TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO v.

LUZ, GLICERIA AND CORNELIO MOLO

Facts:
Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of Pasay, province of Rizal,
without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or ascending line. He was survived,
however, by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces and
nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the
legitimate children of Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator. Mariano Molo
y Legaspi left two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918 and another executed on June 20, 1939.
On February 7, 1941, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
petition, seeking the probate of the will executed by the deceased on June 20, 1939. There being
no opposition, the will was probated. However, upon petition filed by the herein oppositors, the
order of the court admitting the will to probate was set aside and the case was reopened. After
hearing, at which both parties presented their evidence, the court rendered decision denying the
probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the same was executed
in accordance with law.
In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, the widow on February 24,
1944, filed another petition for the probate of the will executed by the deceased on August 17,
1918, in the same court. Again, the same oppositors filed an opposition to the petition based on
three grounds: (1) that petitioner is now estopped from seeking the probate of the will of 1918;
(2) that said will has not been executed in the manner required by law and (3) that the will has
been subsequently revoked.
Issues:
1. Was Molo’s will of 1918 subsequently revoked by his will of 1939?
2. Assuming that the destruction of the earlier will was but the necessary consequence of
the testator’s belief that the revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will was valid
and the latter would be given effect, can the earlier will be admitted to probate?
Doctrines:
1. NO. In the case of Samson vs. Naval, the court laid down the doctrine that “a subsequent
will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason
that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the
previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void.”

Although American authorities on the subject have a pool of conflicting opinions perhaps because
of the peculiar provisions contained in the statutes adopted by each State in the subject of
revocation of wills, the court is of the impression from a review and the study of the pertinent
authorities that the doctrine laid down in the Samson case is still a good law.
2. YES. The earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of “dependent
relative revocation”. The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose validity
the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition,
and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at some
time a will in the place of that destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It
must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new will.
 3. Guevara v. Guevara
G.R. No. L-48840, 29 December 1943, 74:479

FACTS:

It appears that on August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a will, apparently with all the
formalities of the law. On September 27, 1933, he died. His last will and testament, however, was
never presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever been instituted
for the settlement of his estate. Ever since the death of Victorino L. Guevara, his only legitimate son
Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed the land adjudicated to him in the registration
proceeding and to have disposed of various portions thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left
by his father.

In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father’s last will and testament in her
custody, presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only to prove that
the deceased Victirino L. Guevara had acknowledged her as his natural daughter. Upon that proof of
acknowledgment she claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on the theory or assumption
that he died intestate, because the will had not been probated, for which reason, she asserted, the
betterment therein made by the testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be
disregarded. Both the trial court and the Court of appeals sustained that theory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not probate is necessary for Rosario to be able to claim her legitime as an acknowledged
natural daughter.

RULING:

In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present litigants had
received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence and of the provisions
of the will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be obliterated on
account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the court for probate.

Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity and due
execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with that
will without first securing its allowance or probate by the court, first, because the law expressly provides
that “no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper
court”; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed
with the substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public
policy designed to effectuate the testator’s right to dispose of his property by will in accordance with
law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means provided by law,
among which are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees.
Nor may the court approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such an action for partition,
which is one in personam, any more than it could decree the registration under the Torrens system of
the land involved in an ordinary action for reinvindicacion or partition.
ATILANO G. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. ALFONSO SANTOS, Judge of First Instance of
Pampanga, and IÑIGO S. DAZA, Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga, respondents. ROSARIO BASA
DE LEON ET AL., intervenors.

1.WlLLS; CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE DUE EXECUTION OF A PROBATED WILL.—Section 625 of

the Code of Civil Procedure is explicit as to the conclusiveness of the due execution of a probated will.
It provides: "No will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the
Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of
real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution."

2.ID.; ID.—The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof is considered as
conclusive as to its due exeeution and validity, and is also conclusive that the testator was of sound
and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will, and was not acting under duress, menace,
fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is genuine and not a forgery.

3.ID.; ID.; PROCEEDING "IN REM".—The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem.
The provision of notice by publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice
to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody,
even against the State.

4.ID.; ID.; CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTTON.—Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law
makes so peremptory that it will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong.
The will in question having been probated by a competent court the law -will not admit any proof to
overthrow the legal presumption that it is genuine and not a forgery.

5.ID.; ID.; CRIMINAL ACTION AGAINST FORGER OF A DULY PROBATED WILL.—Upon the facts
stated in the opinion of the court, it was held: That in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333 and
625 of the Code of Civil Procedure, criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the forger of a
will which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent Jurisdiction. 6.CRIMINAL LAW;
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.—The prosecution of offenses is a
matter of public interest and it is the duty of the government or those acting in its behalf to prosecute
all cases to their termination without oppressive, capricious and vexatious delay. The Constitution
does not say that the right to a speedy trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for crime is
commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases com-menced
by private individuals. Where once a person is prose-cuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial,
irrespective of the Nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be commenced. In
any event, even the actuations of the fiscal himself to this case is not entirely free from criticism. 7.ID.;
ID.; ID.—In Kalaw vs. Apostol (G. R. No. 45591, Oct. 15, 1937), the Supreme Court observed that the
prosecuting officer is in charge and has under the direction and control all prosecutions for public
offenses (secs. 1681 and 2465 of the Rev. Adm. Code), and that it is his duty to see that criminal
cases are beard without vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays so that the courts of justice may
dispose of them on the merits and determine whether the accused is guilty or not. This is as clear an
admonition as could be made. An accused person is entitled to a trial at -the earliest opportunity.
(Sutherland on the Constitution, 664; United States vs. Fox, 3 Mont., 512.) He cannot be oppressed
by delaying the commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings pending
trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed. 8.ID.; ID.; ID.—it is not to be supposed, of
course, that the Constitution intends to remove from the prosecution every reasonable opportunity to
prepare for trial. Impossibilities cannot be expected or extraordinary efforts required on the part of the
prosecutor or the court. As stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, "The right of a speedy
trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures
rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice." (beavers vs. Haubert [1905],
198 U. S., 86; 25 S. Ct, 573; 49 Law. ed., 950, 954.) Mercado vs. Santos and Daza, 66 Phil. 215, No.
45629 September 22, 1938

FACTS:

• [May 28, 1931] Petitioner Antilano Mercado filed a petition for the probate of the will of his deceased
wife, Ines Basa, with the Pampanga CFI.

• [June 31, 1931] The will was admitted to probate. • [October 27, 1932] Intervenor Rosario Basa de
Leon filed with the justice of the peace court of San Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint against
Mercado for falsification/forgery of the will probated. Mercado was arrested. The complaint was
subsequently dismissed at the instance of de Leon herself. • [March 2, 1933] Same intervenor charged
Mercado with the same offense, this time in the justice of the peace court of Mexico, Pampanga.
Mercado was arrested again. The complaint was likewise dismissed, again at de Leon’s instance. •
[February 2, 1934] Same banana as on March 2, 1933. Upon due investigation, the case was
dismissed on the ground that the will alleged to have been falsified has already been probated and
that there was no evidence that Mercado had forged the signature of the testatrix but that, on the
contrary, satisfactory evidence was presented that established the authenticity of said signature. •
[April 11, 1934] Rosario Basa de Leon and other intervenors moved ex parte to reopen the probate
proceedings, alleging lack of jurisdiction to probate the will and to close the proceedings. This motion
was denied, having been filed ex parte. • [May 9, 1934] The provincial fiscal moved for reinvestigation
of the criminal case for forgery before the Pampanga CFI. The motion was granted, and for the fourth
time, Mercado was arrested. The reinvestigation dragged on for almost a year… • [May 24, 1934] A
second motion to reopen and close probate proceedings was filed, this time with notice to the adverse
party. Same was denied. • [February 18, 1935] … until the CFI ordered the forgery case to be tried on
the merits. • [July 26, 1935] Intervenors’ motion was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed
the probate court’s order of denial. • [c. 1936~37] Mercado moved to dismiss the case, claiming again
that the will alleged to have been forged had already been probated and, further, that the order
probating the will is conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution thereof. The CFI overruled the
motion. Mercado thus filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals,
which promptly denied same. • HENCE, THIS PETITION.

ISSUE:

1. WON the probate of Ines Basa’s will is a bar to Mercado’s criminal prosecution for the alleged
forgery of said will.

RULING:

• Applicable law: Code of Civil Procedure (then governing the law on wills) • Sec. 306 provides, as re:
the effect of judgments: in case of a judgment/order in respect to the probate of a will, such
judgment/order is conclusive upon the the will. • Sec. 333 establishes an incontrovertible presumption
in favor of judgments declared by the Code to be conclusive. • Sec. 625 provides, as re:
conclusiveness of the due execution of a probate will: “… the allowance by the court of a will of real
and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution.” • Basis for PH law on wills (particularly
Sec. 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure) — Statutes of [the US state of] Vermont. • Decisions of the
Supreme Court of Vermont re: effect of probate of a will are of persuasive authority in PH. • Says the
Vermont SC in Missionary Society vs. Eells: “The probate of a will by the probate court having
jurisdiction thereof, upon the due notice, is conclusive as to its due execution against the whole world.”
• In view of the provisions of Secs. 306, 333 and 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a criminal action
will not lie against the forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent
jurisdiction. Disposition: Mercado is entitled to have the criminal proceedings against him quashed;
CA judgment is reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Nuguid v. Nuguid
G.R. No. L-23445, 23 June 1966, 17 SCRA 449

FACTS:

Petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on
November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to
probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.

On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother
of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor is
that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors —
who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and
that in consequence the institution is void.

RTC ruled the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of
the deceased Rosario Nuguid” and dismissed the petition on the ground of

ISSUE:

Whether there is preterition

HELD:

Yes. Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited.” Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving
any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. The will here does not
explicitly disinherit the testatrix’s parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said
will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer
from preterition.

On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of
disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, “shall annul the institution of
heir”. This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in
the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such
disinheritance shall also “annul the institution of heirs”, put only “insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited”, which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. Better stated yet, in
disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been
illegally deprived.
Nepomuceno v. CA
139 SCRA 206

FACTS:
Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last Will and Testament before he died. Petitioner
was named as sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will that he was legally married to a certain
Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, but he had been estranged from his
lawful wife. In fact, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner were married despite the
subsisting first marriage. The testator devised the free portion of his estate to petitioner. On
August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for probate. On May 13, 1975, Rufina Gomez and
her children filed an opposition alleging undue and improper influence on the part of the
petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and
that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator.
The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his
Will to cohabiting with the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA. On June 2, 1982, the respondent
court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will.
The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the
petitioner is null and void.

ISSUE:
W/N the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of
the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provision.

HELD:
No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly
drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor
of the petitioner null and void. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court’s area
of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule,
however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is
not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the
Will.
The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically
void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will
be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid)
The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be void: (1) Those made between
persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation; and Article 1028.
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to
testamentary provisions.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage
when Martin Jugo executed his Will. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because
the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living
in concubinage.
G.R. No. 4445 September 18, 1909 CATALINA BUGNAO, proponent-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO
UBAG, ET AL., contestantsappellants.

Facts: The instrument was propounded by his widow, Catalina Bugnao, the sole beneficiary
thereunder, and probate was contested by the appellants, who are brothers and sisters of the
deceased, and who would be entitled to share in the distribution of his estate, if probate were
denied, as it appears that the deceased left no heirs in the direct ascending or descending line.
Appellants contend that the evidence of record is not sufficient to establish the execution of the
alleged will in the manner and form prescribed in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and
that at the time when it is alleged that the will was executed, Ubag was not of sound mind and
memory, and was physically and mentally incapable of making a will.

Issue: Whether or not the testator was mentally capable of making the will

Held: Yes.

Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction which the
testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the person who
would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner
in which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty. The
testimony of the subscribing witnesses who swore positively that, at the time of its execution, he
was of sound mind and memory. It is true that their testimony discloses the fact that he was at
that time extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe intermittent
attacks of asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he needed assistance
even to rise himself to a sitting position; and that during the paroxysms of asthma to which he
was subject he could not speak; but all this evidence of physical weakness in no wise establishes
his mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the evidence of the
subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing the will, and his
clear recollection of the boundaries and physical description of the various parcels of land set out
therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to give to the person who wrote the will
clear and explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his property, is strong
evidence of his testamentary capacity
Revilla v CA (G.R. No. 95329)

Facts:
Don Cayetano Revilla, a bachelor, owned 2 pieces of land with buildings in Manila and 6 parcels
of land in his hometown in Bulacan. These properties are worth P30M. In 1978, he executed a
13-page last will and testament, bequeathing all his properties to his 9 nephews and nieces
including petitioner, Heracio Revilla. To each, he gave 1/10 of his estate reserving the last tenth
for masses to be said after his death and for the care of religious images he kept in a chapel in
Bulacan.
During his lifetime, Don Cayetano sought the probate of his will to which the CFI Manila admitted.
However, the City Hall of Manila was burned by fire where the records were also burned. A
petition for reconstitution of the records was filed and it was granted.
After Don Cayetano died, Heracio Revilla filed another petition of a will wherein he instituted
Heracio as sole heir of his uncle’s estate and executor of the will allegedly executed in 1982. The
probate was opposed by Heracio’s 8 brothers and sisters on the grounds that:
- Since 1978 up to Cayetano’s death, he never informed that he revoked the will executed in
1978
- The 1982 will was not executed in accordance with law and the signature of Cayetano was
different from his usual and customary signature
- Cayetano was of unsound mind when he executed the will
- That the alleged will was executed with undue pressure and influence
- That the 1978 will is void for the reason that it was executed under duress or the influence
of fear or threats
- Cayetano acted by mistake and the signatures in the alleged will were procured by fraud and
he did not intend that the instrument be his will at the time of fixing his signature
The trial court disallowed the second will. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in disallowing the second will.

Held:
When Don Cayetano testified in the reconstitution proceedings, he was unaware of the second
will which he supposedly made. He identified his first will and declared that it was his true and
only will. He could not have executed a second will because he was sick in the hospital during
that time (he stayed there for 2 months) and he could not sign any papers while he was confined
in the hospital.
During the reconstitution proceedings, the will was produced. It was placed in a browned
envelope stating “Buksan ito pagkalibing ko” to which Cayetano agreed to open. He recognized
the original will and acknowledged that he signed it. In the court records, Cayetano declared that
he did not execute another last will and testament after the original will had been probated.
Significantly, although the petitioner opposed the reconstitution of Don Cayetano's first will, he
did not reveal the second will which Don Cayetano supposedly made only 2months before he
testified in the reconstitution proceeding. If the second will already existed on November 27,
1982, it would have been Heracio's strongest argument against the reconstitution of the probate
of the first will.

Since the execution of the second will could not have occurred on the alleged date (September
13, 1982) appearing therein (for Don Cayetano was admittedly sick in the hospital then) it must
have been procured at the time when the testator was a virtual prisoner, held incommunicado,
in his house. Judge Eduardo Bengson had to issue an order commanding the petitioner to allow
his 8 brothers and sisters to visit Don Cayetano. Only then were they able to penetrate the iron
curtain that Heracio had placed around their uncle. A videotape, taken during their visit and
shown in court, belied Heracio's allegation that Don Cayetano was displeased with his said
nephews and nieces, that was why he left them out of his second will.

Despite Judge Bengzon's order, Heracio did not cease his efforts to monopolize Don Cayetano
and his estate. To isolate Don Cayetano and make him inacessible to the private respondents,
Heracio transferred him from his own house in Manila to Heracio's house in Quezon City.
The execution of the second will in an environment of secrecy and seclusion and the
disinheritance of his 8 other nephews and nieces, justified the trial court's and the Court of
Appeals' belief that undue influence was exercised by Horacio over Don Cayetano to make him
sign the second will (which Don Cayetano did not know to be such) in order to deprive his
brothers and sisters of their rightful share in their uncle's estate.

There was fraud because Don Cayetano was not apprised that the document he was signing with
Co, Barredo and Lim ( as witnesses) was a second will revoking the dispositions of property that
he made in his first will. Had he been aware that it was a second will, and if it were prepared at
his own behest, he would not have denied that he made it. He would probably have caused it to
be probated while he was still alive, as he did with his first will. But apparently, the instrument
was foisted on him without his being aware of its true nature which the petitioner assiduously
concealed, not only from the court and the private respondents, but from Don Cayetano himself.
That the dispositions in the second will were not made by Don Cayetano is proven by the omission
of Don Cayetano's reservation of one-tenth of his properties and the income thereof to pay for
holy masses and to be spent for the maintenance of his family chapel. That provision in his first
will, for his personal benefit, would not have been deleted by Don Cayetano if his only purpose
in making a second will was to disinherit his nephews and nieces. But Heracio overdid himself.
He wanted everything.

*Assuming for the sake of arguments that the second will was executed, the testimonies of the
notary public, as well as those of the three (3) instrumental witnesses were not given credit
because of major contradictions in testimonies.