efforts of the counsels of
the parties.

For the court to admit the sworn statement of MalconOlevere without giving the adverse party the right to cross-examine
him would easily facilitate the fabrication of evidence and the perpetration of fraud. The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is
based, not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, 17 but also on the commonly
known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing
the affiant's statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.
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Furthermore none of the witnesses presented testified on the basis of personal knowledge that the accused sold the
marijuana leaves to Olivere. Under Rule 130, Sec. 30 of the Revised Rules of Court, "a witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his own knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception. ...

A witness, therefore, may not testify as to what he merely learned from others, either because he was told or having read
or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.
Since MalconOlevere was not presented as a witness, the testimonies offered by the witnesses for the prosecution are regarded as
hearsay.

The decision of the trial court is reversed the appellant is hereby acquitted for the failure to prove his quilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

G.R. No. 140756 April 4, 2003 People v. Escote

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN GONZALES ESCOTE, JR. @ Jun Mantika of Sta. Lucia, Angat, Bulacan and VICTOR ACUYAN y OCHOVILLOS @ Vic Arroyo of
Sto. Niño, Poblacion, Bustos, Bulacan, accused-appellants.

Facts: Boarded on Five Star Passenger Bus accused-appellants Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan announced a hold up.
They were able to take the money and valuables of the passengers. In the process they also killed SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr. thus they
are charged with Robbery with homicide. Barely a month thereafter the incident accused Juan Gonzales Escote was apprehended on
a checkpoint for representing himself as a police using the identification of SPO1Manio. In the course of the investigation, Juan
admitted to the police investigators that he and Victor, alias Victor Arroyo, staged the robbery on board Five Star Bus and are
responsible for the death of SPO1Manio, Jr. On the strength of a warrant of arrest, the police officers was able to arrest Victor. On
the trial the driver of the bus positively identified them along with other witnesses. The trial court rendered its Decision judgment
finding Juan and Victor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

ISSUE: whether or not the accused were denied to exercise their right to cross examine the witness

Ruling: No, they were not denied of the right to exercise their right to cross examine the witness.

There is no factual and legal basis for their claim that they were illegally deprived of their constitutional and statutory right
to fully cross-examine Rodolfo. The Court agrees that the right to cross-examine is a constitutional right anchored on due process. It
is a statutory right found in Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that the accused has the
right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. However, the right has always been understood as
requiring not necessarily an actual cross-examination but merely an opportunity to exercise the right to cross-examine if
desired.What is proscribed by statutory norm and jurisprudential precept is the absence of the opportunity to cross-examine. The
right is a personal one and may be waived expressly or impliedly. There is an implied waiver when the party was given the
opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to
himself alone. If by his actuations, the accused lost his opportunity to cross-examine wholly or in part the witnesses against him, his
right to cross-examine is impliedly waived. The testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to
remain in the record.

According to the records of the case they were given the opportunity to cross examine the witness only that their counsel
failed to finish it, though they’ve requested the witness to show up in court it was the accused themselves who failed to show up as
well as their counsel and for that the court considered the absence of their counsel as a waiver of their right to cross examine the
witness. Juan and Victor did not even file any motion to reopen the case before the trial court rendered its decision to allow them
to cross-examine Rodolfo. They remained mute after judgment was rendered against them by the trial court. Neither did they file
any petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals for the nullification of the Order of the trial court dated January 20, 1998
declaring that they had waived their right to cross-examine Rodolfo. It was only on appeal to this Court that Juan and Victor
averred for the first time that they were deprived of their right to cross-examine Rodolfo. It is now too late in the day for Juan
and Victor to do so. The doctrine of estoppel states that if one maintains silence when in conscience he ought to speak, equity will
debar him from speaking when in conscience he ought to remain silent. He who remains silent when he ought to speak cannot be
heard to speak when he should be silent. The Court held in Fulgado vs. Court of Appeals, et al:
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xxx

The task of recalling a witness for cross examination is, in law, imposed on the party who wishes to exercise said right.
This is so because the right, being personal and waivable, the intention to utilize it must be expressed. Silence or failure
to assert it on time amounts to a renunciation thereof. Thus, it should be the counsel for the opposing party who should
move to cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses. It is absurd for the plaintiff himself to ask the court to schedule the cross-
examination of his own witnesses because it is not his obligation to ensure that his deponents are cross-examined.
Having presented his witnesses, the burden shifts to his opponent who must now make the appropriate move. Indeed,
the rule of placing the burden of the case on plaintiff's shoulders can be construed to extremes as what happened in the
instant proceedings.

The trial courts decision was affirmed and both men are sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

RIGHT TO SECURE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESS/COMPULSORY PROCESS

G.R. No. 128280 April 4, 2001 People vs Chua

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALICIA A. CHUA, accused-appellant.

Facts:

Several criminal case was filed against Alicia Chua for illegal recruitment. She represented himself as having the authority to
employ DOMINGO F. TERCENIO, MARTIN B. BERMEJO, EVANGELINE F. GAVINA, DANTE F. BALUIS, EDUARD V. ESTILLER, EDGAR B.
ABONAL, VIOLETA F. REGALADO, GLORIA J. RICAFRENTE and LONITO F. BALUIS abroad without securing a license in the Department
of Labor. After requiring each of them to pay a placement fee of P15,000.00 each, to secure NBI clearances and to undergo medical
examinations, she would go in hiding. When they inquired to the POEA about accused Chua's activities, the POEA issued a
certification that accused Chua was not licensed to recruit persons/workers for overseas employment. She was found guilty to all the
case filed against her except to that filed by EDGAR B. ABONAL for failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was the denial of her constitutional right to compulsory process.

Ruling:

No, the accused was not denied of her constitutional right to compulsory process.

The 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expanded the right to compulsory process which now includes the right to secure the
production of evidence in one's behalf.By analogy, U.S. vs. Ramirezwhich laid down the requisites for compelling the attendance of
witnesses, may be applied to this expanded concept. Thus, the movant must show: (a) that the evidence is really material; (b) that
he is not guilty of neglect in previously obtaining the production of such evidence; (c) that the evidence will be available at the time
desired; and (d) that no similar evidence could be obtained.

In the case at bar, the trial court correctly denied appellant's motion for the production of the records which were the basis
in issuing the POEA Certification dated February 3, 1994, as the same would not in any way alter the undisputed fact that appellant
was not issued a license until then. She cannot invoke for the retroactivity of the approval of her application for a service contractor
authority. The law specifically provides that "every license shall be valid for at least two (2) years from the date of issuance unless
sooner cancelled or revoked by the Secretary.

The trial courts decision is hereby affirmed in toto.