Foreign Policy Analysis^

A Com parative introdyctioo

Marijke Breuning

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F o u e ig n P o lic y A n a ly s is

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P rin te d in th e U n ite d S tates o f A m e ric a .

 ©intents

List o f Tables vii

Preface ix
C h a p te r 1 W h y S tu d y F o reig n P olicy C o m p arativ ely ? 1
C h a p te r 2 D o L eaders S h ap e F o reig n Policy? 27
C h a p te r 3 H o w L eaders M ak e Sense o f th e W o rld 53
C h a p te r 4 L eaders A re N o t A lone: T h e R ole o f
A dvisors a n d B u re a u c ra cie s 85
C h a p te r 5 L eaders in C o n te x t I: D o m e stic
C o n s tra in ts o n F o reig n Policy M a k in g 115
C h a p te r 6 L eaders in C o n te x t II: In te rn a tio n a l
C o n s tra in ts o n F o reig n P olicy M a k in g 141
C h a p te r 7 W h o o r W h a t D e te rm in e s F o reig n Policy? 163
G lossary 177

b ib lio g rap h y 187

In d ex 203
x PREFACE

th e ro a d to th e c o m p le tio n o f th is p ro je c t. I ow e a g re a t d e b t to th e se a n d
m a n y o th e r in d iv id u a ls w h o have, in sm all a n d larg e w ays, s h a p e d m y
th in k in g a b o u t th e field o f fo reig n p o lic y analysis. O f c o u rse, th e re s p o n si­
b ility fo r th e fin al p ro d u c t is m in e a lo n e.
L ast, b u t n o t least, I w a n t th a n k m y sp o u se, Jo h n , a n d m y d a u g h te rs,
Fasika a n d B edelw a. You d eserv e m y u n d iv id e d a tte n tio n , b u t a c cep ted
m u c h less. M ay b e n o w th a t th e b o o k is d o n e , w e can trav el w ith o u t th e la p ­
to p c o m in g a lo n g.
M .B.
 Chapter I

Study Foreign Policy

Com paratively?

Chapter Preview'

• E x p lain s w h a t d istin g u ish e s fo reig n p o lic y a n aly sis as a n

a p p ro a c h to th e stu d y o f in te rn a tio n a l p o litic s.
- E xplains th e differen ce b e tw e en fo reig n p o lic y o p tio n s , d e c isio n s,
b eh a v io rs, a n d o u tco m e s.
• E x p lain s th e difference b e tw ee n in d iv id u a l, sta te , a n d sy ste m levels o f
analysis. v
• E x p lain s th e value o f stu d y in g fo reig n p o lic y c o m p a ra tiv e ly a n d th e
basics o f th e c o m p a ra tiv e m e th o d .

Why Study Foreign Policy?

L e a d e rs have m a d e m an y p u z z lin g fo reig n p o lic y d e c isio n s acro ss th e

years. A lth o u g h so m e o f th o se d e c isio n s tu r n e d o u t to b e o f little c o n ­
seq u en ce a n d have b een largely fo rg o tte n , o n m a n y o c c a sio n s su ch d e c i­
sio n s have p lu n g e d c o u n trie s in to m a jo r c risis o r w ar. C o n s id e r th e
fo llo w in g d ecisio n s, w h ich b o th re p o rte rs a t th e tim e a n d h is to ria n s w h o
w ro te a b o u t th e m la te r fo u n d p u zzlin g .
S a d d am H u ssein , le ad e r o f Iraq , in v ad e d K u w ait in th e e a rly 1990s o n ly
to fin d th a t th e U n ite d S tates, u n d e r P re s id e n t G e o rg e H . W. B u sh p u t
to g e th e r a c o a litio n to p u sh h im b a c k o u t. S a d d a m H u sse in k n e w th a t th e
U n ite d States w as m o re p o w erfu l a n d m u c h b e tte r a rm e d th a n Iraq.
A lth o u g h Iraq h a d , in th o se days, o n e o f th e s tro n g e r m ilita rie s in th e
re g io n , it w as n o m a tc h fo r a su p e rp o w er. S a d d a m H u sse in m ay have cal­
c u la te d th a t th e U n ite d States w as to o p re o c c u p ie d w ith th e d e m ise o f th e
 2 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION

S oviet U n io n a n d th e c o lla p se o f th e la tte r’s e c o n o m y to w o rry a b o u t his

in v asio n o f a sm all n e ig h b o r in g sta te . A m e e tin g w ith th e A m e ric a n a m b a s­
s a d o r to Ira q , c a re e r d ip lo m a t A p ril G lasp ie, re in fo rc e d h is assessm en t. She
m a d e th e n o w -fa m o u s s ta te m e n t th a t “w e have n o o p in io n o n th e A ra b -
A rab co n flicts like y o u r b o r d e r d is a g re e m e n t w ith K uw ait.” 1 S a d d a m
H u sse in m a y have in te r p r e te d th is to m e a n th a t th e U n ite d States w o u ld
n o t tak e a c tio n if h is m ilita r y a tta c k e d K uw ait. S h o u ld h e have realized th a t
th e U n ite d S tates, n o m a tte r h o w m u c h it a p p e a re d to b e o th e rw ise
en g ag ed , c o u ld n o t a c c e p t h is se izu re o f th e sm all, b u t o il-ric h Kuwait?
D e cad es earlier, N ev ille C h a m b e rla in , p rim e m in is te r o f B ritain , m a d e a
fatefu l d eal w ith A d o lp h H itle r o f G e rm a n y d u rin g th e in fa m o u s M u n ic h
co n fe re n c e o f 1938. B rita in w o u ld n o t o b je c t to G e rm a n y ’s seizu re o f th e
S u d e te n la n d , a p o r tio n o f C z e c h o slo v a k ia b o rd e r in g o n G e rm a n y a n d w ith
a G e rm a n -s p e a k in g p o p u la tio n , as lo n g as H itle r p ro m is e d h e w o u ld
re s p e c t th e so v e re ig n ty o f th e re m a in d e r o f C zech o slo v ak ia.2 T h is sm all
c o u n tr y in th e h e a rt o f E u ro p e w as a v e ry re c e n t c re a tio n a t th a t tim e: it
h a d b e e n carv ed o u t o f th e A u s tr o -H u n g a r ia n E m p ire a t th e e n d o f W o rld
W a r I, ju s t tw o d e c a d e s earlier. It w as a m u ltie th n ic state, h o m e to th e
C zechs a n d Slovaks as w ell as G e rm a n , H u n g a ria n , a n d o th e r sm a lle r e th ­
n ic m in ó r ity g ro u p s . C h a m b e rla in re tu r n e d h o m e c o n fid e n t h e h a d m a d e
a d eal th a t w o u ld p re s e rv e th e p e a c e in E u ro p e — a n im p o r ta n t c o n sid e ra ­
tio n in a tim e w h e n th e m e m o ry o f W o rld W ar I a n d its e n o rm o u s to ll in
h u m a n lives w as still v e ry fre sh . H e th o u g h t th a t m e e tin g p e rso n ally w ith
H itle r h a d allo w ed h im to ju d g e th e la tte r ’s c h a ra c te r a n d tru stw o rth in e ss .
H e c o u ld n o t have b e e n m o r e w ro n g . H itle r c o n tin u e d h is c o n q u e sts a n d
so o n E u ro p e fo u n d its e lf im m e r s e d in W o rld W a r II.
In th e e arly 1960s, N ik ita K h ru s h c h e v o f th e S oviet U n io n m a d e a d e c i­
sio n to b u ild la u n c h in g sites fo r n u c le a r m issiles in C u b a a n d s o o n fo u n d
■h im s e lf e m b ro ile d in a crisis. A m e ric a n U -2 spy p lan es p h o to g ra p h e d th e
la u n c h p a d w h ile it w as still u n d e r c o n s tru c tio n . T h e d isco v ery cam e o n th e
h eels o f th e Bay o f P igs fiasco, d u r in g w h ich A m e ric a n -tra in e d C u b a n
exiles h a d a tte m p te d , a n d failed , to to p p le Fidel C a stro , C u b a ’s c o m m u n is t
leader. T h e C o ld W a r w as still in fu ll sw in g , a n d P re s id e n t K ennedy w as
p re s id in g o v e r a m ilita r y b u ild u p th a t w o u ld give th e U nited States clear
s u p e r io rity in stra te g ic w e a p o n s — s o m e th in g K h ru sh c h e v c o u ld n o t
ig n o re. U n d e r th o s e c irc u m s ta n c e s , th e p o ssib ility o f b e in g able to reach
U.S. soil by p la c in g m issile s in C u b a w as q u ite te m p tin g , especially sin ce
th e S oviet U n io n d id n o t y et have th e cap acity to la u n c h in te rc o n tin e n ta l
m issiles. In a d d itio n , th e U n ite d S tates h a d m issiles close to Soviet soil in
Turkey. K h ru sh ch e v m a y have c o n c lu d e d th a t p lacin g m issiles in C u b a w as
c o m p arab le. S h o u ld K h ru sh c h e v have b e e n able to foresee th a t n o A m e ric a n
 W HY STUDY FOREIGN POLICY COMPARATIVELY? 3

p re s id e n t d u rin g th e C o ld W a r c o u ld have a c c ep ted th a t th e R u ssian s w ere

b u ild in g m issile -la u n c h in g cap acities so close to A m e ric a n shores?
E ach o f th e se lead e rs m a d e a d e cisio n th a t w as, ce rta in ly in re tro sp e c t,
p u z z lin g . S a d d a m H u ssein s tu m b le d in to a w a r w ith a c o a litio n o f c o u n ­
trie s h e a d e d by th e U n ite d States th a t h e c o u ld n o t w in a n d th a t b e c a m e a
p re lu d e to a n o th e r w a r a little o v e r a d e ca d e later. In th e in te rim , Ira q su f­
fered th e e c o n o m ic c o n se q u e n c e s o f th e d e s tru c tio n d u rin g a n d th e s a n c ­
tio n s th a t follow ed th e w a r o f th e e arly 1990s.3 N eville C h a m b e rla in lo st his
p o sitio n as P rim e M in iste r o f B rita in a n d is fre q u e n tly c ite d as th e m a n
w h o gave a p p e a s e m e n t its b a d n a m e . N ik ita K h ru sh c h e v s tu m b le d in to th e
C u b a n M issile C risis, w h ic h b r o u g h t h is c o u n tr y to th e b r in k o f w a r a n d
c o n tr ib u te d to th e p re m a tu re e n d o f his p o litic a l career.
F ro m th e v a n ta g e p o in t o f a fo reig n o b se rv e r o r w ith a h is to ria n ’s h in d ­
sig h t, the d e c isio n s m a d e by th e se lead e rs are p u z z lin g m o stly b e c a u se th e y
“sh o u ld have k n o w n b etter.” O fte n , su ch d e c isio n s are d e e m e d “ irra tio n a l,”
a n d th e lead e rs w h o m a d e th e m are ju d g e d to b e crazy o r ju s t fools. W hile
b e in g dism issive o f su ch p o lic y ch o ices a n d th e lea d e rs w h o m a d e th e m
m ay be te m p tin g , it d o es n o t h e lp u s u n d e rs ta n d th ese p u z z lin g d e c isio n s
very w ell. T h e re are o n o cca sio n lead e rs w h o se ra tio n a lity m a y b e q u e s ­
tio n e d , b u t th e re are far few er su c h in d iv id u a ls th a n th o s e w h o are c o m ­
m o n ly lab eled irra tio n a l. H en ce , w h e n seek in g to ex p la in fo re ig n p o licy
d e c isio n s, it is m o re fru itfu l to s ta rt w ith th e a s s u m p tio n th a t th e lead e rs
w h o m a d e th ese p u z z lin g d e c isio n s w ere ra tio n a l h u m a n b e in g s try in g
th e ir b est to m a k e “g o o d ” fo re ig n p o licy d e c isio n s fo r th e ir c o u n trie s .4
O n c e w e m ak e th a t a s s u m p tio n , how ever, w e m u s t also b e g in to p o n d e r
w h a t m o tiv a te s th ese lead e rs, w h a t th e y u n d e rs ta n d a b o u t th e situ a tio n s
th ey face, a n d w h a t facto rs m a d e th e ir d e c isio n s tu r n o u t to b e “b a d ” o n es.
B efore w e p ro c e e d , le t’s c o n sid e r tw o im p o r ta n t c o n c e p ts in tro d u c e d in
th e last p a ra g ra p h : ra tio n a lity a n d g o o d fo reig n p o lic y d ecisio n s. It c a n be
d iffic u lt to accep t th a t S a d d a m H u sse in w as n o t crazy, C h a m b e rla in n o t
naive, a n d K h ru sh c h e v n o t a fool. C o m m o n s e n s e n o tio n s o f ra tio n a lity
d e m a n d th a t each o f th ese lea d e rs sh o u ld have k n o w n b e tte r. Yet if w e sto p
to th in k a b o u t th e w o rld fro m th e p e rsp e c tiv e o f e a c h leader, k n o w in g w h a t
llval. lead e r k n ew a t the tim e o f th e d e cisio n , it b e c o m e s a little m o re d iffi­
cu lt to m a in ta in th is a ttitu d e . W e m ig h t d isag ree w ith th e go als S a d d a m
H u ssein o r K h ru sh c h e v p u rs u e d , a n d w e m ig h t ju d g e C h a m b e rla in to o
p re o c c u p ie d w ith p re s e rv in g peace, b u t in each case, w e can m a k e th e a rg u ­
m e n t th a t th ese lead e rs c o n siste n tly p u rs u e d th e ir goals. A n d th is is th e
m ain re q u ire m e n t o f r a tio n a lity : th e d e m a n d th a t th e m e a n s— o r th e p o l­
icy choices— are log ically c o n n e c te d to th e e n d s— o r th e le a d e r’s goals. In
o ilie r w ords, ra tio n a lity d e m a n d s o n ly th a t a d ec isio n m a k e r have so m e
4 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION

p u rp o s e in m in d a n d m a k e ch o ic e s d esig n ed to achieve th o s e p re d e te r­
m in e d e n d s .5
To a rg u e th a t a d e c isio n m a k e r is ra tio n a l, th e re fo re , d o es n o t m e a n th a t
y o u agree w ith h is o r h e r goals— o r th a t y o u , even if y o u h a d th e sam e
goals, c o u ld n o t m a k e d iffe re n t choices. You m a y fin d th e go als o b je c tio n ­
able. O r y o u m a y sh a re th e go als a n d yet b e c o n v in c e d th a t d iffe re n t p o li­
cies w o u ld b e tte r ach ie v e th o s e o b jectiv es. A d d itio n a lly , a n d even m o re
im p o r ta n t, ra tio n a lity d o es n o t g u a ra n te e a d e sira b le o u tc o m e , b e c a u se th e
o u tc o m e is in p a r t d e p e n d e n t o n th e re a c tio n s o f o th e r a c to rs.6
T h a t b rin g s u s to th e s e c o n d c o n c e p t, th a t o f g o o d d e c is io n s . All to o
o fte n , fo re ig n p o lic y d e c is io n s a re ju d g e d to b e g o o d o r b a d in h in d s ig h t.
S uch e v a lu a tio n s a re fre q u e n tly b a se d o n th e k n o w le d g e th a t th e d e c isio n
le d to a d e sira b le o r d is a s tro u s o u tc o m e .7 T h e e x a m p le s o f S a d d a m
H u sse in , C h a m b e rla in , a n d K h ru s h c h e v a re all d e c is io n s th a t, in h in d ­
sig h t, w ere ju d g e d to b e d is a s tro u s . T h e y “s h o u ld have k n o w n b e tte r.” B ut
is h in d s ig h t a fair s ta n d a rd ? T h e a n sw e r is n o . Ju st as g o o d d e c isio n s d o
n o t g u a ra n te e a g o o d o u tc o m e , flaw ed d e c is io n s d o n o t in e v ita b ly lead to
b a d resu lts.
I f h in d s ig h t a n d a d e sira b le o u tc o m e are p ro b le m a tic g u id e s to ju d g in g
w h e th e r a fo reig n p o lic y d e c isio n w as g o o d , th e n h o w to w e arriv e at su ch
ju d g m e n ts ? A n a lte rn a tiv e is to ju d g e d e c isio n s b a se d o n h o w th e y w ere
m a d e : w ere th e y b a se d o n a s o u n d analysis o f th e s itu a tio n a n d careful
th o u g h t re g a rd in g th e c o n se q u e n c e s o f p o ssib le c o u rse s o f a c tio n ? 8 S uch
ju d g m e n ts rely o n in s ig h t in to th e d e c isio n p ro ce ss a n d asse ssm e n ts o f th e
p rio ritie s a n d m o tiv a tio n s o f le a d e rs. T h e a d v a n ta g e o f ju d g in g fo reig n
p o lic y d e c isio n s in th is m a n n e r is th a t d e c isio n s c a n b e e v a lu a te d w ith o u t
re s o rtin g to h in d s ig h t. T h e re a re tw o d isa d v a n ta g es, h ow ever.
F irst, su ch p ro c e s s -o rie n te d ju d g m e n ts are likely to o v e re stim a te th e
d eg ree to w h ich lead e rs m a k e re a s o n a b le d e c isio n s. W h e n lead e rs en g ag e in
s o u n d analysis o n th e b asis o f a v e ry n a rr o w a n d skew ed p e rc e p tio n o f th e
w o rld o r o n th e b asis o f o b v io u sly flaw ed in f o rm a tio n , a p ro c e s s-o rie n te d
e v a lu a tio n w o u ld lead u s to ju d g e th e d e c isio n as a re a so n a b le o n e . A fter
all, th e p r o p e r p ro cess w as fo llo w ed . D o e s th a t s o u n d like sa tisfac to ry
analysis to you? O r d o e s it s o u n d like a case o f “ g arb ag e in , g a rb a g e o u t”?
C an a g o o d d e c isio n p ro c e ss b a se d o n fa u lty in f o rm a tio n b e e x p e c te d to
y ield a reaso n ab le, o r ev en g o o d , d ecisio n ? M o re lik ely th a n n o t, y o u w ill
c o n c lu d e th a t it c a n n o t. H e n c e , a p ro c e s s -o rie n te d a sse ssm e n t is b e tte r at
h e lp in g u s u n d e rs ta n d w h y a p o lic y m ak er, o r g ro u p o f p o lic y m ak ers,
a rriv e d a t a specific fo reig n p o lic y d e c isio n r a th e r th a n a t ju d g in g w h e th e r
th a t d e c isio n w as g o o d . T h a t is still v alu ab le b e c a u se it h e lp s u s ach iev e a
g re a te r aw areness o f th e p ro b le m s a n d p itfalls in v o lv ed d e c isio n m a k in g .
 WHY STUDY FOREIGN POLICY COMPARATIVELY? 5

T h e seco n d d isad v a n ta g e o f ju d g in g fo re ig n p o lic y d e c isio n s b y th e

p ro cess u sed to achieve th e m is a p ra c tic al p ro b le m : it c a n b e q u ite d iffic u lt
to fig u re o u t w h e th e r a foreig n p olicy d e c isio n w as b a se d o n s o u n d a n a ly ­
sis a n d carefu l th o u g h t. F requently, relev an t in f o rm a tio n m a y b e classified
o r th e n ecessary reco rd s m ay n o t exist. G o v e rn m e n ts a n d c o u n tr ie s d iffer
in th e ir re c o rd k eep in g . T h ey m ay also have d iffe re n t p o lic ies re g a rd in g
d eclassificatio n o f th e d o c u m e n ts th a t d o exist a n d m a k in g th e m available
to research ers. T h is does n o t m ak e analysis im p o ssib le , b u t it d o e s m e a n
th a t w e so m e tim e s n eed to infer p ro cess v a ria b les fro m th e av ailab le in fo r­
m a tio n , ra th e r th a n k n o w in g fo r su re. A skilled a n a ly st ca n o fte n m a k e v ery
effective use o f available in fo rm a tio n .
In su m , th e re is n o easy w ay to d efin e g o o d fo re ig n p o lic y d e c is io n m a k ­
ing. N ev erth eless, it is a su b ject w o rth p o n d e rin g . W h e n w e ju d g e th a t
le a d e rs sh o u ld h av e k n o w n b e tte r, w e are v o ic in g th e e x p e c ta tio n th a t,
given th e resp o n sib ilities o f th e ir p o sitio n s, w e m a y e x p e c t th e m to tr a n ­
sc e n d th e n a rro w n e ss o f th e ir o w n tim e a n d p lace to v iew th e w o rld fro m
m u ltip le p ersp ectiv es.9 W e re tu rn to th e su b jec t o f g o o d d e c isio n m a k in g in
c h a p te r 3.
So far, th e focus has b een o n lead e rs a n d d e c is io n m a k in g , b u t th e stu d y
o f fo reig n p o lic y involves m o re . A t th e h e a rt o f th e s tu d y o f fo re ig n p o licy
is th e d e sire to u n d e rs ta n d c o u n trie s ’ a c tio n s a n d b e h a v io rs to w a rd s o th e r
c o u n trie s a n d th e in te rn a tio n a l e n v iro n m e n t g en erally . F o re ig n p o li c y is
d e fin e d as th e to ta lity o f a c o u n try ’s po licies to w a rd a n d in te ra c tio n s w ith
th e e n v ir o n m e n t b ey o n d its b o rd e r s .10 T h is d e fin itio n is q u ite b ro a d a n d
e n c o m p a sse s a v ariety o f issu e d o m a in s o r is s u e a re a s , w h ic h a re d e fin e d as
a set o f in te rre la te d c o n ce rn s in p o licy m a k in g th a t are, h o w ev er, m o re
loo sely tie d to o th e r sets o f in te rre la te d c o n c e rn s. T ra d itio n a lly , th e stu d y o f
fo re ig n p o licy h as fo cu sed p rim a rily o n th e q u e s t to m a in ta in a n d e n h a n c e
a c o u n tr y ’s p o w e r a n d security. It c e n te re d o n q u e s tio n s o f a v e rtin g w a r
w h e n p o ssib le, d ec id in g to fight if necessary, a n d — first a n d fo re m o s t— •
e n s u r in g th e in te g rity o f th e c o u n tr y ’s b o rd e rs. In creasin g ly , e c o n o m ic
re la tio n s b e tw e e n c o u n trie s have g a in ed a tte n tio n . Since th e e n d o f th e
C o ld W ar, g lo b a liza tio n has b e c o m e a n im p o r ta n t p ro c e ss th a t h ig h lig h ts
th e in te rc o n n e c te d n e ss o f th e w o rld ’s ec o n o m ie s. T h is h a s h a d a g re a te r
im p a c t o n c o u n trie s w ith e c o n o m ie s th a t, in e a rlie r eras, w ere less c o n ­
n e c te d to th e in te rn a tio n a l e co n o m y . F or th o s e c o u n tr ie s th a t tra d itio n a lly
have d e p e n d e d greatly o n in te rn a tio n a l tra d e , e c o n o m ic issu e s h a v e h a d a
h ig h e r p rio rity o n th e fo reig n p o licy a g e n d a m u c h lo n g e r. T h e fo re ig n p o l­
icy a g e n d a d o es n o t sto p w ith se c u rity a n d e c o n o m ic issues: in re c e n t
d ecad es, e n v iro n m e n ta l issues have in c re a sin g ly g a in e d a tte n tio n ; so have
issues su c h as h u m a n rig h ts, p o p u la tio n g ro w th a n d m ig ra tio n , fo o d a n d
6 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION

en e rg y policies, as w ell as fo re ig n a id , d e v e lo p m e n t, a n d th e re la tio n s

b etw een ric h e r a n d p o o r e r c o u n trie s .
In a d d itio n to th e in c re a se d d iv e rsity o f issues o n th e foreign p o lic y
ag en d a, th e re is also a n in c re a sin g v a rie ty in th e a c to rs w h o engage in fo r­
eign p o licy m a k in g . T ra d itio n a lly , in v e stig a tio n s o f fo reig n policy lo o k e d
p rim a rily a t states a n d le a d e rs. T h is is still largely th e case, a lth o u g h th e re
h as b e e n in c re a se d re c o g n itio n o f, a n d in te re st in, th e fo reig n p o licy ro les
o f d e c isio n m a k e rs w h o w e re n o t tra d itio n a lly a sso ciated w ith in te r n a ­
tio n a l d ip lo m a c y , su c h as a se c re ta ry o f c o m m e rc e o r a m in is te r o f ju stic e .
M oreover, in v e stig a to rs a re in c re a sin g ly in te re ste d in p u b lic d ip lo m a c y , o r
a g o v e rn m e n t’s d ip lo m a tic e ffo rts th a t ta rg e t citizens, th e press, a n d o th e r
c o n stitu e n c ie s in o th e r c o u n tr ie s r a th e r th a n th e ir g o v e rn m e n ts, a n d th e y
also o cc a sio n a lly lo o k b e y o n d th e g o v e rn m e n t to stu d y c itiz e n d ip lo m a c y ,
o r th e e ffo rts a n d effects a b ro a d o f a c tio n s b y acto rs w h o are n o t official
re p re se n ta tiv e s o f th e sta te o r its g o v e rn m e n t. O fte n -c ite d as ex am p les o f
U.S. p u b lic d ip lo m a c y a re th e e ffo rts o f th e U n ite d States In fo rm a tio n
A gency (U S IA ). O th e r c o u n tr ie s also e n g a g e in p u b lic d ip lo m a c y to in f lu ­
ence th e p e rc e p tio n s c itiz e n s in o th e r c o u n trie s have o f th e ir so ciety a n d
g o v e rn m e n t. A n e x a m p le o f c itiz e n d ip lo m a c y is th e R ev eren d Jesse
Jackson ’s" 1984 n e g o tia tio n w ith S yria’s g o v e rn m e n t fo r th e release o f U.S.
N avy p ilo t Lt. R o b e rt G o o d m a n , w h o h a d b e e n c a p tu re d a fter his p lan e w as
sh o t d o w n o v er S y ria n -c o n tro lle d te r r ito r y in L e b a n o n .11
T h e fo reig n p o licie s o f c o u n tr ie s — w h e th e r large a n d p o w erfu l, sm a ll
a n d w eak, o r so m e w h e re in b e tw e e n — d riv e th e c o u rse o f w o rld histo ry . A t
tim es, c o u n trie s a n d th e ir le a d e rs have p u rs u e d w ise po licies th a t have
y ield ed p eace a n d p ro s p e rity . Yet a t o th e r tim es, th e y have m a d e ch o ice s
th a t have b e e n d e stru c tiv e o f b o th , as th e p re v io u s e x am p les show . W h a t
d riv es th e stu d y o f fo re ig n p o lic y is th e q u e s t to u n d e rs ta n d n o t ju s t w h y
lead e rs m a k e th e ch o ic e s th e y d o , b u t also h o w a n d w h y d o m e stic a n d
in te rn a tio n a l c o n s tra in ts a n d o p p o r tu n itie s affect th e ir choices. A fter all,
lead e rs d o n o t ex ist in a v a c u u m ; th e y are s u r ro u n d e d b y ad v iso rs a n d a
b u re a u c ra c y , in flu e n c e d b y d o m e s tic c o n stitu e n c ie s, a n d d e p e n d e n t o n th e
p o w e r th e ir state ca n p ro je c t in th e in te rn a tio n a l a re n a . U n ta n g lin g th e re l­
ative im p a c t o f th e se v a rio u s fa c to rs o n fo re ig n p o licy is n o easy m a tte r .12
T h e b e st e x p la n a tio n s o f th e fo re ig n p o lic y ch o ices o f c o u n trie s are fre ­
q u e n tly fo u n d in th e c o m p le x in te rp la y o f m u ltip le fa c to rs.13
U n ta n g lin g th e rela tiv e im p a c t o f v a rio u s facto rs o n fo reig n p o licy d e c i­
sio n m a k in g m ay n o t b e a n easy m a tte r, b u t it n e e d n o t be an im p o ssib le
task , eith er. First, w e n e e d to b e cle a r a b o u t w h a t it is w e seek to ex p la in .
N ext, w e w ill in v estig ate w h e re to lo o k fo r e x p la n a tio n s a n d d iscu ss a
fra m e w o rk th a t h elp s to o rg a n iz e th e v a rio u s fa cto rs o r “cau ses” o f fo reig n
policy. S u b seq u en tly , w e w ill tu r n o u r a tte n tio n to th e b en e fits o f stu d y in g
foreign p o licy co m p a ra tiv ely .
 W HY STUDY FOREIGN POLICY COMPARATIVELY? 7

What Do We Wish to Explain?

F o reig n p o licy an aly sts d o n o t alw ays seek to ex p lain th e sa m e th in g . So far,

th e d e sc rip to rs “choice,” “d e cisio n ,” a n d “b e h a v io r” have b e en u se d in te r ­
c h a n g eab ly in c o n n e c tio n w ith fo reig n policy. B u t are fo reig n p o licy
ch o ices, d ecisio n s, a n d b e h a v io rs really th e sam e th in g ?
C o n sid er, o n c e ag ain , S a d d a m H u sse in ’s in c u rs io n in to K uw ait. H e h a d
several o p tio n s available to h im . In s te a d o f in v a d in g K uw ait, h e c o u ld have
p u rs u e d a v ariety o f o th e r stra te g ie s to achieve h is o b jectiv es, su c h as
a m a ssin g tro o p s o n th e b o rd e r to u n d e rs c o re a th r e a t (w h ic h he h a d trie d
a t an e a rlie r tim e ) o r so m e o th e r fo rm o f coercive d ip lo m a c y . H e c o u ld
have g o n e to th e A rab L eague o r th e O rg a n iz a tio n o f P e tro le u m E x p o rtin g
C o u n trie s (O P E C ) to ad d ress h is g riev an ces. H e c o u ld have c alled fo r a
su m m it m e e tin g w ith th e lead ers o f K uw ait, p o ssib ly w ith th e aid o f a n e u ­
tra l th ird p arty . H e c o u ld even have d e c id e d to d o n o th in g at all. T h e b o t­
to m line is th a t h e c o u ld have a c te d d iffe re n tly th a n h e d id .
If the te rm o p tio n s refers to th e ra n g e o f p o ssib le choices, decision
refers to the o p tio n th a t w as ch o se n , i.e., th e cho ice. N o t all o f th e o p tio n s
listed in th e p re v io u s p a ra g ra p h w o u ld have b e e n e q u a lly a ttra c tiv e to
S ad d am H u ssein . To u n d e rs ta n d h o w h e e v a lu a te d d iffe re n t o p tio n s , w h ic h
o p tio n s he w o u ld have rejected o u t o f h a n d , a n d w h y h e c h o se as h e d id , we
m u s t learn m o re a b o u t h o w he view ed th e w o rld a n d Ira q ’s role in it, as well
as d o m e s tic facto rs— in o th e r w o rd s, w h a t o b jectiv es g e n e ra lly g u id e d his
fo reig n policy. It m ay also b e h e lp fu l to le a rn m o re a b o u t his p e rs o n a lity to
g ain in sig h t in to his p e rc e p tio n s o f th e in te rn a tio n a l p o litic a l e n v iro n m e n t
an d th e m o tiv a tio n s b e h in d h is a c tio n s. Since fo re ig n p o lic y d e c is io n m a k ­
ing is o ften th e task o f n o t o n e p e rs o n b u t o f g ro u p s o f in d iv id u a ls, w e m ay
n eed to u n d e rs ta n d th e p re d is p o s itio n a n d w o rld v iew s o f m u ltip le in d iv id ­
uals a n d h o w th ese view s in te rse c t b e fo re we can fully u n d e rs ta n d a specific
foreig n policy d ecisio n .
Fo reign p o licy behavior is th e a c tin g o u t o f th e d ec isio n . In o u r e x a m ­
ple, it w o u ld be th e a c t o f in v a d in g K uw ait. F o reig n p o licy b e h a v io r can
o ften be d e sc rib e d fairly s tra ig h tfo rw a rd ly : it co n sists o f th e a c tio n s tak en
to in flu en ce th e b e h a v io r o f a n e x te rn al a c to r o r to se c u re a b e n e fit fo r the
c o u n try itself. E specially th e p o lic y m ak e rs o f sm a lle r c o u n trie s o fte n focus
m o re o n se c u rin g ta n g ib le b e n e fits fo r th e ir o w n sta te (su c h as m ilita ry
assistance o r d e v e lo p m e n t aid ) th a n o n o b ta in in g p o litic a l in flu e n c e g lo b ­
ally (by, e.g., p ro m o tin g free tra d e o r d e m o c ra c y ). To fig u re o u t w h y states
u n d e rta k e c e rta in fo reig n p o lic y b e h a v io rs, how ever, it is o fte n n ece ssa ry to
dig in to th e d ec isio n m a k in g process; as w e sh all see, th e o u tc o m e o f
actio n s d e p e n d s n o t ju s t o n th e d e c isio n ta k en by th e lead e rs o f o n e c o u n ­
try, b u t also o n h o w o th e r a c to rs in th e in te rn a tio n a l e n v iro n m e n t react to
those actio n s.
8 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION

A lth o u g h w e o ften a ssu m e th a t fo reig n p o licy b e h a v io r is sim p ly th e

a c tin g o u t o f a d ecisio n , th e im p le m e n ta tio n p h a se h a s its o w n p ro b le m s
a n d pitfalls: th o se w h o a re im p le m e n tin g th e d e c isio n m a y m is u n d e rs ta n d
th e o rd e rs th e y have b e e n g iven, th e y m ay d isag ree w ith th e ir o rd e rs a n d
c a rry th e m o u t in a su b tly o r m o re o v e rtly d iffe re n t m a n n e r th a n h a d b een
in te n d e d , o r th e y m ay sim p ly ig n o re th e o rd e r a n d h o p e n o o n e in th e
h ig h e r ra n k s n o tices. In su m , m u c h can still h a p p e n b etw e e n th e m a k in g o f
a d e c isio n a n d its im p le m e n ta tio n , w h ic h m e a n s th a t th e o b se rv e d fo reig n
p o licy b e h a v io r is n o t alw ays exactly w h a t th e d e c isio n m a k e rs in te n d e d .14
O u tc o m e s are a f u r th e r a b s tra c tio n . T h e a rg u m e n t th a t S a d d a m
H u ssein sh o u ld have k n o w n b e tte r th a n to th in k h e co u ld g et aw ay w ith
in v a d in g a n d an n e x in g K u w ait im p lie s a fo cu s o n th e relativ e p o w e r o f
states. A lth o u g h Iraq w as, a t th e tim e o f th e in v asio n , a w e ll-a rm e d re g io n a l
p o w er, it w as n o t as p o w e rfu l as th e U n ite d States. Its le a d e r sh o u ld have
k n o w n th a t it c o u ld n o t h o ld o n to its n ew ly a c q u ire d te r rito ry if th e
U n ite d States ch o se to flex its m u scle. N o tic e , how ev er, th a t th e u ltim a te
o u tc o m e is in teractiv e: it re q u ire d th e U n ite d S tates to d e c id e th a t K uw ait
m a tte re d e n o u g h to asse m b le a co a litio n o f allies a n d to g o to w ar. D esp ite
p o p u la r w isd o m to th e c o n tra ry , th e U n ite d S tates c o u ld have d e c id e d o th ­
erw ise. P re s id e n t G eo rg e H . W . B u sh a n d his tea m o f fo reig n p o licy d e c i­
sio n m a k e rs also h a d m u ltip le o p tio n s: p r io r to g o in g to w a r w ith Ira q , th e
U n ite d S tates a n d its allies p ro v id e d fo r th e d e fen se o f th e (p re v io u sly
p o o rly se c u re d ) S au d i A ra b ia n b o rd e r to p re v e n t S a d d a m H u sse in fro m
c o n tin u in g h is co n q u e sts. B u sh c o u ld have d e c id e d th a t p re v e n tin g
S a d d a m H u sse in fro m e x te n d in g h is re a c h w as a g o o d e n o u g h so lu tio n .
S a n c tio n s m ig h t have h e lp e d to f u r th e r c o n ta in S a d d a m H u sse in . A n d th e
U n ite d S tates co u ld have c h o se n to d o n o th in g a n d stay o u t o f d is p u te s
b e tw e e n A ra b c o u n tr ie s — o n e in te rp re ta tio n o f w h a t th e A m e ric a n
a m b a s s a d o r to Ira q h a d su g g ested to S a d d a m H u sse in . A lth o u g h o n e
c o u ld a rg u e th a t so m e o f th ese o p tio n s a re less p la u s ib le th a n o th e rs , th e
p o in t is th a t P re s id e n t G eo rg e H . W . B u sh ’s d e c isio n to p u s h Ira q o u t o f
K uw ait w as n o t a fo re g o n e c o n c lu s io n . A n d th is is tr u e m o re g en erally :
d e c is io n m a k e rs a lm o s t alw ays h av e o p tio n s . Even v e ry p o w e rfu l states
o fte n d o n o t u se all th e re s o u rc e s at th e ir d isp o sa l, a n d th e re fo re , k n o w in g
w h a t a state is c ap ab le o f is o n ly o n e in g r e d ie n t in p re d ic tin g th e o u tc o m e
o f a co n flict. H en ce, o u tc o m e s re q u ire th a t w e u n d e r s ta n d th e fo reig n p o l­
icy d e c isio n s a n d b e h a v io rs o f n o t ju s t o n e c o u n tr y b u t o f tw o o r m o re
c o u n trie s in in te ra c tio n .
S tu d en ts o f foreign policy, as a sp ecializatio n w ith in th e field o f in te rn a ­
tio n a l relatio n s, focus less freq u en tly o n o u tc o m e s th a n o n o p tio n s, d e ci­
sions, o r b eh av io rs. A re c u rre n t th e m e is th e q u e st to h e lp lead e rs m a k e b e tte r
d ecisio n s.15 In th e p re v io u s sectio n we d iscu ssed so m e o f th e p ro b le m s
 W HY STUDY FOREIGN POLICY COMPARATIVELY? 9

involved in d e fin in g w h a t c o n stitu te s a g o o d d e c is io n . T h e p ro b le m , in

p a rt, lies in th e te n d e n c y to w o rk b a c k w a rd s fro m g o o d o u tc o m e s: if it
e n d ed w ell, th e n th is m u s t have b e e n d u e to a g o o d d e c isio n . S u ch th in k in g
leaves n o ro o m fo r th e p o ssib ility th a t th e g o o d o u tc o m e is d u e to th e w ay
a n o th e r a c to r chose to re a c t to w h a t m ay have b e e n a r a th e r p o o r d ecisio n .
Even g re a t d e c isio n s m ay n o t lead to d e sira b le o u tc o m e s, b e c a u se d e cisio n
m ak ers d o n o t c o n tro l h o w th e lead ers o f o th e r c o u n tr ie s w ill re a c t to th e ir
decisio n s— a lth o u g h stro n g in sig h t in to th e p e rs o n a lity a n d m o tiv a tio n s o f
leaders o f o th e r c o u n trie s is likely to im p ro v e th e o d d s o f a d e sira b le o u t­
com e. N ev erth eless, an e ffo rt to u n d e rs ta n d h o w , w hy, b y w h o m , a n d o n
w h a t b asis d e c isio n s are m ad e,-as w ell as h o w th e c o n te x ts w ith in w h ich
decisio n s a re m a d e affect d ecisio n m a k in g p ro cesses, is w o rth w h ile : th e
b e tte r w e u n d e rs ta n d w h y lead e rs react as th e y d o , th e b e tte r th e o d d s th a t
w e ca n figure o u t h o w to h e lp d e c isio n m a k e rs tra n s c e n d th e ir o w n biases.
T h a t w o n ’t alw ays g u a ra n te e g o o d o u tc o m e s, b u t it gives u s th e b e s t o d d s
fo r ac h ie v in g th e m .16

Where to Look for Explanations

W h o o r w h a t in flu en ces foreig n policy? A lth o u g h le a d e rs are q u ic k to take

c red it fo r fo reig n p olicy successes a n d th e p u b lic is o fte n q u ic k {o b la m e
th e m fo r failures, lead ers ra rely m ak e fo reig n p o lic y a lo n e . A d v iso ry sys­
tem s a n d g o v e rn m e n t b u re a u c ra c ie s m a y b e o rg a n iz e d d iffe re n tly in d iffe r­
e n t c o u n trie s, b u t th ey alw ays p lay so m e ro le in fo re ig n p o lic y d e c isio n
m a k in g a n d im p le m e n ta tio n . D o m e stic c o n stitu e n c ie s m a y v a ry in in f lu ­
ence, d e p e n d in g o n th e atten tiv e n e ss o f a p u b lic to fo re ig n affairs o r th e
s tru c tu re o f g o v e rn m e n t in a specific c o u n try . F inally, th e w o rld b e y o n d
th e b o rd e rs affects th e po ssib ilities fo r fo reig n p o lic y a c tio n . It m a y p re s e n t
o p p o rtu n itie s , b u t it also p re se n ts c o n stra in ts.
W ith so m a n y facto rs affecting fo reig n policy, h o w d o w e u n ra v e l th e
c o n tr ib u tio n s each o f th ese m u ltip le facto rs m akes? F irst, w e w ill n o t c o n ­
sid er all th ese factors at o n ce. A lth o u g h fo re ig n p o lic y b e h a v io r is ra re ly
cau sed b y o n e p e rso n o r o n e th in g alo n e, it m a k e s sense to in v estig ate v a r­
io u s fac to rs separately b e fo re th in k in g a b o u t th e ir in te ra c tio n . It is sim p le r
to focus o n o n e ex p la n a to ry facto r a t a tim e . A fte r a n a ly z in g v a rio u s facto rs
separately, w e can th e n assess th e ir relative c o n tr ib u tio n s to fo re ig n p o licy
b eh a v io r, ta k in g in to a c c o u n t also th e p o ssib le in te ra c tio n s a m o n g th ese
d iffe re n t e x p la n a to ry facto rs. T h e strateg y is to in itially analyze d iffe re n t f a c - .
to rs th a t influence foreign p olicy m a k in g in iso la tio n a n d to su b se q u en tly
a tte m p t to in teg rate th ese in to a co m p reh en siv e ex p la n a tio n , assu m in g th a t
foreign p o licy is generally pu rp o siv e o r g o a l-d ire c te d b eh av io r.
10 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION

S eco n d , it is p o ssib le to g r o u p th e d iffe re n t facto rs in to categ o ries th a t

have s o m e th in g in c o m m o n . C o n sid e r, fo r in sta n c e , th e c o n tra st b e tw e e n
tw o p o te n tia l e x p la n a tio n s fo r Ira q ’s in v a sio n o f K uw ait: o n e, S a d d a m
H u ssein ’s p e rs o n a l lu s t fo r p o w e r, te rrito ry , a n d oil led h im a n d h is c o u n ­
tr y ’s m ilita ry to in v a d e K uw ait; tw o , th e p re o c c u p a tio n o f th e U n ite d S tates
w ith ev e n ts in R ussia a n d o th e r fo r m e r S o v iet U n io n states led to a p o w e r
v a c u u m in th e M id d le E ast, w h ic h in tu r n c re a te d th e o p p o rtu n ity fo r Ira q
to in v ad e K uw ait. R e m e m b e r th a t Ira q w as th e stro n g e st a c to r w ith in th e
re g io n , even if o n a g lo b a l level it w as n o m a tc h for th e U n ite d States
T h e s e c o n d e x p la n a tio n fo c u se s o n th e relativ e p o w e r o f states in th e
w o rld a n d so m e tim e s also in sp ecific re g io n a l su b sy stem s. It a ssu m es th a t
th e U n ite d S tates h a d a n in te re s t in m a in ta in in g th e relative b alan c e o f
p o w e r a m o n g th e sta te s o f th e M id d le E a st b u t w as sim u lta n e o u sly n o t p a r ­
tic u la rly fo c u se d o n th a t re g io n a t th a t tim e . H en ce, Ira q ’s d ec isio n to
in v ad e K uw ait w as a re s p o n s e to a n o p p o r tu n ity p ro v id e d b y th e A m e ric an
lack o f a tte n tio n . It also im p lie s th a t it w as fairly u n im p o r ta n t w h o w as in
ch arg e o f fo reig n p o lic y d e c is io n m a k in g in Iraq: any le a d e r p e rceiv in g th is
o p p o r tu n ity w o u ld h av e b e e n te m p te d to take ad v a n ta g e o f th e situ a tio n to
ac q u ire te r rito ry a n d o il a n d e n h a n c e h is o r h e r c o u n tr y ’s pow er. In th is
view , lead e rs a n d th e ir p e rs o n a litie s , p e rc e p tio n s , a n d m o tiv a tio n s are less
im p o r ta n t. R a th e r, th e e m p h a s is is o n u n d e rs ta n d in g th e in cen tiv es a n d
c o n s tra in ts th e in te rn a tio n a l e n v ir o n m e n t places o n th e b e h a v io r o f states.
S uperficially, th is w o u ld a p p e a r s tra ig h tfo rw a rd : th e U n ite d States is a
m o re p o w e rfu l sta te th a n , fo r in s ta n c e , th e sm all isla n d n a tio n o f H a iti (in
th e C a rib b e a n ) o r tiny, la n d lo c k e d L u x e m b o u rg (in E u ro p e ). But g e n eral
asse ssm e n ts o f relativ e p o w e r a lo n e d o n o t ex p lain th e specific re la tio n ­
sh ip s th e U n ite d S ta te s h a s w ith th e se tw o sm all states.
T h e e x a m p le o f Ira q ’s in v a s io n o f K u w ait also sh o w s th a t th e c o n ­
s tra in ts im p o s e d b y b e in g a sm a ll a n d w e a k c o u n tr y are g e n e ra lly e n d u r ­
in g fa c to rs a ffe c tin g th a t s ta te ’s fo re ig n policy. K uw ait’s sm a lln e ss m a k e s it
v u ln e ra b le to b e llig e re n t n e ig h b o r s a n d in n e e d o f m o re p o w erfu l allies.
O p p o rtu n itie s , o n th e o th e r h a n d , a re o fte n d e p e n d e n t o n specific c ir c u m ­
stan ces th a t m ay b e te m p o ra r y ; th e y p re s e n t a w in d o w o f o p p o rtu n ity th a t
m ay in tim e close. S a d d a m H u sse in , Ira q ’s leader, acted u p o n ju s t su c h an
o p p o rtu n ity , c o n v in c e d th a t th e U n ite d S tates w o u ld stay o n th e sidelines.
In fact, th a t w in d o w c lo sed r a th e r ra p id ly as th e U n ite d S tates le a d e rsh ip
qu ick ly refo cu sed its a tte n tio n .
N o te th a t th e p re v io u s e x p la n a tio n m ak es c e rta in a ss u m p tio n s a b o u t
th e m o tiv a tio n s o f lea d e rs, n a m e ly th a t lead ers w ill tak e a d v a n ta g e o f
o p p o rtu n itie s w h e n th e y p re s e n t th em selv es. In th is case, th e le ad e r w h o
h a p p e n e d to b e in p o w e r in Iraq a t th e tim e d id a ct u p o n th e o p p o rtu n ity
 W H Y STUDY FOREIGN POLICY COMPARATIVELY? II

p re se n te d by th e in te rn a tio n a l e n v iro n m e n t. B u t w o u ld an y lea d e r have

acted in th is m a n n e r? It is q u ite co n ceiv ab le th a t a d iffe re n t leader, w h o
e ith e r h a d a d iffe re n t p e rs o n a lity o r w h o w as d iffe re n tly c o n s tra in e d by
d o m e stic p o litical in s titu tio n s o r p u b lic o p in io n , m ig h t have d e c id e d th a t
the p o te n tia l risk s o f th is o p p o r tu n ity — th e ch a n c e th a t th e U n ite d S tates
w ould act as it in fact d id — w ere n o t w o rth th e p o te n tia l g ain s. A lth o u g h
we can n ev er k n o w fo r su re w h e th e r Ira q w o u ld have in v a d e d K uw ait if
th ere h ad b e e n a d iffe re n t le a d e r in p o w e r in th a t c o u n tr y in th e early
1990s, it is a t least p lau sib le th a t a n o th e r le a d e r m ig h t have d e c id e d a g a in st
sucli a m ove. In d e e d , even in a u th o r ita ria n c o u n trie s th e re o fte n is lively
d eb ate a m o n g lead ers a n d a d v iso rs as th e y seek to d e fin e th e b e st p o licy for
the co u n try .
T h is im p lies th a t in d iv id u a ls a n d th e d e c isio n s th e y m ak e are a m a jo r
d e te rm in a n t o f fo reig n p o lic y .17 In o rd e r to u n d e rs ta n d fo reig n p o licy d e c i­
sions a n d b eh av io rs, th e n , w e m u s t u n d e rs ta n d lea d e rs— a n d th e ir p e rs o n ­
alities, p e rc e p tio n s, a n d m o tiv a tio n s . In a d d itio n , d o m e s tic p o litic a l
in s titu tio n s a n d p u b lic o p in io n m ay also p lay a role, d e p e n d in g o n th e
n a tu re o f th e p o litic a l system .
The tw o e x p la n a tio n s— th e m o tiv a tio n s o f in d iv id u a l lead e rs o n th e
one h a n d a n d th e o p p o rtu n itie s a n d c o n s tra in ts p re s e n te d by th e in te rn a ­
tional e n v iro n m e n t o n th e o th e r— ca n b e seen as c o m p e tin g , b u t also as
c o m p le m e n ta ry .18 T h e p re c e d in g p a ra g ra p h s in d ic a te th a t it is u ltim a tely
leaders w h o m a k e d ecisio n s, w h ic h w o u ld a rg u e in favor o f a fo cu s o n le a d ­
ers. 'This is c e rta in ly a p p ro p ria te , b u t it m u s t also be n o te d th a t leaders
m ake d ecisio n s w ith in th e c o n te x t o f an e n v iro n m e n t th a t p re se n ts th e m
w ith p ro b lem s, o p p o rtu n itie s , a n d c o n stra in ts. H en ce, w e m u s t u n d e rs ta n d
b o th th e c irc u m sta n c e s a n d th e in d iv id u a l, as w ell as th e in te ra c tio n
b etw een th e m .19
T his d is tin c tio n b etw e e n th e c irc u m sta n c e s a n d th e in d iv id u a l is c a p ­
tured by th e c o n c e p t o f lev els o f a n a ly s is .20 In th is b o o k , w e w ill use th re e
levels o f analysis: th e in d iv id u a l, th e state, a n d th e in te rn a tio n a l system .
T hese th ree levels o f analy sis c o rre s p o n d to th e d iffe re n t foci o f foreig n
policy analysis: in d iv id u a ls p o n d e r o p tio n s a n d m a k e d ecisio n s, states
engage in fo reig n p o licy b e h a v io rs, a n d th e in te ra c tio n b e tw e e n states in
the in te rn a tio n a l system yields o u tc o m e s. T h ese c o n n e c tio n s are s u m m a ­
rized in table 1.1.
T he in d iv id u a l lev el o f a n a ly s is focuses o n lead e rs a n d d e c isio n m ak ers
in an effo rt to ex p lain fo reig n policy. It a ssu m e s th a t in d iv id u a ls sh ap e th e
course o f h isto ry , b ecau se it is th e ir ch o ices a n d d e c isio n s th a t d riv e th e
course o f events. T h e analysis o f in d iv id u a ls m ig h t focus 011 e ith e r th e ir
personalities o r o n th e ir p e rc e p tio n s— h o w th e y m a k e sense o f th e ir w o rld
 12FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION

a n d th e ev e n ts o c c u rrin g w ith in it. T h e first fo cu s lead s to th e stu d y o f p e r ­

so n a lity tra its, beliefs, a n d v alu es as th e fa c to rs th a t ex p la in fo reig n p o licy
d ecisio n s. It e m p h a siz e s th e e n d u rin g q u a litie s o f a n in d iv id u a l d e c isio n
m ak er. In s ig h t in to th e p e rso n a lity , c h a ra c te r, b eliefs, a n d v alu es o f th e
in d iv id u a l e n h a n c e s o u r a b ility to g au g e w h a t m o tiv a te s th a t d e cisio n
m ak er. D o es it m a k e a d iffe re n ce w h e th e r a le a d e r is e x tre m e ly p o w e r h u n ­
gry? D o e s it m a k e a d iffe re n c e w h e th e r h e o r she en jo y s th e p o litic a l gam e?
S tu d e n ts o f p e rs o n a lity a n d o th e r e n d u rin g q u a litie s o f lea d e rs (su c h as
th e ir c h a ra c te r) su g g est th a t th e a n sw e r is m o s t o fte n a ffirm ativ e, as w e
e x p lo re f u r th e r in c h a p te r 2. T h e sec o n d fo cu s lead s to th e stu d y o f th e p e r ­
c e p tio n s a n d h o w th e se in flu e n c e fo re ig n p o licy d e c isio n m a k in g . T h e in d i­
v id u a l’s p e rc e p tio n s , o r th e p ro ce ss b y w h ic h a p e rs o n m a k e s sen se o f
ev e n ts a n d s itu a tio n s in h e r o r h is w o rld , are sp ecific to th a t s itu a tio n o r
ev en t. S tu d e n ts o f p e rc e p tio n , fra m in g , a n d p ro b le m re p re s e n ta tio n d o n o t
n eg a te th e im p o rta n c e o f p e rso n a lity , b u t th e y a re m o re in te re ste d in h o w
p o lic y m a k e rs m a k e sense o f — o r d e fin e — specific d e c isio n m a k in g s itu a ­
tio n s .21 R esearch a t th e in d iv id u a l level o f an aly sis fre q u e n tly em p lo y s c o n ­
c ep ts b o rro w e d fro m p sychology, su ch as framing — d e fin e d as a te n d e n c y
fo r p e o p le to ju d g e risk in te rm s o f h o w a situ a tio n is p re s e n te d to th e m .22
W e e x p lo re p e rc e p tio n in g re a te r d e ta il in c h a p te r 3.
F u rth e rm o r e , in d iv id u a ls o fte n d o n o t m a k e d e c isio n s a lo n e b u t in ste a d
w o rk to g e th e r w ith o th e rs in a g ro u p o r in a b u re a u c ra tic s e ttin g .23 In su ch
in sta n c e s, th e ir in d iv id u a l p e rs o n a litie s a n d p e rc e p tio n s in te ra c t as th e y
jo in tly d e te r m in e h o w b e st to d e fin e th e p ro b le m b e fo re th e m . G ro u p
in te ra c tio n s a re o fte n classified a t th e in d iv id u a l level o f analysis b ecau se
th e focus te n d s to b e o n u n d e rs ta n d in g th e d y n a m ic s o f in te rp e rs o n a l
■ interaction r a th e r th a n o n th e g ro u p as an u n d iffe re n tia te d u n it. G ro u p
d e c isio n m a k in g , as w ell as o th e r a sp ects o f th e a d v iso ry system a n d
b u re a u c ra c y , is th e su b je c t o f c h a p te r 4.
T h e state level o f analysis focuses o n facto rs in te rn a l to th e state as th o se
th a t co m p e l states to engage in specific fo reig n p o lic y b e h av io rs. S uch an aly ­
ses in c lu d e th e in s titu tio n a l fra m e w o rk o f th e state (su c h as th e re la tio n ­
sh ip s b e tw e e n th e ex ecutive a n d legislative b ra n c h e s o f g o v e rn m e n t, th e

Table 1.1 Levels o f analysis and the study o f foreign policy

Level o f Analysis Foreign Policy Focus

Individual O ptions/D ecisions

State Behaviors
System O utcom es
 W HY STUDY FOREIGN POLICY COMPAFtATIVELY? 13

o rg a n iz a tio n o f th e g o v e rn m e n t b u rea u c rac y , o r w h e th e r th e state is a

d e m o c ra c y ), d o m e stic c o n stitu en c ie s (such as in te re s t g ro u p s , e th n ic
g ro u p s, o r p u b lic o p in io n m o re g en erally ), e c o n o m ic c o n d itio n s , a n d also
th e state’s n a tio n a l h is to ry a n d c u ltu re . At th is level o f a n aly sis, th e e m p h a ­
sis is o n h o w facto rs in te rn a l to th e state in flu e n c e th e b e h a v io r o f th a t state
o n th e g lo b al stage.24 F ro m a d e c isio n m ak in g p e rsp ec tiv e , th e s e fa c to rs are
o ften ch a ra c te riz e d as c o n stra in ts th a t d e te rm in e th e p a ra m e te r s o f th e
p o ssib le fo r leaders. O f c o u rse, th e re la tio n sh ip b e tw e e n le a d e rs a n d th e
d o m e s tic e n v iro n m e n t is m u c h m o re c o m p lic a te d th a n th is sim p le c h a ra c ­
te riz a tio n suggests, as w e w ill see in c h a p te r 5.
Finally, th e sy s te m le v el o f a n a ly s is focuses o n c o m p a ris o n s (a n d in te r ­
a c tio n s) b etw e e n states. T h is level o f analysis asks q u e s tio n s a b o u t th e re l­
ative p o w er o f states.25 T h e in te rn a tio n a l sy stem is d e fin e d as a se t o f states
w h o se in te ra c tio n s are g u id e d b y th e ir relative ca p a b ilitie s, su c h as th e ir
p o w er a n d w e a lth , w h ich in flu en ce th e ir p o ssib ilities fo r a c tio n a n d fo r
success o n th e global stage. T hese relative a ttrib u te s m ay c h a n g e acro ss
tim e as a c o u n tr y ’s e c o n o m y yields m o re w e a lth o r as it a tta in s te c h n o lo g ­
ical o r m ilita ry capacities. T h e reverse m ay also b e tru e : c o u n tr ie s can lose
as w ell as g ain pow er. C h an g e s in relative c a p a b ilitie s o f sta tes m a y create
o p p o rtu n itie s , b u t th e y m a y also serve to in cre ase th e c o n s tra in ts o n states.
A n in crease in m ilita ry cap acities m ay e m b o ld e n a sta te , w h ile a n in c re a s­
ingly in te rd e p e n d e n t w o rld e c o n o m y p re s e n ts c o n s tra in ts . \
N o te th a t th e system level o f analysis m a k e s c e rta in a s s u m p tio n s a b o u t
th e p o litical in te re sts o f c o u n trie s, a m o n g w h ic h is first a n d fo re m o s t th e
id ea th a t a state’s p o w e r is c e n tra l to its a b ility to m a in ta in th e in te g rity o f
its b o rd e rs. H ow ever, th e d e fin itio n o f p o litic a l in te re st, so m e tim e s called
n a ti o n a l in te r e s t, is n o t n ecessarily stra ig h tfo rw a rd . R e m e m b e r th a t th e
U.S. resp o n se to Ira q ’s in v asio n o f K uw ait w as n o t a fo re g o n e c o n c lu sio n .
In fact, S ad d am H u sse in m ay have calc u la te d th a t th e U n ite d S tates w o u ld
d ecid e it w as n o t in its in te re st to in te rv e n e. H e n c e , th e sy stem s level o f
analysis can p ro v id e in sig h t in to th e c ap ab ilities o f states a n d ex p la in o u t­
co m es, b u t it c a n n o t ex p lain fo reig n p o licy d e c is io n s o r b e h a v io rs v e ry
w ell, as we ex p lo re fu rth e r in c h a p te r 6.
O n th e d iv id in g line b e tw e e n th e sta te a n d sy ste m levels o f an aly sis sits
th e tw o -le v e l g a m e . T h is c o n c e p t d esc rib e s th e fa c t th a t fo re ig n p o licy
d e c is io n m a k e rs tr y to satisfy d o m e s tic c o n s titu e n c ie s a n d in te r n a tio n a l
im p e ra tiv e s sim u lta n e o u sly , w h ich o fte n tim e s re q u ire s a d e lic a te b a la n c ­
in g a c t.26 T h is is especially tr u e w h e n th e d o m e s tic a n d in te r n a tio n a l e n v i­
r o n m e n t p u s h d e c isio n m a k e rs in d iffe re n t d ire c tio n s . S u c h is o fte n th e
case in th e e c o n o m ic secto r: w o rk e rs m ay p re fe r p r o te c tio n is t p o lic ie s th a t
keep th e ir jo b s secu re ev en if th e in d u s try in w h ic h th e y w o rk is n o lo n g e r
14 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION

in te rn a tio n a lly co m p e titiv e . O n th e o th e r h a n d , c o u n trie s th a t have sim ila r

in d u s trie s th a t are in te rn a tio n a lly c o m p e titiv e w ill tr y to preserv e access to
as m a n y m a rk e ts as p o ssib le . H e n c e , d e c isio n m a k e rs are c a u g h t b e tw e e n
th e in te rn a tio n a l p rin c ip le o f free tr a d e a n d th e in te re sts o f th e ir c o n ­
stitu e n ts, w h o m a y lo se th e ir jo b s as a re s u lt o f in te rn a tio n a l c o m p e titio n .
A d h e rin g to th e in te rn a tio n a lly a c c e p te d p rin c ip le s w h ile n o t a n ta g o n iz in g
d o m e s tic c o n s titu e n c ie s c a n b e to u g h .
M u ch h as been w ritte n a b o u t th e m e rits o f stu d y in g in te rn a tio n a l p o li­
tics a t d iffe re n t levels o f a n aly sis. S o m e sc h o lars have sta k e d o u t clear p re f­
eren ces fo r o n e o r a n o th e r level o f a n aly sis,27 w h ile o th e rs u n d e rs ta n d th e m
to be c o m p le m e n ta ry .28 T h e c o m p le m e n ta rity o f th e d iffe re n t levels o f
analysis can be illu s tra te d b y lin k in g th e m to a n analysis o f th e cau ses o f
ev en ts. W e m ig h t classify cau ses in to d iffe re n t cate g o ries, su ch as d eep ,
in te rm e d ia te , a n d p re c ip ita tin g c a u se s.29 C o n sid e r th e follo w in g e x p la n a ­
tio n o f th e o u tb r e a k o f W o rld W a r I:
T h e a ssa ssin a tio n o f A rc h d u k e F ra n z F e rd in a n d , th e h e ir to th e th ro n e
o f th e A u s tr o -H u n g a r ia n E m p ire , b y a S e rb ia n n a tio n a lis t d u rin g a v isit to
Serajevo (n o w lo c a te d in B o sn ia -H e rz e g o v in a ) is fre q u e n tly p o rtra y e d as
th e cau se o f W o rld W a r I. T h is a ss a ssin a tio n o c c u rre d in a contex t: th e rise
o f n a tio n a lis m a n d class c o n flic t p re o c c u p ie d lead ers in m a n y E u ro p e a n
c o u n trie s a t th e tim e . T h e se fa c to rs h a d b e e n p re s e n t fo r decad es, b u t h a d
n o t led to w ar. T h e A u s tr o -H u n g a r ia n a n d O tto m a n E m p ire s w ere p a rtic ­
u la rly v u ln e ra b le to u n r e s t a n d n a tio n a lis t secession, w h ile G e rm a n y h a d
o n ly re c en tly b e c o m e a u n if ie d e n tity a n d w as ra p id ly e x p a n d in g its in d u s ­
tria l b ase— a n im p o r ta n t so u rc e o f p o w er. R ussia w as try in g to e x p a n d its
in d u s tria l c a p a c ity a n d m o d e r n iz e its m ilitary , b u t it faced in cre asin g t u r ­
m o il d o m estically . B o th th is tu r m o il w ith in m a n y o f th e states o f E u ro p e
a n d a c h a n g in g b a la n c e o f p o w e r a m o n g th e m m a d e c o n d itio n s fav o rab le
fo r co n flict. In a d d itio n , th e re la tio n s h ip s b etw e e n th e la rg e r p o w ers in
E u ro p e w ere c h a n g in g : sin ce th e e n d o f th e N a p o le o n ic w ars in 1815, th e
A u s tro -H u n g a ria n E m p ire , R ussia, B rita in , F rance, a n d P ru ssia (th e p re d e ­
cesso r to G e rm a n y ) h a d m a in ta in e d a b a la n c e o f p o w e r a m o n g them selv es.
A ro u n d th e tu r n o f th e tw e n tie th c e n tu ry , th is C o n c e rt o f E u ro p e b eg a n to
d isin te g ra te as G e rm a n y s tre n g th e n e d itse lf e c o n o m ic ally a n d m ilita rily
a fte r its u n ific a tio n in 1871. To c o u n te r th is risin g pow er, B ritain , F ran ce,
a n d la te r R ussia allied th e m se lv e s, w h ile G e rm a n y re s p o n d e d b y e sta b lish ­
in g clo ser ties w ith th e A u s tr o -H u n g a r ia n a n d O tto m a n E m p ires. In o th e r
w o rd s, th e C o n c e rt o f E u ro p e s p lit in to tw o cam p s.
D esp ite these c irc u m sta n c e s, w a r w as n o t in ev itab le; th e lea d e rs o f
E u ro p e still h a d o p tio n s — ev en if th e se lead e rs perceiv ed them selv es to be
h e m m e d in by th e ir a g re e m e n ts a n d p lu n g e d a h e a d in to w a r w ith o u t m u c h
re fle c tio n . T h e assa ssin a tio n , w h ic h c a n b e classified as th e p re c ip ita tin g
 W H Y STUDY FOREIGN POLICY COMPARATIVELY; 15

cause, w as su re to cause a crisis a g a in st th e b a c k d ro p o f d o m e s tic n a tio n a l­

ist a g ita tio n a n d class co n flict (in te rm e d ia te cau ses) a n d th e ch a n g in g b a l­
ance o f p o w e r a m o n g th e la rg e r E u ro p e a n states (a d e e p c au se), b u t a crisis
d o es n o t in ev itab ly lead to w ar. D iffe re n t d e c isio n s c o u ld have b e e n m ad e ,
a n d a d iffe re n t o u tc o m e m ig h t have resu lte d . H en ce, in th e fin al analysis,
the d ecisio n s m a d e b y le a d e rs are th e k ey to u n d e rs ta n d in g in te rn a tio n a l
p olitics.
T h is d o es n o t m e a n th a t th e d o m e s tic a n d in te rn a tio n a l e n v iro n m e n ts
are irre le v a n t. L eaders m u s t b e u n d e rs to o d in th e c o n te x t o f th e ir tim e a n d
place. T h e c h a n g in g b ala n c e o f p o w e r in th e p e rio d le a d in g u p to W o rld
W ar I c e rta in ly c re a te d a s itu a tio n in w h ic h a crisis m ig h t b e m o re d ifficu lt
to m a n a g e th a n in a m o re stab le a n d p re d ic ta b le in te rn a tio n a l e n v iro n ­
m e n t. N ote th a t w h a t w e e a rlie r te rm e d th e d e e p cau se o f th e w a r c o rre ­
s p o n d s to th e sy stem level o f analysis. M o reo v er, th e d o m e s tic n a tio n a lism
a n d class co n flic t p re v a le n t in E u ro p e a n c o u n trie s at th e tim e c re a te d a
c o n te x t in w h ic h a p o litic a l a ssa ssin a tio n c o u ld b e in te rp re te d as a th re a t to
th e in te g rity o f th e state. T h e O tto m a n E m p ire h a d a lread y b e g u n to d is in ­
tegrate. T h e A u stria n lea d e rs k n e w th a t th e ir o w n m u ltin a tio n a l e m p ire
w as v u ln e ra b le as w ell. T h is c e rta in ly c o lo re d th e ir p e rc e p tio n s a n d in te r­
p re ta tio n s o f w h at, fro m h isto ric a l d ista n c e , lo o k s like a relatively m in o r
event. N ote th a t th is in te rm e d ia te cau se c o rre s p o n d s to th e state level o f
analysis.
W as w ar in ev itab le in 1914? N o. T h e sta te (in te rm e d ia te ) a n d system
level (d e e p ) causes c e rta in ly c re a te d a ten se e n v ir o n m e n t in w h ic h su c h a
d ecisio n b e c a m e m o re likely, b u t th e e n v ir o n m e n t d id n o t u n e q u iv o c a lly
d e te rm in e e ith e r th e d e c isio n s o r th e o u tc o m e . L ead ers m a d e d e c isio n s.30
T h ey acted u p o n th e ir ev a lu a tio n s o f th e s itu a tio n th e y faced a n d chose
from th e o p tio n s th ey p erceiv ed th e y h a d . In tu r n , o th e r lead e rs re a c ted
w ith th e ir o w n a ssessm en ts a n d d e c isio n s. C ollectively, th e ir d ec isio n s
y ielded th e o u tc o m e : w o rld w ar. N o te th a t th e d e c isio n s o f lea d e rs in re a c­
tio n to th e a ssa ssin atio n c o rre s p o n d to th e in d iv id u a l level o f analysis.
Table 1.2 su m m a riz e s th is c o m p a riso n .
So, w h ere d o w e lo o k fo r e x p la n a tio n s? W e can ch o o se fro m th e in d i­
v id u al, state, o r sy stem level o f analysis. A ltern ativ ely , w e m a y seek to
u n d e rs ta n d th e relative im p o rta n c e o f c a u sa l facto rs at each o f th ese levels

Table 1.2 Levels o f analysis and causation

Level o f Analysis Type o f Causal Factor
Individual Decisions in response to
Precipitating Event
State Interm ediate Cause
System Deep Cause
16 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION

o f analysis. W h e th e r w e ch o o se o n e o r a n o th e r level o f analysis d e p e n d s

largely o n w h a t w e seek to ex p lain : d e c isio n s, b e h a v io rs, o r o u tc o m e s.

What Is to Be Gained by Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively?

T h e goal o f fo reig n p o lic y analysis is to g a in g e n e ra lly a p p lic a b le k n o w l­

ed g e a b o u t h o w fo reig n p o lic y d ec isio n s are m ad e ; w h y lea d e rs m ak e th e
d e c isio n s th e y m ak e, w h y states e n g ag e in specific k in d s o f fo reig n p olicy
b e h a v io rs, as well as to assess th e o p p o rtu n itie s a n d c o n s tra in ts p re s e n te d
b y th e in te rn a tio n a l sy ste m .31 H o w is th is b e s t achieved?
H isto ric a l ev en ts h a p p e n o n ly o n c e , a n d each is u n iq u e . H ow ever, fo c u s­
in g o n w h a t m ak es e ac h ev en t u n iq u e gives u s little g e n e ra l k n o w led g e.
K n o w in g all availab le d e ta ils of, fo r in sta n c e , th e C u b a n M issile C risis, tells
u s v ery little a b o u t h o w le ad e rs g enerally re s p o n d to fo reig n p o lic y c rise s.
T h e la tte r c o n c e p t can b e d e fin e d b y th re e elem en ts: th e re is a h ig h th re a t
to s o m e th in g th a t is v a lu e d a n d im p o r ta n t, le a d e rs perceive th a t th e y have
o n ly a s h o r t a m o u n t o f tim e to m a k e a d ec isio n , a n d th e o c c u rre n c e o f th e
th re a te n in g situ a tio n ta k e s th e d e c isio n m a k e rs b y su rp ris e .32
M o st d ecisio n -m ak e rs a n d o b se rv e rs o f fo reig n p o lic y in tu itiv e ly re co g ­
n ize a crisis w h e n o n e o c c u rs. H o w ev er, o n e task o f fo reig n p o lic y analysis
is to m o v e b e y o n d in tu itiv e k n o w le d g e to ex p lic it k n o w led g e. M ak in g
k n o w led g e ex p licit h e lp s u s re e x a m in e o u r a s s u m p tio n s a n d q u e stio n th e
lessons we have d e riv e d fro m o u r ex p erie n ce s. T h is is w h a t fo reig n p olicy
analysis a im s to d o : to sy stem atically c o n tra s t a n d c o m p a re . A lth o u g h d e c i­
sio n m ak ers d eriv e k n o w le d g e fro m th e ir ex p erie n ce s, th e y o fte n in te rp re t
th e lesso n s n arro w ly , fail to re e x a m in e th e ir g u t re a c tio n s, a n d th e y c o m ­
p a re p re v io u s a n d c u rr e n t crises o n ly superficially. In d o in g th e latter, le a d ­
ers m ay m a k e a n alo g ie s o n th e b asis o f su p e rfic ial c o m m o n a litie s w h ile
ig n o rin g sig n ifican t d ifferen ces b e tw e e n s itu a tio n s .33
C o n s id e r fo r in sta n c e , th e o fte n -h e a rd say in g th a t lea d e rs are p ro n e to
fig h t th e last w ar. C h a m b e rla in m a y have a p p e a se d H itle r b e c a u se h e
h o p e d to avoid a re p e titio n o f th e se e m in g ly a u to m a tic se q u e n c e o f ev en ts
th a t h a d led to w a r in 1914. H o w ev er, b e c a u se C h a m b e rla in faced a v e ry
d iffe re n t k in d o f th re a t, h is a c tio n s w ere d is a stro u s— sh o w in g th a t th o se
w ith k n o w led g e o f h is to ry m a y still b e c o n d e m n e d to re p e a t it u n less th e y
g ain th e d e e p e r in sig h ts th a t can b e d eriv e d fro m a m o re c o m p re h e n siv e
c o m p a ra tiv e analysis o f su c h h isto ric a l ev en ts. C h a m b e rla in w as c o m p a r­
in g th e crisis o f 1938 w ith a (th e n fairly re c e n t) h is to ric a l ev en t. Since h e
w ish e d to av o id th e o u tc o m e o f th a t p re v io u s ev en t, h e ju d g e d th a t he
s h o u ld avoid th e k in d o f rig id a ttitu d e s th a t h a d s e n t E u ro p e in to w a r so
q u ick ly in 1914. H en c e , h e c o m p ro m ise d .
 W H Y STUDY FOREIGN POLICY COMPARATIVELY? 17

T h e re is q u ite a b it o f ev id en ce th a t lead e rs u se a n a lo g ies w h e n try in g to

m ake sense o f a foreig n p o licy situ a tio n th a t d e m a n d s a d e c is io n .34
H ow ever, fro m a scien tific p o in t o f view, su c h c o m p a ris o n s can b e q u ite
p ro b le m a tic : a sin g le o b se rv a tio n is u sed to p re d ic t a n o th e r, w h e n clo ser
(o r d e e p e r) c o m p a ris o n o r th e use o f a d d itio n a l o b se rv a tio n s m ig h t have
h e lp e d ev alu a te w h e th e r th e e x p e c ta tio n o f “sam e a c tio n , sa m e o u tc o m e ”
w o u ld have b e e n w a rra n te d .35 A d d itio n a l o b se rv a tio n s , in p a rtic u la r, can
o fte n h e lp to estab lish to w h a t deg ree a c u rr e n t p ro b le m really is sim ila r to
o n e th a t o c c u rre d in th e p a st. A d d itio n a l o b s e rv a tio n s h e lp d e c isio n m a k ­
e rs re e x a m in e th e lessons th e y have in tu itiv e ly g le a n e d fro m p a st e x p e ri­
ence. S uch a re e x a m in a tio n can m o v e d e c is io n m a k e rs b e y o n d sim p le
c o m p a riso n s to a m o re g en eralized u n d e rs ta n d in g o f c rise s a n d , ideally, a
b e tte r u n d e rs ta n d in g o f h o w to b e st m a n a g e a p a rtic u la r crisis.
T h is is w h a t fo reig n p o licy analysts a im to d o : to arriv e at g en e ra liz e d
k n o w led g e th a t can e n h a n c e o u r u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e sim ila ritie s a n d d if­
ferences b e tw e e n foreig n p o licy ev en ts. T h is c a n h e lp g u id e th e sta te ’s fo r­
eign p o licy d e c isio n m ak ers so th e y d o n o t s tu m b le in to a w a r w h e n th e y
w ish to p reserv e peace, o r it can e n a b le th e m to u n d e r s ta n d th e p e rs o n a li­
ties o f o th e r lead e rs to facilitate p ro d u c tiv e n e g o tia tio n s a n d in c rea se th e
lik e lih o o d o f desirable o u tc o m e s.36 Im a g in e fo r a m o m e n t th e d iffe re n c e it
m ig h t have m a d e if C h a m b e rla in h a d h a d access to a p sy c h o lo g ic al p rofile
o f H itler, r a th e r th a n rely in g o n h is o w n in tu itio n s a b o u t th e v G e rm a n
leader. C h a m b e rla in w as n o t th e first (o r th e la st) d e c is io n m a k e r to th in k
th a t, after m e e tin g w ith a n o th e r le a d e r in p e rs o n , h e c o u ld tr u s t th a t in d i­
vid u al. A lth o u g h p o litic ia n s are o fte n a stu te ju d g e s o f c h a ra c te r, th e ir in t u ­
itio n s h av e th e ir lim ita tio n s w h e n ju d g in g p e o p le fro m d iffe re n t c o u n trie s
a n d c u ltu re s, o fte n after m e e tin g th e m in h ig h ly fo rm a l s itu a tio n s fo r o n ly
a s h o r t p e rio d o f tim e.
In su m , s tu d y in g fo reig n p o licy c o m p a ra tiv e ly a n d sy ste m atica lly has
th e p o te n tia l to yield k n o w led g e th a t is far m o re h e lp fu l th a n m e re ly k n o w ­
in g h is to ric a l facts: a sy stem atic u n d e rs ta n d in g o f fo reig n p o licy e v en ts as
alike o r d iffe re n t can h elp d e cisio n m a k e rs to fa sh io n a p p ro p ria te
resp o n ses. M oreover, u n d e rs ta n d in g th e p e c u lia ritie s o f th e p e rs o n a litie s o f
specific lead e rs can facilitate m o re u sefu l a n d p ro d u c tiv e d ip lo m a c y .37

How to Compare

U n d e rs ta n d in g th e need to m ak e c o m p a ra tiv e a n d sy ste m a tic a ssessm en ts

lead s to th e n e x t q u estio n : h o w d o e s o n e c o m p a re d iffe re n t fo re ig n p o licy
d ecisio n s, b eh av io rs, o r o u tco m es? F oreign p o lic y an aly sis is n o t satisfied
to m e re ly d esc rib e d ecisio n s, b e h a v io rs a n d o u tc o m e s , b u t is d e fin e d b y th e
18 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION

q u e s t to u n d e rs ta n d w h y su c h d e c is io n s w ere m a d e , w h a t o p tio n s w ere

c o n sid e re d (a n d w h y n o t o th e r s ), w h o o r w h a t e x p lain s b e h a v io rs as w ell as
o u tc o m e s, a n d — if th e o u tc o m e s w e re u n fav o ra b le— w h a t c o u ld have
im p ro v e d th e lik e lih o o d o f a b e tte r re su lt. T h is re q u ire s u s to th in k in
te rm s o f causes a n d effects.
C au ses a re th e fa c to rs th a t c o n tr ib u te to v a rio u s fo reig n p o licy o p tio n s
b e in g c o n sid e re d in a d e c is io n p ro c e ss, th a t c o m p e l d e cisio n m ak ers to
c h o o se a specific d e c is io n as— in th e ir v iew — b e st su ite d to ach ie v in g th e
d e sire d o u tc o m e , th a t e x p la in sp ecific fo reig n p o licy b e h av io rs, a n d th a t
c o n tr ib u te to th e o c c u rre n c e o f a n o u tc o m e . In fo reig n p olicy analysis,
cau ses are called in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s . T h e effect (o r th e set o f o p tio n s
co n sid e re d , th e d e c is io n , th e b e h a v io r, o r th e o u tc o m e ) th a t we seek to
ex p la in is call th e d e p e n d e n t v a ria b le . T h e effect, o r d e p e n d e n t v ariab le,
w o u ld n o t have o c c u rr e d if th e in d e p e n d e n t v ariab les h a d n o t b een p re s­
e n t. In a d d itio n , th e d e p e n d e n t v a ria b le w o u ld have tak en a d iffe re n t sh ap e
if d iffe re n t in d e p e n d e n t v a ria b le s h a d b e e n p re s e n t o r if th e in d e p e n d e n t
v ariab les h a d b e e n o f d iffe re n t relativ e stre n g th . Table 1.3 illu strates th e
c o m p a ris o n o f th ese d iffe re n t te rm in o lo g ie s. In th e o p e n in g sectio n o f this
c h ap te r, S a d d a m H u sse in ’s in v a s io n o f K uw ait, C h a m b e rla in ’s a p p e a se ­
m e n t o i' H itler, a n d K h ru s h c h e v ’s d e c isio n to b u ild m issile sites in C u b a
w ere all d e p e n d e n t v a ria b le s (o r th e th in g s to be e x p la in e d ). Each o f th ese
w as a d e c isio n th a t w as fo llo w e d b y b e h a v io rs (o r a c tio n s) th a t carried o u t
th e d e c isio n . E ach o f th e se w as also p re c e d e d by a set o f p o ssib le o p tio n s
th a t w ere c o n s id e re d a n d o u t o f w h ic h a ch o ice w as m a d e . Each o f th ese
d e c isio n s w as w id e ly p e rc e iv e d as p u z z lin g — a n d in n e e d o f an e x p la n a ­
tio n — larg ely b e c a u se th e o u tc o m e s w e re n o t w h a t th e lea d e rs in te n d e d .
T h ese e x am p les reflect th e 'e m p h a s is o f fo reig n p olicy analysis o n e x p la in ­
in g o p tio n se lectio n , d e c is io n s, a n d b e h a v io rs— o r o n th e in d iv id u a l a n d
state level o f analysis.
A lth o u g h th e te r m in o lo g y o f in d e p e n d e n t a n d d e p e n d e n t v ariab les m a y
be u n fa m ilia r to y o u , th in k in g in te rm s o f causes a n d effects is n o t. W h a t
m ak es fo reig n p o lic y an a ly sis d iffe re n t fro m n o n sc ie n tific fo rm s o f cau se-
a n d -e ffe c t th in k in g ? F o re ig n p o lic y a n a ly sts try to s tru c tu re th e ir in v estig a­
tio n s so th a t th e y m a x im iz e th e g a in in g en e ra liz e d k n o w led g e a n d
m in im iz e bias. C o n s id e r o n c e ag a in C h a m b e rla in : h e c o m p a re d th e crisis
he faced in 1938, w h e n H itle r th r e a te n e d to in v a d e C zechoslovakia, o n ly to
th e crisis o n th e eve o f W o rld W ar I a n d c o n c lu d e d th a t sta n d in g firm
w o u ld lead to w ar, b e c a u se it d id in 1914. T h e lim ite d c o m p a riso n , c o m ­
b in e d w ith C h a m b e rla in ’s d e sire to a v o id w ar, b iased h is th in k in g in favor
o f a p p e a se m e n t. W h a t m ig h t h e have d o n e to achieve a m o re g e n e ra lly
a p p licab le u n d e rs ta n d in g o f c risis a n d h o w b est to d eal w ith the o n e th a t
c o n fro n te d him ?
 W H Y STUDY FOREIGN POLICY COMPARATIVELY? 19

Table 1.3 Foreign policy analysis and social scientific term inology
Factors that contribute to the Foreign policy decision, behavior, or
occurrence o f foreign policy ------ £>- outcom e (the thing to be explained)
decision, behavior, or outcom e
Causes-------------------- ------ c=- Effect
Independent variables_______ Ts>-_________ D ependent variable_______

O n e , he c o u ld have s tu d ie d m a n y crises a n d have in v estig ated h o w

o fte n , a n d u n d e r w h a t circ u m sta n c e s, th e y led to w a r o r w ere reso lv ed
p eacefully.38 Two, he c o u ld have m a d e a m u c h m o re d e ta ile d c o m p a ris o n
b etw e e n th e k n o w n facts o f th e c u r r e n t a n d p re v io u s crises.39 In d o in g so,
h e c o u ld have o u tlin e d th e sim ila ritie s b e tw e e n th e tw o situ a tio n s, b u t he
m ig h t have fo cu sed especially o n h o w th e tw o ev e n ts d iffered . A lth o u g h th e
u rg e n cy o f th e s itu a tio n w o u ld have m a d e it d ifficu lt to c a rry o u t extensive
research p ro jects a t th a t m o m e n t, fo reig n p o licy an aly sts are in a p o sitio n
to p ro d u c e su ch g en eralized k n o w le d g e a n d m a k e it av ailable to d ec isio n
m ak ers.
T h e tw o ty p es o f in v estig atio n s p re v io u sly o u tlin e d lo o sely fo llo w th e
tw o m a in research strateg ies fo reig n p o licy an aly sts use: c o m p a riso n s o f
large o r sm all n u m b e rs o f cases. T h e fo rm e r are called large-N compar­
is o n s a n d th e la tte r small-N comparisons (N is th e sta tistica l n o ta tio n for
n u m b e r o f cases). W h a t are th e relative a d v a n ta g e s o f la rg e -N v ersu s sm all-
N stu d ies? C o m p a ris o n s o f larg e n u m b e r s o f cases e n ab le re se a rc h e rs to
e v alu a te g e n e ra l c a u se -a n d -e ffe c t p a tte rn s — o r re la tio n sh ip s— th r o u g h th e
use o f statistical m e th o d o lo g ie s. It w o u ld be p o ssib le to in c lu d e in f o rm a ­
tio n o n all states in th e w o rld fo r a given p e rio d o f tim e, p ro v id e d o n e
co u ld get th e in fo rm a tio n fo r all o f th e m . O n th e b asis o f su c h c o m p re ­
hen siv e d a ta , it w o u ld b e p o ssib le to m ak e g en e ra l sta te m e n ts a b o u t, e.g.,
w h e th e r d e m o c ra c ie s are less likely to in itia te w a r th a n n o n d e m o c ra tic
c o u n trie s. H ow ever, it w o u ld n o t b e p o ssib le to m a k e fine d is tin c tio n s
betw een h o w d e m o c ra tic (o r n o t) v a rio u s c o u n trie s are. In its m o s t sim ­
p listic fo rm , w e w o u ld have tw o categ o ries: d e m o c ra tic a n d n o n d e m o c r a ­
tic. We c o u ld create a fin e r-g ra in e d scale, b u t w e w o u ld in e v ita b ly lose
so m e in fo rm a tio n a b o u t th e n a tu re o f d e m o c ra c y in each c o u n try .
W h e th e r th a t loss o f in fo rm a tio n je o p a rd iz e s o u r ab ility to m a k e valid
a ssessm en ts d e p e n d s o n h o w w ell th e c a te g o riz a tio n su its th e re search
q u e stio n : w a r-p ro n e n e s s m ay d e p e n d less o n fin e r-g ra in e d d is tin c tio n s
a b o u t how d e m o c ra tic a c o u n tr y is th a n o n th e fact th a t le a d e rs a re h e ld
a c c o u n tab le in d e m o cracies.
C o m p a riso n s o f sm a lle r n u m b e rs o f cases allo w fo r m o re d e ta ile d
analyses o f sim ilarities a n d d ifferen ces a m o n g b o th th e in d e p e n d e n t a n d
d e p e n d e n t v ariab les o f th e cases.40 W h e n s tu d y in g few er c o u n trie s, it is
20 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION

p o ssib le to m a k e fin e r d is tin c tio n s b e tw e e n th e n a tu r e o f d e m o c ra c y in

e ach c o u n try , fo r e x a m p le . R a th e r th a n u sin g cate g o ries o r n u m e ric a l in d i­
c a to rs to s u m m a riz e o u r a ssessm en ts o f sp ecific c o u n trie s, sm all-N c o m ­
p a ris o n s use d e s c rip tio n s th a t can b e n u a n c e d a n d ric h in d etail. Less
in f o rm a tio n is lost, b u t th e se le c tio n o f c o u n trie s to b e s tu d ie d m u s t b e
d o n e v e ry carefully to e n su re th a t th e cases reflect th e v a ria tio n th a t can b e
fo u n d in th e larg er set o f c o u n trie s to w h ic h w e e x p e c t o u r fin d in g s to
apply.41 A fter all, th e g o al is to a c q u ire g en era liz a b le k n o w led g e: w h e th e r
w e s tu d y a large o r a sm a ll n u m b e r o f cases, w e h o p e to le a rn s o m e th in g
th a t tra n sla te s b e y o n d th e cases s tu d ie d a n d n o t o n ly h e lp s u s u n d e rs ta n d
h is to ric a l foreign p o lic y d ec isio n s, b e h a v io rs, a n d o u tc o m e s b u t h elp s us
reco g n ize p a tte rn s in n e w s itu a tio n s as th e y e m erg e. In o th e r w o rd s, we
h o p e th a t o u r fin d in g s a p p ly also to fo re ig n p o lic y p ro b le m s w e have n o t
stu d ie d , in c lu d in g th o s e th a t have n o t y et o c c u rre d .
A n a lte rn a tiv e stra te g y is to e v a lu a te w h a t m ig h t h av e h a p p e n e d if so m e
asp e c t o f th e h isto ric a l c irc u m sta n c e s o f a h is to ric a l s itu a tio n h a d b e e n d if­
feren t. H isto ric a l ev en ts h a p p e n o n ly o n c e , a n d it is te m p tin g to c o n c lu d e
th a t th e y w ere b o u n d to h a p p e n b e c a u se th e y d id h a p p e n . To a v o id th in k ­
in g in su ch d e te rm in istic te rm s, it c an b e u sefu l to th in k a b o u t c o u n te r fa c -
tuals in o u r e ffo rts to ev a lu a te th e m u ltip le fac to rs th a t in flu e n c e d a
specific fo reig n p o lic y d e c isio n , b e h a v io r, o r o u tc o m e . C o u n te rfa c tu a ls are
essen tially d ecisio n s, b e h a v io rs, o r o u tc o m e s th a t d iffe r fro m th e a c tu a l
facts o f h is to ry .42 T h e y h e lp us e v a lu a te w h e th e r w e h av e a c c u ra te ly d e te r­
m in e d th e in d e p e n d e n t v a riab les in h is to ric a l cases. C o n sid e r, fo r in sta n c e ,
w h e th e r H itle r co u ld have b e e n s to p p e d if C h a m b e rla in h a d ta k e n a firm e r
s ta n d in 1938. W o u ld H itle r have b a c k e d d o w n ? O r w o u ld B rita in have
fo u n d itse lf en g ag ed in w a r s o o n e r th a n it did? T h e a n sw e r to th e se q u e s ­
tio n s h in g e s o n in te rp re ta tio n s o f H itle r’s p erso n ality . O n e m ig h t c o n c lu d e
th a t, faced w ith stro n g e r p re s su re fro m th e m o re p o w e rfu l c o u n trie s in
E u ro p e , h e m ig h t hav e d e c id e d to c o n ta in h is a m b itio n s . H ow ever, it is also
q u ite p o ssib le th a t d ip lo m a c y c o u ld n e v e r have c o n ta in e d h is d esire to c re ­
ate a stro n g G e rm a n e m p ire . A carefu l a sse ssm e n t o f H itle r’s c h a ra c te r
w o u ld b e n ecessary to ev a lu a te th e lik e lih o o d o f e ith e r re su lt. P o n d e rin g
h o w th e c o u rse o f h is to ry m ig h t have b e e n d iffe re n t h e lp s u s u n d e rs ta n d
w h a t d e c isio n s a n d b e h a v io rs w ere m o s t re sp o n sib le fo r th e h is to ric a l o u t­
co m e s.43 T h e u sefu ln ess o f a c o u n te rfa c tu a l, o r a lte rn a tiv e , h is to ry d e p e n d s
o n a carefu l re c o n s tru c tio n o f a c tu a l h is to ry a n d o n a m e tic u lo u s assess­
m e n t o f th e im p a c t a c h a n g e d v alu e o f o n e o f th e in d e p e n d e n t v ariab les
w o u ld v ery likely have h a d o n a lte rin g th e a c tu a l h is to ric a l o u tc o m e .
S tu d y in g foreign policy com p arativ ely, w h e th e r stu d y in g d ifferen t foreign
po licy d ecisio n s m a d e b y th e lead ers o f o n e state o r c o m p a rin g th e foreign
policies o f m u ltip le states, has th e a d v an ta g e o f allo w in g th e id e n tific a tio n o f
 W HY STUDY FOREIGN POLICY COMPARATIVELY? 21

p a tte rn s in d e c isio n s a n d d e cisio n m a k in g pro cesses. W ith o u t th e ability to

co m p a re cases, it w o u ld b e exceedingly d iffic u lt to assess w h a t lesso n s are
to be d e riv e d fro m a specific ev e n t— a n d , as C h a m b e rla in ’s a p p e a s e m e n t o f
H itle r illu stra te s, d e riv in g th e w ro n g lesson fro m a n e v e n t, o r m a k in g a
fau lty analogy, c an have d isa stro u s co n se q u en c es fo r p o lic y m ak in g !

Chapter Summary

• F o reig n p o lic y analysis is m o tiv a te d by th e d e sire to u n d e r s ta n d th e

in te ra c tio n s o f c o u n trie s. It'a ssu m e s th a t in d iv id u a l d e c is io n m ak ers,
alo n e o r in g ro u p s, m ake fo reig n p o licy d ec isio n s. I t also a ssu m e s
th a t fo reig n policies are usu ally d e te rm in e d b y th e c o m p le x in te rp la y
o f m u ltip le factors. (
• F o reig n p o licy analysis can seek to ex p la in d iffe re n t a sp e c ts o f fo re ig n
policy. It m ay seek to u n d e rs ta n d w h a t o p tio n s d e c is io n m a k e rs h a d
a n d w hy th e y m a d e th e d e cisio n s th e y d id ; it m ay see k to e x p la in th e
fo reig n p o licy b e h a v io r o f states; o r w h y c e rta in o u tc o m e s o c c u rre d .
• F oreign p o licy d ecisio n s, b eh av io rs, a n d o u tc o m e s a re s tu d ie d a t d if­
fe re n t levels o f analysis. In th is b o o k , we use th re e levels o f analysis:
th e in d iv id u a l, the state, a n d th e system level o f analy sis.
• S tu d y in g fo reig n p o licy co m p a ra tiv e ly p ro v id e s g re a te r in s ig h t in to
th e c o n d u c t a n d co n se q u e n c e s o f foreig n p o lic y th a n d o e s stu d y in g
single cases o r d ra w in g sim p le analogies.
• T h e o b jective o f foreign p o licy analysis is to a tta in g e n e ra liz a b le
k n o w led g e a b o u t fo reig n p o licy d e c isio n m a k in g , b e h a v io r, a n d o u t ­
com es. F o reig n p o licy analysts th in k in te r m s o f in d e p e n d e n t a n d
d e p e n d e n t variables. T h e y m ay c o m p a re larg e o r sm a ll n u m b e r s o f
cases. T h e y so m e tim e s use c o u n te rfa c tu a ls to e v a lu a te in d e p e n d e n t
(o r cau sal) variables.

Terms

R a tio n a lity
G o o d d ecisio n s
F oreign p o licy
Issue A reas
P u b lic d ip lo m a c y
C itizen d ip lo m a c y
F o reig n p o licy o p tio n s
22 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS; A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION

F oreign p o licy d e c isio n s

F o reig n p o lic y b e h a v io r
F oreign po licy o u tc o m e s
Levels o f analysis
In d iv id u a l level o f an aly sis
F ra m in g
State level o f an aly sis
System level o f an aly sis
N a tio n a l in te re st
T w o-level g am e
C risis
In d e p e n d e n t v a ria b le
D e p e n d e n t v a ria b le
L a rg e -N c o m p a ris o n
S m a ll-N c o m p a ris o n
C o u n te rfa c tu a ls

Study Questions

1. W h a t is fo re ig n p o lic y an aly sis, a n d w h a t is th e o b jectiv e o f th o se

w h o stu d y it?
2. W h a t m a k e s it so d iffic u lt to d e te r m in e w h e th e r a foreign p o lic y
d e c is io n w as a g o o d d e c isio n ?
3. W h a t is th e d iffe re n c e b e tw e e n fo re ig n p o lic y d e cisio n s, b eh av io rs,
a n d o u tc o m e s? W h y w o u ld y o u w ish to d istin g u ish b etw een th em ?
4. W h a t are th e th re e levels o f analysis? H o w d o th e y relate to fo reig n
p o lic y d e c is io n s, b e h a v io rs, a n d o u tc o m es? W h a t is th e ir use in th e
s tu d y o f fo re ig n policy?
5. W h y is it im p o r t a n t to s tu d y fo re ig n p o licy co m paratively? H o w
d o es d o in g so im p ro v e ju d g m e n t?
6. W h a t a re in d e p e n d e n t a n d d e p e n d e n t variables? H o w d o es th in k in g
in te r m s o f v a ria b le s h e lp fo re ig n p o licy an aly sts in th e ir q u e st to
a tta in g e n e ra l k n o w led g e?

Suggestions for Further Reading

A classic w o rk in th e s tu d y o f fo re ig n p o lic y is Snyder, B ra ck , a n d S ap in ,

Foreign Policy D ecision M a kin g : A n A p p ro a ch to the S tu d y o f In tern a tio n a l
Politics. It w as re c e n tly re issu e d w ith tw o n e w essays as Foreign Policy
D ecisio n -M a kin g (R evisited ).
 W H Y STUDY FOREIGN POLICY COMPARATIVELY? 23

A b o o k th a t d iscu sses h o w d e c isio n m a k e rs o fte n use h isto ric a l a n a lo ­

gies a n d h o w th ey m ig h t im p ro v e th e ir u se o f h is to ry is N e u s ta d t a n d May,
T h in k in g in Tim e: T h e Uses o f H isto ry fo r D ecision M akers.
S everal b o o k s have d isc u sse d th e c o n n e c tio n b e tw e e n th e a c a d e m ic
stu d y o f fo reig n p o lic y a n d d ip lo m a tic p ra c tic e : G eo rg e, B rid g in g th e Gap:
T h eo ry a n d Practice in Foreign Policy; N in c ic a n d L ep g o ld , ed s., B eing
Useful: Policy Relevance a n d In te rn a tio n a l R ela tio n s T heory.
T h e re are a n u m b e r o f excellen t essays o n th e h is to ry o f fo reig n p olicy
analysis as a field o f study. T h e m o s t re c e n t is H u d s o n , “ F o reig n Policy
A nalysis: A ctor-S pecific T h e o ry a n d th e G ro u n d o f In te rn a tio n a l
R elatio n s” ; G ern er, “T h e E v o lu tio n o f th e S tu d y o f F o reig n P olicy”;
H u d so n a n d V ore, “F o reig n P olicy A nalysis Yesterday, Today, a n d
T o m o rro w .”
M u ch h a s b e e n w ritte n a b o u t th e c o m p a ra tiv e m e th o d . E specially h e lp ­
ful o n h o w to create w e ll-c ra fte d case stu d y re se a rc h d e sig n s are: G eo rg e,
“C ase S tu d ies a n d T h e o ry D e v e lo p m e n t: T h e M e th o d o f S tru c tu re d ,
F o cu sed C o m p a ris o n ”; K ing, K eo h an e, a n d V erba, D esigning Social In q u iry:
Scientific Inference in Q u a lita tive Research.

Notes

1. Q uoted in Bob W oodward, The Commanders, 212.

2. Czechoslovakia ceased to exist when on January 1, 1993, it split into the
Czech Republic and Slovakia, two sovereign states, as a result o f what was
widely touted as a “velvet divorce” because the dissolution took place w ith­
out a war.
3. In 2003, the U.S. w ent to war w ith Iraq, in p art to topple Saddam Hussein.
There was no question the U.S. had the m ilitary capacity to be successful in
this effort, although the reconstruction effort has, as o f this writing, proven
n lore difficult than anticipated.
4. Philip E. Tetlock, “G ood Judgm ent in International Politics: Three
Psychological Perspectives”; Lloyd S. Etheredge, “W isdom and Good
judgm ent in Politics.”
5. James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists, 17. This definition o f
rationality is generally accepted by rational choice theorists. Many foreign
policy analysts, including many who study foreign policy from a psycholog­
ical or cognitive perspective, define rational decision m aking in a m ore
global manner. Such definitions make m ore comprehensive dem ands on
both the leader’s knowledge and the process by w hich various options are
weighed and evaluated. For a classic enum eration o f a rational decision
making model, see G raham T. Allison, “C onceptual Models and the Cuban
Missile Crisis”; G raham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence o f Decision:
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. ; for a well-known critique, see
H erbert A. Simon, “H um an N ature in Politics: The Dialogue o f Psychology
24 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION

w ith Political Science.” Vesna Danilovic argues th at the psychological o r cog­

nitive perspective misrepresents rational choice theory (“The Rational-
Cognitive Debate and Poliheuristic Theory,” in Integrating Cognitive and
Ratiorwl Theories o f Foreign Policy Decision Making, ed. Alex M intz). This
book argues that the difference betw een rational and cognitive approaches
lies in the aspects o f the decision m aking process which are investigated and
that cross-theoretical com m unication is facilitated by adopting the rational
choice theory definition o f rationality. For a com parable approach, see Alex
Mintz, “Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories o f Foreign Policy
Decision Making: A Poliheuristic Perspective,” in Integrating Cognitive and
Rational Theories o f Foreign Policy Decision Making, ed. Alex M intz. The con­
cept o f rationality is investigated further in C hapter 3.
6 M orrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists, 20-22.
7. Tetlock, “Good Judgm ent in International Politics”; Stanley A. Renshon,
“Psychological Sources o f G ood Judgm ent in Political Leaders: A
Fram ework for Analysis,” in Good Judgment in Foreign Policy: Theory and
Application, ed. Stanley A. Renshon an d D eborah Welch Larson; Stanley A.
Renshon and D eborah Welch Larson, Good Judgment in Foreign Policy:
Theory and Application.
8. Renshon, “Psychological Sources o f Good Judgm ent in Political Leaders.”
9. Welch, “C ulture and Emotion,” 208, makes this point.
10. Overviews o f the developm ent o f the field o f foreign policy analysis are p ro ­
vided by Gerner, “The Evolution o f the Study o f Foreign Policy”; H udson
w ith Vore, “Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tom orrow ” and
H udson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the G round o f
International Relations.” For a recent critical assessment o f the field, see also
H oughton, “Reinvigorating the Study o f Foreign Policy Decision-making:
Toward a Constructivist Approach.”
11. See, e.g., Karin L. Stanford, Beyond the Boundaries: Reverend Jesse Jackson in
In ternational Affairs.
12. Indeed, H oughton charges that foreign policy analysis has paid too little
attention to the im pact o f either the dom estic or international environm ent
on decision m aking (“Reinvigorating the Study o f Foreign Policy Decision-
Making,” 40,34).
13. Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and B urton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision­
making: A n Approach to the Study o f International Politics.
14. Allison, “C onceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.”
15. George, Bridging the Gap; Nincic and Lepgold, Being Useful; R enshon and
Larson, Good Judgment in Foreign Policy.
16. Renshon, “Psychological Sources o f G ood judgm ent,” 48; Welch, “C ulture
and Emotion,” 208.
17. H udson, “Foreign Policy Analysis.”
18. See Knill and Lenschow, “Seek and Ye Shall Find”; Nye, Understanding
International Conflicts.
19. H oughton, “Reinvigorating the Study o f Foreign Policy Decision-Making.”
 WHY STUDY FOREIGN POLICY COMPARATIVELY? 25

20. Singer, “The Level o f Analysis Problem”; Rosenau, The Scientific Study o f
Foreign Policy; Waltz, Man, the State, and War, see also Nye, Understanding
International Conflicts-, Rourke, International Politics-, Kegley an d W ittkopf,
World Politics; Hughes, Continuity and Change.
21. Representative o f the emphasis on leadership and personality is the w ork o f
M.G. H erm ann (see, for instance, her “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior”
or “W ho Leads Matters”). Representative o f an em phasis o n perception and
problem representation are works by Jervis, Perception and Misperception,
and Sylvan and Voss, Problem Representation.
22. Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decisionmaking, K ahnem an and Tversky; Levy,
“An Introduction to Prospect Theory”; “Loss Aversion, Fram ing and
Bargaining.”
23. There is a rich literature on bureaucratic politics. Some w ell-known exam ­
ples are Allison, “Conceptual Models and the C uban Missile Crisis”; Allison
and Zelikow, Essence o f Decision; Bendor and H am m o n d , “Rethinking
Allison’s Models”; George, Presidential Decisionmaking; ‘t H a rt et al., Beyond
Groupthink.
24. O ne example o f work at this level o f analysis is H udson, Culture and Foreign
Policy.
25. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics; see also Keohane, ed., Neorealism and
its Critics.
26. P utnam , “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: T he Logic o f Two-Level
Games”; Evans, et al., Double-Edged Diplomacy.
27. Waltz, Man, the State, and War; Waltz, Theory o f International Politics; Singer,
“The Level o f Analysis Problem.”
28. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, foreign Policy Decision-Making.
29. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts
30. See, for instance, Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making;
Rosenau, “Pre-Theories and Theories o f Foreign Policy.”
31. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making; George, “Case
Studies and Theory Development”; George, Bridging the Gap.
32. H erm ann, Crises in Foreign Policy, 29-30. T here are oth er definitions o f the
concept. However, these mostly boil dow n to th e elem ents enum erated by
H erm ann. See, e.g., Lebow, Between Peace and War, 7-9.
33. N eustadt and May, Thinking in Time; Spellman and Holyoak, “If Saddam is
H itler then W ho is George Bush?”; Keane, “W hat Makes and Analogy
Difficult?”
34. Neustad and May, Thinking in Time; Hem m er, Which Lessons M atter7.; Reiter,
Crucible o f Beliefs; Peterson, “The Use o f Analogies in Developing O uter
Space Law.”
35. King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 212-13; see also Khong,
Analogies a t War, Hemmer, Which Lessons M atter7
36. George, Bridging the Gap; N indc and Lepgold, Being Useful.
37. N eustadt and May recognized that such a comparative understanding of his­
tory is useful not just for diplomats. They taught their strategy for comparing
26 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION

historical events to business students, believing that such skills can serve
individuals in different professions.
38. Such an investigation was undertak en by Lebow in his Between Peace and
War.
39. Such investigations were und ertak en by, e.g., Hemmer, Which Lessons
M atter?; H oughton, “The Role o f Analogical Reasoning”; Khoug, Analogies
at War, N eustad an d May, Thinking in Tinte.
40. Lijphart,” The C om parable-C ases Strategy in Comparative Research.”
41. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development”; George and McKeown,
“Case Studies an d Theories o f Organizational Decision Making”; King,
Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, H it-2 1 .
42. Tetlock and Belkin, Counter/uclual Thought Experiments', Lebow, “W hat’s So
Different A bout a C ounterfactual?”
43. Fearon, “C ounterfactuals and H ypothesis Testing”