Answer to a “Salafi” Brother

By Imam Zaid on 24 November 2007

Category: Ideology

Recently, while attending a gathering of Muslims that was

otherwise characterized by brotherly love and goodwill, I was
hounded by a “Salafi” who angrily demanded that I answer his
questions, to “qualify my position.” To me this was a sad and
pathetic episode. I am not one to get caught up in what is
usually a counterproductive endeavor, because it likely leads to
a series of bitter responses and refutations, and wastes
valuable time a Muslim should be spending to do righteous
deeds for the benefit of his or her soul.

However, having promised to answer the brother, I will briefly

respond. I pray that Allah makes these lines beneficial. I am
traveling and answering from my head so a few minor mistakes
might appear, please forgive me for those.

Q: What do you say about Ibn Taymiyya?

A: Ibn Taymiyya , may Allah have mercy on him, was a pious

man, a great scholar, and a prolific writer. Most of his career
was spent in Damascus. He was a staunch defender of the
Hanbali approach in creed (‘Aqida), an approach based on a
reliance on the transmitted evidence of the Qur’an and Sunnah
to establish and defend theological positions. Although he was
himself a Hanbali, he differed from the mainstream of the
school in many issues related to creed and jurisprudence. For
example, despite the Hanbalis’ staunch condemnation of
speculative theology (‘Ilm al-Kalam) Ibn Taymiyya was a fervent
Mutakallim, or speculative theologian, as is evidence in his
Fatawa and many of his treatises such as Minhaj as-Sunnah.

His defenders claim that he only studied and employed the

language of the speculative theologians, the logicians and
others to refute his opponents. However, this is the exact
argument of those he condemns for employing the language
and analytical framework of the philosophers, such as the
Mu’tazila and the Ash’aris. They argued that they were only
employing the language of their opponents to effectively refute
them. His deep involvement in speculative theology drew
strong condemnation from many of his fellow Hanbalis.

Ibn Taymiyya’s theology contained many deviations from the

agreed upon theological positions of the Sunni Muslims. For
example in his critique of Ibn Hazm’s work, Naqd Maratib
al-‘Ijma (Critique of the Levels of Consensus), he mentions that
the Throne, and implies that other created things, have a
preexisting eternal nature, something all Muslims have held to
be an attribute of Allah alone.

He also insisted on “constituting” the Divine as a physical body,

by emphasizing the reality (Haqiqiyya) of his various attributes,
along with an insistence on physical boundaries to contain and
define his essence, to such an exaggerated extent that one
would be led to envision Him (Allah) as resembling His creation,
in violation of the fundamental rule governing our
understanding of those attributes, Laysa Kamithlihi Shay’un
(There is nothing like unto Him) (Qur’an 42:11). For these and
other innovations in ‘Aqida, Ibn Taymiyya was strongly
condemned by many of the scholars his time and imprisoned
several times to force his repentance.

He also differed from the consensus of the Sunni scholars on

legal issues. An example would be his ruling that three
simultaneously-issued divorce pronouncements constituted a
single revocable divorce. On these and similar matters he
contravened the established consensus of the Sunni Muslims.
Such legal verdicts only add to the controversial nature of Ibn
Taymiyya.

The problem with taking Ibn Taymiyya as the standard for

judging the correctness of the creed of the Muslims is that he is
an extremely controversial figure, who himself was condemned
and tried by the scholars of his age for what they viewed as
defective ‘Aqida. As ‘Aqida is based on clearly understood,
communally transmitted (Mutawatir) texts and positions, the
controversial nature of many of his positions and decrees
indicates his deviation from that which has been communally
transmitted. As a result, by accepting many of his positions, we
are implicitly forced to condemn multitudes Muslims to Hell.
This would include those who lived in the generations who
preceded him, including many of the Salaf. This is a dangerous
and untenable position.

We are enjoined to have a good opinion of all Muslims; owing to

the power of La ilaha Illa Allah Muhammad Rasulullah therefore
I pray that Ibn Taymiyya repented from anything that would
jeopardize his salvation. May Allah reward Ibn Taymiyya for his
good, forgive and overlook his wrong, and accept his
repentance.

Q: What does Tariqa mean?

A: A Tariqa is generally understood by the people of Tasawwuf

to mean an organized brotherhood (whose members usually
include women) dedicated to pursuing a systematic path of
spiritual growth and excellence, based on an emphasis on
certain religious practices, under the direction of a qualified
scholar—Sheikh. For example, some Tariqas may emphasize
Qur’an, others Dhikr, others taking the strictest opinions in
matters of worship (‘Azima), others may emphasize voluntary
prayer, fasting, silence, etc.

Tariqas arose because their advocates felt that people were

drifting away from the essence of Islam, which in their view was
the systematic refinement of the human soul (an-Nafs), to rid it
of its vices and imperfections, thereby removing the barriers
preventing it from the attainment of Paradise. This refinement
was a movement away from the Qur’anic state described as the
Nafs Ammara bis-Su’ (soul urging vileness—Qur’an 12:53),
towards the Nafs Mutma’inna (contended soul—Qur’an 89:27).

Tariqas are an institutional development that occurs late in

Islamic history. Like all institutions introduced for the intended
benefit of the Muslims i.e. orphanages, Qur’an schools,
universities, etc., Tariqas can be in conformity with the dictates
of the divine law and therefore, religiously praiseworthy; or
they can contravene the divine law, and therefore, be
religiously condemnable. This is the nature of all significant
human institutions.

Certain factors led to the rise and popularity of Tariqas during

the centuries they were widespread. Similarly, many factors
such as the advent of the secular state in most Muslim lands,
and the spread of fundamentalist thought has led to a great
reduction in the number and influence of Tariqas
contemporarily.

A question closely associated with the one under discussion

would be, “Is it religiously mandatory for a Muslim to belong to
a Tariqa, or more specifically to take a Sheikh as a spiritual
guide?” This is a question that has occupied many scholars
during the latter period of Islam. The great scholar, Imam Ash-
Shatibi, the author of al-‘Itisam, one of the greatest treatises
outlining what constitutes acceptable and blameworthy
innovations, issued a formal written inquiry to the scholars of
the Islamic realm during his lifetime asking this very question.
Dar al-Fikr al-Mu’asir has published the responses to his
question by Ibn Khaldun, and Ibn ‘Abbad ar-Rundi, two of the
greatest scholars of that day, in a book entitled Shifa’ as-Sa’il.

Many scholars say is that a person does not have to have a

Sheikh, or implicitly belong to a Tariqa, to mature spiritually.
They maintain that a regimen of Qur’an recitation, dhikr, night
prayer, and voluntary fasting is sufficient to ensure a believer’s
spiritual progress. They hold the idea of taking a Sheikh as a
spiritual guide to be a blameworthy innovation. Others opine
that if that person is unable to make spiritual progress on his
own he must find a guide who can assist him. Otherwise, a lack
of sincerity (Ikhlas) in his worship, the possession of
blameworthy character traits such as lying, backbiting, a bad
opinion of others, etc., and dying with an diseased heart will
make one’s attainment of Paradise problematic. They see the
assistance of a Sheikh as being absolutely essential for the
attainment of one of the great objectives of the divine law. Both
sides usher their proofs and advance their arguments. One of
the most powerful arguments for having a Sheikh is advanced
by Ibn ‘Abbad Ar-Rhundi in his response to Imam ash-Shatibi’s
inquiry, and one of the most eloquent arguments against the
incumbency of having a Sheikh is made by Sheikh Abdul Fattah
Abu Ghuddah in his introduction to Imam al-Muhasibi’s, Risala
al-Mustarshideen.

I say that if a person is able to mature spiritually and be upright

in his religion without a formal affiliation to a Tariqa or a Sheikh,
in his case that is closer to intent and spirit of the divine law.
However, if one is unable to do so and can find a Tariqa and a
Sheikh who are committed to the Qur’an, Sunnah, and adhere
strictly to the divine law, in his case involvement with the
Tariqa and following the guidance of the Sheikh are closer to
the intent and spirit of the divine law. Surely, Allah knows best.

Q: What is your position of the Hadith of the Seventy-three

sects?

A: This Hadith is a warning against sectarianism. The

mentioning of seventy-three, although generally meaning a
large number, is understood literally by some scholars who in
their books of heresies try to meticulously delineate seventy-
three sects among the Muslims. As far as using this Hadith to
exclaim the virtue of one group of the Muslims over others, by
the exclaiming group declaring themselves to be the only ones
upon that which the Prophet, peace upon him, and his
companions were on, this is a vain exercise in that proves
absolutely nothing.

In ‘Aqida, all groups can point out with strong arguments the
“innovations” of their opponents. Anyone believing otherwise is
unfamiliar with the intellectual history of the Muslim
community. In worship, even if someone were absolute certain
that they are doing everything exactly as the Prophet, peace
upon him, and his companions, he does not know if his internal
state matches theirs and therefore he does not know if any of
his acts are accepted by Allah. For example, when the verse,
Rather, Allah only accepts from the righteous (5:27) was
revealed, many of the companions were deeply shaken for they
would never assume that they were among the righteous. This
humble spirit was an essential part of their religion, which is
severely lacking in many of those who use the hadith of the
seventy-three sects to proclaim themselves the saved sect (al-
Firqa an-Najiya) while condemning others to Hell.

Speaking of humility, one of the things that the Prophet, peace

upon him, and his companions were on in their religion was
humility. This is an integral aspect of the religion, as affirmed by
the Hadith of Hudhayfa, may Allah be pleased with him, “The
first knowledge to be lost from the religion is humility
(Khushu’).” The assumption of many of those who use the
hadith in questions to proclaim their salvation while
condemning other Muslims to Hell is an indication that they
may be lacking in Khushu’, and therefore are not on, in their
religion, what the Prophet, peace upon him, and his
companions were on.

One of the greatest tribulations Allah can afflict a servant with

is to preoccupy him with the faults of others, and blind him to
his own faults. While he points out what he perceives to be the
flaws of other’s religion and beliefs, he neglects his own and
therefore meets Allah with his own faults unchecked. In my
opinion, this Hadith is one of the means that is contemporarily
used to do just that. Surely, Allah knows best.

Q: What do you say about the Ash’aris?

A: Any comment on the “Ash’aris” has to be prefaced by

mentioning the fact that the term Ash’ari is extremely broad,
and encompasses a lot of historically relevant nuances that are
missed by the average Muslim, and by most of those who issue
blanket condemnations of the “Ash’aris.” For example the
Ash’arism of the Abu’l Hasan al-Ash’ari of al-Lum’a differs from
the Ash’arism of the Abu’l Hasan al-Ash’ari of al-Ibana. The
Ash’arism of Ibn Fawrak differs from the Ash’arism of Imam al-
Bayhaqi. The Ash’arism of Imam al-Qushayri—who affirmed the
20 essential Attributes of God that constitute the basis of the
Ash’ari refutation of the Mu’tazila, and also affirmed all of the
names and attributes of Allah conveyed by valid texts, a caveat
that has become the basis for one of the Salafi critiques of the
Ash’aris—differs from the Ash’arism” of al-Baqqalani, whose
“Ash’arism” in turn differs from that of latter day scholars such
as Imam al-Bayjuri. These wide differences have to be known
and understood before one can profitably begin speaking of the
Ash’aris. Ash’arism also has its own internal critics. For
example, no one has more effectively critiqued the Ash’aris, on
certain points, than Imam Al-Ghazali.

Another issue that has to be understood is that Ash’arism has

always seen itself as an intellectual defense of the beliefs of
Ahli’s Sunnah. To understand its more philosophical arguments,
one has to be thoroughly conversant with both neo-Platonic
philosophy and Aristotelian logic. To attempt to understand the
historical evolution of Ash’arism without those intellectual
prerequisites is an exercise in futility that will inevitable lead to
inaccurate conclusions.

As far as the basic principles that unite Ash’aris, two have

primacy. The first is that revelation can be affirmed by intellect,
but when there is an irreconcilable conflict between the two,
revelation has to be given primacy. This is a conclusion
substantiated by the Qur’an and Hadith and has provided the
basis for the Ash’aris both beating back the intellectual
challenge of various sects such as the Mu’tazila, the Isma’ilis
and others, while affirming the integrity of divine revelation.

The second is that Allah is transcendent above any likeness.

This principle is also rooted in the text of the Qur’an and the
Sunnah. That transcendence has been articulated with the aid
of two processes. One is by deputing unto Allah the knowledge
of any text whose superficial understanding might imply
drawing a likeness between Allah and His creation. This is
known as Tafwid. The second is interpreting such a text in a
way that is supported by its linguistic meaning, while warding
off the ability to draw any likeness unto Allah. This is known as
Ta’wil.

Contemporarily, there is a concerted effort to demonstrate that

Tafwid was not a valid interpretive approach known among the
early generations of Muslims. Rather, their school was more
accurately defined as Taslim, or submission to the literal
meaning of the text. Delving into the specifics of that
discussion is beyond what has been asked here. However,
distinguishing between Tafwid and Taslim is an issue I am
mindful of and perhaps could discuss in another context.

Some of the particular instances relating to how these two

principles (Tafwid and Ta’wil) actually were articulated
throughout history are debatable. But the principles themselves
were the unifying universals that provided the basis for the
evolution of Ash’arism into an identifiable intellectual school.
However, it is of little use for Muslims to become bogged down
in the condemnation or rejection of those particulars,
something very common in our day. Those particulars, while
conveying deep insights, such as al-Baqqalani’s atomic theory,
would be viewed as intellectual curiosities if introduced in
contemporary philosophical debate.
Similarly, it is of little use for students of sacred knowledge to
limit their studies of theological and philosophical issues to the
books of classical Ash’aris, such as Imam al-Jurjani’s
commentary on al-Iji’s al-Mawaqif. Although that text and
similar ones are of tremendous historical value, they do little to
prepare the student to engage in a high level philosophical
defense of Islam based on contemporary philosophical schools
of thought. He or she would be far more effective if they
mastered the basics of ‘Aqida, studied the foundations of
classical Greek philosophy, understood the arguments of the
Muslim philosophers, the Mu’tazila, Ash’aris, and others, and
then mastered contemporary philosophical schools and their
critiques with the objective of issuing a strong Islamic critique
of those schools.

This latter approach, in my view is Fard Kifayah, or a communal

obligation that must be undertaken by some members of the
community on behalf of the rest. Doing so will allow Muslims to
meaningfully engage in the deeper philosophical debates that
are shaping the intellectual landscape of our times. It will also
allow for the development of a body of literature that will
defend the faith from high level very sophisticated attacks that
are undermining the faith of some Muslims, many of whom
eventually leave Islam because they have no effective Muslim
responses to the philosophical and intellectual attacks being
directed at Islam.

Are the Ash’aris to be considered “deviants?” I think the best

answer to that question is provided by the Prophet, peace upon
him, himself. He said, “Constantinople will be conquered—what
an excellent army is that conquering army! And what an
excellent commander is its commander!” This hadith is related
by Imam Hakim in al-Mustadrak and is affirmed by Imam adh-
Dhahabi, which is a clear indication of its soundness (I am
aware of al-Albani’s rejection of this hadith. However, his
rejection does not negate Imam ad-Dhahabi’s affirmation). This
hadith is understood by the scholars to be a reference to
Muhammad al-Fatih, the great Turkish general. Hence, the
Prophet is praising an individual who is Ash’ari in creed, a
Qadiri Sufi, and an adherent to the Hanafi School of
jurisprudence, along with his army, most of whom had the
same affiliations. There can be no higher mark of approval for
the acceptability of Ash’arism, Tasawwuf (that is consistent with
the divine law), and adhering to a Madhhab. Surely, Allah
knows best.

In summary, I believe that collectively the Ash’aris have

defended Islamic beliefs against attacks from myriad directions,
and have provided the basis for the development of a stable
and unifying intellectual tradition. Hence, I have the utmost
respect for their work and their contribution to the Islamic
venture, and consider any innovations that their methodology
involved as praiseworthy innovations. However, some of their
particular arguments are debatable and others are no longer of
any efficacy in terms of contributing to meaningful Muslim
participation in contemporary intellectual and philosophical
discourse. The challenge for Muslims today is to take the
universals that guided the Ash’ari project and use them as the
basis for the articulation of particular arguments that are
relevant to our times.

This is what I have to say in response to these questions that

were advanced by the “Salafi” brother. I hope that they were
posed in sincerity as I have endeavored to answer with
sincerity. If he is looking for my answers to his questions I have
presented those answers. If he is looking for anything other
than that I depute the affair to Allah. In the end, surely He
knows best.

taken from :
http://www.newislamicdirections.com/nid/articles/answer_to_a_s
alafi_brother/