Progress in Development Studies 10, 1 (2010) pp.

19–34

Ã
Approaching development:
an opionated review
Christian Lund
International Development Studies, Department of Society and
Globalisation, Roskilde University, DK-4000 Roskilde, Denmark

Abstract: Development studies navigate between policy and social science; between directed
progress and change. However, the relative propinquity of social science and policy languages
sometimes masks the difference between the two. This article discusses the relationship between
development as social change and as a craft and argues for the necessity of recognizing their difference.
Moreover, as a social science, development studies also navigate between theoretical generalization
and descriptive particularism. By making a distinction between explanatory and heuristic frameworks,
development studies can be normalized as a science and thus able to study a contextual moving
target while drawing on a general or ‘grand theory’.

Key words: development theory, development practice, ‘grand theory’, heuristic framework,
inter-disciplinarity

‘Change’ is scientific, ‘progress’ is ethical; with development agencies and stakeholders,

Change is indubitable whereas progress is a
matter of controversy.
– Bertrand Russell, Unpopular Essays
I Introduction
Development is an elusive concept and con-
sequently development studies or develop-
ment theory is challenged on what constitutes
its subject matter, its objective, and its me-
thods. This is simultaneously a constant source
of frustration and an invitation to define it.
The present article does not pretend to be
an equilibrated compromise containing all
aspects of the discipline; it is a point of view
on how to navigate the challenges of the field
based on a review of the development studies
literature, as well as encounters and dealings
facing practical development problems, and
administrative and academic bureaucracies
attempting to organize efforts, each in their
own domain.
The article has a double ambition. Develop-
ment studies navigate between policy and
social science; between directed progress
and analysis of change, pure and simple. The
objectives have often been confused. It is
important, however, to clarify the distinction
and thereby ‘normalize’ development studies
as a social science in broad terms; not in the
Kuhnian sense of paradigm loyal and puzzle
solving, but in the sense of setting science apart
from policy (Kuhn, 1970). It is, I suggest, through
clarifying this distinction that constructive
dialogue between rigorous analysis and political

© 2010 SAGE Publications 10.1177/146499340901000102

20 Approaching development
action can be engaged. The second ambition is
to discuss and propose an analytical approach
to development or social change in developing
societies. The approach should be understood
in broad terms as a discussion of a series of
epistemological challenges one faces, willy-
nilly, when analyzing development. As such,
the text does not provide ‘how-to’ suggestions,
but rather ‘what-to-consider’ issues to consider
when working on a moving target in a changing
field. The idea is to provide some reflections
on how to observe theoretical and conceptual
rigour in the study of development and social
change and, at the same time, be open to
learning something new about the world, to
avoid sweeping theoretical generalization or
descriptive particularism.
II The field of development
There is no shortage of definitions of develop-
ment and, hence, the field of development
studies. The obvious interconnectedness of
significant societal processes makes me pre-
fer a fairly broad definition of development
processes as the reproduction and trans-
formation processes which somehow impinge
on inequality, impoverishment and human
insecurity.
1 Research priorities and research approach
For historical reasons, development studies
have focussed particularly on post-colonial and
other marginal societies and the international
factors that influence such societies (see
Baeck, 1998; Cooper and Packard, 1997; Leys,
1996; Sachs, 1999). Development studies no
longer pretend that such societies constitute
a homogeneous group, or that a single and
special theory or conceptual framework is suf-
ficient for an understanding of development
processes in such societies. Nor would it be
reasonable to consider development studies as
essentially an ‘area study’ either. Post-colonial
societies exhibit tremendous heterogeneity
in structure, dynamics and trajectories, and
adequate conceptual frameworks must gen-
erally be tailor made to yield the highest
Progress in Development Studies 10, 1 (2010) pp. 19–34
level of quality research. Moreover, the
dynamics of reproduction and transformation –
which impinge on inequality, impoverish-
ment and human insecurity – can be found in
societies all over the world, challenging the
conventional distinction between developed
and developing societies. It is not the area,
nor necessarily a colonial history which quali-
fies for development studies interest, but the
development processes as described above.
While the boundaries between various cat-
egories of societies have become fuzzy, the
development process remains particularly
relevant and significant in post-colonial and
historically marginal societies.
As in general for the social sciences, the
research priority is set by a particular concern –
social science itself cannot tell us whether an
issue is significant or not. This always depends
on the evaluative idea of the investigator, to
use Weber’s words (Weber, 1963: 388; also
see Jackson, 2006). The research approach,
on the other hand, should be critical of its own
assumptions and aim at achieving a high level
of inter-subjectivity. It should, in principle, be
possible for another researcher to analyse the
same phenomenon with the same concepts
and methods and arrive at the same results.
The research approach should not depend on
the researcher’s idiosyncrasies.
III Development as social change
and development as a craft
1 Two worlds – two concerns
A significant feature of social sciences, and
hence development studies, is that its object
changes and transforms over time. Contrary
to the natural sciences, the discovery of trans-
historical universal laws is not the ultimate
objective of the scholarly enterprise, but a more
historically circumscribed analysis of struc-
ture and process would appear to be the con-
cerns of the social sciences. Since the objective
of the social sciences is dynamic societal
change in the result of human industry, there is
an inherent tension between the social sciences

and policy; between ‘how things are’, and ‘how
they should be’. The relative propinquity of
social science and policy languages sometimes
masks the difference between the two. The
very word, development, has a positive con-
notation as desirable betterment and im-
provement of economic, social and political
conditions in general. However, it also has
a non-normative form suggesting societal
reproduction processes for better or for
worse.
As a consequence, researchers on the
one hand, and policy makers, operators and
practitioners, on the other, have a tendency
to speak at cross purposes because of rather
different notions of the concept of develop-
ment. One merely describes change. Here, we
could be dealing with issues such as increasing
monetization of land transactions, rural-urban
migration, politicization of religion, increased
scarcity of particular resources, and so on. In
this perspective, change is the result of the
actions of many actors, and development is the
amalgamated result of countless negotiations.
It is therefore quite difficult – if possible at
all – to attribute distinct agency to such
forms of change. We might term this ‘societal
development’. Development intervention,
on the other hand, is made up of targeted
efforts at improving certain conditions. It is,
for example, building infrastructure, improving
social conditions, refining and reinforcing
politico-legal institutions, and so on. In the
concept of development intervention, there
is distinct agency, there is a notion of target
and an ambition of purposive change, and it is
generally ‘instigated by institutions or actors
who do not belong to the milieu in question
but who seek to mobilize the milieu’ (Olivier de
Sardan, 2005: 25; also see Pieterse, 2001: 3).
Obviously, the distinction between societal
development and development intervention
only holds so far. In some situations, it is quite
difficult to establish who or what institution
‘does not belong’ to the milieu. But, more im-
portantly, the countless negotiations in societal
development may be propelled with as much
Progress in Development Studies 10, 1 (2010) pp. 19–34
Christian Lund 21
desire to improve conditions, notion of target
and ambition of change as development
intervention. Societal change set in motion
by social or political movements (workers, far-
mers, landless squatters, indigenous peoples,
nationalists, religious zealots, and so on) often
have at least as transformative a potential as
any intervention. But more or less engendered
change is not the point of this particular
distinction, the significant difference lies in two
sets of perspective, namely on either actions
that make up society or on specific efforts by
a government or its proxies to change it. This
also often entails a difference in the notion
of whether development has a particular
direction or not. The distinction between the
two notions of development may thus not be
theoretically satisfactory in the longer run,
but as two perspectives on change, they may
explain why communication between different
groups involved with development can be
disappointing.
2 The past and the future
While social science research is often pre-
occupied with questions of ‘what’ and ‘why’,
and the processes that determine this, the
operational side of development are often more
concerned with the questions of ‘how’ things
are done in a better way. This difference may
seem subtle, but it is quite crucial. Researchers
in social science basically deal with history up
until the present moment, practical operators,
on the other hand, deal with ‘history from now
on’. Obviously, research can be conducted in
view of the future, and practical development
should be undertaken with experience and
knowledge of the past. But they are two fun-
damentally different enterprises. The validity
of research depends on evidence, and while it
often is a challenge to access evidence from
the past, it is nothing against the impossibility
of sampling it from the future. If there is no
evidence, and/or if there is no data, it hardly
qualifies as research. Ideas about how a
policy will work, how a development could
unfold, and how a conflict might intensify is
22 Approaching development
guesswork. Possibly intelligent and informed
guesswork, but guesswork still. It cannot be
assessed by normal standards of research be-
cause there is no evidence to hold up against
interpretations and analyses. The validity of the
operational side of development comes from a
different corner. The validity of a development
operation is that it engenders change – possibly
along desired lines – and enables the operator
to formulate new imaginative ideas about
how to move from here. The purpose may
not be to reach an ‘ideal state’ in one move,
but to improve things sufficiently to be able
to reiterate the undertaking (see Hirschman,
1967).
Social science researchers develop certain
reflexes of the trade where social criticism
and scepticism about progress are prominent.
They seem to develop a certain professional
pessimism. Development policy makers and
operators also develop certain reflexes of their
trade. However, these are more constructive,
forward looking and aim at betterment. Policy
makers and operators seem therefore to develop
a certain professional optimism. In a caricatured
way, both groups are prone to develop images
of each other: To the researcher, the operator
may be vain, and naïve as the target set out in
plans is missed; to the operator, on the other
hand, the researcher may well be independent
but equally insignificant and of little proper
use (see Chambers, 1983; Ferguson, 1997;
Hobart 1993; Long, 2001). Segregation of
the two perspectives on development some-
times seems a tempting option, not to bother
about practical questions of intervention if
you are a researcher, and not to worry about
theoretical and conceptual hair-splitting if you
are a practitioner. However, this is not really an
option. First, while development intervention
is only part of a greater picture, in some
societies, it is not a marginal phenomenon at all,
wherefore it deserves the increased systematic
and critical inquiry. Second, scientific concepts
migrate into the realm of planned intervention
with consequence (see Corbridge, 2007: 200).
Let us look at development intervention as a
research object first.
Progress in Development Studies 10, 1 (2010) pp. 19–34
3 Development as a research object
While societal change is broader and more
encompassing than development intervention,
in some parts of the world, the latter is so sig-
nificant a practice in the form of development
aid, and macro-economic and political con-
ditionality, that it must constitute a primary
object of empirical research and theoretical
concern. Conspicuously so in Africa where
the development ‘industry’ with international
aid agencies and national and international
NGOs is very significant in shaping the pol-
itical scene, government institutions and the
practice of social actors. In such societies, aid
and aid agencies’ – ‘specific efforts to change
society’ – are actually so comprehensive
that they shape society in a significant, yet
often un-intended, way. In other parts of the
world, subtler but equally comprehensive
effects of development intervention in terms
of treaties and conventions on trade and
worker’s mobility, and so on, are also no longer
epi-phenomena in the general development
of society. Development intervention then
ceases to be a mere technical operation with
the character of a craft which can be carried
out with more or less competence, quality
and experience; it also becomes an object of
scientific concern. Hence, the same operation
becomes the object of ‘tool-perfection’, on
the one hand, and more fundamental critical
investigation, on the other. ‘Tool-perfection’
literature abounds. It ranges from project
management and planning handbooks for
different sectors, such as water, sanitation,
health, education, budgeting and participa-
tion, and so on, to analyses of policy. For ex-
ample, research edited by Black and White
(2004) investigates a broad set of policies aimed
at achieving the Millennium Development
Goals set by the United Nations. This is not
‘tool-perfection’ in the narrowest sense,
but still focuses on the effectiveness of specific
policies. I shall here leave aside tool perfection
and focus briefly on critical development re-
search on development intervention.

This research actually covers almost all
disciplines from economics over political
science to sociology, geography, law and an-
thropology. What makes this form of research
critical regardless of discipline is, I guess, that
it investigates the effects of development
intervention beyond what was intended.
That is, this research goes beyond merely
checking whether an intervention met targets
or not. It takes a more comprehensive look
at effects – intended or not. In short, one
could say that it also looks at the effects of
the effects. On the macro scale, some of the
neo-classical economists represent not only a
scepticism against development intervention
but also mistrust against all forms of state
intervention in industrial activities and trade
(Lal, 1983, here from Degnbol-Martinussen,
1997: 263). Lal’s empirical studies from the
1960s and 1970s convinced him that inter-
vention in the economy had distorted and
stifled it rather than promoted growth. This
made him sceptical about government inter-
vention in general. More recent research
points to examples from Southeast Asia
where government intervention vis-à-vis the
institutional framework for economic activity,
rather than engineering the activity itself, may
indeed promote growth and development (see,
for example, Lauridsen, 2002). Similarly, on the
larger scale, critical research on the institutional
outcomes of development policies have offered
analyses of how the pursuit of policies for the
promotion of democracy and good governance
or for poverty reduction – worthy causes
all – have had rather insidious consequences
on political institutions and their practice.
Abrahamsen (2000) thus demonstrates how
externally induced policies of democratization
and good governance make governments more
accountable to donors than to their popu-
lations, and how this results in the perverse
effects of shallow democracy. Goldman’s
(2005) analysis of the World Bank and its
comprehensive effects in terms of governance
and institutional domination similarly indicts
the flagship of the development enterprise
Progress in Development Studies 10, 1 (2010) pp. 19–34
Christian Lund 23
(see also Finnemore, 1997). Another interest-
ing analysis of the major international insti-
tutions’ role in globalisation is delivered by
the former chief economist of the World
Bank, Joseph Stiglitz (2002). He argues that
institutions such as the IMF, the WTO and the
World Bank are effectively unaccountable to
the millions affected by the proposed (imposed)
policies and, in addition, that the policies
often fail to effectively address the issues of
poverty (see also Griffin, 2003). In parallel,
Gould shows how agendas such as ‘poverty
reduction’ are political battlegrounds despite
their consensual appearance. The research
demonstrates the inherently political nature of
development agencies and the power relations
of administrative technologies (Gould, 2005).
Finally, Roe’s work on development narratives
and how facile arguments based on little, or
no, evidence stabilise development practice
deserves mention as a highly original contri-
bution (Roe, 1994; 1999).
On a smaller scale, works by Long (2001)
and Olivier de Sardan (2005) and their as-
sociates deal with the encounter between
outside agencies and other authorities, on
one hand, and local societies, on the other,
in the interface of development. The ap-
proaches advocate a fine-grained sociological
or anthropological approach, with a strong
focus on interaction and conflict. Conflict
and interaction are seen as productive entry
points to the description and analysis of
larger systems. Development, or planned
intervention, is only one, albeit an important
one, of several political and economic ‘projects’
in a particular society. The approaches attempt
to ‘normalize’ development intervention as
just another social and political process where
it is important to investigate what actually
happens, what people think happens, and
finally what people think ought to happen
in terms of their political and moral values.
In particular, it is important to recognize
that these are three different enquiries re-
lying on three different forms of data (see
Beattie, 1959). Three of the most significant
24 Approaching development
works on development intervention that fall
broadly within this class of research over
the past decades would be The Anti-Politics
Machine. ‘Development’,De-politicization,
and Bureaucratic Power in Leshoto, by James
Ferguson (1990); Cultivating Development.
An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice, by
David Mosse (2005) and The Will to Improve,
by Tania Murray Li (2007). The authors
examine how development interventions are
borne by a certain set of ideas – political and
moral – about what should happen. This means
investigating policy statements of various
kinds, programmes and plans, strategies and
evaluations. Ferguson, Mosse and Li also
investigate the engaged actors’ ideas about
what is going on. Mosse thus examines what
he terms the ‘social production of develop-
ment successes’. Out of the complex and
contingent practice of development inter-
vention certain points are validated, certain
causalities ‘proved’ and thereby ideas of a
success are produced. Finally, the authors
examine the effects, not only where effects
were intended, but casting a wider net they
examine effects on organisations, institutions
and the distribution of political power. While
this research is a serious indictment of de-
velopment intervention and in particular of
the discrepancy between what development
intervention does and what it declares it does,
it is not an outright dismissal of development
intervention as a means to improve the liveli-
hoods of poor people. But it reminds us that
this process is multi-layered, that every layer
has political dimensions, and while the official
agenda may be trumpeted with bombast; it is
often undercut by other, less overt, agendas.
Therefore, while a project may fail on its own
terms, ‘failure’ often has significant effects
that align well with other interests and thereby
becomes a ‘success’ to some.
It is evident that the practitioner/politician
and researcher perspectives on development
intervention are different. It makes a differ-
ence to approach development as a practical,
technical, organizational, and political operation
Progress in Development Studies 10, 1 (2010) pp. 19–34
to the benefit of beneficiaries and professionals,
on the one hand, or to see it as a socio-political
process with more complex consequences and
no immediate onus for ‘making development
work’, on the other. This does not make one
enterprise inherently nobler than the other.
Each engagement with development has its
particular rigour and preferred principles.
While the research approach puts a premium
on explanation and analytical clarity, the prac-
titioners’ approach puts a premium on targeted
change, feasibility and pragmatism. But while
professionals may work under conditions where
it is essential to focus on the latter aspects to
perform their tasks effectively and efficiently,
I suggest that to perform such functions well,
it is useful to be aware of the distinction and
be able to recognise both perspectives.
4 The migration of words and concepts
Recognition of the distinction and ability to
employ both perspectives is, however, made
difficult by the subtle way the two camps
communicate. As Wilson (1993) points out,
concepts wander from one side of the dividing
line and back. Generally, concepts seep
through from the academic, analytical side,
to the political, engaged, and operational side.
However, the meaning of concepts changes as
it goes from one camp to the other. Concepts
in academic discourses must be qualified. By
this I mean, it is explained and specified in
some detail what they signify. While words
such as property, family, government, state,
and wealth, and so on, have some generally
accepted descriptive everyday meaning, this
does not qualify them as concepts. Concepts
come with some theoretical baggage that
ensures some precision. But when concepts
slip into a development agency and policy
context, they are rarely qualified and thereby
become less clear and may gain a new status as
fund-raising buzz words or simple indicators.
Participation, power, sustainability, democracy,
poverty, and so on, are all concepts that have
travelled from academia to development
operations. ‘Rights’ is another seemingly on

this outward journey where it may lose its
conceptual quality and become a word with
many competing and contradictory meanings
(see Englund and Nyamnjoh, 2004; Wilson,
1997). Another difficulty lies in the return of
these concepts from policy language. When
development agency words find their way back
into academic analysis to perform a precise
function in critical analysis, they may seem
crisp and accurate, but in reality, stripped of
conceptual pedigree, they often merely create
the buzzing noise of the buzz-word.
5 Connections between development research
and practice
It is well known that the ambitions to make
changes through development intervention
often encounter unanticipated reactions and
have rather unexpected results. A FAQ (Fre-
quently Asked Questions) in development
studies is ‘how could research possibly have
helped planners and operators?’ Now, the gut
reaction of social scientists and development
operators and planners alike tends to be, ‘If
we had only known more, we could have
foreseen and have fine tuned the instruments’.
Obviously, there is some element of truth in
this. Some basic knowledge about the context,
about the social dynamics and political history
of a place may help reach targets with more
precision. However, it is not insignificant what
kinds of questions are sought and answered.
If we rush for tool perfection, we may not
allow ourselves to ask the questions that
come before, namely to what extent and
to what degree of precision is it desirable to
regulate, and who stands to benefit from it.
For example, how big a problem is it (and for
whom) that land conflicts are rife in Africa
and that different politico-legal institutions
are competing over jurisdiction? Is this an ac-
ceptable way of negotiating the future rules
of the game? In asking such questions, I’m
not denying that there are indeed a variety of
problems associated with such land conflicts
and institutional confusion, that the outcome
is often socially inequitable, and that the
Progress in Development Studies 10, 1 (2010) pp. 19–34
Christian Lund 25
level of frustration entailed often results in
violence – quite the opposite, in fact. But
development policies and practices are not
merely technical decisions; they are in-
herently political, and intentions about the
social distribution of rights and resources are
embedded in any development intervention
and societal development process. Therefore,
I suggest that it is somewhat naïve to think that
‘had we only known better, we would have
done it differently’. The reforms introduced
and the effective outcomes result from political
choices. The outcomes, whether close to or
further from the declared intentions, generally
resonate with the interests of certain groups.
Policies are motivated as much by interests –
political and organisational – as by knowledge
and technical reason (Mosse, 2005). Moreover,
inconclusive research – and let’s be fair, most
research on a moving target is somehow
inconclusive – may be used as an ‘insurance
policy’ or legitimation for decisions already
made. ‘We have consulted the experts and can
go ahead’ (see Hirschman, 1967: 23). This is
not to say that research-based knowledge is
redundant and does not have its place among
policy makers; on the contrary, it does. Only,
it is in stiff competition with other motivating
factors, such as interests. Modesty about the
potential impact of research in development
planning would, therefore, behove us.
Nonetheless, knowledge about social dy-
namics and institutional change is not inert
technical knowledge to be computed in a de-
politicized operation of development; it can
be acted upon and may thus lead to change.
Information not only serves governments
and technocrats, but also corporations and
capital, and social and political movements
of all kinds. They are all policy makers, in a
way. Research can turn the choices of policy
makers and operators, corporations and
political movements into informed choices,
but it cannot do the actual choosing for them.
Therefore, when policy makers look to research
for directives for intervention, they are liable to
operate as technicians for whom the choices
26 Approaching development
have already been made, and they often look
in vain. Research rarely provides blueprints
for immediate implementation. Instead, it is
often a purveyor of ‘inconvenient facts’ (see
Corbridge, 2007: 201; and Weber, 1958: 147).
On the other hand, development research
clearly reveals a multitude of endogenous
dynamic processes unfolding all the time. It
frequently demonstrates that people do not
necessarily await the cue from the policy
makers to act. Peoples’ actions and countless
everyday struggles and negotiations form a
variety of recorded patterns with winners and
losers. Therefore, when searching for con-
structive and feasible policy choices, policy
makers and operators could find worse places
to look to than research. What is actually going
on? What processes entertained by peoples’
efforts to change their lives can be identified,
identified with, and furthered by policy? The
challenge for social science research vis-à-vis
policy lies in identifying dynamics, changes,
movements and organization of interests in
society that policy makers can underpin, sup-
port and further. Obviously, this means that
policy should relate to existing and expressed
interests in society (Scott, 1998: 345). For
this to happen, it is particularly important to
present research intended for policy makers,
stakeholders and operators in ways that are
palatable to them. By this, I do not mean that
research results should be obscenely simplified,
put in patronizing bullet-point catch phrases,
or popularised ad nauseam. But research can be
presented in ways that relate to the priorities
of the policy makers and operators with the
sincere intention to communicate. It requires
the integrity of the researcher to not oversell
certain dynamics and garnish observations
with wishful thinking but to remain clear-
headed. But it may be exactly at this juncture
that the ‘professional pessimism’ of the re-
searcher and the ‘professional optimism’ of
the policy maker and operator can lead to
constructive communication. It is important
to keep in mind, however, that it is not merely
(sometimes not even primarily) formal policy
Progress in Development Studies 10, 1 (2010) pp. 19–34
makers who effect practice and change and for
whom research is useful. Thus, a similar chal-
lenge of level-headed communication lies in
research’s relations to other active stakeholders
in society. If research is to be useful information
in an effort to change the world, then policies,
politics, and interests must be laid bare and
made intelligible and accessible.
IV Development theory and
development analysis
1 Two types of theory
I now return to the initial ambition of this article.
The diversity and dynamic nature of societies,
in general, creates a perennial challenge for the
social sciences: What are the ambitions con-
cerning general explanatory power of theory
and findings, and is it possible to navigate
between sweeping theoretical generalizations
and descriptive particularism? The diversity
and dynamics in developing societies make the
question inherently relevant for development
studies. To approach this, it is useful to start
out with a distinction between two types of
theory. Mouzelis presents a simple dichotomy
(1995:1, see also Passeron, 2000: 42): first, we
have theory as an explanatory framework;
a set of interrelated substantive statements
venturing to say something new about the
social world, either for a circumscribed section
of it or, in some cases, attempting a ‘systematic
theory of the nature of man and society’
(Mills, 2000: 23). This type of theory can, in
general, be subjected to empirical investigation,
be confirmed or falsified by evidence or at
least held up against empirical findings. The
second type of theoretical construct is a
set of conceptual tools which, rather than
telling us anything substantive about the
social world, suggests ways of approaching it.
The value of this type of theory must be as-
sessed in terms of its heuristic utility, that is,
what questions are asked and how do they
interrogate the empirical phenomena. In short,
we may ‘distinguish between substantive
generalisations and generalisations that are

predominantly methodological/heuristic’
(Mouzelis, 1995: 42). While concrete works
on social change contain both elements, they
are generally more inclined to either one or the
other end. Let me discuss the problems and
merits of the two types of theory in turn.
2 Explanatory framework
The classical theory by W.W. Rostow, Stages of
Economic Growth (1960), is clearly a substantive
theory with a high ambition of theorizing
about five phases of economic growth that all
societies would – sooner or later – follow. And
with an outline of a trajectory for all societies
to follow, each society could, in principle, be
situated according to these phases of progress
on the way to Western modernity. As pointed
out by Hansen (1997), Marxist theories
similarly operate with a highly teleological
(some almost with a theological) perspective,
although with a different end scenario. Mills
criticizes different sociological traditions
and, in particular, two strands of theory for
their overarching ambitions. First, there are
encyclopaedic theories concerned with the
‘whole of man’s social life’ (Mills, 2000: 22).
Prominent figures are Marx and Weber who
attempt a systematic reading of the regularities
of the stages of history. However, as Mills
argues, the ‘theory of man’s history can all too
readily become distorted into a trans-historical
strait-jacket into which the materials of human
history are forced’ (Mills, 2000: 22–23).
Secondly, Mills points to theories that attempt
a comprehensive systematic set of statements
about the nature of man and society. Mills
brings out Parsons as a leading example
(Parsons, 1951; see also Cohen et al., 1975).
The ambition of this theoretical endeavour
is to identify supposedly invariant features of
social life deleting history as a particularly valid
concern. While these two strands of theory
are quite different – one explaining history,
the other practically denying it – they have in
common the ambition to provide a large-scale
explanatory and interpretative framework
Progress in Development Studies 10, 1 (2010) pp. 19–34
Christian Lund 27
for empirical observations. For the sake of
convenience, I shall refer to them all as ‘grand
theory’.
The social sciences offer many substantive
theories of this grand scale as Skinner demon-
strates (Skinner, 1985). I am not suggesting that
‘grand theorists’ have always made universal
claims. In fact, grand theorists often take
pains to present their theories as historical and
circumscribed, but this tends to be disregarded
by their most ardent followers. Hence, when
grand theory of a substantive kind is employed,
in principle, empirical evidence either validates
or invalidates the theory. However, quite often,
a more dishonest operation is undertaken
where empirical data is cut to fit the theoretical
assumptions and anticipations. If the options
regarding grand theories are validation or
distortion, should we then just abandon
them in development studies? My suggestion
is: Not at all! However, we will need to be
conscious of the role of ‘grand theory’ in social
science and development studies, in particular.
Grand theorists such as Bourdieu, Foucault,
Habermas, Luhmann, Marx, Rawls, and
Weber, among others, are not irrelevant or
incommensurable with research on a dynamic
context removed from the contexts that once
inspired the theories. However, the task is to
look to such theories more for their heuristic
utility and conceptual adequacy than for their
substantive propositions about connections or
general causalities. In short, to understand the
politics of decentralisation in, say, Indonesia,
it may be very productive to look to Weber
for the questions he asks about legitimacy, and
rather less rewarding to look at the (ultimately
historically contingent) answers he provides.
Likewise, to understand the political economy
of rural Africa, it may be very productive to
look to Marx for the questions he asks about
power, property and control, and a lot less so
to subscribe to his class analysis of nineteenth-
century Europe. Equally, to understand state-
society relations in highland Peru, it may be a
good idea to look to Foucault for the questions
he asks about discourse and power, and less
28 Approaching development
inspiring to transplant his work on prisoners
and punishment in eighteenth-century France
to the Andes. Studying a moving target –
development – we can often learn as much
from how questions have been asked in
other circumstances as from the answers –
soon dated – they yielded. Grand theory is
a wellspring of ideas of how to approach the
world, just as are (other) empirical studies
with more circumscribed claims to their
validity. This way, works – such as by Rostow
cited above – should not merely be dismissed
because the answers they provide may have
limited value; it may be redeemed because of
the heuristic quality of the questions it offers.
This leads me to the other kind of theory.
3 Heuristic framework
Social science is by nature (no pun intended)
provisory. For development studies, this is no
less true. Its subject matter changes – develops –
over time, and the ambitions of adding small
bricks to the edifice of science in the image
of natural sciences is, in my view, vain. No
sooner than the theories about the post-war
bi-polar world were developed did social and
political changes make them historical. And
theories about class structures and state
building have been challenged by the process
of globalization and the institutionalization of
the development aid system. Changes in social
and political realities necessarily invite new
research and new attempts at making sense of
them. In my opinion, the consequence is that
research on changing social phenomena and
on change itself calls for research approaches,
which privilege inductive over deductive
reasoning. Simply put, deductive reasoning
moves from a general or universal principle to
particular truths. However, the very diversity
of the developing world – well, the world –
tends to defeat any long-range utility of
strict deduction. Deduction tends to leave us
with very abstract ideas. Moreover, strongly
deductive reasoning carries with it the risk
of permanent ‘re-discovery’ of the model in
the empirical material. Inductive reasoning,
Progress in Development Studies 10, 1 (2010) pp. 19–34
on the other hand, moves from the particular
evidence to more general statements about
social dynamics. This, obviously, has the op-
posite limitations; what can indeed be inferred
from a singular case if context is so significant.
Conclusions arrived at by inductive reasoning
are generally less certain than the actual
initial observation, and they are contextually
circumscribed. The difficulty is, of course,
to assess the range of validity, but most of
the time, we are not looking for completely
universal laws of the social anyway, but are
quite happy with explanations which are
historically circumscribed; that is, valid for a
particular period of time and a particular region.
However, inductive reasoning has one distinct
advantage over deduction, namely that it can
provide good examples which have substantive
as well as implicit methodological propositions.
Thus, from examples, we can harvest good
questions for our own inquiry. This is where
the inductive reasoning pairs well with seeing
theorization as a heuristic activity of ‘reading’
other research for concepts and questions
(to engage with this huge debate, see, for
example, Kuhn, 1970, Mills 2000, Passeron,
2006 and Sayer, 1992). Conceptual tools and
incisive questions to investigate historical
realities have a lot of mileage whereas the
propositions of substantive theories have
variable expiry dates and seem to have less
new knowledge to offer out of their context.
A theory like Development Sociology – Actor
Perspectives by Norman Long (2001) has
a different ambition from Rostow’s. Long
wants to generate useful concepts for the
investigation of development processes.
Conceptual tools such as interface, network
configurations etc. thus provide a lens for
approaching society without making far-
reaching assumptions about the substantive
nature of the interfaces, networks, and so
on. Obviously, the inductive, empirical ap-
proach has pitfalls as well. Description of the
unique features of a particular social con-
figuration (and every social configuration has
unique features) is not sufficient for a social

science analysis. Ideographic description where
the analysis does not, through concepts,
relate to a wider picture, or does not pro-
pose patterns or suggest structures, becomes
insignificant, inconsequential and hence un-
interesting as social science (See Moore, 1987,
1993, 2005; Passeron, 2006: 154–68). Thus,
while the empirical, historical context defines
the problem to be described and analysed, it
must be dealt with in a way that resonates
with a wider set of issues in different or wider
contexts to qualify as social science. Research
is, in fact, a constant movement back and forth
between the specifics of contextualization
and more general reasoning. It is possible to
conduct this pendulous movement between a
specific context and more abstractly reasoned
general questions of one particular discipline,
say, political science. Or, one can go scrumping
in several orchards.
4 Combined approaches
Development studies are driven by a concern
about inequality and poverty. Concretely,
however, this involves a broad range of issues.
Problems like inequality are multidimensional
and cannot be the preserve of a single dis-
cipline (Jackson, 2002: 449). Development
studies are, therefore, at the confluence of
different disciplines such as economics, politics,
sociology, geography and anthropology. Let
me take an example from my own research
to illustrate this: land conflicts in Niger and
Ghana. Land conflicts are multidimensional.
When people struggle over land, it is not
merely to secure a livelihood. Elements of
belonging and political identity also play a role.
Therefore, insight into people’s perceptions
about space, rights and interests are as im-
portant as their socio-economic situation.
Moreover, knowledge about the political and
organisational structures of the administration
and the customary institutions as well as of
the processual aspects of law is very useful
(Lund, 1998; 2008). In short, this means that
research on this topic, ideally, should constitute
movements back and forth between the
Progress in Development Studies 10, 1 (2010) pp. 19–34
Christian Lund 29
concrete historical context, and the concepts
from economics, politics, law, geography, an-
thropology and sociology in order to conduct
an intelligent reading of societal development
which relates to a wider context and history.
There seems to be a consensus that the
perspectives from several disciplines are helpful
in order to establish comprehensive knowledge
about concrete phenomena. However, there is
no consensus about how different disciplines
should co-habit. ‘Inter-disciplinarity refers to a
rigorous attempt to integrate the frameworks
of different disciplines and to explore research
questions which would not otherwise arise
within the boundaries of a single discipline’
(Harriss, 2002: 494 n1). As Jackson argues,
this is the ‘source of much that is original in
development research, it is also, however, at
risk of a lowest common denominator effect,
where only relatively straightforward re-
search questions are posed’ (Jackson, 2002:
499). Multi-disciplinarity, on the other hand,
Jackson argues, refers to parallel disciplines in
close conversation about the same problem,
and this has the advantage of the theoretical
development of each discipline. One notes how
the distinction echoes the tension between
practitioners and policy makers with pressing
needs for relevant – ‘straightforward’ –
knowledge, on the one hand, and social sci-
entists with pressing needs to earn brownie
points through publication in discipline-based
journals and good performance in peer
evaluations, on the other. In reality, however,
disciplines rarely remain ‘parallel’ when they
are in close conversation. It often makes
more sense to see them as cognate disciplines
which overlap in their topical investiga-
tions as well as in their theoretical jurisdic-
tions. Particular topical as well as theoretical
ideas and their methodological ramifications
have often appeared in different disciplines at
roughly the same time. To me, it suggests that
the strict segregation of disciplines is justified
less by the inherent logics of the investi-
gated issues or the theoretical orientation
than by academic and institutional interests,
30 Approaching development
tradition and convenience. Moreover, it
seems unlikely that disciplines that engage in
close conversation with others should remain
un-affected by this and not develop partly
as a result of it. It may therefore be difficult
to situate concrete development research as
either inter- or multi-disciplinary. I attempt no
endorsement of one form of co-habitation of
disciplines above the other, nor am I implying
that inter/multidisciplinarity turns all disciplines
into one. In my view, there are two reasons
why development studies require a combined
approach to tackle a research problem: the
reasoning and the data.
5 Reasoning and data
Passeron argues that the social sciences are
the empirical sciences of historical reality.
A discipline is essentially historical when its
statements cannot be severed from the con-
text from which data was drawn. It is the
distinguishing feature of social sciences, which,
contrary to natural sciences, cannot ‘control
for context’ (Passeron, 2006: 145–54). Despite
this fundamental commonality, however, dif-
ferent disciplines within the social sciences
have different preferred ways of reasoning and,
consequently, differ widely in use of data. At
one end of the spectrum, we find disciplines,
such as history, that take pains to moor their
interpretations to a particular spatial and
temporal context. At the other end, we have
disciplines, such as economics, with an in-
clination for ‘experimental reasoning’ where
data is abstracted, stripped of contextual
noise, in order to facilitate comparison and
quantification.
Thus, some disciplines are narrative in
nature, others focus on the spatial distribution
of different phenomena, some are more prone
to synthesis and typologies, others again
prefer to reason in terms of comparative
analysis, and some argue in terms of statistics
and correlations. Passeron argues that social
science reasoning is various combinations of
these forms, which find their purest (though
never completely pure) articulation in the
Progress in Development Studies 10, 1 (2010) pp. 19–34
aspirations of history, anthropology, geog-
raphy, sociology, political science and eco-
nomics. The point is not that one discipline is
forcibly superior to the other; it is all too easy to
fall into rather infantile debates about whether
economics is superior to, say, sociology; each
discipline has specific methods, and rigour, and
imagination must be legitimate requirements
of any discipline. However, different modes
of reasoning make each discipline inclined to
engage with different forms of data, to procure
it differently, and to manipulate and synthesize
it differently.
Let me return to my own research field once
more to exemplify the variation in reasoning
and data it suggests. The field of local politics
and conflicts over landed property lends itself
to virtually the whole gamut of social science.
The evolution of the political system and
property relations invite a narrative approach
where time, sequencing and conjunctures
organize a variety of data. This may be archival
material, established historical accounts, and
interviews about settlement, land acquisition,
transfers and conflict. Conflicts over land and
politics may, on the other hand, appeal to the
sociological and anthropological reasoning
about different fora or institutional theatres for
conflict resolution and the possible emergence
of new institutions. Interesting data may
include different repertoires of justification of
claims. It may encompass information on how
the repertoire relates to different spheres of
people’s universe and their understanding of
custom, power, justice, the state, and so on.
This may lend itself to typologies of institutions
and processes. The institutional competition
between different political authorities and
the establishment of de jure and de facto juris-
dictions beg a political and legal approach.
Legislation, court proceedings and policy
documents in combination with cases of con-
testation and dispute would fuel the data set.
Spatial location of the property in question
and land use are equally significant. Finally, the
distribution of economic costs and benefits of
this process is highly relevant. Data on prices

and values of land and transactions would give
some idea about the creation and distribution
of wealth. And facts about formal and informal
credit systems would provide knowledge
about the functioning of the economic system.
Combining different approaches originating
in different disciplinary quarters thus allows
engagement with different kinds of data and
consequently for comprehensive analyses.
However, such combinations also introduce
some epistemological tensions. I shall point to
two challenges. First, some of the ‘feeder-
disciplines’ of development studies are inclined
to ‘particularize’ and others to ‘universalize’,
and the challenge is to strike a convincing bal-
ance. However, in most cases, there is not
simply one conclusion to research, but several.
There is a nested hierarchy of conclusions,
where the most concrete may be very precise
and substantiated by a wealth of evidence,
but also be somewhat circumscribed to
the precise context. On the other hand, the
more general conclusions with a wider scope
can often be drawn from the same research.
They will be more abstract and refer to a
gradually de-contextualized set of observations
with a decreasing degree of specificity. There
is no absolute and optimal balance between
particularizing and universalizing ambitions
for social science analysis. The litmus test for
any social science research is to what degree
the findings and statements at various levels of
abstraction and generalization are convincing.
This is, in fact, an empirical question.
A second complication with a compre-
hensive analysis drawing on different dis-
ciplines lies with the possibility that the selected
disciplines have different, incommensurable,
explanatory emphasis. How is social action
explained in the different theories? This
does not follow the particular disciplines in a
very systematic way, but runs through all of
them (Boudon, 1986; McAdam et al., 2001).
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly mark out five
overlapping but competing explanations of
change: structural, rational, phenomenological,
cultural and relational (McAdam et al., 2001:
Progress in Development Studies 10, 1 (2010) pp. 19–34
Christian Lund 31
20–22). A crude overview runs like this: Struc-
tural analyses tend to assign interests and
capacities to whole collectivities and to explain
behaviour of individuals and groups primarily
through their relation to the collective in ques-
tion. This line of explanation can be found in
history as well as economics, in political science
as well as anthropology, and in geography
as well as sociology. The rational analyses tend
to explain behaviour and resulting change with
the deliberate choices made by individuals
ranging from persons, over organizations
to states. Choices are often explained with
reference to interests, opportunities and con-
straints. This line of reasoning competes with
structural explanations by attributing decisive
weight to agency. But it is not a competition
between disciplines; it takes place within
them. Phenomenological approaches will give
crucial weight to individuals’ experience as a
motivating factor for action. Here, symbols
of identity, belonging, and exclusion are
examined for their meaning and effect on
change. Similarly, focusing on the individual
is the cultural approach. It tends to attribute
causal power to norms, values and beliefs
that individuals absorb from the surrounding
culture.
Again, no discipline is the single home
of these approaches; they inform political
as well as economic research (see, for example,
Chabal and Daloz, 1999; and Hyden, 1983).
The fifth approach is what McAdam, Tarrow
and Tilly actually advocate. Here, social
movements are seen as learning entities that
operate and improvise within given structures
of economy and politics with a certain set of
political repertoires. In a way, the authors are
‘recovering structuralists’ trying to see not
one single behavioural pattern, but patterns
of patterns of social processes. The point of
displaying these lines of explanation is not to
say that one is inherently superior to another.
Rather, the point is that research which com-
bines different disciplines – development
studies par excellence – runs a particularly high
risk of constructing contradictory arguments.
32 Approaching development
This should not discourage us, however. Again,
the test for any social science research is to
what degree the explanations are actually
credible and make sense.
V Concluding remarks
Problems of development and change pose
political as well as non-normative analytical
challenges. As a consequence, there is an
inherent risk that policy makers and practi-
tioners from one camp, and researchers from
another – professional optimists and pessimists,
respectively – tend to misunderstand and mis-
represent each other. While words migrate
from one camp to the other, the meaning
only seemingly survives the transport, and
a dialogue de sourds is often the result. This
gap is not going to be easy to close by any
measure. Strong institutional interests pull
the practitioners towards ‘solutions’ to con-
crete problems and lead them to search for
‘straightforward knowledge’, whereas other
institutional interests pull researchers in a
different direction. Researchers’ inconvenient
facts – if theorized for specific publication
purposes – can make for poor dialogue with
stakeholders, practitioners and policy makers.
Yet, there is potential for constructive com-
munication if both sides recognize each others’
logics and concerns. Indeed, if researchers
were to present their findings in terms of social
processes and dynamics in relation to policy
concerns, and if policy makers, practitioners
and stakeholders were to look to research for
inconvenient facts rather than directives for
action, a more sincere and hence constructive
communication could be the result.
The second issue taken up in this article
has been to discuss an analytical approach
to development and social change. The field
of development is vast, the issues many and
the research approaches to these issues are as
varied as the social sciences themselves. The
approach is therefore a consequence of the
problem one investigates. Nonetheless, I shall
venture a few points. Work in development
Progress in Development Studies 10, 1 (2010) pp. 19–34
studies is, in the best of cases, production of
new substantive knowledge about empirical –
real – phenomena which stands out from both
policy prescription and mere description by
the rigorous approach to the topic through
a particular theoretical lens and with precise
concepts. This should not entail disciplinary or
methodological monogamy. It is generally more
fruitful to start out with the research problem
and the profit from the different disciplines’
topical convergence and methodological
complementarity. It is rather a plea for
‘methodological opportunism’ (see Katzenstein
et al., 1995). Various forms of data may
converge to form a more comprehensive
argument and interpretation. The major
contribution of the theoretical orientation is
exactly to identify research issues in empirical
problems and provide certain concepts to
facilitate an investigation in order to elicit new
knowledge. This knowledge can then be seen
as an argument or a substantive theory for a
particular historical and geographical context.
In the social sciences, the question of proving
a point is not one of all or nothing, but rather
one of more or less likely with argument and
reasoning based on the context of relevant
elements for the question at issue. The con-
textual, historical situation of the argument,
and the meticulous recording of relevant data
and events, is the only remedy to undergird
its plausibility. However, these substantive
propositions of the theories still represent the
less-durable and less-transferable element,
whereas the approach and the questions raised
have a wider compass. That is, the heuristic
qualities of the substantive propositions are
transcendental, while the substantive pro-
positions themselves are circumscribed. Good
research will have both qualities and will know
the difference between them.
To conclude, development studies, like
other social sciences, is a product of political
and ethical concerns. For development studies,
these concerns are inequality, impoverishment
and human insecurity. To do justice to these

concerns, however, the academic and scientific
practices – the research approach – must
observe standards and principles of critical
scrutiny and context sensitive systematic
conceptualisations and deliver it in reasoned
language.
Acknowledgements
This article has benefited tremendously from
the ongoing methodological and theoretical
discussions at the Friday-seminar at the
Graduate School of International Development
Studies, Roskilde University. Grateful thanks
are also owed to Jesse Ribot and this journal’s
reviewers for valuable comments. The usual
disclaimers apply.
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