La cuarta generación de concesiones viales en Colombia: ¿Qué hemos aprendido sobre el exceso de renegociación y litigio

Fecha de recepción: 20 de octubre de 2015 / Fecha de aprobación: 15 de marzo de 2016
LA CUARTA GENERACIÓN DE CONCESIONES VIALES EN COLOMBIA Y EL NUEVO

MODELO LEGAL PPP: DE QUÉ HEMOS APRENDIDO
¿TENDENCIAS DE SOBRERENEGOCIACIÓN Y SOBRELITIGACIÓN?
PAGS aola a. l Arrahondo C.
Artículo de reflexión
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15425/redepub.38.2017.02
Universidad de los Andes

Facultad de Derecho
Rev. derecho publico No. 38 enero - junio
de 2017. e- issn 1909-7778
La cuarta generación de concesiones viales en Colombia y la nueva ppp modelo legal: ¿Qué hemos aprendido de las tendencias
de exceso de renegociación y exceso de litigio?
Abstracto
Este documento analiza y evalúa las nuevas ppp Modelo legal adoptado en Colombia en 2012 en el marco del programa gubernamental Cuarta Generación
de Concesiones Viales (4G). El objetivo principal es establecer si el nuevo modelo responde o refleja las principales críticas, problemas, riesgos y
recomendaciones recogidas a lo largo de 20 años de experiencias concesionales y divulgadas en estudios económicos. Estas preocupaciones están
dominadas principalmente por costosas y crecientes renegociaciones, retrasos en el suministro de carreteras, altas tasas de litigios y una brecha acumulada
en las infraestructuras de transporte. Este artículo utiliza teorías económicas como el problema principal-agente y la teoría de juegos para exponer las
soluciones a errores previos presentados en el nuevo ppp modelar y revelar los riesgos potenciales que quedan para el modelo en relación con la
implementación que podrían conducir al fracaso del Programa 4G. En general, busca brindar recomendaciones para la minimización de información
engañosa y la ruptura de un programa trascendental del gobierno central de provisión de obras públicas para la competitividad de Colombia.
Palabras clave: Asociaciones Público-Privadas, ppp, Ps3, concesiones, renegociaciones, compras públicas, problema principal-agente, teoría de juegos, infraestructura
de transporte, contratos incompletos.
La cuarta generación de concesiones en Colombia y el nuevo modelo de aplicación: ¿Qué hemos aprendido sobre las
múltiples renegociaciones y la alta litigiosidad?
Resumen
Este documento analiza y evalúa el nuevo modelo legal de app adoptado en Colombia en el año 2012, a partir del Programa “Cuarta Generación del
Concesiones” (4G). El principal objetivo es establecer si el nuevo modelo responde o acoge las principales críticas, problemas, riesgos y
recomendaciones recolectadas en los distintos estudios y análisis económicos, durante 20 años de experiencia en concesiones. Las principales
preocupaciones están principalmente relacionadas con el número creciente de renegociaciones, entregas tardías de las carreteras, alta litigiosidad y
una brecha en el desarrollo de la infraestructura de transporte. Este documento utiliza teorías económicas, como el problema de agencia y la teoría de
juegos, para exponer las soluciones adoptadas en el nuevo modelo de APPs, a los errores identificados. Además, el texto revela los riesgos potenciales
que persisten en éste y representan un potencial fracaso del Programa 4G. En general, el texto pretende proporcionar recomendaciones para minimizar
los problemas de información y el colapso de una política pública trascendental para la provisión de obras y la competitividad del país.
Palabras claves: Asociaciones público privadas, aplicación concesiones, renegociación, licitación pública, teoría de juegos, infraestructura de transporte,
contratos incompletos.
La cuarta generación de concesiones viales en Colombia y la nueva PPP
modelo legal: ¿Qué hemos aprendido de
¿Tendencias en exceso de renegociación y exceso de litigio? *
PAGS aola a. l Arrahondo C. 1
s resumen
Introducción - I. EL CONTEXTO COLOMBIANO: CUARTA GENERACIÓN DE CONCESIONES VIALES - A. Historia de las concesiones
- B. Renegociaciones C.Estadísticas de litigios en curso - II. MARCO LEGAL DE APP EN COLOMBIA - A. Concepto legal -
yo. ¿Qué son las ppp en Colombia? - ii. Pros y contras de ppps - B. Procedimiento de adjudicación - C. Cumplimiento - D. Terminación - III. ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO DEL
MODELO LEGAL DE APP EN COLOMBIA - IV. CONCLUSIÓN Y RECOMENDACIONES - V. Bibliografía.
* Cómo citar este artículo: Larrahondo C., P. (Junio, 2017). La cuarta generación de concesiones viales en Colombia y el nuevo modelo legal de APP: ¿Qué hemos
aprendido de las tendencias de exceso de renegociación y exceso de litigio? Revista de Derecho Público, (38). Universidad de los Andes (Colombia).
http://dx.doi.org/10.15425/redepub.38.2017.02
1. Consultora de política y asuntos públicos especializada en el diseño e implementación de proyectos legales, institucionales y regulatorios de transporte e
infraestructura. Abogado (Universidad de los Andes), Especialista en Gestión Pública e Instituciones Administrativas (Universidad de los Andes) y Magíster en
Derecho y Economía ( Universita di Bologna / Aix-Marseille Université
- EMLE European Master in Law & Economics). Beneficiario de la beca Colfuturo (2014). Correo electrónico: paolala@yahoo.com plarrahondo@gpzlegal.com ;
www.gpzlegal.com
Introducción enviando innovación legal en Colombia. Este nuevo modelo
podría traer algunos cambios institucionales y ajustes
Paola A. Larrahondo C.
[E] n todo gasto público, detrás del bien aparente regulatorios, pero su fundamento no puede desvincularse
hay un mal más difícil de discernir. […] Me gustaría de dos décadas de experiencia en concesiones.
que mi lector adquiriera el hábito de ver uno y otro y

de tomar
cuenta de ambos. También hay que aclarar que esta tesis no se ocupa de si el ppp
modelo es un método de contratación pública más apropiado,

Frédéric Bastiat (1948)
eficaz o legítimo en comparación con los métodos
tradicionales de contratación pública, como los contratos de

Asociaciones público-privadas (en adelante ppp s) son trending
obras públicas. Tampoco detalla las ganancias de eficiencia
topic en Colombia hoy. De hecho, es difícil abrir una revista,
que ppp los acuerdos pueden traer consigo formas
escuchar a un posible político o escanear una declaración de
tradicionales de contratación. Sin embargo, se reconoce aquí
política sobre la planificación del sector público sin encontrar una
que las evaluaciones internacionales de ppp En realidad, los
referencia a ella.
acuerdos han aportado pruebas contradictorias en cuanto a su
eficacia. Los ciudadanos que pagan por estos proyectos se
Una consecuencia de este creciente interés es que se enfrentan, por tanto, a una considerable incertidumbre (Hodge
& Greve, 2010).

debe prestar una atención seria a la investigación ppp modelo
y, más específicamente, su marco regulatorio, arreglos
institucionales, condiciones estándar de contrato y
selección y evaluación de proyectos. Esto facilitará una
mejor comprensión de ppp s en Colombia y permitir la Este análisis comienza con la implementación por parte del
identificación de condiciones que los hagan más gobierno colombiano de un ppp modelo con su Cuarta
seguros, eficientes y efectivos como instrumentos de Generación de Concesiones Viales en Colombia (en adelante
desarrollo económico y social. Programa 4G), un programa público con un valor estimado de
más de 24 mil millones de dólares estadounidenses (47 mil
millones de pesos colombianos) en inversión en
infraestructura vial. Se ejecutará en un período de ocho años

No es nada nuevo mezclar la colaboración público-privada después de su contratación, y la operación y mantenimiento
para proporcionar u organizar servicios públicos, aunque los de la infraestructura se producirá en períodos de entre 25 y 30
partidarios y entusiastas de ppp en Colombia podrá años, según datos oficiales (CONPES 3760/2013). 2 En
manifestar lo contrario. Como muestra esta disertación, el esencia,
supuestamente nuevo ppp modelo está lejos de representar
ppp es un método nuevo y cada vez más popular
2. CONPES 3760 de 2013.
4 Rev. derecho publico No. 38 - e- issn 1909-7778 - enero - junio de 2017 - Universidad de los Andes - Facultad de Derecho
de la contratación pública en Colombia que se retractará se ha modificado alrededor de dos veces al año ”. principal eje de la
política gubernamental en todo el país (Bitran, Nieto-Parra & Robledo, 2013) en el corto, mediano y largo plazo.
En este contexto, los contratos de concesiones representan

Este documento también parte de la importancia de la la contratación de obras o servicios públicos, donde la
infraestructura para el crecimiento económico sostenido y el alivio ejecución de los mismos está sujeta a requisitos específicos
de la pobreza en los países en desarrollo, en particular para definidos en los términos del contrato, y cuya consideración
consiste en el derecho a explotar las obras o servicios que
The fourth generation of road concessions in Colombia and the new ppp legal model: What have we learnt from over-renegotiation and over-litigation trends?
Colombia, porque las carreteras constituyen el componente más
importante de la red de infraestructura de transporte y, por lo implica la transferencia al concesionario de un riesgo

tanto, representan una pieza importante en el rompecabezas del operativo de carácter económico.
desarrollo (Nieto- Parra, Olivera y Tibocha, 2013).
Sin embargo, como el ocde estados, se espera

También se aparta de una definición estándar y amplia de ppp s renegociación en cualquier concesión debido a su
como " cooperación de algún tipo de durabilidad entre actores longevidad, inversiones irreversibles y dificultades para
públicos y privados en la que conjuntamente desarrollan prever y considerar todas las contingencias (Bitran,
productos y servicios y comparten riesgos, costos y recursos, Nieto-Parra & Robledo, 2013). La naturaleza de los
que están conectados con estos productos ”(Hodge & Greve, contratos incompletos fomenta la renegociación y el efecto
2007). endógeno de ppp acuerdos. Estas preguntas deben
discutirse para distinguir entre renegociaciones deseables
y renegociaciones oportunistas / indeseables.
Una vez más, la necesidad de comprender verdaderamente las
implicaciones del ppp El modelo de acuerdo a experiencias
previas de renegociaciones y altos índices de litigio en
concesiones es crucial. Varios estudios económicos realizados Del mismo modo, este documento no busca proporcionar una
por el consultor del Banco Mundial y profesor de doctorado José guía para diseñar o implementar ppp s; este es el deber del
Luis Guasch, así como ocde documentos, proporcionan evidencia dominio público y de los organismos multilaterales,
de que la renegociación ha jugado un papel dominante en las consultores y asesores internacionales. En cambio, explica y
concesiones colombianas. Según sus cálculos, en 25 evalúa de manera integral los problemas económicos
concesiones viales aplicadas en Colombia desde 1992, “ha involucrados en la compleja relación entre los organismos
habido 430 cambios de contrato que representan costos fiscales públicos y el sector privado.
por valor de USD 5.600 millones y 131 años de plazo adicional
de concesión. Estos también han agregado alrededor de 1000
km de carreteras a los contratos de concesión. En promedio, Este trabajo tiene como objetivo, por tanto, abrir una discusión
cada concesión sobre la implementación de la ppp modelo en Colombia
preguntando, ¿Colombia ha solucionado lo que salió mal?
Rev. derecho publico No. 38 - e- issn 1909-7778 - enero - junio de 2017 - Universidad de los Andes - Facultad de Derecho 5
Se utilizan los métodos científicos básicos de análisis y ¿Evolución, y en qué medida, de la contratación pública
síntesis, junto con metodologías estadísticas, tradicional en términos de técnicas legales y captación de
comparativas, inductivas y deductivas. El análisis también necesidades y experiencia? Esta sección sigue el orden, los
se basa en la experiencia personal y el conocimiento títulos y los subtemas utilizados en el cuestionario de Lichère:
directo de los procedimientos organizativos y prácticas i) concepto legal, ii) procedimiento de adjudicación, iii)
internas de la Agencia Nacional de Infraestructura (en ejecución y iv) rescisión.
adelante ANI), dado que el autor se desempeñó como

servidor público en el sector de transporte e infraestructura
de 2012 a 2014. La sección III contiene un análisis económico de la ppp modelo
en Colombia. Evalúa la magnitud de la reforma regulatoria
e institucional, la preparación de proyectos y el diseño de
El documento está organizado de la siguiente manera. La contratos para corregir o enmendar fallas anteriores,
Sección I explica el contexto colombiano e incluye una mitigar riesgos y reducir o debilitar comportamientos
descripción de la historia de concesiones de Colombia, oportunistas entre las partes del contrato. Presenta un
además de presentar datos relevantes sobre las dimensiones análisis positivo que describe y destaca los grandes
económicas del Programa 4G. Explica los principales logros del Programa 4G y las debilidades que persisten, lo
hallazgos sobre las fallas y problemas de las tres que hace que la reforma sea estrecha y limitada y su
generaciones anteriores de concesiones. implementación sea riesgosa.
La Sección II contiene un estudio legal de la ppp modelo
adoptado en 2012. Tras los principales descubrimientos del La sección IV concluye con un resumen de los resultados
Informe del XVIII Congreso de la Academia Internacional de del análisis y recomendaciones.
Derecho Comparado del profesor Francois Lichère, se describe
el ppp modelo introducido en el ordenamiento jurídico. Esta Este documento tiene como objetivo servir a abogados y
sección tiene como objetivo dar respuesta a algunas de las servidores públicos en la mejor comprensión de la lógica
preguntas propuestas por el profesor Lichère en su Informe: ppp económica y los ciclos económicos del ppp
modelo ¿una verdadera novedad jurídica en el ordenamiento modelo. Alguna ppp El contrato contiene un delicado y frágil
jurídico colombiano? ¿Qué significa el nuevo legal ppp implica el equilibrio entre los intereses privados y los intereses públicos,
modelo en términos de cambios en las prácticas de derecho mientras que se debe preservar un esquema de incentivos. Sin
administrativo? ¿Cuáles son las consecuencias de distinguir, si embargo, un ppp es también un proceso dinámico de largo plazo
es posible, la contratación pública tradicional, como que debe adaptarse y ajustarse para garantizar la eficacia y la
concesiones y contratos de obra pública, de la ppp modelo prestación eficiente de obras y servicios públicos. Más importante
(procedimiento de adjudicación y contrato)? Es el ppp modelar aún, los intereses privados de captación de rentas, los intereses
un políticos y la corrupción deben evitarse en todos ppp Contratos.
Como lo atestiguan los estudios históricos y económicos, a pesar de pal causa del fracaso de la política pública; esto va en contra de las
20 años de experiencia en concesiones de infraestructura vial, los predicciones de problemas de la teoría económica debido al
diagnósticos, la planificación, los arreglos institucionales y las carácter incompleto de los contratos a largo plazo.
inversiones en consultoría internacional y privada de Colombia
podrían volver a fallar. Las probabilidades deben cambiarse para
favorecer el éxito. En el “Informe de Expertos en Infraestructura” (Angulo,
Benavides, Carrizosa et al, 2012), los especialistas contratados
por el presidente Juan Manuel Santos para asesorarlo sobre
cómo poner en marcha una “locomotora de infraestructura”
I. EL CONTEXTO COLOMBIANO: CUARTA tardaron más de un año en brindar un análisis de brechas de el
GENERACIÓN DE CONCESIONES VIALES sector y detectar sus principales cuestiones y problemas. Este
informe propuso varias soluciones que superarían conocidos
Existe una alta demanda de infraestructura en Colombia debido al “cuellos de botella” y permitirían al Estado ejecutar proyectos de
crecimiento de la población de las ciudades y la industrialización infraestructura de transporte: trámites de adquisición de tierras,
lejos de los puertos donde ocurren las importaciones y transferencias de servicios públicos de la red, consultas a
exportaciones, aumentando así la necesidad de integración en las comunidades indígenas y licencias ambientales. Todos los
cadenas de suministro globales e impactando directamente en la cuellos de botella vinculados a la falta de experiencia en la
competitividad del país. Los costos de transporte del movimiento planificación de proyectos repercuten en la implementación
de carga a través del país son a veces más altos que los costos de preoperativa, la implementación temprana y las fases de
los envíos internacionales para algunos viajes transatlánticos. 3 operación madura, así como el equilibrio financiero del contrato y
el bienestar social óptimo del proyecto.
El país ha utilizado contratos de concesión de carreteras para
la provisión de carreteras durante más de 20 años. Un
análisis de este proceso a lo largo de los años muestra que Las renegociaciones en Colombia siguen un patrón cíclico, con
las concesiones se caracterizan por persistentes sobrecostos, picos en 1998, 2005 y 2014, y estos picos son consistentes con
demoras en la construcción, fallas en el desempeño períodos de reelección o electorales. Además, en el pasado los
operacional (Bitran, Nieto-Parra & Robledo, 2013), toma de gobiernos no han logrado hacer cumplir los contratos y los
decisiones politizada, tendencia a la renegociación excesiva y proyectos han sido abandonados. Las condiciones
tarifas altas de litigio. institucionales adversas también son importantes (Iossa y
Martimort, 2015). Los servidores públicos a menudo sufren de
memoria selectiva y entre cambios de gobierno se pierde
La preparación insuficiente del proyecto por parte del mucho de una generación.
gobierno se ha identificado como el principal
3. Para mayor información ver: CONPES 3489 de 2007.
a otro, o ciertos detalles se omiten estratégicamente en el Estos contratos se caracterizaron por las siguientes
proceso. Tal evidencia no solo cuestiona el valor de ppp s características: empresas privadas realizaron todas las
pero también requiere una mejor comprensión de los inversiones iniciales; el gobierno garantizó un peaje mínimo
incentivos presentes de semillas; y cada contrato tuvo una duración promedio de
en ppp s. 17 años. Además, se adquirieron siete proyectos y se evitó el
proceso de licitación, antes de adjudicarse sin concurso. Las
Por lo tanto, los comportamientos de las partes quizás expliquen vías públicas estaban desconectadas, dispersas (no
mejor las fallas evidentes durante 20 años de concesiones que formaban parte de una red) y carecían de delimitaciones
han llevado a renegociaciones generalizadas y aún representan claras.
riesgos potenciales. Estos comportamientos pueden incluso
haber aumentado la presencia de errores de planificación o una
falta de capacidad por parte del gobierno, sin importar la nueva Con respecto a la asignación de riesgos, se observó negligencia
tendencia de fomentar la ppp modelo en Colombia que llegó con general en términos de medición y distribución de riesgos, y las
la Ley 1508 en partes públicas retuvieron la mayoría de los riesgos del proyecto:
demanda de tráfico, peajes, tarifas, construcción (excepto
2012. sobrecostos), adquisición de terrenos y licencias ambientales.
Con el fin de estudiar las concesiones aplicadas hasta la
fecha y distinguir entre procesos de desarrollo, se realiza una De hecho, una observación crítica de este período de contrato
revisión de la literatura y se divide entre las cuatro podría comenzar diciendo que las garantías de ingresos
generaciones de ppp s. mínimos se calcularon utilizando estimaciones de tráfico de
estudios preliminares y fueron sesgadas positivamente, lo que
dio lugar a garantías excesivas para los concesionarios.
A. Historia de las concesiones
Bajo el ocde Los principales hallazgos del Documento de Además, los procesos de subasta no fueron competitivos y
Trabajo No. 317/2013 están sistematizados y complementados no incluyeron roadshows internacionales. La ausencia de
con otra literatura. Para cada generación de concesiones se una definición completa y planificación de los proyectos,
presenta el período, número de proyectos viales, incluidas las rutas exactas, antes de firmar los contratos
características principales, asignaciones de riesgo y las fue un error repetido.
principales fallas de diseño.
Además, no se obtuvieron permisos ambientales y la

Primera generación de concesiones expropiación de tierras no se completó antes de la
adjudicación de los contratos;
De 1994 a 1997, un total de 11 proyectos constituyeron un gran problema que aún hoy provoca enormes contrataciones por parte de entidades
gubernamentales. mous retrasos en la entrega de infraestructura.
Los contratos también carecían de cláusulas importantes como Además, se estipuló la protección de los inversores a través de
mecanismos de resolución y reglas para el pago de garantías, mecanismos contractuales y la inclusión de un paso para los
mientras que la falta de evaluación financiera de los postores dejó prestamistas.
en riesgo el presupuesto público.
En cuanto a la asignación de riesgos, se aplicó una consideración más
detallada de la asignación de riesgos, y tanto el tráfico de demanda
La crisis financiera de finales de la década de 1990 impidió al como los riesgos de construcción (excluyendo el riesgo geológico) se
gobierno cumplir con sus obligaciones contractuales en virtud transfirieron a particulares. Sin embargo, la adquisición de tierras y las
del pago de la garantía. Esto resultó en numerosas licencias ambientales siguieron siendo un riesgo y responsabilidad del
renegociaciones antes de que pudiera restablecerse el gobierno, lo que provocó retrasos.
equilibrio económico del concesionario (Neves, 2012).
En este punto, podemos afirmar que se introdujo una

El gobierno no requirió contratos llave en mano y pagó fórmula mucho más simple para elegir las ofertas
hasta un 30% más de lo planeado originalmente para ganadoras, pero que su manipulación fue fácil y dio lugar a
gastos de capital (Neves, 2012) ofertas predatorias. De hecho, solo un contrato completó la
fase de construcción (Malla Vial del Valle del Cauca y
Segunda generación de concesiones Cauca), el otro fue incumplido por conciliación porque el
operador económico entró en default (Commsa). Peor aún,
Para los años 1997 a 1999, solo se pueden identificar 2 proyectos el Consejo de Administración anuló la conciliación y siguió
para esta generación de concesiones. un largo proceso de litigio.
Las principales características de este período de contratos

se desarrollaron en torno a la idea de aprender de los Se mantuvo la ausencia de una visión integrada, al igual que
errores de la primera generación, es decir, avanzar en los la falta de infraestructura construida en forma de una red
acuerdos de compras públicas y concesiones. Se introdujo conectada. Cada proyecto se consideró de forma
el concepto de tasa de rendimiento y se pidió a cada independiente, en lugar de como parte de una red integrada.
licitador que proponga un nivel futuro esperado de ingresos

por valor. Ganó la oferta de menor valor y una vez que los
ingresos alcanzaran el monto esperado, el contrato Finalmente, las carreteras se planificaron de acuerdo con un estudio de
terminaría. tráfico de 20 años y se construyeron en tres años, lo que resultó
rápidamente en un exceso de capacidad.
Se garantizó un ingreso mínimo anual por peaje Tercera generación de concesiones
y la provisión de documentación más detallada

Durante los procesos de licitación se implementó un nuevo gobierno y una economía finalmente se movieron.
Salir de años de recesión proporcionó espacio para
una nueva ola de concesiones de 2001 a 2007 grupos indígenas, no se realizaron con rigor con 10 proyectos.
y de manera eficiente o establecida antes de otorgar los contratos, lo que
ocasiona importantes retrasos.
Se introdujeron nuevos conceptos como la tasa de retorno

esperada, y al variar la duración de la concesión e Además de estos problemas, la adquisición de tierras y las licencias
introducir el concepto de “corredor vial” (para conectar los ambientales provocaron largas interrupciones y provocaron
centros de consumo y producción - conectando entre sobrecostos en las concesiones viales.
ellos, así como con los puertos) cambios importantes

fueron introducidos. La evaluación de la licitación de un solo criterio dio lugar a
ofertas excepcionalmente agresivas, y la idea de reabrir la
negociación del contrato más adelante para permitir la adición
Un movimiento hacia contratos basados en el desempeño, con de más obras de construcción llevó a la renegociación masiva
la introducción de indicadores clave de desempeño y un monto de los contratos de concesión durante este período.
mínimo de ingresos proyectados propuesto por cada licitador
como el único criterio de la licitación, y una duración máxima del
contrato comprendió las principales características de los Algunos académicos identifican una “generación 3.5” de
contratos. concesiones, a la que pertenecen los conocidos proyectos
Ruta del Sol partes I, II y III. Este proyecto paraguas que
conectó la capital con el mar se considera la base de la
Con referencia a la asignación de riesgos, a pesar del debate cuarta y actual generación de carreteras colombianas. ppp s.
académico y público en curso, este sigue siendo un aspecto
fundamental de ppp renegociaciones de contratos y litigios en la
actualidad. Para esta tercera generación, todos los riesgos de
construcción se transfirieron al sector privado, y tanto las De hecho, la Ruta del Sol introdujo las mejores prácticas
licencias ambientales como los riesgos de gestión de adquisición internacionales ( ifc consultoría) y se financió a través del
de tierras se transfirieron a particulares. mercado financiero de Colombia, por lo que se puede decir
que la Ruta del Sol fue un piloto para la cuarta generación de
concesiones; también contiene una mezcla de otras
Como resultado, la oferta ganadora se eligió únicamente sobre características de la 3 y 4 generaciones de concesiones.
la base de la tasa de rendimiento y el riesgo de demanda se
manejó variando la duración de los contratos, que se
extendieron en el tiempo. En otras palabras, no hubo incentivos Cuarta generación de concesiones (en curso)
para entregar y finalizar la construcción, lo que provocó retrasos.
En 2014, el gobierno lanzó oficialmente la cuarta y

actual generación de concesiones,
Además, la evaluación ambiental y social, que incluye la ppp procedimiento y procedimientos de adjudicación, incluidos los
procesos de consulta con una duración prevista de 25 a 30 años. Es claro aqui
que el proceso de planificación del gobierno dificultó el seguimiento de la ejecución física de un se inició casi 3 años
antes y que el proyecto am- (Nieto-Parra, Olivera & Tibocha, 2013). bitious plan revela casi 30 proyectos en este
Generacion. A pesar de esta difícil historia de concesiones, el gobierno

colombiano ha lanzado la Cuarta Generación de
El nuevo ppp La ley (Ley 1508) delinea esta generación y de Concesiones, utilizando la nueva ppp derecho, un nuevo
hecho la distingue fuertemente de sus predecesoras. Los marco regulatorio y transformaciones institucionales por
primera vez.
cambios clave son evidentes ya que la ley limita las
adiciones de hasta el 20% del valor total del contrato de
concesión, además de introducir una etapa de precalificación Esta cuarta generación tiene como objetivo lograr: 8000 km de
y un contrato estandarizado. Además, los pagos se realizan nuevas carreteras de alta calidad, 40 nuevas concesiones de
de acuerdo con un índice de calidad de servicio. La carreteras, especificaciones de alta calidad y carreteras adaptadas al
disponibilidad de la infraestructura y la duración máxima del cambio climático, un ahorro del 20% en costos de transporte y un
contrato de 30 años se analizan en los capítulos 2 y 3. ahorro del 30% en el tiempo dedicado a viajar por las carreteras.
como resultado de la intervención de la infraestructura. Pero con una
inversión de 47 mil millones de pesos colombianos (24 mil millones
de dólares USA) en obras públicas se espera que el desarrollo se
El concepto de asignación de riesgos ha evolucionado y los lleve a 24 de los 32 departamentos totales, generando directamente
actores privados tendrán que asumir un papel importante en la 180 mil empleos. A largo plazo, un crecimiento potencial de pib
adquisición de tierras, los riesgos ambientales y sociales, con
demandas de que los riesgos de tráfico se compartan con el
gobierno. se verá del 4,6% al 5,3%, mientras que la tasa de paro

disminuirá en un 1% y se producirá un eventual
aumento de la competitividad.
Dejando atrás la descripción y el análisis de las cuatro
generaciones de concesiones, otro hallazgo importante para Teniendo en cuenta el desarrollo histórico de las concesiones
los contratos de concesión es que la selección de proyectos y las ambiciosas metas del Programa 4G, en este punto es
y la asignación de presupuesto para carreteras en Colombia necesario revisar el patrón cíclico de las renegociaciones para
son tareas altamente políticas, más que técnicas que comprender plenamente los errores anteriores cometidos en
preservan la conectividad dentro de la red de transporte y los planes gubernamentales.
estimulan la competitividad dentro el país (Nieto-Parra,
Olivera & Tibocha, 2013).
B. Renegociaciones
Análogamente, los problemas de información afectan al
itoring y evaluación de concesiones. Proyectos Desde el principio hay que aclarar que diseñados sin objetivos físicos
específicos hacen ppp s no son prueba de renegociación. Sin embargo, iden-
tificar renegociaciones deseables que cumplan un Como explica la teoría económica, es posible explicar la
papel importante dada la falta de ppp tendencia a las malas renegociaciones que se basan en
los contratos, su naturaleza a largo plazo y los imprevistos, los comportamientos oportunistas de los partidos. Se
deben ser una meta gubernamental. trata de la retención del riesgo y del riesgo moral para el
partido privado para extraer rentas o sesgos políticos y
Las buenas renegociaciones comprenden ajustes selectos electorales del partido público, rompiendo así el equilibrio
hechos al contrato inicial que no agregan nuevos tramos de financiero del contrato y alterando su valor hacia uno de
carretera, aumentan los ingresos o alteran la asignación de análisis monetario.
riesgos; pueden abordar cuestiones como las obras de reparación
después de desastres naturales, por ejemplo. Responden a
eventos verdaderamente imprevistos (no una rendición de Desafortunadamente, en Colombia una tendencia hacia la
cuentas inexacta) y modifican las relaciones a largo plazo: “dada sobre-renegociación exhibe una secuencia de acuerdos
la naturaleza incompleta de los acuerdos contractuales a largo indeseables al principio del ciclo de vida de un proyecto, en
plazo, una renegociación exitosa (que conduce a la revisión de promedio dos años después de la adjudicación del proceso y el
los términos de intercambio dentro del contrato) puede ser plazo de finalización del contrato, con un aumento de entre el
beneficiosa -mejorar en lugar de reducir el bienestar ". 10% y el 15% de las renegociaciones. plazo de la concesión
(Domingues y Zlatkovic, 2015) (Bitran, Nieto-Parra & Robledo, 2013). Como ejemplo, 25
contratos de concesión adoptados en Colombia han sido
renegociados 430 veces. Además, en Colombia todos los
proyectos firmados antes de 2010 han experimentado
Alternativamente, las malas renegociaciones son sintomáticas de importantes costos de renegociación, que en la mayoría de los
proyectos de diseño deficiente, proyectos apresurados, licitaciones casos representan más del 40% de los costos totales (Bitran,
predatorias y extracciones de rentas por parte de las partes Nieto-Parra & Robledo, 2013). Además, se han alargado 15
interesadas: “la renegociación contractual se ha visto típicamente contratos (de un total de 25 concesiones) para extender su
como indeseable y refleja las ineficiencias de los contratos, ya que plazo inicial en un 70% en promedio (Bitran, Nieto-Parra &
impone altos costos sociales y de transacción y puede inducir Robledo, 2013).
comportamiento de las partes tanto privadas como públicas ”.
(Domingues & Zlatkovic, 2015) En consecuencia, las malas
renegociaciones se caracterizan por agregar nuevos tramos,
agregar obras complementarias (como puentes peatonales, carriles One famous case of extension in the concession
viales y rutas ciclistas no incluidas en el contrato inicial), duration by 35 years occurred with the Malla Vial del
prolongando el plazo del contrato, alterando los límites de ingresos, Valle and Valle del Cauca ( mvvc)
aumentando los peajes o tarifas, alterando la asignación de riesgos concession. This renegotiation was challenged in an
debido a estimaciones inexactas y cambiando ciertas condiciones arbitration process by the subsequent government due to
dentro de los contratos. extreme financial assessments that double the expected
revenue of the concessionaire.
In some cases, concession contracts suffer from local administration. Complementary works are frequently the
opposition. A lack of local community support generally result of demands from stakeholders affected by the
implies that surrounding communities resist the use of projects, including local governments and communities,
tolls, demand complementary works for towns that have leading to a more complex project than initially envisaged
been neglected by local governments and demand job in the planning documents (Carpintero, Petersen & Helby,
opportunities during the public works. In such cases, the 2014).
“government has the incentive to provide additional
infrastructure services to surrounding communities with
the goal of obtaining political benefits, taking advantage In the aforementioned cases, changes in the original
of having a concessionaire with machinery working at the designs of the concessions were accepted by the
site that could deliver the work quickly, in other words parties, which were motivated by opportunism; private
economy of scale.” (Bitran, Nieto-Parra & Robledo, 2013) parties were able to extract more rents and public
parties obtained political and electoral revenues. The
resulting cost overruns were thus assumed by the
extension of each concession’s duration or future
payments (fiscal transfers). In addition, other cost
With regard to opposition to tolls, three examples support overruns occurred due to deficiencies in the projects,
the previous findings. The Rumichaca-Pasto-Chachaguí, largely caused by a lack of identification of the public
Ruta Caribe and Córdoba-Sucre concessions services affected (such as electricity, water, telephone
experienced local opposition to tolls. The location of the and gas), or environmental and land acquisition
tolls had to be negotiated with local community leaders underestimations. The Contingency Fund of the
and special discounts for local residents were allowed. Ministry of Finance covered these additional costs.
These negotiations impacted upon the financial
equilibrium of the contract, which had to be adjusted to
the circumstances. Despite extensive efforts by the
National Government to fix an arrangement with local
communities, one part of the Historically, renegotiations in Colombia have used future
Rumichaca-Pasto-Chachaguí concession had to be funds to pay for new concession agreements, meaning
re-taken by the state and the public works are now being that fees are paid in fiscal years that differ from those in
performed by standard procurement, namely a public which the renegotiation is made, thus postponing the
contract. fiscal gap and passing the problem to future
governments. Indeed, “between 2008 and 2010 their
use to pay renegotiations became commonplace,
allowing for costlier renegotiations. In 2010, the average
In most cases, the main cause behind renegotiations renegotiation had a fiscal cost equivalent to 65% of the
that increase the initial costs of the project is that of average ini-
changes made by the public
tial value of the contracts being renegotiated.” (Bitran, First, renegotiations imply high fiscal costs and an
Nieto-Parra & Robledo, 2013) increase in the duration of contracts, making it essential
to modify the fiscal accounting of concessions through an

In addition, the correlation between renegotiations of on-sheet balances policy to first, reduce the risk that
concessions and reelection or electoral periods cannot fiscal deficit is postponed and second, facilitate
be denied. In Colombia, the presidential reelection accountability transparency.
period lasted for 10 years (2005 to 2015). During these
years, both President Alvaro Uribe and President Juan
Manuel Santos ran for re-election and won, in 2008 and Secondly, prioritizing and planning in infrastructure
2014 respectively. The years after and before a projects should not be the result of opportunistic
reelection campaign are consistent with peaks in behavior on the part of the public party (politics and
renegotiations. The oecd electoral motivations), but rather must be governed by
serious technical studies about competitiveness and
demonstrates this in its study (Working Paper No. road system networks, as well as cost-benefit analyses.
317/2013) into increased renegotiations between 2008
and 2010 (reelection period of President Alvaro Uribe),
while 9 renegotiations were conducted by ANI from 2014
to 2015 (reelection period of President Juan Manuel Thirdly, the institutional and regulatory framework for the
Santos). Presidential re-elections were abolished by the transport infrastructure must fix two mistakes: first,
most recent constitutional reforms. insufficient project preparation and deficient
environmental, social and technical design, and second,
the opportunistic behaviors of the parties.
In light of its analysis of statistics regarding
renegotiations, the oecd argues that in Colombia it is the
public party that often prompts renegotiations, indicating With the undesirable renegotiation panorama of Colombia
political opportunistic behavior by the government in a now exposed, we turn to look at further elements required
way that dominates the hold up risk presented by the to correctly assets the real impact of the new PPP legal
private party. This also suggests that contract model and analyze litigation cases to illuminate this issue
renegotiations are principally driven by a lack of in the next section.
adequate contract designs and studies or by
opportunistic behaviors (Bitran, Nieto-Parra & Robledo,
2013).
C. Statistics of on-going litigation
Overall, several key conclusions have been Both Guasch and oecd studies have not yet anmade about past
renegotiations in Colombia alyzed litigation cases for the 25 concessions that can be used to improve future
outcomes: in Colombia. Yet several relevant observations
confirm opportunistic behavior and project preparation Extreme weather conditions: Most of the cases argued
failures within the over-renegotiation tendency. that the climate had changed as a particularly rainy
period (2010-2012) impacted projects and generated
significant cost overruns. This was presented as an
In total, according to the ani database, 24 litigation unforeseen event of force majeure.
procedures have been undertaken for arbitration clauses
in contracts for 25 concessions:
Risks allocations: The misallocation and incorrect
assessment of environmental, social and land acquisition
First, three arbitration processes went (Consorcio Vía al risks created overruns.
Mar, Santa Martha Paraguachón and Autopista de los
Llanos) against the public parties and ordered payments Unilateral decisions: Concessionaries challenged the
of less than $40,000million pesos (US$ 16million authority outlined in the contract of the public party to
dollars). But the economic expectations of applicants adopt monetary retentions or fines against the
were about $262,500 millions pesos (US$ 105 millions concessionaire.
dollars)
Given these circumstances, it can be said that:
Second, two litigation cases were finished by Hypothesis 1: The determinants of litigation conciliation (Devinar and
San Simon) and are repeatedly related to deficient studies and the public party agreed to make payments of
contract design rather than being caused by $8,500 million pesos (U$ 3.4 million dollars)
the incomplete nature of ppp contracts.
Third, 19 on-going litigations by arbitration procedure on Hypothesis 2: Financial equilibrium is a general and
concessions contracts still remain. But for the six residual legal ground for any claim and can be the scope
concession contracts, two or more arbitration tribunals of opportunistic behavior for concessionaries.
are active, signaling more than one lawsuit per contract. Furthermore, the existence of these disputes serves as a
reminder that at an early stage in the life of the project
any judgment in overall merit is inherently speculative
The causes of litigation, extracted from the lawsuit texts, (Hodge, 2004). At early stages of the contract life, the
are almost homogeneous and can be split into four judge’s role in identifying financial disequilibrium is
groups: essentially still out. This hypothesis is analyzed in detail in
the third section.
Financial equilibrium principle: In 100% of cases,
applicants claimed a breach of the financial equilibrium
principle of the contract as a principal or even residual As presented above, the history of concessions in
argument of the case. Colombia, the spread of renegotiations and
the proliferation of litigation are all relevant in an analysis of the fact that the idea on which it is based is far from
of the new ppp legal model in Colombia. Accordingly, two new (Wettenhall, 2003); indeed, it has been described by
main premises are prompted by this section regarding some as the reinvention of an old wheel (Wettenhall,
concessions failures in Colombia: First, project design 2003). It perhaps represents a novelty for citizens due to
defects should be corrected and second, the its catchy name (Hodge & Greve, 2007).
opportunistic behaviors among parties should be
controlled, avoided or mitigated.
Since the early 1990s, Colombia has used private
(contractors to provide public) infrastructure through
regular (competitive bidding arrangements for public
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK procurement contracts or concessions contracts. So the
OF PPP IN COLOMBIA use of private firms (to provide public infrastructure (is
not new (Hodge & Greve, 2007). Concessions contracts
So far, concession contracts and ppp contracts have been are based on the tasks of building, operating and
treated as synonymous, but in legal terms they need to be transferring a risk-allocation structure, just as the ppp model
distinguished between because the new ppp law has predicts.
introduced a new contractual model and the government
has launched a new corresponding program. It is important
to differentiate which new features have been adopted in With this inmind, this section is divided into four
the legislation and analyze if these legal innovations subsections to facilitate a study of the framework of ppp s in
actually amend or adjust the concessions failures outlined the Colombian legal system: the legal concept of ppp s, the
above. In the next section a legal study of the ppp model award procedure, performance and termination. Special
introduced by Law 1508/2012 is conducted. attention is given to the legal concept in order to detail the
ppp system that Colombia is using.
An important point noted in the literature is that some

countries that claim to implement A. Legal concept
ppp s in fact only use ppp s in a limited way to deliver
certain functions, and not as a structured program The international phenomenon of ppp s was fitted into
(Abdel, 2007), as is the case for Colombia. public policies and business plans within the private
sector before legislators could define and regulate it. In
fact, a tendency towards convergence and
Colombia is experiencing the rhetorical power of a new harmonization in ppp
slogan, namely the public-private partnership ( ppp) slogan, best practices is present, but a unified concept remains
but lawyers, public servants and contractors need to absent from any international agreement or international
remain aware and legally binding docu-
ment. The general rule follows that every country should – ppp s are considered the mid-point between
create its own ppp model. interventionism and liberalism. Indeed, the ppp
concept brings with it new ideas for public management:
Most authors recognize that the ppp phenomenon started extend the participation of the private sector in traditional
in the United Kingdom in 1992 under the Private Finance public duties, more private sector participation in the
Initiative. ppp s appeared as a public management tool design of public projects and increased benefits due to the
used to finance public works when public budget deficits partially private financing of public works and services.
meant that further money could not be invested into the
building of public infrastructures. Insufficient public funds
motivated the entrance of the private sector into the Professor Francoise Lichère also sustains that, given
provision of public services and works, bringing fresh the difficulty of finding a precise definition of ppp s in the
equity and capital to investments, along with private literature, a set of characteristics should instead be
expertise regarding risk management for delivery times identified. Most authors recognize four main features: (i)
and cost efficiency. task bundling (build and operate), (ii) risk transfer, (iii)
long-term contracts, and (iv) preferential use of private
finance arrangements.
As a consequence, the accessibility of private finance for

major infrastructure projects has provided governments Green Paper COM (2004) 327 of the European Commission,
with a huge credit card. On Public-Private Partnerships and Community Lawon
ppp s are simply a ‘buy now, pay later’ scheme (Hodge & Public Contracts and Concessions, confirms the well-known
Greve, 2010), and indeed the accountable features of ppp s:
management that a credit card should come with is a
first-order concern. “ The relatively long duration of the relationship, involving
cooperation between the public partner and the private
Furthermore, this new flow of capital into public projects partner on different aspects of a planned project.
represents fresh opportunities for new business and a
renewed support scheme for boosting business in difficult
times, hence political incentives for the government can The method of funding the project, in part from the
be high: “voter acquiescence, quicker promised delivery private sector, sometimes by means of complex
of infrastructure and more positive relationships with arrangements between the various players. Nonetheless,
finance and construction businesses.” (Hodge & Greve, public funds – in some cases rather substantial –may be
2010) added to the private funds.
As Lichère (2012) notes, ppp s stand half way be- The important role of the economic operator,
tween privatization and classic public provisions which participates at different stages in the
project (design, completion, implementation, funding). feasibility studies), a ‘broker’ (brings together
The public partner concentrates primarily on defining institutional and national actors), a ‘target setter’
the objectives to be attained in terms of public interest, (defines guidelines, goals, etc.).” (Peric, & Dragicevic,
quality of services provided and pricing policy, and it 2011). It appears that it will continue to perform its role
takes responsibility for monitoring compliance with of promoter, rather than regulating the field.
these objectives.
Some of the conclusions about the ppp concept made in

The distribution of risks between the public partner and the General Report should be mentioned before detailing
the private partner, to whom the risks generally borne by the specific concept adopted by the Colombian legal
the public sector are transferred [...]. The precise system:
distribution of risk is determined case by case, according
to the respective ability of the parties concerned to First, ppp contracts are not a legal innovation for legal
assess, control and cope with this risk. ” (Green Paper, systems. In fact, different forms of public-private
2004) collaboration have been presented for decades and have
evolved with diverse denominations, such as concessions.
The real novelty of ppp s is the weight given to the private
After the Commission launched the Green Paper in2004, finance function of the private party in the ppp
other documentson thesame topic followed in 2005 (EU
Commission, 2005a), (EU Commission, 2005b), along contract. The users (tariff-tolls) and the public budget will
with Interpretative Communications on the topic of pay for the project in the long run and the private party
Institutional will invest in and finance the entire works.
ppp s, Concessions and public procurement (EU
Commission, 2008) a Communication on Public Private
Partnerships in November 2009 (EU Commission, 2009b), Secondly, it can be said that ppp contracts are a
and so on. However, EU member states are essentially renovation of concessions contracts but with more
responsible for determining their own ppp approach and similarities than differences with traditional procurement
regulation, as long as it complies with the basic EU rules of processes or public works contracts. It is not possible to
procurement and does not infringe on other functions of make a total distinction.
the internal market (Samuel Colverson Summit Consulting
Group & Perera,
Thirdly, it is not feasible to distinguish between
2012). concessions, public works and ppp contracts in light of an
economic element, that is, by asking ‘who pays?’, because
Thus, “it is clear that the EU Commission has the role of for both the answer is users and the public budget (taxes).
ppp promoter, that is, the role of a ‘catalyst’ (generating The question is rather ‘who provides the financing?’
ideas and promoting
Finally, Much of the literature sustains that one lic management tool to boost investment from the private
differentiated element among standard procurement sector for public works.
systems is risk distribution. While the private party should
assume internal risks, like construction, operations, Interestingly, the payment associated with availability
finance and economic risks of work or service, the public and quality of service represents a legal innovation in the
party should retain external risks, like stability of the legal system and a new mandatory element in ppp contracts
regulatory framework, force majeure and tariff regulation. that was not present in public works contracts or
concessions contracts; it is presented in article 5º as the
retribution right. Payments in public works contracts are
made monthly according to quantities of works executed
and supplies used. Concessions are paid in relation to
i. What are PPP s in Colombia?
the achieved goals or boundary posts reached in the
project and checked by contract supervisors, no matter
Law 1508 of 2012 introduced a definition for the connectivity or functionality of the infrastructure.
ppp s in Colombia. Article 1 presents the following
elements of the concept:
Function: Instrument for involving private capital in public

projects. In article 2 of Law 1508/12 another interesting feature of
the Colombian Legal system is evident. This article
Mode: Public contract.
establishes that concession
Parties: Public entity (public authorities) and natural or contracts are understood as ppp s. Hence concessions are
legal private person. a kind of ppp, but the law does not specify other kinds,
giving freedom to legal operators in its creation. Traditional
Purpose: Provision of public goods and related services.
models of ppp
are well known: dbfm ( Design, Build, Finance, Maintain), dbfo
Special features: Risk allocation among parties and ( Design, Build, Finance, Operate), and boot ( Build, Own,
payments attached to the availability and level of quality Operate, Transfer).
service of the infrastructure and/or services.
It must be pointed out that in Colombia ppp s are legally

allowed to design and build or only build public
The Colombian definition uses the finance approach as infrastructures, but that operations and maintenance are
the principal element of the ppp mandatory (art. 3) as part of the project. The scope of
model. Since ppp s present a solution to insufficient public application for this is directly targeted at public services
funds for public infrastructure and services investment, so provision. This legislation does not mention any specific
the new Colombian ppp activity that cannot be considered a ppp proj-
Law follows this logic, presenting ppp as a pub-
ect, but other laws like Law 498 provide legal limits for should be. In any case, for the level of progress made in
the delegation of public duties, while various judicial Colombia with ppp s it is appropriate at this particular
precedents have created specific rules. It can be affirmed moment. However, some public figures wish to file a bill in
that all the activities excluded from Law 80/93 (General congress to deactivate the freeze period for
Statute of Public Procurement) do not fall within the renegotiations. Great consideration should be given to this
scope of application, for example, military or security transcendental legal rule.
facilities. Another limit is the value of the project, which
should exceed 6000 times the minimum monthly wage in
Colombia (1.5 million US dollars). Article 3 determines that all other matters about award
procedures, completion and performance of the contract,
termination and remedies that havenot beendiscussedor
regulated in the ppp law, should be ruled by the General
Additional elements that the ppp law incorporates and Statute of Public Procurement, Law 80 of 1993 and its
which differ from those of public contracts or modification Law 1150 of 2007. Law 80 of 1993 regulates
concessions are: contract length requires a maximum of all government acquisitions of public goods and services.
30 years, including prorogations (art. 6); additions have a In article 32 the right to concession for the provision of
cap of 20% of the initial budget (arts. 13 and 18). Under public services is established.
Law 80/93 there is a 50% limit of addition for standard
public procurement. Also, the new law stipulates a new
prequalification period in the award procedure.
Further legislation applicable to ppp s or infrastructure
projects still remains, 4 since the administrative regulation
issued by the Executive Branch is extensive, diverse
One specific provision deserves attention at this point. and changing. The regulatory framework of Colombia is
Article 7 stipulates a freeze period for renegotiations of complex, unclear and unstable; it is formed not only of
three years and up to three quarters of the total length of laws but also decrees, resolutions, jurisprudential rules
the project. This article represents a great tool for and interpretative communications among public
avoiding opportunistic behavior among parties. It holds oversight bodies. The regulatory framework has allowed
back predatory bids and changes in contracts because of for the manipulation of the rules of public procurement
political or electoral motivations. It is a strong instrument and contracting in topics such as fines and other
by which to protect the incentive balance and the sanctioning methods (Law 1474/11 sets the legal
equilibrium of the contract, but is still not as flexible as discussion for a new due process) and
many argue it
4. See: Law 105/93, Law 1474/11, CONPES documents for 4G Program.
limits additional contracts or complementary works (Law In conclusion, the framework must be clarify that ppp s are:
80/93 (50% of initial value), Law 1150/07 (60% of initial a) business project, b) contractual in form, and c) a type
term, no longer valid) and Law 1508/12 (20% of initial of procurement award.
value)). It also addresses the number of times the
administrative regulation of Law 1150 has been modified
(Decrees 066/08, 2474/08, 734/12 all overruled by ii. Pros and Cons of PPP s
Decree 1510/2013).
A comprehensive evaluation of the ppp phenomenon
requires an understanding of all the literature related to
As a result, this complex set of rules generates a complex favorable and unfavorable economic, management or
world, and “one which only lawyers can understand and business arguments about the ppp model. These positive
navigate at very stiff fees,” as Richard Epstein (1995) and critical opinions enlighten the subsequent
would say. Incentives are also available for opportunistic comments, recommendations and remarks that this
behavior on the part of public entities, private parties and paper proposes.
stakeholders in ppp s projects. In essence, the Colombian
legal system suffers from hypernormative inflation.
a) Main advantages of ppp s:
The main value-creating mechanisms in publicprivate

partnerships are:
After the evolution of such regulations, since
Ley 1150/07 was issued 8 years ago, it should be clear • ppp s bring efficiency from the private sector,
that simple rules can contribute to a better outcome in any combining private sector managerial abilities and
public duty. In opposition to this, complex rules reinforce proprietary know-how with public sector assets
conflictive contractual relationships with suboptimal (Kivleniece and Quelin,
welfare results for citizens. Unclear, unstable and complex 2012).
rules provide fertile land for opportunistic behavior. • Reduced fiscal pressure on government budgets,
allowing a greater capacity to spend on other policy
priorities because of the use of private funding for
infrastructure (Hodge and Greve, 2007).
An unstable regulatory framework also has some

economic consequences for contracts as “the main • The risk transfer golden rule specifies that risks are
source of regulatory risk, affecting levels of investment, transferred to the party best equipped to deal with it,
both in terms of expertise and costs, for the stability
costs of capital, and tariffs, because additional premiums
and benefit of the project.
are required to cover that risk. Credible and stable
regulation and transparent rules reduce that risk.”
(Guasch, 2004) • The ppp component of private financing has produced
better-defined contracts, better
contract management, design innovation, and services (Samuel Colverson Summit Consulting
effectively commits contractors to longterm contacts Group et al, 2012).
(Spackman, 2002). • A competitive auctioning process can result in the

• On-budget projects, because the design of selection of the most efficient operator, as well as in
optimal pricing, given that competition takes place
ppp s lasts for the entire lifecycle of a project, allow
before firms commit to investment (Guasch, 2004).
the private sector to introduce its expertise in
investment planning and efficiencies throughout the
management, operation and maintenance phases of • ppp s can be seen as ways out of a financial crisis and
the project. opportunities to boost industry; they generate growth

and provide stability for 25-30 years in written
• Bundling activities like construction and operation government contracts. They ensure private capital
provides higher-powered incentives and encourages flows, provide investment opportunities, and stimulate
the private sector to choose the most appropriate
local industry and job markets (Samuel Colverson
technology for the long term and adequately maintain it
Summit Consulting Group et al,
(Samuel Colverson Summit Consulting Group; Perera
Oshani, 2012).
2012).
• Significant cost saving compared to traditional b) Main criticisms:

procurement: better value for money in the provision
of public infrastructure (Iossa and Martimort, 2015). The potential disadvantages are:
Resulting in either lower costs or a superior product
• ppp s have lengthier tender processes than standard
for the same investment.
procurement. ppp s require longer terms to prepare
tenders due to multi-party agreements, financial
• Privatization of the finance function in ppp s, intricacies, and longagreement terms inherent in the
captures the monitoring expertise of lenders and relationship (Samuel Colverson Summit Consulting
enhances incentives for private developers to Group; et al, 2012).
complete projects on time and on budget (de
Bettignies and Ross, 2008). • An inaccurate estimation of risk transfers from the
• Increase the service quality of public works by linking public to the private sector, meaning that risk is not
payments to performance targets, thus providing an transferred to the private sector but taken on by the
incentive to perform that is absent from public standard public, creating several refinancing negotiations or
provision. unsuccessful ppp projects for the public sector
(Hodge and Greve, 2007).
• ppp s represent a political advantage for politicians.
There is strong political leverage to be claimed, as

projects are delivered on time with less impact on the • ppp s have a high tender nature and transaction costs,
budget, while providing superior quality infrastructure thus reducing the pool of private sector companies
or with the capacity to apply
for certain projects, while decreasing both government • If predicted benefits are estimated at the early stage of a
choice and competitive tender processes (Samuel long-termcontract, optimism and political sensitivity
might both increase (Hodge and Greve, 2007).
Colverson Summit Consulting Group; et al, 2012).
• Risks involved in the manipulation of valuefor-money • ppp projects suffer from reduced accountability and
methodologies biased in favor of
transparency because of the difficulty in accessing
ppp policy expansion is a big concern, since the private sector information. Furthermore, data is
value-for-money case rests almost entirely on risk spread over numerous sources, compiled differently,
transfer, for which the amount of risk transferred can and not always available to the public (Samuel
be almost exactly what is needed to tip the balance in Colverson Summit Consulting Group et al, 2012).
favor of undertaking the ppp mechanism (Hodge and
Greve, 2007).
• ppp offers limited flexibility, capacity and opportunity
• ppp might generate monopolies in favor of economic to governments in the making of future
groups, supported by exclusivity agreements, the decisions/investments in the public interest because
locking in of guaranteed profits and the controlling of governments are locked in with contracts of up to
long extensions of land or regions. Such companies several decades. Future needs cannot respond to
can control (within their projects) job creation, their individual circumstances but must adhere to
construction supplies, land acquisitions, outdated operations from previous ppp contracts
environmental impacts and transport of supplies (Hodge, 2004).
(Samuel Colverson Summit Consulting Group et al,
2012). • ppp investments have the added political advantage
of being treated as “off balance sheet” so that heavily
• The use of inaccurate discount rates for time and indebted or fiscally conservative governments could
value-of-money estimates of net benefit predict the invest in large infrastructure projects without
superiority of the economic partnership mode over
increasing the reported level of public debt
traditional delivery mechanisms. Hence the psc results
(Siemiatycki, 2011).
dependent on the discount rate adopted in the
analysis (Hodge and Greve, 2007).
• High rates of litigation, delays and hold ups in ppp s are
the result of complex and multitask agreements.
Disputes take longer to be settled and any unforeseen
• ppp s as a business might cover costs plus make a
eventualities that take place in future years involve a
return on investment, which could lead to higher
lengthy renegotiation of the contract (Samuel
consumer prices than traditional procurement. There
Colverson Summit Consulting Group et al, 2012).
is a potential source of abuse for user fees (Samuel
Colverson Summit Consulting Group; et al,
• The private sector is not impervious to project
stoppages. The start of projects is also
2012).
delayed by the political debate and public opposition risks and other critical elements of information were not
(communities) that can surround fully available upon initiation. The law has thus brought
ppp projects (Samuel Colverson Summit Consulting transparency to the process.

Group et al, 2012).
• An overreliance on external consultants also leads to an Furthermore, Colombia’s legislation does not introduce
expertise-scape, where any knowledge gathered the negotiation stage during the award procedure for
throughout projects is not retained by public bodies, public initiatives, but several public hearings are
making it difficult to build knowledge and lessons for
accommodated for in the regulation before and after the
other projects or other phases of the project cycle,
award procedure officially begins, for example, risks
such as contractual management (Samuel Colverson
Summit Consulting Group et al, hearing. In these spaces, potential tenders and
stakeholders are listened to by the public administration
in a constructive process.
2012).
Also, it is necessary to clarify that Colombian law brings a

B. Award procedure particular division to types of ppp:
public initiatives and private initiatives of public-private
ppp s are characterized by a longer procurement process partnerships contracts. Regulations separate the origins
and higher costs of bidding than traditional procurement of the project, whether private (arts. 14-21) or public
(Iossa &Martimort, 2015). (arts. 9-13). Hence when a project is conceived, project
preparations (engineering studies, environmental and
As mentioned before, article 3 determines that all other social impact and risks assessments are calculated)
matters about award procedures, completion and made by the public entity will contain some provisions in
performance of the contract, termination and remedies order to be launched into the public procurement contest.
that have not been discussed or regulated in the ppp law, But when the opposite occurs, a private party will
should be ruled by Law 80 of 1993 and Law 1150 of 2007. propose one specific project to the public entity, conduct
all the studies and calculations, and the public party will
evaluate the pertinence of the project. Its financial
However, Law 1508/12 does stipulate a new structure will have severe restrictions in terms of asking
prequalification period in the award procedure with the for public funds (cap of 20%). If the project is accepted it
objective of forming a shortlist of tenders. This stage has will remain published for a period of waiting during which
been criticized because it adds more time to the award new tenders and bids from third parties can be
process (7-9 months are required instead of 4-6 submitted. In case another bid should appear, a contest
months). Potential tenders in the 4G Program were not procedure will open and the
fully informed of the scope of ppp projects because all
technical studies, environmental
original tender will be given some advantage, otherwise, use of the value for money method that prefers ppp s to
with no new tenders the ppp contract will be awarded traditional procurements, without taking into account real
directly to the original tender. costs, potential delays and the risks of renegotiation.
Hence ppp Law 1508/12, with some unpredictable
An enormous effort has been made for the wisdom, has created a multipart arrangement for ppp
standardization of procedures, documents and contracts
in the 4G Program, generating progress in the creation approvals.
of transparency in public procurement. It is argued that
the results of this success can be seen in the awarding The next graphic is an illustration of a public initiative
of more than 20 ppp s for road concessions by ani process of approvals according to ppp
Law and Decree 1467/12:
so far. Another component is also important, namely the
selection and formation of public servants. Investment in
the formation of qualifications and salaries for public Figure 1. ppp s public initiative procedure
agents involved in ppp projects it sculpted in a new
positive image in the award procedures for the national
government along with its potential investors.
However, before continuing to talk about the award

procedure, some words need to be said about the
previous stage, the preparation of the project and its
selection as a ppp.
Several institutions are involved in Colombia’s selection

and evaluation of ppp s for transport infrastructure. These Source: Author
include the Ministry of Finance, the National Planning
Department ( dnp), the National Council for Economic and
Social Planning ( conpes), the Superior Council of Fiscal Actually, the most important task for ppp approval is
Policy ( confis), the Ministry of Transport and the National performed by the dnp ( Department of National Planning)
Agency of Infrastructure. This chain of approval is in fact and Ministry of Finance. The dnp looks at the coherence
a chain of checks and balances for the ppp model. of the infrastructure and road investments in relation to
the overall needs of the country, it conducts a
cost-benefit analysis of the projects and applies the psc comparator
by comparing the project under both ppp procurement
As mentioned, the principal criticisms of the and public
ppp model relate to an inadequate or biased
sector traditional delivery in order to establish ppp s expressed by the main political figures and
ppp viability (Resolution No. 3656/2012). The Ministry of parties, with some stability over time being crucial
Finance reviews the numbers, ensuring coherence with (Verhoest et al, 2015). The consequences of
the budget, checks that the risks are covered and well unstable rules have already been mentioned.
allocated, and the contractual conditions reasonable.
ii) The efforts and investments of professional and

For its part, the National Infrastructure Agency ( ani) was capable teams in ANI will not end in paying electoral
created to develop and run the 4G Program and all debts due to these strategic positions. As the oecd recommends,
infrastructure concessions like ports, airports and railways, “it is necessary to follow hiring schemes that
with better administrative capacity, qualified professionals encourage professionalization, specializa-
and technical expertise in the design, awarding and
monitoring of public contracts. However, the ani tion, and the development of a civil service that is
independent from the political cycle and is capable of
performs, at the same time, functions related to project using sophisticated tools for planning, evaluation and
structure, allocation and monitoring, producing an monitoring.”
overlapping of responsibilities and conflict of interests, or, ( oecd/eclac, 2013)
at least, perverse incentives (Nieto-Parra, Olivera &
Tibocha, 2013). Independent project preparation in the iii) The independence and technical approach of ANI
monitoring and regulating of activities is necessary in the policy cannot be compromised, therefore project
checks and balances of the ppp chain. preparation, contractual management and monitoring
among the regulatory functions should be separated
since there are different roles that cause conflicts of
Despite the recently improved institutional and regulatory interest: business seller, commercial partner and
framework of ppp s, which brought some satisfactory authority. This points to the recommendation of the
results and transparency in award procedures for the 4G existence of a dedicated
Program, the challenge of preserving good intentions in
the model remains in five particular ways: ppp unit as one crucial element to support
ppp success (Verhoest et al, 2015).
i) The leadership of political figures, like the iv) Lower participation in the bidding process (two or
vice-president of Colombia, in the 4G Program three tenders) not only attests to complex contractual
should not bias the selection of projects and value for arrangements, but also represents an example of how
money analysis towards electoral targets and ppp s limit competition. The role of sme s as
preferences (a latent risk). However, this statement stakeholders in ppp projects deserves deeper analysis
does not deny the importance of clear political from public entities.
support for
v) The selection of projects for ppp s should be public service networks (gas, telephone, energy or oil
guarded because it is a guarantee of limits on the tubes). A micromanagement implementation for these
opportunistic behavior of the parties. Since in Colombia specific and sensitive circumstances could be a
private initiatives for ppp s recommended strategy and one extracted from the
are reinforced by the ppp law, the stringency of value experience of working with nine problematic concessions.
for money should be maintained in order to avoid A weekly chart report and multidisciplinary teams are
regulators capturing risk by economic groups of being used in the ani to solve smaller difficulties.
interest or undesirable influence in project selection
priority. So far, 10 private initiatives have been
approved using the new ppp law.
Most of the authors question the accountability of ppp s.
The quantity and quality of information available for
concessions performance is characterized by being
C. Performance disperse, imprecise, undisclosed and deficient in critical
aspects like on-time execution and on-budget execution.
According to the literature, during the execution or An ANI public hearing in the regions of the projects with
performance stage of the contract, several phases can all the local authorities and leaders is the ideal
be distinguished: contract completion, financial closure, mechanism for overcoming this problem. Local leaders
operation and maintenance. But since this stage has not and communities will follow the track of the project and
been reached yet for the 4G Program, not many not forget or miss environmental impacts, increases in
comments can be made. tariffs and quality of services, which are usually forgotten
when governments change.
Perhaps the most important remark is related to forming

good teams familiar with or capable of performing the
appropriate contractual management within the role of Moreover, information about renegotiations would have
commercial partner, thus foreseeing optimal public to be placed in no less than three years, unless the ppp law
results. The learning process for the project preparation is changed before by the actual government as recent
and tendering processes must be transferred via a news suggests; information should be disclosed and
bidirectional communication channel. explained to stakeholders, including directly affected
communities, before signing. Otherwise, the opportunistic
behavior of public and private interests will break down
Special attention and monitoring should be given to the ppp financial model and the logic of using this type of
bottleneck circumstances that have traditionally contract. The communities’ reasonable opposition is a
paralyzed important projects, such as social opposition, useful instrument in avoiding the repetition
land acquisition processes, environmental licenses, and
transference of
of the perverse renegotiations of concessions be transferred to the state when the partnerin Colombia and their
overruns and delays. ship is over.
On the other hand, the community consultation process The new ppp law makes it compulsory in ppp
(indigenous and Afro-Colombian) is a pending regulative contracts to stipulate a specific mathematical formula in
duty to be fulfilled by the government in the short term. case of mutual or unilateral termination. However, Law
The unclear regulatory framework not only causes 105/93 limits this unilateral power for concessions during
litigation and project paralysis (Ruta del Sol III) but also the operation phase; this article cannot been overruled
produces an undesirable incentive for rent extraction because it represents a guarantee for the private party’s
from communities to ppp projects. However, it requires a recovery of its investment in this phase. As the final point
whole new study to cover all the constitutional principles of the legal study, it is necessary to mention that the
and rights involved in the community consultation natural judge of ppp
process and its practical difficulties for implementation.
contracts according to the Colombian legal system is the
administrative judge. However, due to judicial congestion
a delay of more than 10 years exists for unresolved
disputes. Public policy adopts an arbitration clause as an
alternative mechanism for dispute resolution, which is
D. Termination internationally recommended because a costly justice is
preferable to delayed or absent justice.
The termination of the ppp project is projected to occur 30
years from now, and so policy makers or legislators barely
consider it.
Probably the most important activity is the transference III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE PPP LEGAL
of infrastructure operations to the public administration MODEL IN COLOMBIA
or a new private party. Terminating a ppp project is like
closing an enterprise after three decades: all bills must Viewed from a critical perspective, policy makers should
be cleared up and paid among the parties, and all the be careful about how they approach the analysis of ppp s.
goods delivered to the right party and workers released Consumers, users and citizens must be aware of how
and settled. It could be a slow struggle and long governments deliberately change discourse in the pursuit
administrative process. Hence the new ppp law foresees of obtaining policy votes from more supporters and how
this situation and article 31 establishes a mandatory this new practice is introduced through the construction of
provision for ppp contracts: a specification of goods meaning (Hodge & Greve,
(movable or immovable properties) to
2007). In Colombia, in governmental terms,
ppp s represent the promise of an infrastructure
revolution, economic prosperity and the reversing of the ing and traffic studies and efforts to make better
infrastructure lag. assessments of environmental, social and land
acquisition risks. Other improvements include the
Indeed, ppp s can be an effective and efficient model if well rigorous analysis of risk allocations and a
adjusted to the context. In other words, every country well-constructed chain of value for money analysis for ppp
should tailor its own set of ppp s. Hence this document projects that does not favor concessions over traditional
aims to analyze if the new model transplanted into the public projects. Hence adequate project planning and
legal system and public rhetoric has learnt from previous design would indicate that some causes of concessions
mistakes. deficits, higher than expected costs along with
lower-than-expected traffic (Guasch, Laffont & Straub,
2008), are being threatened by the reforms.
Failures in previous generations of concessions in
Colombia amount to: i) deficient project
preparation/contract design, ii) opportunistic
behavior-renegotiations, and iii) unstable, complex and Remarkable work has been done with the tendering
inadequate regulatory and institutional frameworks. This process, today recognized by the private sector as
section will center on transparent and trustworthy. The standardization of
ii). procurement procedures and documents, especially the
standard contract and prequalification stage, has
The government has made important improvements in transformed administrative practices in Colombia and
the regulatory framework and the institutional reduced corruption.
framework of ppp s. ppp Law No.1508/12 has been
analyzed in section II and its principal features
highlighted, and a stable and simple set of rules There are incentives present in terms of the tendering
recommended. process that are used to avoid predatory bids: an inferior
limit (80-90%) of the official value of the project and each
The National Infrastructure Agency ( ani) has been bidder is required to propose an expected future public
transformed to support the 4G Program, with greater payment with a superior limit for the public budget.
administrative capacity and technical expertise in the According to the number of bidders, a formula is applied
design and monitoring of contracts, better salaries and to assign points in the economic proposal. Also, winning
professional personal and business-oriented strategies, a bid requires a technical offer and a commitment to the
guided by Luis Fernando Andrade, former McKinsey use of national industrial supplies.
Country Director.
Project preparation has undergone a big trans- By law, concessionaire payments are tight in orformation in a positive
sense: better engineer- der to meet the quality index and the availabil-
ity of the service as a correct incentive to guarantee the Following this argument, it is argued that the root of the
adequate execution of public works. problem arises with the multiple role that public partners
play in the contract since these are intrinsically

However, an evaluation of ppp s would logically touch upon contradictory roles: representing a contractual
the renegotiations issue. If ani repeats the pattern of weak counterpart to the private actor and, simultaneously, from
governance in the contract – a lack of monitoring, the an institutional perspective, a political authority shaping
absence of a fiscal accounting system, a failure to honor the overall context of economic activity through a variety
the terms of concession contracts and introduce unilateral of legislative, normative and administrative means. This
changes (regulatory risk), and pursue electoral interests – dual role besets the public agents with an uneasy choice
the 4G Program will generate catastrophic overruns and between value creation and capture, because they
delays since 4G investment is superior to that seen for simultaneously face the contradictory incentives of
the 1G, 2G and 3G concessions taken together. securing wider collective interests and maintaining the
overall institutional “rules of the game” while maximizing
political benefits, such as reelection or extended control
over public resources (Iossa & Martimort, 2015).
Economic theory suggests that agency costs, transaction
costs and contract incompleteness will be present in the
4G Program and will impact the social outcome. Also,
both moral hazard and adverse selection problems may
arise. The separation of commercial and governance roles for
the public party is not easy, and is clearly a challenge for
As a matter of fact, in a world of ‘incomplete’ contracts, the 4G Program implementation process. ani could not
where it is difficult to foresee and contract for uncertain continue to confuse the roles of ppp policy advocate,
future events, it is important to get the incentive structure project promoter, manager, planner, legislator, contract
right (Hoppe & Schmitz, 2013). At the planning stage, developer, contract regulator, financial supervisor, project
the agent must be motivated to create better (designed assessor (Hodge, 2004), and electoral source of
projects. At the implementation stage, public and private governmental image and regional resources.
parties must be incentivized to efficiently manage and
use disclosed information (Iossa & Martimort, 2012). The
incomplete contract dynamics of ppp s are thus related to
the cost of flexibility and adaptations over the life of the In the case of a private partner, the private contractor
contract – it is a trade-off between incentives to perform enters into a long-term relationship with the public sector
as planned and the likelihood of flexibility through and simply wants to raisemaximum revenue by granting
renegotiations (Iossa & Martimort, 2015). the right to act as a monopolist (Bovaird, 2004), which
may create scope for the private party to engage in
rentseeking behavior (Hoppe & Schmitz, 2013).
In such a context, the relationship between the public forgo the partnership opportunity altogether or may opt
party and private party is highly complex and covers for a governance structure of least hazards, even if it
several private interests that incentivize deviation from the means choosing a less optimal arrangement in light of
public interest or service provisions that a ppp project other contextual requirements surrounding the
represents. It becomes a social dilemma in which collaboration (Ilze & Bertrand, 2012).
individual efforts to capture higher payoffs undermine a
socially optimal outcome, leading to potential partnership
failures (Ilze & Bertrand, 2012). Despite the tripartite approach that the ppp approach can
offer, an appreciation of value captures tensions in ppp projects
and might lead to renegotiation. The ppp model goes
But there is a third part that completes the structure of a pppbeyond such a composition and a better comprehensive
’s basic or primary relationships: users or citizens. They understanding will reveal howmany others actors play a
should be considered as individuals and as communities specific role within a check and balances structure, in
directly affected by the project. order to guarantee the real goal of the ppp project: optimal
welfare and the provision of public services.
When citizens perceive private parties as transgressors,

that is, they disagree with the contract conditions, tolls or
scope of the project, they are likely to suffer from Consequently, the next graphic comes from Kivleniece
diminished community or local support and threatened and Quelin’s Tripartite Model of Value Tensions (2012)
access to resources, as well as unofficial punishment, and captures the intricacy of agent behaviors when
such as public shaming, boycotts and negative press seeking to maximize private revenue or political benefits
coverage, leading to further stakeholder pressure, loss of (red lines: rent extraction, political or electoral bias,
reputation and potential stigmatization (Ilze & Bertrand, moral hazard, private information, risk of hold ups),
2012). rather than looking to the public interest inherent in
public service provision (purple lines).
It could also be that communities foresee an opportunity

to capture rents from the private party, for example, job
creation opportunities and additional local works. A higher Since this behavior is expected from the parties and will
degree of citizen mobilization and increased pressure for dominate performance during the contract period, a
local benefits are therefore more likely. whole set of instruments and players is put in place to
act as behavioral boundaries. Insurance guarantees,
equity investors, financial lenders, controller public
As a consequence, firms anticipating important external authorities, external supervision and stakeholders thus
third party mobilization and involving behaviors prior to appear at the contractual scene
engagement may decide to
in order to offer monitoring activities to money Game Theory
investment, reveal private information or asymmetric
information, cover solvency risks, reduce adverse Moving further into an analysis inside economic theory,
selection and moral hazard, offer social control and take the methodology selected is that of game theory, which
disciplinary measures. relates to a usual agency problem.
Diverse principals, bundles in the public party position

Figure 2. Opportunistic behavior in ppp s: a
(e.g. Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Finance and other
multipartite model of constraints
local authorities, such as governors or mayors and the
National Agency of Infrastructure) look for their duties in
providing public works or services that should be
executed by one agent (private concessionaries, actors in
charge of the implementation bot of public works).
Information, private incentives and enforcement

problems cause different transaction costs that affect
political relations and outputs
Source: Author based on Kivleniece and Quelin’s Tripar- for public provisions.
tite Model of Value Tensions (2012)
The following game studies the interactions between

agents (private concessionaires) and the public
The above figure illustrates the design order of the ppp modelauthority ( ani) during the performance period or
adopted in Colombia and rests on the simple idea that post-completion stage of the
self-interest, personal or political ambitions and individual ppp contract when renegotiation is allowed and overruns
benefits are perfectly predictable in any contract emerge. The parties have two options: renegotiation or
dynamic. no-renegotiation.
The decision-making process of the public and private

All the regulatory, contractual and institutional parties is shown in the following figures, with two different
instruments are settled to avoid this dominant private results emerging between the public and private parties;
interest in the behavior exhibited by the parties, the first does not have a dominant preference while the
however, there is still scope for perverse renegotiations, second goes for renegotiation and establishes the
as game theory indicates. dominant strategy in the game.
Figure 3. Public party Figure 4. Private party
decision-making process decision-making process
Source: Author Source: Author
The public party cannot easily identify legitimate or For the private party the analysis is similar but the
illegitimate intentions (opportunistic behavior) in the outcome will determine a dominant strategy for
private party in relation to renegotiation. It could run the renegotiation. Non-renegotiation seems improbable
strategy of signaling itself as a strong party with little because it suggests a quitting of the contract and the
space for renegotiation, as Guasch (2004) suggests, initiation of a litigation process. On the other hand,
while fear of rejecting legitimate renegotiations will end renegotiation implies a rent extraction opportunity or the
in the systematic failure of the 4G Program. rescuing of the contract from truly unforeseen
circumstances.
On the other hand, renegotiation opens opportunities for The private party would expect opportunistic behavior
public opportunistic behavior in pursuit of electoral and from the public party, but it has a stronger bargaining
political interests, such as adding strategic stretches or power due to asymmetric information (it controls the
complementary words not present in the initial scope, all project information and development) and can predict
without public contest, or altering risk allocation to gain that the public party will fear the systematic failure of the
concessionaire support and thus financial power: electoral 4G Program, preferring to renegotiate. In other words,
cycles may induce incumbents to invest in order to “once the contract is signed, governments usually
guarantee their election or re-election (Domingues & cannot afford the political cost of letting the concession
Zlatkovic, 2015). In the renegotiation decision a good and fail, which generates hold-up risk.” (Bitran, Nieto-Parra
sincere renegotiation may occur. & Robledo, 2013)
As Guasch (2004) argues, “renegotiation is a strategic Similarly, private equity investors and lenders could
and rational response to the concession environment encourage opportunistic behaviors for private parties in
and to the costs and likelihood of renegotiation success. any renegotiation process because this would provide a
The friendlier the environment and the less costly such source of income that would lead to the quickest
action is, the more likely are claims for renegotiation.” recovery of investment.
As a result, even when the design of the ppp

The following Figure 5 integrates an independent model tries to withhold the opportunistic behavior of
strategic analysis of the parties, which ends with a parties, but the inherent self-interests of parties involve a
dominant strategy for the private party of renegotiation public-private partnership, undesirable renegotiations
and opportunistic behavior for both. may occur. It is thus possible to bridge the gap of
opportunistic behavior but never close it and this is
indeed inherent to the nature of the public-private
partnership.
Figure 5. Game theory analysis
Therefore, in order to keep constraining the opportunistic

behavior of parties in ppp s, some recommendations that
Colombia needs to fully implement are as follows:
In the first place, the release and publication of

renegotiation information to stakeholders to reveal
opportunistic interests and control good faith in new
Source: Author
arrangements.
Furthermore, in this analysis, the third party (citizens or In the second place, adopt ex-post and accurate
users) would not oppose renegotiation if the additional evaluations of ppp projects at the executive level to
works would benefit them directly. Only arrangements that improve accountability and disclose the welfare outcomes
increase tolls or tariffs or do not benefit local communities of the 4G Program. Standard and periodical evaluations
would suffer from social opposition. Furthermore, if the by independent parties should be implemented and
quality of information about renegotiations is deficient or discussed with authorities, parties and stakeholders.
secret, future fiscal impact cannot be perceived as
providing a counterbalance by controllers public
authorities. In the same way, “renegotiation can be seen as ‘a
possibility of Pareto improving deals to
account for changes in the environment or in agents’ Fourth, traffic forecast update (with real data from the
preferences’; effective contractual agreements must first years of operation). Updating traffic forecasts with
provide strategic goals and the tools to achieve them.” real data from operations is also a positive feature for
(Domingues & Zlatkovic, 2015). renegotiation since the financial performance of the
concession depends on demand (Ribeiro et al, 2015).
Accordingly, some strategies that public entities may

apply to the pursuit of welfare-based renegotiations are: Fifth, revenue risk transferred to a private partner. A
positive result from renegotiation should be that revenue
risk is transferred to the concessionaire. Colombia needs
First, build trust-based relations among all the actors of to limit and better define the financial equilibrium principle
the ppp model: public-private parties, investors, lenders, and the guarantee of utility in public contracts (Law 80 of
users, citizens, controller authorities, and external 1993).
supervision parties. Then communication between agents
must improve and information must flow.
The equilibrium principle has been misunderstood and
perhaps badly applied, since in economic terms the
Second, a priori programmed renegotiations. private party is able tomanipulate it to transferred -back
Programmed renegotiations are related to contract the commercial risk:
duration, formalizing moments of partner discussion for
adjustments that can thus be budgeted for to avoid “Another element that needs to be very clearly stated
unexpected transaction costs (Ribeiro et al, 2015), with in the financial equilibrium clause of the contract is the
the possibility of identifying and defining triggers for period of application. The period of application refers
renegotiations beforehand( in the contract. The freeze to the period of time over which the financial
period of Law 1508/12 should be keep as an important equilibrium is evaluated, and in principle it could range
instrument for the avoidance of depredatory bids. from one year to the life of the concession. Both of
these extreme points are inappropriate; a
three-to-five-year period seems more appropriate. If
that period is not clearly stated, operators will choose
Third, fewer advance payments from the state. The fact the shortest period when the financial results have
that concessionaries stopped receiving advance been deficient, and the longest period when the
payments from the state is considered a success in the financial results are very good. The choice of the
4G Program; it means that the concession is financially relevant period has been a source of conflict when it
viable and provides a correct incentive for investing was not properly specified. Finally, the principle of
equity and private finance in public works. financial equilibrium should
be an ex ante consideration and not ex post any excess in the management of credit card
market outcome, in the sense that it should purchases.
not bail the operator out for adverse realiza-
tions of normal commercial risk”. ( Author’s Furthermore, it is difficult to judge whether

emphasis.) (Guasch, 2004). ppp s are the next chapter in the privatization wave, a
new set of rules and norms for the standard contract, the
Lastly, the claw-back mechanism allows for the sharing correct path to bridge the infrastructure gap, or another
of the upside of revenues between the state and promise in our continuing search to improve public
concessionaires and must be considered a logical sector service performance. What can be said is that the
economic principle in publicprivate arrangements (Ribeiro PPP model has larger implications for the legal,
et al, 2015). Not only when the contract is in deficit economic and political contexts of the country.
should the State bail out the concessionaire, but surplus
must be distributed or reintegrated into the public budget.
It should be encourage in lawyers and civil servants and

even in foolish citizens to abandon the idea that new
regulatory frameworks or transplant models will
IV. CONCLUSION AND automatically disappear and deter undesirable behavior
RECOMMENDATIONS of contract parties and will avoid inefficient outcomes.
There is not magic potion or logic predetermined
ppp road infrastructure projects in Colombia have been operation to install in the legal system in order to
discussed extensively herein, pointing out that major contracting out public services with optimal welfare
drawbacks include the risk of perverse renegotiations outcomes.
that would benefit private companies and politicians
using public resources. Traditional mechanisms and
instruments like improved project preparation and As Hayek (1945) sustained in his economic analyses,
contract-design incentives, or improved institutional and new contracting models for public procurement are not
regulatory frameworks, serve as powerful constraints on problems of logic with predictable solutions. A country
opportunistic behavior but are unable to erase the cannot gather in legal box best practices,
underlying dynamics. recommendations of international consultants and
organizations, standard documents, public policies, and
a set of regulations in order to easily create a suitable
and reliable outcome. Most likely, when you open the
The ppp model is a “mega credit card” onto which box, you let free all the evils of public procurement,
governments charge infrastructure deals and bills are resembling a Pandora Box.
collected through taxes or tolls. In the end, users and
citizens will pay for
An understanding of the complexities, dynamics and Secondly, citizens have the right to clear and explicit
synergies of public-private partnerships is better suited to project and finance details, and increased
protecting and enhancing the public interest in public transparency, including the interest rate under which
procurement. This is so because the interactions of several the government signs any contract, along with a clear
actors and their self-interests and ambitions will emerge in specification of ‘the deal’ endorsed. In the absence of
a spontaneous order rather than following a strict ppp design. this, the political purchase of huge infrastructure
projects will continue to leave citizens open to
opportunistic renegotiations hampered by political and
commercial trade-offs (Hodge,
Public service ethics and public service motivations
must be defended and strengthened, so that the public 2004).
sector can hold back political pressures and act in the
public interest. The key message is that ppp projects Thirdly, Colombia needs a pipeline of ppp projects that
involve long-term relationships. Success can only be give coherence to thenetwork of transportation and
achieved if the public authority and the contractor separate planning stages free from political bias. A ppp unit
approach the project in a spirit of partnership, is one alternative that might contribute to unmixed ANI
understanding each other’s business and interests, and multiple roles (policy advocate, economic developer,
holding a common vision as to how best they can work steward for public funds, elected representative for
together (Spackman, 2002), but while being respectful of decision-making, regulator of contract life, commercial
the provision of a public service as the main goal. signatory to the contract and planner) (Hodge & Greve,
2010) within the 4G Program.
There exists some scope for general recommendations

made in addition to those present in each section of this The ppp unit that the literature recommends for countries
thesis. These touch upon the main threats and in the early stages of the development and
challenges of the 4G Program: implementation of ppp s represents a real center of
expertise, with the gathering together of knowledge and
provision of the capacity to improve ppp operations via
First, it is critical that, with the huge financial resources the points listed (SCS Consulting Group & Perera,
at stake in the 4G Program, the priorities of democratic
debate, transparency and clarity are provided for. With 2012):
contract decisions covering dozens of future
government terms (2015-3038) these contracts also Policy guidance: Developing and advising on policies,
need to be optimal in the technical sense (Hodge, procedures, guidelines and legislation. Key function for
the development of new
2004). ppp s in regional and local governments.
Technical support: Assisting government authorities Furthermore, public agencies should better collect and
throughout the ppp project cycle. Relevant task of disseminate data on the outcomes of large transportation
transferring and teaching contract management theory to infrastructure projects as a way to support learning from
diverse and disperse public authorities. past experiences and systematically identify the
strengths and weaknesses of delivering large
infrastructure projects through ppp s. National government
Capacity building: Training and education of public sector should develop databases that compile both financial
servers through professionalization or specialization and nonfinancial information on project performance
courses. (Siemiatycki, 2010).
Promotion: Ensuring awareness and understanding of ppp

s within the private and public sectors and the wider Besides, the dominant optimism (biased or not) in the 4G
(community ( scs Consulting Group & Perera, 2012). Program is overwhelming and should be systematically
followed and examined by civil society: academics, ngo s,
and so on. If the 4G Program is contaminated by political
Fourthly, environmental and social sustainability have yet opportunism or by inadequate contractual renegotiations,
to be implemented in ppp contracts. It is necessary to or by inflated traffic demand forecasts, a severe
ensure that the public sector maintains a reasonable misallocation of governmental funds would occur to the
level of control and influence over the impact of projects. detriment of education, health and peace policies
Unless environmental, social and development (Domingues &Zlatkovic, 2015).
safeguards are enforced in ppp contracts, the private
sector may seek to act only in its own interests, which
may not necessarily be those of the society (SCS
Consulting Group & Perera, Finally, ppp s are vulnerable to economic cycles.
ppp transport contracts, given their inherent dependence,
2012). are exposed to exogenous risks. Fluctuations of a few

percentage points in macro-economic growth, interest or
In addition, it should be examined whether the ppp model exchange rates can all have an important impact on a
reduces the flexibility of current and future planning for project, moving from success to failure: the oil price drop
the government because ppp contracts imply 25-30 that the world is facing represents a public income deficit
years of a fixed project. Planners should develop for Colombia since the majority of rents come from the
strategies that preserve government flexibility to plan oil and gas sector or the revaluation of the US dollar
for future community needs or incoming innovations for (part of the private finance debt is in USD). Although
public transportation without violating the terms of the both public and private partners have little control over
contract (Siemiatycki, 2010). macro-economic shocks, “under-
standing the degree of volatility of the uncertainty 6. Bettignies a, Jean-Etienne de; Ross, Thomas W.
around these shocks may help limiting the downside (2008), Public–Private Partnerships And The
and benefiting from the upside in case those risks Privatization Of Financing: An Incomplete Contracts
materialize.” (Domingues &Zlatkovic, 2015). Approach, International Journal of Industrial
Organization 26 (2008) 393–411.
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LA CUARTA GENERACIÓN DE CONCESIONES VIALES EN COLOMBIA Y EL NUEVO

PAGS aola a. l Arrahondo C.

Universidad de los Andes

PAGS aola a. l Arrahondo C. 1

que mi lector adquiriera el hábito de ver uno y otro y

modelo es un método de contratación pública más apropiado,

tradicionales de contratación pública, como los contratos de

eficacia. Los ciudadanos que pagan por estos proyectos se

& Greve, 2010).

más de 24 mil millones de dólares estadounidenses (47 mil

millones de pesos colombianos) en inversión en

infraestructura vial. Se ejecutará en un período de ocho años

ppp es un método nuevo y cada vez más popular

2. CONPES 3760 de 2013.

En este contexto, los contratos de concesiones representan

importante de la red de infraestructura de transporte y, por lo implica la transferencia al concesionario de un riesgo

Sin embargo, como el ocde estados, se espera

implicaciones del ppp El modelo de acuerdo a experiencias

previas de renegociaciones y altos índices de litigio en

por valor de USD 5.600 millones y 131 años de plazo adicional

de concesión. Estos también han agregado alrededor de 1000

cada concesión sobre la implementación de la ppp modelo en Colombia

preguntando, ¿Colombia ha solucionado lo que salió mal?

internas de la Agencia Nacional de Infraestructura (en ejecución y iv) rescisión.

adelante ANI), dado que el autor se desempeñó como

La Sección II contiene un estudio legal de la ppp modelo

un políticos y la corrupción deben evitarse en todos ppp Contratos.

inversiones en consultoría internacional y privada de Colombia

podrían volver a fallar. Las probabilidades deben cambiarse para

favorecer el éxito. En el “Informe de Expertos en Infraestructura” (Angulo,

Benavides, Carrizosa et al, 2012), los especialistas contratados

cómo poner en marcha una “locomotora de infraestructura”

I. EL CONTEXTO COLOMBIANO: CUARTA tardaron más de un año en brindar un análisis de brechas de el

informe propuso varias soluciones que superarían conocidos

el bienestar social óptimo del proyecto.

El país ha utilizado contratos de concesión de carreteras para

la provisión de carreteras durante más de 20 años. Un

tarifas altas de litigio. institucionales adversas también son importantes (Iossa y

Martimort, 2015). Los servidores públicos a menudo sufren de

memoria selectiva y entre cambios de gobierno se pierde

gobierno se ha identificado como el principal

3. Para mayor información ver: CONPES 3489 de 2007.

haber aumentado la presencia de errores de planificación o una

demanda de tráfico, peajes, tarifas, construcción (excepto

2012. sobrecostos), adquisición de terrenos y licencias ambientales.

Con el fin de estudiar las concesiones aplicadas hasta la

generaciones de ppp s. mínimos se calcularon utilizando estimaciones de tráfico de

estudios preliminares y fueron sesgadas positivamente, lo que

dio lugar a garantías excesivas para los concesionarios.

A. Historia de las concesiones

Además, no se obtuvieron permisos ambientales y la

gubernamentales. mous retrasos en la entrega de infraestructura.

mientras que la falta de evaluación financiera de los postores dejó prestamistas.

en riesgo el presupuesto público.

En cuanto a la asignación de riesgos, se aplicó una consideración más

detallada de la asignación de riesgos, y tanto el tráfico de demanda

renegociaciones antes de que pudiera restablecerse el gobierno, lo que provocó retrasos.

equilibrio económico del concesionario (Neves, 2012).

En este punto, podemos afirmar que se introdujo una

Las principales características de este período de contratos

licitador que proponga un nivel futuro esperado de ingresos